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trainers should also avoid the temptation to create long, complex training programs based

on unrealistic standards. The program must take into account the culture, resources, and

short-term security needs. To a certain extent, the insurgent threat dictates how long

training can take. As security improves, training programs can be expanded to facilitate

achievement of the long-term end state.

Training Methods

6-58. There are a number of possible training methods that have proven successful, many

of which also enhance the development of training capability:

Formal schools run by the ANA and multinational partners, forces with graduates

selected to return as instructors. This includes entry-level individual training.

Mobile training teams to reinforce individual or collective training on an as-

needed basis.

Partnership training, with U.S. combat units tasked to train and advises ANA

units with whom they are partnered. The U.S. unit provides support to the ANA

unit. As training progresses, ANA squads, platoons, and companies may work

with their multinational partners in security or combat operations. Habitual

training relationships should be maintained between multinational partners until

ANA units meet established standards for full capability.

Advisor teams detailed to assist ANA units. Advisor teams are a particularly good

method for training senior ministry personnel.

Contractors can also be used to assist with training, though care must be taken to

ensure the training is supervised and meets standards.

Training Soldiers

6-59. Security force members must be developed through a systematic training program

that first builds their basic skills, then teaches them to work together as a team, and

finally allows them to function as a unit. Basic military training for forces involved in

COIN should focus first on COIN-related skills, such as first aid, marksmanship, and fire

discipline. Leaders should be educated on tactics, including patrolling and urban

operations. Everyone must master rules of engagement and the law of armed conflict.

Units should train to standard for conducting the major COIN missions they will face.

Requirements include the following:

Manage their own security.

Provide effective personnel management.

Conduct logistic (planning, maintenance, sustainment, and movement) operations.

Conduct basic intelligence functions.

Coordinate indirect fires.

Provide for effective medical support

Training Leaders

6-60. The effectiveness of the security forces is directly related to the quality of their

leadership. Building an effective leadership cadre requires a comprehensive program of

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officer, staff, and specialized training. The ultimate success of any involvement in COIN

depends on the ability to create viable leadership capable of carrying on the fight at all

levels and building their nation on their own.

Leader Training Standards

6-61. The training methodology adopted must reinforce the different levels of authority

within the security forces. The roles and responsibilities of each commissioned officer

and NCO rank must be firmly established so recruits can understand what is expected of

them. Their subordinate relationship to civilian authorities must also be reinforced to

ensure civilian control. In addition, training should be conducted in a way that establishes

team dynamics. Military forces in some cultures may require training to understand the

vital role played by those who are not necessarily in primary leadership positions.

6-62. In addition to tactical skills, commissioned officers should be trained in

accountability, decision making, delegation of authority, values, and ethics. Special

requirements for COIN should be the primary focus of the initial curriculum. These

subjects include the following:

Intelligence collection.

Day and night patrolling.

Point security.

Cordon and search operations.

Operations with police.

Treatment of detainees and prisoners.

Psychological operations.

Civic action.

As the insurgency declines, the curriculum can be adjusted for a long-term focus.

6-63. In addition, training of leaders should be conducted in a way that shows:

How to work as a team.

How to develop and take advantage of the skills of subordinates.

How to train subordinates.

How to maintain discipline and assume responsibility for one’s actions and the

actions of subordinates.

How to understand and enforce the rules of engagement.

Basic Officer Education

6-64. Various models for basic officer education exist. These include The National

Military Academy and Officer Candidate School (OCS). Time available may be the key

indicator as to which model should be used as the primary commissioning source. If the

state of the insurgency allows, the multi-year course at the National Military Academy

will provide capable officers. If not, the OCS model may be better. Theoretically, it may

be better to have a few high-quality officers than many adequate ones, but the insurgents

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may not allow this luxury. Citizens being attacked would much rather have an adequate

officer and unit now than to wait years for the better leader and organization.

6-65. Under an OCS-style program, outstanding individuals are taken from the enlisted

ranks or from society and given the opportunity to go to an officer training course. An

OCS-style course should be followed by additional specialized branch training.

Intermediate and Advanced Commissioned Officer Education

6-66. Military units only become effective when their commanders and staffs can

effectively plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations. Initial intermediate-level

commissioned officer training should focus on building effective commanders and staffs

for small units, then progressively move to higher echelons. Thus, initial intermediate-

level officer training should be focused at the company- and Kandak-levels (or police

station-level). Later courses address higher echelons, depending on the size of the overall

force to be developed.

6-67. A cadre of carefully selected low- and mid-level commissioned officers can be

provided advanced- level education at existing formal schools in the United States or

other partner nations through International Military Education and Training (IMET)-like

programs. The object of this type of program is to build a qualified leadership cadre. This

cadre can, upon their return to Afghanistan, assume leadership positions and become

faculty for schools. These officers should have increased credibility when they return to

Afghanistan. Officer students usually make and maintain strong personal connections

with their hosts during and after their stay abroad. Since one of the key goals for

developing security forces is to professionalize them, the first-hand experience of the

officers training in foreign military schools, living abroad, and seeing military

professional standards practiced, is invaluable. As with officer commissioning programs,

time is a key consideration. IMET-like programs are expensive and time-consuming. The

best officers—those normally selected for such training— may be needed more in the

country’s combat forces fighting the insurgency today.

Operational Employment of Newly Trained Forces

6-68. Building up the morale and confidence of security forces should be a primary

strategic objective. Committing poorly trained and badly led forces results in high

casualties and invites tactical defeats. While defeat in a small operation may have little

strategic consequence in a conventional war, even a small tactical defeat of national

forces can have serious strategic consequences in COIN. Insurgent warfare is largely

about perceptions, and minor insurgent wins can be quickly turned into major propaganda

victories. Defeat of one government force can quickly degrade the morale of the others.

Failure by national forces can also result in a loss of confidence of the public in the

government’s ability to protect them. A string of relatively minor insurgent victories can

cause widespread loss of morale in the security forces and encourage the “neutral

majority” to side with the insurgents. In short, the national security forces must be

prepared for operations so that they have every possible advantage. The decision to

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commit units into their first actions and their employment method requires careful

consideration. As much as possible, they should begin with easy missions and, as their

confidence and competence grows, assume more difficult assignments. Partnering with

multinational units can be an effective way to allow new security units to become

gradually accustomed to the stresses of combat.

6-69. Newly trained units should enter their first combat supporting more experienced

national, or multinational forces. Operational performance of such inexperienced

organizations should be carefully monitored and assessed so that weaknesses can be

quickly corrected. The employment plan for security units should allow considerable time

after each operation for additional training. By introducing units into combat gradually,

the poor leaders can be weeded out while the most competent leaders are identified and

given greater authority and responsibility.

Training Civilians in the Defense Ministry

6-70. Forces training with ANA personnel must also ensure that the military and security

forces have capable management in the top ranks. The commander should consider

placing experienced ANA officers inside the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Defense

and Interior Ministries as trainers and advisers for their managers and leaders. ANA

forces should also develop a training program for civilian personnel of the Ministry of

Defense. Personnel training should address the following:

Equipment acquisition.

Departmental administration.

Personnel management.

Financial and resource management.

Selected Ministry of Defense personnel may receive specialized training in defense

management through multinational partner nation schools, or in civilian institutions that

specialize in graduate programs for security studies.

EQUIP

6-71. The strategic plan for security force development should outline requirements for

appropriate equipment for the nation. Equipment should meet the nation’s requirements.

Equipment meets the standard when it is affordable and suitable against the threat. The

nation must also be able to train on the equipment. Interoperability may be a desired goal

in some cases. A central consideration must be the nation’s long-term ability to support

and maintain the equipment provided.

6-72. The initial development plan should include phases with goals to be met by the

security forces over a period of three to four years. Due to the highly adaptive nature of

insurgents and the often rapidly changing situation on the ground, the direction and

progress of developing security forces must be continually assessed.

6-73. The requirement to provide equipment may be as simple as assisting with

maintenance of existing formations or as extensive as providing everything from shoes

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and clothing to vehicles, communications, investigation kits, and so forth. If the

insurgents are using heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, security forces

need comparable or better equipment. This is especially important for police forces,

which are generally lightly armed and vulnerable against well-armed insurgents.

6-74. Maintainability, ease of operation and long-term sustainment costs should be

primary considerations. In COIN operations it may be better to have a large number of

versatile vehicles that are easy to maintain and operate than a few highly capable armored

vehicles or combat systems that require extensive maintenance to keep operational.

Developing an effective maintenance system often begins with major maintenance

conducted by contracted firms. The program then progresses to partnership arrangements

with multinational forces as national personnel are trained to carry out the support

mission.

6-75. Sources for materiel include ANA stockpiles, multinational or third-nation resale of

property, contracts with internal suppliers, or national purchases on the international

market. Appendix C provides amplification on relevant legal considerations. The nation

should have the flexibility necessary to obtain equipment that meets force needs for

quality, timeliness and cost.

ADVISE

6-76. Advisers from multinational units may be assigned to work with ANA units.

Advisers live, work and fight with their ANA counterparts. The relationship between

advisers and ANA forces is vital. Commanders must be aware that advisers are not just

liaison officers, nor do they command ANA units.

6-77. Effective advisers are an enormous force enhancer. The importance of the job

means that the most capable individuals will be picked to fill these positions. Advisers

could be either Soldiers known to take the initiative and who set the standards for others.

6-78. More than anything else, professional knowledge and competence will win the

respect of ANA troops. Effective advisers develop a healthy rapport with their Afghan

hosts.

6-79. Advisers who understand the military culture understand that local politics have

national effects. It is important to recognize and employ the cultural factors that support

commitment and teamwork. Part of the art of the good advisor is to employ the positive

aspects of the local culture to get the best performance out of each security force member

and leader.

6-80. Important guidelines to be followed by advisers include the following:

Try to learn enough of the language for simple conversation.

Be patient. Be subtle. In guiding your counterparts, explain the benefits of an

action and convince them to accept the idea as their own. Respect the rank and

positions of your counterparts.

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Be diplomatic in correcting your security force counterpart. Praise each success

and work to instill pride in the unit.

Understand that an advisory team is not the unit commander but an enabler. The

security forces commander must make decisions and command the unit.

Keep your counterpart informed.

Work to continually train and improve the unit, even in the combat zone. Help

your counterparts.

Develop unit standing operating procedures.

Be prepared to act as a liaison to multinational assets.

Maintain liaison with civil affairs and humanitarian teams in the area of

operations.

Be ready to advise on the maintenance of equipment and supplies.

Have a thorough knowledge of light infantry tactics and unit security procedures.

Use “confidence” missions to validate training.

Don’t isolate yourself from the unit you’re working with.

Be aware of the operations around you in order to prevent fratricide.

Insist on adherence to the recognized human rights standards concerning

treatment of civilians, detainees, and captured insurgents. Violations that are

observed must be reported to the chain of command.

Be objective in their reports on unit and leader proficiency and report gross

corruption or incompetence.

Train units to standard and fight alongside them. Consider limitations and adjust

accordingly. Flexibility is key. It is impossible to plan completely for everything

in this type of operation. Therefore constantly look forward to the next issue and

be ready to develop solutions to problems that cannot be answered with a

doctrinal solution.

Remember that most actions have long-term strategic implications.

Maintain a proper military bearing and professional manner.

POLICE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

6-81. The primary front line COIN force is often the police—not the military. Few

military units can match a good police unit in developing an accurate human intelligence

picture of their area of operations. Because of their frequent contact with populace, police

are often the most appropriate force to counter small insurgent bands that receive support

from the civilian population. In COIN operations, special police strike units may be

moved to different areas of operations, while patrol police remain in the local area on a

daily basis and build a detailed intelligence picture of the insurgent strength,

organization, and support.

ORGANIZING THE POLICE

6-82. The police are normally organized into several independent but mutually supporting

forces. These may include the following:

Criminal and traffic police.

Border police.

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Transport police for security of public transport.

Specialized paramilitary strike forces.

In addition, the country may establish a variety of reserve police units or home guards to

provide local security. The force may include paramilitary or gendarmerie-like units.

Police might be organized on a national or local basis. Whatever police organization is in

place, it is important for the ANA to understand the system in order to operate more

effectively. This often means dealing with a variety of police organizations and

developing appropriate plans for potential training with them.

6-83. While military forces might have to perform police duties at the start of an

insurgency, in the long term it is best to establish police forces to take over these duties as

soon as possible. As quickly as possible, the government and any multinational partners

should institute a comprehensive program of police training. Moreover, plans for police

training need to envision a several-year program to systematically build institutions and

leadership.

6-84. Although the roles of the police and military in COIN may be blurred, there are

important distinctions between the two forces. If insurgents are considered criminals, the

police may retain the primary responsibility for their arrest, detention and prosecution.

6-85. Combating insurgency requires a police force that is visible day and night. The

nation will not gain legitimacy if the populace believes that insurgents and criminal bands

control the city and village streets. Well-sited and protected police stations are one means

to establish a presence in communities as long as the police do not hide in those stations.

Police presence provides security to communities and builds support for the legitimacy of

the government. The police are also in daily contact with the civilian community, thus

serving as key information collectors for COIN forces.

6-86. Good pay and attractive benefits must be combined with a strict code of conduct

that follows the rule of law and allows for the immediate dismissal of police personnel

for corruption. Planning must ensure that police pay, housing, benefits, and work

conditions are good enough to attract a high quality police recruit, and to serve as a shield

against the temptation of the petty corruption that undermines the public’s confidence in

the police and government. One of the most important steps in organizing a police force

is to set up an independent review board, with the authority to investigate charges of

police abuse and corruption, oversee the complaints process, and dismiss and fine police

found guilty of misconduct. This board should be composed of experts, government

officials or nongovernmental organization members. It should not be under the direct

command of the police force or responsible government ministry.

TRAINING THE POLICE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

6-87. Police training is best conducted as an interagency and multinational operation. In a

multinational effort, a separate multinational police training and advisory command could

work in tandem with the military training command. Civilian police have personnel with

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extensive experience in large city operations. Multinational police organizations also

have extensive experience operating against organized crime groups. Experience

countering organized crime is especially relevant to COIN, as most insurgent groups are

more similar to organized crime in their organizational structure and relations with the

population than they are to military units. Military police units serve best when operating

as a support force for the professional civilian police trainers. However, there may be

times when military forces are given the primary responsibility for police training, and

they must be prepared to assume that role if required (More details on police training

responsibilities are discussed in Appendix C.).

6-88. If mandated to do so, military police are capable of providing much of the initial

police training and are especially suited to teach the local police forces the following

skills:

Weapons-handling.

Small unit tactics.

Special weapons employment.

Convoy escort.

Riot control.

Traffic control.

Prisoner/detainee handling and processing.

Higher-level police—skills such as civilian criminal investigation procedures, anti-

organized crime operations, and police intelligence operations—are best taught by

civilian experts.

6-89. Military police or corrections personnel can also provide training for detention and

corrections operations. Local police personnel should be trained to handle and interrogate

detainees and prisoners in accordance with internationally recognized human rights

norms. Prisoner and detainee management procedures should provide for the security and

the fair and efficient processing of those detained.

6-90. Police forces, just like military forces, need effective support personnel to be

effective. This requires training teams to ensure that training in support functions is

established. Specially trained personnel required by police forces include the following:

Armorers.

Supply specialists.

Communications personnel.

Administrative personnel.

Vehicle mechanics.

6-91. Effective policing also requires an effective justice system with trained judges,

prosecutors, defense counsel, prison officials, and court personnel who can process

arrests, detentions, warrants, and other judicial records. These elements are important

components for establishing the rule of law.

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Chapter 7

Leadership and Ethics for Counterinsurgency

“Leaders must have a strong sense of the great responsibility of their office; the

resources they expend on war are human lives”.

There are leadership and ethical imperatives that are prominent and in some cases unique

to counterinsurgency. The dynamic and ambiguous environment of modern

counterinsurgency places a premium on leadership at every level, from sergeant to

general. Combat in counterinsurgency is frequently a small unit leader’s fight; however,

the actions of commanders at the brigade and corps levels are often more significant

because the senior leader sets the conditions and the tone for all actions by subordinates.

Today’s Soldiers are required to be competent in a broad array of tasks. They must also

rapidly adapt cognitively and emotionally to the numerous challenges of

counterinsurgency, and master new competencies as well as new contexts. Those in

leadership positions must provide the moral compass for their subordinates as they

navigate this complex environment. Underscoring these imperatives is the fact that

exercising leadership in the midst of ambiguity requires intense, discriminating

professional judgment.

LEADERSHIP IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

7-1. Military leaders, as members of Afghan society, are expected to act ethically in

accordance with shared national values and Constitutional principles, which are reflected

in law and the military oaths of service. Military leaders have the unique professional

responsibility of exercising military judgment on behalf of the Afghan people they serve.

They continually reconcile mission effectiveness, ethical standards, and thoughtful

stewardship of the nation’s precious resources—human and material—in the pursuit of

national aims.

7-2. Military leaders work proactively to establish and maintain the proper ethical climate

of their organizations. They serve as visible examples for every subordinate,

demonstrating cherished values and military virtues in their decisions and actions. Army

leaders are responsible for ensuring the trying environment of counterinsurgency does not

undermine the values of their Soldiers. Under all conditions, they must remain faithful to

basic standards of proper behavior and respect for the sanctity of life.

7-3. Leaders educate and train their subordinates. They create standing operating

procedures and other internal systems to prevent violations of legal and ethical rules.

They check routinely on what their Soldiers are doing. Effective leaders respond quickly

and aggressively to indications of illegal or unethical behavior. The Nation’s and

profession’s values are not negotiable. Violations of them are not just mistakes; they are

failures in meeting the fundamental standards of the profession of arms.

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LARGE AND SMALL UNIT LEADERSHIP TENETS

7-4. There are basic leadership tenets that are applicable for all levels of command and

leadership in counterinsurgency, though their application and importance may vary.

7-5. Leaders are responsible for ensuring that Soldiers are properly trained and educated,

including cultural preparation for the environment in which they will operate. In a COIN

environment, it is often counterproductive to employ troops who are poorly trained or

unfamiliar with operating in close proximity to the local populace. COIN forces aim to

mobilize the good will of the people against the insurgents. Therefore, the populace must

feel protected, not threatened, by COIN forces’ actions and operations.

7-6. Proper training addresses many of the possible scenarios of the COIN environment.

Education should prepare Soldiers to deal with the unexpected and unknown. Senior

commanders should, at a minimum, ensure that their small unit leaders posses tactical

cunning and mature judgment. Tactical cunning is the art of employing the fundamental

skills of the profession in shrewd and crafty ways to out-think and out-adapt the

adversaries. Developing mature judgment and cunning requires a rigorous regimen of

preparation that begins before deployment and continues throughout. These skills are

particularly important for junior leaders in COIN because of the decentralized nature of

operations.

7-7. Senior leaders are responsible for determining the purpose of their operations. This

entails, as discussed in Chapter 4, a design process that focuses on learning about the

nature of unfamiliar problems. Effective commanders know the people, topography,

economy, history, and culture of their area of operations (AO). They know every village,

road, field, population group, tribal leader, and ancient grievance within it. The COIN

environment changes continually; good leaders appreciate that state of flux and

constantly assess their situation.

7-8. Another part of analyzing a COIN mission involves assuming responsibility for

everyone in the AO. This means that leaders feel the pulse of the local population,

understand their motivations, and care about what the people want and need. Genuine

compassion and empathy for the populace provides an effective weapon against

insurgents.

