Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 3)

ANA 3-24

Culture is changeable, meaning it is constantly changing through social

interactions between people and groups.

Culture is arbitrary, meaning that Soldiers should make no assumptions regarding

what a society considers right and wrong, good and bad.

Culture is internalized, in the sense that is habitual, taken-for-granted, and

perceived as “natural” by people within the society.

3-39. Culture might also be described as an operational code that is valid for an entire

group of people. Culture conditions the individual’s range of action and ideas, including

what to do (and what not to do), how to do it (or not do it), whom to do it with (or whom

not to do it with), and under what circumstances the “rules” shift and change. Culture

influences how people make judgments about what is right and wrong, assess what is

important and unimportant, categorize things, and deal with things that do not fit into

existing categories. Cultural rules are flexible in practice.

Identity

3-40. Each individual belongs to multiple groups, through birth, assimilation, or

achievement. Each group to which the individual belongs influences his or her beliefs,

values, attitudes, and perceptions. Individuals rank their identities consciously or

unconsciously into primary (national, racial, religious) identities and secondary identities

(hunter, fisherman, coffee drinker). Frequently, individuals’ identities may be in conflict,

and COIN forces can use these conflicts to influence key leaders’ decision-making

processes.

Beliefs

3-41. Beliefs are concepts and ideas accepted as true. Beliefs can be core, intermediate, or

peripheral.

3-42. Core beliefs are those views that are part of a person’s deep identity, and are not

easily changed. Examples include belief in religion, the value of democratic government,

and the role of the family. Core beliefs are unstated, taken for granted, resistant to

change, and not consciously considered. Attempts to change the central beliefs of a

culture may result in significant unintended second- and third-order consequences.

Decisions to do so are made at the national-strategic level.

3-43. Beliefs in the intermediate region are predicated on reference to authority figures or

authoritative texts. Thus, intermediate beliefs can be influenced through co-optation of

the opinion leaders.

3-44. From intermediate beliefs flow peripheral beliefs, which are open to debate,

consciously considered, and easiest to change. For example, political affiliation, numbers

of children a family should have derive from beliefs in governmental leadership and

immediate family norms.

ANA 3-24

Values

3-45. A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end state of

existence is preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end state of

existence. Each group to which an individual belongs ingrains that individual with its

values and their ranking of importance. Individuals do not unquestioningly absorb all the

values of the groups to which they belong, but accept some and reject others. The values

of each culture to which individuals simultaneously belong are often in conflict: religious

values may conflict with generational values, gender values with organizational practices.

Commanders should evaluate the values of each group, such as toleration, stability,

prosperity, social change, and self-determination. Commanders should also consider

whether the values promoted by the insurgency correspond to the values of other social

groups in the AO or to those of the government, and whether these differences in values

can be exploited by ANA forces.

Attitudes and Perceptions

3-46. Attitudes are affinities for and aversions to groups, persons, and objects.

Commanders should consider groups’ attitudes toward other groups, outsiders, their

government, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the ANA, globalization, and so forth.

Attitudes affect perception, which is the process by which an individual selects,

evaluates, and organizes information from the external environment.

Belief Systems

3-47. The totality of the identities, beliefs, values, attitudes, and perceptions that an

individual holds—and the ranking of their importance—is that person’s belief system.

Religions, political ideologies, and all types of “isms” fall in this category.

3-48. The belief system acts as a filter for new information: it is the lens through which

people perceive the world. Understanding the belief systems of various groups in an AO

allows COIN forces to more effectively influence the population.

3-49. The belief systems of insurgents and other groups within the AO should be given

careful attention. The insurgency may frame its objectives in terms of a belief system or

may use a belief system to mobilize and recruit followers from among the population.

Where there are differences between the belief system of the insurgents and civilian

groups, an opportunity exists for counterinsurgents to engineer a split between the

insurgency and the larger population.

Cultural Forms

3-50. Cultural forms are the concrete expression of the belief systems shared by members

of a particular culture. Cultural forms, such as rituals, symbols and narratives, are the

medium for communicating ideologies, values, and norms that influence thought and

behavior. Each culture constructs or invents its own cultural forms, through which

ANA 3-24

cultural meanings are transmitted and reproduced. COIN forces can identify the belief

systems of a culture by observing and analyzing its cultural forms.

3-51. The most important cultural form for COIN forces to understand is the narrative. A

cultural narrative is a story recounted in the form of a causally linked set of events that

explains an event in group’s history and expresses the values, character, or self-identity

of the group. Narratives are the means through which ideologies are expressed and

absorbed by individuals in a society. By listening to narratives, COIN forces can identify

the basic core values of the society.

