Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8)

2) HN unit partially plans and executes with Marine

units in support

3) HN unit executes with Marine Corps enabling only

POLITICAL DECISION REQUIRED FOR TRANSITION TO THE NEXT PHASE

TIER 3

Host nation (HN) that fully

This tier can be defined as coalition action in pursuit of

supports itself (logistically and

a common goal (often strategic) and is episodic in

operationally). This is referred

nature. Marine assistance may be required, but, other

to as Coalition Warfare

than some liaison officers (LNOs), the force is self

sustaining and equipped. Also characterized by the fact

that no formal alliance may exist, however, political

and military agreements have been made in order to

accomplish a specific mission.

This relationship may take 2 forms:

1) HN unit plans, trains and executes with Marine

Corps forces enabling only

2) HN plans, trains and executes independently with

US/Coalition observation and LNOs

End State: A HN force that is capable of conducting

basic independent or combined operations IAW HN

doctrine and able to perpetuate/sustain that capability to

the next generation of HN security forces.

MILITARY DECISION REQUIRED FOR TRANSITION TO THE NEXT PHASE

TIER 4

Fully Integrated w/ existing

This is the most developed form of ‘partnership’. It

Treaties and standing Alliances

includes fully integrated combined operations. This

to govern conduct and

level typically involves existing treaties and alliances

relationships

that govern the conduct and specific roles and

responsibilities of all parties. In this tier, it is possible

to have another nation’s military under Marine forces

control and vice versa.

Table 2

While partnering in general may map to these four tiers, it is

vital to understand that your unit may be inserted into any tier or may

be called upon to conduct multiple tiers simultaneously. This

Handbook limits its focus to operations conducted by the Marine Corps

at the battalion level or below, normally focused on the Tier 1 and Tier

2 Partnerships in Table 2, i.e. in conjunction with a HN who is not part

of a standing alliance.

One common method of partnering has been putting parallel and

like units together. Optimally, partnering should be achieved by

vertically establishing partnering relationships between the partnering

units, from the lowest tactical level to the highest levels of the national

governments. Should there be gaps in partnering the HN civilian

leadership structure with corresponding US government agencies, the

effort of all below will be diluted. Partnering must be holistic and

include the other entities involved in the operation. All organizations

involved in re-stabilizing, reconstructing, or rebuilding the HN must

work in harmony towards a common endstate and should be partnered

at every level possible. It should include partnerships between the HN

government and US government officials, along with non-

governmental organizations (NGOs). Designing an effective

partnering scheme of maneuver will be discussed in detail later in

Chapter 4.

d. Advisers. Embedded advisers are the crucial element to effective

partnering, but in many circumstances it will not suffice to allow a HN

security force to become independent. Where a more mature partnership

exists (Tier 2, 3) embedded advisers provide access to US or coalition

enablers. In immature partnerships a combination of advisers, trainers

and partnered units is needed. As missions, HN capacity, organic

capabilities, and capacity differ, it is critical that units conduct a

thorough mission analysis prior to deployment. This will provide the

necessary insight into the approach and capabilities that are required for

partnering.

e. Trainers. In some cases HN partner units will come to you having

gone through training programs conducted by U.S./Coalition forces.

There may also be Mobile Training Teams (MTT’s) that will come out to

provide more focused training in such areas as; CIED, intelligence

collection, command and control, and planning. Understand the training

backg5round of the unit you are partnering with and continue to provide

build on previous training. Ensure that you have training packages ready

to support your HN unit. Let the HN unit see your unit training as well,

so they understand that training like camouflage is continuous even in a

high tempo operational environment. You may also have to develop

your own MTT to support units you are partnered with. Finally, you will

also need to develop a “train the trainers” program.

Partnering Relationships

a. Supported vs. Supporting. Partnering relationships and roles can be

thought of in terms of a supported force and a supporting force. In some

instances, Marines may initially be the supported force, in that they will

lead the planning and conduct of operations. The ultimate goal of this

relationship must change to a supporting relationship, where the HN

forces will plan and conduct operations with the support of Marines.

This support can be in the form of ground troops, tactical enablers,

and/or logistical support. Responsibilities (ours and theirs) will vary

based on the mission. As soon as the HN’s forces are capable of

conducting independent operations without support, the partnership

effort has achieved its goal. Any future relationships between Marines

and the HN will then be determined through political dialogue, which

could present future training activities and liaison between militaries.

b. Patience, Trust and Respect. Successful partnering starts with

relationships that are clearly built upon three very important traits:

patience, trust and respect.

In order to truly partner effectively, both partners have to

establish professional relationships built upon a common trust, respect,

and goals. Strong personal relationships will develop from strong

professional relationships and professional relationships are enriched

through personal relationships. For example, if a partner can implicitly

trust your professional opinion/guidance, they will establish a personal

relationship based on mutual trust and shared backg5rounds. .Whatever

the decisions, actions, and/or operation(s) undertaken, they must serve

the interests of both parties.

With some HN forces the first action to develop is a personal

relationship based on personality and social trust. Personal

relationships start with the commander, but are also the responsibility

of every member of the HN force. As these personal relationships

develop, trust and respect is the natural by-product. This trust and

respect will increase efficiencies and productivity on both parties as

their actions become more and more combined. Also understand that

as friendships develop, there is a cultural expectation to exchange

small gifts to demonstrate this friendship. Be prepared to establish

guidelines for accepting gifts and Marines should be prepared to

reciprocate with small tokens of appreciation.

Patience is required to establish and build a trusted relationship.

Western cultures and their military forces are characterized with an

expectation of immediate response. Our training emphasizes an ability

to quickly process and respond to corrective instructions. We are time

sensitive and time oriented. We must recognize and understand that

many partners are not as time oriented, so we need to be prepared to

adjust and operate within this constraint remembering the long term

goals of the partnership.

The ability of US forces to appreciate and understand the HN’s

religion and cultural requirements such as ‘saving face’ will facilitate

building trust and respect -the importance of which cannot be

overstated. Never make a promise to your partner you can’t keep.

c. Benefits of Partnerships. There are inherent challenges to overcome

in order to partner effectively. These challenges range from linguistic

challenges, cultural differences, incompatible and different equipment,

threats to operational security and force protection, as well as, undeclared

national interests. However, while not always apparent, the benefits will

often outweigh the challenges. US and HN forces operating in this

environment will gain a great deal of legitimacy and appreciation in the

eyes of the local population as they operate alongside their HN’s security

forces and allay any perception that may exist about US intentions. In a

practical sense, HN forces provide a great deal of cultural and enemy

intelligence, linguistic skill, and social acceptability. In a strategic sense,

they reinforce government sovereignty, legitimacy, and authority.

Effective partnering enable HN forces to reestablish contact and

credibility with the local inhabitants.

d. Endstate. Commanders must continuously assess and critically

examine how their partnering efforts are working towards their common

goals. There is no single right solution. The mission must be carefully

analyzed and reanalyzed, roles clearly defined and delineated, and an

assessment made of both partners’ strengths and weaknesses in order to

determine how the partnership will be formed and developed. Building

the capacity within the host nation force for independent warfighting and

institutional functions IAW HN doctrine, policies and procedures is the

goal. Further developing a HN force that (1) has a legitimate standing

with the local populace and (2) operates with the support of the local

populace will ensure success. It is not our objective to develop a force

that can fight in “every clime and place” rather to operate in the

environment they are facing. The focus needs to be on ensuring the unit

is proficient with those core skills that are required by their nation and

are effective in the environment they are facing.

Chapter 2

Partnering Guidelines

“You better get in there and eat…You eat that sheep in the bowl.

Or you’ll be here next year, the year after that, and the year next.

Your kids will be here.”

-GySgt Dober, Platoon Commander, 2D LAR

Be culturally aware but not overly-sensitive.

a. Help the HN understand our perspective, our culture, and our values.

Our values will most likely not be theirs so do not impose your values

upon their culture; however, do not jeopardize your own morals and

beliefs by being overly sensitive to theirs. The key is to ensure that the

HN has a basic understanding of our values, especially the delicate

balance of honesty vs. saving face.

b. HN forces understand that there may be times when the cultural strain

is too great to overcome “living amongst” their personnel, but we must

promote the sharing of common areas (dining area, COCs (within

classification parameters), etc.) and activities (meals, PT,

weapons/vehicle maintenance) which will ultimately help bridge cultural

differences without encroaching on each other.

c. It is extremely important that HN forces have the same or similar

amenities (per their cultural beliefs) as your Marines - be prepared to go

without until the HN force receives it. Bottom line: if the HN forces

don’t have it, work with them to get it. Equity prevents envy and the

perception of double standards.

d. Understand that the Marine Corps has a ‘Warrior Culture’ unto itself

and this culture is widely respected. Do not be quick to sacrifice our

Warrior Culture for ‘cultural sensitivity’ because it can be perceived as

weakness. Setting the example is often the fastest and most effective

way to convey new ideas and concepts.

e. Have a basic understanding of the HN religion since it will likely

affect how HN officers make decisions.

f. Understand the additional social requirements placed on HN

leadership, especially those ‘non-traditional’ paternal relationships that

may exist beyond what exists in the Marine Corps. Also understand any

gender specific relationships - male/female.

g. Make every attempt to speak the language. Every Marine may not be

fluent, but make every attempt to introduce language training early and

often. Individual Marine language skills will improve as they operate

alongside HN forces; the by-product of this effort helps to build trust

quickly in counter-insurgencies.

