Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 3)

Describing an Insurgency

The value to removing or killing an insurgent leader must be carefully considered. The

costs involved and the undesired secondary effects (collateral damages, etc.) may outweigh the

tactical and operational advantages gained. Indeed, a powerful and charismatic leader open to

a negotiated settlement may be of more value alive, in terms of reaching an enduring end-state.

213. POPULAR SUPPORT

The cause and the leader must appeal to as wide an audience as possible. Those who

are uncommitted or hostile to the cause must be persuaded or coerced to join the cause. Some

may have to be killed to persuade the others. Popular support is important from a political point

of view and essential to the provision of intelligence, logistics and to support a protective

security screen around the insurgents’ clandestine organization. The need to garner a decisive

level of popular support, or at least pervasive acquiescence, is necessary for eventual success.

214. ORGANIZATION AND ACTORS

Insurgent groups often possess a cellular organization that both enhances force

protection and enables decentralized command and control. The cellular organization will limit

the numbers of personnel who know the actual names and locations of key actors of the

insurgency but still allows directives to be carried out. Thus if one or even multiple cells are

compromised, the threat to the overall organization is limited. The cell structure will extend to all

of the active supporters of an insurgency, including facilitators outside of the actual geographic

region where the insurgency is occurring. Although the cell structure is a very old method of

organization, modern information technologies increase its effectiveness by facilitating

networking and enhancing command and control in high risk environments.

Within an insurgent organization, the primary classes of actors are the top leaders,

lieutenants, foot soldiers and recruiters.²³ Ancillary classes of actors include external suppliers

and facilitators, financiers, heads of supportive states, supportive population segments and

sources of moral and religious support.²⁴ The most important of these are the committed actors

and the sympathizers that may reside in either the primary or ancillary classes of actors.²⁵

Alongside the primary and ancillary actors are people who play a more ephemeral or

transient role. There is much evidence from recent conflicts, including Iraq and Afghanistan,

that insurgent and terrorist groups have paid, non-ideologically committed civilians to support

operations. In particular, this has included substantial remuneration for such things as sniping,

placing improvised explosive devices and other booby traps, launching rocket-propelled

grenades (RPGs) and conducting suicide attacks. Insurgent groups will exploit unemployed or

disaffected members of the populace by offering remuneration that may in fact represent the

only viable means of supporting families. As well, the old maxim of “the enemy of my enemy is

my friend” will likely hold true in any conflict where multiple, disparate actors are involved,

particularly in societies where tribal affiliations are stronger than any national identity. The

support of all of these actors is transitory because of the lack of ideological ties to the

²³ Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins, Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002),

p. 13-15, figure 3.3.

²⁴ Loc cit.

²⁵ Fred Burton, “The Psychological Battlefield,” Stratfor Intelligence Report, 10 August 2005.

http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/print.php?storyId=253467. Accessed 13 June 2006.

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insurgency. As such they represent an ideal target for influence activities to dissuade behaviour

at odds with host nation government and campaign objectives.

Many, particularly the younger members, will join an insurgency out of peer pressure, a

willingness to gain a sense of belonging or a sense of adventure. Insurgents will actively recruit

based on these desires. The popularity of such choices is increased when unemployment rates

are high. Again, such non-ideologically committed individuals are key targets for influence

activities that seek to dissuade support for the insurgency.

215. NARRATIVE

At the basis of an insurgency is a narrative that contains an idea and founding cause for

the insurgency. It motivates the primary and ancillary actors and allows the idea to be

formalized as an ideology. The narrative will be a plausible story that illustrates real or

perceived historical or extant injustices and grievances. The narrative will present a vision,

mission, strategy and goals that purport to resolve and redress those injustices. It is a highly

motivational tool that exploits grievances, culture and beliefs in order to further the insurgent

aims.

In combination with actions, the narrative is used to attract devotees and supporters.²⁶

The narrative will justify insurgent actions and may advocate for the use of violence to achieve

political goals and eventually justify actions, even atrocities. Furthermore, it will be used to paint

the existing authority and power structures as the logical result of the injustices that are

described through the narrative. Similar to propaganda, most narratives will possess, at the

very least, a kernel of truth but may also include substantial amounts of mythology and may

illustrate a utopian ideal as an ultimate goal. The narrative may be published as a manifesto,

religious edict or in some other form, or it may simply be passed verbally.

Narratives underpin much of human thought. Narratives (or stories) influence the ability

to recall and understand history, motivate people to act, temper emotional reactions to events,

cue certain heuristics and biases, structure problem-solving capabilities and ultimately perhaps

even constitute individual identity.²⁷ Narratives form not only the basis of insurgent

organizations but also of terrorist groups, national identities, culture, society and a host of other

things to which humans often cling in order to develop feelings of inclusiveness and identity.²⁸

Sub-narratives also form a substantial part of the overall narrative. This is true for all

individuals and groups. A further broad example is religion. All religions possess substantial

narratives and, indeed, the devotion of followers is predicated on faith in what is in essence a

story and, for branches and sects, the belief in sub-narratives that are offshoots of the primary

story. A narrative is not necessarily untrue, but neither can it be unquestioningly accepted as

completely factual.

²⁶ Brigadier (ret’d) Maurice Tugwell, “Revolutionary Propaganda and Possible Counter-Measure,” PhD. Diss.

(London: King’s College, University of London, March 1979), p.307. Brigadier Tugwell, who continues to hold

complete copyright on his dissertation, graciously granted permission to quote from his work during a telephone

conversation on 13 February 2007.

²⁷ William Casebeer and James Russell, “Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive ‘Counter-Narrative

Strategy,’” Strategic Insights, Volume IV, No.3, March 2005 (Monterey CA: Center for Contemporary Conflict,

US Naval Postgraduate School). http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/mar/casebeerMar05.pdf Accessed

November 2006.

²⁸ Walid Phares, The War of Ideas (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), p. xiii.

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Narratives exist in all situations and cultures. For example, Canadian narratives and

sub-narratives include, true or not, such notions as hockey as Canada’s national sport,

Canada as a nation of peacekeepers, and the dollar “loonie” coin embedded in the ice

at the Salt Lake City Olympics.

The power of the narrative cannot be underestimated. Information operations (influence

activities) must work to counter the insurgent narrative and its supporting propaganda.

Countering the narrative will require the symbiotic use of words and deeds that seek to redress

the grievances exploited by the insurgent narrative while promoting the desired narrative of the

host-nation government and coalition.

216. CONTEXT OF AN INSURGENCY

Beyond the five basic tenets listed above, it is essential for a COIN campaign to consider

and comprehend the insurgency’s context. Circumstances will often dictate what an insurgent

can and cannot do. For example, several uprisings that slavishly copied revolts in Russia or

Cuba were dismal failures. The Spartacist revolts in Germany (1919) and Che Guevarra’s

attempts in Bolivia (1967) failed given that ideologically based campaign plans did not fit the

socio-political context of either environment. Nonetheless, a population that is dissatisfied with

its conditions in general and holds the perception of a weak government can provide fertile soil

for a skilled insurrectionary leader with a popular cause and competent organizational support.

A well led and organized insurrection may, if the government commands a wide

measure of support and can rely on its security forces, devolve into a protracted competition of

attrition. Such an attrition campaign may still succeed if the insurgency can gradually erode the

will of the government’s supporters at home and persuade public opinion amongst its foreign

allies that the government’s cause is hopeless or too expensive to support.

217. FACTORS AFFECTING THE CONDUCT OF AN INSURGENCY

The factors affecting an insurgency can be as important as the tenets of the insurgency

itself and will contribute significantly to the end results if carefully applied. The factors are:

Protracted War. Although a weak government may fall quite quickly to a well-

organized rebellion, or even overnight to a coup d’état, a strong government may

only be defeated by a war of attrition. Time is on the side of the insurgent. In a

rural-based insurgency, the territory supports a gradual occupation of a country,

as demonstrated by Mao Tse-tung in China. While the urban guerrilla’s

operating environment is not so permissive, its inability to occupy territory can be

partially overcome by establishing “no-go” areas within cities. Here the strategy

is based not on an outright overall military victory but upon creating war-

weariness, emphasizing economic privation and demonstrating the inability of the

government to provide security.

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Choice of Terrain. Given the relative weakness, in relation to the government’s

standing army, an insurgent force is compelled to make best use of terrain.

Without the ability to seize and hold ground or to quickly achieve victory, space

and time became weapons rather than goals for the insurgent.²⁹ As such,

insurgents utilize the terrain to their advantage. This terrain will include

populations in which to take cover. They will make best strategic use of space

and attack their enemy in their rear or echelon areas.

…the guerrilla’s greatest advantages are his perfect knowledge of an area (which he himself

has chosen) and its potential, and the support given him by the inhabitants.” To turn this

defeat into a victory, the counter-insurgent must recognize that “this total dependence upon

terrain and population is also the guerrilla’s weak point.

Source: Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of COIN (New York: Praeger, 1964), cited in Robert R.

Tomes, “Relearning COIN Warfare,” Parameters (Spring 2004), pp. 18-19.

Intelligence. The insurgency threat picture is vastly more complicated than most

other forms of conflict given the wide range of elements, influences and factors

involved in an insurgency. Unlike conventional warfare, where mass fires and

manoeuvre may potentially substitute for comprehensive intelligence and

planning, neither the insurgency nor COIN can afford that luxury. For the

insurgent, the best source of intelligence is a sympathiser working for the

government, preferably in security-related employment. The media may also

contribute to the insurgent’s information-gathering process.

Establishment of an Alternative Society. The aim of imposing an alternative

view of society is common to all insurgent organizations. These viewpoints may

be motivated by nationalist, religious or political beliefs. While nationalism

presents an emotive call of patriotism to replace a government portrayed as

ruling against the country’s interests, religious viewpoints promote a remoulding

of society along religious, dogmatic lines. Political motivations, regardless of the

supporting ideologies, are enhanced by a simple desire for power. Support for

these alternative perspectives will not be solely internal, as external support may

be received from sympathetic nations.

External Support. Insurgencies are seldom successful at obtaining their goals

without external assistance. As such, outside support of both foreign populations

and governments is enlisted for the insurgency. Sympathetic governments may

assist the insurgent openly, through providing diplomatic support, or

clandestinely, by supplying weapons and training assistance. Even if a

government is unwilling to lend support to the insurgents, groups may appeal

directly to the foreign populace, notably ex-patriot communities, through the use

of propaganda aimed to appeal to popular sentiment. The resulting sympathetic

population may pressure their home government, engage in protests or sign

petitions, all increasing the insurgent support base. The insurgent can then use

these overseas actions as propaganda to increase local support. Sympathetic

external populations often also prove to be a good source of financial support.

²⁹ John Shy and Thomas W Collier, “Revolutionary War,” Makers of Modern Strategy, Peter Paret, ed.

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pg. 839.

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Concurrent Activity. The leadership will attempt to wage the insurgency on

political, economic, propaganda and military fronts simultaneously. This ability to

simultaneously conduct its range of activities enhances the effectiveness of the

insurgents’ overall operations, thus creating a synergy. This has the additional

effect of heightening the public’s perception of its cohesion and capability. As

such, the insurgency that looks and acts like a competent parallel state,

increases its ability to become the state.

218. WEAKNESSES AND ASPECTS OF INSURGENT VULNERABILITY

There are usually many potential weak points within an insurgency. These are

particularly apparent in the early days of a campaign, when the insurgency is vulnerable to

some form of pre-emption, dislocation and disruption by COIN forces:

Secrecy. Any group planning to use force and violence to prosecute its aims

must adopt a secretive, conspiratorial approach to its planning and actions.

While such discretion may add a degree of glamour and attractiveness to

potential recruits, this secrecy can quickly become counterproductive. Adverse

implications include affecting the necessary freedom of action, lowering

confidence in similar insurgent groups and readily lead to serious

misunderstanding within the organization. Consequently, a balance must be

struck between a too secretive and clandestine approach to insurgency actions

and the need to avoid undue attention from the authorities or rival groups. Some

insurgencies have attempted to minimize this difficulty by creating a more public,

political arm. For example, there is the Irish Republican Army’s (IRA’s)

associated political arm, Sinn Fein.

Gaining Support. Gaining popular support for the cause can be a difficult and

sensitive stage in the evolution of an insurgency. If the publicly accepted reason

for rising against the government has appeal, it would seem that the insurgency

would therefore thrive. Unfortunately, various groupings and factions may hold

varying opinions, requiring different techniques, including possible compromises

and/or intimidation, to gain their support. Indifference, antipathy and likely fear of

government reprisal also have to be overcome. Publicity dramatically improves

the prospect of gaining popular support, as even bad publicity can advertise that

a group is resisting, consequently expanding recruitment.

Secure Operating Base. Insurgents require a secure base from which to

operate. Selecting a location distant from activity centres may be potentially

more secure for the insurgents but may also put them out of touch with the

population and make them vulnerable to isolation. Alternatively, close proximity

likely eases the security force tasks of surveillance, infiltration and destruction.

Establishing an operating base in a border region can often provide temporary, or

perhaps permanent, headquarters beyond the reach and authority of the state.

Funding. All insurgencies require some degree of funding in order to acquire the

staples of conflict: weapons, ammunition, food and medicines. Lack of sufficient

funds can limit the scope of an insurgency, inhibiting its prospects for success.

Accordingly, state authorities must utilize this weakness to their advantage,

aiming to dismantle the insurgents’ funding mechanisms. Lacking a friendly

nation or individuals to back the insurgency, funding can be found in criminal

activities such as narcotics trafficking, robberies and extortion. While the illegal

drug trade in particular has proven to be a more enduring source of income than

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bank robberies, it brings the movement into contact with unreliable, vulnerable

groups who can attract undue attention from the authorities. Insurgencies will

attempt to gain income from low-profile, high turn-over criminal sources such as

movie and music pirating. External support may also have a political price

affecting the overall aim of an insurgency.

The Problem of Changing Aims. Changing aims is not a substantial problem at

an insurgency’s onset but has a potentially damaging effect once an insurgency

has been operational for some time. Indeed, changing aims is common when an

insurgency is still coalescing. Initial operations may change the outlook of a

number of insurgents, with some questioning the price of the overall aim

particularly if security force successes spread doubt about the cause or the

insurgency’s leadership. A seemingly generous compromise offered by the state

to the insurgents could prove divisive; forcing insurgent leaders to apply ruthless

measures to ensure that unity and secrecy are preserved. Changing aims can

be further problematic given the aforementioned secrecy, which may spark

misunderstanding and suspicion throughout the insurgency.

Setting the Pace. Controlling the pace and timing of operations is vital to the

success of any campaign. Given that insurgents can control the start of

operations and have some measure of control over subsequent activity, it is

surprising to note that many insurgencies have failed to capitalize on

opportunities or have allowed the pace of events and scope of activities to be

dictated by the state authorities. Once momentum is lost, the strategic initiative

returns to the state, leaving the insurgency exposed.

Informers. While informers have sometimes been infiltrated into insurgent cells,

it is far more common to achieve success by persuading the insurgent to become

an informer. This is someone already in the organization, or is a link between

clandestine cells and their public accomplices, such as the couriers or suppliers.

There is nothing more demoralizing to the insurgents than to fear that one of their

trusted comrades is giving information to the government. Insurgent leaders will

try to pre-empt the recruitment of informers by ruthless exemplary punishments.

Lack of Moral Authority. Given its use of violence and the fact that an

insurgency will normally be related to and involved with criminal elements, its

leadership will be vulnerable to attacks on its moral authority and claimed

superiority. Its susceptibility to this will depend upon the culture in which the

insurgency occurs. This lack of moral authority must be pointed out to the

supporting and neutral populace. Furthermore, to exploit this weakness, COIN

forces must not only conduct their campaign from a standpoint of moral

superiority, in terms of conduct and application of the law of armed conflict, but

must advertize this fact through public affairs and psychological operations. This

will help to undermine the insurgency and its supporting narrative.

SECTION 3

INSURGENT METHODS AND END-STATES

219.

INSURGENT TACTICS

The deliberate promotion of adverse publicity against government agencies and security

forces is essential and complementary. This aspect has proven more effective with the growing

trend towards political groups using civil liberties and human rights to lower the tolerance of the

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public for harsher COIN measures. The insurgents’ claim to legitimacy is based on their

declared ability to improve the position of the oppressed. The essentially violent nature of

insurgencies moves in two concurrent complementary paths, one destructive and the other

constructive, as follows:

Destructive actions are clearly aimed at overthrowing the established order and

creating a climate of collapse in the states’ authority. Destructive activities

include subversion, sabotage of the economic framework, terrorism and guerrilla

activity and large-scale combat operations.

The constructive effort, meanwhile, aims at creating an organization to

subsequently replace the established order at a suitable moment.

Subversion. Subversive activity attempts to undermine the political, economic and

military strength of a state without resorting to the use of force by the insurgent. Such activity

may provoke violent countermeasures, to be denounced as an overreaction by the authorities,

thus discrediting the government. As such, subversion probably poses the most difficult and

dangerous threat to a government engaged in a COIN campaign. Subversion takes many

forms, such as penetrating existing political parties and organizations and developing front

organizations that can have the appearance of challenging and defying the authority of

government. An insurgency will seek to win supporters within the government, especially the

security elements, in order to discern future plans and possibly any other economic and

financial information. These types of information are all useful for an insurgency to exploit as

required, particularly in the early days of an insurrection.

Insurgent Information Operations. Propaganda is a key element of subversion. It

includes publishing information detrimental to the government or security forces and the

spreading of rumours, whether true or false, designed to undermine trust and confidence in the

government.

Passive Resistance. Depending upon the society in which the insurgency is operating,

passive resistance may be a useful tactic. It is more effective in liberal societies, given an

authoritarian regime’s ability to crush such open dissent. Examples of passive resistance

include withdrawing labour from public services, obstructing the law or sit-ins in public places.

These measures to gain political change do not alone indicate an insurgency, which by

definition uses violence to acquire change. However, insurgent leaders will encourage passive

measures on behalf of the larger population in order to undermine the authority of the

government and disrupt civil society through agitation. They may also seek to provoke violence

during public demonstrations in hopes of causing an overreaction by the government forces and

creating another claim to injustice and a sense of alienation and frustration amongst the

populace.

Sabotage. Sabotage is disruptive activity that furthers the insurgents’ interests. It may

be active or passive.

Active sabotage sees insurgents set out to disrupt important services, functions

or industrial processes by violent means. Targets may be selected at random for

political or economic impact, or they may fit into a wider tactical plan with the aim

of increasing general confusion and tying down troops in the static defence of

installations. Suitable targets include bridges, roads, telephone lines or

dispersed military logistics sites. Targets whose destruction might cause mass

unemployment and thereby lose the goodwill of the people are in general

avoided.

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Passive sabotage is generally aimed at causing disorder and disruption by

deliberate error, contrived accident, absenteeism or strikes. The target can be

industry, public services, supplies or troops, where action is usually planned on a

wide scale through political front organizations. Data sabotage is facilitated by

the universality of computers in government, business and industrial control

systems. These can be carried out through cyber attack or by having an

insurgent or sympathizer physically damage the system.

The Tactic of Terrorism. Terrorism is a tactic. Despite the attention that it receives,

terrorism is a tactical level undertaking; however, one that is normally used to influence the

situation at the operational and strategic levels. It may be used by individuals, groups or states

as part of a larger operational objective and strategy to intimidate and coerce governments,

societies or elements of each. Terrorist actions call attention to the perpetrators and their

causes and may help them win support of potential sympathizers. Terrorism is used to strike at

civilian targets which normally have limited means of self-defence.³⁰ The more spectacular or

outrageous the action, the louder it speaks. Terrorist attacks seek to undermine the legitimacy

of the indigenous government and security forces by demonstrating their inability to counter the

threat and prevent attacks. Thus, the key effect of terrorist attacks is psychological, in that they

seek to shape the perceptions of various audiences, locally, regionally and internationally. The

physical damages caused are simply the means of sending their message. Through the

resulting psychological impact, terrorist attacks seek to force policy changes or specific actions

by the effected governments. For example, at a tactical and operational level, they may seek to

cause an over-reaction by local security forces, thereby giving testimony to claims of

discrimination and bias against the perpetrating group. At the operational and strategic levels

they may seek to force a nation to withdraw its forces from a coalition campaign. Terror tactics

may include assassinations, bombings, hostage-takings, kidnappings, hijackings and sabotage.

The method chosen will try to exploit a perceived weakness within the adversary or to attack

what was thought to be a strength in order to heighten the psychological effect. Terror tactics

evolve with new technology and the availability of weapon systems, and seek to exploit

globalization, often through international criminal organizations. The speed of global

communications has supported and enhanced the messages that the perpetrators send through

their use of terror. These changes have served to strengthen the traditional network-based cell

structures favoured by organizations that use terror. This in turn reduces the efficacy of certain

traditional countermeasures, such as leadership targeting, and makes penetration more difficult.

In short, recent developments in the nature of global communications have made terror a

cheaper and more effective tool than in the past.³¹

³⁰ Bard O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolutionary to Apocalypse, 2^nd ed., Revised.

Washington DC: Potomac, 2005. p. 33.

³¹ Allan Castle, Trans-national Organized Crime and International Security, University of British Columbia

Institute of International Relations Working Paper No. 19, November 1997.

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Terrorism is a tactic that may be used by a number of irregular threats including

insurgents. The importance of terrorist acts is not in the act itself, but in the message

that it sends to various audiences. It is fundamental to the propaganda campaigns of

many insurgent groups. One expert on insurgent propaganda, retired British Brigadier

and academic Maurice Tugwell noted the following regarding the messages that

terrorist acts can transmit to various audiences:

“The nineteenth century anarchist Bakunin coined the phrase, ‘Propaganda of the

deed’ to describe an act, usually of terrorist violence, committed more for its indirect

effect upon public opinion than for any direct benefit arising from the act itself. Mr. Paul

Wilkinson has suggested that “the terrorist by his act of violence is telling the world,

‘We are here. Look what we can do. Heed us or there is worse to come.’ We may

comment that this message is the one intended for ‘enemies’ and that the same act is

telling ‘neutrals’ and ‘friends’ other things. To ‘neutrals’ it may say: ‘We are here. See

how the weak oppose the oppressors. Obviously our cause has justice on its side.

Support us.’ And to ‘friends’ it may impart this message: ‘We are here. Look how the

mighty forces of the oppression fade before our blows. There is no cause to fear them.

Victory will be ours. Join.’”

Every enemy action, even a seemingly irrational one such as a terrorist bombing of a

crowded market, is conveying a message, often at the strategic level, to various

audiences and is part of a larger propaganda campaign.

Source: Brigadier (ret’d) Maurice Arthur John Tugwell, “Revolutionary Propaganda and Possible Counter-

Measures,” Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, London: King’s College, University of London, March 1979,

p. 22.

