Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 3)

Information Operations—Influence Activities

committed to the insurgency) may be decisively influenced by PSYOPS and should be identified

as a primary target audience. However, in general, the neutral or indifferent members of a

population that indirectly enable the survival, movement and actions of an insurgency will

always be an important target audience. The result will be a hostile operating environment for

the insurgent. A second order effect of this may be the undermining of an insurgent’s will due to

the inability to increase public support for the cause.

809. ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING CREDIBILITY

In order for Info Ops to be successful in creating influences—in operating on the

psychological plane—the source of the Info Ops must have significant credibility in the eyes of

the target audience. Poor or non-existent credibility has been identified as a primary cause of

failure of Info Ops in past campaigns. Whether a source is seeking to generate support from an

indigenous population or convince enemy troops to surrender, the lack of credibility will hinder

success. For example, an indigenous population with strong religious and cultural bias against

campaigning troops may distrust messages created and disseminated by a western military

force such as NATO.

Credibility will take time to develop and is intimately tied to the actions of a military force

and the host government. The PPP of a force will have a significant impact on credibility.

Depending on the specific context, a force may need to show strength, decisiveness,

friendliness or a limited footprint or several of these at once. The credibility of a force may have

to be established in a planned, incremental fashion. Even when possessing credibility,

indigenous proxies such as social, religious or political leaders who have credibility with target

audiences and are sympathetic to the mission should be used to broadcast desired messages.

It must be remembered that all actions should reinforce the perception of host government

legitimacy, credibility and competence, and the use of indigenous voices will further this goal.

Every action of the soldier must be considered a means of influence and should be judged

for potential unintended effects. The simple act of picking fruit from an orchard or vegetables

from a field by resting soldiers can alienate a village dependent on that produce for winter

survival. Without asking permission of the farmer and offering suitable compensation, this

seemingly harmless act could be misconstrued and used by an adversary for propaganda

purposes (e.g., “the wealthy western invaders care little for the average person and steal

your food”). Every action has effects, and all soldiers must understand the repercussions of

even seemingly benign acts.

810. PERFORMANCE AND EFFECTS MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT

As with any military activity, the results of information operations are assessed using

measures of performance (are things being done right?) and measures of effectiveness (are the

right things being done to create the desired effects?) are employed.

Measures of performance (MoP) for info ops are relatively straightforward and similar to

MoP used for other activities. MoP refer to the mechanisms of planning and implementation.

They can be viewed in the same manner as the delivery of indirect fire: reaction times, quality of

product, correct target identification and assessment and suitability of engagement means, to

name a few. Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) refer to the desired effects and whether or not

the activities conducted created the effects.

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The successful prosecution of Info Ops relies on continuous monitoring and assessment

of the short- and long-term effects of inter-related activities. This is achieved by collection of all-

source intelligence and other feedback on the Info Ops activities. MoE must be included in the

Info Ops planning from the outset and are integrated in the intelligence collection activities.

Particular attention should be paid to changes in the adversary’s or other audience’s will and

actions, including such items as changes in the attitude of the civilian population, political

activity and expressions of unrest. Also, changes in an adversary’s capability, such as reduced

efficiency, disorganization and slower reactions to events and specific actions in response to

deception or destruction, may be used as an MoE.

Influence activities may take a significant amount of time to achieve recognizable effects.

In some cases, effects may not become apparent until well after an individual unit or

commander’s tour has ended. Short-term support and friendliness that may be a result of

personal relationships with a particular commander or unit should not be mistaken for

confidence in the government. Although these relationships are critical, winning over the trust of

the target audience will take time and considerable effort and likely span several rotations.

Furthermore, deeds at the tactical level will have the greatest effects, both positive and

negative. The positive effects are critical steppingstones to success, while negative effects will

carry far beyond the limited tactical context in which they originated. Negative effects will also

be remembered longer and are easily exploited by insurgent propaganda.

Changes in behaviour may take place over a lengthy period of time and be

imperceptible. For example, the effects of a radio broadcast campaign may take years to

become apparent. Additionally, it is very difficult to develop a causal link between a single Info

Ops action and target behaviour, even when direct messages are used at the tactical level. For

example, changes in driving behaviour around military convoys may be due to several

concomitant factors: PSYOPS products, previous use of warning shots or past incidents of

civilian casualties when proximity to a suicide bombing targeting coalition forces resulted in

collateral damage. Despite these difficulties, MoE are critical to gauging the usefulness of Info

Ops.

With influence activities, MoE are applied to activities and changes on the cognitive

plane. Given all of the individual and environmental variables in the human decision-making

process, developing MoE for Info Ops on the cognitive plane may be one of the most daunting

intellectual tasks facing a commander. Influence activities seek to work through external and

internal filters composed of the socio-cultural, political and economic factors in order to

persuade or dissuade and thus affect behaviour and action. Hence, the planning and conduct

of these activities is an art requiring the commander’s subjective feel for their potential effect. A

sophisticated comprehension of the cultural factors at play is necessary to first establish a

baseline measure at the beginning of a mission and to detect changes in perceptions, attitudes

and behaviours throughout the campaign.

MoE will vary significantly between missions and even within missions. Commanders

must clearly define the end-state and ideally any milestones on the path to that end-state.

Using whatever means are most appropriate, MoE measure and indicate progress in the target

audience towards that end-state. MoE must be tailored to the specifics of not only the overall

change desired but to the environment, that is, the commander’s battlespace and area of

operations. Because of the intangible factors involved and the subjective nature of influencing

will and perceptions, the MoE may very well be subjective. Moreover, because affecting

behaviour is the ultimate aim (either by maintaining non-action or causing the target audience to

adopt a particular course of action), they require a significant amount of time to determine

effectiveness. Therefore, they must be assessed as a set routine to attempt to recognize

changes, trends and slight yet significant indicators. The commander exercises judgement as

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to when an adjustment or change to an activity against a target must be made in reaction to

behavioural changes in the target audience.

Some fundamentals that can aid in the development of useful MoE are:

Causality.⁹⁴ A definitive cause and effect relationship must be established

between the activity and the effect to be measured. There has to be a

reasonable likelihood that the planned activity will create the desired effect. As

well, commanders and Info Ops staff must be able to assess any other extant

factors that may be causing the effect other than their own activities. Likewise,

they must ascertain if the measured effect is merely coincidental.

Quantifiable.⁹⁵ An MoE that can be counted helps to remove some of the

subjectivity that plagues MoE on the psychological plane. Quantification allows

accurate trend measurement. For example, during a tour in Iraq, one formation

monitored and counted local and international media coverage of events in their

AO as an MoE. This allowed positive and negative trends to be identified, which

helped to discern the effectiveness of ongoing Info Ops.⁹⁶

Observable and Attributable. This principle may seem obvious, however,

when drafting MoE, consideration should be given to the possibility that all of the

variables influencing an activity and change in behaviour cannot be observed.

The MoE must be able to recognize trends or alterations in behaviour and

confirm the relationship between the target audience behaviour and the Info Ops

activity. For example, if the presence or absence of negative graffiti is being

used as an informal indicator of support for a campaign and military force in an

urban area, observers will ideally be able to ascertain its timing, that is, when it

was done; its attribution to a particular group (political, criminal, military) and their

motive and whether it represents a minority or majority viewpoint; its attribution in

terms of cause, particularly if it appears as a reaction to a specific event or

action; and, its location in relation to the cultural make-up of the environment.

Correlated to Decisive Points and Objectives. Just as activities are planned

to reach sequential decisive points along a line of operation, MoE should be

selected to correlate to the achievement of each decisive point and should be

reflective of the level of employment. Although strategic Info Ops require

measures that occur throughout the length of a campaign, many MoE at the

operational and tactical level will measure the incremental progress through

sequential decisive points.

Flexibilty. Although MoE should be drafted at the planning stage, they should

remain under regular review, and commanders must be prepared to adjust them

as required. MoE must reflect mutable conditions in an AO. They must evolve

as a mission progresses, particularly as decisive points are reached and

⁹⁴ For a detailed discussion of causality, see William S. Murray, “A Will to Measure,” Parameters, Vol. 31, No. 3

(Autumn 2001), pp. 134-147.

⁹⁵ The quantifiable, observable and timeliness fundamentals are adapted from LtCol David Grohoski, Steven Seybert,

and Marc Romanych, “Measures of Effectiveness in the Information Environment,” Military Intelligence Professional

Bulletin, Vol. 29, No. 3 (July-September 2003), pp. 12-16.

⁹⁶ Baker, Col Ralph O., “The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander’s Perspective on Information

Operations,” Military Review, May-June 2006 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Combined Arms Center/USCGSC),

pp. 13-32.

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secured. Similarly, MoE are likely not transferable from mission to mission.

Even if a mission takes place in the same AO, the passage of time will force

reconsideration of MoE previously employed.

Collection. The commander must possess the capabilities to collect the

intelligence necessary to employ an MoE and provide the direction and guidance

to do so. Plans must be made to collect and assess MoE through all units in the

affected battlespace. As well, collection may be assisted by other agencies,

however, absent a formal command relationship, this may have to be done

informally. Notwithstanding this, non-military agencies may prove to be an

effective gauge of progress through Info Ops. To this end, attempts should be

made to develop working relationships with agencies from all participating

governments, the HN and NGOs active in the environment.

Relativity. Improvements sought in a given environment must be relative to that

environment. It is imperative that a baseline measurement of the overall

environment be established as early as practicable in the campaign planning.

Absent a comparative baseline, it may be impossible to accurately determine the

effectiveness of Info Ops and ultimately campaign progress. Expectations for

situational improvement must be reasonable given the starting state and the

normal state of that particular environment. This does not mean that moral

relativity should be applied to excuse gross criminal behaviour.⁹⁷ Some change

in the environment may occur quickly; for example, an immediate drop in crime in

a particular neighbourhood may result from the presence of regular patrols.

However, systemic and social improvements that will create an enduring

improvement may require a substantial amount of time and be measured in

multiple years or even decades. Thus measuring an overall drop in gang and

criminal activity throughout a theatre must be measured in relation to the levels

that existed under pre-crisis circumstances and could take years to achieve.

Furthermore, systemic change will be the result of numerous concomitant

factors. Expectations for change and the related MoE should be set as

incremental milestones so that improvement can be measured and demonstrated

as tangible progress over time.