Be sure that you have the ‘right’ interpreter. Here are a couple of

simple rules of thumb for interpreters:

a. When possible ensure that the interpreter is from the same tribe/clan as

the partnered unit. This may be impossible given ethnic diversity in the

security force, but careful selection and training of and relationships with

the interpreter are required.

b. If the HN unit does not trust or respect your interpreter, don’t try to

force him on them. If the HN unit offers you an interpreter he will still

need to be vetted.

c. In some cultures the age of the interpreter matters, especially when

dealing with senior leadership. An older interpreter imparts not only

language translation skills, but tacitly imparts credibility because many

cultures place a high value on age and equate it to wisdom.

d. Take gender into consideration. In some cultures it is acceptable to

have a female interpreter speak to males, in others, it is strictly taboo. It

may be completely possible and advisable to have female interpreters

working in office spaces so long as they do not accompany you into the

field.

e. In sum, cultures will look at age and gender differently. Be conscious

of the potential implications - i.e. not having the ‘right’ interpreter may

severely degrade your credibility. Build a diverse core of interpreters as

the situation permits. Odds are that you will need every one of them in

order to be successful - but do not sacrifice quality for quantity.

f. An adviser or commander/leader who is working through an interpreter

must establish a personal and professional relationship with the

interpreter. An explanation of personality, beliefs, understanding and

familiarity with family will ensure that the interpreter understands the

adviser/commander and enhance his ability to communicate effectively

with the partnered commander/leader.

g. Ensure that the interpreter-translator is prepared to support the

discussion about to take place and understands what the lead speaker's

talking points are to mitigate the risk of miscommunication.

Do more than operate with HN - Living with HN forces is the only

way

a. Build trust through shared experiences, hardships, and successes

b. Equity not Equality - Equity implies that there is a seat at the table.

Although some partners may have access to more influence, power and

resources, it is necessary that both partners have equal input in the

discussions when in comes to working a solution. HN solutions should

predominate.

c. Combine planning, training, operations, and duties. Establish a Battle

Rhythm and stick to it. Formations, unit PT, inspections, weapons

maintenance, etc. serve practical purposes and are vital aspects of a

security force culture. If it does not exist within the HN forces, work

with the leadership to establish.

d. Remember that force protection is vital to the success of the

partnership. Be prepared to alter force protection to protect the force, but

do not appear to be protecting yourself from your partner or

inadvertently sending the message that you are frightened, especially in

cultures that have a singular word for “coward” (i.e. Pashtunwali).

e. Give them credit for all success you achieve together, especially with

their chain of command and within the local community

f. Be genuine and sincere in everything you do

Encourage HN forces to build relationships with the local leaders

a. Positive interaction with the people builds trust - build this trust above

all else!

b. Encourage local recruiting for security forces, especially police. In the

United States, local police have to live in the communities that they work

in; yet, in many places, national police are moved throughout the country

where they have no ties to the community and are often viewed as

outsiders. This may be an expedient method to restore law and order, but

it should only be used in the most extreme circumstances. Locally

recruited forces will have the backing of that community - “their

community” - and their training by Marines and HN military units serves

to reinforce the ties among Marines, the HN forces, and the communities

that they operate in. Until the police force is made up of ‘local sons’

there will be no real security or trust in an area.

c. Encourage the HN force to develop an information operations (IO)

plan and effective methods to convey key messages to the people. HN

forces should be the primary executers of information operations and

they should be on hand to explain it to the people. Perception is

important to the success of the partnership and its goals.

d. Encourage HN forces to help local leaders govern well.

e. Help shape and guide the local leadership to make good decisions.

This includes assisting HN forces to be more locally involved and

persistent in engaging from the tactical to the operational levels.

f. Empathize with the people’s problems and frustrations - help them

translate problems and frustrations into workable and effective solutions

that engender greater contentment.

g. Work through HN systems to reach consensus and provide a forum for

the people to address their issues, such as local leadership meetings

and/or city council/town hall meetings.

Do not solve HN logistics problems by performing these functions for

them - work within HN systems and processes

a. Be comfortable with HN levels of acceptability for effectiveness and

efficiency so long as they accomplish their missions and perform to

standard. The key is to help the HN force implement their solutions, not

simply execute yours. Remember, “good enough is good enough, so

long as they do it.” Expectation management is the key. You are not

trying to make Marines, just an effective and sustainable organization

that is as efficient as possible within their established system.

b. Make the HN process more efficient. Temper solutions by

understanding the capacity of the HN logistical system. The less mature

the operating environments, the more involved Marines need to be. HN

units that are not paid, fed, allowed to call home, granted leave, etc. will

quit. In these cases do not wait for the ‘acceptable’ HN system to work -

have a solution readily available to prevent mutiny when/if the HN

process fails.

c. Understand the difference between ‘empathy’ and ‘sympathy’ - do not

become sympathetic.

Empathy - “Intellectual identification with or vicarious

experiencing of the feelings, thoughts, or attitudes of another person”

(Random House Dictionary, 433).

Sympathy - “harmony of or agreement in feeling, as between

persons or on the part of one person with respect to another” (Random

House Dictionary, 1332).

Be prepared to perform both your and the HN unit’s administrative

and logistic functions until the HN system becomes reliable enough

to sustain their unit.

a. Once that occurs, the ‘de-coupling’ may commence. The key is to be

able to wean the HN force off Marine support without letting it die of

neglect. The old maxim, “don’t mess with a Marine’s pay, leave, or

family” holds true for HN forces as well.

b. Self-sufficiency may involve the HN force subsisting off the local

economy and markets, which is a good thing. It builds rapport with the

locals, provides security to the population, and develops close ties to the

community

c. Realize that your solutions, though tried and true for our units, may not

work nor may they be the best solutions for the HN’s problems

Embrace the chaos of the environment

a. Do not allow frustration with the HN to show - do it in private away

from the partnering force members - never display direct frustration in

front of your partnered force.

b. Understanding the HN forces’ frustrations (specifically focused on

inefficiencies of their existing systems/processes that make simple tasks

difficult) is critical; it is beneficial to the relationship for them to know

you are aware of and understand their frustration. However, it also

important that you avoid getting caught in an “us versus them”

atmosphere, especially when it comes to dealing with the HN’s higher

headquarters.

c. Temper expectations -yours and your partners. Slow progress is still

progress and your contribution is an important piece of the larger plan.

Partnering relationship is a two way street. Do not assume that the

Marines are the only ones that will advise and train.

a. In order for this relationship to work effectively, a ‘reciprocal’

relationship must be in place. There should be a mutual benefit to both

parties. Not only will this be extremely useful in certain areas where the

HN force possesses expertise in local conditions - it will also help them

‘save face’/gain respect within the community.

b. In some circumstances, HN forces and leadership should and will

advise and train Marines. Utilize the HN forces’ vast knowledge of

culture, terrain, and social dynamics. They are a force multiplier when

employed correctly because, while HN forces may have different

doctrine than Marines, it may better reflect the tactical and cultural

situation better than ours.

c. Provide positive feedback to the HN unit when their advice has

enhanced the capabilities of your unit.

Provide sufficient partnering and monitoring at all levels of HN

forces

a. Through careful and constant monitoring, you will be able to apply

subtle changes to TTPs and principles in order to achieve the ultimate

goal of “de-coupling” from the HN force. Your ability to easily shift and

adapt to changes in the command relationship with the HN force should

be transparent, so long as this transition occurs when the HN force

increases their capability to certain, established level. Depending on the

partnership tier, an advisor or LNO Team may be able to provide timely

and accurate information that allows for the slow and smooth de-couple

process and enable the HN force to assume greater responsibility for

their battlespace, tactical operations, and administrative control of the

area. The decision to de-couple is often not the completion of a checklist

or pre-determined criteria, rather an informed and logical assessment of

the situation and the capability of the HN force.

b. Ensure commensurate rank and experience at all levels of the

partnership. The rank and experience of the partner is significant to

establishing good relationships.

c. Choose to do the ‘harder right’ of involving HN staffs in the planning

process from the beginning. Make them do the work and although it

lengthens the process, do not do it for them, do it “with” them. This

effort is so much more than “advising” them.