Insurgents who employ terrorism will justify its use in a number of ways. Among other

ways, terrorist acts will be justified as legitimate by portraying them as altruistic

because the act is supposedly for a greater good and that it is the only weapon

available given the enemy’s superior military capabilities. Historically terrorists have

sought to distinguish themselves from common criminals because of adherence to and

support for what they believe to be a legitimate cause and that those who die

committing such acts are martyrs who’ll be remembered for their sacrifice. These

justifications have been used by groups throughout history, including Irish nationalists,

Jewish settlers desiring the creation of a Jewish state, Sri Lankan separatists, and

extremist Islamists of both the Sunni and Shia sects.

Source: Bruce Hoffman Inside Terrorism, rev. ed. NY: Columbia University Press, 2006; Roger

Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, Westport CT: Praeger

Security International, 1964, 2006; Bard O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to

Apocalypse, 2^nd ed, rev., Washington D.C.: Potomac, 2005.

Fund Raising. The insurgents’ operating budget for weapons, medicines, political

bribes and other requirements will be substantial. An indicator of a developing insurgency

should therefore include fund-raising efforts. In the early stages, this will probably be covert and

criminal, such as bank robbery. Subsequently, the political organization within the insurgency

will take on the task of extracting aid from well-intentioned, charitable and philanthropic

organizations and from sympathizers abroad. More violent methods may include, the extorting

of ransom from individuals (kidnapping) or from governments (hijacking) and perhaps the

enforced levying of taxes on intimidated sections of the population. Finally, as has been

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demonstrated by the PLO and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), a

mature insurgency can develop a parallel socioeconomic order, which may attain a level of

political legitimacy greater than that enjoyed by the legal government in the eyes of the local

populace.

Some criminal organizations blur the line between lawbreaking and insurgency. For

example, the Cali drug cartel funds an insurgency in Colombia through narco-terrorism

that has spin-off economic benefits to the local growers of the coca plants. The sowing

of this general disorder helps allow freedom to operate for the drug cartel.

Source: Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks (New

York: Seven Stories Press, 2005). See especially Chapter 2 “The Macroeconomics of Terror,” pp. 13-29

and Chapter 3 “The Privatization of Terror,” pp. 31-48. Napoleoni examines and catalogues the methods

and effects of various insurgent movements’ linkages, if not outright involvement, with narcotics trade and

other forms of parallel socioeconomic structure and activity.

Weapons and Equipment. Insurgents tend to use basic weapons whose essentials

have not changed very much since the 1940s. Beyond simple availability, selection criteria are

based upon compactness, lethality and simple operating procedures. The following should be

noted:

Personal weapons are principally pistols, carbines, rifles and weapons with a

high rate of fire. In recent times, weapons and bombs have been miniaturized,

explosives harder to detect and more lethal, accompanied by a dramatic increase

in improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Insurgents generally have access to a complete range of combat support

weapons. Sniper rifles utilizing armour-piercing ammunition are being seen more

frequently. Improvised mortars are easy to make, although they are usually

inaccurate and unreliable. Most require some form of “flat bed” for

transportation. Acquisition of military mortars and ammunition significantly

increase the range and lethality of such weapons. Rocket-propelled grenade

(RPG)-type anti-armour weapons proliferate. Portable air defence missiles pose

a significant threat. The mere possession of air defence weapons, particularly

man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), by an insurgent group will

disrupt the government use of helicopters.

Explosives in various forms are the favoured weapons of insurgents. Military

mines, both anti-personnel and anti-tank, are frequently utilized by insurgents.

They have the dual purpose of hampering COIN forces’ efforts while terrifying the

local population. Insurgency forces are increasingly using IEDs. The

effectiveness of these weapons is well known, and expertise in their manufacture

and handling is often of a high order. Sophisticated initiating devices, anti-lifting

mechanisms and innovative tactical placement (including secondary IEDs) are

becoming common. Furthermore, any incident, bomb or hoax, can be used as a

bait to kill security forces and disposal specialists. Recently, the suicide bomber

has emerged as a particularly effective weapon. The suicide bomber is in effect

a precision weapon that also demonstrates the degree of the insurgent’s

commitment.

Sophisticated chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons will

likely remain beyond the capability of insurgent groups. Since the release of

Sarin gas in Tokyo subway in 1995, the potential for insurgents to use crude

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CBRN devices must be considered. Such a capability is to be expected only in

an insurgent group already employing terrorist tactics.

220. INSURGENT TACTICS IN A RURAL ENVIRONMENT

Rural insurgencies continue as the allocation of land, water or other scarce mineral

resources continues to provide a real or perceived grievance, particularly in areas where there

is a burgeoning population and a malevolent government. Insurgent bases will be established

in remote areas, often in difficult terrain (mountains, jungles, forest, etc.), from which attacks

may be launched over as wide an area as possible to disperse scarce security resources.

These actions may be mistaken for banditry. Under the pretext of protection against such

banditry, isolated villages will be prepared for defence, including the discreet clearance of fields

of fire. Other indications that a campaign is developing include hoarding supplies, training and

arming of village “self-defence” groups and increased evidence of local intimidation and

coercion.

In its early stages, a rural insurgency relies upon small bands assembling for a limited

attack, probably against a remote and inadequately guarded target. As the movement grows to

the stage where it can command significant support from the local population, so its objectives

will become more ambitious and larger forces will be necessary. The relative strength of

insurgent bands will always place them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the security forces, and they

will seek to avoid a pitched battle. Their tactics are therefore based on mobility and surprise,

generally using ambushes and explosives.

Rural populations are vulnerable to terrorism and intimidation, and very quickly a feeling

of insecurity can spread throughout a whole region. Such intimidation is common within rural

insurgencies because of the population’s relative physical isolation from the protective security

forces and the government’s presence.

Ambush is the most widely used insurgent tactic. It is particularly effective against road

movement, especially when the ground makes it difficult for the government forces to move off

the road and take cover. In addition to sniping and massed fires ambushes, there is a growing

trend in ambushes featuring IEDs and suicide bombing.

221. INSURGENT TACTICS IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT

With the degree of urbanization increasing globally, encountering urban insurgencies will

likely expand. Urban populations are vulnerable, providing relatively small insurgent forces with

the opportunity to create an atmosphere of fear and insecurity sufficient to discredit the

government.

In the urban environment, insurgents do not normally plan to occupy and control

territory, although they may seize small areas for a limited time to establish a presence from

which they can subsequently receive support. Lacking the ability to occupy territory on a

significant scale, insurgents will aim to make the government’s position untenable by

engendering a state of war-weariness, frustration and anger against government emergency

measures. Under such conditions, the people may rally to any organization or leader who offers

stability.

Cities and towns provide great scope for insurgencies. The concentration of a large

population in a relatively small area provides cover for the insurgents, although they may find

support only in certain areas. Additionally, the needs of a great city, related to the complexity of

urban living, could find a city brought to its knees through the interruption of power supplies,

non-collection of rubbish or the cutting off of water.

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For these reasons, the urban insurgent can operate more boldly than his rural

counterpart, and his tactics reflect this. Intimidating the local population, as seen in rural

insurgencies, also occurs in urban environments. In this setting, population density facilitates

the insurgents’ audacity, as they are able to readily disappear amongst the populace. However,

this too is a double-edged sword, for population density may also be used to advantage by the

COIN forces in the recruitment and placement of agents and in the stealthy infiltration of patrols.

The ready availability of large numbers of people in urban areas enables insurgents to

engineer demonstrations and assemble crowds with relative ease. The emotions of the

demonstrators can then be readily manipulated, often in an effort to provoke an overreaction by

security forces. Women and children may be purposely included in a demonstration because

they lend a certain legitimacy to the event, are easier to gain sympathy from observers and may

help create an enormous propaganda victory if the insurgents succeed in provoking a

government overreaction that causes civilian casualties.

Countering an insurgency in an urban area offers a number of challenges to the COIN

forces, particularly given the density and complexities of an urban environment. However, if a

city is an “urban jungle,” then it too consists of a number of villages or local areas. Each urban

area may be divided into almost self-contained sections. Few individuals live throughout an

entire city; instead they live, work, socialize and worship in the same local area, often within

walking distance. The terrain analysis and knowledge base established by intelligence

assessment should work to identify the urban delineations and their internal power structures.

222. INSURGENT COMMUNICATIONS

Given the political aims and secretive nature of insurgency, communicating is critical.

Contact amongst the insurgents is accomplished through small, surreptitious groups or cells.

Insurgents make extensive use of secure methods, such as dead-letter drops or coded graffiti.

In addition to the methods below, they will also use political literature such as manifestos,

magazines, posters and circulars communicate. Today, modern mass communications facilitate

the task of the insurrectionary leader and supporting cadres. They can gain secure

communications within their organization and stage broad appeals to the mass audience

provided by the public. Therefore, a modern military seeking to defend its parent or foster

society must be prepared to exploit modern media and deny its use to an opponent. Currently,

insurgents are known to employ modern communications as follows:

Cellular Telephone and Hand Held Radios. The mobile phone and similar

devices have become ubiquitous in the developing world. Insurgents use them

for communication and deception. Veiled speech and false information are used

to compensate for and even exploit the open nature of these types of systems.

Radio. Radio is an increasingly used component of control as well as a means

of passing information or propaganda. Underground radio stations may

disseminate propaganda or order crowds out for demonstrations. They may also

use radio frequencies to detonate bombs.

Television. Almost every insurgent group has used television directly to

promote their cause or indirectly, ensuring that incidents are newsworthy enough

to be reported on television. It is no coincidence that the steep rise in terrorist

and insurgent action has taken place at the same time as the growth in

television. The distribution of video tapes also enormously enhances an

insurgent cause, as seen by the linkage between certain media outlets and

terrorist organizations.

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Media. Coded messages may be included in newspaper advertisements,

articles in magazines or on posters or circulars to convey instructions to cells,

perhaps in conjunction with the dead letter box system. Such messages may be

used to pass information when time is not essential for the execution of an

operation or to inform an insurgent of the time and date a pre-planned attack or

incident is to be staged.

Internet. The World Wide Web is being used increasingly within insurgencies.

Not only can it be used for propaganda purposes but also as a tool to pass along

terrorist and insurgent techniques and procedures. Insurgents are increasingly

publishing their versions of events in order to attract support and show their

strength, often through video clips of attacks on security forces or killings of

kidnapped government supporters. Such websites thus become a primary

source of intelligence, as analysts seek indicators of insurgent morale,

noms-de-guerre, various factions and their motivators or ideologies, which may

then be useful for negotiations or PSYOPS targeting.

SECTION 4

CONCLUSION—A MEDICAL METAPHOR FOR AN INSURGENCY AND COIN

An insurgency may be compared to a communicable disease. The insurgent ideology

and its popular support are spread through a population by exposure to the equivalent of risk

factors: the exploitation of legitimate grievances, propaganda and the insurgent narrative.

Agents for the spread of the “disease” are memes—behavioural practices passed on by

imitation. Many individuals, especially young people, are not necessarily drawn to an

insurgency out of ideological commitment but rather through social and cultural associations

between family members and friends.

A communicable disease is countered through a holistic and systematic approach

involving a wide range of means: changes to behaviour and the environment, such as the

reduction of risk factors; isolation and quarantine; inoculation; and, treatment of the clinically

infected.

Figure 2-4: An Insurgency Spread as a Communicable Disease³²

Just as a communicable disease may be treated in a number of ways, we can extend

the metaphor to illustrate how a COIN strategy may be applied to resolve an insurgency:

³² This construct was adopted from a briefing by LtGen P.K. Van Riper, USMC ret'd during the USMC JOINT URBAN

WARRIOR EXERCISE 2005 given to the COIN study group.

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Changes to Behaviour and Environment. Just as the spread of a disease may

be curtailed through changes to behaviour and the environment and the removal

of risk factors, the same idea may be applied to stop the spread of an

insurgency. Grievances and circumstances that fuelled the insurgency’s start

and that continue to lend it credence and support must be resolved.

Isolation and Quarantine. Just as those who are infected with a disease are

often quarantined, COIN forces and policies must seek to separate insurgents

from the populace. This will firstly cut off support from the populace, but more

importantly, will help preclude the “infection” of others and thus an increase to the

insurgency membership. The insurgents must be isolated both physically and

cognitively from the populace. In the latter sense, this will rely upon defensive

information operations and attacks against insurgent communication and

propaganda means.

Inoculation. Those not infected with a disease are inoculated. Likewise, whilst

legitimate grievances are being resolved, information operations will be needed

to counter the ideological infection of the populace with the narrative and

justification for the insurgency.

Treatment. Those who have been infected by a communicable disease undergo

treatment. In the case of those supporting an insurgency, a number of means

may be required. Ideally, influence activities (information operations) may be

used to persuade and dissuade insurgents and their supporters to pursue

peaceful and legitimate means to resolve their grievances. It may even be

possible to convert some insurgents to support the military forces of the COIN

forces. In other cases, committed insurgents unwilling to surrender may have to

be captured, killed or marginalized to the point that they are ineffective.

In order to properly and effectively counter an insurgency, one must truly understand the

motivations, aims, strategies and context of the insurgency. Moreover, one must understand

the culture in which the insurgency is occurring. This is vital, for the overall goal of the COIN

campaign is to solve root causes and to convince the vast majority of the populace to support a

legitimate process and to reject the insurgency. This can only be done within the context of the

culture at hand.

The solution to an insurgency is a political one, which will require a comprehensive

approach incorporating a wide variety of agencies with the military in a supporting role. This is

reflected in the philosophy and principles that frame the conduct of a COIN campaign.

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CHAPTER 3

COIN PRINCIPLES

The first thing that must be apparent when contemplating the sort of action which

a government facing insurgency should take, is that there can be no such thing

as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity.

At the same time there is no such thing as a wholly political solution either, short

of surrender, because the very fact that a state of insurgency exists implies that

violence is involved which will have to be countered to some extent at least by

the use of force.

—General Sir Frank Kitson, reflecting upon his experiences from

campaigns in Kenya, Malaya, Oman and Cyprus.

301. INTRODUCTION

No insurgency has been defeated solely by military means. Successful conduct of

counter-insurgency (COIN) requires a harmonized approach using political, social, economic,

psychological, informational and military measures to restore or establish the authority of a

legitimate government and address the root causes of the insurgency. The root causes will be

political, social and economic in nature and therefore require agencies and elements of power

other than the military to resolve.

Within this harmonized effort, military force will play a supporting role. The fundamental

maxim of all COIN is that a strategic centre of gravity is the populace of the threatened state or

region. Without the moral support of the people, no COIN campaign can succeed. Similarly, no

insurgency can succeed without at least the tacit acceptance of the populace. Insurgents will

also seek to attack the will of nations contributing coalition forces and other elements of power

and capabilities to combat the insurgency. These domestic populations and their will to support

a long-term commitment must be considered strategic centres of gravity in the campaign.

Operations at all levels must be conducted with these centres to gravity in mind.

SECTION 1

COUNTER-INSURGENCY PHILOSOPHY

As in all campaigns, the application of military capabilities in a COIN campaign is guided

by doctrine, which consists of a philosophy, guiding principles and tested practices and

procedures. A COIN campaign is conducted using the same overarching philosophies that

guide the application of fighting power in other campaigns:

a comprehensive approach that uses military capabilities in conjunction with

other elements of power to create enduring outcomes;

adherence to the Principles of War;

a war-fighting ethos;

a manoeuvrist approach;

mission command; and

an ethical application of combat power.

Specific to the conduct of a COIN campaign is a philosophy that reflects the centres of

gravity that are generally common to any COIN campaign. The overarching philosophy of a

COIN campaign is encompassed by the following:

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An insurgency is a political problem that requires elements of power other than

the military to create an enduring solution and outcome. The military therefore

plays a supporting role.

A successful COIN campaign requires the support of the populace. Thus all

military activities must be conducted with a view to gaining and maintaining the

support of the local populace and, to this end, creating and maintaining the

legitimacy of the campaign. This must be understood at all levels of command,

including the lowest tactical levels.³³

SECTION 2

PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY

302. GENERAL

From the overarching philosophy, certain principles may be developed in order to guide

the military and other agencies in the conduct of a COIN campaign. These principles are based

on history and theory and draw on the experiences of friend and foe alike. It must, however, be

remembered that principles are guidelines only and must be tempered by a realistic estimate of

the situation and an appraisal of the variables and potential responses. Like all principles, they

should be applied pragmatically and with common sense to suit the circumstances peculiar to

each campaign. The assessment of the situation will indicate where application of a principle

may not be possible (at least temporarily), where they may conflict or where there is overlap.

As with the principles of war, they must be balanced with one another, and all operations must

be examined against them. Part of the art of command will be to balance competing demands,

consider options and develop the best course of action possible, adhering as closely as possible

to the principles and the overarching philosophy. Plans and their implementation must be tailor-

made for the context in which they are to be implemented. Underpinning the principles are the

assumptions of minimum necessary force and legitimacy of all actions.

Although the military plays a supporting role in a COIN campaign, the failure of

commanders to properly apply the principles could easily and directly lead to failure of the entire

campaign.

In any campaign, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) will routinely be modified in

order to meet the situation at hand. Particularly in a COIN campaign, where the adversary will

be adaptive, cunning and resourceful, this will be a continual process.

Principles offer the civil leadership and the heads of all agencies, including the military

commander, both a start point and useful guideposts. The COIN principles offered herein are

arranged in a logical sequence and provide a government and military commanders with a

general pattern on which to base and review strategy and operational plans.

The principles for the conduct of a COIN campaign are:

effect political primacy in the pursuit of a strategic aim;

promote unity of purpose to coordinate the actions of participating agencies

(including government machinery);

³³ The overarching nature of this concept and the need for it to be understood at all levels of command, like mission

command, raises the need to gain popular support to the level of a guiding philosophy rather than have it as a

constituent principle.

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understand the complex dynamics of the insurgency, including the wider

environment;

exploit intelligence and information;

separate the insurgents from their physical and moral sources of strength,

including addressing their grievances, real and perceived;

neutralize the insurgent;

sustain commitment to expend political capital and resources over a long period;

and

conduct longer-term, post-insurgency planning.

303. EFFECT POLITICAL PRIMACY IN THE PURSUIT OF A STRATEGIC AIM

Insurgencies are a political problem that cannot be countered solely by military means.

Although an insurgency may be slow in becoming apparent, once it is identified, the host

government and its international supporters must decide upon a strategy to stop, neutralize and

reverse any effects of the insurgency. This must include an effective, pro-active response to

any violence and intimidation generated by the insurgents. Apart from immediate short-term

actions, many of which will be taken with the advice of the military force commander, the

government must formulate a long-term political plan—backed by political, economic and social

programmes—with the aim of addressing legitimate root grievances and legitimacy for the

insurgency. The military role will be to provide a security framework that creates conditions

conducive to implementing these programmes. That is, the military security and neutralization

of the insurgent violence will provide manoeuvre space for other agencies required for enduring

solutions. A COIN plan involving the police, military, locally raised militias and coalition security

forces will implement this security framework.³⁴ Ideally, the security framework will be lead by

host nation police and military forces in order to provide additional legitimacy for the

government.

Political primacy underpins COIN as it legitimizes strategic, operational and tactical

actions. All actions follow the political lead and support its strategic aim. Within a COIN

campaign, the specific strategy determines which instrument of power (diplomatic, military,

economic or social) is the focus of effort, and which agency may have the lead at operational

and tactical levels. This will change over time as the COIN operation and situation evolve.

³⁴ Security forces include military, coalition military forces, national police, local police and locally recruited

support forces.

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Ensuring a Public Perspective in a COIN Campaign

Not only is it imperative that the military takes a supporting role to the other COIN players

during the execution of the campaign, it is also necessary that the fundamental of minimum

force be followed. Aggressive offensive actions should be viewed as a necessary, but

secondary, aspect to the campaign with only short-term value. The longer-term influence

aspects of the military’s engagement, particularly in conjunction with other agencies, that

lead to enduring solutions of the crisis must be highlighted to both indigenous and domestic

audiences. This serves two purposes. Firstly it demonstrates to the indigenous population

that COIN forces are not there to destroy their lives and property but rather to assist them in

securing the basics of life and enhancing their quality of life. This in turn garners their active

support for the campaign. Secondly, it illustrates to domestic populations of contributing

nations within a coalition that their sacrifice of treasure and lives are worthwhile in that

measures are being actively pursued to resolve underlying grievances and create enduring

stability. This is particularly important when the domestic populations hold an inaccurate

viewpoint focusing on the use of force only. In order for this perspective to be better

balanced, efforts must be made to advertise the use of strategic-level advisory teams and

other means used to build lasting capacity within a developing nation. Such was the case

with the former Canadian commander of the Afghanistan Strategic Advisory Team engaging

a wide variety of audiences upon his return from theatre. Such publicity, locally and

domestic, may help protect two strategic centres of gravity.

304. PROMOTE UNITY OF PURPOSE TO COORDINATE THE ACTIONS

OF PARTICIPATING AGENCIES—CONTROL AND COORDINATION

The COIN effort requires a comprehensive approach involving a wide range of agencies

seeking to resolve the causes of the insurgency. This should be a number of agencies and

elements of power united by common objectives and end-state, thus a unity of purpose and

ideally a unity of effort will be achieved. This concept of a unity of effort may be implemented

through a variety of structures that promote various levels of common command, control and/or

coordination.

Many of these agencies have different philosophies, modus operandi and methods.

Unity of command across this array of national, government and non-government organizations

and agencies will be impractical. Although unity of effort is most desirable, it too may not be

achievable. Unity of purpose, however, must be achieved, and all agencies must agree to work

towards a common purpose and end-state. This will require close coordination, often led or

facilitated by local military commanders.

Within a national approach (i.e., that of the threatened nation or that of a coalition

contributing nation) and within a coalition, one person will ideally be granted responsibility for

the direction of the campaign and authority over all government agencies involved in the effort.

This will ideally allow differences of opinion between agencies to be resolved by an impartial

director and centralized coordination in order to exploit in a complementary and mutually

supporting fashion the strengths of each contributing agency. While this single individual could

be a military commander, control will likely be vested in a politician, diplomat or civil servant. In

any case, the individual will be working to strict government guidelines and overall control.

Ideally, the single commander will lead a joint command and control structure.

Single Command System: Unity of purpose and effort is facilitated by organizing the

COIN campaign under a single commander, or committee director. While the person so

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designated may be civilian or military, it is critical that responsibility for overall direction is vested

in one headquarters. The commander will bring together both military and non-military elements

of power in a single command structure. Advisors will be made available from all of the relevant

participating elements, such as the civil service, international organizations, police and military.