3-52. Other cultural forms include ritual and symbols. Ritual is a stereotyped sequence of

activities involving gestures, words, and objects, performed to influence supernatural

entities or forces on behalf of the actors’ goals and interests. Rituals can be either sacred

or secular. A symbol is the smallest unit of cultural meaning and is filled with a vast

amount of information that can be decoded by a knowledgeable observer. Symbols can be

objects, activities, words, relationships, events, or gestures. Institutions and organizations

often use cultural symbols to amass political power or to generate resistance against

external groups. Careful attention should be paid to the meaning of the common symbols

and how various groups in the AO use them.

Power and Authority

3-53. Once the social structure has been mapped and the culture is understood, COIN

forces must understand how power is apportioned and used within a society.

Understanding power is the key to manipulating the interests of groups within the society.

3-54. There may be many power holders in a society, both formal and informal.

Understanding the formal political system (including central governments, local

governments, political interest groups, political parties, unions, government agencies, and

regional and international political bodies) is necessary but not sufficient for COIN

operations. Informal power holders are often more important for COIN operations, and

may include ethno-religious groups, social elites, or religious figures.

3-55. For each group within the AO, COIN forces should identify what type of power the

group has, what they use their power for (such as amassing resources, protecting

followers, and so forth) and how they acquire and maintain power. Commanders should

also identify which leaders have power within particular groups, what type of power they

have, what they use their power for, and how their power is acquired and maintained.

There are four major forms of power in a society: coercive force, social capital, economic

resources, and authority.

Coercive Force

3-56. Coercion is the ability to compel a person to act through threat of harm or by use of

physical force. Coercive force can be positive, in the sense that a group may provide

security to its members (such as policing and defense of territory), or it may be negative,

ANA 3-24

in the sense that a group may intimidate or threaten group members or outsiders. One

essential role of government is to monopolize coercive force within its territory in order

to provide physical security to its citizens. Where the state fails to provide security to its

citizens or becomes a threat to them, citizens may seek alternative security guarantees

from an ethnic, political, religious, or tribal group in the AO. Insurgents, and other

nongovernmental groups, may possess considerable coercive force, in the form of

paramilitary units, tribal militias, gangs, or organizational security personnel that they use

to gain power over a civilian population. These groups may be using their coercive force

for a variety of purposes unrelated to the insurgency, such as protecting their own

community members, carrying out vendettas, or engaging in criminal activities. For

example, what may appear to be insurgent violence against “innocent civilians” could in

fact be a tribal blood feud unrelated to the insurgency.

Social Capital

3-57. Social capital refers to the power of individuals and groups to utilize social

networks of reciprocity and exchange to accomplish their goals. In many non-Western

societies, patron-client relationships are an important form of social capital. In a system

based on patron-client relationships, an individual in a powerful position provides goods,

services, security, or other resources to followers in exchange for political sup- port or

loyalty, thereby amassing power. COIN forces must identify, where possible, which

groups and individuals have social capital and how they attract and maintain followers.

Economic Power

3-58. Economic power is the power of groups or individuals to use economic incentives

and disincentives to change people’s behavior. Economic systems can be formal or

informal, or a mixture of both. In weak or failed states, where the formal economy may

be functioning in a diminished capacity, the informal economy plays a central role in

people’s daily lives. For example, in many societies, monies and other economic goods

are distributed though the tribal or clan networks and are connected to indigenous

patronage systems. Those groups able to provide their members with economic resources

through an informal economy (whether smuggling, black market activities, barter, or

exchange) gain followers and may amass considerable political power. Counterinsurgents

must therefore be aware of the local informal economy and evaluate the role played by

various groups and individuals within it. Insurgent organizations may also attract

followers through criminal activities that provide income.

Authority

3-59. Authority is power that is attached to positions and is justified by the beliefs of the

obedient. There are three primary types of authority:

Rational-legal authority, which is grounded in law and contract, codified in

impersonal rules, and commonly found in developed, capitalist societies.

ANA 3-24

Charismatic authority, which is exercised by leaders who develop allegiance

among their followers because of their unique, individual charismatic appeal,

whether ethical, religious, political, or social.

Traditional authority, which is usually invested in a hereditary line or in a

particular office by a higher power.

3-60. Traditional authority, which relies on the precedent of history, is a common type of

authority in non-Western societies. In particular, tribal and religious forms of

organization rely heavily on traditional authority. Traditional authority figures often

wield enough power, especially in rural areas, to single-handedly drive an insurgency.