811.

SUMMARY

Developing appropriate MoE to assess effects on the psychological plane is a very

difficult task. Willpower, motivations, perceptions and beliefs are intangible variables that defy

simple measurement. Observing and measuring trends is one of the surest ways of gauging a

target’s attitude, will and behaviour change. Trends, however, require a definable baseline, and

this will be a complex but crucial initial task. Difficulties aside, accurate MoE can make the

difference between meeting desired objectives or ending a campaign in frustration.

⁹⁷ Gross criminal behaviour such as the abuse of basic human rights, corruption or theft from the public purse cannot

be justified as simply being normal. However, all situations must be judged in context. For example, an under paid

schoolteacher in a struggling nation charging students to attend an ostensibly public-funded school is a different case

to an armed policeman extorting funds at a checkpoint, particularly if this is the only means by which the teacher can

survive. Careful judgement is necessary when establishing a baseline of conditions in an AO.

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SECTION 3

CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURGENT PROPAGANDA⁹⁸

812. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

A substantial proportion of COIN influence activities will concentrate on refuting

insurgent propaganda. This may be seen as defensive influence activities. Thus it is useful to

illustrate the major characteristics of insurgent propaganda to better understand how to

construct themes and messages that will support friendly Info Ops while undermining those of

the enemy. Deconstructing the themes of enemy propaganda allows the commander and staff

a better understanding of the enemy’s lines of operation and what counter-measures will best

undermine the enemy campaign. The characteristics illustrated below are broadly applicable to

all insurgencies.

Insurgencies are supported by a closely coordinated and mutually supporting triad of

political goals, propaganda and military action. Like friendly Info Ops, propaganda can take

several forms and will be reinforced with action. Words will be supported by deeds and vice

versa.

The insurgent cause is advanced predominantly by discrediting the government and

security forces, reducing public morale (both indigenous and that of coalition forces) and vilifying

pro-government media. Insurgents and their propaganda will exploit any government mistake,

especially incidents in which the police and military may be seen to have overreacted. Unlike

the government, the insurgents do not have to prove anything; they simply have to make the

government appear incompetent. Because of this fact, the insurgents can use falsehoods and

heavy manipulation of information to support their propaganda, while a legitimate government

and campaign will be constrained by the imperative to use only truthful information while

maintaining basic freedoms.

A consequence of all this is the necessity for campaign forces to disclose what may be

considered bad news. Despite the best efforts, errors will be made in COIN campaigns,

including breaches of rules of engagement (RoE) and inadvertent civilian casualties. When

these errors occur, they must be quickly acknowledged and amends made to limit the potential

propaganda value to the enemy. Modern technologies guarantee that bad news will eventually

be disseminated; therefore, it is better to deal with the story and have some control over it than

try to cover it up and have no control when it becomes widely known.

Propaganda must be effectively countered if a COIN campaign is to be successful. Like

all Info Ops, counter-propaganda requires a unified multi-agency approach throughout the levels

of command and must include political direction on approved themes and messages.

Propaganda is effective and cannot be ignored. It is through propaganda that the adversary

increases his popular support, reinforces his narrative, gains recruits and material resources

and ultimately develops legitimacy and credibility.

⁹⁸ Propaganda is defined by the Oxford Dictionary of English (2^nd ed., revised) as a mass noun meaning

“information.” By this definition, friendly Info Ops could be considered propaganda. However, the dictionary definition

also states that propaganda is especially used to denote information “of a biased or misleading nature.” The term

“propaganda” is used throughout this manual in this latter, pejorative sense. The vast majority of this section is

adapted from Brigadier Maurice Tugwell’s doctoral dissertation Revolutionary Propaganda and Possible Counter-

Measures (London: King’s College, University of London, March 1979). See in particular Chapter 8, pp. 295-335.

Brigadier (ret’d) Tugwell graciously granted permission to reference his dissertation during a telephone conversation

with Neil Chuka (DAD-4 contractor) on 13 February 2007.

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The goal of counter-propaganda is to refute insurgent propaganda and to present the

truthful justification for the legitimacy and credibility of the host government. Effective counter-

propaganda is required to convince both domestic and international audiences that the

campaign is legitimate. Public opinion must be considered throughout the campaign by all

levels of command, including the political element. Clearly, PA will play a leading role in

communicating the truth to the international public. The effort to counter enemy propaganda

must explain government strategy and goals, present facts and expose the fallacies of the

enemy message and the illegitimacy of enemy motives.

All propaganda contains some kernel of truth, however miniscule, which is distorted to

play upon the preconceived notions, attitudes and perceptions of the target audience as well as

socio-political trends that have led to discontent. Adversary Info Ops target the same segments

of the indigenous population as friendly Info Ops: the neutral or wavering portions from which

new supporters can be drawn.

Perhaps more importantly, modern information technologies enable insurgents to target

the domestic populations of those states contributing to a COIN campaign. The internet in

particular allows insurgent groups to immediately distribute propaganda internationally, monitor

the political climate and public opinion in campaigning nations and synchronize activities to

maximize effects on the will of the allied domestic public. This is a critical factor because most

contemporary insurgent groups will be politically savvy and understand that it is far easier to

undermine the will of the public in a democracy, and thus the political support for a campaign,

than it is to militarily defeat a superior armed force. In fact, there is much evidence suggesting

that the survival and success of a contemporary insurgent movement is dependent on the

mastery of the use of modern information technologies and the manipulation of international

public opinion.⁹⁹

813. THEMES OF INSURGENT PROPAGANDA

There are a number of overarching themes that characterise insurgent propaganda.

Although some of these themes become more prevalent as an insurgency evolves, the themes

will likely be used simultaneously, targeting different specific audiences, tailored to suit the ebb

and flow of the struggle.

Righteousness. The insurgent cause is right and just and supported by the

divine. This theme is founded in faith and ideas rather than fact.

Hatred. The government or opposing international force is painted as heretical

or morally and spiritually corrupt. Since the government opposes the

righteousness of the insurgent cause and has sought to suppress the people, it

and its agents are deserving of hatred and death.

Inevitable Triumph. Because the struggle is portrayed as a moral and righteous

affair, the insurgency can only end in triumph, regardless of the time required to

achieve victory. This theme is highlighted in conflicts involving fundamentalist

ideologies.

Allegiance. “You are with us or against us” is given as a stark choice. Although

insurgencies only require the ambivalence of the population to exist and thrive,

propaganda will leave no uncertainty about the ultimate requirement to support

⁹⁹ See for example, Clifford Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism

(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

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the cause. This theme seeks to paint those opposing the insurgency as traitors,

cowards or unfaithful apostates.

Moral Certainty. A concept of moral certainty is used to bolster active

supporters of an insurgency. This theme seeks to implant the notion that the

moral high-ground lies with the insurgent and that all acts committed by

supporters are just, both legally and spiritually.

Terror. Although terrorism is a tactic, the theme of terror is used in insurgent

propaganda to coerce assistance from the civilian population and to enforce

discipline within an insurgency. This theme must be supported by violent action

which may be limited in scope but can cause terror out of all proportion to the act

itself.

Martyrdom. Also known as glorification of heroes, this theme will highlight the

actions of insurgents and glorify the fallen to bolster internal morale and impress

the civilian population.

Praise of Violence. Violence is portrayed as a righteous and spiritually

cleansing.

Justified Reaction. All actions are justified as a necessary and just reaction to

government suppression.

Long War. Insurgencies do not succeed overnight, and in order to sustain

support, it is necessary to reinforce the notion of inevitable triumph by

communicating that the struggle will be long and difficult and may span several

generations. This is often portrayed in religious terms to exploit belief in the

transcendental nature of the divine and the afterlife to give strength to religiously

motivated insurgents.

Guilt. This theme is directed at the enemy government and supporters. It will

play upon the sensitivities of the populations of liberal democracies. This theme

is heavily exploited using modern communications technologies to publicize real

and contrived incidents.

Bad Faith. This theme seeks to undermine attempts by the government to reach

out to insurgent supporters and to portray government efforts to improve the lot

of the people as a façade meant to dupe the people.

Security Force Incompetence. This theme will try to demonstrate an inability of

the government to provide a safe and secure environment as well as an

impotence to stop the insurgency. This theme will be supported with violent

actions targeting security forces themselves as well as segments of the

population.

Legitimacy. Insurgencies will ultimately attempt to develop legitimacy through

both deeds and words. Advance insurgent elements will use international

propaganda to paint themselves as a popular representative of populations and

will use reconstruction aid to create this sense of legitimacy.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ An example of this is Hezbollah’s international propaganda campaign in the summer of 2006 and infusion of

reconstruction aid in war-devastated neighbourhoods in Lebanon immediately after the cessation of hostilities with

Israel. The goal was to demonstrate both the illegitimacy of the enemy, Israel, and the powerlessness of the secular

government to provide for the needs of the people.

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Credibility. The ultimate purpose of propaganda is to establish credibility in the

eyes of the civilian population. Developing credibility is an important step to

gaining the outright support of the civilian population.

814. SUMMARY

Commanders and planning staff must understand the aims of insurgent propaganda and

seek to counter these themes and the objectives that they support. They cannot wait for the

propaganda to appear and then attempt to counter it. They must anticipate the messages and

aims of the insurgent propaganda and actively pre-empt them. This will be pre-emption on the

psychological plane.

SECTION 4

INFORMATION OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY

815. GENERAL

The primary influence activities grouped under the Info Ops title are PSYOPS, PA,

CIMIC, PPP and deception. All may be applied in an offensive or defensive sense. All, save for

PPP, are discussed in detail in their respective manuals, which should be read in conjunction

with this chapter. The specific uses of each activity in a COIN campaign are discussed in this

section.

816. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

The primary purpose of PSYOPS is to influence the understanding, perceptions,

attitudes, will and ultimately behaviour of selected individuals or groups in accordance with

mission or campaign objectives. PSYOPS has first order effects on the psychological plane.

Unlike PA, which simply provides truthful information for dissemination by others,

PSYOPS retains direct control over content and dissemination of a message and focuses on a

specific target audience. PSYOPS is not propaganda in the pejorative sense. CF PSYOPS

only disseminates truthful messages. The use of falsehoods or misleading information only

undermines legitimacy over the long-term and is therefore not practised.