The commander will oversee a staff system established to ensure that all plans and actions are

conducted towards a common goal.

The Committee System: Operational-level committees are formed, again, mirroring the

strategic-level command. These committees will conduct joint planning in order to ensure that

the representative subordinate elements execute such plans in a manner keeping with the

overarching campaign plan. The actual committee structure and representation will vary

between insurgencies and indeed will likely change as the conflict evolves. As a minimum,

representatives will include the host nation political and civil authorities, host-nation military and

security authorities, political and civil troop-contributing representatives, troop-contributing

military commanders and select staff, intelligence, security-contributing representatives and

probably international organizations’ representatives.

Trust is a key factor in making such an organization functional. This is often difficult to

establish across differing organizational cultures. For example, the military requirement for

security and expertise in applied violence is potentially the antithesis of humanitarian non-

governmental organizations’ (NGOs’) neutral transparency and abhorrence of things military.

The committee director and all members must continually strive to maintain mutual openness

and confidence. A key component of this will be clearly communicating the purpose and

reasoning behind military operations, within the bounds of operational security (OPSEC)

considerations.

Role of Personalities: Given the inter-agency aspect of COIN operations and the need

for the military to work hand-in-hand with its civilian and police partners (many of whom will

have little understanding³⁵ of military organization or command structures) the role of individual

personalities becomes magnified. Any system of control and coordination must be able to adapt

to the personalities of those involved. Military commanders must select their liaison officers and

committee members with care, exploiting those who can achieve progress through a balance of

charisma, persuasion and graceful force of personality. Commanders must be able to realize

that they themselves may not be the most suitable individuals to conduct daily face-to-face

operations and coordination with their civilian counterparts and therefore must select the most

suitable representative. This must be balanced with the message that the commander’s own

personal presence will send at any given time.

Assistance to Allies and Foreign Powers: When a military provides assistance to a

foreign state, the forces assigned may necessarily be subordinate to that government in order to

preserve the host nation’s sovereignty and the government’s credibility in the eyes of its

populace. At the very least, the leadership role of the indigenous government must be

highlighted. In such cases, assisting forces will likely be obliged to adopt the coordination

system of the host nation.

Government Planning and Military Support—Assessment and Estimate of the

Situation and Military Advisors. When the government is determining which of its objectives

can best be attained with the help of the armed forces, the military commanders and advisers

³⁵ Experience has shown that some government political leaders, civil administrators and staff of NGOs will not only

have lack an understanding of how the military functions and operates but will have significant misconceptions and

even hold hostilities towards the military, and thus may be reluctant to cooperate.

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will be able to explain the forces’ capabilities and limitations in the context of the particular crisis.

An analysis of the situation should reveal the areas in which the supported government and the

insurgents are most vulnerable. These vulnerabilities are likely to be spread over the entire

political, economic, social and security spectrum. The aim will be to identify those government

vulnerabilities that are best suited to military defensive action and those vulnerabilities of the

insurgents that are most susceptible to offensive military action. The military will likely be able

to assist in certain areas of stability activities, such as reconstruction and governance, but the

capability limitations of the military and the perceptions of military involvement in these areas

must be fully assessed and clearly articulated to political leaders. Throughout the planning of a

COIN campaign, the supporting role of the military must be emphasized, and the concept that

insurgencies require enduring political solutions must be stressed.

10.

Allocation of Priorities. The coordinated national plan that emerges from the above

estimate should address the political, economic, social and security spectrum and seek

enduring solutions to the insurgency causes. Determining the type of insurgency faced will

highlight two priorities: identification of physical and moral centres of gravity for the insurgents,

and identification of the government actions that will achieve meaningful results. Some of these

results, or at least the actions leading to them, should be achieved quickly so as to demonstrate

resolution. Others, such as re-building of an economic infrastructure, will take a long time to

achieve, but it will often be these actions that lead to enduring success. The national priorities

need to be addressed at this stage of the planning process. Once the overarching priorities are

identified, other allocations of tasks and resources will be identified, to include:

Roles and responsibilities between government departments and military offices

in order to avoid duplication of effort, gaps and potential conflict.

Priority of action between the social, economic, military and civil administration

fields.

Priorities within each field of activity (social, economic, military and civil

administration). Just as the military will apportion efforts across the operational

functions (command, sense, act, shield, sustain), so too must the civil, police and

other authorities set priorities across their own organizations and capabilities.

11.

Campaign Design and Operational Planning. Once the strategic priorities and

objectives have been identified, campaign design and operational planning may begin. The

military will work in conjunction with the host nation and the other elements of power and

agencies involved. Operational objectives will be identified and grouped along thematic lines of

operation leading to the operational end-state. It will be vital that the military conducts the

campaign design in cooperation with the other elements of power involved in order the truly

realize a unity of purpose and effort across all agencies.

305. UNDERSTAND THE COMPLEX DYNAMICS OF THE INSURGENCY, INCLUDING

THE WIDER ENVIRONMENT

The various inter-related dynamics of an insurgency will present profound intellectual

challenges for commanders and staff. In order to understand the context of the insurgency, its

causes and motivations, a broad knowledge base must be created in order to understand it and

the environment in which it has grown. This will require an assessment of all the various

elements within the environment: political, military, economic, social (including culture and

religion), informational and infrastructure. It will also demand an understanding of the various,

often competing, power structures present in the society and insurgency itself.

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Given the large number of variables at work, it may very well be impossible to predict the

secondary and tertiary effects of specific actions. Still, effort must be expended to understand

these variables and dynamics at hand and how best to tackle them.

The dynamics of an insurgency may include:

cause—what makes the insurgency attractive to the uncommitted;

central idea (the narrative) of the insurgency—this may be an ideology or

religious ideal that also identifies a strategic end-state;

aims of the insurgency—long term, short term, advertised and hidden;

organization and capabilities—leaders, cadre, combatants, support base and

political wings;

external support—moral, physical and conceptual;

methodology—strategies and tactics; and

the wider environment—political, economic, sociological and technical.

For every dynamic within an insurgency, the lines of operation within the campaign plan

must anticipate and counter the evolving dynamics of the insurgency.

306. EXPLOIT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION—THE OVERARCHING

IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence is the key enabler that will allow the insurgency, its causes, its motivations,

its power structures and its weaknesses and vulnerabilities on both the physical and

psychological planes to be understood. It will thus support the creation of an effective and

legitimate campaign plan. Such intelligence will demand a multi-faceted assessment and

analysis capability that will examine the entire environment and its influences, well beyond the

mere military capabilities of the insurgents.

Combating an insurgency requires a sophisticated human intelligence (HUMINT)

network that includes not only local sources of intelligence but also a detailed collection plan

that incorporates all sources, from the soldiers who patrol daily to the agents of influence within

a society. A sophisticated, well-guided network is essential to develop a complete picture of the

strengths and weaknesses of an insurgency.

Information and intelligence must be exploited in a systematic and thorough manner. All

individuals concerned—civilians, commanders and soldiers of all ranks—must understand the

overriding importance of intelligence in actively defeating an insurgency and in gaining the

support of the populace. Intelligence will support direct military action against insurgents, guide

influence activities and psychological effects to attack the root causes of the insurgency, create

enduring solutions of standing grievances and allow for success to be measured. All-source

intelligence is the key enabler required to defeat an insurgency.

Operational-Level Application—Local Knowledge. Knowledge of the country—its

ethnic composition, culture, religions and schisms, the political scene and party leaders, the

clandestine political organizations and their undercover armed groups, the influence of

neighbouring states and the economy—will provide the essential backdrop to understanding the

insurgency. However, such a knowledge base takes time to build. It is essential to do so

because the development of actionable intelligence relies on an ability to discern patterns of

change in behaviour. The host nation police and its intelligence service should be the prime

agencies for providing backg1round intelligence at the start of a mission so that a baseline of

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local conditions can be established. Creation of a baseline understanding and its growth into a

broad knowledge base allows developing trends and changes in specific areas to be identified

and encouraged, if positive, or halted if negative. In all cases, the best source of intelligence

comes from members of an insurgent group who have been detained or convinced to switch

loyalties.

All operations must be intelligence driven. This produces two benefits: first, it minimizes

disruption to the general population by focusing on specific targets, allows refined risk

assessment and avoids collateral damages; and second, it creates a snowball effect,

as each targeted operation inevitably produces more intelligence.

Since the summer of 2003 US forces in Iraq had been searching for and trying to

eliminate Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the head of ‘al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.’ Al-Zarqawi

was personally responsible for innumerable suicide and roadside bombings, and

assassinations.

In February of 2006 US forces had gleaned intelligence from a captured insurgent

detailing a number of safehouses and residences in the Iraqi town of Yusufiya. This

intelligence was used to launch a number of raids in mid-April that captured more

insurgents and uncovered more intelligence. These operations had two effects: it

uncovered a videotape of al Zarqawi fumbling with a C9 (M249) light machine gun,

which was broadcast worldwide by the US in a counter-propaganda effort aimed at

demonstrating the incompetence of al Zarqawi and his immediate associates. The

second effect was more important. After weeks of interrogation by specially-trained

intelligence personnel, the captured insurgents revealed enough information to create

a detailed mapping of al-Zarqawi’s organization’s mid-level leadership. This

breakthrough allowed a number of targeted raids on 13, 14, and 17 May by SOF that

killed a number of insurgents and produced more physical intelligence.

Finally, at the beginning of June 2006 interrogators were able to produce intelligence

detailing the security precautions taken by Sheikh al-Rahman, a close advisor to al-

Zarqawi. Combined with electronic intelligence, this enabled US forces to identify the

location of a meeting between al-Rahman and al-Zarqawi. Using this intelligence, al-

Zarqawi was targeted and killed by aircraft-launched PGMs on 7 June 2006.

The deliberate, patient exploitation of intelligence guided and shaped an effective

series of operations that produced tangible results, resulting in a weakened and less

operationally effective adversary.

Source: Mark Bowden, “The Ploy,” The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 299, No.4, May 2007,

Washington DC: The Atlantic Monthly, pp.54-68.

Tactical-Level Application. Without accurate intelligence, the security forces are

reduced to conducting blind and ineffective operations, which often provoke a negative reaction

amongst the population. The ensuing negative media reporting can undermine domestic and

international support for the mission and benefit the insurgency. Furthermore, troops

conducting routine framework patrolling tend to loose their focus and motivation, with the result

often being the conduct of patrolling for the sake of patrolling itself. Tactical intelligence

requirements should be pushed down to the lowest levels, and all sources, specialist and

routine framework patrols alike, should be given specific informational requirements to gather.

Furthermore, specialists wherever possible, should be pushed down to the lower (sub-unit)

tactical levels so that they may remain responsive to their intelligence requirements while

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fulfilling those of the units and formations. Every soldier is a source of information collection

and must come to understand the human and geographic terrain, including the operational

methodology of the enemy. Standing information requirements should be pushed down to the

lowest levels in order to focus routine operations such as security patrols and to allow the

requirements to be applied pervasively. In the end, each successful operation becomes an

intelligence windfall and parlays into a stronger intelligence picture.

The tactical-level application of information and intelligence will allow large named areas

of interest (NAIs) to be reduced to point NAIs and eventually to target areas of interest (TAIs) for

subsequent precision strikes. For example, HUMINT reports may indicate a gang and their

suspected weapons cache are located in a neighbourhood containing 20,000 occupants.

Patrols and other sources, through specific tasks and stated information requirements, may

reduce this area NAI to a specific city block or house. This will eventually become a TAI that

can be passed to operations staff and commanders for subsequent action—in this case, a

cordon and search activity.

The same can be said regarding information exploitation for psychological effects. For

example, HUMINT reports or interrogations may indicate that an insurgency is recruiting

members from a particular suburban region. Further examination and collection regarding this

area may reveal that it is an ethnic enclave with high unemployment. Hence, this area may

become a TAI for the application of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and other influence activity

capabilities in order to stimulate development of this enclave. Follow-up patrols can, in time,

gauge the public reaction to such measures. In short, intelligence drives and focuses tactical

operations, limits collateral damage and assists in measuring success.

The Intelligence Organization. It should be expected that intelligence organizations in

COIN campaigns will have to grow considerably compared to those in conventional operations,

which focus merely on a conventional enemy. Ideally, the intelligence organization should start

expanding in lock step with the insurgents’ developing threat. Inevitably, however, there is an

interval before the expanded organization becomes effective. Such expansion should reflect

the need to understand the various elements of the environment that influence the campaign’s

outcome, such as cultural and economic aspects.

307. SEPARATE THE INSURGENTS FROM THEIR PHYSICAL AND MORAL SOURCES

OF STRENGTH

Two Facets of Isolation. One of the primary operational objectives of the COIN

campaign is the physical and moral isolation of the insurgents from the sources of physical

resources and the population. Without the support, both physical and moral, of the population,

an insurgency will likely be unable to survive. Additionally, it is important to work to eliminate

the sources of funding and material support that sustain insurgent operations that come from

both internal and external sources. All agencies involved in the COIN operation must

understand this and work within their own fields to this end. Both elements must be addressed:

Physical Separation. Insurgents must be separated from their physical support,

which includes recruits, finances and material resources that may be originating

from within the host nation or from external sources.

Moral Separation. Insurgents must be undermined intellectually and morally

and any justification for their moral support by a population removed. A narrative

will form the foundation of insurgent propaganda and guide their actions. This

narrative will highlight real or perceived grievances and provide a vision and

strategic end-state as an alternative to the existing government or society. The

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narrative will also provide moral justification for the insurgency and attempt to

capture the moral high ground from the government. Thus, undermining the

insurgency’s narrative is critical to influencing the population to support the

government. To this end, a legal, viable alternative to the insurgency must be

offered by the COIN campaign. The insurgency must be deprived of any claim to

moral superiority.

308. PHYSICAL SEPARATION

Establish a Firm Base. The first requirement may be to secure the base areas

essential to the survival and functioning of the government and state. These normally include

the capital, key points of entry, vital installations such as public infrastructure and reinforcing

those areas that are loyal to the government. The provision of security in these vital areas

encourages their inhabitants to rally behind the government.

Expand Secure Areas. Once established, security forces expand outward from the

secure areas in a campaign akin to the spreading of an oil slick. As each area is consolidated,

loyal local forces could be raised to secure the area to release mobile regular troops to secure

the next area while the host state’s civil administration and police re-establish themselves in the

recently liberated territory and gain, through social development, the support of the populace.

This is a proven approach to combating an insurgency.

The tache d’huile, or “oil spot,” technique of counter-insurgency was first formalized by

French General Hubert Lyautey in the first decade of the 20^th century. The premise of the

technique is the provision of a security umbrella or framework at the local level concomitant

to furnishing social services such as schools, health care and government administration.

Lyautey’s aim was to physically and psychologically separate the insurgent from the

population and to slowly expand government control by using “the army not as an instrument

of repression but as a positive social force.” Support for the government would come with

tangible improvements in the local populace’s well-being. Versions of this technique have

been applied by, among others, the French in Morocco and Algeria, the US Marines in

Vietnam and the US Army on southern Luzon during the 1899-1902 Philippine War (even

though the term tache d’huile had yet to be coined).

Source: Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows: The guerrilla in history (New York: Morrow, 1994), pp. 150-157.

Integration of Security Forces. The most effective way of expanding a COIN

campaign’s affect and achieving physical separation of the insurgents is by having security

forces living amongst the population. History has proven that isolating security forces in fortified

strongholds is ineffective, allows insurgent infiltration and serves to separate the counter-

insurgents from the population, all of which is the reverse effect of that actually being sought.

For this “oil spot” or “ink spot” method to work as intended, the security forces must live and

interact intimately with the population and its established authority and government. Not only

does this create strong personal bonds between the people and the military, it enhances the

intelligence network and creates a hostile environment for the insurgents. This method is not

without risk. Indeed, risks may have to be taken in force protection in terms the relative

exposure of the soldiers is increased. This will also involve a political risk in terms of the

potential for higher casualties. Such risks must be carefully explained to soldiers and domestic

populations alike. In order to mitigate such risks, a certain level of security is necessary before

such a tactic can be employed. In the final analysis, it is imperative for a successful campaign

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that the security forces build confidence in the population, and it is unlikely that this can be

achieved from behind fortified walls.

Eliminate the Insurgent Subversive and Support System. The security forces’

operations must focus on eliminating the insurgents’ subversive and support organizations.

This is an essential prerequisite to defeating any active insurgent group for the following

reasons:

The subversive organization controls the population, denies the government

popular support, spreads propaganda unchecked and prevents witnesses from

providing information.

Without such action, the insurgents continue to receive supplies, recruits and

information regarding the security forces and can continue to disrupt

development and stability even if the majority of their moral support has been

eliminated.

Once the subversive organization is destroyed or dislocated, the insurgents are

forced to operate more openly and thus expose themselves to deliberate military

actions and arrest.

Subversive elements arrested are the best sources of information on the

insurgent organization. These elements must be carefully handled, according to

legal constraints, by specialist staff skilled in extracting detailed intelligence.

Methods of Physical Separation. A thoughtful combination of methods by all agencies

involved is needed to separate the insurgents from their subversive and supporting constructs:

Intelligence should aim at the identification of support cells, quarter-master

functionaries, subversive cells and propagandists. This information should come

in good part from civilian police sources, but where police forces lack a physical

presence in a remote geographical area, the void may be filled with elements of

Special Forces assigned specific information requirements.

The provision of security for the populace, the overt supporters and informers.

This is best done proactively through the use of anonymous tip telephone lines,

specialist handling of sources and low-level security measures (such as face

masks) to hide the identity of informers working with security forces.

The gradual spread of government and security force control over areas.

Curfews and searches of individuals thought to be supporting insurgents.

Patrols, ambushes and vehicle checkpoints (the latter best done at low levels for

short intervals on likely routes).

Interdiction operations against the entry of external supplies.

Closing national borders or imposing control measures over them.

International diplomacy to staunch the flow of external fiscal, human and material

support for the insurgency. This may require government legal action in a

number of nations, particularly those contributing troops to an insurgency.

Certainly, evidence collected in a theatre of operations indicating the sources of

external funding and resources should be advertised widely to support

government action that will staunch this support.

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309. INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL SEPARATION

General. Undermining the narrative of the insurgents and removing grievances,

justification and causes of the insurgency is critical to enduring end-states. Indeed, such action

will be decisive in the campaign.

Addressing this facet primarily involves dealing with the real and perceived

grievances that help to intellectually draw supporters and recruits to outwardly or

tacitly support the insurgents. Just as insurgent propaganda involves both words

and deeds, providing an alternative to the insurgent narrative requires both words

and actions. Therefore, not only does the campaign plan and its intent need to

be broadcast, it must be constantly reinforced, updated and supported by real

action that creates a sense of normalcy and improves the day-to-day lives of the

populace.

A legal, viable alternative to the insurgency must be offered to members of the

insurgency, their supporters and the uncommitted in the population. Hand-in-

hand with this is the fact that the conditions that permit the spread of the

insurgency, and its justification in the eyes of many, must be addressed and

resolved with long-term solutions that are well publicized through information

operations.

Broadly speaking, this will often involve the reform of government and

government institutions and policies, and alternatives to the idealized vision of

society that insurgent propaganda will advertise. The insurgency must be

deprived of any claim to moral superiority.

In general, the concept of separating the insurgent in a moral or intellectual

sense has been termed “winning the hearts and minds.” More accurately, this

should be considered winning the minds and hearts of the population.

Specifically, planned influence activities must be conducted to affect the

understanding and perceptions (i.e., the mind) of the target audiences in order to

affect their will (heart) and ultimately their behaviour in a desired manner.

Reforming the Host Nation Government and Institutions. In many cases, the

government under attack from an insurgency requires some type of reform in order to solidify its

legitimacy, win and maintain the support of its own populace and gain international support.

This may include the reform of unjust policies such as inequitable distribution of

land. Government actions within a moral context—such as observance of the

law, discrete use of force, the provision of public services, and equitable

distribution of benefits realized through social and economic development—will

help to produce a favourable climate domestically and internationally. In other

words, the government must learn to envision and provide an equitable social

contract with its populace.

Internationally, it is critical that the host nation government make real and

sustained efforts at any needed reforms for responsible and representative

government. The publics of supporting nations in a coalition will likely demand a

high standard of human rights, rule of law and good governance. Maintaining

this support is dependent partly on the efforts of the host nation to reform weak

institutions and develop internationally recognized legitimacy.

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Domestic and International Diplomacy. Diplomacy must play a central role in the

intellectual and moral separation of the insurgents from the population. This involves both

diplomacy within the affected state and internationally.

Domestically, it is important that the host nation government negotiate with

disaffected groups to develop a sense of inclusion and ownership of the political

process. Broadening the base of stakeholders in a political process is critical to

increasing participation in the legitimate process. With regards to insurgents,

undoubtedly there will be die-hards that refuse to support anything but absolute

achievement of the stated goals. For these, the only options are capture, death

or to be made so irrelevant that they wield no influence or threat. However, the

vast majority of most insurgent groups are normally composed of less highly

motivated people who simply want to achieve a better life. Domestic diplomacy

is critical in trying to bring this group to the government side and, although their

trust will be difficult to gain, it is imperative that efforts to do so are made. It is

highly unlikely that a permanent solution can be achieved otherwise.

Internationally, diplomatic efforts aimed at cutting moral support from countries

that share ideological, cultural or religious links to an insurgency can play an

important part in countering the narrative underpinning insurgent propaganda.

This may simply involve greater support to a state that demonstrates the

compatibility of religion and democracy or a successful example of settling long-

standing grievances with government reforms. In other cases, this may involve

encouraging governments to enforce legal constraints on religious leaders

advocating violence or the support of extremist propaganda.

Holding the Moral High Ground. Insurgent narrative and propaganda will provide a

moral justification for the existence of the insurgency and for any violent acts committed. The

struggle to intellectually and morally separate the insurgents from the populace hinges on the

government being seen as morally superior to the insurgents and the alternative society being

offered by the insurgency. This involves establishing and ascribing to the rule of law. Host

nation governments and institutions may require detailed assistance in achieving this concept in

both practice and in the eyes of their populace. To this end, commanders and even their

soldiers must understand the need to help ensure the supported government remains legitimate

and acts accordingly. Where possible, they must assist in the raising of standards of conduct,

from the local level upwards. Violations must be reported to the military and civil chains-of-

command and addressed accordingly. Coalition forces involved in the campaign must, as part

of the solution, set the example for the host nation government were necessary. In short, the

insurgency must be deprived of any claim to moral superiority.

Apply Power Discriminately to Influence Human Will. Force must be applied

discriminately throughout a COIN campaign to avoid alienating the population through civilian

casualties or unnecessary damage to property. At times, short-term tactical success may have

to be forsaken in order to meet the long-term operational objectives of the campaign and

maintain the support of the populace.