7-9. Senior leaders exercise a leadership role for everyone within their AO. They exert a

direct influence on those in the chain of command, but equally important is the indirect

leadership provided to everyone within their AO. All elements engaged in COIN efforts

look to the military for leadership. Therefore military actions and words must be beyond

reproach. The greatest challenge for leaders may be in setting an example for the local

population. Effective senior and junior leaders embrace this role and understand its

significance. It involves more than just killing insurgents; it includes the responsibility to

serve as a moral compass that extends beyond the COIN force and into the community. It

is that moral compass that distinguishes Soldiers from the insurgents.

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7-10. Senior commanders are responsible for maintaining the “moral high ground” in all

deeds and words of their units. Information operations complement and reinforce actions,

and actions reinforce the operational narrative. All COIN force activity is wrapped in a

blanket of truth. Maintaining credibility requires immediately investigating all allegations

of immoral or unethical behavior, and providing a prudent degree of transparency.

7-11. Military leaders emphasize to subordinates that, on the battlefield, the principles of

honor and morality are inextricably linked. They do not allow subordinates to fall victim

to the enormous pressures associated with the strain of prolonged combat against an

elusive, unethical, and indiscriminate foe. While the environment that fosters insurgency

is characterized by violence, immorality, distrust, and deceit, ANA leaders continue to

demand and embrace honor, courage, and commitment to the highest standards. They

know when to inspire and embolden their Soldiers, and when to enforce restraint and

discipline. Effective leaders at all levels get out and around their units and among the

people. Such leaders see what they are actually doing, engage in discourse, and most

importantly, listen, in order to get a true sense of the complex situation in their AO.

7-12. Leaders at every level establish an ethical tone and climate that guards against the

moral complacency and the frustrations that build up in protracted counterinsurgency.

Leaders remain aware of the emotional toll that constant combat takes on their

subordinates and the potential resulting emotional injury. Such injuries can result from

cumulative stress over a prolonged period, witnessing the death of a comrade, or killing

other human beings. Caring leaders recognize these pressures and provide emotional

“shock absorbers” for their subordinates. It is critical that Soldiers have outlets to share

their feelings and reach closure on traumatic experiences. These psychological burdens

may be carried around for a long time. Leaders watch for the signs of possible emotional

injury within individuals and units. These include:

Physical and mental fatigue.

Lack of respect for human life.

Loss of appetite; trouble with sleep; no interest in physical hygiene.

Lack of unit cohesion and discipline.

Depression and fatalism.

7-13. Combat requires commanders to be prepared to take some risk, especially at the

tactical level. Though this tenet is true for the entire spectrum of conflict, it is particularly

important during COIN operations, where the insurgent seek to hide among the local

populace.

7-14. Leaders prepare to indirectly inflict suffering on their Soldiers by sending them into

harm’s way to accomplish the mission while attempting to avoid, at great length, injury

and death to innocents. This requirement gets to the very essence of what some describe

as “the burden of command.” The steadfast ability to regularly lose Soldiers, yet continue

day-in and day-out to close with the enemy, requires a resoluteness and mental toughness

in commanders and units that must be developed in peacetime through study and hard

training, and then maintained in combat.

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7-15. Success in COIN operations requires small unit leaders agile enough to transition

among many types of missions and able to adapt to change. They must be able to shift

through the spectrum of conflict from unstable peace to combat and back again in the

course of days or hours. Alert junior leaders recognize the dynamic context of a tactical

situation and can apply informed judgment to achieve the commander’s intent in a

stressful and ambiguous environment. COIN operations are characterized by rapid

changes in tactical and operational environments and a high degree of ambiguity due to

the presence of a civilian population within which insurgents may disappear. Adaptable

leaders scan the rapidly changing situation, identify its key characteristics, ascertain what

has to be done, and determine the most appropriate manner to accomplish the mission.

7-16. Cultural awareness has become an increasingly important competency for small

unit leaders. Perceptive junior leaders learn how cultures affect military operations. They

develop their knowledge of major world cultures and learn the specifics of the new

operational environment as a matter of priority when deployed. Different solutions are

required in different cultural contexts. Effective small unit leaders remain aware of how

their words and actions might be interpreted in different cultural settings and adapt to

new situations. Like all other competencies, cultural awareness requires self-awareness,

self-directed learning, and adaptability.

7-17. Self-aware leaders understand the need to continually assess their capabilities and

limitations. They are humble, self-confident, and brave enough to admit their faults and

shortcomings. More important, self-aware leaders work at improving and growing. After-

action reviews, dialogues, and open discussion throughout a COIN force are essential to

achieve understanding and improvement. Soldiers can become better, stronger leaders

through a similar habit of self-examination, awareness, and focused corrective effort.

7-18. Commanders exercise initiative as leaders and fighters. Learning and adapting with

appropriate decision making authority are critical to gaining an advantage over

insurgents. Effective senior leaders establish a leadership climate that promotes

decentralized modes of command and control, what the Army calls mission command.

Under mission command, commanders create the conditions for subordinates’ success by

providing general guidance and the commander’s intent, assigning authority

commensurate with responsibility to small unit leaders, and establishing control measures

to monitor their actions and keep them within bounds without micromanaging everything

they do. At the same time, it is important that the commander’s presence be felt

throughout the AO, especially at decisive points. The operation’s purpose and

commander’s vision of resolution must be clearly understood throughout the force.

7-19. Sharing hardship and danger with subordinates builds confidence and esprit.

Soldiers who know their leaders are committing them to schemes of maneuver based on

firsthand knowledge of the point of contact are more confident in their chances of

success. However, this fighter/leader concept does not absolve leaders from remembering

their position and avoiding needless risk.

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7-20. COIN operations require leaders to exhibit patience, persistence, and presence.

Successful commanders lead Soldiers, cooperate with the entire COIN force, leverage the

capabilities of multinational partners and nongovernmental organizations, and gain the

confidence of the local population, while at the same time defeating and discrediting their

adversary.

ETHICS

7-21. Conflict brings to bear enormous moral challenges, as well as the burden of life and

death decisions with profound ethical considerations. Combat, including COIN and other

forms of irregular warfare, often obligates Soldiers to choose the riskier course of action

to minimize harm to noncombatants. This risk-taking is an essential part of the Warrior

Ethos. In conventional conflicts, balancing competing responsibilities of mission

accomplishment at least friendly cost with protection of noncombatants is difficult

enough. Complex COIN operations place even tougher ethical demands on Soldiers and

their leaders.

7-22. Even in conventional operations, Soldiers are not permitted to use force

disproportionately or indiscriminately. Typically, more force reduces risk. But military

values obligate Soldiers to accomplish their missions while taking measures to limit the

destruction, particularly in terms of harm to noncombatants, caused by military

operations. This restriction is based on the belief that it is wrong to harm innocents,

regardless of their citizenship.

7-23. Limiting the misery caused by war requires combatants to consider certain rules,

principles, and consequences that restrain the amount of force they may apply. At the

same time, combatants are not required to take so much risk that they fail their mission or

forfeit their lives. As long as their use of force is proportional to the gain to be achieved

and discriminate in distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants, Soldiers may

take actions where they knowingly risk, but do not intend, harm to noncombatants.

7-24. Ethically speaking, COIN environments can be much more complex than

conventional ones. Insurgency is more than combat between armed groups; it is a

political struggle with a high level of violence intended to destabilize and ultimately

overthrow a government. COIN forces using excessive force to limit short-term risk

alienate local residents. In doing this, they deprive themselves of the support or tolerance

of the populace. This situation is what the insurgents want. It increases the threat they

pose. Sometimes lethal responses are counterproductive. At other times, they are

essential. The art of command includes knowing the difference and directing the

appropriate action.

7-25. A key part of any insurgent’s strategy is to attack their domestic and international

opposition’s political will. One of the insurgents’ most effective means to undermine and

erode political will is to portray their opposition as untrustworthy or illegitimate. These

attacks are especially effective when insurgents can portray the opposition as unethical by

their own standards. To combat these efforts, Soldiers treat noncombatants and detainees

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humanely and in accordance with national values and internationally recognized human

rights standards. In COIN, preserving noncombatant lives and dignity is central to

mission accomplishment. This imperative creates a complex ethical environment that

requires combatants to treat prohibitions against harming noncombatants as absolute.

Further, it can sometimes require combatants to forego lethal solutions altogether. In

practical terms, this consideration means that mission accomplishment sometimes

obligates combatants to act more like police than warriors. That requirement imposes a

very different calculus for the use of force.

WARFIGHTING VERSUS POLICING

7-26. In counterinsurgencies, warfighting and policing are dynamically linked. The moral

purpose of combat operations is to secure peace. The moral purpose of policing is to

maintain peace. In COIN operations, military forces defeat enemies to establish civil

security; then, having done so, these same forces preserve it until indigenous police

forces can assume responsibility for maintaining the civil order. When combatants

conduct stability operations in a way that undermines civil security, they undermine the

moral and practical purposes they serve. There is a clear difference between warfighting

and policing. COIN operations require that every unit be adept at both and capable of

moving rapidly between one and the other, depending on circumstances.

7-27. In COIN operations, the environment frequently and rapidly shifts from warfighting

to policing and back again. There are numerous examples from counterinsurgencies

where forces drove insurgents out of urban areas but, because of the difficulty of

maintaining civil security afterwards, the insurgents later returned and reestablished

operations. The insurgents had to be dealt with as an organized combatant force all over

again. To prevent this situation from occurring, forces that establish civil security need to

be prepared to maintain it. And maintaining civil security entails very different ethical

obligations than establishing it.

7-28. Civil security holds when institutions, civil law, courts, prisons, and effective police

are in place and can protect the recognized rights of individuals. Typically this requires

that:

The enemy is defeated or transformed into a threat not capable of challenging a

government’s sovereignty.

Institutions necessary for law enforcement, including police, courts, and prisons,

are functioning.

These institutions are credible, and people trust them to resolve disputes.

7-29. Where a functioning civil authority does not exist, COIN forces are obligated to

work to establish it. Where forces are trying to build a credible government, the interim

military government should transition to civilian authority as soon as possible.

Accomplishing this requires COIN forces to work within the framework of the

institutions established to maintain order and security. In these conditions, COIN

operations more closely resemble police work than combat operations.

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7-30. The most salient difference between warfighting and policing is the moral

permissibility of noncombatant and bystander casualties. In warfighting, noncombatant

casualties are permitted as long as combatants observe the restrictions of proportionality

and discrimination. In policing, bystanders may not be harmed intentionally under any

circumstances. Failure to observe this rule undermines the peace—often tenuous in these

circumstances—that military action has achieved. In maintaining the peace, police are

permitted to use only the least force possible to achieve the immediate goal.

PROPORTIONALITY AND DISCRIMINATION

7-31. Because of the importance of gaining popular support and establishing legitimacy

for the government, practicing proportionality and discrimination during COIN is an

operational necessity as well as a legal and moral one. Proportionality and discrimination

require combatants not only to minimize the harm to noncombatants, but also to make

positive commitments to:

Preserve noncombatant lives by limiting the damage they do.

Assume additional risk to minimize potential harm.

7-32. Proportionality requires that the advantage gained by a military operation not be

exceeded by the collateral harm. Combatants must take all feasible precautions in the

choice of means and methods of attack to avoid and minimize loss of civilian life, injury

to civilians, and damage to civilian objects.

7-33. In conventional operations, proportionality is usually calculated in simple utilitarian

terms: civilian lives and property lost versus enemy destroyed and military advantage

gained. But in COIN operations, advantage is best calculated not in terms of how many

insurgents are killed or detained, but rather which enemies are killed or detained. If

certain key insurgent leaders are essential to the insurgents’ ability to conduct operations,

then military leaders need to consider their relative importance when determining how

best to pursue them. In COIN environments, the number of civilian lives lost and

property destroyed needs to be measured against how much harm the targeted insurgent

could do if allowed to escape. If the target in question is relatively inconsequential, then

proportionality requires combatants to forego severe action, or seek non-combative

means of engagement.

7-34. Further, when conditions of civil security exist, COIN forces are prohibited from

taking any actions in which noncombatants will knowingly be harmed. However, this

does not mean COIN forces are prohibited from taking risks that might place civilian

lives in danger. But those risks are subject to the same considerations of proportionality.

The benefit anticipated must outweigh the risk taken.

7-35. Discrimination requires combatants to differentiate between enemy combatants

who represent a threat and noncombatants who do not. In conventional operations, this

restriction means that combatants cannot intend to harm noncombatants, though

proportionality permits them to act knowing some noncombatants may be harmed. In

policing situations, combatants cannot act in any way in which they know bystanders

may be harmed.

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7-36. In insurgencies, it is not only difficult to distinguish combatant from noncombatant;

it is also difficult to determine whether the situation permits harm to noncombatants. Two

levels of discrimination are necessary:

Deciding between targets.

Determining an acceptable risk to noncombatants and bystanders.

7-37. Discrimination also applies to the means by which combatants engage the enemy.

The law and morality of war prohibit the use of certain weapons, such as chemical

munitions, soft lead bullets, and others against combatants. In COIN environments,

combatants must not only discriminate among the kinds of weapons used but also

whether lethal means are permitted in the first place. Where civil security exists, even

tenuously, COIN forces are obligated to pursue non-combat and non-lethal means first,

using lethal force only when necessary.

DETENTION AND INTERROGATION

7-38. Detentions and interrogations are critical components to any military operation. But

the nature of COIN operations produces the potential for complex detainee situations due

to insurgents’ deliberate mingling with the civilian population and lack of distinctive

uniforms. Interrogators are often under extreme pressure to get information that can save

the lives of noncombatants and Soldiers. While enemy prisoners in conventional war are

considered moral and legal equals, the moral and legal status of insurgents is ambiguous

and often contested. What is not ambiguous is the legal obligation of Soldiers to treat all

prisoners and detainees according to the law (Appendix C provides more guidance on the

legal issues concerning detention and interrogation.).

LIMITS ON DETENTION

7-39. Mistreatment of noncombatants, including prisoners and detainees is illegal and

immoral. It will not be condoned.

7-40. In COIN environments, distinguishing an insurgent from a civilian is difficult and

often impossible. Treating the second like the first, however, is a sure recipe for failure.

Individuals suspected of insurgent or terrorist activity may be detained for two reasons:

To prevent them from conducting further attacks.

To gather information in order to prevent other insurgents and terrorists from

conducting attacks.

These reasons allow for two classes of persons to be detained and interrogated:

Persons who have engaged in, or assisted those who engage in, terrorist or

insurgent activities.

Persons who have incidentally attained knowledge regarding insurgent and

terrorist activity, but who are not guilty of associating with such groups.

By engaging in such activities, persons in the first category may be detained as criminals

or enemies, depending on the context. Persons in the second category may be detained

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and questioned for specific information. However, since they have not, by virtue of their

activities, represented a threat, they may be detained only long enough to obtain the

relevant information. Since persons in the second category have not engaged in criminal

or insurgent activities, they must be released even if they refuse to provide information.

7-41. At no time is it permissible to detain family members or close associates in order to

compel suspected insurgents to surrender. This kind of hostage taking is both unethical

and illegal.

LIMITS ON INTERROGATION

7-42. Abuse of detained persons is immoral, illegal, and unprofessional. Those who

engage in cruel or inhuman treatment of prisoners betray the standards of the profession

of arms and the laws of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. They are subject to

punishment under military law. The Geneva Conventions as well as the Convention

against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment agree

on what is unacceptable for interrogation. Torture and cruel, inhumane, and degrading

treatment is never a morally permissible option, even in situations where lives depend on

gaining information. No exceptional circumstances permit the use of torture and other

cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

7-43. The ethical challenges posed in COIN require commanders’ attention and action.

Proactive commanders establish procedures and checks to ensure subordinate leaders do

not allow apparent requirements of the moment to result in violations of proper detainee-

handling procedures. Prohibitions against mistreatment may sometimes clash with

leaders’ moral imperative to accomplish their mission with minimum losses. Such

situations place leaders in the difficult situation where they must choose between

obedience to the law and the lives of their troops. However, Afghan law and professional

values compel commanders to forbid mistreatment of noncombatants in their hands,

including captured enemies. It is essential that senior commanders make the limits of

acceptable behavior clear to their subordinates and take positive measures to ensure their

standards are met.

7-44. To the extent that the work of interrogators is indispensable to fulfilling the state’s

obligation to secure its citizens’ the lives and liberties, conducting interrogations is a

moral obligation. The methods used, however, must reflect the Nation’s commitment to

human dignity and international humanitarian law. A commander’s need for information

remains valid and can be met while observing relevant regulations and ethical standards.

Acting morally does not necessarily mean that leaders give up obtaining critical

information. Acting morally does require that leaders relinquish certain ways of obtaining

information, even if that means that members of the military and intelligence professions

must take greater risk.

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THE LEARNING IMPERATIVE

7-45. Today’s operational environment requires military organizations at all echelons to

prepare for a broader range of missions than ever before. The ANA is preparing for

preventative stability operations or post-conflict reconstruction tasks with the same

degree of professionalism and study given to the conduct of combat operations. Similarly,

COIN operations are receiving the attention and study merited by their frequency and

potential impact. This broader mission set implies significant leadership development,

education, and training implications, especially for land forces. The next chapter

highlights how COIN requirements affect logistic operations.

7-46. ANA leaders need to visualize the operational impact of many tactical actions and

relate their operations to larger strategic purposes. Effectively blending traditional

military operations with other forms of influence is necessary. Effective leaders are

placing a stronger emphasis on organizational change, developing subordinates, and

empowering them to execute critical tasks in consonance with broad guidance. Leaders

are required to directly and indirectly influence the behavior of others outside their chain

of command. Finally, leaders are increasingly responsible for creating environments in

which individuals and organizations learn from their experiences and for establishing

climates that tap the full ingenuity of subordinates. Open channels of discussion and

debate are needed to encourage growth of a learning environment in which experience is

rapidly shared and lessons adapted for new challenges. The velocity of organizational

adaptation must outpace the enemy’s efforts to identify and exploit weaknesses or

develop countermeasures.

7-47. Effective individual professional development programs develop and reward

initiative and adaptability in junior leaders. Self-development, life-long learning, and

reflection on experience should be encouraged and rewarded. Cultural sensitivity,

development of non-authoritarian interpersonal skills, and foreign language ability must

be mastered. Institutional professional development programs must develop leaders’

judgment to help them recognize when situations change from combat to policing.

Leaders must be as skilled at limiting lethal force as they are in concentrating it. Indeed,

they must learn that non-lethal solutions may often be preferable to “breaking things and

killing people.”

SUMMARY

7-48. Senior leaders must model and transmit to their subordinates appropriate respect for

professional standards of self-discipline and adherence to ethical values. Effective leaders

create command climates that reward professional conduct and penalize unethical

behavior. They also are comfortable with delegating authority. However, as always,

accountability for the overall behavior and performance of a command cannot be

delegated. Commanders remain accountable for the attainment of objectives and the

manner in which they are attained.

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Chapter 8

Building and Sustaining Capability and Capacity

…the object [is to]…restore government authority in an area and establish a firm

security framework.…“Winning” the population can tritely be summed up as good

government in all its aspects.…More desirable than outright gifts are schemes which are

self-perpetuating or encourage a chain reaction. For example, building plans should

stimulate the production of local building material.…All this helps to give the impression

notonly that the government is operating for the benefit of the people, but that it is

carrying out programs of a permanent nature…It gives people a stake in stability and

hope for the future….