Effective PSYOPS requires timely provision of resources such as linguistic, support,

graphics and print capability and various electronic broadcasting means. Mediums for the

broadcast of messages include face-to-face contact, print, radio, television, loudspeakers, the

Internet, faxes, pagers and mobile phones.

PSYOPS is one of the most cost-effective components of a COIN campaign.

Coordinated with other influence activities and fires and properly applied, PSYOPS can ensure

that the indigenous population receives and comprehends the activities and objectives of the

campaign. Strategic-level direction and close coordination between all command levels are

required to seamlessly integrate themes, messages and actions. All messages must be

reinforced with action because deeds and words must not be contradictory. Close coordination

does not indicate a requirement for rigid control. The need for consistency in theme and

message is essential, but it must not be regarded as a requirement for restrictive control of

subordinates.

Although the distributive means may be similar, the purposes of operational- and

tactical-level PSYOPS differ. Operational themes will address long-term objectives. Tactical

PSYOPS should support and reinforce operational themes but may also have very limited

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tactical aims, such as the surrender of insurgents in a specific area. It is only through seamless

integration and coordination of PSYOPS into the overall campaign plan that conflicting

messages can be avoided.

PA is used at the strategic level to communicate information. Modern information

technologies make it impossible to limit the target audience for strategic-level products and thus

preclude the use of PSYOPS at this level. At the operational level, PSYOPS are typically

directed at modifying general attitude sets to alter long-term behaviour. Typically, this will

involve some form of rational argument that may be forcefully or subtly presented. An example

of a forceful message would be continued publicizing of public infrastructure projects in a

province. An example of a subtle message would be the broadcast of popular music targeting

15-25 year olds to emphasize that religious ideals and liberal societies are not incompatible. In

many ways, operational-level PSYOPS can be viewed in marketing terms as building brand

recognition. In essence, the messages and themes are trying to build a relationship between

the target audience and the campaign, that is, the brand.¹⁰¹

Immediately prior to the launch of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, a leaflet campaign was

planned to communicate the purpose of the mission to the Afghan people. The first leaflet

that was to be used pictured B-52s bombing a green valley. The leaflet, almost identical to

one used in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq, was deleted from the campaign at the last

minute out of concern that the pamphlet would create the perception that the Afghan people

were being targeted for retribution for 9/11. Further confusion over the proper use of both

the dissemination method (leaflet bomblets) and the target audience (PSYOPS planners

designed the leaflet for a tactical, not strategic, application) highlights the requirement for

coordination and the need to tailor PSYOPS products to specific audiences.

Source: Christopher Lamb, Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent Operational

Experience (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, September 2005), p. 71.

At the tactical level, PSYOPS will present a concise message geared towards modifying

specific behaviours. The target audience will be more specific than at the operational level, and

emotive and rational arguments may be used in the message. The goal is to cause a target

audience to act rather than to think about and rationalize a message. Examples of tactical-level

PSYOPS are leaflets informing a village of an impending operation or posters hung along

popular thoroughfares demonstrating safe driving behaviour around a military convoy.

A nuanced understanding of the socio-cultural environment in which PSYOPS are

conducted is essential to success. Mere awareness of the socio-cultural milieu is insufficient for

those involved in the conception, design and approval of PSYOPS products. Tribal or clan

relations are also a necessary consideration. Urban operations hold the potential for vastly

different socio-cultural constructs in different neighbourhoods. PSYOPS products must be

specifically tailored to the target audience. The potential for unintended effects is great if an

error in target audience analysis is made.

¹⁰¹ Tim Calkins, “The Challenge of Branding,” in Alice Tybout and Tim Calkins, eds., Kellogg on Branding (Hoboken,

NJ: Wiley, 2005), pp. 1-4. As quoted in Todd Helmus, Christopher Paul, Russell Glenn and Megan McKernan,

Enlisting Madison Avenue: the Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation (Santa

Monica, CA: RAND, Forthcoming 2007). This document is not yet cleared for release to the public.

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PSYOPS products must not endanger the target audience. Depending on a number of

factors, including the security situation, some products may be unsuitable. For example, leaflets

may endanger anyone possessing a leaflet in a locale where insurgents are highly active and

coalition presence is sporadic. In such a situation, another medium such as television, radio or

text messaging may be more appropriate. A poor product is worse than no product at all.

10.

Time is an uncertain ally. On the one hand, PSYOPS themes and messages need to be

lasting and continuous to make an impression; on the other hand, over-prolonged exposure to a

single message may result in boredom and irritation. Fine judgement is needed to draw the line

between the advantages to be gained from the consistent exploitation of a fact or theme and the

dangers of saturation. The audience is not stupid.

11.

Political and military oversight must ensure that PSYOPS and supporting activities are

consistent with the HN and national policies and conform to any specific political guidance. The

psychological dimension of counter-insurgency is so important that a PSYOPS staff officer

should be nominated in all formation headquarters and indeed at the battlegroup level if deemed

appropriate. A staff officer specializing in PSYOPS may work under the G3 (G5 for plans) and

will be in addition to any PSYOPS detachment or platoon commander supporting the formation.

At lower levels, the PSYOPS detachment commander will have the combined role of

commanding his capability, advising the commander and assisting in planning.

817. PUBLIC AFFAIRS

The aim of PA is to protect the credibility and legitimacy of operations and promote

widespread understanding, thereby gaining support for military operations while not

compromising essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). PA accomplishes this task by

communicating information to audiences through the medium of local, national and international

news media and other means. Unlike PSYOPS, PA has no control over the production or

dissemination of the information it presents. Its task is simply to provide information for others

to analyze.

An important facet of any military operation is to communicate the principal themes and

messages while providing a clear and complete understanding of the operation but all the while

maintaining operations security (OPSEC). Although PA is primarily focused on informing and

educating audiences, its impact is much wider. It is therefore essential that PA staff and those

of other Info Ops capabilities work together closely to ensure that a coordinated message is

delivered to the intended audiences and that all of them are coordinated with fires. Particular

attention must be paid to local and regional media and to other media sources that are

influential with indigenous populations. To avoid giving the false impression that the media are

being manipulated in any way, a clear distinction must be maintained between PSYOPS and

PA. However, this does not obviate the requirement of PA to be fully integrated into the overall

plan and to understand the desired effects of influence activities.

In COIN operations, it is essential to conduct media relations in a positive manner. Such

relations must project an accurate and balanced picture of the aims of the campaign in general

and of the role of security forces in particular. They must demonstrate the practical contribution

soldiers are making to the solution of a difficult and frequently hazardous mission. Creating and

maintaining a positive public image of the COIN forces includes countering potentially hostile

media activity.

Operational PA is a G3 staff function and should be coordinated at the level of the

highest formation headquarters in the theatre of operations. Public affairs officers (PAO) are

responsible to the commander for all aspects of news media relations, including the provision of

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suitable facilities for the news media, the nomination of units to embed reporters and the

requirement to escort reporters and provide other resources.

In periods of intense operational activity or during major incidents, the PA section may

need additional support, particularly in urban areas. Sub-units should be prepared to help the

PA personnel in terms of news media escorts, movement and the assistance of the news

media. If the PA office is to provide an authoritative, consistent and credible information

service, the news media office must receive prompt and accurate information from subordinate

headquarters and units. It must also receive early warning of planned operations together with

clear instructions on how to deal with news media enquiries, preferably in the form of a media

response lines or questions and answers.

In many aspects, dealing with the news media is no different in a COIN campaign than in

any other operation. When speaking to the news media, and in accordance with security

regulations, individuals must talk in their official capacity only, about their own job, their own

expertise and responsibility. No statements are to be made concerning government policies,

political decisions or topics likely to be politically sensitive. Nor are they to speculate. A large

number of journalists representing the print, radio and television can be expected to report on

COIN operations. To facilitate an effective two-way passage of information and to better

manage and reduce news media queries, standing orders should give guidance on the limits of

information that can be disclosed. Before any information is passed to the news media, it must

be cleared for release by the appropriate military agency (e.g., G2, G3) and the appropriate HN

or police authorities and where applicable, approved by the commander through the PAO.

No unnecessary hindrance is to be offered to a journalist’s freedom to do his/her job. It

is in the interests of law and order that the news media should have facilities to expose

terrorism, acts of violence and the intimidation of civilians. Members of the news media have

the same rights, liberties and obligations under the law as any other citizen. Furthermore,

enabling a free press presents a positive example to be emulated by HN government agencies

and the populace in theatres where such freedoms are nascent or non-existent. If an on-scene

commander believes that a member of the news media is prejudicing OPSEC, the matter should

be dealt with on the advice of the PAO.

You have no influence with the press if you do not talk to them…Not talking to the press is

the equivalent of ceding the initiative to the insurgents, who [are] quite adept at spinning

information in adverse ways to further their objectives.

—Lt.Col. Ralph Baker, USA, on the importance of engaging domestic and international

media in COIN operations

Source: Ralph Baker, “The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander’s Perspective on Information

Operations,” Military Review, May-June 2006 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Combined Arms Center), pp. 13-32.

818. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is defined as “coordination and cooperation in support

of the mission, between commanders and civil actors, including the national population and

local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and

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agencies.”¹⁰² CIMIC is a coordination and liaison function that facilitates operations in relation to

civil authorities and non-military organizations and leads to activities that support local

authorities. These activities may include reconstruction, infrastructure development,

governance development and mentoring. Because of their ability to inform, demonstrate,

persuade, influence and even co-opt, CIMIC-related activities are influence activities that affect

understanding, perceptions, will and behaviour of the target audience. For example, the

building of essential services and the development of governance institutions will build

campaign legitimacy and influence individuals and groups to create enduring solutions to the

crisis and support the successful outcome of the campaign.

CIMIC and the resulting activities are part of operations, for they deliver a capability that

creates desired effects in support of operational objectives. They are therefore the remit of

operations staff for planning and execution (G/J5 and G/J3 respectively). CIMIC detachment

commanders facilitate related CIMIC assessments and activities.¹⁰³

CIMIC is central to any COIN campaign because the perception of host government

competence and campaign legitimacy must be reinforced. It is often a key capability in

addressing the root grievances of an insurgency. The perception of competence and legitimacy

is tied to security and the ability to provide for the day-to-day needs of the populace. Improving

the social, physical and economic well-being of the populace is a central goal of any COIN

mission. Thus, CIMIC actions aimed at infrastructure development, reconstruction and

assistance to governance are crucial to achieving success.