Minimum use of force should guide the actions of the security forces. This

maxim must be reinforced at all stages of the campaign and at all levels of

command.

Furthermore, the exercise of power by any of the agencies involved in a

campaign must be conducted with legitimacy, within the rule of law and without

prejudice to any one group within the affected population.

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Additionally, disruption to normal civic life must be limited to the greatest extent

possible. This principle must be applied at the operational and tactical levels.

For example, the imposition of curfews should be as limited in time and scope as

possible in order to avoid disruption to the lives of the majority of the populace,

who are always at risk of becoming fatigued by security measures. Likewise, the

conduct of a cordon and search in private homes may require forced entry into

locked rooms. If the owners cannot locate keys, even when breaching tools are

produced, then the door should, whenever possible, be removed from its hinges.

If nothing is found (as will often be the case), the door can then be replaced

without damage. This in turns limits embarrassment for the security forces, and

the extra effort taken to avoid damages to private property is, to a certain extent,

appreciated by the populace. It in turn helps gain and maintain their support and

counter the propaganda undoubtedly spread by the insurgents regarding the

security forces and their methods.

310. NEUTRALIZE THE INSURGENT

The security forces of the government or coalition will have a significant role in the

selective destruction, disruption and dislodgment of insurgents. Confidence, trust and freedom

of action, without the need to refer routine and anticipated operations that will exploit often

fleeting opportunities back to a higher level(s) of command, must be afforded tactical

commanders (particularly down to sub-unit level) if they are to be successful in striking the

insurgent and dislocating him from his power base.

It will be highly unlikely, if not impossible, to destroy the entire insurgent movement. Part

of the neutralization of the insurgent will be to neutralize his presence in affected areas. A

critical aspect of successful military COIN is command initiative and action at the lowest tactical

level that involves the junior commander (platoon and section level) leading small patrols³⁶ into

the insurgents’ area of operations. The aim should be to defeat the insurgent on “home ground”

using adequate force, but no more than is absolutely necessary. Proportionality must be the

measure applied when employing force.

All military tactical actions must be conducted in harmony with the other actions taken to

neutralize and defeat the insurgency: amelioration of the causes, reformation of the government

and development of local security forces (if necessary), information operations (to explain the

military actions) and social development. Without this multi-pronged approach, killing

insurgents simply becomes a form of attrition warfare and may encourage more converts to the

insurgency. Indeed, this point may be exacerbated by socio-cultural codes of conduct that

demand retribution for the death of a relative regardless of cause or justification.

311. SUSTAIN COMMITMENT TO EXPEND POLITICAL CAPITAL AND RESOURCES

OVER A LONG PERIOD

Insurgency and counter-insurgency, like all forms of warfare, are protracted contests of

will. Insurgents understand that they do not have to win a decisive battle but have to make the

campaign too expensive and demanding (in terms of time, resources, financial and political

capital) for the government, the populace and/or the government’s external supporters, some of

whom may be supplying troops to stabilize and support the state. Not only must the

³⁶ The required size of the patrol will depend upon a number of factors considered in the estimate and planning

process, including threat, insurgent tactics, distance to be covered and tasks of the patrol.

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commitment of the local populace be sustained, but the populations of any supporting nations

must be convinced to remain committed to the COIN. These are strategic centres of gravity

within the campaign.

A sustained commitment to the COIN is underpinned by unity of purpose across a wide

range of disparate elements and organizations involved in the campaign, that is, through the

comprehensive approach to the campaign. Information operations will have to work towards

this aim. Furthermore, realistic measures of success will have to be decided and promulgated

so that complementary lines of operation and successive operational objectives may be fully

identified, broadened and exploited.

312. CONDUCT LONGER-TERM POST-INSURGENCY PLANNING

The requirement for post-insurgency security and development probably holds the key to

effectively applying all of the other principles. Merely providing for the military defeat of

insurgents does not in any way end the government requirement to make suitable, longer-term

plans to address the perceived and real grievances that enabled the rise of an insurgency in the

first instance.

The plans and requirements to address these grievances must be communicated to the

populace of the host nation, the international public and the populaces of nations contributing

resources and manpower to the campaign. This will allow the COIN campaign to develop the

long-term legitimacy required to sustain what will undoubtedly be a lengthy and complex effort.

The announcement of bold government initiatives to be started after the insurgency has

been defeated, or at least significantly neutralized, can have a real and significant effect on

winning the moral support of the population. Such initiatives should be designed at the same

time as the comprehensive strategic plans are being prepared to defeat the insurgency. The

timing of any statement about longer term plans could be of crucial importance and should be

handled in a sensitive and controlled manner by the state authorities in concert with the overall

information operations plan. It is critical that the announcement of government reform initiatives

coincide with actual deeds. Failure to coordinate the words and actions of a strategy will

increase disenchantment with the government, both domestically and internationally.

In the British Dhofar campaign (1970-1975), the end of insurgent activity occurred in

December 1975, but the authorities had to work relentlessly for several more years to

achieve continued support from the population before the causes of the insurgency had been

fully rectified. As with subduing a fire, the flames have to be out and the embers cold before

it can be considered fully extinguished.

SECTION 3

FACTORS BEARING ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF COIN

313. POPULAR SUPPORT

Insurgent Aims. An insurgency aims to discredit the government, its legitimacy and its

policies. It will have spent much time preparing the ground for insurgency with propaganda,

using real and contrived discontents. When it considers that the government and/or its

supporting authorities (e.g., support from an external nation) have been sufficiently undermined

and that a significant part of the population has been alienated from authority, the insurgency

will use coercion and terror to reinforce its propaganda campaign.

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A Competition for Loyalty: Minds and Hearts. A government must convince its

population that it can offer a better solution, better government and a better life than the

opposing insurgents in order to influence the minds and win the hearts of the population. This

will be a focal point for the information operations campaign. Just as an insurgency needs the

sympathy or the acquiescence of a sizeable percentage of the population to survive and to

overthrow the government, so the government needs the people’s support to appear legitimate

in its eyes and to obtain information leading to the arrest or capture of the terrorists. Violence,

or the threat of it, is aimed at the citizen’s fears for his family and freedom to earn a wage to

feed them. Whoever can guarantee citizens security can often command their allegiance. An

insurgency is a competition between government and insurgent for the individual’s loyalty.

Unless the government can offer reasonable protection, individuals are unlikely to risk their own

or their families’ lives by volunteering information, and the security forces will meet passive

resistance from the populace as a whole in addition to the active resistance of the insurgents.

Government Protection. Protection of the civilian population will require restrictions

and measures (searches, checkpoints, curfews, etc.) that will disrupt normal lives and frustrate

the local populations. Their frustration will increase with time. Insurgents will seek to

misrepresent necessary inconveniences as harsh and oppressive. Consequently, the

government and its security forces must anticipate a possible hostile public reaction to such

security measures and prepare arguments to rebut insurgent propaganda in order to keep the

initiative in the battle for the hearts and minds of the people.

Involving the Local Population in the Campaign. Even in situations in which the local

authorities and host nation police forces require significant reform, much effort should be made

to include them, within the dictates of force protection and OPSEC, in the campaign. Including

them will build their confidence, encourage higher standards and raise their profile in the eyes of

the local communities. Likewise, local populations should be made to feel that they have a vital

part to play in countering the insurgency and leading to its conclusion. Such confidence-

building measures may even extend to having remote communities raise their own local

defence forces. The trust the community initially places in its protectors is repaid by the trust

the government shows in them by allowing them to bear arms in a common cause.

Countering Insurgent Propaganda. Insurgent propaganda must be monitored and

addressed by a deliberate and multi-faceted information operations campaign, that is, through

the use of influence activities. However, as much authority as possible must be pushed down to

the tactical levels in order that information operations at that level are able to be executed in a

timely and effective manner. Broad themes developed at the strategic and operational levels

must be tailored to the specifics of a local target audience at the tactical level in order to

address the specific issues at the local level. Canadian and coalition soldiers must be aware of

the key role that they play in countering insurgent propaganda, which, at the very least, will paint

them as foreign, oppressive occupiers. Their friendly (but professional) disposition, tone and

decorum while patrolling amongst the local population, their ability to relate to the populace, and

the discriminate use of force will quickly undermine that propaganda.

314. AVOIDANCE OF MORAL RELATIVISM

Moral relativism is the doctrine that morality exists in relation to culture, society or

historical context and that there is no absolute right and wrong. Moral relativism assumes that

morals are not universal and therefore confuses culture and morality. When working in another

society, there is a natural tendency to practise moral relativism and thus accept immoral

practices by members of an indigenous population and attribute them to immutable local

customs and cultural values.

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Such an assumption and the ensuing practice are wrong. Moral is defined as

“concerned with the principles of right and wrong behaviour.”³⁷ Value, as in cultural value, is

defined as “the regard that something is held to deserve; the importance, worth, or usefulness of

something.”³⁸ Because morals are concerned with principles, they can be considered

universal. Values are culturally specific, and the values and social constructs assumed by a

culture will vary to extreme degrees from those of other cultures. Values may change, but only

over very long periods of time. Both morals and cultural values are distinct from individual or

social practices, although all are related.

The practice of moral relativism in COIN, as in all campaigns, should be avoided

because it creates a substantial risk of alienating the population and undermining support for the

campaign. This can occur in two ways:

Firstly, moral relativism can sanction corrupt or otherwise illegal actions of people

in authority. This, in turn, will undermine their authority, legitimacy, credibility and

moral superiority along with that of the campaign in the eyes of indigenous and

international populations. Moral relativism must be avoided when dealing with

any individual or group, be they government officials and members of the host

nation security services or criminal elements, tribal authority figures, business

people, and members of the insurgency itself. The effects of moral relativism are

even greater when the sanctioned violations clearly undermine good governance

and the legitimacy, moral superiority and effectiveness of those authorities

fighting the insurgency. Thus moral relativism and its attribution of immoral

behaviour to simply extend local values and culture is counter productive as it

de-legitimizes the host nation government, the COIN campaign itself and the

forces conducting it.³⁹

Secondly, the illegal or immoral activities may have been one of the root causes

to instability in the society in the first place. By permitting, effectively sanctioning,

such behaviour as extortion by armed policemen at checkpoints, the

commanders will only forestall the long-term improvement of the society.

In avoiding the practice of moral relativism and ensuring acceptable standards of

conduct from public officials and society itself, commanders must use a degree of common

sense and judgement. For example, armed police extorting money from civilians at a

checkpoint is different from a school teacher who charges parents a stipend per child in light of

poor or non-existent wages from a developing government.

Although it may be considered a social or cultural norm, by virtue of its ubiquity,

corruption and criminal activity cannot simply be dismissed as a cultural or moral norm and

indeed may have aggravated the root causes of an insurgency. The insistence that government

officials and other authority figures follow moral standards may require individual and societal

changes but unlikely changes to cultural values. Societal change is acceptable and may indeed

be necessary for the successful conclusion of the COIN campaign. Additionally, if the

improvement of the host nation populace’s well-being is a primary goal of COIN, moral

relativism, with regards to permitting criminal activity and excusing a failure to fulfil the

government’s social contract, cannot be accepted as a legitimate or beneficial practice.

³⁷ From The Oxford Dictionary of English, 10^th ed. Revised, Oxford University Press, 1999, edited by Judy Pearsall,

p. 925.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 1584.

³⁹ At its worst, moral relativism in such cases may be considered racist for it assumes an indigenous population is not

capable of morally correct standards of behaviour. Again, this attitude will not garner support from the local populace.

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In trying to improve a society facing an insurgency, it must be realized that a reduction in

corruption and criminal activity will not occur instantaneously but rather over a period of time.

Forces conducting a COIN campaign must expect and insist upon the moral conduct of host

nation authority figures and security forces. This may become part of the long-term security

sector reform and governance development.

Ensuring Police Professional Conduct: Haiti, 2004

In conducting low-level COIN operations against the criminal-based insurgency in Haiti in

early 2004, Canadian troops conducted a number of cordon and search operations against

gang headquarters and gathering places, most of which contained brothels. It quickly

became obvious that members of the Haitian national police routinely frequented such

establishments, thereby associating with gang members and exhibiting anti-social

behaviours. Some headquarters staff dismissed this issue as simply part of the Haitian

culture. Not only does this view disregard the lack of legitimacy of the local authorities, but it

assumes either that there is no moral yardstick that can be applied or that the local populace

is not capable of higher standards. Such conduct by local authorities certainly undermined

their legitimacy and trustworthiness in the eyes of the local populace. Throughout the

operation, the tactical-level commanders, from section commander upwards, continued to

insist on high standards from the local constabulary and reported violations to the upper

echelons of their chain-of-command.

Source: After-action reports from I Coy, 2 RCR, OPERATION HALO.

315. AVOIDANCE OF CULTURAL ABSOLUTISM

It is possible to assume that one’s societal and cultural values and norms are universal

and equivalent to morals. Thus, one may attempt to impose social constructs unsuited to the

culture and society in which a campaign is being conducted. This is a form of cultural

absolutism.

Such an assumption and situation risks creating or exacerbating the perception that

foreigners are trying to impose values and beliefs at odds with those of the indigenous

population. Confusing what is morally universal (e.g., the right to education or responsible

government) with what is specific to a culture and society (e.g., secular democracy) and

attempting to apply it in another culture can lead to the creation of the perception that one is

seeking to impose cultural rather than societal change and will thus undermine the authority of a

campaign and its acceptance by an indigenous population. While this perception may exist

within the host nation population regardless, the practice of cultural absolutism is more likely to

generate feelings of ill will or cultural imperialism than would otherwise be the case.

For example, while responsible governance is considered a universal human right,⁴⁰ it

must be recognized that there can be many forms of responsible government. Thus, secular

democracy as practised in Western nations may not be directly transferable to a culture that

does not necessarily ascribe to the notion of the separation of religion and politics. However,

this does not mean that forms of responsible, participatory government that incorporate religion

⁴⁰ The 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, articles 18 through 21, declare freedom of opinion,

expression, peaceful assembly and association and participatory government as universal rights. These are all

fundamental tenets of democracy but may be inherent in other forms of representative, responsible government

not considered purely democratic in the Western sense.

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into the political process should be dismissed as illegitimate if they do not violate the basic

principles of responsible government. Another example may be found in education

development. If the desires of a village council is for a CIMIC team to coordinate and provide

for the construction of a religious school rather than a secular school, this request should be

granted. It is not for the military commander to decide what type of education is offered.

Instead, the aim is to facilitate education in general, keeping in mind that development is

incremental and long-term. In this case, providing for a religious school at the local level may

allow parents and village leaders to moderate instruction at the school and avoid radicalized

teachings practised elsewhere.

Insurgent propaganda, particularly from a point of moral superiority, will exploit the

practice of cultural absolutism by coalition forces, usually by claiming that grievances and

injustices are being perpetuated and that the fundamental, traditional culture is being attacked.

In order to avoid such situations and perceptions, commanders and those planning a

campaign must understand the traditional tenets of the culture and society in which they will

operate. They must understand how their words and actions will be viewed and interpreted.

They must attempt to effect individual and societal change where necessary for a successful

outcome, whilst adhering to the cultural and traditional arrangements and avoiding assumptions

of cultural absolutism. A campaign may require changes to a society, but they must occur with

the culture arrangements of the environment.

It should be noted that the domestic populations of nations contributing troops to a

campaign may not comprehend the importance of working within cultural constructs and expect

social developments to reflect their own society’s concept of development and progress. The

importance of working within a cultural construct reflective of the environment at hand may have

to be explained carefully to domestic audiences.

316. POLITICAL AWARENESS

Commanders at all levels and individual soldiers must be aware of the consequences of

any action they may take. This is especially important should an unexpected opportunity

present itself to create a tactical success or in a sudden emergency when there is no time to

seek advice or direction from higher authority. Those with an understanding of the socio-

cultural and political nuances at the local level will be better able to assess the likely effect of

their actions on the local populace and to make correct decisions that will reinforce the larger

goals and objectives of the campaign. They must be ready to sacrifice short-term tactical

success in order to support the principles of a COIN campaign and the operational objectives

specific to the campaign.

All ranks must be briefed on the aims of both the COIN campaign and those of the

insurgency and trained to recognize themes and messages in enemy propaganda along with

the need to avoid feeding those propaganda messages. An understanding of the issues at

stake ensures that soldiers know how to reinforce the COIN effort and objectives. Furthermore,

commanders and soldiers must be made to understand that success in COIN is not necessarily

synonymous with physical destruction of insurgents and that achieving tactical success must not

take precedence over the longer-term operational and strategic goals.

317. ACTING WITHIN THE LAW

Even though terrorists and insurgents use lawless and violent methods, the government

and security force response must be constrained by adherence to the rule of law. Operating

outside the law will only fuel discontent and the insurgent propaganda machine. If the

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government and its security forces lose the moral high ground, and thus legitimacy and

credibility, the people have no incentive to support them. The host nation security forces must

act within domestic law, while coalition forces must operate within the bounds of both

international and national law as well as within the bounds of accepted international norms,

which may not be formally stated but nonetheless exist. In many nations, the police and local

military will require close supervision in order to ensure that they and their actions fall within

these parameters. Leaders at all levels must not be reluctant to voice their concerns with

respect to the conduct of local security forces, both on the spot and in their reports to their

chains-of-command.

318. MINIMUM NECESSARY FORCE

No more force may be used than is necessary to achieve an aim. The amount used

must be reasonable and it must not be punitive. Once the aim is achieved, no more force

should be used.

The need to use minimum force is not to be confused with deploying the minimum

number of troops. The appearance of a force large enough to contain a situation at the right

psychological moment may convince insurgents and other adversaries or dissidents that the

authorities are well prepared and determined to deal with lawlessness.

As in all operations, commanders remain morally responsible to ensure that all ranks

can apply their rules of engagement robustly and with confidence. In doing so, commanders

and soldiers alike must recognize the need to limit collateral damages and to only engage

clearly identified threats. Insurgents will undoubtedly attack from the shelter and screen of

civilian populations, and soldiers must ensure that they clearly identify the threat before

engaging with deadly force. This must be a key aspect of training.

Furthermore, insurgents will execute atrocities with the specific aim of causing an

overreaction from the security forces that will later be used in propaganda to undermine the

credibility of COIN forces and to enhance the insurgent’s narrative. This should be kept in mind

by commanders when planning.

SECTION 4

CONCLUSION

The principles and considerations articulated above are only intended to provide

guidance and are not meant to be read as hard-and-fast rules. They are doctrinal principles

based on the overarching philosophy; they are not dogma and should be applied with flexibility

and common sense. All forms of warfare evolve, particularly during times of conflict, and

insurgency and counter-insurgency are not exceptions to this fact. However, the principles

listed and described represent the distillation of the facts of history and provide a reasonable

guide for the commander to comprehend a complex operational situation and develop plans that

will reinforce and complement the necessary political solution to the conflict.

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CHAPTER 4

STRATEGIC-LEVEL CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTER INSURGENCY

… the first requirement for the successful conduct of a COIN campaign is for the

government to set up a sound framework within which it can take place.

—General Sir Frank Kitson

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

In its widest context, an insurrection will be politically motivated. Therefore, the

overarching strategy to defeat the insurrection must be political. While military activities will act

to form part of this strategy, they only encompass one arm of a multi-faceted campaign that

uses a comprehensive approach incorporating all elements of power in a unity of purpose. The

amount of emphasis placed the military’s role will be dictated by the strength of the insurgent

forces and their tactics, techniques and procedures. Strategic and operational considerations

are fundamentally different for counter-insurgency (COIN) campaigns than for conventional

campaigns. They require closer cooperation with ongoing diplomatic activities and more

consideration of the overarching political objectives at lower operational and tactical levels of

command. Usually this involves the selective use of force, as opposed to maximum firepower

and destruction, in conjunction with humanitarian and diplomatic activities. Therefore, closer

and more extensive coordination between the military and other governmental and non-

governmental agencies is required. Nonetheless, whether or not an insurgency develops to the

point at which there is major combat, as with the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army in 1947 or

the Afghan Northern Alliance in 2002, the outcome of a COIN campaign will be profound.

SECTION 2

THE GOVERNMENT CONCEPT

401. THE SETTING

Alliances and global security arrangements enhance the security environment through

reducing the threat of attack against Canada while increasing the likelihood of support from

other nations. Also the willingness to contribute to allies, both regionally and on a global level

has been seen as effective in containing potentially unstable situations. As such, working with

other nations is an essential element of our foreign and defence policies. Here, the military has

a proven role in maintaining international policies and relationships.

The government of the day decides on participation in international deployments on a

case-by-case basis. Considerations affecting the decision making process include Canadian

interests and costs, risks to military personnel, probability of success, specificity of objectives

and mission duration as well as existing commitments.

It is possible that a national government, an international organization or other lead

nation faced with an insurgent threat will request assistance from Canada. In the event of the

Government of Canada agreeing to such a request, the Canadian military may deploy a force to

conduct COIN operations. Such a deployment may be a unilateral action or part of a

multinational coalition under the United Nations (UN) or other lead-nation or coalition

arrangements.

In considering requesting Canadian military assistance, a national government or the UN

is likely to delay such a request in the hope that the existing situation will improve so that

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outside assistance will not be necessary. It should be expected, therefore, that any insurgency

will be well established by the time Canadian troops are committed.

Even before a firm commitment is made by the Canadian government, and most

certainly immediately following any public announcement, military leaders must work to ensure

that the enablers and conditions needed to help ensure campaign success will be provided. As

stated earlier, a COIN campaign requires a comprehensive approach, with the military working

in support of other agencies in order to address the root causes of the insurgency. The

involvement of other government departments and other agencies in the campaign planning,

training and deployment to the campaign and their long-term commitment to the campaign will

be essential for success. Given the military’s unique understanding of COIN campaigns and the

principles by which they should be conducted, commanders must be prepared to take a lead in

encouraging the government to set these conditions for success in the campaign.

402. THE PRIMACY OF HOST NATION POLICIES

A COIN campaign must be conducted in accordance with an agreed, pervasively applied

national policy of the host nation (HN) and indigenous government. They must take the lead in

the campaign. In the case of a failed, failing or re-established state, an interim government

mandate and its military campaign must be in accordance with any mandate issued by the

international organization sponsoring the overall campaign and coalition.

In situations in which the indigenous government is nascent and only developing, it must

be mentored and brought to the fore in the public eye to the greatest extent possible. This will

give legitimacy to the campaign and to the indigenous government, and, ideally, a sense of

pride and ownership amongst the populace. Furthermore, even a nascent government will be

able to provide advice to coalition leadership regarding the perceptions and attitudes of its own

population and their view of coalition actions.