Sir Robert Thompson

This chapter begins with a general discussion and analysis of how logistics in

counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are different from logistics in conventional

operations. This is followed by a survey of COIN-specific factors that affect how

commanders can leverage available logistic assets and assign logisticians to meet special

requirements needed to support different COIN logical lines of operations. The

discussions that follow acknowledge that COIN operations may be entered into from a

variety of military conditions ranging from unstable peace to general war. Furthermore,

due to the long-term commitment usually required for successful COIN, logistic units

need to become more adept at relief-in-place operations that maintain continuity of

progress between rotations.

LOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

8-1. In counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, logistic units are asked to not only support

combat efforts as they always have, but also to provide decisive or shaping support as

well. Logistic providers are now no longer the tail but the nose of a counterinsurgent

force. Among the most valuable services that military logisticians can provide to COIN

operations are the means and knowledge required for setting up or restarting self-

perpetuating sustainment schemes that give the people a stake in stability and hope for

the future. One of the paradoxes of counterinsurgency is that many of the logisticians’

best weapons for countering an insurgency do not shoot. In this respect, logistic units can

provide some of the most versatile and effective non-lethal resources available to ANA

forces. Logisticians supporting COIN operations prepare to provide support across all

logical lines of operations (LLOs) visualized and articulated by the commander. In many

cases, logisticians already supporting COIN combat operations may be the only available

source able to provide essential knowledge, capabilities, and materials in the most timely

manner. While this chapter focuses heavily on the capabilities and responsibilities of

logistic units and logisticians, commanders of all types of units at all levels should also be

aware of the distinct characteristics of COIN support.

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WHAT IS DIFFERENT ABOUT LOGISTICS IN COIN OPERATIONS

8-2. In COIN operations, logistic units and other logistic providers find themselves

performing all the functions they normally do in conventional operations, as well as some

new ones. Conventional operations usually involve two recognizable military-like

organizations engaged in force-on-force operations in contiguous areas of operations.

What is different in COIN operations is that all the usual logistic functions, as well as the

COIN-specific new activities, must now all be performed in a frequently disorienting

environment in which security conditions can rapidly change from moment to moment

and every few hundred yards over a wide variety of terrain conditions.

Conventional Operations

Counterinsurgency Operations

Mission

Support combat unit missions.

Same as conventional operations

Sustain and build combat power.

plus support COIN-specific

LLOs.

Supporting a mobile force with a

Supporting both a static force and

clear organization and structure.

mobile force. Increased

Typically in direct support

requirements of area support

operations.

Logistics units and assets conduct

Logistic units and assets can be

only sustaining operations

assigned as decisive and shaping

(focused on the force).

operations (focused on the

environment).

Enemy

Enemy forces have supply trains

Insurgents use non-standard,

and support echelons.

covert supply methods that are

difficult to template.

Friendly operational surprise

Limited operational surprise.

(masking possible).

Easy for enemy to observe

Difficult for enemy to conduct

patterns in friendly logistics

pattern analysis.

operations.

Targeting logistic units is the

Insurgents place a high value on

enemy’s shaping effort and

attacking logistics units and other

considered a second front.

less formidable “softer, high pay-

off targets”.

Terrain

Fought in a definable AO.

Operational environment poorly

Focus destruction of enemy

defined with multiple dimensions.

combat forces.

Population is the center of

Few constraints.

gravity. Constrained time to

achieve results, yet many COIN

tasks are inherently time

consuming.

Contiguous areas of operations,

Non-contiguous and wide

echeloned formations, and

dispersion of units.

discernable hierarchical logistic

No front; everything is potentially

organizations supporting well

close, yet far.

defined deep, close and rear

areas.

Relatively secure LOCs facilitate

Need to maximize multiple LOC

distribution operations from corps

capacity/greater complexity.

to brigade to Kandak.

Potentially decreased throughput

capabilities. Increased area

support requirements. LOCs very

vulnerable.

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Troops and Support Available

Uniformed personnel: always

Uniformed personnel: Usually

suitable.

Contractor personnel: Suitable for

Contractor personnel: Case by

secure areas only.

case.

Task and location dependent:;

must be part of economic

pluralism promotion plan.

Time Available

Tempo quicker.

Long duration operations.

Geared toward decisive major

Continuity/logistics hand-off

operations.

planning often required.

Civil Considerations

Secondary to considerations of

Primarily considered as the center

how to defeat the enemy.

of gravity.

May figure prominently in

logistic planning.

AO = Area of Operations

LOC = Line of Communication

LLO = Logical Line of Operation

Figure 8-1 Conventional and Counterinsurgency Operations Contrasted

8-3. These differences between the characteristics of logistic support to conventional

operations and COIN operations are listed in Figure 8-1 (above).

8-4. Differences in COIN logistics are summarized into the following major

considerations:

Logistic units are an essential part of the COIN fight.

Logistic units are perceived by insurgents as high-payoff targets and potential

sources of supplies; COIN lines of communications (LOCs) are a main battle area

for insurgents.

8-5. The significant difference in COIN operations is that logistic units must be prepared

to provide conventional logistic support to highly lethal, mid-intensity combat operations

while simultaneously supporting humanitarian operations (until conditions stabilize

locally and civilian organizations can assume those duties).

8-6. This complex operational environment, with numerous competing demands, means

that logisticians need to creatively seek distribution efficiencies wherever possible. In the

COIN environment, it is highly desirable to eliminate backtracking and unnecessary

distribution traffic. Methods of logistic throughput that bypass, either on the ground or by

air, population centers and heavily used civilian transportation nets are desirable. The

benefits derived from such practices are especially valuable in COIN operations because

they improve logistic security, speed delivery of required support, and minimize adverse

effects and stress on the civilian population that is supposed to benefit from the COIN

operation.

8-7. Because of the diversity of requirements for COIN operations, logisticians must be

involved from the very beginning of the planning process, and they must begin planning

in detail as early as possible. Because of the complexity and diversity of logistic

requirements as well as the variety of conditions under which COIN operations are

pursued, a careful logistic preparation of the area of operations (AO) is required.

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LOGISTIC PREPARATION OF THE COUNTERINSURGENCY AREA OF

OPERATIONS

8-8. Logistic preparation of the AO is related to and can be treated as a COIN-specific

logistic preparation of the theater. In COIN operations, detailed analysis of civil logistic

and economic assets takes on an even greater importance because of their potential

significance for supporting the insurgency as well as their potential value to the

development and sustainment of national security forces and the restoration of other

essential services. Some examples of essential information for COIN logistic planning

include the following:

Analysis of the nation’s conventional force’s existing logistics as source of supply

for developing security forces and the potential insurgents/black market.

Effects of requirements generated by combat operations/collateral damage.

Effects of multinational distribution requirements on national lines of commerce.

The national economic base (industry/manufacturing/agricultural).

The national lines of commerce (such as main supply routes, industrial cities,

technical cities, pipelines, and airports).

The national public works/utilities/health/transportation/legal/justice systems.

Potential or existing displaced person populations/refugee requirements.

ANALYSIS OF INSURGENT LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES

8-9. In COIN operations, analysis of the logistic capabilities/shortfalls of the insurgent

forces is especially significant. Logisticians, together with intelligence personnel perform

what is known as reverse-BOS (battlefield operating systems) analysis. The purpose of

this analysis is not just the targeting of enemy logistic capabilities and LOCs; it also

includes an assessment of the suitability of various sources of supply for the development

and sustainment of insurgent forces. This analysis includes an assessment of black market

material, including salvage goods that might still be useful to the insurgents in an

improvised manner.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO LOGICAL LINES OF OPERATIONS

8-10. Although logisticians support all LLOs, logistic support during COIN focuses on

the following:

Combat operations.

Training and employment of national security forces.

Essential services.

Governance.

Economic development.

SUPPORTING COMBAT OPERATIONS

8-11. The combat operations LLO is the line of operations most familiar to logisticians

and non-logisticians alike. The paramount role of logistic units will always remain to

support Soldiers in accomplishing the commander’s intent and other responsibilities. The

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use of logistic units to augment civil programs supporting other lines of operations must

not take away from the logistic system’s capability to support maneuver forces engaged

in combat operations.

Support to and from Operating Bases

8-12. Logistic support to COIN combat operations is often accomplished from bases or

forward operating bases. Operating bases provide combat units with relatively secure

locations from which to plan and prepare for operations. As a result, these bases take on

new significance in operations executed in a non-contiguous COIN environment.

Considerations for Situating Operating Bases

8-13. In COIN, base site selection becomes extremely important for more reasons than

providing optimal support to combat operations. Under certain geographic conditions,

such as in rugged mountains with few passes or desolate desert terrain, placement of

secure operating bases astride or near the insurgents’ LOCs can improve the COIN

force’s interdiction and disruption capabilities. In other environments, such as urban

areas, the advantages of such an operating base position may be negated by the insurgents

rerouting their LOCs around the base,

8-14. Other reasons for carefully considering base placements in COIN operations

involve the sensitivities and concerns of the local population. The potential for ill-

considered bases to be substantially disruptive and to produce unintentionally negative

effects on the daily lives and operations of the population is significant, even if the COIN

force arrives with the most positive of intentions. Other related concerns include taking

care to set up bases so that they do not project an image of undue permanency or a

posture suggestive of a long-term foreign occupation. Similarly, logistic postures that

project an image of unduly luxurious living by foreign forces while the local population

suffers in poverty undermines the COIN message and mission. Such perceptions derived

from logistic practices can be construed and twisted by insurgent propaganda into

evidence of malign intentions by COIN forces. While all these considerations take on

special significance in COIN, none of them override the primary concern that operating

bases be securable and defendable.

8-15. Operating base site selection and development in support of COIN operations also

requires the careful consideration and balancing of several other factors. In COIN

operations, it is desirable to provide support through a carefully optimized mix of supply-

based or supply-point (“just-in-case”) practices with distribution-based or unit

distribution (“just-in-time”) logistic methods. In COIN operations, situations can swiftly

develop that require equally rapid logistic responses to prevent further deterioration of

security conditions. Under these COIN-specific circumstances, “just-in-time” practices

may still not be quick enough and use of “just-in-case” capabilities may be much more

appropriate, effective, and timely, while economizing resources. This dilemma of COIN

logistics is best illustrated by a fire-fighting analogy. When a fire is small and confined to

a pan on the stove, the five-pound extinguisher hanging on the wall in the kitchen can

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easily put it out. But when this small but important resource is not immediately available

to put out the fire, half of the house may be consumed by the time the fire department

arrives. The problem of the fire now requires thousands of gallons of water, trucks, and

hoses, not to mention construction materials to restore the house to its former state. The

challenge for logisticians supporting COIN operations is to correctly identify which

materials are the COIN forces’ “five-pound extinguishers” and to make sure these items

are supply-based at the most appropriate operating bases.

8-16. This carefully considered balancing between distribution- and supply-based

methods supports the goal of minimizing operating base footprints. Not only are minimal

footprint bases easier to relocate as required; they are also less intrusive and antagonizing

to the local population, all characteristics which significantly assist COIN operations.

8-17. Another consideration in operating base selection is the base’s purpose. If, for

instance, extensive logistic throughput is anticipated, planners pay close attention to entry

and exit points. Ideally, there should be more than one entry/exit point. Where possible,

at least one of these points should not require convoys to travel though a heavily

populated area. Space should be allotted near an entry point for staging areas for logistic

convoys so that they do not have to transit the base to form up.

8-18. Due to the noncontiguous nature of COIN operations, logisticians give special care

to the development of web-like LOCs and main supply routes between operating bases

and logistic bases. The advantage of web-like linkages between bases is twofold. It

minimizes by means of dispersion the intrusive effects of COIN logistic operations on the

population. It also provides redundancy in distribution capabilities, making the system

more robust and impervious to the effects of insurgent interdiction of any one LOC.

Additionally, more ground LOC routings provide more opportunities to observe the

population and gather information from them. For these reasons, wherever possible in

COIN operations, multiple LOCs between bases should be identified.

Force Protection

8-19. Force protection of all logistic activities takes on greater significance during COIN

operations. Historically, insurgents deliberately seek out and engage logistic units,

particularly those that they assess as poorly defended and easy targets. Because of the

intensive manpower requirements and dispersed nature of COIN operations, logistic units

cannot assume that combat arms units will be available to assist them with force

protection. For this reason, logistic units play a much greater role in base and LOC

defenses and also must assume responsibility for protecting civilian logistic augmentees

working in their AOs.

Combat Logistic Patrolling

8-20. During COIN operations, every logistic package (LOGPAC) or resupply operation

becomes a mounted combat operation, or combat logistic patrol. From the insurgents’

perspective, attacks on resupply operations are not only a potential source of dramatic

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propaganda but can also be a source of supplies and materiel. For this reason LOGPAC

convoys should project a resolute image that suggests that they will not be an easy target.

Logistic convoys should project their available combat power to the maximum extent

possible as would any other combat patrol. Under these conditions, logistic units, or

anyone else involved in resupply operations, conducts a detailed intelligence preparation

of the battlefield and prepares a fire support plan as well as identifying usable

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Additionally, combat logistic patrols

should gather information, report on road statuses, and be a valuable source of

contributions to intelligence collection plans. Logisticians should be mindful that, in the

COIN environment, distribution-based practices may actually provide insurgents with

more opportunities to target resupply activities, due to the large blocks of time materiel is

in motion towards the customer. Correspondingly, logisticians remain aware that

insurgents constantly and deliberately seek out adaptive countermeasures to logistic

activities, such as development and proliferation of improvised explosive devices

(IEDs)—a natural counter to a distribution-based doctrine. For these reasons, it is

essential that logisticians conduct careful analysis of conditions and thorough combat

preparations before launching combat logistic patrols.

Unit Equipment for COIN

8-21. Due to the rapidly shifting nature of COIN operations, logistic units and the combat

units they support usually deploy with at least some of their equipment unsuitable for the

prevailing operational and tactical trends when they arrive. This dynamic of COIN

operations causes logisticians to actively seek equipment modifications and new items on

behalf of customer and logistic units. For this reason, COIN operations may be

particularly well suited to the adoption of improved and new procurement programs, such

as rapid fielding initiatives (RFIs) and the purchase of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)

items. These approaches make sense when one realizes that, in many cases, the source of

the insurgents’ surprising capabilities also comes from their creative exploitation of

commercially available technologies and materials as well as their lack of bureaucratic

encumbrance.

8-22. By utilizing more streamlined materiel procurement procedures, COIN forces can

benefit from closer to real-time satisfaction of previously unforeseen needs generated by

specific and localized environmental and cultural conditions. Examples of COIN

requirements that fit into these categories for COTS are:

Public address systems.

Language translation devices.

Nonlethal weapons.

Back-pack drinking water systems.

Commercial mobility systems.

8-23. Examples of RFIs are:

Up-armor kits for light wheeled vehicles.

Body armor improvements.

Improved explosive detectors.

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IED signal jammers.

8-24. A potential drawback when adopting COTS equipment is that maintenance support

packages and repair parts may be inadequate or difficult to obtain in theater. Many

civilian commercial product manufacturers have no experience or infrastructure in place

to support their equipment under military conditions and in quantity, operating in hostile

austere theaters, far from their regular markets and customer base. It may take time to get

needed parts into normal supply channels and trained personnel into theater to fix such

novel equipment. Actions to be considered to permit more continuous operation of newly

vital equipment are the establishment of pools of COTS “floats” and allocating time for

floated equipment to be evacuated to locations where maintenance and repairs can be

performed.

8-25. Units conducting COIN operations may be required to temporarily draw additional

or specialized equipment in theater. For long-term COIN operations, theater property

books may be established for the maintenance and accountability of rotationally issued

additions to standard equipment, as well as specialized or specially modified equipment.

In-theater special issues and fieldings may include materiel and equipment procured

through military channels, RFIs, or COTS sources. Depending on the unit’s non-COIN

primary function, supplementary or modified equipment might be drawn to a greater or

lesser degree. Other examples of items that might be provided as required to COIN forces

by this method include:

Up-armored vehicles.

Cargo trucks.

Commercial mobility systems.

IED jammers.

Body armor.

8-26. Units in COIN operations can expect somewhat different maintenance requirements

than in conventional operations. For instance, units may put very high mileage on their

wheeled vehicles and therefore need more frequent servicing. Armor packages may wear

out shock absorbers and springs much faster; these would require replacement sooner

than normal (compared to conventional operations). Due to the mission and the

remoteness of many operating bases, unit leaders should expect their maintenance

sections to have to perform higher echelons of maintenance than normal and therefore to

need greater organic capability.

Unit Basic Loads and Operational Reach

8-27. Because of rapidly developing situations can keep units without access to resupply

for extended periods, units conducting activities away from supporting bases maximize

the amount of basic supplies (for example, water, food, ammunition, first aid, and

equipment batteries) that they carry with them on their vehicles. Additionally, some

COIN operations can consume surprisingly high quantities of ammunition (specifically

small arms) because of combined defensive and offensive actions. Logisticians

supporting these types of operations adjust stockage levels for unit basic loads and other

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sustainment commodities. In turn, logisticians and their supported units should rethink

how their supporting vehicles can best be configured as supply platforms that meet these

COIN-specific needs. Successful solutions should be validated by competent authorities

and standardized across formations to ensure safety and to support planning for effective

employment.

8-28. Unit leaders, when developing their operating base requirements, should plan for

ammunition/explosive storage areas. Ideally, units are issued ammunition and explosives,

anticipating that it may be some time before resupply is affected. Units normally carry

only their basic load. The rest should be staged appropriately.

Aerial Distribution

8-29. During COIN operations, intra-theater aerial resupply should be utilized to the

maximum extent possible. This practice not only reduces the vulnerability of resupply

activities to ground-based attacks by insurgents, but also has the added benefit of

minimizing the negative effects of COIN logistic activities on public roadways and

reduces the potential for alienating the population. Site selection for bases and forward

operating bases includes assessment of aircraft support capabilities and seeks to

maximize the possible options for aerial delivery (that is, by rotary- and fixed-wing

aircraft, air drops, and landings).

SUPPORTING THE TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT OF HOST-NATION

SECURITY FORCES

8-30. One of the most important missions and LLOs for forces engaged in COIN

operations is the establishment and employment of national security forces. Security

sector reform is done through various support and training activities, all of which may

substantially involve military logisticians. The development and support of police forces

and their training normally falls under the auspices of non-MOD agencies, such as the

Ministry of the Interior, or UN mandated missions. The development and support of

military forces is a COIN mission that military logisticians prepare to undertake, from

planning at the strategic level to practical implementation on the ground. (Chapter 6

covers the support of national security forces in more detail.)

8-31. Some tasks required to establish national security forces may initially fall to

military logistics units until other government agencies’ programs start, other logistic

support can be contracted, or national logistic organizations are in operation. They are:

Providing operating base space or establishing another supportable secure

location for the recruiting, reception, and training of national security forces.

Providing initial logistic support to forming national security forces, to include

possibly equipping, arming, feeding, billeting, fueling, and medical support.

Providing logistic training to newly formed national security force logistic

organizations.

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Equipping and Sustaining National Security Forces

8-32. Logisticians involved in the development of plans and programs for the sustainment

of national security forces should take care to ensure that equipment selected is suitable

to and sustainable through the nation’s capabilities. Logisticians remain mindful that

equipment and support programs must be within the nation’s resources, including budget

and technological capabilities. In many cases “good enough to meet standards”

equipment that is indigenously sustainable is preferable to “high-tech, best available” that

requires substantial assistance for maintenance support for years to come, all the while

providing the insurgent movement with a valuable propaganda point that could negate

any potential technological advantages.