Do not hesitate to deviate from doctrine when needed.

a. The intent here is to “be doctrinally sound, not doctrinally bound”. “A

force engaged in small wars operations, irrespective of its size, is usually

independent or semi-independent and, in such a campaign, assumes

strategically, tactical, and territorial functions” (SWM 2-10, pg 11). “In

short, the force must be prepared to exercise those functions of

command, supply, and territorial control which are required of the

supreme command or its major subdivisions in regular warfare…For

these reason, it is obvious that a force undertaking a small wars

campaign must be adequately staffed for independent operations even if

the tables of organization do not specify a full staff complement” (SWM

2-11, pg 12).

b. Section 2, “The Staff in Small Wars,” from the Small Wars Manual

provides suggestions for re-organizing existing staff functions in order to

meet the demands of conducting small wars. Of particular interest is

how to integrate existing staff functions with civilian leadership, HN

forces, and State Department personnel. In short, the existing staff

structure may be inadequate to conduct small wars, so it is essential that

necessary changes be made to account for the increased responsibilities

found when operating on foreign soil with a HN force and the added

requirement to assist in local governance. An assessment of required

staff functions to fully partner with a HN force is required and may

involve the addition of additional staff and/or the changing of existing

billet descriptions.

Build a unified team with Marine and HN staffs - develop and refine

daily

a. Respect how they do things - help them lead well.

b. Understand the capability of the host unit - and task within their

capacity.

c. Guide them to make good decisions, but do not make decisions for

them.

d. Support the HN commander’s decisions in accordance with the

established rules of engagement (ROE) and the law of war (LOW). It is

vital that the HN understand our ROE and the LOW and respect them.

e. Recognize the balance between tactical and operational goals/needs

and HN morale.

f. Be aware of unit politics and the influence of tribal and ethnic ties.

g. Be prepared to (BPT) provide access to coalition and USMC fires,

non-kinetic effects, and other support (i.e. artillery, mortars, CAS, IO,

CasEvac, etc.)

Build your best team for the mission

a. The importance of attitude and temperament cannot be overstated.

Embedded advisers must be selected.

b. Perform a comprehensive mission analysis and determine the skill

sets, personality traits, and leadership abilities required for the mission.

Marines gravitate toward what they know and are comfortable with.

This is not a popularity contest, not every Marine will possess these

traits. Regardless whether they are the best Marine in the squadron,

battalion, or group, they may not be suited for advising or mentoring of

foreign, HN forces.

c. You must make staffing decisions (to the extent that you can control

them) based on your knowledge of your Marines personalities and

temperaments. Extroverted Marines suited for this mission will have

more personal energy at the end of a day full of discussions and meetings

than Marines who are introverted by nature. Unit/team leaders must

manage unit/team member energy daily for ‘burn-out.’ Burnout is a very

real issue when dealing with HN forces. It affects seasoned Marines who

are used to doing things “their way,” but also exists amongst our younger

and less mature Marines who have not yet developed strong leadership

coping skills. As a Marine’s patience erodes, so potentially does the

relationship with their counterpart. Guard against and always be aware

this.

d. Experience.

The Marine must always be able to bring professional experience

to the table. Do not short-change this. The long and lengthy

education/training process for Marines does not equate to parity with a

HN counterpart who may have been fighting his entire life.

Advisors and mentors are part of this team. Whether embedded

or external augments, they will impact your level of success with a HN

force. All activities must support each other and must be coordinated.

When establishing any new policy that restricts or appears to restrict

HN forces, the partnering unit must consult the advisors/mentors to

discuss the potential impacts, before broaching the subject with the HN

force commander.

Ensure that every Marine understands the importance of the mission

and the implications of failure.

a. Pre-conceived notions based on previous deployments, rumors, and

cultural misgivings will damage relations

b. If Marines understand the commander’s intent two levels up, they will

understand where their unit fits into the larger picture and help them

understand the ‘why.’

BPT graciously ‘take a back seat’ to HN forces as their capabilities

increase

a. We should not be seen as leading, rather a transparent shepherd. Do

not allow frustration with indecisiveness or inaction to supplant patience

and understanding. Offer advice and options to the HN commander to

consider. It is critical not to compromise the HNs commander’s

leadership position among the HN forces and/or other officials. Not

doing so will relegate that commander’s position to a puppet in the eyes

of the populace. This is a tool which can and will be utilized by the

insurgent’s propaganda machine. However, it is also our responsibility

to have a plan to step in and assist in accomplishing the mission if the

HN forces are unable to complete it on their own; this plan should reflect

assistance vice taking over.

b. Understand the nature of the ‘Supported’ and ‘Supporting’

relationship. Strive to be the supporting unit.

c. Be the HN force advocate to other US units and fight for their interests

Understand Risk

Don’t be adverse to the risk, but mitigate it. The risk can be mitigated by

the reciprocal trust obtained in the establishment of personal and

professional relationships. You must accept that a greater security is

obtained when fully partnered with HN forces.

a. When living amongst the HN unit, keep track of normal operating

procedures and be wary of those that are outside the “norm”. Keep track

of the movement and demeanor of individuals within the unit.

b. If you have a trusting relationship with the HN partner unit leader,

identify your concerns with him. If not, identify your concerns with your

HHQ.

c. Conduct initial operations that are HN supportable and desirable, well

thought out, and allow for a high probability of success. Continue to

build on this, to increase confidence and reduce risk.

Chapter 3

Designing the Partnership

Designing the Partnership Program

A partnering program must be comprehensive in its approach. Within

the partnership, there must be a common vision and shared

understanding of each partner’s goals. The program must support open

collaboration and free exchange of information within classification

parameters in order to sustain development, maintain the initiative, and

promote the HN force’s role. Effective partnering exists at multiple

levels from the lowest tactical unit to the political levels. It is important

to understand the command and support arrangements for each partner.

Seams or gaps at higher echelons may impact how your partner is able to

operate. Examples that might assist in visualizing this idea are logistics

support that may affect a partner’s capability or capacity or pay

procedures that affect morale.

a. Holistic partnering arrangements generated from the higher

headquarters, HN Ministerial or Department level are essential. Tactical

level partnering successes are “short lived” without successful partnering

at all echelons. A tactically proficient partner battalion is for naught if

proficiency is not also developed at the higher levels to support that

battalion. Of equal importance is that the partnership be balanced. Gaps

in echelons of the partnership created by dissimilar organizations must be

accounted for. The uniqueness of the MAGTF may create a dissimilar

relationship, which must be taken into account. For instance, in

Afghanistan there is not a corresponding level of command and control

below the ANA Brigade, so the Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs) do

not have a partnered command which needs to be recognized and

planned for.

b. The partnership scheme should describe command arrangements, plan

for training and assessments, and plan for relief and transfer of authority.

Constant assessment, information exchange, and adjustments regarding

HN forces are to be expected and must be planned for. Some HN units

will be better prepared than others, and in some cases there will be

significant disparity between a unit’s readiness level and the readiness

level of its higher headquarters or sub-units. Knowing the HN’s unit

readiness level and how it relates up and down its chain of command is

critical to partnering. Embrace the successes enjoyed by other partnered

units, socialize those successes with the HN force, and collaboratively

evaluate and apply those lessons learned as applicable.

Understanding

Designing the partnership should include an understanding of the

operating environment, partner capabilities and capacities, anticipated

missions and tasks, and red lines or limits for a partner.

a. Partnerships take time to build and develop. They are principally built

on mutual respect and open relationships. Developing a relationship

takes time and is enhanced by shared experiences and successes--

appreciate that fact, embrace it, and plan for it. Developing a partnering

scheme of maneuver based solely on a timeline will lead to frustration

and failure.

b. Understanding the history, culture, region and challenges in that

region is important. Sharing that understanding is more important as it

promotes learning from each other. Understanding your capabilities and

capacities as well as the HN force’s capability and capacity must be

made before determining the partnering scheme of maneuver. This

assessment, made by both commanders, will guide the development of

shared goals of the partnering scheme of maneuver.

c. Develop shared goals for the partnership that fall within HN limits. Do

not set goals for the HN, rather help them establish goals for themselves

and then to develop a plan to achieve them. Meet with the HN

commander in order to determine his goals and objective. It is to

understand why they are what they are. Trying to understand where he

is coming from is the KEY factor before starting to work toward a shared

goal. Underlying factors may not be readily apparent at first look, so

failing to understand the why could be a grave error. Do not be fooled

into believing that all motivations are clear or pure.

d. Define and understand shared ‘Red Lines’ (items neither side will

compromise on). It will be necessary to establish the cultural framework

of each partner that establishes those areas that are “red lines”. ‘Red

lines’ include such areas as; collateral damage, treatment of prisoners,

the role of female personnel, respect of the civilian population, and

application of Marine Corps enablers and effects. These must be

established up front in order to prevent friction points between Marines

and the HN and prevent distrust and animosity.