CIMIC provides information in the form of physical evidence of the legitimacy, credibility

and competence of the host government. CIMIC will comprise a significant proportion of the

deeds that must support the words of a campaign. Failure to follow through on promises made

will alienate the population and damage credibility and legitimacy. Care must be taken that

expectations are not created in the population that cannot be met. CIMIC-related activities

therefore need to be coordinated within the overall plan, in terms of impacts upon civil

audiences and their leaders in order to ensure that activities work to support overall objectives.

CIMIC facilitates cooperation between military forces and the civilian environment by:

Considering and assessing social, political, cultural, religious, economic,

infrastructural and environmental factors in support of military operations and

objectives. CIMIC staff should be a valuable source of information to intelligence

staff in creating a knowledge base of the environment, but CIMIC cannot be

perceived as intelligence gathering assets.

Liaison and coordination with domestic agencies, government officials and

elements of power, international organizations (IOs) and NGOs.

Forging an effective relationship between military and civilian authorities,

organizations, agencies and populations.

It is critical that CIMIC projects reflect the needs and desires of the population.

Moreover, it is pointless to build institutions such as a school or medical facility that cannot be

staffed or funded. A satisfied population is a benign population. CIMIC is a most useful tool to

¹⁰² Taken from NATO Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) 6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions

for Military Use.

¹⁰³ The construct of G9 staff function for CIMIC was sufficient for the conduct of conventional, major combat

campaigns when CIMIC supported operations. With the development of CIMIC as a type of stability operation

and set of activities, it belongs under the G3 staff responsibility.

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address the underlying causes of an insurgency, as it has the potential to directly influence the

day-to-day lives of the people.

During the 1899-1902 Philippine War, CIMIC formed a significant portion of the US Army

strategy to gain the support of the population on southern Luzon. The improvement of civil

government, the building and operation of schools and the provision of medical services

enticed the population back to the villages from jungle refuges. The strategy integrated

native police and village presidentes (mayors) into the effort. This increased support for the

US mission and physically and psychologically isolated the insurgents from the population.

Separated from their sources of food and other provisions and harassed by constant US

patrols, the insurgents were robbed of the initiative and forced to attack US occupied towns

and villages in a desperate and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to defeat the US strategy.

Although not termed “CIMIC” at the time, the improvement of the day-to-day lives of the

populace was instrumental to the success of this COIN campaign.

Source: Brian McAllister Linn, The US Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902

(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), pg. 164.

819. PRESENCE, POSTURE, PROFILE

The appearance, presence and attitude of a force and its overall profile may have

significant impact on perceptions and attitudes, particularly on neutral or potentially adversarial

audiences. Deploying even limited capability to the right place at the right time can add

substantial credibility to messages being delivered through other channels and provide a major

contribution to the deterrence of a threat. Similarly, too heavy a presence with a one-

dimensional, menacing profile may cause misperceptions and mistrust as to the purpose of a

mission. The posture of troops on the ground can demonstrate both commitment and intent and

must be considered and balanced with the requirements of force protection. The decision to

wear berets instead of helmets can make a considerable difference to the perceptions of both

the adversary and local people. The public profile of commanders at all levels will impact on

perceptions, and therefore the public role of the commander must be carefully analyzed and

opportunities used to transmit key messages. Commanders must understand and assess the

attendant risk that accompanies any decision regarding posture and profile against the need to

send a particular message.

The profile and posture of troops will have to be considered carefully in relation to the

local culture. A serious, robust image will help dissuade potential attackers. However, it may

be needed to impress even local, potentially friendly populations who are attracted to symbols of

strength. This profile, however, cannot be the only image presented to the populace. It must be

carefully blended with an approachable, cooperative and protective aspect when dealing with

the local populace and its leaders.

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The Importance of Posture, Profile and Presence in RAMSI 2003

One of the priorities of the Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was to

present a strong, competent, yet friendly, posture that would reassure the populace while

intimidating the warlords and gangs which had undermined lawful order on Guadalcanal.

Initial planning called for the landing of C-130s loaded with infantry simultaneous with the

arrival offshore of the HMAS Manoora. Soldiers disembarking from the C-130s were fully

armed and ready to engage any resistance but held their weapons in a relaxed, non-

threatening manner. Significantly, police and civilian members of the mission arrived with the

initial series of flights, ensuring that the political, military and law enforcement elements were

together at the start. The posture of the soldiers and the presence of the Manoora and other

patrolling naval vessels demonstrated readiness and a decisive military superiority. The

police and civilian political elements successfully created a competent, non-threatening,

reassuring and committed perception with the populace. Moreover, throughout the mission,

off-duty soldiers were allowed only limited freedom to frequent the capital of Honiara to

minimize disruption to the local economy. The early consideration of presence, posture and

profile in the RAMSI planning process proved instrumental to displacing a developing

insurgency.

Source: Russell Glenn, Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance

Mission Solomon Islands (RAMSI) (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2007).

820. DECEPTION

Deception involves measures designed to mislead adversaries by manipulation,

distortion or falsification, etc. Deception is defined as “Those measures designed to mislead the

enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner

prejudicial to his interests.”¹⁰⁴

Deception is a complex art that demands considerable effort, a high level of security and

a sound understanding of an adversary's way of thinking. It is normally used to dislocate the

attention and combat power of an adversary. In operations it can directly contribute to the

achievement of surprise and indirectly to security and economy of effort. Deception will likely

use a combination of physical means (such as a feint or demonstration) supported by other

information cues such as false radio traffic.

Deception is aimed directly and solely at enemy forces and commanders. Although it is

an influence activity, it cannot be confused and associated with those other influence activities

that seek to inform and influence other audiences such as indigenous populations. Deception is

a planning (J/G5) and operations staff (J/G3) responsibility.

Deception is a broad concept that spans tactical camouflage to sophisticated strategic-

level operations. Deception also includes the planting of false information, and commanders

must continually be on guard regarding insurgent uses of deception. For example, an insurgent

could plant false information which could cause an overreaction or inaccurate targeting by

security forces.

¹⁰⁴ NATO AAP 6.

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SECTION 5

CONCLUSION

The success of any counter-insurgency campaign hinges on the support of the

indigenous population. A primary centre of gravity is the neutral and friendly portions of the

populace whose support is vital for campaign success. Info Ops will play a central role in

countering the adversary narrative and disseminating and supporting the friendly message. Info

Ops influence activities will comprise a significant amount of the activities that a military force

undertakes in a COIN campaign.

Info Ops forms an integral part of any operational plan through the use of influence

activities. These influence activities demand complex planning, for they demand consideration

of the effects across a wide spectrum of target audiences and environmental systems.

Understanding how to influence those audiences requires careful consideration by commanders

and staff. Furthermore, all activities eventually create influences. Thus commanders at all

levels, even down to the lowest tactical levels, must understand the lasting impressions and

ramifications, be they positive or negative, intentional or unintentional, that all activities create

on target audiences. In the end, all activities, be they fires or influence, must seek to undermine

the insurgent and build support and legitimacy amongst the populace.

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CHAPTER 9

SUSTAINMENT IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY

SECTION 1

SUSTAINMENT PRINCIPLES AND PLANNING

901. INTRODUCTION

The principles of sustainment remain extant within a counter-insurgency (COIN)

campaign and are just as applicable in that context as in any other campaign. However, the

characteristics of a COIN campaign will cause some to be emphasized more than others in their

application. These principles are:

foresight;

economy;

flexibility;

simplicity;

cooperation;

self-sufficiency;

visibility;

responsiveness; and

survivability.

Given the characteristics of COIN campaigns, with their dispersed nature, their need of a

comprehensive approach and the pervasive threat, the principles that will be emphasized the

most in COIN campaigns will likely be flexibility, cooperation, responsiveness and survivability.

Regardless of the nature of COIN, and indeed partly because of it, the echelon system

of integral sub-unit, unit and formation echelons remains a valuable asset that must be

maintained and used. Failure to use such a system contravenes the principles of sustainment.

902. FACTORS AFFECTING SUSTAINMENT

Some modifications to normal combat service support (CSS) practice and procedures

are necessary to allow for the circumstances under which COIN operations take place:

Dispersion. Non-contiguous deployment of the security forces in small

detachments over a wide area increases difficulty in the provision of support.

There may be a tendency to fragment and disperse CSS units to support widely

deployed security force elements. However, the support of isolated sub-units

and platoons may be a problem better solved by increasing the level of self-

sufficiency through robust A echelons. Nevertheless, some dispersion of CSS

units may be inevitable.

Security. There will be a host of security threats:

(1)

A surface-to-air missile and small arms threat may complicate the

provision of replenishment by air.

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(2)

Dependence on local resources/labour for endeavours such as

construction, purchase, storage and perhaps distribution adds to the

overall security problem.

(3)

Static installations should be sited in an area secured and protected,

commensurate with operational and geographical factors. If the scale

and intensity of the operation warrant the establishment of forward

support groups (FSGs), their elements are likely to be more at risk,

requiring greater security force effort to defend them.

(4)

The greater the amount of air and helicopter lift that is available, the more

it will be possible to cut out intermediate bases with the advantage of

economies in ground resources, convoys, guards and theatre transport.

The use of aviation support will allow rapid resupply of forward echelons.

Where possible, the use of a sea-based echelon would ease some of the

physical security and protection demands.

(5)

With respect to operational security (OPSEC), care must be taken that

CSS preparations do not prejudice the security of information and plans.

Sudden increases in stock levels, exceptional amounts of road, rail and

air movement, the arrival of new CSS units in certain areas and the local

purchase of unusual items are just some examples of changes in a

normal pattern of replenishment which might betray a future operation. A

combination of secrecy, insofar as it is possible to hide CSS preparations,

and convincing deception plans help to preserve security. Discretion in

dealing with contractors and taking care not to discuss operational

matters, especially future plans, within hearing of local labour are

essential if elementary precautions are to keep our intentions secret.