8-33. One of the acknowledged difficulties in establishing national security forces is

identifying where suitable materiel and equipment is to come from. Often, plans

developed in a joint or multinational environment include provisions for such forces to be

initially equipped from multiple donor nations and agency sources. As a result,

logisticians may be compelled to familiarize themselves with the capabilities of these

agencies and nations’ supply and maintenance systems, though support packages may not

be included with the donation.

National Security Forces Logistics

8-34. Logisticians involved in the training of national security force logistic personnel

need to be aware that a large part of the problem with previously dysfunctional military

cultures in many developing countries was that pervasive climates of corruption and graft

crippled their attempts to develop effective support services. Logisticians conducting

such training should expect to find themselves repeatedly emphasizing the long term

benefits of supply discipline and materiel accountability and the importance of those

practices to the security and development of the nation. For this reason, emphasis should

be placed on inventory procedures. Simultaneously the black market should be monitored

for the presence of pilfered military equipment and as a means of determining the

effectiveness of logistic procedures and accountability training. Of all the capabilities

being developed for national security forces, logistic functions may take the longest to

impart due to their inherent complexity and potential cultural challenges. For these

reasons, it may be a long time before national security forces are able to operate

independently of multinational logistic support.

8-35. Nationally produced materiel should be procured and used to support national

security forces if it is reasonably and reliably available and deemed adequate to meet

requirements. Not only does this help stimulate the economic base; it also promotes an

attitude of self-sufficiency on the part of forces and reinforces the important political

message that the security forces are of the population and not the agents of foreign

powers. When promoting these practices, logisticians may find themselves stepping into

roles somewhat beyond the normal scope of their duties when they assess the suitability

of locally available materials and provide advice on how such materials might be made

suitable for self-sustainment. In this case, the most valuable lesson logisticians may be

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communicating to security forces and those tasked with supporting them is not “what to

do” but “how to think about the problem of sustainment” and its linkage to security

effectiveness.

ESSENTIAL SERVICES

8-36. In general, according to existing military logistic doctrine, there is no provision for

ANA forces to become decisively or exclusively engaged in providing essential services

to the local population during COIN operations. However, this doctrinal position does not

prohibit units from using applicable skills and expertise resident in their military

organizations to help assess essential local service needs. In conjunction with these

assessments, logistic and other units can also be used to meet immediate needs where

possible and in the commander’s interest, and to assist in the handoff of essential service

functions to appropriate government agencies and other civil support organizations.

Assessing Essential Services Requirements

8-37. Military logisticians should already have good insights into capabilities,

requirements, and shortfalls from their logistic preparation of the theater and more

detailed assessment of COIN-specific issues. As a work in continuous progress, this

assessment should be merged later with information from civil affairs area assessments.

Areas of civil affairs concern where logisticians and logistic branches can contribute to

the area assessment include, for example:

Sanitation.

o Quartermaster. Water specialists.

o Engineer. Earth moving specialists, plumbing construction, soil analysis,

concrete casting, and sanitary landfill management.

o Ordnance. Heavy wheeled vehicle, pump, and mechanical repair

Water.

o Quartermaster. Water purification.

o Medical service. Preventive medicine and sanitation specialists.

o Ordnance. Pumps and mechanicals repair.

Electricity. Engineer. Power generation specialists.

Academic.

o Engineer. Vertical construction specialists.

o All. Training and education.

Transportation.

o Engineer. Assessment of bus facilities, roadway/bridge assessments, and

airfield capabilities/upgrades.

o Transportation. Assessment of bus capacities.

o Ordnance. Assessment of mechanical maintenance of bus/truck operating

equipment.

o Military police. Roadway and traffic flow assessments.

Medical. Medical service/medical corps. Assess local health care

capabilities/needs

Security. Military police. Security survey, crowd control

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Food Supply.

o Veterinary corps. Food source/quality, vector control.

o Quartermaster. Food packaging and distribution

Fuel. Quartermaster. Fuel specialists, testing of locally procured fuel supplies

Financial. Finance. Requirements to reestablish accountability/security of

national funds/captured funds, assess financial support requirements

banking/currency access, and so forth.

Time as a Logistic Commodity

8-38. Success in COIN operations and buy-in of the population into COIN efforts, may

hinge on there being as small a gap as possible between the time assessments of essential

services needs are determined and the time that initial remediation efforts are begun. In

order to keep this time gap as small as possible and manage the development of popular

expectations, COIN logistic units may be compelled to begin to remediate essential

services until civilian authorities and agencies can assume these functions. The rationale

for logistic units taking up this mission is similar to that applied to a metaphor of

lifesaving trauma care. If one thinks of the populace as a patient destabilized by the

trauma of insurgency, in COIN operations, logistic and other units may need to function

much like the first-responder medic on the scene, conducting initial assessments of

patient’s needs, providing lifesaving first aid, and letting the hospital know what more

specific higher-level care is required. Both medical and COIN first responders are most

effective when they can assess and initiate life support treatment immediately. In COIN

operations though, “immediately” may last weeks or months and is harder to determine

without obvious calibrated vital signs, such as blood pressure, pulse, and temperature. For

this reason, COIN logistic units may be required to take whatever measures they are able

to immediately provide for stabilizing essential services and preventing deteriorating

conditions.

8-39. The ways in which logistic and other units can be used to bridge the essential

services gap is an extension of the assessment capabilities of these units. Some examples

of how military logistic assets and capabilities can be used to meet immediate and

essential service needs are:

Contingency contracting officer procures commercial public utility equipment

and then employs theater contractors and external theater subject matter

experts/trainers to maintain the asset.

Reverse osmosis water purification unit provides immediate source of potable

water until the water pumps at a purification plant can be restored.

Distribution companies and supply support activities provide temporary

storage and distribution of foreign humanitarian assistance.

Explosive ordnance disposal, supported by logistic transportation, disposes of

munitions in populated areas.

Combat logistic patrols provide security for nongovernmental organization

(NGO) transportation of critical humanitarian assistance. (Not all NGOs agree to

this.)

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Medical units provide a medical civic action program (MEDCAP) team to

conduct a visiting clinic at a small or remote village; may augment an NGO (for

example, Doctors without Borders).

Brigade surgeon/brigade engineer work with the contracting officer

representative to restore a clinic/hospital service.

Medical personnel/units assist with upgrading/restoring medical training

programs to meet civil healthcare provider critical shortfalls.

Senior power generation technicians provide advice and troubleshoot for a

municipal power source.

Rations section accounts for, preserves, and distributes humanitarian rations.

Truck companies move internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Logistic units tasked with providing life support to IDP (or refugee) camps, that

is, billeting, food service, personnel (biometric) accountability, and work

placement).

Preventive medicine team, in conjunction with veterinary support, conducts

vector/parasite analysis on farm livestock (local food source).

Engineers repair a critical highway, renovate a bridge, or build a building (such

as a clinic or school).

Handoff of Essential Services

8-40. Frequently logisticians who have provided stopgap essential services may be the

only personnel with accurate knowledge of essential services needs and priorities. For

this reason, logisticians providing these services should expect to be actively involved in

the handoff process to other government agencies and designated civil organizations until

those agencies and activities are reasonably functional and adequately able to meet

essential services needs. A poor handoff can provide the insurgents with propaganda

opportunities and evidence of the “insincerity” of COIN efforts.

8-41. Through the restoration and transition of essential services to the government, one

of the principal causes exploited by the insurgents is removed. This action greatly assists

the government in its struggle for legitimacy. For this reason, the insurgents can be

expected to conduct attacks against restored services. During this handoff period,

multinational logistic assets may need to maintain a logistic quick reaction force to

ensure the continuity of services and marginalization of the insurgents’ counteractions

and messages.

Public Transportation, Population Movement, and Life Support to Internally

Displaced Persons and Refugees

8-42. Under conditions of national crisis or insurgency, public transportation systems

often fall into disarray. COIN forces may be faced with the task of recovering stolen or

misappropriated buses, trucks, cars, and other government vehicles (including former

military equipment), and restoring them to public service. This action not only helps

alleviate urgent requirements for public transportation; it sends an unmistakable message

of resumption of governmental authority, and it can substantially reduce the amount

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of replacement equipment that must be procured from other sources. Logistic units and

personnel can expect to be significantly involved in this process, from reestablishing

accountability procedures to assessing repair and maintenance needs, until competent

public or government authorities can resume these duties.

8-43. While not a specified essential services task or an LLO, one of the most common

problems arising on short notice during an insurgency is the creation of substantial

groups of IDPs and refugees. Attending to IDP and refugee needs can quickly become an

urgent logistic requirement, drawing on all essential services in the process of providing

secure emergency shelter (IDP/refugee camps) and life support (food, water, medical

care). While it is normally the mission of NGOs and other civilian agencies to furnish this

type of support to IDPs and refugees, conditions may prevent them from providing these

services in a timely manner. Furthermore, in COIN operations, IDP and refugee security

may take on heightened military importance because traumatized and dislocated persons

may become vulnerable to insurgent threats and recruitment. Restoration and

maintenance of public transportation services can also be helpful for IDP and refugee

support. Figure 8-2 (below) shows that, as essential services projects take root and start to

provide tangible benefits for the population, management of these activities can be

handed-off from military forces to civilian aid agencies and ultimately to authorities.

Progress in these individual endeavors may experience individual setbacks as programs

and projects are calibrated to specific localized needs, but overall progress should be

measurable before agency transfers are implemented. As essential services become more

effective, insurgent activities are marginalized and generate less popular support.

Civil Authorities Assume Total

Responsibility Including Security.

Civil Authorities Manage Assets;

Security Still Provided/Supported.

Civil Enduring Assets Established.

Tactical Assets Relieved by NGO

Assets/Systems.

Initial Employment of ANA

Assets/Systems to Provide

Essential Services.

Figure 8-2 Comparison of Essential Services Availability to Insurgency

Effectiveness

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GOVERNANCE SUPPORT

8-44. One of the main objectives of COIN operations is the restoration of the rule of law,

order, and civil procedures to the authority of the government. All actions of Soldiers

conducting COIN operations must be congruent with those of agents of a legitimate and

law-abiding government. Multinational and other military units brought in to support this

objective remain mindful that all of their actions will be scrutinized by the population to

see if they are indeed consistent with this avowed purpose. For this reason, legal support

to COIN operations is of particular significance and sensitivity. Inconsistencies in this

area can furnish insurgent forces with valuable issues for manipulation in propaganda.

Legal Support to Operations

8-45. Legal support to COIN operations can cover many areas. (See Appendix C of this

manual.) One of the most significant areas of legal support in COIN operations is the

continuous monitoring and evaluation of rules of engagement as they are applied in a

constantly changing environment. This legal status may also affect the conduct of

contractors and their requirements for protection. Another area of legal support is status

of forces agreements, which will need to be negotiated between the Islamic Republic of

Afghanistan and any multinational forces involved in the counterinsurgency. Status of

forces agreements affect how legal disputes between foreign forces and local nationals

are handled, including those disputes emerging from contracting and other commercial

activities. Contracts and claims require sensitive and fair construction and execution, so

perceptions of exploitation and favoritism do not undermine overall COIN initiatives.

Since COIN operations often depend upon a variety of complex funding sources, judge

advocate legal advice on fiscal law is particularly important to ensure compliance with

domestic statutes governing the funding of military and nonmilitary activities. In these

contexts, judge advocates may also be asked to advise the government at all political

levels, about how to establish and administer appropriate legal safeguards.

Legal Aspects of Contracting and Claims

8-46. In COIN operations, two circumstances may require extensive civil law support.

The first situation is when COIN forces engage in commercial contracts with local

sources for provision of goods and or services. The second occasion is when Afghan

nationals seek compensation for damages, injuries, or deaths that individuals or their

relatives claim to have suffered due to the actions of COIN forces.

8-47. Legally reviewing COIN contracts negotiated with local sources establishes several

important conditions. First the process makes clear to the sources that there are indeed

established procedures rooted in law that govern such transactions, and it sends the

message that favoritism and partisanship are not part of the process in a legitimate

government. Second, this review potentially forestalls contracts going to individuals who

may be part of the insurgency and may already be named or identified as subjects of other

ongoing investigations or legal actions.

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8-48. In the case of claims for damages allegedly caused by COIN forces, legal reviews

show genuinely wronged citizens that their grievances are indeed taken seriously. In the

case of insurgents or opportunists misrepresenting the terms or conditions under which

“damages” occurred, legal reviews provide an effective method of assessing the validity

or falsehood of such claims and thereby prevent COIN forces from squandering resources

or at worst inadvertently supporting the insurgents.

Restoration of Civil Judicial Functions

8-49. In periods of extreme unrest and insurgency, governmental legal structures (such as

courts, prosecutors, defense assistance, prisons) may fail to exist or function at any level.

Under these conditions, in order to establish legal procedures and precedents for dealing

with captured insurgents and common criminals, provisions may be made for the

establishment of special tribunals under the auspices of either a provisional authority or a

United Nations mandate. While legal actions are being handled under these provisions,

COIN forces can expect to be substantially involved in providing sustainment and

security support as well as legal support and advice on these functions.

8-50. Even when judicial functions are restored to local authorities, COIN forces may

have to provide logistic and security support to judicial activities for a prolonged period if

insurgents continue to demonstrate interest in disrupting all activities supporting the

legitimate rule of law. With restoration of judicial functions to the government, COIN

forces must recognize and acknowledge that not all laws passed by the popular legislative

or parliamentary branches of the government will be consistent with those experienced by

multinational forces in their home countries. Under such conditions, COIN forces need to

look to their legal advisors, commanders, and diplomatic representatives for appropriate

guidance on dealing with these sensitive matters.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

8-51. Many commanders are unfamiliar with the tools and resources required for

promoting economic pluralism. In COIN operations, economic development is probably

the LLO with the greatest logistic significance. This LLO is usually exercised by military

commanders using resource managers (comptrollers) and contingency contracting

officers. The challenge for these staff officers is to deliver financial resources such that

they:

Maximally benefit the local population.

Support the COIN force’s other LLO objectives.

Ensure the funds are not diverted into insurgent hands.

Achievement of these objectives depends upon the efforts of logisticians maintaining a

thorough and accurate logistic preparation of the theater and commanders and contracting

officers obtaining goods and services consistent with its assessments. Such purchasing

must also promote vendors and businesses whose practices are supportive of widespread

job stimulation and local investment. In addition to the logistic preparation of the theater

issues, some other areas for assessment and analysis are:

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Local economic capabilities and shortfalls suitable for filling by external means.

Methods of determining land and other real property ownership, means of

transfers, and dispute resolution.

Methods for promoting and protecting property and asset rights, and open access

to trade goods and services.

Prevailing wage rate standards and correlation to occupational category

(unskilled/skilled/ professional labor).

Historic market demographics.

Identification of potential vendors with local sources of supply in the AO.

Sources of Funding

8-52. COIN operations are usually supported by a variety of funding sources. The

principal source of funding with be from the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

8-53. Other sources of funding that may be encountered in COIN operations are those

provided by Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), other donor nations and agencies,

or the United Nations. In some cases misappropriated or illicit funds may be seized or

captured by national government or COIN forces and redistributed to fund COIN

activities. Under these complex fiscal circumstances, resource managers and staff judge

advocates are the best sources of guidance on the legal use of different types of funds

(This subject is covered in more detail in Appendix C.).

Contracted Logistic Support

8-54. In COIN operations, ANA forces can expect to be supported by contracted logistic

support. Contractor activities fall into three different categories:

Theater support contractors.

External support contractors.

System contractors.

8-55. For the purposes of promoting economic pluralism in COIN operations, national

support contractors are the most significant because this type of contractor is the most

reliant on local employees and vendors. External support contractors are designed to

provide logistic services, usually through large-scale prearranged contracts with major

contractors, who may in turn subcontract various components of their large contracts to

smaller national-based providers. Systems contracts are designed by systems program

managers to support special or complex equipment and generally have little influence on

promoting economic pluralism.

NATIONAL SUPPORT CONTRACTORS

8-56. National support contractors can be obtained either under prearranged contracts or

by contracting officers serving under the direct authority of the national principle

assistant responsible for contracting. National support contractors usually obtain most of

their materials, goods, and labor from the local manufacturing and vendor base. Some

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examples of goods and services that can often be obtained from theater support

contractors are:

Construction, delivery, and installation of concrete security barriers for the

defense of COIN force bases and government public buildings.

Construction of security fencing.

Public building construction and renovations (for example, site preparation,

structure construction, electrical and plumbing installation, and roofing).

Sanitation services.

Maintenance augmentation in motor pools.

Road construction and repair.

Trucking and cartage.

Manual labor details (for example, grounds maintenance, and sandbag filling).

Housekeeping (such as warehouses).

COIN CONTRACTOR CONSIDERATIONS

8-57. In a COIN environment, the employment of national support contractors and locals

must be carefully considered and supervised so as not to undermine larger COIN

objectives. Due to the subversive nature of many insurgent activities, all contractors and

their employees require vetting through the intelligence services, as well as tamperproof

photograph biometric-tagged identification, coded to indicate access areas and level of

security and supervision required. Particularly in the case of local employees, “badging”

can also function as a valuable accountability tool if the badges are issued and returned at

entry control points on a daily basis. While contractor security breaches are one concern,

so is the security and safety of the contractor’s employees. Though they may be targeted

by insurgents, logistic contractors and their employees are not combatants. They are

classified as “civilians accompanying the force.” This status must not be jeopardized and

the military units with which they work are responsible for their security in the

workplace. Units employing local contractors and employees need to be on the lookout

for signs of exploitive or corrupt business practices that may alienate segments of the

local population and inadvertently undermine COIN objectives. Treated fairly and

respectfully, local employees can become good sources of insights into the local

language, culture, and perceptions of COIN activities as well as other issues affecting

communities in the AO.

EXTERNAL SUPPORT CONTRACTORS

8-58. Many of the same considerations that apply to theater contractors apply to external

support contractors and their subcontracted employees, particularly if they are local or in-

theater hires who are not foreign or multinational partner citizens.

SYSTEM CONTRACTORS

8-59. System contractors generally work on technologically complicated military

systems, such as vehicles, weapons systems, aircraft, and information systems. They are

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provided under prearranged contracts negotiated by program executive officers and

program managers. These contractors provide systems expertise.

CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING OFFICERS AND OTHER AGENTS

8-60. In COIN operations the timely and well-placed distribution of funds at the local

level can serve as an invaluable force multiplier. Challenges to accomplishing payments

and purchases in the COIN environment are many, including the following:

Problems with the security of financial institutions, agents, and instruments.

Potential for sudden volatility in the local economy.

Reliability issues with local supplier and vendors.

Peculiarities of local business cultures.

8-61. The challenge for contracting officers and other agents authorized to make

payments to support COIN activities is that it is often difficult to obtain reliable

information upon which to make decisions and conduct negotiations. Military means for

accomplishing this type of purchasing are found at two levels:

The contingency contracting officer, who acts upon unit-generated purchasing

request and committals.

The ordering officer for smaller purchases.

CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING

8-62. Because contingency contracting officers are able to set contracts for larger

amounts than ordering officers, they normally place purchasing request and committal

requirements out for bid to local vendors. During COIN operations, it is especially

important to spread contracts across different vendors to forestall any appearance of

partiality.