Partnership Plan

a. Your partnering plan is based on findings from the initial assessment

and the expected goals and objectives that may be required of the team.

The terms of the partnership must be developed similar to a supporting-

supported arrangement. In some cases, HN’s units will simply require

additional vehicles to conduct operation. In others they will require

significant training to be able to accomplish required missions; some

cases may require fully integrated operations. The terms of the

partnership are similar to a contract describing responsibilities and

authorities as well as what each partner has to contribute. The terms of

the partnership will change over time but must always be understood.

The initial assessment will also assist the Marine and HN commander’s

establishment of priorities.

b. Establish priorities that are nested within the HN commander’s

priorities. There may be cases where the Marine commander and HN’s

commander disagree about the order of priority. The HN commander

may prioritize what he wants to ‘fix’ first and will depend entirely on his

acceptance of risk. If this conflict cannot be mutually resolved, take the

matter to the higher commander. Issues like these must be resolved or

they continue to create problems for the entire chain of command;

however, once the decision is made the discussion is over. One thing to

keep in mind is that the partnering scheme of maneuver is not a rigid

plan that cannot be changed. The scheme of maneuver will change

during the deployment so pick your battles wisely.

c. Develop a scheme of maneuver to achieve the HN’s goals. Partnership

is a mindset. It is not something that comes easily. The scheme of

maneuver may require completely integrated staffs or units to be moved

and re-organized to better align to the mission requirements. Consider

appointing USMC personnel to ‘deputy’ positions within the HN

organization and vice versa. These positions may have some real

authority or they may not, but it is a golden opportunity to share ideas,

develop HN capabilities, truly understand the HN perspective, and

deepen the relationship. Be flexible and expect to make changes to

current staff organizations in order to be effective. Do not be afraid to

review the plan often and at scheduled intervals in order to make minor

adjustments or completely shift priorities based on successes or failures.

d. Issuing the scheme of maneuver needs to be done in two parts. First,

the scheme of maneuver should be formally briefed to Marine and HN

higher headquarters through proper channels. Both tactical level,

partner, commanders should be prepared to brief and defend their plan -

together. Doing this allows the Marine and HN higher headquarters to

understand what actions are occurring with their subordinates; provide an

opportunity to make refinements to the plan; provides a context for

future changes in command relationships and/or partnering plan; and

ensures that all subordinate units are fulfilling their respective highers’

intent and partnering scheme of maneuver. Once the respective higher

headquarters has approved the plan, the partnering scheme of maneuver

must be issued to all subordinates - Marines and HN forces alike. Never

underestimate the power of two commanders together issuing orders and

guidance to their subordinates. This solidifies the “plan” for the

partnered forces and strengthens the bonds and ties of the partnership.

The key is to ensure that all subordinate units have clear understanding

of the partnering mission - down to the last rifleman. Ensuring that they

know and understand the plan and ensuring that that all of their actions

are supporting the larger partnering effort is critical. This must include

any and all advisors, liaisons, ANGLICO teams, and enabling or

supporting units.

Assessments (Assess, Adjust, Re-assess, Re-adjust, Be Flexible, and

Patient)

a. Assessment plans should include an established timeline for

assessments, must be published to all parties, must be conducted as

partners, and should strive for parity and equity in the assessment. It is

expected that there will be successes and failures throughout the

execution of a partnering operation since we should strive for “stretch”

goals, and learning from mistakes often achieves more robust success.

b. Successes must be viewed from the perspective of the HN unit.

Successful mission accomplishment must meet the shared goals of the

partners and be seen as a success by the HN. Success in developing

partner capabilities must be evaluated relative to the HN not the

partnered Marine unit. It is not the intent to make a HN’s infantry

company equivalent to a Marine Corps rifle company, the intent is to

develop its leaders and men to execute the missions required of them.

c. Be conscious of the fact that a unit operating in one region of the

country will likely have different requirements than a unit operating in a

completely different. Be prepared to tailor your approach to the specific

needs of the unit, area of operations, HN commander’s desires, or

combinations thereof.

d. It is vital to understand the HN’s abilities and how it has improved.

Shortfalls in the HN abilities may not be fixed ‘on your watch’, the goal

is building a sustainable capacity, so the HN unit can operate

independently. The only way to do that is to take it slow. Conversely,

the same is true for the HN. They may perceive any success as ‘total

success’ and try to proceed faster and farther than they are capable.

Wherever success can be found, look to make it more efficient, but do

not dedicate too much time, effort, or resources to something that works,

so long as it works “good enough.”

e. Sometimes there is value in allowing the HN to suffer some short-term

failures in order to achieve long-term success and achievements. This is

a very difficult mindset shift for many Americans; however, sometimes

more is learned from failure than success. This is usually not an issue at

the battalion level and below, but becomes a larger problem at the higher

headquarters.

f. Communication up and down the US chain of command is vital to

building higher’s situational awareness. Only by understanding why

something failed, will higher be in a better position to support or

reinforce decisions or prod their counterpart into fixing a discrepancy.

g. Understanding why requires constant attention and assessment. Only

by truly understanding why, can both forces ensure that all efforts are

unified. It also ensures Marines are assisting HN forces fix deficiencies,

not doing it for them.

The Relief in Place (RIP) / Transfer of Authority (TOA) and

Transfer of the Relationship

a. The initial plan should be built upon and continued by the next unit,

not scrapped. A VERY DETAILED RIP must be conducted at all levels

in order to ensure continuity. The momentum must be maintained and

the RIP must not be an opportunity for the HN unit to play one US unit

against the other, nor is it a time to point fingers and say, “those guys

didn’t get it, but we do.”

The RIP itself must be a partnership between the outgoing and

incoming US forces so that the support relationship is maintained and

the HN sees a seamless transition of support from one unit to another.

It is irrelevant if one US unit likes the way that the last unit conducted

business, the most important piece of the RIP is that the HN force

continues in its development and the de-coupling still occurs slowly

and in concert with a pre-established plan.

Failure to reach this common understanding from the outset will

result in a re-coupling of HN force to US force that actually reverses

previous success. In short, the RIP is not a time to start over; it is a

time to build on successes. In order to ensure that this occurs, higher

headquarters must be part of the RIP. Without higher headquarters’

‘buy in’ and monitoring, units are doomed to repeat past failures

(memory is only so good for so long) and provides opportunities for

HN units to actually ‘re-attach’ themselves. With that said, the US unit

must be a positive balancer to the entire evolution. The HN force

commander must be able to voice his opinions and desires, but just

because the HN force Commander wants something does not

necessarily mean that he will get it. Common ground must be found to

balance the difference. This is a ‘partnership’ not an all for one or the

other.

b. Conducting the RIP. During the RIP, commanders must emphasize as

much face-to-face or knee-to-knee turnover. This must include left

seat/right seat activities with emphasis on individual Marines having the

opportunity to increase their understanding. They must take advantage

of this valuable time to refine their understanding of partner capabilities.

During this time, when there are additional forces available, the

commanders should conduct a partnered operation with outgoings,

incoming, and HN units. This provides the incoming unit with a

firsthand assessment, ensures new forces do not re-plow old ground,

increases mutual operation awareness, and provides the opportunity to

establish critical relationships in a controlled environment.

c. Transition from partnering to overwatch. The plan for this major

phase of the partnering process is just as vital as all of the efforts made

up to this point. How and to what extent US force will support the HN

forces is crucial to the next phase - the exit strategy. The transition from

active partnering to overwatch still requires staff integration because it is

at this level where effective planning and execution occurs. If

completely removed from the equation, the HN loses the ability to lean

on their partners for insight and advice, and US forces lose visibility and

perspective on what the HN forces are doing. So long as the staffs

remain partnered, then unity of effort is maintained and the HN forces

continue seamlessly in their development and towards the final goal of

self-sufficiency.

Indicators of Success

a. The partnership is doing what it is established to do. The agreed

upon objectives of the partnering program are being met. These are best

determined by a combination of the adviser’s and the partnered unit’s

objectives as well as HQs assessment methods. The HN unit increases

recruitment from within its operational area, and also developing non-

kinetic skills in such areas as; civil-military operations, and IO.

b. The partnership is having a positive impact beyond the immediate

partners. Tactical success does not equate to operational success. A HN

battalion that is having tactical success, but does not receive proper

support along the lines of operation from its higher headquarters, will not

likely maintain its positive momentum. This reinforces to need to have a

comprehensive partnering approach throughout the chain of command of

the HN and the importance of tactical actions having operational and

strategic impact.

c. The partnership is sustainable or self-manageable. As the

partnership continues to grow, it will be maintained or adjusted so that

the decoupling process begins where one partner reduces its direct

involvement and provides more oversight rather than direct partnering.