All actions and restrictions arising from strategic policy affecting the nation, its population

and resources must be carefully explained to the populace. Similarly, the operations of the

security forces must be seen to stem from national policy.

403. THE PRIMACY OF LAW

The legal framework within which COIN operations may be conducted will almost

certainly change from situation to situation, but the primacy of the law cannot be usurped by

military action. Where the national or mandated government maintains control of the country or

parts of the country, it should determine the policy and priorities for COIN operations and the

restoration of legitimate government.

If martial law or emergency powers are enacted, these measures should be temporary in

nature and their purpose must be clearly explained to the people of the host nation. Such a

decision must be made carefully, for it will be readily exploited by insurgent propaganda as an

example of the unjust policies of the government.

These facts dictate that the highest level of government develop and distribute a

strategic message which pervades down to the lowest tactical level. Furthermore, restoration of

legal normalcy is a decisive factor.

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SECTION 3

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Since insurgency is principally a political struggle, the ultimate objective will be achieved

by a combination of complementary objectives under the overall direction of the highest civilian

authority. These objectives, which will address the root causes of the insurgency, will be

achieved through:

political policy that will develop responsible governance, a competent civil service

and politically subordinate security forces;

economic policy that will create enduring and pervasive wealth to meet basic

needs and expectations;

social programmes that seek to develop current and future generations; and

security operations that create a framework in which other elements of power

may operate and foster the development of indigenous forces to assume and

fulfil their own security requirements.

In a COIN campaign, strategic centres of gravity will be segments of the population

(generally the majority) and their support for the campaign. There will be a competition over the

support, or at least the acquiescence, of the broad mass of indigenous people.⁴¹ The domestic

populations of troop contributing nations and their will to support a long-term campaign will also

be a strategic centre of gravity, which the insurgents will try to influence, mainly through

attacking their will by inflicting a heavy cost on the coalition forces. Other strategic centres of

gravity may be individuals or groups who are moral centres of gravity.

The identification of centres of gravity becomes more complex at lower levels of

command, where subordinate commanders must deal with regional, sub regional and local

political, economic, social and military issues and influences. All activities, regardless of the

level at which they are conducted, must work to support the strategic and operational objectives

through the identified centres of gravity.

Although centres of gravity remain vital considerations in campaign and operational

planning, they cannot be the sole focus. Campaigns must focus on the strategic and

operational objectives that must be reached or created in order to realize the desired end-state.

These objectives will be reached through, or at least in relation to, the identified centres of

gravity. Given the nature of counter-insurgencies, this will in many cases be conducted on the

psychological plane vice only the physical plane of physical attack and defence.

In certain situations, the insurgency itself may have become complex enough to be

considered as a combination of groups of insurgencies, perhaps with shifting alliances and

varying degrees of competition within and amongst groups. The insurgency in Iraq during

2004-2005 is an example of this. Although planning will require perhaps greater complexity

and detail, plans should continue to apply the guiding principles for COIN campaigns.

In a campaign in a foreign country, the objectives of the Canadian military will be

influenced by the policies of the host nation, the Government of Canada and the capabilities and

limitations of any coalition partners, be they military or other elements of power. The overall aim

is to create a situation in which the coalition military is no longer needed and the indigenous

security forces can provide a reasonable level of security, other agencies are capable of

⁴¹ COIN forces will need to gain and maintain the support of the broad mass of the indigenous populace. For

their part, insurgents only need to intimidate or exhaust the will of the local populace to resist the insurgency.

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operating securely and can eventually pass development and aid issues to international and/or

indigenous agencies, and Canadian involvement may be withdrawn in the confidence of an

enduring solution.

SECTION 4

THRESHOLD CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONSIDERATIONS

It is vital the political and military leaders recognize the development of an insurgency

whilst it is still in its early stages. During this threshold period, key decisions will be made that

will either alleviate the crisis and pre-empt the insurgency or worsen and inflame the situation.

Ideally, the effects of decisions and actions will be carefully considered before they are

implemented.

As a political and social situation deteriorates and an insurgency develops, the host

nation government may face a series of threshold circumstances. These will manifest in a

manner difficult to recognize, as a range of seemingly unrelated events such as politically

motivated strikes within key industries or demonstrations with potentially subversive political

undertones. Recognizing these actions as insurgent activity may be difficult because many of

these incidents occur with no subversive intent in normal times and no threat of violence.

Indeed, any related violence may be dismissed by some as simply criminal activity and an

attempt made to disassociate it from any political motivation.

Although one must be careful not to assume an insurgency exists where it does not, the

dismissal of a nascent insurgency as mere criminal behaviour is the surest way of fuelling it.

Such dismissal adds to the insurgent’s narrative of subjugation and overall legitimacy and

provides political leaders with an excuse to ignore the root causes of the discontent

underpinning any growth in the insurgency.

In dealing with a developing insurgency, all restrictive measures—curfews and

restrictions on movement, or in an extreme case, detention without trial—place a strain on

democracy, and any decision to introduce them must not be made lightly. Insurgent incidents

often bring a public demand for extreme measures as the populace seeks security.

Simultaneously, the insurgent, through his actions, intends for the government, military and

security forces to respond in a repressive manner. This must be avoided at all costs, as an ill-

considered response will heighten the effectiveness of the insurgent campaign.

The government may conclude that a combination of selective legislation and small-

scale, precision security force operations would stand a good chance of nipping the insurgency

in the bud. In practice, however, crossing that threshold is seldom easy, as sensitivity to

potential domestic and international repercussions firmly inclines a government towards the

deferment of painful decisions.

During this threshold period, the government will monitor the situation in the strategic

environment. If it deteriorates, relevant departments and ministries, such as National Defence

and Foreign Affairs in Canada, will begin contingency planning. This will include informing the

respective ministers of possible capabilities, options and restrictions within the context of the

insurgency’s perceived causes and objectives. From this initial planning, a strategic directive

should be prepared,⁴² setting out the government’s policy and objectives as the basis for

campaign design and a basis for the comprehensive approach to engage with political, military,

economic and social issues. The government should begin to bring together the military with

⁴² B-GG-005-004/AF-000 Canadian Forces Operations, dated 2000-12-18. See Chapter 3 “The Campaign Plan,”

especially Section 1 “Campaign Design,” article 301,“ The Strategic Environment,” pg. 3-1.

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the other elements of power and national and international organizations needed to resolve the

crisis and conduct a successful campaign.

Although such a scenario is likely to develop gradually as the seriousness of the threat

becomes obvious, there are a number of issues that would be particularly beneficial to military

planners, should the government give them early consideration. These include, but are not

limited to, formulating a long-term political aim, integrating and expanding the requisite

intelligence and security services and establishing a multi-agency framework for the planning

and conduct of security and other operations requiring civil, police and military cooperation.

Naturally, such efforts would be expanded should the situation continue to deteriorate.

SECTION 5

MILITARY COMMITMENT

Guided by the national strategic directive, the Canadian military will develop a military

strategy and campaign plan, which is a subset of national strategy. The degree of preparation

enabled by this military strategy and campaign plan during this early stage will determine the

ease of deployment and subsequent operations for Canadian troops. The earlier that liaison is

established between the Canadian Forces, government agencies, coalition and local forces, and

the more integrated the planning that has taken place beforehand, the smoother the deployment

will be.

In the simplest of terms, the aim of military intervention is to restore the situation to the

point at which the host nation police and security forces are able to maintain law and order. At

the same time, the military will provide the security framework within which other agencies may

be able to operate in order to restore essential services and help develop indigenous

government capacity. Initially, the security situation may be such that the military must assume

additional roles such as the re-establishment of essential services and emergency humanitarian

relief. As the security situation improves, these responsibilities should be assumed by other

organizations better suited to undertaking them. Concurrent with this must the hand-over of

security responsibilities to local authorities, ideally with a police lead. This will show progress,

lend legitimacy to the campaign and government and restore a sense of normalcy in the society.

A training and mentoring role may have to be adopted in order to develop the capability of the

local security forces to assume these responsibilities.

There is always the risk that a deploying military force will replace rather than

supplement local security forces. This situation must be avoided in the interests of maintaining

the military in a supporting relationship with government, police and other agencies, both

indigenous and international. This will lend legitimacy and support to both the campaign and

the local forces themselves. It will be vital that a local face be given to any operation whenever

possible. Additionally, this will help preserve the security forces’ morale and their standing with

the population they will have to serve upon the return to normalcy.

When acting within a coalition force, it will remain important to coordinate activities with

the local authorities. This will avoid the image of occupation and ensure that an understanding

of indigenous needs is gained and that planned operations and their effects are considered from

a suitable cultural perspective.

When operating in support of a friendly government, the military must be seen to operate

clearly in support of the civil power and not in isolation from it. This can be accomplished more

readily if the local security forces are incorporated into military planning whenever possible, and

the civil government is seen to be implementing those aspects of policy, planning and control

which closely affect military operations.

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SECTION 6

THE WITHDRAWAL OF MILITARY FORCES

The strategic end-state should describe the withdrawal of all government agencies from

the campaign, whilst the operational end-state will describe the conditions leading to the

withdrawal of military forces.

The withdrawal phase of military disengagement may prove problematic. Whilst no

government or military aspires to a protracted conflict, history provides scant few examples of

short-lived counter-insurgencies. There is always the potential that public antipathy, manifest in

widespread opposition to a deployment and demands for withdrawal, could form a strategic

challenge to the government and the military to maintain the morale of the public and of military

elements deployed and in training to deploy. The key element in achieving these objectives is a

strategic public affairs programme.

Potentially, a domestic or international settlement may allow for a swift troop withdrawal.

Nevertheless, the history of COIN indicates a greater probability for a prolonged struggle of the

attrition of national will.

Because it is a political struggle on both the physical and psychological planes, a COIN

campaign takes years to succeed and to reach a point at which the military commitment may

hand-over to indigenous security forces and a normal force presence occur. Often the host

nation government will only regain control of its disaffected territory area by area over time.

This will necessitate a prolonged military withdrawal phase. This fact should be articulated at

the start of the strategic planning process, and the campaign plan must anticipate it and reflect

it.

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ANNEX A

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CONDUCT OF A COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN

4A01. INTRODUCTION

Before any unit or component of the Canadian Forces (CF) may deploy on operations,

commanders at all levels need to understand the legal foundation for the particular mission or

operation to be undertaken. Generally, there are two legal regimes that govern the deployment

of the CF on missions or operations outside Canada, including, for the purpose of this manual,

counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. The first regime is the body of national, or domestic, law

that provides the foundation for embarking on COIN operations. The second regime includes

that large body of international law that governs the conduct of the CF during the execution of a

COIN operation in another sovereign state.

4A02. NATIONAL, OR DOMESTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION

There are two sources of authority in national, or domestic, law that provide the legal

foundation for the CF to engage in operations. The first source can be found in the National

Defence Act (NDA). Sections 31 to 34 set out the authority of the government to place

members of the CF on active service, either for the defence of Canada or the consequence of

any action taken by Canada under the UN Charter, NATO treaty or other regional agreements.

Those sections of the NDA also provide that all members of the Regular Force are liable to

perform any lawful duty, and that members of the Reserve Force may be liable for lawful duty

when called out by regulations (i.e., Class B or C reserve service). In addition, Part III of the

NDA sets out the Code of Service Discipline. CF members on COIN operations are always

subject to the Canadian military justice system.

The second source of authority within the national legal regime is the general authority of

the government to engage in military activity under the rubric of crown prerogative. Crown

prerogative is a residual royal power that is currently vested in the Governor-in-Council (i.e., the

governor general of Canada acting on behalf of the cabinet) and provides the authority for the

cabinet to order military deployments, engage in international expeditions, enter into

international treaties and declare war without the constitutional requirement to refer the matter

to Parliament.

4A03. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FOUNDATION

The second regime that provides a legal foundation for operations abroad is set out in

international law. Under international law, Canada may engage in overseas operations in any of

four possible sources of authority. The first source consists of the authority to conduct

operations on the territory of another state by the request or consent of the host state. For the

purpose of COIN campaigns, requesting states may ask Canada to provide military assistance

in the form of equipment or training (e.g., Congo in the 1960s, Sierra Leone, Sudan) or

humanitarian assistance to the host nation (e.g., Rwanda).

The second source of authority is found in the UN Charter. Each of Chapters VI, VII and

VIII of the charter contain specific authority to conduct a spectrum of operations with UN

approval, and in the case of Chapter VIII, by regional arrangement. In the majority of cases,

Canada will only engage in operations that are approved by the UN or under internationally

recognized regional arrangements (e.g., International Security Assistance Force [ISAF]).

Historically, Canada has not unilaterally engaged in expeditionary operations in another

sovereign state.

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A third source of authority is founded on the inherent right to self-defence, either

collectively or in defence of Canadian sovereignty. Both of these legal authorities to engage in

military operations are unlikely in a COIN situation, mainly due to the level of threat and slow-to-

evolve nature of insurgencies. While unlikely, it is possible that a nation that is a member of a

regional arrangement will request the assistance of another member nation to combat an

insurgency (e.g., Australian assistance to the UK COIN operations in Malaya).

A fourth and recently developing source of authority to engage in international missions

can be found in the principle of humanitarian intervention. While not universally accepted,

humanitarian intervention provides that a state may intervene in the internal affairs of another

state on the conditions that there is widespread humanitarian distress, the host nation is

unwilling or unable to deal effectively with the crisis, and the existing international organs have

failed to act. Humanitarian intervention must be limited in time and scope, and the intervening

force must withdraw once the situation is stabilized.

4A04. LAWFUL CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN A COIN CAMPAIGN

Once the government has decided to engage in COIN operation under one or more of

the authorities explained above, the law of armed conflict governs the conduct of the CF during

the mission. It is well settled in COIN doctrine that maintaining the confidence of the legitimate

government and the citizens of the country suffering the insurgency is crucial to continued

military and governmental success. To that end, the conduct of the CF must be above reproach

when engaging in operations against the insurgents. Any real or perceived breach of the law of

armed conflict will undermine the legitimacy of the COIN campaign and those forces conducting

it. History has shown that once the citizens have lost the confidence of the military forces

engaged in COIN operations, their sympathies and support will be transferred to the insurgents.

There is a robust international and domestic legal regime controlling the conduct of CF

units and members on operations. Apart from the protections offered by the domestic law of the

host nation, international law sets out the standard of conduct in non-international conflicts. The

CF will always conduct operations within the parameters of international law. For COIN

operations, Additional Protocol II (AP II) to the Geneva Conventions provides protection to

victims of non-international armed conflict by applying the humanitarian principles found in

Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions to non-international conflicts.

Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions is the absolute minimum standard of

treatment, and it states that persons not taking part in hostilities must be treated humanely and

without discrimination. Specifically, they must not be subject to violence to life or person, being

taken as hostages, subjected to humiliating and degrading treatment. If charged with a crime,

they must be afforded the judicial protections commonly guaranteed by civilized nations.

Finally, if wounded or sick, they must be collected and cared for. The standard of treatment

afforded by this article also applies to those insurgents, irrespective of their status under

international law, who have been captured, surrendered or rendered hors de combat by wounds

or sickness.

In addition, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) has stressed direction to the CF to the

effect that all persons detained by units or individuals of the CF must be accorded the standard

of treatment provided by the 3rd Geneva Convention,⁴³ i.e., the standard of treatment afforded

to a prisoner of war. Because CF personnel will treat all captured individuals as prisoner of war

irrespective of subsequent determination of their status, using labels such as “unlawful

⁴³ B-GG-005-004/AF-005 Use of Force in CF Operations, dated 2001-06-01.

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Annex A to Chapter 4

combatants,” “detainees” or “personnel under custody” to identify captured insurgents are

irrelevant for the CF members involved with the capture, handling or treatment of detained

insurgents.

The greatest leadership challenge in COIN operations is maintaining the moral high

ground and the rule of law by resisting the provocations of the insurgents. History has shown

that overreaction to insurgent provocation has led to breaches of the law of armed conflict,

which in turn have provided valuable propaganda material to the insurgents, the loss of citizen

support and ultimately mission failure. To avoid such a situation, commanders and units must

be well disciplined, well trained and comfortable and confident with the rules of engagement.

While the legal foundation of the COIN operation may vary from situation to situation, the

primacy of the rule of law must never be displaced. CF personnel must conduct operations

within the accepted international norms of warfare and the Code of Service Discipline,

irrespective of the type of operation.

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CHAPTER 5

OPERATIONAL-LEVEL CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTER-INSURGENCY

If the long-term political objective is not first in the mind of all participants, there

will be a tendency to adopt short-term, ad hoc measures in response to insurgent

or terrorist activity.

—Sir Robert Thompson

SECTION 1

JOINT AND COMBINED ASPECTS OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY

501. INTRODUCTION

The planning and conduct of counter-insurgency (COIN) at the operational level requires

a realization by commanders and political leaders alike that the campaign requires a wide range

of actors and elements of power and cannot involve the military alone. Indeed, in most areas of

activity, or lines of operation, the military will have a supporting role to other elements of power

and international organizations.

Despite this supporting role, military commanders will likely take the lead in campaign

planning, including the incorporation of other elements of power into the campaign plan. This

may occur within a formal command structure, within a cooperative, consensual arrangement or

within a combination of arrangements. Regardless, the approach to the campaign must be

comprehensive, addressing the root causes of insurgency.

502. COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

The demands of a COIN campaign call for the application of a comprehensive approach

that sees the military working in conjunction with other agencies and elements of power to

address the root, systemic causes of a crisis (including an insurgency) and to produce enduring

outcomes in the campaign. The comprehensive approach is defined as “The application of

commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of

favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular environment. Note: The comprehensive

approach brings together all the elements of power and other agencies needed to create

enduring solutions to a campaign.”⁴⁴

Many of the root causes of an insurgency cannot be addressed by military forces and

require the application of international organizations (IOs) and other agencies and elements of

power. The military must neutralize the insurgents through pre-emption, disruption and

dislocation and create freedom of manoeuvre for these other agencies. Indeed, once the

security situation has improved and can be maintained by indigenous forces, the military may

even withdraw whilst these other agencies remain.

The campaign plan must reflect this comprehensive approach. Each line of operation

will group together similar and related operational objectives and will likely involve a number of

agencies. In many lines of operation, the military will have a supporting role. At times, such as

in a line of operation dealing with security issues, the military may be the lead agency supported

by other elements of power.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Army Terminology Panel, May 2007.

⁴⁵ For more details regarding the comprehensive approach, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations.

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Working with a comprehensive approach will require a unifying theme, manifested in a

common end-state, a unity of purpose and, ideally, a unity of effort across all agencies. Much of

this approach will be realized at the lower operational and tactical levels through military forces

working hand-in-hand with other agencies.

503. COMPREHENSIVE OPERATIONS

Military units tend to be trained, organized and equipped for combating conventional

threats that are similar to themselves in terms of aims, structures and doctrine. A COIN

campaign necessitates a somewhat different emphasis. Many activities conducted by military

forces will seek to build confidence within a local populace and to convince them to support the

campaign vice the insurgents. Thus the military will conduct influence activities. These will be

activities that have first-order psychological effects in order to affect the understanding and

perceptions (i.e., the minds) of the populace and even the insurgents themselves and to

ultimately affect their will and behaviour (i.e., their hearts).

These influence activities may be short-term psychological operations and public affairs

or longer-term civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) related undertakings. Many stability operations,

such as the construction of infrastructure or the training of indigenous forces, may be

considered part of influence activities.

Influence activities are combined with fires—physical activities with first order physical

effects—to form the concept of comprehensive operations: the deliberate use and orchestration

of the full range of available capabilities and activities to realize desired effects. The campaign

theme, together with the situation at hand, will dictate the balance that is struck between fires

and influence. They are planned and conducted in a synchronized and complementary manner

and coordinated through manoeuvre and battlespace management (see Chapter 1 and

Figure 1-4).

Together, fires and influence create effects on the physical and psychological planes

respectively and should be planned to support operational objectives. Many of these influences

will be conducted with or through other agencies that are best suited to meet humanitarian and

governance demands, thus realizing a comprehensive approach (see Figure 5-1).

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Figure 5-1: The Comprehensive Approach and Comprehensive Operations

The application of fires to neutralize the insurgents will ideally be done with indigenous

forces in order to develop their capabilities and to enhance the legitimacy of the campaign. In

conducting the engagement of the insurgents, commanders must come to appreciate and avoid

undesired effects. The creation of collateral damage and civilian casualties, for example, will do

much to undermine the operational objectives and overall legitimacy of the COIN campaign and

will greatly detract from influencing minds and hearts. Thus planning must be done with this in

mind.

Planning of tactical-level activities must always be done in order to support the stated

operational objectives. The combination of fires and influence will support the neutralization of

the insurgent and the separation of him from his sources of strength. Fires and other physical

activities will separate the insurgent from his physical support, whilst influence activities, through

public affairs, psychological operations (PSYOPS) and other capabilities, will separate him from

his moral support and ideally neutralize his influence on indigenous and other populaces.

COIN will be conducted through a joint and combined command intimately linked with

civilian political activities and other agencies. The shift in emphasis from the destruction of

enemy manoeuvre forces to a balance between fires and influence requires greater awareness

of intelligence, information and the socio-cultural milieu of the area of operation. In order to

gauge how influence messages will be perceived and understood and thus create the desired

effect, commanders must come to understand the overall environment, its systems and its

overall culture.

Commanders must consistently emphasize the minimum use of force rather than

maximum firepower, with consideration of both primary and secondary effects, in order to

maintain legitimacy and avoid providing material for insurgent propaganda. All of these factors

will require a greater degree of cooperation and unity of effort across all agencies from all

participating countries, with a more diverse range of civilian and security force actors to deal

with than is customary to many within the military.

Structurally, organizations at the operational level will mirror those civil and military

arrangements created at the strategic level, thus ensuring continued joint and combined

integrity throughout the various levels of command. Military leaders at the operational level will

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continue to ensure that military efforts remain subordinate to political-civil constraints and

requirements. This will hold true regardless of the shifting effort and emphasis as the

insurgency evolves.

10.

At the operational level and below, the comprehensive approach, with its integration of

multiple agencies to create enduring solutions to the insurgency, may be realized and

implemented through the creation of civil-military transition teams.⁴⁶ These teams or groupings

combine military and other agencies to undertake a wide variety of tasks that focus on

reconstruction, governance and development. They may include a range of government

departments and international organizations supported by the military. Their overall tasks will

include essential services, sustainable development, infrastructure and governance

development. The military’s role may be wide ranging, particularly in the early stages, but as a

minimum will likely include security, escort, liaison duties as well as the provision of expertise in

fields such as engineering.

11.