Manpower. Because COIN operations are manpower intensive, there will be

pressure for economy in CSS manpower. While, on the one hand, low rates of

expenditure of combat supplies reduce the CSS burden, the dispersed

deployment of units in a COIN campaign increases it. Manpower limitations may

increase dependence on local labour.

Multi-national Forces. Canada will most likely deploy as part of a multi-national

coalition security force. This could lead to potential coordination and

standardization problems.

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Coordination in Combined Operations: Kabul Multinational Brigade IV/V

Often a COIN campaign will not be conducted by one nation unilaterally; instead, various

nations will work in concert, creating a multinational force. While multilateral actions increase

the legitimacy of the COIN effort, they pose a potential risk of creating coordination and

standardization difficulties.

During KMNB [Kabul Multinational Brigade] IV/V, Canada acted as the head nation of the

NATO-led campaign. As such, the Canadian contingent of the KMNB HQ was forced to

overcome a variety of challenges when coordinating the use of numerous resources, many of

which they had no experience with. For example, these included the AH-64 Apache

helicopter detachment from the Netherlands, CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter detachment from

Germany and UH-60 Blackhawks contributed by Turkey. Although coordination between

these assets was essential, the Canadian staff would have to balance competing needs to

ensure each nation’s operational security.

Intelligence presents an additional challenge in a multinational campaign. The G2 section in

the KMNB consisted of 27 members from various nations, some of which were not NATO

members. As such, various personnel were unable to receive some intelligence, due to their

home nations’ non-NATO status. Consequently, intelligence operators possessed varying

depths of knowledge, depending on their nationality, impacting the groups’ unity and

common operating picture.

Aside from the free exchange of intelligence, security classifications proved to be a difficult

obstacle within operational planning process, as usable intelligence was often Canadian,

British or American in origin. Unfortunately security restrictions often limited or precluded the

German G2 - a key member in planning sensitive operations—from all aspects of planning.

Standardization and unity of effort was facilitated through the adoption of NATO procedures.

Unfortunately, knowledge of standardized agreements (STANAGs) amongst the staff officers

varied, and in many cases, was inadequate. While knowledge of NATO SOPs [standing

operating procedures] pertaining to brigade operations was essential in such an operation,

this knowledge was also deficient amongst participants. To combat this problem, the HQ

undertook a review of the existing NATO SOPs, drafting a detailed document covering all

aspects related to the KMNB.

Through overcoming these challenges, a multinational force can ensure effective,

collaborative operations. For maximum efficiency to be obtained, an acceptance of cultural

differences between contributing nations must occur, while a joint operations doctrine is

respected. Additionally, the implementation of commonly understood and accepted

standardized procedures will ease the multinational effort.

Source: Brigadier-General Peter Devlin, “Canadian Soldiers Deploy to the Kabul Multinational Brigade,”

The Bulletin, The Army Lesson Learned Centre, Vol. 10, No. 2 and Major Dany Fortin, “The Challenges of a

Multinational Headquarters: The Kabul Multinational Brigade,” The Bulletin, The Army Lessons Learned

Centre, Vol. 11, No. 3.

903. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT RECONNAISSANCE PLAN

Given the nature of COIN, it is unlikely that campaigning forces will have to make a

forced entry into the theatre of operations. Thus, the deployment of troops and supporting

reconnaissance parties will have the consent of the standing government. Where no central

authority exists and deployment is supported by an international or perceived mandate, an entry

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may be forced or at least must expect little indigenous support until some sort of permanent

presence and representation have been established.

The reconnaissance plan may have to be adjusted given the situation. It may have to be

conducted from a third nation from which forces may be staged, or it may be the responsibility of

the advance party. Regardless of the situation, the need for some form of reconnaissance and

confirmation of planning details needs to occur prior to the deployment of the main body.

904. RECONNAISSANCE PARTY

Prior to initial deployment to the campaign or in support of a relief in place, a CSS

reconnaissance party will be deployed. It may return prior to deployment of the main body or

remain in theatre to link up with the advance party and main body upon their arrival. Information

would thus be passed back by electronic means. Points to note in the mounting and conduct of

the reconnaissance party are:

The reconnaissance party sent to a new theatre will be organized on a joint

service basis. The party will aim to make early contact with the host nation (HN)

government through the local diplomatic representative. In doing so, an

assessment of the resources available in the theatre must be undertaken to

provide an estimate of the requirements, which must be sent out from Canada.

Ideally, the reconnaissance party will represent the campaign’s comprehensive

approach in that the support elements of other government departments also

deploy in support of their planning. If this is not the case, but the campaign is to

include known agencies other than the military, then CSS planners may have to

consider the sustainment of these other agencies. Ideally, responsibilities

between agencies for sustainment will be clearly delineated prior to the departure

of reconnaissance parties.

The joint reconnaissance party must include a strong CSS element headed by a

sufficiently senior officer who is fully aware of the envisaged operation and of the

CSS requirements to support it. He should have the executive authority to

arrange liaison with the HN and allies, to make decisions and to make

recommendations to the task force commander and, through the diplomatic staff,

to the appropriate HN ministry.

The earlier the reconnaissance party is sent out and the sooner CSS

preparations for the arrival of forces are made, the better.

905.

STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE

J4 logistics staff and other national representation will possibly conduct a strategic

reconnaissance, depending upon the security situation in theatre. The CSS element of the

reconnaissance party must make arrangements with the HN government for facilities and

procedures regarding the reception and logistic support of campaign forces. The following

points must be considered:

Liaison. Liaison procedures for coordinating CSS requirements with the HN,

any other allies and Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) must

be established.

Accommodation and Real Estate. The estimated requirement for operational

and logistic accommodation and real estate must be assessed prior to and during

the reconnaissance. It may be given to the HN’s government liaison or

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representation if such indigenous control and bureaucracy exists. Suitable

locations for deploying forces must be found within their planned area of

operations (AO). It will violate the principles of COIN if forces are located at a

base camp outside of their AO, in which case they will not be able to establish

control of their AO or properly respond to situations. Ideally, it will be arranged

so that forces may deploy directly to their own AOs. The procedures for

obtaining accommodation on loan—by requisition, by leasing or by purchase—

must similarly be worked out with the HN’s authorities with all possible speed.

The availability of local labour, building material, services (electricity, water,

sewage, etc.) must be ascertained quickly.

Provision of Resources. The capacities of the HN or coalition partners to

provide combat supplies, services and consumer items must be determined

before finalizing what must be brought in from Canada or neighbouring countries.

Infrastructure. Availability and capacity of HN infrastructure must be assessed.

This assessment should include the following:

(1)

Port Facilities. As well as berthing, the reconnaissance party should

consider discharge rates using existing unloading facilities and storage

accommodation at and near the main port of entry, unloading and

lighterage facilities at small ports, inland water transport and road and rail

exits. Liaison with the harbour authorities should occur if possible.

(2)

Airports. Agreement should be sought on the main entry airfield and

availability of forward airfields or airstrips in conjunction with the air force

component of the reconnaissance party. Agreement should be reached

on aircraft schedules, leading to a planned flow of troops, reinforcements

and supplies.

(3)

Railroads. Rail transport within the nation must be assessed along with

access from third nations.

(4)

Road System and Network. Roadways need be assessed along with

the measurements and classifications of bridges and tunnels on main

supply routes and theatre entry routes. Border controls and access from

third nations must be assessed.

Arrival of CSS Units. The build up of CSS units must be planned to support the

combat elements as they arrive, taking into account the assistance available from

the HN and other coalition forces.

Accounting. There will be a need for financial staff representation on any

reconnaissance party. Agreement with the host government, if such local

authority exists, will be needed on cost sharing, accounting procedures and

domestic banking facilities.

Operational Reconnaissance. The deploying force J/G4 will conduct an operational-

level reconnaissance as part of a reconnaissance party. This level of reconnaissance may be

combined with the tactical level. The following will be considered:

Firm Bases and Potential Forward Operating Bases. Detailed planning for

the establishment of CSS installations, medical facilities and the siting of unit

camps needs to be concurrent. In conjunction with the intelligence (J/G2) and

operations (J/G3) staffs, it will be necessary to draw up a plan for the provision of

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protection from blast, indirect fires and rocket attack for key or exposed

headquarters, installations, isolated bases and positions.

Allocation of Main Supply Routes. In a country with a limited road network, it

may be necessary to allot time blocks for the road movement of resupply

convoys and routine troop movements.

Level of Self-Sufficiency Required. Based on the deployment of the force

elements, basic load quantities must be established. Despite the establishment

of a centralized support element for the theatre, the integral echelon system of

combat and combat support units must be maintained to ensure adherence to

the principles of sustainment.

Equipment Support. The equipment support plan must be geared to providing

special requirements:

(1)

enhanced electronic repair facilities to deal with extra radios, security

systems, alarms and electronic warfare (EW) equipment;

(2)

modifications to vehicles to be made in theatre (e.g., armouring) along

with local repair facilities; and

(3)

operational stocks must be estimated and maintained with the exception

of significant vehicle casualties from operation.

Security. The G4 must work with the G2 and G3 to establish a responsive and

appropriate security plan for CSS elements, convoys and activities.

Labour. Detailed requirements must be developed for each installation and area

in terms of skilled and unskilled labour.

Interpreter Support. Plans will have to be made to obtain sufficient interpreter

support for the deploying forces. The option of using expatriates should be

considered. Rules of engagement must clearly articulated and make provisions

for the moral obligation to defend interpreters.

Civilian Contractor Services. A determination should be made regarding what

levels of civilian contracting services are appropriate for the initial stages of the

campaign given the threat and availability of in theatre services.

Requirement for the Conduct of Stability Activities. CSS elements will

undoubtedly be expected to undertake stability activities in theatre in support of

certain operational objectives. Possible activities and tasks might include

assistance to other agencies (e.g., delivery of humanitarian aid), the mentoring or

training of indigenous security forces (especially staff and planners) and the

provision of medical services to other agencies and the conduct of local medical

clinics. The anticipated level of support and activities should be forecasted to the

greatest extent possible in consultation with the commander and take into

account his expectations and envisioned scheme of manoeuvre. National

authority is required to undertake activities and tasks such as the provision of

national medical supplies to the indigenous population.