Raids that were conducted by US forces with the partner forces

providing security are now being reversed. The raid is being conducted

by the HN force, with the US forces providing security. Later, the HN

partner unit does not require advisors, but effectively employs specific

enablers, i.e. an ANGLICO detachment to provide fire support

coordination.

d. The partnership has provided gains and benefits to the HN. The HN

partner must see the benefits of the partnering. HN leaders may be

initially skeptical but will need to understand and embrace it. The HN

must see that the partnership is developing the capabilities and capacities

that are in support of their objectives and not just those of the US or the

coalition partners.

Indicators of Failure

a. Lack/Loss of Trust. It takes time to establish a relationship of trust,

yet on the other hand it can be lost very quickly. In many cultures, once

it is lost it is extremely difficult to regain. Promising support that is not

delivered, not sharing relevant information, and cultural disrespect are

just some of the major categories of perceived causes that have derailed

successful partnering relationships. Understanding the basis of trust that

have been developed between partners and its fragility are extremely

important when rotating in new advisors, liaison officers, and partnering

units. Subsequent units and personnel will have to continue to build and

maintain the trust that was established by previous units. This reinforces

the need to have a comprehensive rotation plan, which allows for overlap

and a phased turnover approach.

b. Loss of Autonomy by the HN. As discussed earlier, successes will

likely be followed by failures. The tendency of US partners is to look at

a failure as a time for them to come in and take over, vice a time to sit

down and discuss the lessons learned and steps the HN unit can take to

correct mistakes. Stepping in to takeover after a failure should not be

done rashly. Any such action must be well thought out and planned in

order to ensure the HN unit understands and does not “lose face.”

c. Conflicts of Interest. Both partners, US and the HN forces, will run

into conflicts of interest. At times both parties will feel pushed to accept

an uncomfortable compromise. If viewed in the short term, and not the

long term, this has the potential to be detrimental to the relationship.

Some personnel are not well suited for partnering missions or will not be

initially placed in the best position for this type of operations. It is an

arduous task and requires planning, persistence, and patience. Leaders

need to be aware of the uniqueness of the partnering mission and place

the right people with the right skills within a partnering program.

Chapter 4

Training for Partnering

a. In developing a partnering mission training plan it is essential to

understand the assigned missions of the HN force. Specifically what

does the HN Ministry of Defense (MOD) and/or Ministry of the Interior

(MOI) define as desired capabilities? Understanding what missions the

civilian government expects their force to fulfill lays out the initial left

and right lateral limits for the partnering unit. This will affect training

density, training focus, and may even assist in establishing an alternate

task organization. Second, review the Advise, Train, and Assist (ATA)

Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual, the Cultural T&R Manual, and

the Infantry T&R Manual. Finding common tasks will lead to training

efficiency and provide commanders with potential area and opportunities

for additional training.

b. Training typically falls into three categories - Advisor/mentor, partner,

and individual/collective Pre-deployment Training Program (PTP) skills.

While not a complete and comprehensive list, the list below should help

guide Marines in planning and conducting training for a partnering

mission.

1. Advisor training includes, but is not limited to:

Understanding the HN command and control hierarchy

Staff planning functions, which includes the ability to teach staff

planning at battalion level and how to integrate a HN staff.

Learn and train police specific skills

Immersive scenario and role player based training focused on

key leadership engagement (KLE), and HN security force

training, advising, and combat advising

HN History which will greatly help in building rapport

Understanding HN security force’s processes and procedures

across all functional lines

Introduction to human questioning techniques

Transition Readiness Assessment Tool (TRAT) and

Area/Structures/ Capabilities/Organizations/People/Events

(ASCOPE) assessment

Classes on the HN doctrine and tactics, techniques, and

procedures

Individual train-the-trainer (T3) focusing on noncommissioned

officers (NCOs)

Integration of government organizations, and civil affairs (CA)

elements. A relationship should also be developed with Non-

Government Organization (NGOs) via a bridging organization

such as a non-military government organization.

Understanding the HN forces internal readiness assessment

reporting

2. Partnering unit training includes, but is not limited to:

IO development and implementation

Logistics management in support of (ISO) distributed ops

Negotiation skills and conflict resolution

Foreign weapons, communications, and vehicle training\

Understanding the HN command and control hierarchy

Staff planning functions, which includes the ability to teach staff

planning at battalion level and below and how to effectively

integrate a HN staff

Learn and train police specific skills

Immersive scenario and role player based training: focused on

key leadership engagement (KLE) and HN security force

training, advising, and combat advising

HN History which will greatly help in building rapport

Understanding HN security force’s processes and procedures

across all functional line

Introduction to human questioning techniques; intelligence

collection and dissemination

TRAT and ASCOPE assessment

Classes on the HN doctrine and tactics, techniques, and

procedures

Individual Train The Trainer (T3) focusing on NCOs

Integration of government organizations, and civil affairs (CA)

elements. A relationship should also be developed with Non-

Government Organization (NGOs) via a bridging organization

such as a non-military government organization.

Understanding the HN forces internal readiness assessments

Commander's emergency response program (CERP) Funding

Lessons learned and after action reports (AARs) from other units

operating in the area

3. Additional Pre-deployment Training Program (PTP):

Lessons learned and AARs from other units operating in the area

CERP Funding

Communications classes

Convoy operations

UAS employment

Urban warfare training

IO development and implementation

Female engagement team (FET) integration

Company level intelligence cell (CLIC) and non-kinetic

targeting

Distributed operations

Escalation of force and use of force

Sensitive site exploitation - theatre specific

Improvised explosive device (IED) awareness and integration of

IED dogs and route clearance

Dedicated advisors, trainers, and liaison detachments may not be

part of the partnering unit, but should be integrated into the pre-

deployment training program as early as possible (where

possible) to establish relationships prior to deploying, especially

if, in some cases, they may be reporting to a separate chain of

command.

c. What are the training tools and who do you go to for training

assistance?

MEF

a) Special Operations Training Group (SOTG)

b) Advisor Training Cells (ATC) / Advisory Training Groups

(ATG)

c) Other MEF developed training programs and initiatives

SCETC - The Security Cooperation Education and Training

Center coordinates service-level security assistance (SA), security

cooperation (SC), civil-military operations (CMO), and humanitarian

assistance (HA) for the Marine Corps.

a) Security Assistance. SCETC’s emphasis in SA includes

providing mobile training teams in conjunction with foreign

military sales (FMS), managing Marines attending partner

nation training and education, and managing partner nation

students attending USMC training and education courses and

schools.

Security Cooperation. SCETC’s focus in SC includes

sourcing SC Teams from TECOM subordinate commands in

support of regional Marine Forces Commands and the

supported combatant commander, in order to build partner

nation capacity in institutional and warfighting functions.

SCETC also conducts a range of assessments supporting SC

planning. SCETC provides expertise with regard to

authorities and funding of SC activities and conducts the SC

Planning Course. SCETC has developed and maintains

cognizance on the Advise, Train, and Assist (ATA) Partner

Nation Forces (PNF) Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual

(NAVMC 3500.59), which is useful for developing

individual and collective skills for Marines and units

engaged in partnering activities.

Civil-Military Operations. SCETC conduct pre-deployment

training for Civil Affairs Groups (CAGs) and units assigned

Civil Affairs missions. SCETC also conducts both the

military occupational specialty (MOS) producing Civil

Affairs Course and the Civil-Military Operations Planners

Course.

Formal Courses. Security Cooperation Planners Course;

Civil Military Operations Planners Course; and Civil Affairs

Course.

CAOCL - Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning.

The Marine Corps established the CAOCL as the central Marine Corps

agency for operational culture and language training. CAOCL’s

mission is ensure Marines are equipped with regional, operational

culture and language knowledge through training, education, research

and mentorship in order to plan and operate effectively in the joint

expeditionary environment. CAOCL is the Marine Corps’ institution

focused on culture and language and its impact on operations. CAOCL

is a resource for operational culture and communications skills prior to

and during deployment and for career long cultural regional learning.

The goal of Marine Corps culture and language training and education

programs is to develop a force of Marines that have the skills needed to

quickly and accurately comprehend and then appropriately and

effectively operate in any culturally complex environment to achieve

the desired effects. It is imperative that units developing a PTP review

the Operational Culture and Language Training and Readiness manual

(NAVMC 3500.65). Units should contact the appropriate CAOCL

LNO listed below as soon as possible to begin coordinating and

scheduling required CAOCL training events.