These teams should be considered manoeuvre elements not in terms of combining

firepower and movement but in terms of psychologically out-manoeuvring the insurgents to

dislocate the insurgents and create lasting stability. They bring a customizable, multi-faceted

capability to the campaign, which will create effects in support of operational objectives. They

may work along a single line of operation or along a number of lines of operation.

504. COMMAND SYSTEMS AND STRUCTURES⁴⁷

The command and control structures adopted for a COIN campaign should include the

wide variety of agencies and elements of power needed to successfully prosecute the

campaign. These may be formal or informal arrangements. In either case, they must be based

on a unity of purpose and common end-state and include the various elements of power needed

to address the causes and aggravating factors of the insurgency.

505. SINGLE COMMANDER SYSTEM⁴⁸

In a single command construct, the chairman or director of the coordinated effort is in

overall command of the campaign. In this system, policy and executive authority are vested in a

single commander, usually a military officer, with senior civil service, police and subordinate

military commanders as advisers. The system requires a perceptive and charismatic (team

building) commander. Whether military or civilian, the commander will be acting on behalf of the

government and will have a variety of military and civilian advisers. The executive authority of

⁴⁶ Civil-military transition team is defined as: “An organization designed to integrate and coordinate interagency and

multidisciplinary efforts within a given geographic region. Note: Its purpose is to develop capacity in local agencies

and institutions in order to promote long-term stability. It may be referred to as a provincial reconstruction team

(PRT) in some theatres” (submitted to the Army Terminology Panel, September 2007). The use of (PRTs) during

the campaign in Afghanistan is an example of civil-military transition teams.

⁴⁷ “This section and the concept of single and committee command structures are based in part on the work of

General Sir Frank Kitson. See: Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five, London: Faber and Faber, 1977: passim.”

⁴⁸ A recent example of a single command system can be found in the Australian command construct used in the

Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), initiated in 2003. In this case, a civil servant/diplomat led

the mission with the military and police elements subordinate to him in a single command structure even though the

military contributed the majority of the forces deployed. It is important to note, however, that the style of command

used was highly cooperative in nature. See: Russell Glenn, COIN in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the

Regional Assistance Mission, Solomon Islands, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007).

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the commander must be well understood by all subordinate commanders, be they civil or

military.

A single command system will best suit a single nation’s contribution to a campaign

(even as part of a larger coalition) or that of a closely knit coalition.

Although a single command system may exist, there will be important contributors to the

campaign that will not come under this command system. These may be international

agencies, private volunteer organizations, private business and non-governmental organizations

(NGOs). Ideally, they will share a unity of purpose and close coordination will be a common

practice.

Within a nation’s campaign contribution, a single command system should allow the

application of a comprehensive approach at all levels of command, with an appropriate mix of

military and civil elements of power at various levels of command (see Figure 5-2, which is a

theoretical example only).

Figure 5-2: Example of a Possible Single Command System

506. COMMITTEE SYSTEM

It may not be possible, particularly when dealing with a coalition, to form a single

command system across different civilian and military agencies. In such a case, committees

may be formed at the strategic, operational and tactical levels in order to coordinate all COIN

objectives and activities across all elements of power and lines of operation.

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A committee lead, normally the civil administration, provides the chairman of the highest-

level committee, thus linking joint forces and other elements of power. Subordinate committees

may be formed to group together similar elements of power between international and

indigenous powers.

The organization of committees may reflect thematic lines of operation in the

campaign plan. Committees are replicated at each level—national regional and local—as

appropriate.

The police and the military provide members to the various security operations

committees at each level—national, regional and local—in the administrative and command

hierarchy. These must include elements of indigenous forces, particularly if they are mature

and reliable. The ability of indigenous forces, both police and military, to provide intelligence

and situational awareness cannot be underestimated.

Other elements of power, such as judiciary reform institutions and infrastructure

development organizations, may form their own cooperative committees with indigenous input

or leadership at national, regional and local levels in order to coordinate and harmonize actions.

Military forces may also be represented at these non-military committees in order to coordinate

support (e.g., engineer expertise, security and transport) and provide situational awareness.

Decisions are made jointly and implemented by the chairman and members through

their own civil service, police and military command. At various levels, the committees may also

include lead administrators from various NGOs and international bodies providing support to the

operation (such as the UN special envoy, United Nations High Commission for Refugees

[UNHCR] coordinator, etc.). The structure of the committees must be flexible and altered to suit

the circumstances at hand. A national police command and civilian intelligence agencies, both

indigenous and foreign, may be able to support.

While the committees at various levels will guide and coordinate operations, military

commanders at all levels must be prepared to exploit fleeting opportunities in order to do

damage to the insurgency movement. In simple terms, time may not exist to refer potential

military actions back to a committee. Any military action taken, however, must be fully in

concert with the overall strategy of the COIN operation, use the minimal force necessary,

support the campaign objectives and avoid undesired effects that will undermine the legitimacy

of the campaign.

Under a committee system, arrangements will become fairly ad hoc and change over

time. Nations contributing to a coalition will determine the level of commitment and the levels

and regions in which they will participate, be it a military commitment, a civilian commitment or a

combination thereof.

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Figure 5-3: Example of a Committee System for a COIN Campaign

SECTION 2

THE PLANNING OF THE COIN CAMPAIGN

507. OPERATIONAL CAMPAIGN PLANNING

The COIN principles identified for the successful conduct of operations, as detailed in

Chapter 3, must be clearly understood. They form the backdrop to the campaign plan and

continue to be applied through all levels of command and integrated into daily operations.

Developing the military aspects of a COIN plan depends on many factors but typically involves

the securing of a firm base from which to operate. Once this base is established, military forces

should then seize the initiative in separating the insurgent from the supporting population in

order to support the government’s subsequent activities.

The nature of a COIN campaign and the demand to use a comprehensive approach

calls for all elements of power needed in the campaign to be involved, to the greatest extent

possible, in the development of the campaign plan.

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508. EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO CAMPAIGN PLANNING

An effects-based approach will be used in the development of the campaign plan.⁴⁹ The

effects-based approach is defined as “a planning philosophy combined with specific processes

that enable firstly, the integration and effectiveness of the military contribution within a

comprehensive approach with other elements of power, and secondly, the realization of

operational objectives.”⁵⁰ In simple terms, an effects-based approach ensures that the military

activities are integrated with those of other agencies and that military activities are directly linked

to operational objectives—the results or effects of the activities directly contribute to operational

objectives.

The campaign plan for a COIN campaign must span a considerable length of time in

order to be realistic and address the systemic causes that led to the crisis. Once devised, the

campaign plan is implemented through a series of operational plans that are constantly

reviewed and issued on a continual basis. Assessment of the situation, the environment and

campaign progress is continuous and informs subsequent iterations of the operational plan.

Each successive operational plan adjusts operations to reflect the progress made in the

campaign. This is illustrated in figure 5-4.

Figure 5-4: Model of a Campaign Plan and Supporting Operational Plans

In dealing with an effects-based approach and specifically with a COIN campaign, the

normal taxonomy used in campaign planning must be expanded.⁵¹ The campaign plan must

⁴⁹ For more details on the effects-based approach, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations.

⁵⁰ Army Terminology Panel, May 2007.

⁵¹ For the purposes of a military lexicon, effects are simply considered the results of activities. They may occur as

first order effects on the physical or psychological plane or on both planes when second order effects are considered.

For more details, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations.

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work towards a desired and well articulated operational end-state that supports the strategic

end-state and objectives. Such an operational end-state should envisage the termination of all,

or at least the majority of, military involvement in the campaign and a prevailing security

situation that allows other elements of power to operate freely and is maintained by indigenous

forces at a sustainable operating level. The campaign plan begins with an articulation of this

operational end-state.

From this operational end-state, the commander and planning staff determine key

centres of gravity, operational objectives that will support the end-state, supporting effects that

will realize operational objectives and finally the activities (assigned through the operational

plans) that will create those supporting effects. This is illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 5-5: Model for the Development of an Effects-Based Campaign Plan

The basic steps in completing such a campaign plan are as follows:

Review the Situation. The operating environment will be complex, and a wide

range of factors—political, military, economic, social (including culture and

religion), informational and infrastructure—will need to be analyzed for their

power structures and influences upon the successful outcome of the campaign.

This will form the broad knowledge base that will inform the remainder of the

operational and tactical planning process.

Identify and Analyze the Problem.

(1)

The commander and staff conduct a mission analysis to establish both

the mission and the operational end-state. Initial operational objectives

may also be identified.

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(2)

The staff conducts a detailed evaluation of the factors, building upon the

broad knowledge base. Based upon the operational end-state and

objectives, centres of gravity may be identified. Other operational

objectives and the supporting effects needed to create them may also be

identified at this point.

(3)

The commander and senior staff conduct analysis of the factors to

discern the major building blocks of the campaign plan. They will select

and analyze the centre(s) of gravity that dominate the situation along

with their critical requirements and vulnerabilities. Furthermore, they will

confirm the desired operational end-state. Based on the key centre(s) of

gravity, the commander will determine the operational objectives needed

to achieve the end-state. Analysis will occur throughout in order to

confirm the validity of decisions. At this point, the commander should

have identified coherent operational objectives focused on the operational

end-state and addressing the key centre(s) of gravity. The commander

will issue planning guidance to his staff.

Frame the Campaign Plan and Initial Operational Plan (OPLAN). With the

building blocks decided, the campaign plan may be devised.

(1)

For the campaign plan, operational objectives may be grouped into

thematic lines of operation, which allow commanders and staff to

visualize the progress and direction of the campaign. The lines of

operation will indicate where the military has primacy and where it

supports other instruments of power. Note that all lines of operation,

regardless of the primary agency involved, move towards the operational

end-state. Once this framework is established, commanders and staff

may determine supporting effects or decisive points that create the

operational objectives. Measures of effectiveness⁵² are also determined.

Commanders and staff must realize that many of the desired effects in a

COIN campaign will take extensive periods of time to realize, for they

relate to changes in understanding, perceptions and will mainly in relation

to supporting a campaign.

(2)

Whilst the campaign plan depicts the long-term process, the near-term

requirements to commence the plan must be considered. Thus the

campaign plan is initiated through an operational plan (OPLAN), which is

updated and adjusted regularly to meet changes to the environment (see

Figure 5-4). The commander and staff select the decisive points that are

most relevant to the immediate situation and that must be achieved

before others can be achieved. Selection and prioritization of decisive

points will generate options, each of which will provide a potential

framework for an OPLAN. Based on his intuition, the commander will

select an option to decide which decisive points will be developed first. A

broad, outline scheme of manoeuvre may be developed.

Develop and Validate Courses of Action (CoAs). The broad direction

and scheme of manoeuvre issued by the commander must now be

⁵² Measure of effectiveness (MoE) is defined as “A criterion used to evaluate how a task has affected selected

system behaviour or capabilities over time” (Army Terminology Panel, May 2006).

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developed into detailed courses of action. The decisive points / supporting

effects chosen for initial development will be analyzed to determine what

activities are needed to create them. This is done by staff in collaboration with

specialist advisors, such as cultural or political advisors, and subordinate

headquarters. The activities may be arranged in different courses of action that

will lead to the realization of the decisive points. Courses of action may be

developed and compared in terms of activity, resources, time and space.

Course of Action (CoA) Evaluation. Each potential CoA is evaluated and

compared using a number of means in order to determine the most feasible and

likely of success. In doing so, the validity of selected decisive points may also be

examined to determine if they are deliverable and realistic within the constraints

of resources.

Commander’s Decision and Plan Development. Once the CoAs for the

OPLAN have been compared and assessed, the commander may select or

develop the CoA most likely to be successful in terms of creating the required

decisive points / supporting effects.

The extant taxonomy for campaign planning must be expanded beyond the concepts

dealing with conventional forces linked to geographical features and become broader concepts

in order to support the objectives and environmental issues relevant to a COIN campaign. The

expansion of campaign planning taxonomy should incorporate the need to create operational

objectives that involve more than simply military forces operating against other military forces:

Lines of operation should be considered as thematic groupings of operational

objectives and their supporting effects. They connect and drive activities to meet

operational objectives and ultimately the operational end-state in relation to

identified centres of gravity.

Centres of gravity remain vital in the development of a campaign plan and will

dictate the development of operational objectives.⁵³

(1)

Centres of gravity should be considered capabilities, based on groups or

individuals, that can create effects. They may be physical, such as an

enemy armoured reserve, or they may be moral, such as a charismatic

religious leader. Centres of gravity will have characteristics and localities

of importance but must be considered as a capability to be affected or

influenced.

(2)

Centres of gravity at the strategic and operational levels must be

identified and considered in the development of the campaign plan.

(3)

Generally, within a COIN campaign, strategic centres of gravity are

populations and their support of the campaign. The population of the

region or nation in question is a centre of gravity over which the

insurgents and the COIN elements will fight for support. The domestic

populations of any troop contributing nations will also be centres of

gravity, which the insurgents will attempt to intimidate and convince not to

support the campaign.

⁵³ Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) 6 defines a centre of gravity as “Characteristics, capabilities or localities

from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or

will to fight.”

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(4)

Operational objectives can be devised based on strategic and operational

centres of gravity. If a population mass and its support is a key centre of

gravity, then operational objectives will seek to create the conditions—a

responsible government, sustainable infrastructure, etc.—that will gain

and hold their support.

(5)

At an operational level, centres of gravity may be regional governments

and leaders whose competence and legitimacy in providing support and

security to their populations will be vital. Other centres of gravity may be

regional groups or tribes whose support withdrawn from an insurgency

may be key to long-term success.

(6)

In attacking or defending these centres of gravity, there will be a

requirement for comprehensive operations—the synchronized

combination of fires and influence activities. Influence activities through

public affairs, PSYOPS, CIMIC and presence, profile and posture are

particularly important in terms of convincing population-based centres of

gravity to reject the insurgency and support the COIN campaign.⁵⁴

Operational objectives will not necessarily be terrain-linked objectives but more

in the nature of decisive conditions that have both physical and psychological

dimensions. They may be military and security related, or they may be related to

governance, civil institutions and infrastructure. Thus many operational

objectives will be reached or created by other elements of power, with the military

in a supporting role or providing security and perhaps, given an early security

situation, initial work. Operational objectives are the key building blocks of the

campaign.

Decisive points may be considered those supporting effects—results of

activities—that build to the operational objectives. For example, if, based on a

desired end-state, an operational objective is the creation of a competent,

politically subordinate military force, a decisive point or supporting effect required

for this objective may be the creation of a military training centre and professional

NCO corps. This supporting effect can then be created by the assignment of

tactical activities, in particular, those dealing with security sector reform (see

Figure 5-5). Several decisive points or supporting effects will likely be required to

achieve an objective.

Activities are tactical activities and tasks assigned in order to create supporting

effects or decisive points that together will realize operational objectives. In this

manner, tactical activities are not conducted out of hand or from a preconceived

template but are directly related to operational objectives.

Once operational objectives have been identified, they may be grouped together in

thematic lines of operation. The figures below indicate an example of lines of operation for a

campaign.

⁵⁴ For more details with respect to influence activities, see B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations.

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Figure 5-7: Example of Lines of Operations, Operational Objectives and Decisive Points /

Supporting Effects

509. CAMPAIGN ASPECTS UNIQUE TO A COIN CAMPAIGN

Although the development and conduct of a COIN campaign at the operational level will

follow the same general process as that for any other campaign, there are several aspects that

warrant special consideration. These are reflective of the philosophy and principles unique to a

COIN.

The importance of these unique aspects or factors cannot be overstated. Failure to

understand and consider them will ignore the principles for COIN and thus potentially lead to

campaign failure.

510. COLLABORATIVE PLANNING

By its vary nature a COIN campaign will require a comprehensive approach so that

elements of power other than the military may address and solve the underlying causes of the

insurgency and morally separate the insurgency from its legitimacy and support base. Thus,

many lines of operation and operational objectives will not only involve other agencies, but

those agencies may well be the lead element.

To this end, these other agencies—be they government departments, international

organizations or NGOs entering into the campaign in a spirit of cooperation—should be involved

in planning for the campaign. This will pose some challenges to agencies, including the military,

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which are accustomed to working in isolation or working without a formal plan at the operational

level. Military commanders may have to take the lead and carefully explain to other

organizations the reasoning and process behind collaborative campaign planning. This will be

necessary whether the campaign hierarchy is based on a single command system or a

committee system.

In the early stages of the campaign, the security situation may be such that only the

military forces are able to operate. In such cases, some lines of operation that would normally

have a civilian agency lead may be assumed by the military in order to commence work, to

develop legitimacy for the campaign and to garner public support through the demonstration of

tangible progress. Restoration of essential services may be a case in point. In such cases, the

military activities should be supportive of likely future work by other agencies. Collaborative

planning before the deployment will help ensure this complementary aspect of activities.

511. OPERATIONAL CENTRE OF GRAVITY—INSURGENT SUPPORT

Strategically, a small number of centres of gravity will exist. Within the nation itself,

these will likely be limited to the following possibilities:

the bulk of the population, their support for the COIN campaign and their

rejection of the insurgency;

the host government (members and structures) and their perceived legitimacy

amongst the populace, their capability and their physical and moral superiority to

the insurgents; and/or

any individual national leader who has pervasive influence across the nation as a

moral centre of gravity.

Gaining the support of the population will require effective political action, a safe and

secure environment and socioeconomic programmes that serve to substantively improve the

day-to-day lives of the people.

Operational centres of gravity for insurgents will likely be various groups of individuals

who support the insurgency. This may be a particular tribe or clan in a region known to forego

recognition of a central government or one that has been marginalized by a central authority.

Another operational centre of gravity may be an external supporter supplying resources to the

insurgent forces.

Each centre of gravity will have to be analyzed in order to determine its critical

requirements and critical vulnerabilities. These may be physical, moral or a combination. For

example, a specific tribe supporting an insurgency may have done so out of historic

marginalization by a central government. If assessed as an operational centre of gravity, it may

be neutralized through a number of means: its grievances regarding political marginalization

may be solved through political reform, its moderate leaders motivated and their images

enhanced through PSYOPS, the tribe’s tactical capabilities destroyed and hard line leadership

either destroyed or marginalized to the point that they are no longer influential. Thus, a

combination of fires and influence will be used to neutralize adversary centres of gravity.

It is from operational centres of gravity that the insurgents draw their freedom of action,

physical strength and a portion of their will to fight. Although campaign planning must support

the overarching effort against the insurgents’ strategic centre of gravity, operational-level

leadership must determine the relevant operational centres of gravity, analyze them and

determine how best to neutralize them. Methods of neutralizing these centres of gravity may

include destruction or disruption of insurgents’ higher command and control structures, removal

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of fear of reprisals amongst the general population or influence activities seeking popular

support and legitimacy such as the provision of utilities and medical aid to society at large.

Analysis of operational centres of gravity will involve the same general process as any

centre of gravity analysis; however, a greater emphasis must be placed upon centre of gravity

capabilities and vulnerabilities on the psychological/moral plane, for the operational focus must

be on influencing groups of people to reject the insurgency. Such an analysis will help inform

the development of operational-level objectives and subsequent decisive points (supporting

effects) and activities. This will require immense support from the intelligence community in

terms of identifying and analyzing the various factors and influences in the environment in order

to understand how best to engage, physically and psychologically, these centres of gravity and

alter their behaviour in a manner desired.

Once this analysis is done, it will ultimately inform, shape and focus tactical-level

activities and their links to operational-level objectives. In all cases, the indigenous population is

the primary centre of gravity because no insurgency can survive amidst the hostile terrain of an

unreceptive public. Other centres of gravity may include, but are not limited to, sources of

financing, weapons and munitions, groups of supporters and their motivations and political

conditions that fuel public grievances. Higher headquarters and national sources can provide

valuable intelligence and information but will seldom be able to provide information of the

requisite quality to conduct tactical operations. The operational planning process will therefore

dedicate a significant amount of effort towards acquiring the information necessary to target the

insurgents’ centre of gravity.

512. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN PLAN

Once the centres of gravity and their critical vulnerabilities and requirements have been

identified and analyzed, operational objectives, lines of operation, decisive points (supporting

effects) and activities to meet those decisive points may be determined. In short, the campaign

plan may be developed.

Part of this process should include an analysis of the insurgent’s own campaign plan.

This will be part of the intelligence assessment. It should determine the insurgent’s aims,

intents and strategic and operational schemes of manoeuvre and thus should allow

commanders to identify likely lines of operation and objectives for the insurgents. In turn, the

COIN campaign’s planned objectives, lines of operation, decisive points and activities should

seek to counter insurgent lines of operation and pre-empt, dislocate and disrupt the key

pillars of the insurgent campaign plan. Some of those key pillars will be to target friendly

centres of gravity. The commander must be aware of this fact and consider what actions may

be required to counter-act these insurgent efforts.

Specifically, insurgents will try to capitalize on the role public opinion plays in

democracies and will deliberately stage events and coordinate operations to undermine the will

of domestic audiences of campaigning nations in order to cease their participation in the

campaign. The domestic audiences of these nations and their support for the campaign are

strategic centres of gravity that the insurgents will attack. Plans must be made and activities

conducted to defend these centres of gravity. Part of this battle will consist of a proactive public

affairs policy that seeks to highlight the legitimacy of the campaign to indigenous, domestic and

international audiences and, above all, ensures that the domestic audience of a campaigning

nation receives accurate and timely information regarding the campaign.

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The support of the domestic public is critical to sustaining any COIN campaign the CF is

tasked to undertake and is therefore a friendly centre of gravity. Technology now allows

insurgents to more easily coordinate actions and effects and directly target the will of the

public of coalition partners. Domestic public opinion can and will be targeted a number of

ways, including media releases and interviews with Western media outlets, attacks timed and

coordinated to coincide with specific events in coalition countries, and strategies aimed at

causing rates of attrition unacceptable to coalition members. There are many historical and

recent examples of insurgents targeting the will of an adversary’s domestic public. General

Vo Nguyen Giap specifically created a strategy that would target the will of the American

public during the Vietnam War. More recently, the Madrid train bombings on 11 March 2004

likely altered national election outcomes and led to the withdrawal of Spanish troops from

Iraq. At both the operational and strategic levels planners must anticipate and plan to counter

enemy lines of operation targeting friendly centres of gravity.

Sources: Michael Hennessy, Strategy in Vietnam: the Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps,

1965-1972. Westport CT: Praeger, 1997, pp.128-129.

In short, the insurgents too will seek to influence key target audiences. Thus the

commander must anticipate this with a combination of defensive and offensive information

operations / influence activities. The former will seek to protect domestic populations,

supportive indigenous groups and friendly forces from the insurgent propaganda and explain the

nefarious motivations of his actions and atrocities. The latter—offensive influence activities—

will seek to convince neutral or unsupportive target audiences to reject the insurgency and its

aims.