Lack of Host Nation Support. It must be remembered that a situation may exist in

which the HN government lacks real control over ports of entry into the nation or in which a

forced entry is required in order to initiate the force deployments into the theatre. In such cases,

the reconnaissance may be limited to neighbouring third nations. CSS bases may have to be

established in neighbouring territories until the initial entry force has secured sufficient bases

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and routes to allow the deployment of CSS elements. The initial entry force will have to be self-

sufficient and resupplied by air or sea until the echelon system can deploy forward to ground

bases.

SECTION 2

SUSTAINMENT AND RESOURCES

906. SUSTAINMENT SYSTEM

In developing the sustainment system and architecture in support of the campaign, the

G4 staff must:

Decide on the stock levels to be held in the echelon locations and the self-

sufficiency level of units to provide for:

(1)

the predicted intensity of operations;

(2)

the length of time by which the echelon system can be established to full

capacity within theatre;

(3)

a cushion of reserves to meet interruptions in the replenishment system

by insurgent action; and

(4)

the changing dependency of units.

Demand commodities through the national authority or contract through the HN

and work out a movement and distribution plan to transport materiel from the

entry points to the base installations.

Organize distribution for commodities in the operational areas and allocate

dependency for units based on the nearest or most appropriate source of supply.

Arrange rail transport, road convoys, inland and coastal water transport, fixed or

rotary wing airlift and/or air dropping.

Along with intelligence staff support, conduct an assessment on the insurgent

threat to CSS units and the means of resupply.

Confirm resupply procedures, methods and levels of security and protection to be

implemented.

Develop a traffic control and route protection plan. In conjunction with the G3

staff, it will be necessary to arrange:

(1)

escorts and pickets;

(2)

route opening and closing policies and procedures; and

(3)

avoidance of a routine and predictable pattern of convoy movements in

areas where there is high risk of insurgent attack.

Determine locations and procedures for distribution points and transition between

echelons.

Advocate for enlargement and reinforcement of echelons at unit level in order to

provide for an increase in unit self-sufficiency, robustness and force protection.

Determine unit and sub-unit responsibility for the movement of material from the

distribution points to their own areas. Units may require helicopter lift or even

pack animals in difficult country.

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907. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Situational awareness (SA) is critical to sustainment in COIN operations. Enemy forces

will likely put a high priority on destroying or disrupting CSS elements as they will be seen as

soft, predictable targets. CSS units down to the lowest level must have the ability to react

immediately to enemy action and changing support requirements.

SA also demands that up-to-date and accurate figures be known for sustainment

requirements of the lower echelons. Robust communications on dedicated administrative nets

from unit level upwards will provide such SA and allow for a suitable balance between push and

pull replenishment. In times of deployment and engagement, the command net is too busy to

support communications for administrative, recovery, evacuation and sustainment needs.

908. REPLENISHMENT THROUGH AIR, AVIATION AND SEA BASING

In certain situations—be they influenced by terrain, threat or a combination of other

elements—fixed or rotary wing aircraft may become the method of choice for replenishment for

the following reasons:

Forces can be supplied in inaccessible areas, thus avoiding the necessity for a

vulnerable surface supply route.

Troops are better able to move with light scales of equipment, unencumbered

with echelon transport, thus exploiting the principle of flexibility to give them a

good level of tactical mobility.

Subject to the capacity of the airlift resources, weather and terrain air

replenishment is quicker than overland resupply.

Reserve stocks can be reduced and held centrally, allowing the establishment of

fewer but larger bases situated in more secure areas.

Reducing the dependency on surface routes lessens the risk of ambush and cuts

the convoy protection commitment. Aviation replenishment may become the

preferred method in situations of high threat.

Rapid casualty evacuation improves wounded soldiers’ chances of survival, thus

improving morale.

The urgent needs of the civilian population in isolated areas can be met quickly.

Aerial delivery (parachute or unmanned aerial vehicle [UAV]) means of replenishment is

less economic than air or aviation landed resupply but is often necessary in very broken country

where there are no landing zones, even for helicopters and for covert Special Forces. The

penalties for air dropping are that the recovery of parachute equipment may be difficult or

impossible and there may be a risk that the supplies fall into insurgent hands.

Landing strips and helicopter landing zones (LZs) should be constructed whenever

possible and as soon as possible to economize in airlift. It should be standard operating

procedures (SOP) that whenever a forces stops or plans a deliberate activity, such as a cordon

and search, helicopter LZs are designated (initially from the map and confirmed once on the

ground) in order to support emergency evacuation.

There is a need for close cooperation between the CSS, operations and air staffs. A

detailed analysis will have to be conducted regarding the threat to aviation and air and the

general, routine demand that will be placed on air and aviation resources.

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Consideration should be given to the concept of at least initially basing CSS elements

and supplies at sea, from which they can operate in a fairly secure manner. This will be a

possible solution early in the campaign, however, once security forces have established a firm

base and begun to expand, CSS echelons will have to be deployed forward if the campaign is to

be conducted for any length of time.

909. USE OF LOCAL RESOURCES

The maximum use of local resources to reduce the CSS lift resources deployed from

national resources must be made. Simultaneously, care must be taken not to cause shortages

in the HN’s home market and consequent price rises, although this must be balanced against

the advantages to be gained by boosting the local economy. If the civil population suffers from

increased shortages and inflation, the campaign will loose legitimacy and the insurgents will be

handed a ready grievance to exploit through propaganda.

910. SECURITY

Insurgent Infiltration of Labour. It must be assumed that hostile intelligence agents

will infiltrate local labour. At the very least, their supporters will exist amongst ready labour

pools. It will be difficult for incoming units and security sections to distinguish between loyal and

disloyal elements. To reduce the potential threat to base installations, ports, airports, roads and

railways, reliance must be placed on good unit and installation security and an efficient local

vetting system. The method of vetting must be agreed with the host government, whose police

and security units may be largely responsible for its implementation. The system may never be

foolproof, and measures must be taken to guard vulnerable installations from attack and to

prevent the leakage of plans and intentions. All soldiers, especially CSS troops employing

civilians, must be carefully briefed on security matters.

Protection of Labour. Labour must be protected from insurgent attack and intimidation.

If the HN cannot provide suitable protection, additional forces may have to be deployed in an

escort and protection role. Rules of engagement must clearly reflect the moral obligation to

protect civilian labour in the employment of campaigning forces. This is especially important for

interpreters employed with combat units.

Installations. CSS installations must be suitably sited for security and defence, and

they must be effectively guarded. In the best case, the HN will provide protection. If this is not

possible, extra forces may have to be provided because CSS units do not normally have

sufficient personnel to carry out their functions and guard themselves except against the lightest

of threats. Nevertheless, CSS troops must be sufficiently well trained in combat skills to be able

to defend themselves.

SECTION 3

PERSONNEL

911. MORALE

Soldiers and their Families. Troops will often be operating in small groups for long

periods in trying conditions often out of regular contact with their families. Soldier’s families may

be worried by press coverage of action and casualties in the areas where the soldier is

stationed. When a campaign lasts for a considerable time, lack of progress may discourage

soldiers and their families. The insurgents may try to aggravate a discouraging situation with

propaganda means. With or without hostile propaganda, rumours spread and may be difficult to

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dispel or refute when troops are deployed in small detachments over a wide area. Families will

require regular updates and reassurance regarding the conduct of the campaign. This is best

furnished by home units and garrisons.

Promoting Good Morale. Morale is a key element to the moral component of a force’s

fighting power.¹⁰⁵ While motivating soldiers by pointing out good and sound reasons for the

conduct of the campaign itself and the need for continued, patient commitment is the duty of the

commander and a function of leadership at all levels, certain other measures can be taken to

help maintain morale. They include:

Reliable information services, Internet and national and local newspapers.

A quick and frequent mail service to and from home.

Welfare telephones and Internet services at reasonable rates or free.

Access to television and radio receivers.

Gymnasium equipment in protected areas where outdoor recreation is not

feasible.

Local leave centres in secure and attractive surroundings, if possible in a

temperate climate, and periodic home leave if sustainable from a mission and

manning perspective.

Responsive unit rear parties that take appropriate action to preclude problems

with families and family support. Many problems or frustrations can be avoided

through thorough family pre-deployment briefs that lay out the points of contact,

manage expectations, articulate limitations to available support services and help

families create their own support networks.

Confidence in a robust and efficient casualty evacuation and treatment system.

A rapid and efficient system for notifying relatives of deaths and casualties as

they occur.

912. MEDICAL SUPPORT

Providing medical support for small and widely scattered detachments places a strain on

the medical services. The problem can be alleviated by consideration and implementation of

the following:

refresher training for all ranks in combat first aid;

training at least one member of isolated detachments in advanced first aid and

providing such trained soldiers with additional medical supplies and the means of

stabilizing casualties;

providing sufficient combat medics, even down to rifle platoon level;

provision for quick casualty evacuation on all operations, including armoured

ambulances and aviation, especially in urban areas, remote areas or on routes

subject to insurgent targeting; and

¹⁰⁵ For further discussion of fighting power and its components, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations.

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CHAPTER 10

COUNTER-INSURGENCY TRAINING

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

Training for conventional campaigns provides a sound basis for the conduct of counter-

insurgency (COIN) operations in terms of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for offensive

and defensive activities. However, in preparation for COIN, there is a requirement for additional

training that is campaign and mission specific. This training and preparation across all ranks is

as much intellectual as it is physical. Not only do units and sub-units have to undertake skill

training in preparation for the likely tactical tasks (stability activities such as urban presence

patrolling, cordon and searches and vehicle checkpoints) but they have to be trained in the

principles unique to COIN, the importance of the support of the civilian populace and the

importance of local cultural and social dynamics.

It must be remembered that doctrine for COIN operations will provide guiding principles

and methods for the conduct. The most successful armies in COIN operations have not treated

doctrine as dogma but have afforded commanders trust and confidence and freedom of action

within the allocated mission. Sound TTP can be identified and practised prior to any

deployment, but TTP will change rapidly in a theatre of operations as the insurgents come to

learn the TTP used by security forces and vice versa. Commanders at all levels must be

flexible and dynamic, and lessons learned at the lowest levels must be passed quickly for wider

implementation.