Mobile Training Teams. CAOCL has personnel available

for delivering classes & briefs at home station or underway

Operational Culture Classes. (2 days/16 hours) - Iraq and

Afghanistan only. These classes are designed to give the

student the cultural knowledge and skills relevant across the

spectrum of modern military operations in foreign

environments. Operational culture, not “cultural sensitivity,”

provides Marines the tools they need to navigate the cultural

terrain in support of the mission.

Operational culture briefs. (2-4 hours) provide

familiarization with the aspects of a foreign culture that can

influence the success of military operations in a foreign

environment. Operational culture briefs for numerous

countries are available.

Operational language classes. (20-200 hours) provide

familiarization of operationally-relevant terms and phrases.

The core/basic-level class can be supplemented with three

mission-specific categories of classes and material: civil

affairs, military advisors, and detainee handling. The

operational language classes provide students, at the

minimum, the ability to use CAOCL language cards to

communicate. There are complimentary self-study language

materials, available through CAOCL (outlined below), that

enable a motivated student to become proficient in

communication of functional phrases without reference (e.g.

common greetings, pleasantries, farewells, and commands).

MTT operational language classes currently available: Iraqi

Arabic, Pashto, Dari, French, and Spanish. CAOCL can

arrange classes in other languages through the use of the

Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, CA.

Self-study culture and language resource. In order to provide

an assortment of additional opportunities to Marines for

operational culture and language self-study, CAOCL is

currently providing access to a number of distributed

learning, computer-based product

The CL-150 Technology Matrix for Critical Languages: CL-

150 is designed to support the learning of all languages

determined by US government organizations to be of

national security interest. The CL-150 suite of products

provides a variety of culture and language learning and

sustainment tools appropriate for all proficiency levels and

all learning regimens: classroom, distance learning, remote

mentoring, and self-study. The software operates on many

of the hardware platforms now commonly available to

Marines: laptops, desktops, Web, PDA, iPod, etc., (not all

CL-150 software is compatible with NMCI computers).

Rosetta Stone. All active duty and reserve Marines are able

to access the Rosetta Stone^® Language Learning Software

via the MarineNet Distance Learning Portal:

www.marinenet.usmc.mil.

Operational Language Training System (OLTS). currently

provides language and culture training via four modules -

Operational Iraqi, Operational Pashto, Operational Dari, and

Operational Sub-Saharan Africa French.

Language Learning Resource Centers (LLRCs). In an effort

to meet home station training requirements, CAOCL is

establishing Language Learning Resource Centers (LLRC)

at all eight major Marine Corps Bases to facilitate culture

and language training for all Marines. The LLRCs are

computer labs equipped with culture and language study

materials and software.

Incidental language program. The incidental language

program, per MARADMIN #0670/09 signed November 23,

2009, clearly states the four phases of the incidental

language training for battalion and regimental commanders.

Phase 1: (commanders focused training) for infantry

battalion, light armed reconnaissance battalion, and

regimental commanders conducting Operation Enduring

Freedom (OEF) PTP, those deploying commanders in

support of OEF will receive 40 hours of live instruction by

CAOCL SMEs on key leader engagement in culture and

language, other commanders and or officers that are slated

for command will receive CDs and computer based training

(CBTs). Phase 2: deploying commanders will be assigned

culture mentors, where the non-deploying commanders will

receive 40 hrs live instruction based on the affordability and

or funding. Phase 3: evaluation of the deploying

commanders in Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV) at

Twentynine Palms, CA during the mission rehearsal exercise

(MRX) on their language and culture ability provided by

CAOCL assessors in the field during the MRX. Phase four:

deploying commanders may coordinate with CAOCL for

sustainment using CAOCL MTTs. The 40 hours key leaders

program consists of: 25.5 hours of the use of tactical

language, 1.0 hour on how to communicate through an

interpreter, 0.5 on non-verbal communication, and 2.0 hours

on cross-cultural communication.

CAOCL Liaison Officers (LNOs). For advice and assistance

in regards to culture & language training, please contact the

appropriate LNO:

I MEF: Steve Taylor staylor@prosol1.com

II MEF: Jim Parran parranj@battelle.org

III MEF: Ron Williams rwilliams@prosol1.com

MARFORRES & Others: Naser Manasterli

NManasterli@prosol1.com

The MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) conducts MRX, as

well as Marine Expeditionary Force exercises (MEFEX) and Marine

Expeditionary Brigade exercises (MEBEX). Participation in these

exercises as a MAGTF staff allow for the opportunity to plan for

partnered operations at the MEB and MEF level. During the conduct

of the command post exercise portion of these exercises, the MAGTF

staff is also afforded the opportunity to execute their plan using a

simulation of the operating environment along with role players that

simulate HN government officials and security forces.

The MAGTF-TC also offers many training/assessment venues

for the Battalion Commander to utilize in preparing for

deployment:MCTOG; MAWTS-1; MAGTF-TC ATG; TTECG;

MCMWTC

“Soft Skills”

a. Conflict resolution - which includes learning how to arbitrate

disagreements through a cultural lens.

b. Team building

c Organizational skills. The US military’s organizational skills have

been built over a long period of time. Trying to teach a HN US

organizational skills will not work, so it will be necessary to be prepared

to teach the basics.

d. Teaching skills. Training is not the same as teaching. The US

training methods will not work in some places with very low literacy

rates because US training methods are based on a ‘base-line’ educational

level. Teaching and training is much more difficult when dealing with

low literacy rates. Periods of instruction must be rewritten, more

pictures must be used, and the language/instruction must be simplified as

well. These things take time and are best done slowly in garrison before

deploying.

e Listening skills. Listening is a key skill, and some Marines are better

at than others. The ability to listen to people and understand what they

are trying to say, both overtly and subtly, is not something that every

Marine has, but it can be trained. This skill becomes particularly vital

when conducting key partnering tasks like interviewing local nationals in

order to collect information about the enemy, local leadership, etc.

f. Patience and Persistence. Sometimes the best thing to do is nothing.

We have a tendency to see something wrong and want to go in and fix it

right away. Partnering requires the ability to stand back at times and

allow the HN unit to make mistakes and learn from them. Based on their

backg5round, those areas we see as problems maybe obvious to us, but not

to them. It also requires persistent engagement, it can not be “drive by

partnering”, but constant working together to establish proficiency.

Chapter 5

HN Training and Support

a. Training. Training with HN forces is a challenge. This is especially

true in states with very different cultures and capabilities. No one needs

to guide Marines on how to train; it is what the Corps excels at. There

are, however, factors that commanders should always consider when

preparing for joint training in partnership environments:

1. Training of HN forces should be by invitation only and the

parameters of that training thoroughly understood by all involved

from battalion commander to rifleman of all participating partner

elements.

2. Culture and local customs must always be taken into

considerations. Degrading behavior and embarrassment of the

less capable members of the partnership is a recipe for failure,

especially in well-defined ancient cultures. What they may lack

in esprit de corps as the US views it, they make up for in pride.

Ensure all Marines selected to conduct training are of a rank

commensurate to their counterparts, have sufficient maturity and

expertise to enhance the partnership, and do not provide the

insurgents with tales of American arrogance.

3. Train-the-Trainers. One of the goals of partnerships such as

Afghanistan is capacity building. By developing local trainers,

commanders assist in developing a professional cadre who will

have far greater influence on developing a capable force much

faster than coalition partners ever can by doing it for them.

4. Encourage HN leadership by teaching them to do it right and

letting them garner all the success gained by the results of

coalition force participation.

5. Develop a ‘professional school’ environment as much as possible

and be prepared to alter training techniques based on literacy

issues. This should include supporting presentation of awards

and training certificates by HN commanders to enhance morale.

6. Suggest formalization of training to the HN commander in order

to validate certification of the training by other levels of

command so that the unit and student receive ‘credit’ regardless

of where they may be assigned in the future.

b. Support

1. Support of HN commanders in partnership environments is

challenging. Lack of infrastructure and mature support

institutions coupled with a lack of literacy and fledgling military

and/or police capabilities are temptations for commanders and

their staff to want to help too much. Over-reliance on partner

forces discourages the maturing of the partnered unit and creates

a dependency, which is unlikely to foster the development of a

stable democracy in which the population can place their trust.

As a partnering commander, success is best achieved by being

like a shadow on a cloudy day, always in the backg5round and

ready to guide, not to do it for your partners. Help them develop

their capacity by populating teams with capable Marines who

possess the patience and tolerance for ambiguity necessary to

mentoring. Partnering Marines must possess detailed knowledge

of:

a. Your partners’ institutional and structural centers of power

and influence. Who is really in charge? What

interdependent relationships exist, both formal and informal?