Understanding the types of authority at work in the formal and informal political systems

of the AO helps COIN forces identify the agents of influence who can help or hinder the

accomplishment of objectives.

Interests and Economics

3-61. After mapping the social structure, evaluating the culture of the society as a whole

and that of each group within the society, and identifying who holds formal and informal

power and why, COIN forces should consider how to use the capabilities at their disposal

to reduce support for insurgents and gain support for the legitimate government.

3-62. To accomplish this task, requires COIN forces to understand the population’s

interests, meaning the core motivations that drive behavior, such as physical security,

basic necessities, economic well-being, political participation, and social identity. During

times of instability when the government cannot function, the groups and organizations to

which an individual belongs provide physical security, basic necessities, economic

resources, and political identity. Understanding a group’s interests illuminates the various

opportunities available to a commander to meet or frustrate those interests with the

capabilities at his or her disposal. A group’s interests may become grievances if the

government does not fulfill the group’s needs.

Physical Security

3-63. During an insurgency or any period of political instability, the primary interest of

the civilian population is physical security for themselves and their families. When

government forces fail to provide security or threaten the security of civilians, the civilian

population is much more likely to seek alternative security guarantees from insurgents,

militias, or other armed groups. This process can drive an insurgency. However, when

government forces provide physical security, civilians are more likely to support the

government against the insurgents. Commanders should therefore identify who is

providing security to each group within the civilian population. The provision of security

must occur in conjunction with political and economic reform.

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Essential Services

3-64. Other interests of a population include that which is necessary to sustain life, such

as food, water, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment. Stabilizing a populace requires

meeting all these essential needs. People pursue these needs until they are met, at any

cost and from any source. If an insurgent source provides for the populace’s needs, the

populace will support that source. This may impede mission accomplishment. If the

government provides that which is necessary to sustain life, the population is more likely

to support the government. Commanders should therefore identify who is providing basic

life necessities to each group within the civilian population.

Economy

3-65. Individuals and groups within a social system satisfy their economic interests

through the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services. How

individuals within a society satisfy their economic needs depends on the level and type of

economic development. For instance, in a rural-based society, land ownership may be a

chief component of any economic development plan. For a more urban society, jobs in

both the public and private sector may be the biggest issue of contention.

3-66. Economic disparities between groups may drive political instability, and economic

disenfranchisement may be a core grievance of insurgent groups. Insurgent leadership or

traditional authority figures often use real or perceived societal injustices to drive an

insurgency, such as economic disenfranchisement, exploitative economic arrangements,

or a significant income disparity that creates (or allows for) intractable class distinctions.

The economic system within an AO may be adversely affected by military operations

and/or insurgent actions. This can cause the population to resent the government. On the

other hand, restoration of production and distribution systems can energize the economy,

create jobs and growth, and positively influence local perceptions. Commanders should

evaluate whether the society has a functioning economy, whether civilians have fair

access to land and property, and how to minimize the economic grievances of the civilian

population in order to reduce support for insurgency and increase support for the

government.

Political Participation

3-67. Another interest of the civilian population is political participation. Many

insurgencies begin because certain groups within the society perceive that they have been

denied political rights. In order to satisfy their political interests, groups may use

preexisting cultural narratives and symbols to mobilize for political action. Very often,

they will come together around traditional or charismatic authority figures. Commanders

should investigate whether all members of the civilian population have a guarantee of

political participation; whether there is ethnic, religious, or other discrimination; and

whether there are legal, social, or other policies that contribute to the insurgency.

Commanders should also identify what narratives mobilize political action within the

group and who their traditional or charismatic authority figures are.

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LANGUAGES

3-68. The languages used in an AO have a major impact on operations. Languages must

be identified so language training, communication aids such as phrase cards, and

requisitioning of translators can be accomplished. Translators are critical for intelligence

collection, interaction with local citizens and community leaders, and development of

products for information operations. The mission cannot proceed without them.

3-69. Another aspect of language involves transliteration of names not normally written

using the English alphabet. This affects all intelligence operations, to include collection,

analysis, fusion, and targeting. In countries that do not use the English alphabet, a theater-

wide standard should be set for spelling names. Without a spelling standard, it can be

difficult to conduct effective analysis. (This problem is compounded in cultures where

people use different names depending on the context in which the name is asked.)

Unfamiliar and similar place names can confuse map reading and cause targeting errors.