All operational objectives, decisive points and related activities of the campaign plan

should seek to undermine the physical and moral strength and legitimacy of the insurgents.

Given that the successful outcome of a COIN campaign is linked to the psychological

disposition of a population to support or reject an insurgency, destruction of the moral

superiority and legitimacy of the insurgent must underpin all operational objectives, supporting

effects and tactical activities. In doing so, the military will have a supporting role to other

agencies and elements of power that can address social grievances, build campaign legitimacy

and convince the populace to invest in and support the campaign.

The various lines of operation for a COIN campaign will depend upon the thematic

groupings of the operational objectives. They may include such themes as security,

governance and social and economic development, to name only some possibilities. These will

be broad lines of operation containing a number of operational objectives and their related

decisive points. For example, a governance line of operation may include objectives and

decisive points in the area of economic and government development, the civil service, the

judiciary and the penal system. A line of operation dealing with security may include objectives

and decisive points regarding the military, paramilitary, constabulary, civil defence and border

security, to name just a few possibilities (see Figure 5-8 below). Many of these will of course

require elements of power other than the military to be successful. Thus, the campaign plan will

incorporate a comprehensive approach.

Once the campaign plan has identified the operational objectives and required decisive

points or supporting effects, then successive operational plans will assign the tactical activities

needed to create the decisive points and subsequent objectives.

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NOTE

Some decisive points may not be necessary depending upon the progress of a

campaign.

THEMATIC LINES OF OPERATION

Governance

Security

Political Process

Reconstruction

OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Interim

Self-

Secure

Self-

Electoral

Elected

Key

Sustained

Governance

Environment

Sustaining

Process

Government

Restoration

Infrastructure

Provided

Established

Maintained

Security

Reformed

Empowered

Established

DECISIVE POINTS/SUPPORTING EFFECTS

Transitional

Military

Provincial

Militia B

Electoral

Government

Essential

Equitable

government is

control

capitals

repatriated

process

structures

services re-

control

established

reformed

secured

designed

reformed

established in

achieved

all areas

Provincial

Police control

Border

Military

Ethnic

Political

Resource

Accountability

governments

reformed

crossings

training re-

leaders

oversight of

infrastructure

procedures in

re-established

secured

established

engaged

security

secured

place

institutions

Economic

Militia B

Police

Interim control

Enduring

reforms for

deterred

training re-

of resources

infrastructure

distribution

established

achieved

re-built

Militia B

Sustained

defeated if

growth

necessary

Figure 5-8: Example of a Campaign Plan Showing Lines of Operation, Operational Objectives and

Decisive Points / Supporting Effects

Once the campaign plan is developed, it must be revisited continuously, as insurgent

activities and tertiary effects will cause decisive points and objectives to shift both in time and

space. This shifting of decisive points and objectives may be addressed through the process of

designing and issuing successive operational plans that seek to progress the campaign plan.

513. SUPPORTING AND TRANSITORY ROLE OF THE MILITARY

Throughout the COIN campaign, the military will generally have a supporting role. It will

undertake actions to neutralize the insurgent—through pre-emption, disruption and dislocation—

in order to allow manoeuvre space and freedom of action other elements of power need to bring

a successful end to the campaign.

Depending upon the security situation in the early stages of a campaign, the military

force may be the only element of power capable of working in the environment. Thus, it will be

the supported force and will initiate action along as many lines of operation as possible. Much

of this will be undertaken to neutralize the insurgent and seize the initiative but also to begin to

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gain the understanding and support of the indigenous population. Thus the military can expect

to undertake a combination of offensive, defensive and stability activities.

Offensive activities will seek to seize the initiative from the insurgent and pre-empt and

disrupt his activities and influences. Defensive activities will seek to protect vital points,

vulnerable elements of the population and the force itself. Stability activities will seek to disrupt

the influence of the insurgent through area security and control, thereby establishing the

conditions for other agencies to begin work and undertake initial reconstruction, governance and

security sector reform (SSR) tasks in order to gain the support of the local populace.

As the security situation improves, the ability and requirement to conduct stability

operations/activities will increase, and the military can expect to hand over some responsibilities

to other agencies, be they police or civilian. It should also allow other lines of operation beyond

the military’s capability to commence. Ideally, as the security situation continues to improve, a

greater proportion of the stability activities, including security and control, will be assumed by

other agencies, be they foreign, international or indigenous. In the later case, this will also

occur as indigenous capabilities are developed (see Figure 5-9).

Figure 5-9: Illustration of Transition of Stability Operations to Other Agencies

Early involvement of those other agencies in the campaign plan will ensure that initial

military efforts in reconstruction, governance and security sector reform are done in accordance

with long-term objectives. Although commanders cannot assume this transition too early in the

campaign, the sooner it begins to occur, the greater will be the legitimacy of the campaign, for it

should indicate an improvement to the security situation and government action to address the

root social and/or economic causes of the crisis.

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514. THE SUBORDINATE ROLE OF FIRES AND THEIR PHYSICAL EFFECTS

As discussed in earlier sections, the philosophy and principles of a COIN campaign

demand that the enduring solutions to an insurgency will require campaigning elements to

address the root and systemic causes of the insurgency and to not only physically neutralize the

insurgent but to morally separate him from his support base and the population in general.

Together, this will gain and hold the support of the mass of the populace and eventually cause

the insurgency to wither.

To this end, offensive operations—fires and their physical effects—will only go so far.

Regardless of how many successful engagements occur, it is highly unlikely that the insurgency

will succumb in a permanent sense to attrition. Indeed, such attempts will likely drive more

individuals to the insurgency and provide additional support for the insurgent’s narrative and

propaganda. This will be magnified in certain cultures that practise an eye-for-an-eye sense of

retribution and justice.

The successful outcome of the campaign will require a greater emphasis on activities

that influence a wide variety of target audiences, be they groups of individuals or key leaders

who may be moral centres of gravity. The influence activities should seek to gain the support of

the populace and will include in large measure stability activities that will solve the root

economic/social causes of the insurgency, address political and civil development and enhance

domestic services and security forces. Other influence activities, through PSYOPS and public

affairs, should seek to pre-empt and dislocate that of the insurgents and protect the indigenous

and domestic populations from insurgent propaganda. Properly conducted, these influence

activities may even convince certain portions of the insurgent group to either convert to support

the COIN campaign or at least enter a peaceful negotiation process.

Such influence activities will take extensive periods of time, even years, to produce

tangible results. This will be a change for commanders accustomed to seeing the immediate

results or effects of fires, who may demand immediate feedback considering the possibility of a

relatively short period of time in theatre. However, acceptance of this subordination of fires and

the realization that measures of effectiveness for influence activities take considerable time are

essential for success in a COIN campaign.

In light of this then, the operational plans through which the long-term campaign plan is

realized should not seek to resolve the campaign within a narrow time frame. Instead, they

should analyze the current situation and environment and seek to make incremental progress

towards the desired end-state that will set the conditions for the next operational plan to be

issued.

The aim of military operations is to create a security framework that assists the host

nation government and other agencies in re-asserting control throughout the country and in

creating enduring solutions to the crisis. It is imperative that the civil administration be able to

provide public goods and services in order that the people are given proof of the government’s

legitimacy and capability to govern. A security framework that pre-empts, dislocates and

disrupts insurgent activity is a crucial enabler in achieving this imperative.

The military commander’s task will not be as straightforward as is likely during

conventional warfare. The operational planning process must take account of a wide range of

political, economic, civil and security interests. This will ensure that the correct target audiences

are engaged through the appropriate influence activities that also take into account cultural

perspectives. These realities are reflected in the way in which operations are subject to the

approval of the civil administration through the joint committee system or single command

system. In most instances, the operational plan will aim to isolate and neutralize the insurgents

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both morally and physically through simultaneously conducted and parallel political, social and

military activities.

515. UNDERSTANDING EFFECTS OF ACTIVITIES AND THE COMPRESSION ACROSS

LEVELS OF COMMAND

The nature of a COIN campaign sees the main effort focused on gaining and holding the

support of the majority of the populace in contrast to them supporting the insurgent’s will and

end-state. Tactical activities, even at the lowest levels, in a COIN campaign generally occur

amongst the populace for two reasons: they and their vital points must be secured against

insurgent attack, and insurgents tend to hide and operate amongst the populace. Thus the

effects of tactical activities are viewed and felt immediately by the very centre of gravity over

which insurgents and counter-insurgents are fighting.

A result then is a compression across levels of command, in which tactical activities may

have operational and strategic level effects. Thus the conduct of soldiers at a checkpoint, for

example, may influence the perceptions of the whole populace with regard to the campaign and

its legitimacy.

This compression across the levels of command must be understood at all rank levels.

The need to consider and avoid undesired effects, such as collateral damages and civilian

casualties, that will undermine campaign legitimacy and popular support must be considered in

planning and avoided. At times, risks must be taken or short-term tactical success must be

forsaken in order to avoid possible outcomes that will undermine support for the campaign.

516. WAR GAMING

Operational plans and their tactical activities must be war gamed in the same fashion as

those for campaigns against conventional adversaries. However, the factors that must be

considered in such COIN war gaming are more extensive and complicated.

Planning and subsequent war gaming must consider the political, military, economic,

social (including religious and cultural), information and infrastructure related systems⁵⁵ in the

environment along with the influence that each system will have on the outcome of the

operation and campaign. Power structures and influential individual leaders must be identified

and considered in the war gaming. Additionally, other agencies and their reactions to

operational plans and activities must be considered.

To this end, war gaming will be fairly complicated, with staff and, ideally, experts and

advisors considering the planned activities from the viewpoint of these various environmental

systems and gauging their respective reactions. Such reactions must be informed by the

cultural perspective of the environment or group under consideration. For this purpose, cultural

and political advisors may be included in the war gaming process.

In this way, proposed courses of action at the operational and tactical levels may be

considered in detail and in perspective of the local environment in order to help ensure that

desired effects, both physical and psychological, are obtained and undesired effects are

avoided.

⁵⁵ This range of environmental systems may be abbreviated as PMESII systems.

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SECTION 3

IMPLEMENTATION AND EXECUTION OF THE CAMPAIGN PLAN

517. EXPANDING THE CAMPAIGN PRESENCE: PHYSICALLY AND

PSYCHOLOGICALLY

The operational plans that are issued to implement and execute the campaign may be

prosecuted in a number of ways. The concept of the campaigning COIN forces, and with them

their security and control and other agencies working to the same end, spreading like a tache

d’huile or ink spot over the contested environment is an effective, practical and methodical

manner of achieving success in the campaign. In simple terms, it sees the expansion of the

campaign and its influences, both physically and psychologically, throughout the environment,

gradually dislocating the insurgent from his physical and moral support bases. This is

particularly effective when parts of a territory or nation have been lost to insurgent control.

The process of spreading the presence and control of the government and its

campaigning forces requires the comprehensive approach of all elements of power. This will

thus address the security and social issues inherent to the insurgency and in turn will build

legitimacy for the campaign and its forces and begin to influence the local populations to accept

and support the COIN campaign.

In keeping with the philosophy and principles of COIN, political engagement will lead,

followed by simultaneous military and social/economic engagement. All should be advertised

and explained through information operations to the public audiences in order to influence the

understanding, perceptions and will of the indigenous populations and to win their support for

the campaign.

At every stage of the campaign plan implementation, local forces and agencies must be

seen to be in the lead and at the forefront to the greatest extent possible. This will enhance

their legitimacy and undermine insurgent claims that the COIN campaign is an occupation.

Every advance of the “ink spot” should be done in consultation with national, regional and local

authorities as appropriate.

As the deployment and manoeuvre of military forces cause insurgent activity and

presence to be pre-empted, dislocated and disrupted in a new area, other agencies (but

possibly the military initially) must undertake activities to relieve suffering, provide aid and

essential services, address grievances and generally gain support for the campaign. Thus

together, this will involve full-spectrum operations—simultaneous offensive, defensive and

stability operations.

The manoeuvrist approach taken to pre-empt, dislocate and disrupt the insurgents will

involve both fires and influence activities (information operations) on the physical and

psychological planes as detailed below:

Fires, or physical activities, will physically separate the insurgents from the

populace by pre-empting their plans, dislocating their forces and presence in a

population and disrupting their activities. Furthermore, military forces will directly

target the insurgents in order to destroy or deter them and their influences

whenever possible. Such activities must be done with a long-term view of

securing the population, allowing for the return of normal levels of civil activity

and deterring further insurgent actions.

Influence activities will seek to shape the understanding, perceptions and the will

of a wide variety of targets—be they adversary, friendly or neutral—in order to

gain and maintain support for the campaign:

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(1)

PSYOPS, through such means of radio stations and public messages, will

inform the indigenous population as to the purpose of the mission and

seek to undermine the narrative of the insurgents.

(2)

Public affairs will support national and international media to ensure the

truth is presented in a public forum regarding the expansion of the

campaign and actions taken to support and protect the populace.

(3)

CIMIC related projects will address essential services, emergency aid and

other projects that will quickly impact upon the well-being of the populace,

alleviate suffering and gain their support for the campaign.

(4)

The profile, presence and posture of the forces, particularly those

providing a framework security presence amongst the public, must be

carefully considered. Forces should present hard targets to insurgents

but be accessible to the population at large. Apart from gaining support,

this may induce a flow of information on insurgent intentions and

activities.

In such a manner, the insurgents will become not only physically, but psychologically,

separated from the local populace (see Figure 5-10).

518. SECURING A FIRM BASE AND INITIAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING

It can be anticipated that the host nation government will have sufficient control of its

territory to provide a secure base where reinforcing coalition contingents can build up and

establish essential support elements. If this is not the case, an initial entry into the nation may

establish a firm base or one can be found amongst a supportive element of the populace.

Consideration must be given to not overburdening the host nation with demands for

administrative support. This can be best achieved through increased self-sufficiency by the

deploying units. Incoming military formations and units should be deployed on the same

geographical basis as the host-nation security forces, corresponding with the boundaries of the

civil administration. It is possible, however, that the situation is deteriorated to such an extent

that no area is safe from insurgent activity. It may therefore be necessary to hold some logistic

assets afloat or in a third country while troops are committed to secure a base area. From this

secure area, troops are deployed into hostile territory to begin the process of re-establishing

control and security area by area.

From this firm base, the COIN forces will conduct planning in cooperation with the

federal and/or regional political and civil authorities. This plan should layout the process for

spreading control and presence into the next area to be secured. Such a plan must take a

comprehensive approach and take into consideration all aspects of engaging in the new area,

using comprehensive operations to physically dislocate and pre-empt the insurgents and to

psychologically dislocate and disrupt them.

519. ENGAGEMENT OF THE LOWER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT

Once the plan has been agreed to by the national or higher regional government, the

expansion into the new district or area may begin. This expansion should have an indigenous

government lead to it. In beginning to make this expansion, the following should be undertaken

or considered:

Key leaders in the area or district are engaged to develop a plan customized for

that region and the group or groups of people contained within it. This

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engagement must incorporate all leaders—be they elected, appointed or

traditional—that wield influence and power within the population. The leaders will

be able to identify the grievances and issues unique to that area, the

expectations of the populace and the intent and capabilities of the insurgents in

that area.

A comprehensive approach must be incorporated from the outset, which sees the

military and other agencies planning the expansion hand-in-hand with local

leaders. Thus, engagement of the local leaders must be conducted with all

elements of power represented. Planning may follow the lines of operation

developed in the campaign plan. Any committee system established at the

higher national levels may be replicated at this local level in order to harmonize

information and plans between levels of government. A formal committee should

be established and regular meetings planned. This will support the coordination

of all campaign activities, be they offensive, defensive or stability.

A specific assembly or committee may be developed with local stakeholders and

power structures in order to identify the needs of the local populace from their

perspective. This may include short-term projects and/or long-term

developmental undertakings.

An information operations (influence activities) programme must be planned to

advertise immediately to the populace this cooperation between indigenous

government and COIN campaign forces.

If not already present, indigenous police forces must be brought into the area.

Those already there should be enhanced if necessary. These local constabulary

forces must be integrated into the local government and into the campaign plan.

Wherever and whenever possible, they should have the lead in operations.

Quick-impact CIMIC projects may be conducted in order to relieve serious

suffering, quickly gain the support of a local, perhaps wary, populace and to build

campaign legitimacy. Military forces may undertake some of these projects,

particularly if they are the only agency in the area. This will include simple but

effective measures such as emergency medical care, medical clinics in villages

or neighbourhoods, repairs to schools or orphanages and/or delivery of aid.

In addition to quick-impact projects, long-term development planning must begin.

The root causes or grievances of the insurgency likely result from long standing

and complicated social, political and economic issues that may be difficult to

resolve. This may require extensive development in such areas as infrastructure,

economic development and political reform.

Auxiliary security forces should be recruited and developed in these newly

secured areas. This will add legitimacy to the campaign, help provide enduring

security and help ensure a security vacuum is not created once campaigning

forces move to the next area. Such forces will require significant support but will

likely be able to provide excellent situational awareness and intelligence within

their areas. The raising and training of these forces should not be done as an ad

hoc measure once security forces arrive in the new area but should be part of the

plan from the beginning, and forces specifically designated for this training and

mentoring role should be allocated.

Simultaneous to the political engagement will be the establishment of a security

force presence in the new area. Ideally, this will include an indigenous element.

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The forces will establish a form of a forward operating base (FOB) within the area

in order to support and realise the physical and psychological dislocation of the

insurgent from the populace. These security forces will support other agencies

and provide the security framework for their operations. Ideally, initial expansion

will occur in areas traditionally loyal to the central government, where the

population will readily rally back to its allegiance once it feels secure from

insurgent actions and retributions.

(1)

The selection of the area of the FOB must be one that can be

consolidated quickly and used as a base for further operations designed

to link up with the initial firm base and be able to spread government

control and influences to other areas.

(2)

Although an FOB is necessary, whenever possible military forces should

live and work amongst the population. Although the security situation

must be somewhat stabilized for this to occur, and that such a practice

may entail a higher level of risk to personnel, it is the only sure way of

developing solid relationships with the communities the security forces

are trying to protect. The constant and prolonged use of FOBs will create

in the minds of both the campaign forces and the indigenous populace a

fortress mentality and posture that physically and psychologically

separates the security forces from the population. This fact and

perception must be avoided.

520.

CLEAR AREA OF INSURGENT PRESENCE AND INFLUENCES

Once security forces have moved into an area and are supported by a political plan and

scheme of manoeuvre in conjunction with indigenous forces, measures may be taken to clear

the area of insurgent presence and influence.

Influence activities (information operations) must be exploited to morally separate the

insurgents from the populace. This requirement to gain the support of the indigenous

population must be understood down to the lowest rank levels, and all operations must be

conducted with the ultimate goal in mind.

Daily contact with the local populace must also be used to gain valuable information

regarding the insurgents, their aims and methods as well as any reasons as to their support

amongst the populace. This will support the pursuit and engagement of the insurgents and

inform other activities that will seek to undermine the moral claims of the insurgents and

address root causes and grievances.

A combination of offensive and defensive operations will be used to directly pursue and

engage the insurgents. Where deemed prudent, Special Forces may be used to conduct direct

action.⁵⁶

Wherever and whenever possible, indigenous forces should be seen to lead such

offensive and defensive operations. If still developing, they may have to be mentored and

continuously trained by specially designated observer and mentoring teams. Even if local

forces are in a developing stage, they should still be involved and certainly consulted in terms of

⁵⁶ Direct action is defined as “A short-duration strike or other small-scale offensive action by special operations forces

or special operations capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover or inflict damage to achieve specific, well-

defined and often time sensitive results” (AAP 6).

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situational awareness and intelligence information requirements. Particular caution may need to

be used when considering the operational security limits and challenges of indigenous forces.

Local police must be developed and exploited as greatly as possible. They bring a

sense of normalcy to the indigenous population and are significant sources of intelligence

regarding local insurgent groups and their support bases. This is particularly true since

insurgents often stem from or work with local criminal organizations, about which police forces

should have detailed knowledge. As the security situation improves, the role and presence of

indigenous police forces should be raised in order to give a visible sign of improvement and to

free up military forces for other duties.

Depending upon the situation and capabilities of the constabulary, local police forces

may be able to take the lead in pursuing and arresting insurgents whilst military forces assume

the manpower-intensive tasks of vital point security and routine patrols.

521. GOVERNMENT LEAD IN THE RETURN OF DISPLACED PERSONS

Once a designated level of security and stability has returned to the local area, national

and regional governments may take the lead in the return of refugees and internally displaced

persons (IDPs).

This must be handled carefully. Any underlying cultural or ethnic tensions between

competing groups must be managed and alleviated. As well, these groups cannot be returned

without a coherent and comprehensive plan that provides for their continued security as well as

for their welfare and sustainable employment. Displaced refugees will not stay, nor even begin

to return, if they cannot feel secure and have a means of supporting themselves.

The return of refugees and IDPs will not only be a sign of returning normalcy and

security but will breed additional security through their presence and support of the campaign.

522. CIMIC ACTIVITIES BY THE MILITARY

Even before non-military agencies arrive in the area to begin long-term development

projects, military forces may begin the process to alleviate suffering, spark development and

gain campaign support. Measures will involve quick-impact projects such as repairs to wells

and the conduct of local medical clinics, remuneration for collateral damages, low-level

employment schemes such as war damage repairs and checkpoint construction and delivery of

basic tools for work and agriculture.

Much of these CIMIC activities should be planned in advance and started as soon as

possible after expanding into a new area. Many of the initial supplies may be delivered quickly

to theatre having been pre-planned as part of the campaign. Funds, resources and the

authority to use them should be pushed prior to the actual requirement to the unit and sub-unit

levels so that the quick-impact CIMIC projects may be designed to meet the needs of the

immediate local populace.

Ideally, pre-planning with other agencies will allow these military lead projects to support

the further development of larger projects by other elements of power in due course.

523. ESTABLISH LOW-LEVEL (COMMUNITY-BASED) DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS

The establishment of community-based development councils will allow local leaders the

opportunity to guide the development in their local areas in order to meet local grievances and

needs. These councils must bring together all agencies, including the military and political

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leadership. This should ensure that not only are local needs met but that best use of resources

is made and duplication and conflicts are avoided. The committee should be able to identify

and vocalize priorities and specific projects.

Although the incorporation of local leadership is vital, care must be take to ensure that

the support won by such development is support and legitimacy for the campaign and is not

exploited by local leaders with their own agendas to gain support for themselves at the expense

of the larger campaign.

524. DEVELOP SECURITY PRESENCE AND SET CONDITIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE

SECURITY

Development can only be supported by a permanent security presence and stable state.