Gain information from a variety of sources and learn to trust

and work with interpreters to understand what right means.

b. Capabilities and limitations from both institutions and

structures above such as a corps headquarters and the central

government as well as adjacent such as the local village

leadership.

c. What actions and behaviors should be synchronized between

partnered and partnering units (TTPs, conducting SSE’s,

etc).

d. Other actors in the area such as USAID, Provincial

Reconstruction Teams, etc, as they can be valuable sources

of both historical and current trends.

e. Know HN and partnered unit logistical, medical,

communications, and other support capabilities as well as

choke points in advance. Partnering Marines should have the

requisite knowledge to assist, but the patience to let your

partner fail in non-critical situations so they may learn from

their mistakes and not become overly reliant.

2. Utilize HN local and national government support and assistance

whenever possible. This assists in encouraging the development

of capacity and building trust among the population. External

support sources should also be investigated and their capabilities

explored by:

a. Developing relationships with USG Agencies such as State,

Provincial Reconstruction Teams, USAID, Country Teams,

FBI, DEA, DOA, Treasury, etc, to capitalize on their

expertise and provide alternative sources of assistance for

your partnered unit.

b. These agencies may also be used as “bridging” elements to

communicate with the Non-Governmental Agencies (NGO)

in the area as means to assess needs and problems. Contact

with NGOs should be developed via a bridge so as to not

place them in danger from insurgents.

c. Commanders should also develop relationships with

coalition forces and friendly foreign government agencies in

the area. This will better assist in HN capacity building

through international cooperative efforts, especially for large

projects which may be needed.

Annex A

Reading List for Partnering

NAVMC 3500.59 Advise, Train & Assist Partner Nation Forces Training

and Readiness Manual

MCRP 3-33.8A Advising, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces

FMFRP 12-25 The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him

Lawrence T.E. Seven pillars of Wisdom

The French Forces in America 1780-1783.

Punishment of Virtue

Afghanistan, A Short History…Martin Ewans

The bookseller of Kabal, Asne Seierstad

Tactics, the Bear Went over the Mountain

Afghan Constitution

Small Wars, CE Callwell

Small Wars Manual

SOF Advisors Handbook

Air Land Sea Application Center (ALSA) Publication: Advising Foreign

Forces (Sept 2009)

Annex B

Vignette: Helmand Province

By the fall of 2009, 3d Platoon, Company C, 2d Light Armored

Reconnaissance Battalion had conducted kinetic operations for three

months in southern Helmand Province, Afghanistan. While maneuvering

through the austere terrain and territory previously void of coalition

forces, the platoon encountered multiple complex ambushes, indirect fire

attacks, and improvised explosive devises. At the end of August, the

Company Commander, Captain Christopher, instructed the 3d Platoon

Commander that his Marines would assist engineers in designing and

constructing a patrol base south of the Helmand River. Upon its

completion, 2nd Lt John’s platoon and attachments would be responsible

for the security of the outpost and conducting operations in the

surrounding areas. The ultimate goals of the patrol base were to

influence the surrounding villages by providing security, disrupting the

enemy’s freedom of movement, and spreading the battalion’s

information campaign. In order to publicize and demonstrate the

legitimacy of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,

the platoon would be partnered with 40 members of the Afghanistan

National Border Police.

Three weeks after Patrol Base South Station had been completed; the

platoon had already made significant advances in conducting census

operations. The platoon had immediately identified the village elders and

religious leaders and begun to regularly meet with them in order to

address the Marines’ goals, learn how the coalition forces could aid the

villagers, and discuss the enemy’s influence in the area. With less than

two days of notice, the platoon was informed that the Border Policemen

would be arriving to operate with the Marines. Although having heard

the reasoning for partnership and the importance of bolstering the image

of the local forces from the highest leadership levels, the Marines were

wary of this new relationship for multiple reasons. The Marines knew

that their schedule was about to become even more hectic and were

already worn from securing South Station and conducting multiple

patrols a day. Although training was going to be the main thrust of the

initial few weeks of the partnership, the Marines were unnerved by the

fact the Afghans would have weapons and ammunition and that soon

they would be operating with the Border Policemen as a joint force.

Some Marines also had previous negative experiences with coalition

forces from Operation Iraqi Freedom, and they believed local forces to

be incompetent and corrupt. Another platoon had already partnered with

ANBP north of the Helmand River and stories had been passed about

their lack of hygiene, whining, and stubbornness. Knowing the personal

hesitancy of the Marines, the platoon’s leadership hammered the

Noncommissioned Officers with the concrete benefits that the platoon

would receive from developing a relationship with the ANBP. Once the

NCOs viewed the relationship with the ANBP from the perspective of

professional warfighters and put aside any personal reservations, the

platoon had positioned itself for success with the ANBP. The Marines

keeping sight of the positive cost benefit analysis of partnering with the

local forces enabled the platoon to overcome the ANBP’s growing pains

and continue to work towards long term victory in southern Helmand.

Upon the ANBP’s arrival, Captain Christopher dictated that the Border

Policemen would receive two weeks of training before beginning

operations. Although the ANBP platoon had worked with Marines

before, their lack of fundamental infantry skills became evident

immediately. However, because of pride and previous efforts with

Marines, they were extremely resistant to training because they believed

they had all the knowledge that they required for success. Once their

leadership was convinced that they would also teach the Marines classes

about their culture and military experiences, an intensive training

schedule began. From individual weapons handling to patrolling, the

Marines built a training schedule based on skills they believed necessary

to succeed in the operating environment. The ANBP quickly grew tired

of working in the mornings and evenings and disliked the regimented

schedule the platoon had imposed on them, but the Marines insisted on

continuing at the rapid pace. The training culminated in a live fire, in

which the ANBP completed a modified Combat Marksmanship Program

course of fire. The live fire provided the ANBP a much needed morale

boost and continued to assuage the Marines fear of a friendly fire

incident.

Integrating the ANBP into combat operations immediately improved the

accessibility of the villagers. Although the village leadership claimed not

to trust the ANBP, the commoners were much more willing to speak

with coalition forces and have ANBP in the vicinity of their homes

compared to when the Marines operated alone. During foot patrols, the

ANBP would send a squad comprised of about 10 Policemen to

accompany a section of scouts which was made up of 10 to 15 Marines.

While conducting mounted operations, it was often difficult to

incorporate the ANBP’s vehicles due to the terrain. The LAV-25’s were

able to negotiate much more terrain than the ANBP’s Ford Rangers or 5-

ton Truck. This was frustrating to the ANBP because they were forced to

rely on us for rides or, if they had brought their vehicles, for multiple

recovery efforts. The platoon was fortunate to have dedicated Military

Policemen who acted as mentors during operations to the ANBP. The

Marines would have been overwhelmed if team leaders had to correct

and focus on controlling the ANBP through the use of an interpreter and

lead their own subordinates. During operations, the Marines encouraged

the ANBP to focus on the basic principle of the Cycle of the

Infantryman. As they progressed in skill and proficiency, they became

more competent in holding security while remaining covered, moving

with dispersion, and paying attention for longer periods of time. A

battalion operation at a large bazaar served as the largest scale mission

with the platoon and ANBP working together. The mission placed a

heavy emphasis on demonstrating the proficiency of Afghanistan’s

forces in order to bolster the information campaign. The ANBP searched

over 500 shops by conducting mechanical breaches and discovered

weapons, drugs, and illicit chemicals. They also helped hold security

while over ten improvised explosive devices were neutralized as the

enemy’s rockets exploded around the bazaar. Although significantly

aided and mentored by the Marines during the operation, the ANBP were

extremely proud of their accomplishments and were praised by the

battalion leadership and embedded press.

The ANBP were eager to fight and kill the enemy but their enthusiasm

caused tension since they were not allowed to operate independently

from the Marines. The ANBP did not desire to operate alone offensively

but wanted to operate independently to obtain more Class I supplies.

Their common request was to conduct resupply by convoying to their old

district center which would have taken multiple hours through unsecured

territory or leave the patrol base to purchase goods at the local bazaar. In

response, they were confronted with the reasoning that our battalion

controlled the battle space and would not risk an independent ANBP

operation due to limited fire support, casualty evacuation platforms, and

command and control. Often, this controversy would lead to the ANBP

expressing that they felt like prisoners and were being treated like

children. They believed that they were equals with the Marine platoon,

although they were completely provided for by the Marines. Besides

their pride, they believed in their equality because Captain Christopher

had told the ANBP’s platoon commander that Lt John was his right hand

and that the ANBP platoon commander was his left hand. This was an

absolutely necessary step towards building the ANBP to become self

sustaining eventually, but proved difficult when the Marines had to deny

the ANBP their operational requests. Through all the arguments,

regardless of frustrations, relying on the cost benefit analysis enabled the

Marines to continue to nurture the ANBP.