FIELD ORDERING AND PROJECT ORDERING OFFICER TEAMS

8-63. Both field ordering and project ordering officer teams consist of the respective

contracting officer agent, a paying agent, and a security detail, and they operate under

similar regulatory constraints. These officers’ duties differ with respect not only to the

type of funds they disburse, but also in the increment caps applied. Consult with your

Corps Finance Office concerning the contractual capabilities of both of the field and

project ordering officer teams. In both cases, these teams provide an invaluable asset for

reaching into the local communities and promoting economic pluralism while assessing

the economic effects of purchasing activities and economic stability initiatives.

8-64. Due to their activities throughout the community and their cultivation of local

business connections, field ordering and project ordering officer teams should not be

overlooked as a potential information gathering and distribution sources. Vendor

observations and actions may also reveal much about the real status of the COIN effort.

These indicators may be as simple as vendor comments about outsiders moving into the

area, contractors failing to show up for work and deliver goods, or employees asking to

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leave early because they have been tipped off about an impending attack. By doing

business with COIN forces, local contractors and vendors may be putting themselves at

great risk. Protection of their activities can pose a great challenge and must be seriously

considered when doing business with them.

SUMMARY

8-65. Logistic activities are an integral part of counterinsurgency operations. These

activities take on both the traditional form of support to combat and security forces as

well as the unconventional form of providing mixes of essential and timely support to a

wide variety of local security and stability-enhancing activities that may seem to be

purely civil in character. Initially this support may have to be conducted by uniformed

military logistic providers, but one of the logistic objectives of COIN operations should

be to encourage and promote local providers as soon as security conditions make this

reasonably feasible. This transition is a delicate one. Logistic providers must be

continuously aware of how their practices are or are not contributing to their long-term

objectives and adjust their methods accordingly. If there is a final paradox in

counterinsurgency, it is that logistic postures and practices are a major part of the fight

and may well determine if COIN forces are able to deliver the desired political end state.

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Appendix A

A Guide for Action: Plan, Prepare, Execute, and Assess

Translating the lessons of this manual into practice begins with planning and preparation

for deployment. Successful counterinsurgents execute wisely and continually assess their

area of operations, the impact of their own operations, and their enemy’s strategy and

tactics to adapt and win. This appendix discusses several techniques that have proven

successful during counterinsurgency operations. They are discussed within the

framework of the operations process. However, this does not limit their use to any

operations process activity. Successful counterinsurgents assess the operational

environment continuously and apply the appropriate techniques when they are needed.

PLAN

A-1. Planning is the process by which commanders (and staff if available) translate the

commander’s visualization into a specific course of action for preparation and execution,

focusing on the expected results. Planning for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations is no

different than for conventional operations. However, effective counterinsurgency

planning requires paying at least as much attention to aspects of the environment as to the

enemy force.

ASSESS DURING PLANNING: PERFORM MISSION ANALYSIS

A-2. Learn about the people, topography, economy, history, religion, and culture of the

Area of Operations. Know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader, and

ancient grievance. Become the world expert on these topics. If the precise destination is

unknown, study the general area. Focus on the precise destination when it is determined.

Understand factors in adjacent AOs and the information environment that can influence

AO. These can be many, particularly when insurgents draw on global grievances.

A-3. Read the map like a book. Study it every night before sleep, and redraw it from

memory every morning. Do this until its patterns become second nature. Develop a

mental model of the AO. Use it as a framework into which to fit every new piece of

knowledge.

A-4. Study handover notes from predecessors. Better still, get in touch with the unit in

AO and pick their brains. In an ideal world, intelligence officers and area experts provide

briefings. This may not occur. Even if it does, there is no substitute for personal mastery.

A-5. Require each subordinate leader, including noncommissioned officers, to specialize

on some aspect of the AO and brief the others.

ANALYZE THE PROBLEM

A-6. Mastery of the AO provides a foundation for analyzing the problem. Who are the

insurgents? What drives them? What makes local leaders tick? An insurgency is

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fundamentally a competition among many groups, each seeking to mobilize the

population in support of its agenda. Thus, COIN is always more than two-sided.

A-7. Understand what motivates the people and how to mobilize them. Knowing why and

how the insurgents are getting followers is essential. This requires knowing the real

enemy, not a cardboard cut-out. Insurgents are adaptive, resourceful and probably grew

up in the AO. The locals have known them since they were young. ANA troops are the

outsiders. The worst opponents are not the psychopathic terrorists of the movies; rather,

they are charismatic warriors who would do well in any armed force. Insurgents are not

necessarily misled or naive. Much of their success may be due to bad government

policies or security forces that alienate the population.

A-8. Work the problem collectively with subordinate leaders. Discuss ideas, and explore

possible solutions. Once all understand the situation, seek a consensus on how to address

it. If this sounds un-military, get over it. Such discussions help subordinates understand

the commander’s intent. Once in the AO, situations requiring immediate action will arise

too quickly for orders. Subordinates will need to exercise subordinates initiative and act

based on the commander’s intent informed by whatever knowledge they have developed.

Sergeants and privates will have to make quick decisions that may result in actions with

strategic implications. Such circumstances require a shared situational understanding and

a leadership climate that encourages subordinates to assess the situation, act on it, and

accept responsibility for their actions. Employing mission command is essential in this

environment.

PREPARE

A-9. Preparation consists of activities by the unit before execution to improve its ability

to conduct the operation including, but not limited to, the following: plan refinement,

rehearsals, reconnaissance, coordination, inspections, and movement. Compared with

conventional operations, preparing for COIN operations requires greater emphasis on

organizing for intelligence and for working with nonmilitary organizations, preparing

small unit leaders for increased responsibility, and maintaining flexibility.

ORGANIZE FOR INTELLIGENCE

A-10. Intelligence and operations are always complementary, especially in COIN

operations. COIN operations are intelligence-driven, and units often develop much of

their own intelligence. Commanders must organize their assets to do that.

A-11. Each company may require an intelligence section, including analysts and an

individual designated as the “S-2.” Platoon leaders may also have to designate

individuals to perform intelligence and operations functions. A reconnaissance and

surveillance element is also essential. Augmentation for these positions is normally not

available, but the tasks must be performed. Put the smartest troops in the intelligence

section and the reconnaissance and surveillance element. Doing these things results in

one less rifle squad, but intelligence section pays for itself in lives and effort saved.

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ORGANIZE FOR INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

A-12. Almost everything in COIN is interagency. Everything from policing to

intelligence to civil-military operations to trash collection involves working with

interagency and indigenous partners. These agencies are not under military control, but

their success is essential to accomplishing the mission. Train troops in conducting

interagency operations. Get a briefing from the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), aid

agencies and the local police or fire departments. Designate interagency subject matter

experts in each subordinate element and train them. Realize that many civilians find

rifles, helmets, and body armor intimidating. Learn how not to scare them. Look at the

situation through the eyes of a civilian who knows nothing about the military. Most

importantly, know that military operations create temporary breathing space, but that

long-term development and stabilization by civilian agencies are required to prevail.

TRAVEL LIGHT AND HARDEN YOUR SUSTAINMENT ASSETS

A-13. A normal combat load includes body armor, rations, extra ammunition,

communications gear, and many other things—all of which are heavy. Insurgents may

carry a rifle or rocket-propelled grenade, a head scarf, and a water bottle. This situation

requires ruthlessly lightening troops’ combat load and enforcing a habit of speed and

mobility. Otherwise, the insurgents consistently outrun and outmaneuver them.

However, make sure troops can always reach back for fires or other support.

A-14. Also, remember to harden sustainment bases. Insurgents often consider them weak

points and attack there. Most insurgent attacks, other than combat actions, are against

sustainment installations and convoys. Ensure sustainment assets are hardened and have

communications. Make sure the troops there are trained in combat operations. They may

do more fighting than some rifle squads.

FIND A POLITICAL/CULTURAL ADVISOR

A-15. A force optimized for COIN would have political/cultural advisors at company

level. This situation requires lower-echelon commanders to improvise. They must select a

political/cultural advisor from among their troops. This person may be a commissioned

officer, but may not. The position requires someone with “people skills” and a feel for the

environment. Commanders should not try to be their own cultural advisor. They must be

fully aware of the political and cultural dimension, but this is a different role. Also, this

position is not suitable for intelligence professionals. They can help, but their task is to

understand the environment. The political advisor’s job is to help shape it.

TRAIN THE SQUAD LEADERS—THEN TRUST THEM

A-16. COIN is largely executed by squads and platoons. Small-unit actions in a COIN

environment often have greater impacts than similar actions during major combat

operations. Engagements are often won or lost in moments; whoever can bring combat

power to bear in seconds wins. The on-scene leader controls the fight. This situation

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requires mission command and subordinates’ initiative. Leaders at the lowest echelons

must be trained to act intelligently and independently without orders.

A-17. Training should focus on basic skills: marksmanship, patrolling, security on the

move and at the halt, and basic drills. When in doubt, spend less time on company and

platoon training, and more time on squads. Ruthlessly replace ineffective leaders. Once

troops are trained, give them a clear commander’s intent and trust them to exercise

subordinates’ initiative within it. This allows subordinates to execute COIN operations at

the level at which they are won.

IDENTIFY AND USE TALENT

A-18. Not everyone is good at COIN. Many leaders don’t understand it, and some who

do can’t execute it. COIN is difficult and anyone can learn the basics. However, people

able to intuitively grasp, master, and execute COIN techniques are rare. Learn how to

spot these people and put them into positions where they can make a difference. Rank

may not indicate the required talent. In COIN, a few good troops under a smart junior

noncommissioned officer doing the right things can succeed, while a large force doing

the wrong things will fail.

CONTINUE TO ASSESS AND PLAN DURING PREPARATION: BE FLEXIBLE

A-19. Commander’s visualization is the mental process of developing situational

understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning how to move the force

from its current state to that end state. It begins with mission receipt and continues

throughout any operation. The commander’s visualization forms the basis for conducting

(planning, preparing for, executing and assessing) an operation.

A-20. Commanders continually refine their visualization based on their assessment of the

operational environment. They describe and direct any changes they want made as the

changes are needed. The do not wait for a set point in any process. This flexibility is

essential during preparation for COIN operations. Some are tempted to try and finalize a

plan too early. They then prepare to execute the plan rather than what changes in the

operational environment require. However, as commanders gain knowledge, their

situational understanding improves. They get a better idea of what needs to be done and

of their own limitations. This lets them refine their visualization and direct changes to the

plan and their preparations. Even with this, any plan will change once operations begin. It

may need to be scrapped if there is a major shift in the environment. But a plan is still

needed, and developing it gives leaders a simple robust idea of what to achieve, even if

the methods change. Directing changes to it based on continuous assessment is one aspect

of the art of command.

A-21. One planning approach is to identify phases of the operation in terms of major

objectives to achieve: for example, establish dominance, build local networks, and

marginalize the enemy. Make sure the force can easily transition between phases, both

forward to exploit successes and backward to recover from setbacks. Insurgents will

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adapt their activity to friendly tactics. The plan must be simple enough to survive

setbacks without collapsing. This plan is the solution that began with the shared analysis

and consensus that began preparation. It must be simple and known to everyone.

EXECUTE

A-22. Execute means to put a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish

the mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution

and adjustment decisions. The execution of counterinsurgency operations demands all of

the skills required to execute conventional operations. In addition, it also requires mastery

of building alliances and personal relationships, paying attention to the local and global

media, and a number of additional skills that are not as heavily tasked in conventional

operations.

ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A PRESENCE

A-23. The first rule of COIN is to establish the force’s presence in the AO. If troops are

not present when an incident happens, there is usually little they can do about it. The

force can’t be everywhere at once; however, the more time troops spend in the AO the

more likely they are to be where the action is. If the force is not large enough to establish

a presence throughout AO, then determine the most important places and focus on them.

This requires living in the AO close to the population. Raiding from remote, secure bases

doesn’t work. Movement on foot, sleeping in villages, and night patrolling all seem more

dangerous than they are—and they are what ground forces are trained to do. Being on the

ground establishes links with the locals. They begin to see troops as real people they can

trust and do business with. Driving around in an armored convoy degrades situational

awareness. It makes troops targets and is ultimately more dangerous than moving on foot

and remaining close to the population.

ASSESS DURING EXECUTION: AVOID HASTY ACTIONS

A-24. Don’t act rashly; get the facts first. Continuous assessment, important during all

operations, is vital during COIN. Violence can indicate several things. It may be part of

the insurgent strategy, interest groups fighting among themselves, or individuals settling

vendettas. Or, it may just be daily life. Take the time to learn what normality looks like.

Insurgents may try to goad troops into lashing out at the population or making a similar

mistake. Unless leaders are on the spot when an incident occurs, they receive only

second-hand reports and may misunderstand the local context or interpretation. This

means that first impressions are often highly misleading, particularly in urban areas. Of

course, leaders cannot avoid making judgments. But when there is time, ask an older

hand or a trusted local for their opinion. If possible, keep one or two officers from your

predecessor unit for the first part of the tour. Avoid rushing to judgment.

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BUILD TRUSTED NETWORKS

A-25. Once the unit is settled into the AO, its next task is to build trusted networks. This

is the true meaning of the phrase “hearts and minds,” which comprises two separate

components. “Hearts” means persuading people their best interests are served by the

COIN’s success. “Minds” means convincing them that the force can protect them and that

resisting it is pointless. Note that neither concerns whether people like the troops.

Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. Over time, successful trusted

networks grow like roots into the population. They displace enemy networks, forcing

enemies into the open. That lets the force seize the initiative and destroy them.

A-26. Trusted networks are diverse. They include local allies, community leaders, and

local security forces. Nongovernmental organizations, other friendly or neutral nonstate

actors in the AO, and the media should also be included.

A-27. Building trusted networks begins with conducting village and neighborhood

surveys to identify community needs. Then follow through to meet them, build common

interests, and mobilize popular support. This is the true main effort; everything else is

secondary. Actions that help build trusted networks support the COIN effort. Actions that

undermine trust or disrupt these networks, even those that provide a short-term military

advantage, help the enemy.

GO WITH THE GRAIN AND SEEK EARLY VICTORIES

A-28. Don’t try to crack the hardest nut first. Don’t go straight for the main insurgent

stronghold or try to take on villages that support the insurgents. Instead, start from secure

areas and work gradually outwards. Extend influence through the locals’ own networks.

Go with, not against, the grain of local society. First win the confidence of a few villages,

and then work with those with whom they trade, intermarry, or do business. This tactic

develops local allies, a mobilized population, and trusted networks.

A-29. Seek a victory early in the operation to demonstrate dominance of the AO. This

may not be a combat victory. Early combat without an accurate situational understanding

may create unnecessary collateral damage and ill will. Instead, victories may involve

resolving a long-standing issue or co-opting a key local leader. Achieving even a small

early victory can set the tone for the tour and help commanders seize the initiative.

PRACTICE DETERRENT PATROLLING

A-30. Establish patrolling tactics that deter enemy attacks. An approach using combat

patrols to provoke, then defeat, enemy attacks is counterproductive. It leads to a raiding

mindset, or worse, a bunker mentality. Deterrent patrolling is a better approach. The aim

of deterrent patrolling is to keep the enemy off balance and the population reassured.

Constant, unpredictable activity over time deters attacks and creates a more secure

environment. Accomplishing this requires one- to two-thirds of the force to be on patrol

at any time, day or night.

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BE PREPARED FOR SETBACKS

A-31. Setbacks are normal in COIN, as in all operations. Leaders make mistakes and lose

people. Troops occasionally kill or detain the wrong person. It may not be possible to

build or expand trusted networks. If this happens, drop back to the previous phase of the

plan, recover, and resume operations. It is normal in company-level COIN operations for

some platoons to be doing well while others are doing badly. This situation is not

necessarily evidence of failure. Give subordinate leaders the freedom to adjust their

posture to local conditions. This creates flexibility that helps survive setbacks.

REMEMBER THE GLOBAL AUDIENCE

A-32. The global reach of today’s news media affects the conduct of military operations

more than ever before. Satellite receivers are common, even in developing countries.

Internet articles and print, radio, and television reporters monitor and comment on

everything military forces do. Insurgents use terrorist tactics to produce graphic images

that they hope will influence public opinion—both locally and globally.

A-33. Train troops to consider how the global audience might perceive their actions.

Troops should assume that everything they say or do will be publicized. Also, treat the

media as an ally. Help reporters get their story. That helps them portray military actions

favorably. Trade information with media representatives. Good relationships with non-

embedded media, especially indigenous media, can dramatically increase situational

awareness.

ASSESS CONTINUOUSLY DURING EXECUTION

A-34. Develop measures of effectiveness early and refine them as the operation

progresses. They should cover a range of social, informational, military, and economic

issues. Use them to develop an in-depth operational picture and how it is changing, not in

a mechanistic, traffic-light, fashion. Typical measures of effectiveness include the

following:

Percentage of engagements initiated by friendly forces versus those initiated by

insurgents.

Longevity of friendly local leaders in positions of authority.

Number and quality of tips on insurgent activity that originate spontaneously.

Economic activity at markets and shops.

These mean virtually nothing as a snapshot; trends over time are the true indicators of

progress.

A-35. Avoid using body counts as a measure of effectiveness. They actually measure

very little and may provide misleading numbers. Using body counts to measure

effectiveness accurately requires the following information:

How many insurgents there were to start with.

How many moved into the area.

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How many transferred from supporter to combatant status.

How many new fighters the conflict has created.

Accurate information of this sort is usually not available.

MAINTAIN MISSION FOCUS THROUGHOUT

A-36. Once a unit is established in its AO, troops settle into a routine. A routine is good

as long as the mission is being accomplished. However, leaders should be alert for the

complacency that often accompanies routines.

A-37. It will probably take troops at least one-third of the time in an area to become

effective. Toward the end of an assignment in an area, leaders struggle against the “short-

timer” mentality. So the middle part of the tour is often the most productive. However,

leaders must work to keep troops focused on the mission and attentive to the

environment.

EXPLOIT A SINGLE NARRATIVE

A-38. Since COIN is a competition to mobilize popular support, it pays to know how

people are mobilized. Most societies include opinion-makers: local leaders, religious

figures, media personalities, and others who set trends and influence public perceptions.

This influence often follows a single narrative—a simple, unifying, easily expressed story

or explanation that organizes people’s experience and provides a framework for

understanding events. Nationalist and ethnic historical myths and sectarian creeds are

examples of such narratives. Insurgents often try to use the local narrative to support their

cause. Undercutting their influence requires exploiting an alternative narrative. An even

better approach is tapping into an existing narrative that excludes the insurgents.

A-39. Higher headquarters usually establishes the COIN narrative. However, only leaders

and troops at the lowest levels have the detailed knowledge needed to tailor it to local

conditions and generate leverage from it. For example, a nationalist narrative can be used

to marginalize foreign fighters. A narrative of national redemption can undermine former

regime elements seeking to regain power. Company level leaders apply the narrative

gradually. They get to know local opinion-makers, win their trust, and learn what

motivates them. Then they build on this knowledge to find a single narrative that

emphasizes the inevitability and rightness the COIN’s success. This is art, not science.

LOCAL FORCES SHOULD MIRROR THE ENEMY

A-40. Local indigenous forces need to mirror the enemy’s capabilities and seek to sup-

plant the insurgent’s role. This does not mean they should be irregular in the sense of

being brutal or outside proper control. Rather, they should move, equip, and organize like

the insurgents but have access to ANA support and be under the firm control of their

parent societies. Combined with a mobilized population and trusted networks, this allows

local forces to isolate the enemy from the population.