SECTION 2

OPERATIONAL-LEVEL, JOINT AND COMBINED TRAINING AND PREPARATIONS

The military is only one of many agencies that will be used in the conduct of COIN. It is

vital that the agencies involved in a comprehensive approach plan, train and prepare to the

greatest extent possible in order that responsibilities and requirements can be identified and

addressed prior to deployment.

At the earliest opportunity, all agencies and civilian and security forces should come

together to conduct joint training. In some cases, the military may have to take the lead in the

education of agencies less knowledgeable in the conduct of COIN. This training can begin with

seminars and conferences before developing to actual field exercises. Standing points of

contact and positions for liaison teams can be identified in much of this training.

All security force elements designated for COIN operations should come together at the

earliest opportunity. Training should begin with seminars and war games for leaders and

progress to tactical field exercises for all levels. Incorporating other COIN partners may be

useful during such seminars and war games so as to provide the most accurate scenario

possible and to become familiar with expectations.

Such early collaboration across agencies will help a unity of purpose become a unity of

effort.

Training in simulated environments and in the field should encompass full-spectrum

operations. Hence, field training exercises (FTXs) should, whenever suitable, ensure that

scenarios reflect the continuum of operations and the required changes to force structures,

tactics and intellectual challenges. For example, a scenario may begin with entry into a major

combat campaign and then progress to an insurgency situation that will require a greater

balance between offensive, defensive and stability operations. This will force commanders and

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soldiers at all levels to adjust their plans, orders, TTP and mindsets in order to reflect the

changing scenario.

Training with coalition partners will readily identify differences in approaches and

methods in a COIN campaign and will identify potential for liaison positions, particularly in the

early stages of a campaign. This will also offer the opportunity to circumvent some of the

coordination and standardization problems routinely encountered.

1001. LESSONS IDENTIFIED DURING CAMPAIGNS

It is vital that as actual campaigns progress, lessons identified are captured, assessed

by doctrine staffs, schools and training systems and then implemented pervasively. This will

require formal and informal reporting methods, the submission of detailed after-action reports,

their widest dissemination and staff visits to operational theatres. Formal links between

lessons-learned staffs, doctrine writers, training authorities and trainers need to be established

and exploited.

Commanders in the field must be forthright in lessons learned and honest and candid in

the acknowledgement of errors so that others may learn, missions may be better accomplished

and unnecessary loss of life avoided.

SECTION 3

TRAINING PRIOR TO UNDERTAKING COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Training plans in preparation for a COIN operation should consider inclusion of the

following:

Training in TTP for COIN operations, with great emphasis on the sub-unit level,

probably in a non-contiguous battlespace. There must be an emphasis on junior

leader training. Computer based training in simulated environments offers very

little benefit for section and platoon commanders. Their skills will only be truly

developed when leading their subordinates through physical and intellectual

challenges, ranging quickly across the full-spectrum of operations.

Instruction in the root causes, grievances and conditions that led to the

insurgency and reasons for the motivations of the non-committed populace. The

need to gain the support of the population must be placed foremost in the mind of

the soldiers and their commanders, and they must come to understand that all

their actions will be seen to either build or undermine campaign legitimacy and

public support.

Instruction in the insurgent operational techniques, their TTP, structures and

equipments. All forces, particularly those of the echelons, must be made aware

of and trained in the pervasive, asymmetric threat that is posed by insurgent

forces.

Acclimatization and environmental training, reflective of the planned operational

theatre.

Cultural training regarding the indigenous populations to be encountered, their

customs, laws, beliefs, etc., including their motivations for supporting or not-

supporting the insurgency.

Specialist training required to expand the force capabilities in urban operations,

intelligence operations, psychological operations (PSYOPS), civil-military

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Counter-Insurgency Training

cooperation (CIMIC), the local language(s), health aspects, improvised explosive

devices (IEDs) and mines.

The marry-up of specialist detachments such as public affairs and PSYOPS to

the units and formations to which they will belong during the deployment.

The use in training of PSYOPS and other influence activities so that they may be

integrated with fires in a routine and seamless manner.

The skills required for human intelligence (HUMINT) collection through presence

patrolling and other stability activities. Soldiers and their commanders must

understand the important role that they play in gathering information and

intelligence for the development of targets and measures of effectiveness.

Intensive training to ensure physical fitness, as troops acclimatize more quickly if

they are in good physical condition upon arrival in the theatre.

Intellectual training for all ranks to ensure that they all understand the unique

aspects of a COIN campaign, the potential operational and strategic impacts that

low-level decisions and actions can have and the need to influence the will of the

local population in order to support the campaign.

Rules of engagement (ROE) training.

Media training.

Crowd control operations (CCO). The use of CCO equipment, which can cause

death if not used correctly, and CCO TTP cannot be learned in theatre, at the

time of its employment. It must be part of pre-deployment training and refreshed

in theatre.

Training teams from units already in theatre or just recently returned and reverse

technical assistance visits (TAVs) should be used to train on the local situation

and up-to-date TTP and threats.

Good tactical training will prepare soldiers well in the conduct of a COIN operation. At

the same time, however, commanders must ensure that all ranks, particularly those in daily

contact with the populace, understand the pervasive threat posed by insurgents and the vital

importance of gaining and holding the support of the local populace.

SECTION 4

IN THEATRE TRAINING

When deployed on operations, training must continue and commanders must ensure

that they allocate appropriate time, resources and supervision to it. Commanders should

ensure that regular refresher training of TTP, ROEs and equipment is conducted in theatre

throughout the mission. In addition, commanders and staff should consider the following:

Reconnaissance and advance parties must quickly assess the operational and

tactical situation and identify any aspects in training that troops may have not yet

covered or that require greater emphasis. If these training requirements cannot

be met prior to deployment, then they must seek training venues for the units to

use following their arrival but prior to operational commitment. Temporary battle

schools may be established by the in theatre force to provide training to troops,

on new enemy TTP or equipment, which was not available for pre-deployment

training. Staff planners must balance the training need with the need to at least

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begin to undertake tactical operations in support of the besieged authority and a

coalition commander.

Commanders may precede their main bodies and be attached to units already

committed to operations. The lessons they learn can then be used to hone final

training or guide in theatre training. Commanders need not return home but may

marry-up with their troops once they deploy.

Physical fitness training should continue in theatre to any extent possible.

Physical fitness will save lives.

Troops should be given regular situation updates in terms of the overall mission

and campaign progress and their contribution to it. They should be briefed on

what measures are proving successful, and they should be given feedback as to

the usefulness of the intelligence that their patrols are providing. This will keep

the troops motivated and focused on the success of the mission.

Units engaged in COIN campaigns should undergo continuous training at all levels to

ensure that basic individual and collective skills are maintained to a high standard. Particular

attention should be paid to the maintenance of individual skills during periods of little activity.

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Suggest Readings

SUGGESTED READINGS IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY

As well as these books, there is an enormous body of periodical and academic journal

literature on counter-insurgency. While the books below will provide a solid foundation

for understanding insurgency and counter-insurgency, the reader is encouraged to look

to some of the material in periodicals, much of which is available online.

Anderson, David. Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of

Empire. New York: Norton, 2005.

A multitude of variables influence insurgencies. This volume provides a look at some of

the legitimate grievances that may drive an insurgency, including some of the self-

interested parties in the colonial government, and some of the less than palatable

techniques used by British counter-insurgents in Kenya.

Armstrong, Karen. Islam. New York: Random House, 2000.

This book provides a comprehensive and easy to understand introduction to Islam, its

origins, history, and sects.

______________. The Battle for God: A History of Fundamentalism. New York:

Ballentine, 2001.

This work documents how fundamentalism has taken root and grown in all three of the

monotheistic religions. A useful volume to provide a basic understanding of the root

causes of radicalised religion and to provide context for one of the major factors in

contemporary global affairs.

Asprey, Robert B. War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History. New York: Morrow,

1994.

A comprehensive overview of guerrilla warfare, from the Scythians to the Afghan-Soviet

War, this volume helps develop perspective on insurgency and counter-insurgency,

forms of warfare that are often characterised by the layman as ‘new’.

Bickel, Keith. Mars Learning: The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine:

1915-1940. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001.

This work examines details the process that led to the creation of one of the best and

most durable military doctrinal manuals ever produced, the US Marine Corps Small

Wars Manual. Bickel’s book details the operations, lessons learned, and bureaucratic

process that led to the creation of the manual.

Birtle, Andrew. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine

1860-1941. Washington: Centre of Military History United States Army, 1998.

This work documents the initial COIN operations engaged in by the US army and their

impact on advancing the evolving doctrine. Part I of a detailed study of the origins of US

Army counter-insurgency doctrine.

_________. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine

1942-1976. Washington: Centre of Military History United States Army, 2006.

Building on the first volume, Birtle continues his analysis of US Army counter-insurgency

practices, and the effect of operations upon doctrine. These two books are critical to

understanding the roots of the oft-criticised counter-insurgency practices of Canada’s

most powerful ally.

Clifford, Bob. The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media and International Activism.

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Clifford Bob’s recent study helps to detail the relationship between insurgent groups,

information technologies, the media, and non-governmental organisations. This book

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Counter-Insurgency Operations

rejects dominant views that needy groups readily gain help from selfless

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Instead, the author argues that they face a

Darwinian struggle for scarce resources where support goes to the savviest, not the

neediest.

Bohannan, Charles and Napolean Valeriano. Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The

Philippine Experience. Westport: Praeger, 1962.

Written by two officers who fought as guerrillas against the Japanese occupation of the

Philippines in WW II and who went on to defeat the Huk rebellion in later years. This

work examines the means to assess the strengths and weaknesses of insurgencies with

a focus on the importance of intelligence in combating insurgent movements

Charters, David, and Brig. (Ret’d) Maurice Tugwell, eds. Armies in Low Intensity

Conflict: A Comparative Analysis.London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1989.

This edited volume is a comparative analysis of how Western armies adapted to

unconventional roles and missions in the post 1945 political-military environment of low

intensity conflict.

Elkins, Caroline. Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya.

London: Henry Holt and Company, 2005.

A detailed account of the brutal counter-insurgency techniques used alongside more

palatable efforts by the British in Kenya. Elkins’ work is founded on new archival and

field research that counters the common view of British post-WW II COIN as a universal

model to be followed in contemporary times. This book must be read to understand the

entirety of past British COIN techniques so that alternatives to unsuitable techniques can

be devised for modern COIN operations.