In addition, insurgents may be released from custody if their name is misidentified. To

overcome these problems, there must be one spelling standard for a theater. Because of

the interagency nature of COIN operations, the standard must also be agreed upon by

non-ANA agencies.

EVALUATE THE THREAT

3-70. The purpose of evaluating the insurgency and other related threats to the mission is

to understand the enemy, enemy capabilities, enemy vulnerabilities, and opportunities

commanders may be able to exploit. Evaluating an insurgency is difficult. Neatly arrayed

enemy orders of battle are not available and are not the critical information commanders

require. Commanders require knowledge of difficult-to-measure characteristics of the

threat, such as insurgent goals, grievances exploited by the insurgents, means used by the

insurgents to generate support, the organization of insurgent forces, and accurate

locations of key insurgent leaders. However, insurgents usually look no different from the

general populace and do their best to blend with noncombatants. The structure of

insurgent groups is often adaptive and flexible, and they may publicly claim different

motivations and goals than what is truly driving their actions. Further complicating

matters, insurgent organizations are often rooted in ethnic or tribal groups and they often

take part in criminal activities or link themselves to political parties, charities, or religious

organizations. This blurs the lines as to what and who the threat is. The following

characteristics of an insurgency provide a basis for evaluating the threat and are discussed

in depth in Appendix B:

Insurgent objectives.

Insurgent motivations.

Popular support/tolerance.

Support activities, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

Information activities, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

Political activities, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

Violent activities, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

Organization.

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Key leaders and personalities.

3-71. Of the preceding characteristics, knowledge of objectives, motivations, and means

of generating popular support/tolerance will often be the most important intelligence

requirements and the most difficult to ascertain. In particular, generating popular

support/tolerance often has the greatest impact on the insurgency’s long-term

effectiveness. This is usually the center of gravity of an insurgency. Support/tolerance,

provided either willingly or unwillingly by the populace, results in safe havens, freedom

of movement, logistic support, financial support, intelligence, and new personnel for the

insurgency. It should be noted that support/tolerance is often generated using violent

coercion and intimidation of the people. In these cases, even if the people do not favor the

insurgent cause, they are forced to tolerate the insurgents or provide them material

support.

3-72. Generating popular support has a positive effect on an insurgent organization. As

the insurgent group gains support, its capabilities grow, which in turn enables it to gain

more support. Insurgents generally view popular support as a zero-sum game in which a

gain in support for their movement is a loss for the government and a loss of support for

the government is a gain for the insurgents.

3-73. Although violence is generally the most visible aspect of the insurgency, it can

represent only a small portion of the insurgent effort. Support activities, such as

recruitment, securing finances, and securing logistics, are more difficult to detect, but

often more widespread and important to the insurgency than violence. It is important to

track the violent actions of insurgents, but this should not be done at the expense of

understanding the other characteristics of the insurgency.

3-74. As explained in chapter 1, insurgents are by nature an asymmetric threat. They do

not use terrorist and guerrilla tactics because they are cowards afraid of a “fair fight.”

They use these tactics because they are the best means available for achieving their goals.

Terrorist and guerrilla attacks are usually planned to achieve the greatest political and

informational impact with the lowest amount of risk to the insurgents. This means that

commanders must not simply understand insurgent tactics and targeting; they must also

understand how violence is used to achieve the goals of the insurgent organization and

how violent actions are linked to political and informational actions.

3-75. Attitudes and perceptions play a very important role in understanding the threat. It

is important to know how the population perceives the insurgents, the host nation, and

your forces. In addition local government and insurgent perceptions of one another and of

your forces is also very important. Attitudes and perceptions of different groups and

organizations inform decision-making processes and shape popular thinking on the

legitimacy of the actors in the war.

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Insurgency-related Threats

3-76. The presence of an insurgency with widespread support in a state usually means the

government of the state is weak and losing control. In such situations, criminal

organizations and nongovernmental militia forces can become powerful.

Criminal Networks

3-77. Though not necessarily a part of the insurgency, criminal networks can further

undermine the authority of the state through banditry, hijackings, kidnappings,

smuggling, and other disruptive activities. Insurgent organizations often link themselves

to criminal networks in order to secure additional sources of funding and logistics. In

some cases, insurgent networks and criminal networks become indistinguishable. As

commanders work to reassert government control of an area, they need to know what

criminal networks are present, what their activities are, and how they interact with the

insurgency.