The presence of security forces must be expanded in a logical and measured manner. As the

security situation improves, security forces should be increasingly integrated into the local

populace in order to avoid development of a fortress disposition and mentality and to further

separate and dislocate the insurgent.

Local forces must play a key and ideally lead role. Their counsel will be vital in gaining

accurate and timely intelligence from the local populace and in identifying insurgents amongst

the local populace. Local security forces may require an ongoing training and mentoring

regime.

Key to local forces will be the establishment or re-establishment of constabulary forces.

The presence of police forces brings a certain sense of civil normalcy to a population.

Furthermore, police are ideal for tackling the criminal elements and activities that routinely

become part and parcel of an insurgency. The expansion of a police presence will see the

creation of police posts and sub-stations throughout the area, which may be co-located with

military forces for a certain amount of time.

Security forces should begin to raise auxiliary security forces, particularly such elements

as auxiliary police services. These will consist of locals who know their own areas and

populace the best and who have a vested interested in guarding stability and development.

This raising of auxiliary forces should be part of the overall security sector reform process.

Ideally, police training is conducted by civilian police forces as part of a comprehensive

approach.

525. SET THE CONDITIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Once security has been established, other agencies within the comprehensive approach

should begin to create sustainable development. Agencies will include other government

departments (both indigenous and those of supporting nations), international organizations,

private business and NGOs. The activities of these organizations must be carefully coordinated

with those of the security forces through either a single command system or a committee

system.

Just as with the security forces, work towards sustainable development and improved

governance should be led by indigenous and local authorities. Only members of the indigenous

population will understand the needs and grievances of the local populace and be able to guide

development in a manner to address those needs and to meet local expectations. Without local

leadership, development may not meet the needs and expectations of the indigenous

population.

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Remediation and payment for collateral damages must be foremost in any scheme, as

the related grievances will be readily identified with the campaign and its legitimacy. Likewise,

any expropriation of private property must be immediately repaid and ideally should start from a

premise of negotiation. Failure to quickly re-pay incurred debts by the campaigning forces will

undermine legitimacy, build distrust of the campaign, create grievances and feed insurgent

propaganda.

The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process of any former

military, militia or insurgent forces must be carefully planned and managed in detail by both

military forces and other agencies. Former soldiers and fighters cannot simply be disarmed and

sent home without a reintegration plan that will include gainful employment.

Expectation management of local populations must be carefully managed, as unrealistic

expectations that go unsatisfied will lead to discontent and a loss of legitimacy for the campaign.

Quick-impact projects and humanitarian aid should address short-term needs and gain quick

support for the campaign. Long-term development and its measured progress will have to be

well advertised to local populations. In order to avoid initial delays in development, the

campaign plan from the outset must include details for the sustainable development. Plans

should include project details, responsibilities and pre-approved funding envelopes. In this

manner, delays that will lead to indigenous frustration and disappointment will be avoided to the

greatest extent possible.

526. CONTINUED CAMPAIGN DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSITION

As the security situation improves, successive operational orders will continue to pass

increased authority and responsibility to local security forces and agencies in each area. Viable

improvements in each area should encourage similar development in other areas as the “ink

spot” expands (see Figure 5-10 for a summary of the process).

The expansion of the campaign into various contested areas will seldom follow a smooth

and orderly fashion, identical in each newly gained area. Regardless of how the COIN

campaign is conducted in detail, the following key elements must be maintained:

a political lead and engagement of acknowledged leaders in each area;

the incorporation of indigenous forces, ideally seen to be leading operations but

as a minimum done in cooperation with them and exploiting their local expertise;

the simultaneous engagement through influence activities to gain the support of

the indigenous population and gain the moral/psychological advantage over the

insurgents; and

sustainable development within carefully managed expectations based on a

comprehensive plan incorporated into the campaign plan from the outset.

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Figure 5-10: Example of the “Ink Spot” to Execute a COIN Campaign Plan

Application of Campaign Expansion

During the period December 2006 to February 2007, Canada's Joint Task Force Afghanistan

achieved remarkable success using classic "ink spot" doctrine to counter the existing

insurgency in Kandahar Province. Although known officially as the Afghan Development

Zone (ADZ) concept, it was in reality nothing more than expanding the Government of

Afghanistan' influence using ink spot doctrine. In essence security and quality of life had

been improved in the small town of Pajry Panjway (unofficially known as the "ink dot') to the

point where the inhabitants of the neighbouring districts of Panjway and Zhari assisted their

government and NATO forces in establishing security. As 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian

Regiment Battle Group and partnered Afghan National Army units pushed forward to clear

the districts, the Taliban, knowing they had little support from the local population, withdrew.

In conducting these operations, a workable step-by-step process was developed.

Source: Colonel F.A. Lewis, Deputy Commander Canada's Joint Task Force Afghanistan, August 2006 to

February 2007

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SECTION 4

CONSIDERATIONS IN THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY DOCTRINE

IN A COIN CAMPAIGN

527. INTRODUCTION

The conduct of any operational plan and subsequent tactical activities must be

conducted in keeping with the philosophy and principles inherent in a COIN campaign.

Furthermore, their conduct must all lead directly to the attainment of the operational objectives

delineated in the campaign plan.

528. BALANCE ACROSS FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

The simultaneous conduct of offensive, defensive and stability operations, that is, the

realization of full-spectrum operations, will occur throughout a COIN campaign. Commanders

must carefully balance forces and activities across these three sets of activities in order to

further the campaign and reach operational objectives.

Offensive operations are conducted in order to separate the insurgents from their

supporters, resources, suppliers and sources of information in the designated area. Such

operations must be based on actionable intelligence and sound planning. The secondary

effects of offensive operations must be carefully considered so that they do not cause undue

collateral damages or alienate the local populace. Indeed, there may be times when short-term

tactical success must be postponed in order to avoid undesired effects that will undermine the

campaign.

The resulting dislocation of the insurgents from offensive operations will allow civil

administration to be re-established. Essential services, infrastructure development and

improvement to governance may commence through a comprehensive approach. The military

security forces may provide robust support to the police or be asked to help train local auxiliary

forces that will support the police when military forces withdraw. These newly controlled areas

then provide firm bases for further security operations, until gradually the entire theatre or nation

is restored to civil government control and enduring stability.

Defensive operations will consist mainly of securing those areas from which the

insurgents have been displaced. They will secure base camps, government institutions, vital

points such as key infrastructure and the population at large. Military forces may assume many

of these manpower-intensive tasks in order to free up local constabulary forces so that they may

take the lead in pursing the insurgents and their related criminal activities and linkages.

There will be occasions when private security companies assume defensive activities.

These may be hired by the indigenous government, brought into theatre by coalition forces or

hired by NGOs, international organizations or private businesses. If such private security

companies are considered part of the coalition, their rules of engagement, employment

responsibilities and limitations must be clearly defined. The local populace will not distinguish

between campaigning forces and these private security organizations, and indiscretions and

illegal use of force by either will undermine the campaign and its legitimacy.

Stability operations consist of security and control activities, support to disarmament,

demobilization and reintegration activities, support to security sector reform activities, support to

civilian infrastructure and governance and assistance to other agencies. In due course, many of

these stability activities will be assumed by other agencies and indigenous government

services. Nevertheless, many stability activities, such as the training of new security elements

and the provision of military forces to augment the police in security patrols, will require direct

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military involvement or at least the military acting in a supporting role. Stability activities,

particularly the provision of security and control, will continue the dislocation of the insurgents

and will attempt to pre-empt or disrupt future insurgent activities. Other stability activities, such

as the training of indigenous forces and the development of local governance, will consolidate

the insurgent dislocation and morally dislocate the insurgents by addressing root causes and

grievances that support insurgent motivations and aims.

Military forces and other security forces will always be in short supply. A careful balance

must be struck between the three types of tactical operations in order to meet the demands of

situation and the operational objectives. Too much of an emphasis on offensive operations will

allow insurgents to infiltrate amongst the populace and its vulnerable infrastructure. The

insurgents will thus be offered an opportunity to achieve easy successes against poorly

protected vulnerable points and thus embarrass the government and undermine its support.

With too little emphasis on offensive operations and a focus on defensive and stability

operations, the insurgent organization may continuously grow, and an ever-increasing

proportion of the campaign’s resources will become devoted to defensive countermeasures, so

that eventually the insurgents achieve their aim by making it appear that the price of further

resistance is too high.⁵⁷

The security and control activities and tasks within stability operations should be

emphasized whenever possible as a means to take a measured approached to continued

dislocation and disruption of the insurgents. Offensive activities should only be initiated on

sound intelligence. Activities for security and control will create a security framework within

which the military and civilian agencies may operate and the local populace may assume

routine civil duties. Patrols, checkpoints, observations posts and similar stability tasks will

protect the populace and disrupt or pre-empt insurgent activities and movement. They will gain

valuable intelligence which will support subsequent selective offensive operations.

529. COMPRESSION ACROSS THE LEVELS OF COMMAND

The relationship between the operational and tactical levels of command during COIN

operations are somewhat compressed. Given the focus on winning popular support for a

campaign, actions at the tactical level can have far reaching operational and strategic

repercussions. Activities will be conducted in public view, and the manner in which routine

patrols, checkpoints and other tactical tasks are conducted will either support the attainment of

operational and strategic objectives or undermine them. The conduct of an individual soldier,

amplified by the media, can become an issue. A thoughtless move or overreaction at the

section or platoon level can easily have ramifications above the immediate tactical level that

undermine the legitimacy of a campaign and loose public support. Even if the majority of

tactical tasks are conducted with a view to gaining public support and winning campaign

legitimacy, the populace will remember and the insurgents will exploit those few poorly

conducted tasks that undermined legitimacy. Measures and precautions must be taken to limit

such occurrences. This must be understood by all levels of command, in all components,

including Special Forces.

530. MANOEUVRIST APPROACH

The record of attritional success in COIN operations is generally a poor one. Effective

COIN operations place due emphasis on the intellectual and psychological aspects of

⁵⁷ Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five, London: Faber and Faber, 1977: passim.

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operations not simply the material. They emphasize the focus on people and ideas not only on

ground.

To this end, insurgent cohesion is identified and attacked by applying concentrated, yet

discrete, force against key vulnerabilities. Surprise, tempo and simultaneity are used to

overwhelm and unhinge the insurgent, attacking will and shattering cohesion and ultimately

helping to create the conditions for political defeat. Force is applied selectively, and destruction

is a means not an end.

The successful application of the manoeuvrist approach still has limitations in a COIN

campaign. Even if COIN forces are highly successful in destroying insurgent critical

vulnerabilities, the insurgent’s will and cohesion are likely to remain intact or at least be less

affected than a conventional enemy, for insurgents are motivated by a political idea and

narrative. The insurgents may continue to fight, change tactics or simply go into abeyance and

re-appear at a later date.

Thus, the manoeuvrist approach must be expanded to include psychological attacks

directly against the will, motivation and cohesion of the insurgency. Insurgents must be

defeated psychologically, as a first-order effect, and not solely through physical attacks.

Influence activities such as PSYOPS and CIMIC must seek to undermine insurgent legitimacy

and claims to a superior political option. The populace itself must be engaged with influence

activities that seek to gain their support and undermine or preclude support of the insurgency.

In this way, the manoeuvrist approach within the campaign involves a blend of fires that

attack the insurgent’s capability to ultimately affect his will and cohesion and influence activities

that attack his understanding, perceptions, will, cohesion and legitimacy directly. Together

these fires and influence activities are synchronized through manoeuvre and battlespace

management.

Furthermore, classic police work will undermine insurgent cohesion by evidence

gathering, arrest and legal action. Surprise can be achieved, for example, through developing

information by all sources then acting on the cue of intelligence gathering technology or human

intelligence (HUMINT). Rapid exploitation of this intelligence by either covert action or rapid

concentration of combat forces into a given area sows confusion and disruption throughout the

insurgent’s command structure. This occurs in large part because the level of trust within and

amongst insurgent cells is compromised and reduced.

531. MISSION COMMAND

Success in COIN requires all participants to be actively aware of the long-term goals and

the plan to achieve them. Tactical-level commanders must be made to understand the

philosophy and principles by which a COIN campaign is conducted. The mission command

approach to leadership reaffirms this view, emphasizing informed initiative throughout the force.

This methodology is particularly applicable to COIN, given the key role played by low-level

tactical commanders. Militarily, COIN is quite often a platoon and section conflict.

532. DESCRIBING OPERATIONAL SUCCESS IN A COIN CAMPAIGN

Success is defined by the state of affairs that needs to be achieved by the end of a

campaign—an end-state. Since insurgency is principally a political struggle, it may be that the

desired end-state of the government (and supporting nations) falls short of an identifiable victory

in a strictly military context.

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Success in COIN may equate to reducing the threat to a point at which the situation may

be passed to the civil police or simply not losing control to the insurgents. If, for example, the

intention of committing troops is to buy time in which to address particular grievances, then

dramatic tactical military success may in fact be counter-productive. Troops must be aware of

the military role, which is normally a supporting one, and commanders should select accurate

measures against which to judge the effectiveness of military tactics. Ground captured has

much less significance in COIN than it does in conventional warfighting. Militarily speaking,

operational success may equate to the containment or reduction of violence and threats to a

level at which the police can deal with the situation and civil society functions normally.

533. DESTRUCTION OF INSURGENTS

In COIN, physical destruction of the enemy may still have an important role to play.

Despite the best efforts of influence activities to persuade insurgents and their supporters to

pursue peaceful means to affect political change, there will be some insurgents who will remain

committed to the violent destruction of the in-place political and social structures. These

insurgents must be captured, killed or so physically and psychologically isolated that they are no

longer effective.

Attrition will be necessary, but the number of insurgents killed should be no more than is

absolutely necessary to achieve success. Wherever possible, non-lethal methods of

neutralizing the enemy such as arrest, physical isolation or subversion are more likely to

advance the campaign’s cause. Given intense media scrutiny and domestic and international

legal oversight, sound judgement and close control of lethal force will need to be exercised.

534. ATTACKING INSURGENT LEGITIMACY

The political and moral legitimacy of the insurgents must be attacked if a COIN

campaign is to be successful. Insurgencies gain legitimacy through a combination of words and

actions that emphasize flaws and injustices in the government or status quo while providing

evidence of the insurgent narrative and ideology as a viable alternative. Insurgent legitimacy

must be undermined through coordinated influence activities, including those aimed at

specifically countering the insurgent propaganda. These should aim to erode the narrative of

the enemy, exposing fallacies and fabrications. Other influence activities, such as CIMIC,

governance reform and public affairs, must reinforce the legitimacy of the campaign, the

government and its long-term objectives.

535. ATTACKING INSURGENT FUNDING

Although many insurgencies will be fiscally supported from abroad, it is important that all

sources of funding within the host nation be identified and neutralized. Insurgents use funding

not only for the purchase of weapons, equipment and explosives but to pay informants,

supporters and members of the local population to be proxy fighters.

Insurgent funding will likely be complex and involve sophisticated networks that include

international electronic banking and trading. It may also involve criminal activity such as

narcotics production and trafficking and the use of fraudulent charitable organizations or

legitimate charities that have been duped. Insurgent funding will also come from rather low-

profile and mundane sources such as pirated media sales. Attacking the sources of funds that

support the insurgency will be a complex effort that relies as much upon police and legal efforts

as military activity. However, it is absolutely vital that such an effort be made.

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536. SIMULTANEITY

All effective insurgent strategies emphasize simultaneity by creating parallel political and

social challenges to the in-place authorities in addition to military challenges. If the use of

simultaneity is productive for the insurgent, then it is equally applicable for the COIN effort.

Tactically, it can be achieved through the restrained and carefully considered use of, and by

grouping for independent action, a mix of agencies, such as joint military-police patrols with

compatible communications reporting to a single headquarters. Operationally, it is achieved

through the development of a harmonized campaign plan using a comprehensive approach

along multiple lines of operation. This will attack the insurgents physically, undermine their

legitimacy and gain support of the local populace in a concerted and complementary fashion.

SECTION 5

THE ROLE OF MILITARY SERVICE COMPONENTS AND INDIGENOUS FORCES IN COIN

537. LAND COMPONENT

The predominant service in counter insurgency is the land force, although air elements

often play a strong supporting role. Unless the insurgents are joined by an outside power with

significant naval and air forces, counterinsurgency will remain primarily a land force

responsibility with the other two services acting largely in support. This reflects the nature of

COIN and its focus on the indigenous population. Insurgents can only be countered

comprehensively through deploying troops on the ground, amongst the population.

The land force can expect to be called upon, particularly at the tactical level, to employ

its traditional skills, ranging from providing observation and security to closing with and

destroying the enemy. The subtle political nuances underpinning COIN operations, the focus on

gaining popular support and the dispersed nature of the battlespace, however, require greater

initiative and flexibility at the sub-unit, platoon and section levels.

(See Chapter 6 for a further

discussion on the employment of land forces in a COIN campaign.)

538. AIR COMPONENT

The use of the air component during various COIN and peace support campaigns has

clearly demonstrated the potential of advanced technology for surveillance, target acquisition,

reconnaissance and attack of targets. These capabilities have been expanded upon through

the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and have become a significant enabler of land

operations. The use of air support in a COIN campaign has been able to be expanded and

enhanced through precision weapons that have made improvements in reducing casualties and

collateral damage to infrastructure near the target area.

For COIN operations, fixed-wing aircraft can provide the same types of support—troop

lift and resupply and photographic and visual reconnaissance—as they do for conventional

operations. Air component capabilities can be employed for ground attack missions, when

confirmed targets can be found along an insurgent’s lines of communication and when

insurgents are engaged by ground manoeuvre forces. Nonetheless, one must not

underestimate the insurgent’s ability to counter air power through deception, reduced signature

and even low-level air defence weapons such as man-portable air defence system (MANPADS).

The use of air component assets to attack insurgents must be carefully considered and

targets confirmed in terms of their authenticity and value. Collateral damages and civilian

casualties will do much to undermine the campaign and its public support, both indigenously

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and abroad. Insurgents will exploit such incidents through propaganda and will be the first to

ensure international media coverage.

Air-land integration and battlespace management will require careful planning. The

nature of COIN operations and the high volume of aircraft sorties available compared to

conventional operations will likely cause air-land integration coordination teams to be pushed to

lower levels of command.

Aviation assets have obvious roles for troop carrying, surveillance, liaison and over-

watch of ground troops. Given the nature of COIN and the dispersed nature of insurgent

targets, it is unlikely that aviation will be used as a manoeuvre arm. Aviation can be used in

many roles comparable to those given to armoured reconnaissance regiments, such as

surveillance, point and area reconnaissance, imagery support to intelligence, economy of force

tasks and command and control (C2).

Aviation assets may be employed in close fire support to ground manoeuvre forces.

Their target acquisition systems, responsiveness and ability to remain in the immediate area

make them valuable fire support assets.

539. MARITIME COMPONENT

Much of the world’s population lives in littoral states and in large coastal cities.

Therefore, maritime considerations may be an important factor when campaigning in such

regions. Naval support may consist of providing deterrence and presence patrols, enforcing

international sanctions and blockades and providing some degree of support for troops ashore.

The presence of naval forces can also send a strong political statement and message to

insurgents and their supporters.

Naval ships may be close enough to provide a timely, high profile appearance to

demonstrate support for a threatened ally. Conversely, naval forces have the ability to loiter

over the horizon for prolonged periods, providing a warning to hostile elements with minimum

provocation.

They can be used in a sea basing concept for command and control and for resupply of

forces ashore. In addition, naval air support can potentially augment the air assets in theatre.

Naval forces may also provide the initial firm base needed to support expansion into a

new territory. This may be the initial entry, or it may be an expansion further along the littoral

regions of a nation. Despite the advantages to the use of maritime resources, security must be

vigilant. Given the concentration of resources onboard ship, a single successful surface attack

by insurgents could cause significant loss of life and material.

540. SPECIAL FORCES

The organization of Special Forces (SF) units, the high quality, versatility and

comprehensive training of these troops, and their capacity to work well in small groups make

them particularly suitable for a supporting role in COIN campaigns. Care should be taken,

however, that they be used to complement rather than replace conventional units.

Tasks for Special Forces may be wide ranging and include special reconnaissance,

close protection, deep penetrations and covert observation in remote or difficult areas. They

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may undertake direct action⁵⁸ tasks. However, care must be taken that Special Forces do not

become employed in tasks that are within the capability of line units, for this would be a waste of

valuable resources.

Despite their capabilities and independent nature of operating, Special Forces must be

employed in line with the same principles of COIN as other forces. They too must understand

the need to win and maintain popular support and, to this end, avoid collateral damages and

civilian casualties. To the greatest extent possible, their operations must be coordinated with

the local tactical commanders in whose area they are operating, for these local tactical

commanders know their own areas and will be left to deal with the repercussions of the

operations.

Special Forces may be used to train indigenous forces, however, this should be limited.

Training and mentoring forces should train forces that have identical or similar roles, mainly for

purposes of commonality, identity and mentoring. Thus Special Forces may be used to train

indigenous Special Forces and units responsible for typical special force operations.

541. INDIGENOUS SECURITY FORCES—POLICE FORCES

Indigenous police forces may play a valuable role in the conduct of a COIN mission and

will be a key element in a comprehensive approach. Indeed, if competent and trustworthy,

they will likely have a detailed knowledge of insurgent leaders and their links to criminal

elements. The presence of police forces, particularly if seen to be leading operations, will have

a normalizing effect on the population.

Military COIN forces must be closely coordinated with police forces, and military forces

will likely be employed in support of police forces in order to provide security and protection for

them in their routine duties. In some cases, police forces may play a supporting role, such as

the arrest of insurgents captured and detained by military forces.

Police and military forces may be co-located in stations and sub-stations in order to

conduct joint operations and to afford the police additional protection, particularly in the early

stages of a campaign.

The role of police in the host nation and the level of employment of those police are

often dependent on the competency of the police force and judiciary and their reputation

amongst the population. For example, if a police force or judiciary is regarded as corrupt, the

people will have little trust that the police will have the best interests of the people in mind or

that the force can provide real security.

Military forces may be used, at least initially in a campaign, to train indigenous civilian

police. Ideally, this responsibility will be assumed by supporting police forces so that they

receive proper mentoring and training in all aspects of police duties. Nevertheless, the military

will continue to work closely with police forces and mentor them when necessary.

Close and routine coordination with police forces will also provide valuable intelligence

sources. Joint intelligence and analysis centres may be established in order to exploit the

capabilities and resources of both military and police forces.

⁵⁸ Direct Action is defined as “A short-duration strike or other small-scale offensive action by special operations forces

or special operations capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover or inflict damage to achieve specific, well-

defined and often time sensitive results” (AAP 6).

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