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A-41. ANA forces should support local forces. At the company level, this means raising,

training, and employing local auxiliary forces (police and military). These tasks require

high-level clearance, but if permission is given, companies should each establish a

training cell. Platoons should aim to train one local squad and then use that squad as a

nucleus for a partner platoon. The company headquarters should train an indigenous

leadership team. This process mirrors the development of trusted networks. It tends to

emerge naturally with the emergence of local allies willing to take up arms to defend

themselves.

CONDUCT CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

A-42. COIN can be characterized as armed social work. It includes attempts to redress

basic social and political problems while being shot at. This makes civil-military

operations a central COIN activity, not an afterthought. Civil-military operations are one

means of restructuring the environment to displace the enemy from it. They must focus

on meeting basic needs first. A series of village or neighborhood surveys, regularly

updated, are invaluable to understanding the population’s needs and tracking progress in

meeting them.

A-43. Effective civil-military operations require close cooperation with national,

international, and local interagency partners. These partners are not under military

control. Many NGOs, for example, do not want to be too closely associated with military

forces because they need to preserve their perceived neutrality. Interagency cooperation

may involve a shared analysis of the problem, building a consensus that allows

synchronization of military and interagency efforts. The military’s role is to provide

protection, identify needs, facilitate civil-military operations, and use improvements in

social conditions as leverage to build networks and mobilize the population.

A-44. There is no such thing as impartial humanitarian assistance or civil-military

operations in COIN. Whenever someone is helped, someone else is hurt—not least the

insurgents. So, civil and humanitarian assistance personnel are often targeted. Protecting

them is a matter not only of close-in defense, but also of creating a secure environment

by co-opting the local aid beneficiaries and their leaders.

SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL

A-45. Another tendency is to attempt large-scale, mass programs. This usually does not

work. Often small-scale programs succeed because of local conditions or because their

size kept them below the enemy’s notice and helped them flourish unharmed.

Company-level programs that succeed in one AO often also succeed in another; however,

small-scale projects rarely proceed smoothly into large programs. Keep programs small.

This makes them cheap, sustainable, low-key, and (importantly) recoverable if they fail.

New programs—also small, cheap, and tailored to local conditions—can be added as the

situation allows.

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FIGHT THE ENEMY’S STRATEGY

A-46. When COIN efforts are succeeding, insurgents often transition to the offensive.

COIN successes create a situation dangerous to insurgents by threatening to separate

them from the population. Insurgents attack military forces and the population to reassert

their presence and continue the insurgency. This activity does not necessarily indicate an

error in COIN tactics (though it may: it depends on whether the population has been

successfully mobilized). It is normal, even in the most successful operations, to have

spikes of offensive insurgent activity.

A-47. The obvious military response is a counteroffensive to destroy the enemy’s forces.

This is rarely the best choice at company level. Only attack insurgents when they get in

the way. Try not to be distracted or forced into a series of reactive moves by a desire to

kill or capture them. Provoking combat usually plays into the enemy’s hands by

undermining the population’s confidence. Instead, attack the enemy’s strategy. If

insurgents are seeking to recapture a community’s allegiance, co-opt that group against

him. If they are trying to provoke a sectarian conflict, transition to peace enforcement

operations. The possible situations are endless, but the same principle governs the

response: fight the enemy’s strategy, not enemy forces.

ASSESS DURING EXECUTION: RECOGNIZE AND EXPLOIT SUCCESS

A-48. Implement the plan developed early in the campaign and refined through

interaction with local partners. Focus on the environment, not the enemy. Aim at

dominating the whole district and implementing solutions to its systemic problems.

Continuously assess the results and adjust as needed.

A-49. Achieving success means that, particularly late in the campaign, it may be

necessary to negotiate with the enemy. Members of the population supporting the COIN

operation know the enemy’s leaders. They may have grown up together. Valid

negotiating partners sometimes emerge as the campaign progresses. Again, close

interagency relationships are needed to exploit opportunities to co-opt segments of the

enemy. This helps you wind down the insurgency without alienating potential local allies

who have relatives or friends among the insurgents. As an insurgency ends, a defection is

better than a surrender, a surrender better than a capture, and a capture better than a kill.

PREPARE DURING EXECUTION: GET READY FOR HANDOVER FROM

DAY ONE

A-50. It is unlikely the insurgency will end during the tour. There will be a relief in place,

and the relieving unit will need as much knowledge as can be passed to them. Start

handover folders in every platoon and specialist squad immediately upon arrival, if they

are not available from the unit being relieved. The folders should include lessons learned,

details about the population, village and patrol reports, updated maps, and photographs—

anything that will help newcomers master the environment. Computerized databases are

fine, but keep good back-ups and ensure you have hard copy of key artifacts and

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documents. Developing and keeping this information current is boring, tedious work. But

it is essential to both short- and long-term success. The corporate memory this develops

gives troops the knowledge they need to stay alive. Passing it on to the relieving unit does

the same for them. It also reduces the loss of momentum that occurs during any

handover.

ENDING THE TOUR

A-51. As the end of the tour approaches, the key leadership challenge becomes keeping

the troops focused. They must not drop their guard. They must continue to monitor and

execute the many programs, projects, and operations underway.

A-52. The tactics discussed above remain applicable as the end-of-tour transition

approaches. However, there is an important new one: keep the transition plan secret. The

temptation to talk about home becomes almost unbearable toward the end of a tour. The

locals know you are leaving and probably have a good sense of the generic transition

plan. They have seen units come and go. But the details of the transition plan must be

protected; otherwise, the enemy might use the handover to undermine any progress made

during the tour. Insurgents may stage a high-profile attack. They may try to recapture the

population’s allegiance by scare tactics that convince them they will not be protected

after the transition. They may try to persuade the locals that the successor unit will be

oppressive or incompetent. Keep the transition plan details secret within a tightly

controlled compartment in the headquarters. Tell the troops to resist the temptation to say

goodbye to locals.

THREE “WHAT IFS”

A-53. The discussion above describes what should happen, but things do go wrong. Here

are some “what ifs” to consider.

WHAT IF YOU GET MOVED TO A DIFFERENT AREA?

A-54. Efforts made preparing for operations in one AO are not wasted if a unit is moved

to another. In mastering the first area, troops learned techniques they can apply to the

new one. For example, they know how to analyze an AO and decide what matters in the

local societal structure. The experience provides a mental structure for analyzing the new

AO. They can focus on what is different, making the process easier and faster. They need

to apply this same skill when they are moved within a Kandak or brigade AO.

WHAT IF YOU HAVE NO RESOURCES?

A-55. Things can be things done in a low-priority AO. However, leaders need to focus on

self-reliance, keeping things small and sustainable, and ruthlessly prioritizing efforts.

Local community leaders can help. They know what matters to them. Leaders should be

honest with them, discuss possible projects and options, and ask them to recommend

priorities. Often they can make introductions with key personnel, find building supplies,

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or expertise. They may only expect support and protection in making their projects work.

And negotiation and consultation can help mobilize their support and strengthen social

cohesion. Setting achievable goals is key to making the situation work.

WHAT IF THE THEATER SITUATION SHIFTS?

A-56. Sometimes everything goes well at the tactical level, but the theater situation

changes and invalidates those efforts. When that happens, drop back a stage, consolidate,

regain balance, and prepare to expand again when the situation allows. A flexible,

adaptive plan is helpful in such situations. Friendly forces may have to cede the initiative

for a time; however, they must regain it as soon as the situation allows.

CONCLUSION

A-57. This appendix has summarized one set of tactics for conducting COIN operations.

Like all tactics they need interpretation. Constant study of the AO is needed to apply

them to the specific circumstances a unit faces. Observations and experience helps

Soldiers apply them better. Whatever else is done, the focus must remain on gaining and

maintaining the support of the population. With their support, victory is assured; without

it, COIN efforts cannot succeed.

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Appendix B

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

The purpose of the appendix is to provide commanders and staffs with a framework for

performing intelligence preparation of the battlefield during counterinsurgency

operations.

B-1. As explained in Chapter 3, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) in

(COIN) follows the same process as conventional operations. However, it places greater

emphasis on civil considerations, especially the people of the area of operations (AO). In

addition, the threats evaluated in COIN differ greatly from a conventional military threat

and must therefore be evaluated differently. The steps of IPB are:

Define the operational environment.

Describe the effects of the operational environment.

Evaluate the threat.

Determine threat courses of action.

B-2. When defining the area of interest for a unit, commanders and staffs must account

for the movement of people and information to and from the AO, and how this might

affect the AO. Some of the important factors which must be evaluated include the

following:

Cultural geography: family, tribal, ethnic, religious, or other social links that go

beyond the AO.

Communication links to other regions.

Economic links to other regions.

Media influence on the local populace, national populace, and multinational

partners.

External financial, moral, and or logistic support of the insurgency.

B-3. Another consideration of defining the operational environment is to identify the

other organizations with operating in the AO:

Higher and adjacent units.

Local security forces and government personnel.

Multinational forces.

Nongovernmental agencies.

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B-4. Describing the effects of the operational environment involves developing an

understanding of that environment and is critical to the success of operations. This step

includes:

Civil considerations (ASCOPE), with emphasis on the people, history, and the

government in the AO.

Terrain analysis (physical geography), with emphasis on complex terrain,

suburban and urban terrain, and lines of communications.

Weather analysis, with attention given to the weather’s effects on activities of the

population, such as agriculture, smuggling, or insurgent actions.

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS (ASCOPE)

B-5. Civil considerations concern how the manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions,

and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within

an area of operations influence the conduct of military operations. Because the purpose of

COIN is to support a government in gaining legitimacy and the support of the population,

civil considerations are often the most important factors to consider during mission

analysis.

B-6. Civil considerations generally focus on the immediate impact of civilians on

operations in progress; however, they also include larger, long-term diplomatic,

informational, and economic issues at higher levels. At the tactical level, they directly

relate to key civilian areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events

within the AO.

B-7. COIN cannot be conducted effectively without a thorough appreciation of civil

considerations consistently applied to all operations. Civil considerations comprise six

characteristics, expressed in the memory aid ASCOPE:

Areas.

Structures.

Capabilities.

Organizations.

People.

Events.

AREAS

B-8. Key civilian areas are localities or aspects of the terrain within an AO that have

significance to the lives of the people there. This characteristic approaches terrain

analysis from a civilian perspective. Commanders analyze key civilian areas in terms of

how they affect the missions of individual units as well as how military operations affect

these areas. Examples of key civilian areas are:

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Areas defined by political boundaries, such as districts/neighborhoods within a

city, municipalities within a region, or provinces within a country.

Areas of high economic value, such as industrial centers, farming regions, and

mines.

Centers of government and politics.

Culturally important areas.

Social, ethnic, tribal, political, religious, criminal, or other important enclaves.

Trade routes and smuggling routes.

Possible sites for the temporary settlement of dislocated civilians or other civil

functions.

STRUCTURES

B-9. Analyzing a structure involves determining how its location, functions, and

capabilities can support the operation. Commanders also consider the consequences of

using it. Using a structure for military purposes often competes with civilian

requirements for it. Commanders carefully weigh the expected military benefits against

costs to the community that will have to be addressed in the future. Some of the

important structures in an AO may include:

Government centers—necessary for the government to function.

Headquarters and bases for security forces—necessary for the security forces to

function.

Police stations, courthouses, and jails—necessary for countering crime and very

beneficial for COIN operations.

Communications and media infrastructure, such as radio towers, television

stations, cellular towers, newspaper offices, or printing presses—important to

information flow and the opinions of the populace.

Roads—allow for movement of populace, goods, insurgents, and COIN forces.

Bridges—allow for movement of populace, goods, insurgents, and COIN forces.

Ports of entry, such as airports—allow for movement of populace, goods,

insurgents, and COIN personnel.

Dams—provide electric power, drinking water, and flood control.

Electrical power stations and substations—enable functioning of the economy and

often important for day-to-day life of the populace.

Storage depots and other sources of fuel—enable functioning of the economy and

often important for day-to-day life of the populace.

Sources of potable water—important for public health.

Sewage systems—important for public health.

Clinics and hospitals—important for the health of the populace; these are

protected sites.

Schools and universities—affect the opinions of the populace; these are protected

sites.

Places of religious worship—affect opinions of the populace; often of great

cultural importance; these are protected sites.

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CAPABILITIES

B-10. Capabilities can refer to the ability of local authorities—those of the host nation or

some other body—to provide a populace with key functions or services. Commanders

and staffs analyze capabilities from different levels, but generally put priority on

understanding the capability of the government to support the mission. The most essential

capabilities are those required to save, sustain, or enhance life, in that order. Some of the

more important capabilities are:

Public administration—effectiveness of bureaucracy, courts, and other parts of the

government.

Public safety—provided by security forces, military, police, and intelligence

organizations.

Emergency services—fire departments, ambulance services, and so forth.

Public health—clinics, hospitals.

Food.

Water.

Sanitation.

B-11. In populated areas, the public services important that need to be assessed may be

remembered using the acronym SWEAT-MS. Providing these services is a measure of a

government’s capabilities. In addition, the relative demand for these services is a measure

of some of the interests of the populace:

Sewage.

Water.

Electricity.

Academic (schools and universities).

Trash.

Medical.

Security.

ORGANIZATIONS

B-12. Organizations are nonmilitary groups or institutions in the AO. They influence and

interact with the populace, COIN forces, and each other. They generally have a

hierarchical structure, defined goals, established operations, fixed facilities or meeting

places, and a means of financial or logistic support. Some organizations may be

indigenous to the area. These may include:

Religious organizations.

Political parties.

Patriotic or service organizations.

Labor unions.

Criminal organizations.

Community organizations.

B-13. Other organizations may come from outside the AO. Examples of these include:

Multinational corporations.

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United Nations agencies.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the International Red Cross.

B-14. Operations often require commanders to coordinate with international

organizations and NGOs. Required information for evaluation includes these groups’

activities, capabilities, and limitations. Necessary situational understanding includes

knowing how the activities of different organizations may affect military operations and

how military operations may affect these organizations’ activities. From this analysis,

commanders can determine how organizations and military forces can work together

toward common goals.

B-15. In almost every case, military forces have more resources than civilian

organizations. However, civilian organizations may possess specialized capabilities that

they may be willing to share. Commanders do not command civilian organizations in

their AOs. However some operations require achieving unity of effort between these

groups and COIN forces. These situations require commanders to influence the leaders of

these organizations through persuasion, relying on the force of argument and the example

of actions.

B-16. See socio-cultural factors analysis below for a more in-depth means of evaluating

organizations.

PEOPLE AND SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS ANALYSIS

B-17. “People” refers to nonmilitary personnel encountered by military forces. The term

includes all civilians within an AO as well as those outside the AO whose actions,

opinions, or political influence can affect the mission.

B-18. There can be many different kinds of people living and operating in and around an

AO. As with organizations, people may be indigenous or introduced from outside the

AO. An analysis of people should identify them by their various capabilities, needs, and

intentions. It is useful to separate people into distinct categories. When analyzing people,

commanders consider historical, cultural, ethnic, political, economic, and humanitarian

factors. They also identify the key communicators and the formal and informal processes

used to influence people.

B-19. An understanding of the people in an AO is developed using socio-cultural factors

analysis. This analysis addresses the following factors:

Society.

Social structure.

Culture.

Power.

Interests.

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Society

B-20. Populations with a shared political authority and identity. There will usually be one

society in an AO; the presence of a more than one society in a country may contribute to

the development of an insurgency.

Social Structure

B-21. Social structure describes the relationships between groups within a society. It can

be analyzed in terms of the following:

Groups.

Networks.

Institutions.

Organizations.

Roles and statuses.

Social norms and practices.

Groups

B-22. Racial, ethnic, religious, or tribal identity groups exist within any society. It is

important to know the following about them:

The types of groups present in the AO.

The size of the groups.

The locations and distribution of the groups.

Formal connections and relationships between and within groups, such as treaties

or alliances.

Informal connections and relationships between and within groups, such as

tolerance, vendettas, and cooperation.

Is the insurgent leadership composed of one particular group?

Is the insurgent rank and file composed of one particular group?

Is the government leadership composed of one particular group?

Do key leaders belong to more than one group? If so, do they have conflicting

values that may be exploited?

Are the groups organized as networks, institutions, or organizations?

Networks

B-23. A network is a series of direct or indirect ties within a social structure that serve a

purpose, such as business, emotional support, or criminal activity (See Appendix D.).

Institutions

B-24. Institutions are groups engaged in patterned activity to accomplish a common task.

It is important to know which institutions are in the AO and their relative importance.

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Organizations

B-25. Organizations are institutions that have bounded membership, defined goals,

established operations, fixed facilities or meeting places, and a means of financial or

logistic support. They include communicating organizations, religious organizations,

economic organizations, governance organizations, and social organizations. Important

information about them includes the following:

What organizations are in the AO?

What activities are they engaged in?

Are the organizations dominated by members of particular groups?

How do they interrelate to the government and the insurgency?

Roles and Status

B-26. Status is an achieved or ascribed position, such as that of doctor. Each status has an

associated role or activity that is the expected behavior of an individual based on their

status, such as the doctor’s role of practicing medicine. Roles help understand how and

why individuals behave in a certain way. Important information includes the following:

What are the statuses and roles for each group, organization, and institution within the

society?

What are the social norms associated with different roles?

Does this particular society have a role for “guests”?

Are COIN forces considered guests?

How are guests supposed to behave?

Social Norms and practices

B-27. Social norms and practices are unspoken rules associated with statuses and roles.

They may either be moral (incest prohibition, homicide prohibition) or customary (prayer

before meals, remove shoes before entering house). When behavior does not conform to

social norms, it may be sanctioned. Understanding norms allows Soldiers to interact with

people positively. Some norms to be understood for each group within the society include

the following:

Requirement for revenge if honor is lost.

Appropriate treatment of women and children.

Common courtesies, such as gift giving.

Standard business practices, such as bribes and haggling.

Culture

B-28. Culture is a “web of meaning” shared by members of a particular society or group

within a society. There are often multiple cultures within a society.

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Identity

B-29. Each individual in the AO belongs to multiple groups, through birth, assimilation,

or achievement. Each group to which the individual belongs influences his or her beliefs,

values, attitudes, and perceptions. Individuals rank their identities consciously or

unconsciously into primary identities (national, racial, religious) and secondary identities

(hunter, fisherman, coffee drinker). Frequently, individuals’ identities may be in conflict,

and COIN forces can use these conflicts to influence key leaders’ decision-making

processes.

Cultural Forms

B-30. Cultural forms are the material, concrete aspects of culture that express the belief

system of a group. The most important of these are narratives, symbols, rituals.

B-31. A narrative is a story that explains an event in a group’s history, and which also

expresses values, character, or self-identity of the group. Understanding its narrative is

very beneficial to understanding the culture in an AO and how various groups perceive

the world. Important information concerning narratives includes the following:

What narratives are commonly used by each group in the society to explain

history and create meaning?

What narratives are used by the insurgents to mobilize the population?

What beliefs do these narratives express?

How can group narratives be used by COIN forces to shift perceptions, gain

support or reduce support for insurgents?

B-32. Important information concerning symbols includes the following:

What symbols are commonly used by each group in the society to explain history

and create meaning?

What symbols are used by the insurgents to mobilize the population?

What beliefs do these symbols express?

How can group symbols be used by COIN forces to shift perceptions, gain

support or reduce support for insurgents?

B-33. Important information concerning rituals includes the following:

What rituals are commonly used by each group in the society to explain history

and create meaning?

What rituals are used by the insurgents to mobilize the population?