Another cause of discontent with the ANBP was their lack of

communication with their families and inability to give them money. The

ANBP had been promised leave after a certain amount of time on station,

but since they had transferred between Marine units their time had

restarted. Since they could not go on leave and there was no banking

system, they had no way to give money to their families. Also, they had

no way to contact their families without satellite phones or a mail

system. The Marines did their best to disguise when they received mail

or packages from home or were able to use the one satellite phone the

patrol base had available. However, the ANBP knew that the Marines

were able to contact home and used it as ammunition in arguments over

accommodations. The Marines knew that keeping the ANBP motivated

was crucial to their operating capabilities so they always installed or

repaired the heat, electricity, and any amenities that the patrol base had

for the ANBP first. The platoon knew that their own discomfort was a

short term issue and that by offering these gestures of good will, the

ANBP would be better able to build a solid foundation for success.

Throughout the platoon’s time partnering with the ANBP, there were

moments of frustration, but they were far outweighed by the pride the

Marines took in the bonds they had formed and progress they saw with

the Border Policemen. The ANBP admired and respected the tenacity

and hospitality of the Marines. The ANBP’s transition process to work

with the incoming Marine unit was painful for them. The ANBP had

tearfully expressed how thankful they were for our service and how sorry

they were that our men had been hurt by their country when the Marines

had had to evacuate three urgent casualties during a joint patrol. The

Marines had also shared many late night feasts with the ANBP, eating

the native food, drinking tea, and laughing over translated jokes and

cultural misunderstandings. Although the Marines who initially trained

and mentored the ANBP have returned to their homes, the ANBP remain

at South Station, continuing to fight for their country. The only way the

Afghan forces will enforce stability in the region by themselves is if

Marines down to the smallest unit level continue to think of long term

Annex C

Friendly Force Information Requirements

for Consideration in Partnering

Background and history of your HN partner.

How the HN is military organized? What are the HN names of

these organizations?

What is the rank structure? How does it equate to your units

rank structure?

Who are the key players of the unit I am partnering with?

What are their backg5rounds, militarily, culturally, and

linguistically?

What are the cultural norms of the unit? Which ones may cause

issue with your unit?

What other language capabilities does the unit have outside the

standard language of the area? English, French, German,

Spanish?

What has been the units training? Individual and collective?

Who runs the training? What schools have they attended?

Are the soldiers’ conscripts? Or enlistees? Or volunteers?

What are the skills of the Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO)?

What are the units’ views on the role of NCO’s?

Where do their officers come from? How to they get promoted?

Experience/Expertise? Favoritism?

What is the pay scale for the unit? How do they get paid? Does

the unit have an incentive program? Promotions, decorations,

incentive pay?

What is their liberty/leave policy? Will it affect your unit during

time period you are partnering? Holy days? National Holidays?

Does the unit have a combat history? Types of operations

conducted?

Has the unit partnered before and with who?

What are units’ strengths? What are units’ weaknesses? What is

there best operating level? Squad, Platoon, Company?

Does unit have operational quirks? Won’t patrol at night? Will

not enter specific areas?

What is the command relationship and personnel relationship of

the unit with it higher headquarters?

What is the units’ relationship with the civilian population?

What is the units’ command and control capability? Is it

compatible to your unit? How do they disseminate information?

Verbal, Written orders, radio, cell phone?

Does the unit have any Standard Operating Procedures?

What ability does the unit posses in control fires? Air and

Surface?

What are the procedures for dealing with captured enemy?

Has the unit trained to conduct heli-borne operations?

What is the HN unit’s capability to conduct day to day

operations? Logistics, Admin, C2, Planning?

aa.

What intelligence capabilities does the HN possess? Analysts,

HUMINT, Recon, scouts etc?

bb. What type of Information Operations (IO) capability and

understanding does the unit have?

cc. Do they have a Civil Affairs like capability?

dd. Do they have a PSYOP capability?

ee. Does the unit have any Non-Lethal weapons capability?

ff. What type of weapons do they have? Do they have maintenance

program? Do they have armorers? How do the get additional

weapons? How do they maintain accountability?

gg. What night vision capabilities does the unit possess?

hh. What mobility does the unit have? Trucks, pickups?

ii. How is the units supported logistically?

jj. What is the subsistence of the unit? What do they eat? Who

provide their chow?

kk. How does unit perform administrative functions? Personnel

rosters? Platoon commander notebooks?

ll. How does unit deal with KIA’s and WIA’s? Where are their

CASEVAC/MEDEVAC procedures?

mm. What has been the historical relationship with the HN forces

and the local population? What is the current relationship?

2. Important information for Your Unit

a. Where is the AO you are partnering in?

b. What is the operational environment? What is it historical,

cultural, and operational history?

c. What history and cultural information should you share with

your HN partner?

d. What cultural challenges could impact your relationship?

What capabilities do you have that will be in high demand?

What do you need to effectively partner with the HN unit? Do

you have the right expertise and personnel required?

What are your gaps in capability?

Are there advisors with the unit you are partnering with? What

is the U.S/Coalition involvement in partnering throughout the

chain of command? Training Teams, Liaison teams, advising

teams, ANGLICO?

Are there advisor teams that will be supporting your partnering

unit that are not from your unit? Are they already in country? If

not, and they deploying with you are you training with them?

Will your unit fall in on advising teams that have been on deck

for awhile, but will rotate in the middle of your deployment?

What tasks do you want to ensure individuals and units are

proficient to support the partnering mission?

What are the language requirements? Do you have interpreters

to train with, or will you fall in with them when you get to HN

country?

If units basic training being conducted by US or Coalition, what

does the training program consist of?

What is your chain of command in identifying requirements to

support the HN unit you are partnering with?

What support will your unit also be responsible for with the HN

unit? Administration? Logistics? CASEVAC/MEDEVAC,

initial triage? Holding prisoners? Mobility? Do you have the

right personnel to support additional requirements or do you

need augmentation?

What assets can you make available to the HN unit? UAV’s,

CAS, helicopters?

Are you providing advisor teams? If so, to what level?

Do you have armorers who are trained to support partnering

units weapons systems?

Do you have communicators who understand HN units

communications systems?

What is your plan or what are the procedures for information

sharing, especially classified information?

What plan for execution or training do you have if required to

support HN units in the areas of civil affairs, IO, PSYOP?

What mirror image personnel are you going to dedicated to the

HN Bn? Administrators, Logisticians, Communicators?

What is your plan to work with developing the HN Bn staffs?

What training program do you have developed in HN language

to support continual training?

What is your training program to develop familiarity with HN

units weapons and equipment? Dummy cards? FamFires?

Do you have access to food that HN unit will likely be subsisting

on to provide to your unit prior to deployment?

aa.

Do you have ability to assist in developing products to support

HN unit IO plan?

bb. How will you unit be dispersed to support partnering? If

extensive, to you have right C2 capability? What is plan for

logistics support? Do you require additional support? ROWPU,

Generators, additional radios?

NWP 2-01

NAVY WARFARE PUBLICATION

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

TO NAVAL OPERATIONS

NWP 2-01

NOVEMBER 2010

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:

URGENT CHANGE/ERRATUM RECORD

DISTRIBUTION AUTHORIZED TO U.S.

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NUMBER

DATE

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DATA OR INFORMATION FROM AUTOMATIC

DISSEMINATION. THIS DETERMINATION

WAS MADE ON AUGUST 23, 2010.

PRIMARY REVIEW AUTHORITY:

COMMANDER, NAVY WARFARE

DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

0411LP1107407

NOV 2010

NWP 2-01

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

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18213 HERSEY STREET BLDG 0-27

NORFOLK VA 23511.2723

November 2010

LETTER OF PROMULGATION

1. NWP 2-01 (NOV 2010), INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO NAVAL OPERATIONS, is

UNCLASSIFIED. Handle in accordance with the administrative procedures contained in

NTTP 1-01, The Navy Warfare Library.

2. NWP 2-01 (NOV 2010), INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO NAVAL OPERATIONS, is

effective upon receipt and supersedes NWP 2-01 (JAN 1997), INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

TO OPERATIONS AFLOAT. Destroy superseded material without report.

3. NWP 2-01 (NOV 2010), INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO NAVAL OPERATIONS, is a

comprehensive reference detailing the intelligence support available to the operational

commander. It also serves as a ready resource for the Information Dominance Corps

intelligence professionals, information warfare officers, and cryptologic technicians.

4. NWP 2-01 (NOV 2010), INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO NAVAL OPERATIONS, is not

approved for public release. Further dissemination only as directed by Navy Warfare

Development Command or higher DOD authority. This determination was made August 23,

2010. Requests for this document shall be referred to Navy Warfare Development Command,

1528 Piersey Street, Norfolk, VA 23511-2723.

WENDI 13. CARPENTER

NOV 2010

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8) - page 41