Galula, David. Pacification in Algeria: 1956-1958. Santa Monica CA: RAND,

1963 (2005).

Galula reconstructs the story of his highly successful command in the Algerian district of

Greater Kabylia, at the height of the rebellion, and presents his theories on

counterinsurgency and pacification. In the process, he discusses the larger political,

psychological, and military aspects of the Algerian war, and provides a context for

present-day counterinsurgency operations.

______. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. New York: Praeger,

1964 (2006).

Galula builds upon his first study for RAND to "define the laws of counterinsurgency

warfare, to deduce from them its principles, and to outline the corresponding strategy

and tactics." His book provides an analysis of how to undermine insurgency and the

broad elements that the counter-insurgent will likely face.

Geraghty, Tony. The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict between the IRA and British

Intelligence. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2000.

This work explores the role of British Intelligence and the SAS in Northern Ireland. A

useful study that details the complexity in the use of intelligence and special forces in

combating an insurgency in urban terrain, underscoring the requirement and

effectiveness of intelligence-driven operations.

Glenn, Russell. COIN in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance

Mission, Solomon Islands (RAMSI). Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2007.

This study is an example of a recent and ongoing COIN campaign that highlights the

importance and effectiveness of the comprehensive approach to operations. A number

of highly relevant points are drawn out by the author, including the role of criminal

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Suggest Readings

elements in destabilisation, the importance of intervening at the earliest stages to halt

budding insurgencies, the absolute necessity for careful consideration of influence

activities throughout a campaign, and the critical role of law enforcement in COIN.

Gunarathna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Beverly

Books, 2002.

This book, which details al Qaeda’s leadership, ideology, structure, strategies, and

tactics, is useful to understand the difference between insurgency and global terrorism.

The two are not the same, and personnel deployed on counter-insurgency must

understand how to differentiate between terrorists and insurgents and the role of al

Qaeda-like terrorists in modern conflict.

Hennessy, Michael. Strategy in Vietnam: The Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I

Corps, 1965-1972. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997.

The US Marines in Vietnam conducted some of the most successful COIN in the

Vietnam War while simultaneously fighting a conventional war of attrition against regular

units of the North Vietnamese Army. This book helps draw out the fact that there are

highly relevant lessons to be learned from the Vietnam War at the political, strategic,

operational, and tactical levels of command. Of great interest should be the development

and application of the CAP program, the US Marine version of the tache d’huile

technique of COIN in a rural setting as well as an enemy strategy that successfully

employed a comprehensive approach to operations.

Jalali, Colonel A, and Lester W. Grau. The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen

Tactics in the Soviet Afghan War. Volumes I-III. London: The Military Press, 2000.

This three volume series outlines the operations of the Afghan Mujahideen resistance

during their struggle against invading Soviet forces. This series is critical to

understanding the learning process and origins of tactics that continue to be used in

Afghanistan to this day on the exact same terrain as in the Afghan-Soviet War.

Kitson, General Sir Frank. Bunch of Five. London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1977.

This work discusses General Kitson’s personal involvement in a variety of British

conflicts, specifically focusing on Oman, Kenya and Malaya, to provide a first hand

account of the implementation of COIN strategy.

Kitson, Frank. Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping.

London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1971.

This work outlines the why non-traditional methods will not defeat an adversary in low

intensity operations before delving into particulars regarding the army’s contribution and

the preparation required.

Lawrence, T.E. Revolt in the Desert. U.S.A.: Tess Press, 2004.

An abridgement on Lawrence’s Seven Pillars of Wisdom, this work offers insight into the

author’s First World War experience with irregular troops in the Arabian Desert.

McAllister Linn, Brian. The US Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War,

1899-1902. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.

In this book, Linn details the complex environment faced by the US Army as it began its

occupation of the Philippines after Spain's defeat, looking at the shape of both the

insurgency and US counter-insurgency activity in different parts of the Philippines. Not

all the US efforts were successful and this volume provides a useful contrast between

different methods as well as the role commander personality can play in COIN.

Mockaitis, Thomas. British Counterinsurgency in the Post Imperial Era. Oxford:

Manchester University Press, 1995.

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Counter-Insurgency Operations

This work offers a history of the development of British counter-insurgency principles

and practices since 1960. Through case studies in Borneo, South Arabia, Oman and

Northern Ireland, Mockaitis links emerging British approaches to internal conflict to

colonial and post colonial policies.

Mockaitis, Thomas. British Counterinsurgency 1919-69. London: MacMillan, 1990.

Here Mockaitis discusses the differences between insurgency and counter-insurgency,

along with the learning process inherent in the British evolution from Imperial Policing to

counterinsurgency, and subsequent Lessons Learned.

Nagl, John A. Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya to Vietnam: Learning to Eat

Soup with a Knife. Westport, Conn., and London: Praeger, 2002.

In this popular book the author compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine

and practice by the British in the Malayan Emergency to that of the US Army during the

Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975. Nagl argues that the ability to analyse operations, learn

lessons and adapt as an institution is critical for any military to succeed in COIN.

Newsinger, John. British Counter Insurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland. New

York: Palgrave, 2002.

Newsinger highlights the successes and failures of British COIN in the post-WWII era

highlighting both the useful and brutal techniques employed. This book provides a

balance to other works that tout the ‘British model’ as the ideal COIN methodology to be

followed in the modern era.

O’Neill, Bard E. Insurgency and Terrorism—Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare. New

York: Brassey’s, 1990.

This author systematically dissects insurgency and terrorism, examining the nature of

revolutionary war, strategies used by terrorists and insurgents, and supporting factors

before providing a framework so one can understand the nature of a particular conflict.

Paget, Julian. Counter-Insurgency Campaigning. London: Faber and Faber Limited,

1967.

In this work Paget, who fought in a number of the post-WWII British COIN campaigns,

emphasises the need for political supremacy in COIN, while outlining the various factors

affecting counter-insurgency operations.

Carment, David and Martin Rudner, eds. Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players,

Extended Boundaries. New York: Routledge, 2006.

This book is an edited collection of essays that evaluates the role and dynamics of

intelligence in peace support operations. It considers the intelligence requirements for

successful PSO and is applicable to COIN as well. The book also addresses the roles of

coalition forces, law enforcement agencies, development institutions and NGOs that

commonly influence operations.

Phares, Walid. The War of Ideas: Jihad Against Democracy. New York: Palgrave

MacMillan, 2007.

At a broad level, this book can help the reader understand the role of the narrative in

motivating people. It highlights the role of ideology in contemporary conflicts and the use

of information technologies and the manipulation of the media by ideologues.

Smith, M.L.R. Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican

Movement. London: Routledge, 1995.

This work examines the evolution of the complex military strategy of the IRA over the

entire length of the conflict in Northern Ireland. It is an excellent study of the internal

struggles common to insurgent groups as well as the critical importance of words and

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Suggest Readings

deeds in propaganda targeting both the will of the indigenous population and that of the

security forces.

Tanham, George. Communist Revolutionary Warfare: From the Vietminh to the Viet

Cong. USA: Fredrick Praeger, 1967.

This work, whose author managed the US rural development program in South Vietnam,

was among the first major published analyses by an American expert on the insurgency

in Indochina. In addition to tracing the Chinese influence on the Vietminh cadres and the

French military response, the book describes the organization, logistics, and tactics of

the communist movement.

Taylor, Philip M. Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda From the Ancient

World to the Present Day. 3^rd Edition. Oxford: Manchester University Press, 2003.

Taylor, one of the foremost authorities on propaganda, traces the use of propaganda

throughout history. A highly readable book, this study illustrates the importance of

synchronising words and deeds when conducting influence activities.

Thompson, Sir Robert. Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and

Vietnam. St. Petersburg FL: Hailer, 2005.

This work presents keys to victory and success in COIN operations waged against

communist structured insurgencies, based upon the author’s experience in Malaya.

Trinquier Roger. Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, New York:

Praeger, 1964.

A classic of COIN literature, Trinquier examines how French officers in Indochina fought

fierce rear-guard actions against ideologically motivated insurgents in the 1940s and

1950s, revealing COIN techniques and tactics from a French perspective.

Tse-tung, Mao. On Guerrilla Warfare. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1961.

In this book Mao discusses the differences between guerrilla and "orthodox" military

forces, as well as how such forces can work together for a common goal. Other topics

covered include propaganda and political concerns, the formation of guerrilla units, the

qualities of a good guerrilla officer, discipline in a guerrilla army, and guerrilla bases.

Tugwell, Maurice. “Revolutionary Propaganda and Possible Counter-Measures” PhD

Dissertation, London: King’s College, March 1979.

Brigadier Tugwell, who has operational experience with the British Army in a number of

COIN campaigns, dissects the role and features of ideological propaganda through the

use of historical case studies. This is one of the best works examining propaganda, the

role of narratives, and the importance of coordinated words and deeds in motivating

fighters as well as undermining the will of the adversary. Available through inter-library

loans.

B-GL-323-004/FP-003

Release Notes

Document Title: DRRS Software User Manual (SUM)

Software Version: 4.5.12

Document ID: DRS.CD.SUM-070

Document Release Date: 19 February 2010

CURRENT UNIT STATUS

New Features

• In the Personnel grid the Billet Code, Skill Match, Deployability, and Modified columns

are now hidden.

• Unit Long Name is now displayed (with tooltip hover) for all grids in Current Unit Status.

• A new tab labeled "Authorized" has been added to the bottom pane displaying

authorized billets for the unit in view in order of skill name (position title), and rank.

PORTAL

Bugs Fixed

• Fixed issue with incorrect Watch List Height/Width resizing occurring for values

between 0 and 22.

• Corrected the text on the Contact Support Center text page regarding the hours of

operations.

QUICK SEARCH

Bug Fixed

Fixed issue of Quick Search Personnel displaying the primary MOS for Secondary MOS and

Tertiary MOS. This has been updated to show the correct values.

DATA

Bug Fixed

Fixed issue of Quick Search Personnel displaying the primary MOS for Secondary MOS and

Tertiary MOS. This has been updated to show the correct values.

DRRS Software User Manual (SUM) 4.5.12

Table of Contents

Preface

Document Overview

Document Conventions

xxii

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 3) - page 19