What beliefs do these rituals express?

How can group rituals be used by COIN forces to shift perceptions, gain support

or reduce support for insurgents?

Beliefs and Belief Systems

B-34. Beliefs are concepts and ideas accepted as true, such as the existence of God.

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B-35. Core beliefs are those views that are part of a person’s deep identity, and are not

easily changed, to include:

Religious beliefs.

Importance of family.

The importance of individual and collective honor.

B-36. Intermediate beliefs are beliefs that are derived from authoritative figures and texts.

These can be changed by formal and informal leaders within an AO.

B-37. Peripheral beliefs change relatively quickly over time. They may be influenced by

a variety of factors, but flow from central and intermediate beliefs.

B-38. A belief system is the sum of beliefs, values, attitudes, and perceptions, as reflected

through cultural forms. Belief systems include ideologies, religions, and “-isms.” Belief

systems form the “lens” through which people perceive the world. Insurgencies are

commonly built around a belief system. It is very important to know the following about

belief systems:

What is the belief system of each group in the AO? What are their values,

attitudes, and perceptions?

If people are members of more than one group, are there contradictions in their

belief systems that can be exploited?

What is the belief system of the insurgent group?

Does the insurgent group use belief systems to gain support and if so, how?

Can some of these beliefs be changed or co-opted by COIN forces?

Values

B-39. A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end state is

preferable or desirable. Each group to which an individual belongs inculcates that

individual with its values and their ranking of importance. It is important to understand

the following about values:

What are the values of each group? Such values may include the following:

toleration, stability, prosperity, social change, and self-determination.

Do the values promoted by the insurgency correspond to the values of all the

social groups in the AO?

Do the values promoted by the insurgency correspond to the values of the

government?

Can the differences in values be exploited by ANA forces?

Attitudes

B-40. Attitudes are affinities for and aversions to groups, persons, and objects. It is very

important to evaluate public attitudes toward the government, the insurgents, and ANA

forces. It is important to understand the following about values:

Attitude toward other social groups.

Attitude toward insurgent ideology or ideologies.

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Attitude toward the government that may contribute to the insurgency.

Attitude toward ANA forces.

Perceptions

B-41. Perception is the process by which people organize external information.

Understanding perceptions allows commanders to shape attitudes.

Power

B-42. Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a

position to carry out his own will despite resistance. In any society, many groups have

power. Formal power holders include the following: governments, political interest

groups, political parties, unions, government agencies and regional and international

political bodies. Informal power holders include the following: ethno-religious groups,

social elites, or tribes. Informal power is often very important in states with a weak,

failed, or illegitimate government. For each group within the AO, COIN forces should

answer the following questions:

What type of power does the group have?

What do they use their power for? To protect their followers? Amass resources?

How is their power acquired and maintained?

Which leaders have power within particular groups?

What type of power do they have?

What do they use their power for?

How is their power acquired and maintained?

B-43. Types of power include the following: coercive force, social capital, authority, and

economic resources.

B-44. Coercive force is a form of power expressed by using force or the threat of force to

change people’s behavior. In a well-functioning state, the government has a monopoly or

near monopoly on coercive force. In a weak state, insurgents, militias, criminal networks,

and other groups may derive extensive power from coercive force. Coercive force can be

positive, in the sense that a group may provide security to its members (such as policing

and defense of territory), or it may be negative, in the sense that a group may intimidate

or threaten group members or outsiders.

B-45. Social capital is the power of individuals and groups to utilize social networks of

reciprocity and exchange to accomplish their goals. In a system based on patron-client

relationships, an individual in a powerful position provides goods, services, security or

other resources to followers in exchange for political support or loyalty, thereby amassing

power. This may be seen as corruption, but it is an expression of power through social

capital.

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B-46. Authority is power considered legitimate by certain members of the population,

which is attached to positions and is justified by the beliefs of the obedient. The three

types of authority are:

Rational-legal (rule by law and elected government).

Charismatic (attraction of followers through charismatic appeal).

Traditional (derived from the historic position of leader or leader’s family).

Traditional power in religious and tribal groups can be very important to COIN.

B-47. Economic resources comprise the power of groups or individuals to use economic

incentives and disincentives to change people’s behavior. In weak or failed states, where

the formal economy may be functioning in a diminished capacity, insurgent organizations

may attract followers through patronage systems, smuggling, and other criminal activities

that provide income.

Interests

B-48. Interests comprise the needs, desires, and other core motivations that drive

behavior. An interest that has been frustrated may become a grievance, meaning a

resentment that motivates action. A group or individual’s interests can be satisfied or

frustrated by insurgents or counterinsurgents to gain the support of the people. Interests

fall into the following basic categories:

Physical security

B-49. Use the following questions to assess the status of physical security:

Is the civilian population safe from harm?

Is there a functioning police and judiciary system?

Are the police fair and non-discriminatory?

If the police are not providing civilians with physical security, who is?

If the government fails to provide security to civilians, they may look for alternative

security guarantees from armed groups such as tribes, militias, and insurgents. Failure to

provide security may erode the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens.

Economic resources

B-50. Use the following questions to assess the status of physical security:

Does the society have a functioning economy?

Are production, distribution, and consumption systems functioning?

Do civilians have fair access to land and property?

Is a multinational corporation or a central government monopolizing the natural

resources?

Who provides basic services (sewage, water, electricity, education,

trash/sanitation, medical)?

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Political participation

B-51. Use the following questions to assess the status of physical security:

Do all members of the civilian population have a guarantee of political

participation?

Is there ethnic, religious, or other discrimination?

Is the government violating human rights?

Do all civilians have access to basic government services, such as health care,

sewage, water, electricity, and so forth?

Are there legal, social, or other policies that contribute to the insurgency?

Grievances

B-52. COIN forces should use these questions to determine whether these interests have

become grievances that are motivating insurgents and their followers:

What are the insurgents’ grievances?

What are the grievances of the population?

Would a reasonable person consider them to be valid? Validity of grievance is not

effectively assessed by objective condition.

Are the articulated grievances of the population and those of the insurgency the

same?

What does the government believe to be the grievances of the population? Does it

consider those grievances to be valid?

Are the articulated grievances of the population the same as those perceived by

the government?

Has the government made genuine efforts to address these grievances?

Are these grievances practically addressable or are they beyond the immediate

capacity of the government?

Can ANA forces address these interests or grievances to elicit support from the

civilian population?

Additional Civil Considerations

B-53. The following civil considerations factors should be evaluated:

Languages and dialects spoken by the populace.

Nonverbal communication, like hand signals and gestures.

Education levels, including literacy rates, and availability of education.

Means of communication and its importance to the populace.

Interpersonal via face-to-face conversation, e-mail, or telephone.

Mass media, such as print publications, radio, television, or the Internet.

National history and political history.

Events leading to the insurgency.

Events contributing to the development of the insurgency.

The availability of weapons to the general population.

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EVENTS

B-54. Events are routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities that significantly

affect organizations, people, and military operations. They are often symbols, as

described in socio-cultural factors analysis. Examples include the following:

National and religious holidays.

Agricultural crop/livestock and market cycles.

Elections.

Civil disturbances.

Celebrations.

B-55. Other events include disasters from natural, manmade, or technological sources.

These create hardships and require emergency responses. Examples of events precipitated

by military forces include combat operations, deployments, redeployments, and paydays.

Once significant events are determined, it is important to template the events and to

analyze them for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal

implications.

TERRAIN ANALYSIS

B-56. Terrain analysis in COIN includes the traditional examination of terrain’s effects

on the movement of military units and enemy personnel. However, because the focus of

COIN is on people, terrain analysis usually centers on populated areas and the effects of

terrain on the people. Soldiers will likely spend a great deal of time in suburban and

urban areas interacting with the populace. This is a three dimensional battlefield.

Multistory buildings and underground lines of communication, such as tunnels or sewers,

can be extremely important. Insurgents also commonly use complex natural terrain to

their advantage as well. Mountains, caves, forests, swamps, and other complex terrain are

potential bases of operation for insurgents.

B-57. An important terrain consideration in COIN is urban and suburban land navigation.

This can be difficult in areas that do not have an address system and in cities where 10

digit grids may not be accurate enough to find the correct apartment. If at all possible,

foreknowledge of how locals find one another’s houses and what type of address system

is used are beneficial. Recent, accurate maps that use overhead imagery are extremely

helpful for use in operations. In addition, tourist maps and locally produced maps may be

helpful for understanding the names used by locals to describe places.

WEATHER ANALYSIS

B-58. Weather analysis in COIN evaluates how weather affects friendly and enemy

operations, but must also include affects on the people of the host nation. Weather factors

of importance include the following:

Visibility.

Wind.

Precipitation.

Cloud cover.

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Temperature.

Humidity.

Thermal crossover.

Natural disasters—flood, drought, or massive storms.

MILITARY ASPECTS OF TERRAIN (OCOKA) AND CIVIL

CONSIDERATIONS

B-59. At the tactical level, Service members can use a modified version of the military

aspects of terrain to describe the operational environment’s effects. For example:

Observation—surveillance, use of spies and infiltrators, areas with good fields of

fire or line of sight.

Cover and concealment—from fire, from view, use of disguises or false

identification badges, hiding supplies underground or in buildings.

Obstacles—Traffic control points, electronic security systems, guard plan, rules of

engagement (enemy using protected place), translators, and ability to

communicate with the population, culture, politics.

Key terrain—the population, key leaders, key structures, economically and

politically important areas, access control points, lines of communications.

Avenues of approach—sewers, rooftops, roads, sidewalks, smuggling routes,

infiltration and/or exfiltration routes into a facility or region, ability to blend with

the populace, media and other means of influencing popular opinion.

B-60. The purpose of evaluating the insurgency and other related threats to the mission is

to understand the enemy, enemy capabilities, enemy vulnerabilities, and opportunities

commanders may be able to exploit. The following characteristics of an insurgency

provide a basis for evaluating the threat:

Insurgent objectives.

Insurgent motivations.

Popular support/tolerance.

Support activities, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

Information activities, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

Political activities, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

Violent activities, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

Organization.

Key leaders and personalities.

INSURGENCY-RELATED THREATS

B-61. The presence of an insurgency in a state usually means the government of the state

is weak and losing control. In such situations, armed criminal and nongovernmental

elements can become powerful. Therefore, it is also important to track non-insurgent

threats including:

Criminal networks.

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Nongovernmental militias and armed groups.

OPPORTUNITIES

B-62. As the threat is evaluated and the interests, attitudes, and perceptions of the people

are learned, it will be possible to discover divisions between the insurgents and the

people and divisions between the nation and the people. Determining such divisions

provides opportunities for crafting friendly operations that expand splits between the

insurgents and the people or lessen the divides between the government and

the people. Some factors that should be tracked include:

Discrepancies between the insurgent belief systems and the popular belief

systems.

Appeal of insurgent goals.

Public attitudes toward insurgent and counterinsurgent actions.

Effectiveness of insurgent strategy and tactics in generating popular support.

Changes in public interests.

OBJECTIVE AND MOTIVATION IDENTIFICATION

B-63. Insurgents have political objectives and are motivated by ideology or grievances

that may be real or perceived. Identification of insurgent objectives and motivations

allows COIN forces to address the underlying causes of the conflict. Broadly speaking,

insurgencies can be divided into two varieties, national and liberation. Both can be

further classified into the eight types explained in Chapter 1.

B-64. In a national insurgency, the war is between a country’s government and a segment

or segments of the country’s population. In this type of insurgency, the insurgents seek to

change the political system, take control of the country, or secede from the country. A

national insurgency polarizes the population of a country and is generally a struggle

between the government and insurgents for legitimacy and popular support.

B-65. In contrast, a liberation insurgency occurs when insurgents seek to expel or

overthrow what they consider a foreign or occupation government. The grievance

addressed by the insurgents is a foreign government or foreign intervention into their

country. Liberation insurgencies tend to have a unifying effect as the foreign occupation

serves to unite insurgents with varying objectives and motivations. However, the

insurgency can split into competing factions if the occupiers leave, sending the country

into civil war.

B-66. Identification of insurgent goals and motivations can be difficult for a number of

reasons. There may be multiple insurgent groups in one country, each with differing

goals and motivations. In this case, the goals and motivations of each must be monitored

independently. Another problem is that leaders within an insurgent organization may

change over time and the goals may change with them. In addition to this, insurgent

leaders may have different motivations from their followers. For instance, an insurgent

leader may simply want to be a new dictator and may motivate followers through a

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combination of political ideology and money. A fourth issue is that insurgents may hide

their true motivations and make false claims. For instance, liberation insurgencies are

generally easier to unify and mobilize due to the clear differences between the insurgents

and the outsiders they are fighting. Therefore, insurgents may try to portray a national

insurgency as a liberation insurgency. Finally, the goals of the insurgency may change

over time due to changes in the operational environment. The entry of a foreign military

force into a COIN effort can transform the insurgency from national to liberation. The

reverse may happen if a foreign force exits the country. For all of these reasons, analysts

continuously track insurgent actions, internal communications, and public rhetoric to

determine insurgent goals and motivations.

POPULAR SUPPORT OR TOLERANCE

B-67. Developing passive support (tolerance) is often critical to survival and growth of an

insurgent organization in its early stages. Generating active popular support often has the

greatest impact on the insurgency’s long-term effectiveness. This is the center of gravity

of the insurgency. Popular support results in safe havens, freedom of movement, logistic

support, financial support, intelligence, and new personnel for the insurgency. Generating

such support has a positive feedback effect on an insurgent organization. As the insurgent

group gains in support, its capabilities grow. These enable it to gain more support.

Insurgents generally view popular support as a zero-sum game in which a gain in support

for the insurgents is a loss for the government, and a loss of support for the government is

a gain for the insurgents.

B-68. Popular support comes in many forms. In broad terms, it either originates internally

to a country or externally, and is either active or passive. There are four forms of popular

support:

Active external.

Passive external.

Active internal.

Passive internal.

The relative importance of each form of support varies depending on the insurgency, but

all of them are beneficial to the insurgency.

B-69. Active external support includes finance, logistics, training, fighters, and safe

havens provided by a foreign government or by NGOs, such as charities.

B-70. Passive external support occurs when a foreign government takes no steps to

curtail the activities of insurgents living or operating within its borders. This kind of

support can also take the form of a foreign government recognizing the legitimacy of an

insurgent group or denying the legitimacy of the government fighting the insurgency.

B-71. Active internal support includes the following:

Individuals or groups joining the insurgency.

Providing logistic or financial support.

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Providing intelligence.

Providing safe havens.

Providing medical assistance.

Providing transportation.

Carrying out actions on behalf of the insurgents.

This form of support is usually the most important to an insurgent group.

B-72. Passive internal support is also beneficial, however. Passive supporters do not

provide material support, but allow insurgents to operate and do not provide information

to COIN forces.

B-73. The different kinds of support require commanders to take different approaches to

address them. Both active and passive external support often requires diplomatic pressure

on the governments or groups supporting the insurgency. In addition, actions like sealing

borders may effectively stop active external support. Undermining active and passive

internal support is critical to the success of counterinsurgents. In order to deal with

internal support effectively, commanders must understand how it is generated by the

insurgents. Insurgents use numerous methods to generate popular support. These include

the following:

Persuasion.

Coercion.

Encouraging overreaction.

Apolitical fighters.

B-74. Persuasion includes charismatic attraction to a leader or group, esoteric appeal of

an ideology, exoteric appeal of insurgent promises to address grievances, and

demonstrations of potency such as large-scale attacks or social programs for the poor.

Persuasion can be used to get either internal or external support. It can be countered with

a counter-ideology, denying insurgents freedom of movement, and provision of basic

services.

B-75. Coercion includes terrorist tactics, violence, and the threat of violence used to force

people to support or tolerate insurgent activities. Coercion may be used to alter the

behavior of people, organizations, governments, or counterinsurgents. It is countered by

providing security.

B-76. Encouraging overreaction is also referred to as provocation of a government

response. Insurgents will try to force counterinsurgents to use repressive tactics that

alienate the people. It is countered by ensuring responses are appropriate to the

operational environment.

B-77. Apolitical fighters may be attracted via many non-ideological means, such as

monetary incentives, promise of revenge, and the “romance” of fighting a revolutionary

war.

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B-78. All of these methods of generating support are potentially effective, and insurgent

groups often use a mix of them. Of these methods, terrorist tactics and intimidation often

get the most media attention. However, they are also the most likely to backfire on the

insurgent. Both methods employ force or the threat of force to make people,

organizations, and governments alter their behavior to the insurgents’ benefit. These

methods are often very effective in the short term, particularly at the community level.

However, terrorism against the general populace and popular leaders or attacks that

negatively affecting people’s way of life can undermine insurgent popularity. Likewise,

though intimidation is an easy means for insurgents to use to generate passive support,

this support will exist only as long as the insurgents maintain the ability to intimidate.

B-79. Demonstrations of potency can be the most effective of the techniques because

they can create the perception that the insurgency has momentum and will succeed.

However, this method will publicly expose shadow governments or large-scale military

actions of insurgents and thereby provide analysts with a great deal of insight into the

insurgent organization’s support and capabilities.

B-80. Although difficult to quantify, analysts evaluate the popular support an insurgent

group receives and its ability to generate more support. This depends largely on open

sources and whatever intelligence reporting is available. Among these sources, polling

data can be a valuable, though imprecise, means of gauging support to the government

and support to the insurgents. Media and other open-source publications are important at

all echelons. Assessing community attitudes, by gauging such things as the reactions of

locals to the presence of troops or governmental leaders, is also a means of estimating

popular support at the tactical level. At a minimum, the following should be known:

The overall level of popular support to the insurgency relative to the government.

The forms of popular support the insurgents receive.

Sources of popular support by type (active, passive, internal, external).

Segments of the populace supporting the insurgency.

Foreign government support.

Support from NGOs, including charities and transnational terrorist organizations.

Criminal network support.

Methods used to generate popular support and their relative effectiveness.

Grievances (real or perceived) exploited by insurgents.

Capabilities and vulnerabilities in generating popular support.

SUPPORT ACTIVITIES—CAPABILITIES, AND VULNERABILITIES

B-81. Violence is the most noticeable activity of an insurgency but may represent only a

small portion of overall insurgent activity. The unseen activity includes recruiting,

training, and logistic actions used to maintain the insurgency. These are the support

activities of an insurgency. They come from an insurgency’s ability to generate popular

support. Like a conventional military force, the “logistic tail” of an insurgency is usually

larger than the number of combatants. Insurgent support networks may be substantial

even if overall levels of violence are low. For this reason, it is easy to overlook the early

development of an insurgency.

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B-82. Undermining popular support to insurgents is the most effect way to reduce their

support capabilities. However, identification of support capabilities and vulnerabilities is

still important. This process permits analysts to evaluate potential threat courses of

action. Such analysis also allows commanders to target vulnerable parts of the insurgent

support network and thereby reduce the insurgents’ ability to carry out their operations.

Support activities to be evaluated include the following:

Means of gaining or retaining popular support, to include recruiting (See

discussion above.).

Safe havens.

Freedom of movement.

Logistic support.

Financial support.

An ability to train recruits in military or terrorist tactics and techniques.

Means of collecting intelligence.

Means of maintaining operations security.

Means of communications.

INFORMATION AND MEDIA ACTIVITIES—CAPABILITIES, AND

VULNERABILITIES

B-83. Information and media activities can be the main effort of an insurgency, with

violence used in support. Information activities by insurgents undermine the legitimacy

of the government, undermine counterinsurgent forces, compel counterinsurgent forces to

behave in accordance with national and international laws and norms (while excusing the

insurgents’ own transgressions), and generate popular support. In order to get these

effects, insurgents broadcast their successes, the failures of COIN forces, failures of the

government, and illegal or immoral actions taken by counterinsurgents or the

government. Their broadcasts need not be factual; they need only find traction with the

populace. Insurgents may use any form of media to include the following:

Word of mouth.

Speeches by elites and key leaders.

Fliers and hand-outs.

Newspapers.

Journals or magazines.

Books.

Audio recordings.

Video recordings.

Radio broadcasts.

Television broadcasts.

Web sites.

E-mail.

B-84. In addition to producing their own media, insurgents take advantage of existing

private and public media companies through press releases and interviews. These efforts,

in addition to use of the Internet, allow the insurgent message to reach a global audience.

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By broadcasting to a global audience, insurgents gain the ability to directly attack public

support for foreign intervention.

B-85. Insurgents can lie at will, while governments must continuously maintain their

integrity to be credible. This often gives the initiative to the insurgents and put the host

nation or COIN personnel on the defensive in the information fight. Understanding the

information capabilities and vulnerabilities of insurgents is the first step to effectively

counter insurgent information activities and take the initiative away from them.

Information and media activities to be evaluated include the following:

Commitment of assets and personnel to information activities.

Types of media employed.

Professionalism of products, such as newspaper articles or videos.

Effectiveness and reach of information activities.

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

B-86. Insurgents use political activities as a means of achieving their goals and to

enhance the legitimacy of their cause. Political activities are tightly linked to both

information and violent activities. Political parties affiliated with an insurgent

organization may negotiate or communicate on behalf of insurgents, thereby serving as

the public face of the insurgency. Insurgencies may grow out of political parties, or

political parties may grow out of insurgencies. It is important to recognize, however, that

the links between insurgents and political parties may be weak or easily broken by

disputes between insurgents and politicians. In such cases, political parties may not be

able to deliver on promises to end violent conflict. It is important to understand not only

the links between insurgent groups and political organizations, but also the amount of

control each exerts over the other.

B-87. An understanding of insurgent political activities enables effective political

engagement of insurgents. Without this knowledge, the wrong political party may be

engaged, the wrong messages may be used, or counterinsurgents may make deals with

political parties that cannot deliver on their promises. Political activities to be evaluated

include the following:

Links, if any, between the insurgency and political parties.

Influence of political parties over the insurgency and vice versa.

Political indoctrination and recruiting by insurgent groups.

VIOLENT ACTIVITIES

B-88. As explained in previous chapters, insurgents are an asymmetric threat. They make

up for a lack of conventional power by exploiting the weaknesses of counterinsurgents.

Information, political, and violent activities are all means of doing this. In the case of

using violence, insurgents usually tie their limited capability for violence to information

or political actions to multiply the effects of the violence. In addition, they usually attack

in such a way that they conserve their forces while inflicting maximum damage.

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B-89. Violent actions by insurgents use three types of tactics, which may occur

simultaneously:

Terrorist.

Guerrilla.

Conventional.

B-90. Terrorist tactics employ violence primarily against noncombatants. Terror attacks

generally require fewer personnel than guerrilla warfare or conventional warfare. They

allow insurgents greater security and relatively low support requirements. Insurgencies

often rely on terrorist tactics early in their formation due to these factors. Terrorist tactics

do not involve mindless destruction nor are they employed randomly. Insurgents choose

targets that have maximum informational and political effects in support of their goals.

As explained above, terrorist tactics can be effective for generating popular support and

altering the behavior of governments.

B-91. Guerrilla tactics, in contrast, feature hit-and-run attacks by lightly armed groups

primarily targeting the government, security forces, or other COIN elements. Insurgents

using guerrilla tactics usually avoid decisive confrontation unless they know they can

win. Instead, they focus on harassing counterinsurgents. As with terrorist tactics, guerrilla

tactics are neither mindless nor random. Insurgents try to choose targets to ensure

maximum informational and political effects. The goal is not to militarily defeat COIN

forces, but to outlast them while building popular support for the insurgency. It is

important to note that terrorist and guerrilla tactics are not mutually exclusive. An

insurgent group may employ both forms of violent action simultaneously.

B-92. The use of conventional tactics is relatively rare in insurgencies and is not always

necessary for their success. It can arise after an extended period during which the

insurgency develops a great deal of popular support and extensive support capabilities.

The insurgents are then able to generate a conventional military force that can fight

directly against government forces.

B-93. Knowledge of violent capabilities is used to evaluate insurgent courses of action.

Commanders use this knowledge to determine appropriate force protection measures, as

well as tactics to be used in countering insurgent actions. In addition, knowledge of how

the enemy conducts attacks provides a baseline that aids in determining the effectiveness

of COIN operations. The following should be evaluated to determine insurgent violent

capabilities:

Forms of violent action used.

Weapons available and their capabilities.

Training.

Known methods of operating.

Frequency of attacks.

Timing of attacks.

Targets of attacks.

Tactics and techniques.

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Known linkages between violent, political, and information actions—how do the

insurgents use violence to increase their popular support and undermine

counterinsurgents?

Means of command and control during attacks (including communications means

used).

INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND KEY

PERSONALITIES

B-94. In order to conduct the activities described above, an insurgency requires some

form of organizational structure and leadership. Insurgents may use any of a wide variety

of organizational structures, each with its own strengths and limitations. The structure

used balances the following:

Security.

Efficiency and speed of action.

Unity of effort.

Survivability

The human and physical geographies of the operational environment.

The organization also varies greatly by region and time. The result often ends up being

based on familial, tribal, ethnic, religious, professional, and other existing social

networks. For these reasons, social network analysis is required to determine

organizational structure. (See Appendix D).

B-95. The organizational structure of an insurgency often determines the effectiveness of

targeting enemy or eliminating enemy leaders by COIN forces. For instance, if an

insurgent organization is hierarchical and has few leaders, removing them may greatly

degrade the capabilities of the insurgent organization. However, if the insurgent

organization is nonhierarchical and amorphous, focusing on the leadership is unlikely to

have much effect. When creating the organization, insurgents decide whether to make the

structure:

Hierarchical or nonhierarchical.

Highly structured or amorphous.

Composed of personnel conducting a few specialized tasks or composed of non-

specialized personnel capable of a wide variety of tasks.

Use rigid command and control or allow autonomous action and initiative.

Have a few leaders for rapid decision making or redundant leadership for

survivability.

Tie directly into other organizations and networks, such as criminal groups,

religious organizations, and political organizations.

Weight one activity over another, such as a focus on political organization over

combat organization.

B-96. As explained in Chapter 1, the members of the insurgent organization fall into five

broad categories that may overlap:

Leaders, who serve as planners and organizers.

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Cadre, mid-level leaders in the insurgent organization, who conduct information

and political activities, recruiting, and ideological indoctrination. They are

believers in the insurgent ideology.

Combatants, who serve as foot soldiers and conduct violent activities.

Auxiliaries, active members who provide support services (safe havens, supplies,

and so forth).

Mass base, consisting of active or passive supporters. Understanding the roles and

numbers of each category is important.

B-97. The mass base forms the foundation upon which most insurgencies are built.

Removing its members often reduces the strength of the insurgency to a level where local

law enforcement can deal with it. This is usually the most effective means of countering

an insurgency and is a part of winning the “hearts and minds” of the people.

B-98. The cadre and combatants carry out the visible actions of the insurgency and

reinforce the mass base by increasing popular support. Eliminating them may disrupt an

insurgency, but rarely brings about the end of the insurgency by itself.

B-99. Leaders are important because they choose the organization, strategy, and tactics of

the insurgency. The personalities of the leaders and decisions they make often determine

the success or failure of the insurgency. Therefore, the leaders must be identified and

their basic beliefs, intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities understood. Leader

characteristics to be identified include the following:

Role of the leader in the organization.

Known activities.

Known associates.

Background and personal history.

Beliefs, motivations, and ideology.

Education and training.

Temperament, meaning whether the person is careful, impulsive, thoughtful, or

violent.

Importance of the leader in the organization.

Popularity outside of the organization.

B-100. The purpose of determining threat courses of action is to understand insurgent

strategies and tactics so they may be effectively countered. The initial determination of

threat courses of action focuses on two levels of analysis. The first involves defining the

overall strategy of an insurgent force for achieving its goals. The second focuses on

determining tactical courses of action used in support of the strategy.

INSURGENT STRATEGIES

B-101. As described in Chapters 1 and 3, insurgents may follow five general strategies.

These can be combined with one another and may change over time.

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B-102. The conspiratorial strategy has the following characteristics:

Secretive political body seeking to grab power rapidly when the government is

sufficiently weak.

Usually a small organization that is tightly controlled by leadership.

Cadre large relative to combatants and has little or no mass base.

Difficult to detect.

Countered by capturing or killing leaders and cadre.

An example is the Bolsheviks in Russia.

B-103. The protracted popular war strategy has the following characteristics:

Historically the most effective strategy and most complex to counter.

Efforts focused on developing a large mass base while undermining the

legitimacy and will of the government and supporting elements.

Use of violent, informational, and political actions together to achieve goals.

Popular support is the center of gravity that must be won by counterinsurgents.

Examples are the Viet Minh in Vietnam and the communists in China.

B-104. The traditional strategy has the following characteristics:

Relies on a tribal, ethnic, religious, or other traditional identity.

Builds on group identity and exploits differences between the group and the

government.

Organization tends to have traditional leaders in leadership positions, a large mass

base, and many auxiliaries, though roles shift as required.

Countering generally requires political or economic deals between the

counterinsurgents and insurgents.

An example is the Dinka insurgency in southern Sudan.

B-105. The military-focus strategy has the following characteristics:

Relies almost completely on violence to incite a popular revolution.

Organization tends to have leaders and combatants but little, if any, cadre or mass

base.

Countered by capturing or killing leaders and combatants, though social, political,

and development programs also aid COIN efforts.

An example is the Cuban Revolution of 1959.

B-106. The urban-warfare strategy has the following characteristics:

Relies on terrorism in urban areas to incite repression by COIN forces.

May seek to fix COIN forces in cities so insurgents gain freedom of movement in

rural areas.

Emphasizes infiltration and subversion of government and security forces.

Tends to be organized in small, compartmentalized cells, due to urban operations.

Cadre and mass base usually small relative to combatants.

COIN forces must win support of people and avoid repressive measures that fuel

insurgency.

Examples include the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland and the Basque

Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) movement in Spain.

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TACTICAL COURSES OF ACTION

B-107. Insurgents base their tactical courses of action on their capabilities and intentions.

The capabilities of an organization are the support, information, political, and violent

capabilities evaluated in the third step of IPB. The intentions come from goals,

motivations, strategy, culture, perceptions, and leadership personalities. Insurgents can

employ a huge variety of tactics. Typical insurgent tactics and operations include,

but are not limited to the following:

Ambushes. Guerrilla-style attacks to kill or intimidate counterinsurgents.

Assassination. A term generally applied to the killing of prominent persons and

symbolic personnel as well as “traitors” who defect from the group, human

intelligence sources, and others who work with/for the government.

Arson. Less dramatic than most tactics, arson has the advantage of low risk to the

perpetrator and requires only a low level of technical knowledge.

Bombing and high explosives. The improvised explosive device (IED) is the

insurgent’s or terrorist’s weapon of choice. IEDs can be inexpensive to produce

and, because of the various detonation techniques available, may be a low risk to

the perpetrator. However, suicidal bombing cannot be overlooked as an

employment method. Other advantages include their ability to gain publicity, as

well as the ability to control casualties through timed detonation and careful

placement of the device. It is also easily deniable should the action produce

undesirable results.

Demonstrations. These can be used to incite violent responses by

counterinsurgents and also to display the popularity of the insurgent cause.

Hostage taking. This is an overt seizure of one or more individuals with the

intent of gaining publicity or other concessions in return for release of the

hostage. While dramatic, hostage and hostage barricade situations are risky for the

perpetrator.

Infiltration and subversion. These tactics gain intelligence and degrade the

effectiveness of government organizations by getting them to hire insurgent

agents or by convincing members of the government to support the insurgency.

Subversion may be achieved through intimidation, indoctrination of sympathetic

individuals, or bribes.

Indirect fire. Insurgents may use indirect fire to harass counterinsurgents or to

cause them to commit forces that are attacked by secondary ambushes.

Kidnapping. While similar to hostage taking, kidnapping has significant

differences. Kidnapping is usually a covert seizure of one or more specific

persons to extract specific demands. It is normally the most difficult task to

execute. The perpetrators of the action may or may not be known for a long time.

Media attention is initially intense, but decreases over time. Because of the time

involved, successful kidnapping requires elaborate planning and logistics. The

risk to the perpetrators may be less than in the hostage situation.

Hijacking or skyjacking. Sometimes employed as a means of escape, hijacking

is normally carried out to produce a spectacular hostage situation. Although

trains, buses, and ships have been hijacked, aircraft are the preferred target

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because of their greater mobility and because they are difficult to penetrate during

terrorist operations.

Propaganda. Insurgents may disseminate propaganda using any form of media,

including face-to-face talks.

Seizure. Seizure usually involves a building or object that has value in the eyes of

the audience. There is some risk to the perpetrator because security forces have

time to react.

Raids or attacks on facilities. Armed attacks on facilities are usually undertaken

to:

o Demonstrate the government’s inability to secure critical facilities or

national symbols.

o Acquire resources (for example, robbery of a bank or armory).

o Kill COIN or government personnel.

o Intimidate the government and the populace.

Sabotage. The objective in most sabotage incidents is to demonstrate how

vulnerable a particular society or government is to terrorist actions. Industrialized

areas are more vulnerable to sabotage than less highly developed societies.

Utilities, communications, and transportation systems are so interdependent that a

serious disruption of any affects all of them and gains immediate public attention.

Sabotage of industrial or commercial facilities is one means of creating significant

disruption while making a statement of future intent. Military facilities and

installations, information systems, and information infrastructures may become

targets of terrorist sabotage.

Denial and deception.

o Denial consists of measures taken by the threat to block, prevent, or

impair ANA intelligence collection. Examples include killing human

intelligence sources.

o Deception involves deliberately manipulating information and perceptions

in order to mislead. Examples include providing false intelligence.

Hoaxes. Any insurgent or terrorist group that has established credibility can

employ a hoax with considerable success. A threat against a person’s life causes

that person and those associated with that individual to devote time and efforts to

security measures. A bomb threat can close a commercial building, empty a

theater, or delay an aircraft flight at no cost to the insurgent or terrorist. False

alarms dull the analytical and operational efficiency of key security personnel,

thus degrading readiness.

Use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon. Some insurgent

groups may possess chemical and biological weapons, and there is a potential for

use of both chemical and biological weapons in the future. These types of

weapons, relatively cheap and easy to make, may be used in place of conventional

explosives in many situations. The potential for mass destruction and the deep-

seated fear most people have for these weapons can be attractive to a group

wishing to attract international attention. Although an explosive nuclear device is

acknowledged to be beyond the financial and technical reach of most terrorist

groups, a chemical or biological weapon, or even a radiological dispersion device

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Appendix C

Legal Considerations

Law and policy govern the actions of the Afghan National Army in all military

operations, including counterinsurgency (COIN). There must be a legal basis for ANA

forces to conduct operations, and this legal basis has a profound influence on many

aspects of the operations themselves, including the rules of engagement (ROE), the

military’s participation in organizing and training forces, the authority to spend funds for

the benefit of the local government confronting insurgency, the authority of forces to

detain and interrogate, and a range of other matters. Under the Constitution, the President

is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Therefore, orders issued by the President or

the Minister of Defense to a commander provide the starting point in determining the

legal basis. This appendix summarizes some of the most significant laws and policies that

also bear upon ANA operations in support of foreign COIN.

AUTHORIZATION TO USE MILITARY FORCE

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION

C-1. Because National Assembly support is necessary to the success of any prolonged

involvement of ANA forces in actual operations, the central legal basis for such

involvement within Afghan law is often provided in a National Assembly resolution. This

is especially likely if ANA forces are anticipated, at least initially, to be engaged in

combat operations against an identified enemy or hostile force.

STATE OF EMERGENCY

C-2. The President, in accordance with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of

Afghanistan may declare a state of emergency for a period of up to 60 days. A state of

emergency in excess of this period must be approved by the National Assembly.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

OPERATION-SPECIFIC RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

C-3. ROE are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the

circumstances and limitations under which ANA forces initiate and/or continue combat

engagement with other forces encountered. In a large-scale deployment, the Minister of

Defense may issue ROE that are specific to the operation to a combatant commander.

The combatant commander and subordinate commanders then issue ROE that must be

consistent with the ROE received from the Minister of Defense. In addition to stating the

circumstances under which Soldiers may open fire—that is, upon positive identification

of a member of a hostile force or upon clear indications of hostile intent—the ROE may

include rules concerning when civilians may be detained, specify levels of approval

authority for using heavy weapons, or identify facilities that may be protected with

deadly force. All ROE comply with the law of war. ROE in COIN are dynamic and must

be regularly reviewed for their effectiveness in the complex COIN environment. ROE

training for COIN forces should be reinforced regularly.

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COALITION RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

C-4. When ANA forces operate in conjunction with a multinational force, reasonable

efforts are made to affect common ROE. If such ROE cannot be established, ANA forces

operate under their operation-specific ROE provided by Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

authorities. To avoid misunderstanding, any differences in ROE or ROE interpretation

among coalition forces must be thoroughly discussed between commanders and

disseminated throughout all units involved.

THE LAW OF WAR

C-5. COIN and international armed conflicts often overlap. COIN may take place before,

after, or simultaneously with a war occurring between nations. In such situations, ANA

forces obey the law of war, a body of international treaties and customs, recognized by

the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan as binding, which regulates the conduct of hostilities

and protects noncombatants. The main law of war protections of the Hague and Geneva

Conventions applicable at the tactical and operational level are summarized in ten rules:

Soldiers fight only enemy combatants.

Soldiers do not harm enemies who surrender. They disarm them and turn them

over to their superior.

Soldiers do not kill or torture enemy prisoners of war.

Soldiers collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe.

Soldiers do not attack medical personnel, facilities, or equipment.

Soldiers destroy no more than the mission requires.

Soldiers treat civilians humanely.

Soldiers do not steal. Soldiers respect private property and possessions.

Soldiers should do their best to prevent violations of the law of war.

Soldiers report all violations of the law of war to their superior.

C-6. When insurgency occurs during occupation, the law of war includes rules governing

situations in which the military forces of one state occupy the territory of another.

Occupation is not a transfer of sovereignty, though it does confer upon the occupying

power the authority and responsibility to restore and maintain public order and safety

while respecting, as much as possible, the laws in force in the country. One of the four

Geneva Conventions of 1949—the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of

Civilian Persons in Time of War—becomes a prominent source of law during occupation.

INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT

C-7. Geneva Convention, Common Article 3: Although insurgencies can occur

simultaneous with a legal state of war between two nations, they are classically conflicts

internal to a single nation, between uniformed government forces and armed elements

that do not wear uniforms with fixed distinctive insignia, carry arms openly, or otherwise

obey the laws of war. As such, the main body of the law of war does not strictly apply to

these conflicts—a legal fact that can be a source of confusion to commanders and

soldiers. It bears emphasis, however, that one article contained in all four of the Geneva

Conventions—Common Article 3—is specifically intended to apply to internal armed

conflicts:

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory

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