Nongovernmental Militias

3-78. As the state weakens and violence increases, people look for ways to protect

themselves. If the state cannot provide protection, people may organize into armed

militias to protect themselves. Examples of this are the warlords that inhabit remote parts

of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. If militias are outside of the control of the

government, they are often disruptive to ending the insurgency. They may become more

powerful than the government, particularly at a local level. They may also fuel the

insurgency and a downward spiral into full-scale civil war if they conduct their own

armed attacks on insurgents.

3-79. Although militias may not be an immediate threat to ANA forces, they constitute a

long-term threat to the law and order within the state. They should be tracked by

intelligence in the same manner as an insurgent group. The intent of this analysis is to

understand what role militias play in the insurgency, what role they play in politics, and

how they can be disarmed.

Opportunities

3-80. As the threat is evaluated and the interests and attitudes of the people are learned, it

becomes possible to identify divisions between the insurgents and the people as well as

between the government and the people. For instance, if the insurgent ideology is not

popular, the insurgents may rely on intimidation to generate support. Another example

would be discovering that the insurgents gain support by providing social services that

the government neglects. Determining such divisions provides opportunities for crafting

friendly operations that expand splits between the insurgents and the people or lessen the

divides between the government and the people.

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DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION

3-81. The purpose of this IPB step is to understand insurgent strategies and tactics so they

may be effectively countered. The initial determination of threat courses of action focuses

on two levels of analysis. The first is determining the overall strategy, or combination of

strategies, selected by an insurgency to achieve its goals. The second is determining

tactical courses of action used in support of the strategy.

INSURGENT STRATEGIES

3-82. As indicated in Chapter 1, there are five general strategies insurgents may follow:

Conspiratorial.

Protracted popular war.

Traditional.

Military-focus.

Urban warfare.

3-83. These approaches may be combined with one another or occur in parallel in the

same AO as different insurgent groups follow different paths. In addition, insurgents may

change strategies over time. The type of strategy pursued affects the insurgents’

organization, the types of activities they conduct, and the emphasis they place on

different activities. It should be noted that insurgents may be inept at the use of a given

strategy, or they may misread the operational environment and use an inappropriate

strategy. Knowledge of misapplication of strategy or the use of different strategies by

different insurgent groups may provide opportunities that can be exploited by

counterinsurgents.

Conspiratorial

3-84. A conspiratorial strategy relies on the secret creation of a political body that

exploits popular revolution, the actions of other insurgents, or weakness in the

government to seize control. Insurgent organizations following this strategy generally

conduct very few overt violent or informational actions until they believe the conditions

are set for them to seize power. Their cadre is large relative to the number of the

combatants in the organization and they may have a small mass base or no mass base at

all. The organization will usually be small, secretive, disciplined, and tightly controlled

by leadership. Insurgencies following a conspiratorial strategy may be countered

effectively by targeting leaders and cadre through direct action. However, information

operations and political or economic programs should be used to prevent the government

from weakening to the point that conspiratorial insurgents can seize power.

Military-focus

3-85. The military-focus strategy relies almost completely on violence. Followers of this

strategy believe the populace shares a general resentment for the government and that

violence will create the conditions for overthrowing the government. They further believe

ANA 3-24

that, as the populace sees insurgents fighting the government on their behalf, it will be

motivated to support the insurgency. Insurgent organizations following this strategy tend

to have leaders and combatants, but little, if any, cadre or mass base. This strategy has

rarely been effective historically, although the Cuban revolution is a well-known success.

Targeting leaders and combatants through direct action is often the best way to counter an

insurgent group using a military- focus strategy. However, political, economic, and social

programs can be used to bolster support for the government and make it impossible for

the insurgents to gain support through violent actions.

Urban

3-86. An urban strategy relies on terrorism in urban areas. The intent of the terrorist

activities is to incite repression by COIN forces that bolsters support to the insurgency. In

addition, practitioners of the urban strategy may seek to tie-down large numbers of COIN

forces in cities so they may gain freedom of movement in rural areas. They may also

infiltrate and subvert government and security forces in urban areas. Insurgent

organizations using this strategy tend to be composed of small, compartmentalized cells.

Like the military-focus strategy, the cadre and mass base in the organization will

generally be small relative to the number of combatants. Countering the urban strategy

relies on effectively securing cities without being repressive. As in countering other

strategies, information operations, political programs, economic programs, and social

programs may be used to isolate the insurgents and ensure support to the government.

Protracted Popular War

3-87. Protracted popular war is the best-known, most successful insurgent strategy and is

most closely associated with Mao Zedong. It relies on the slow development of popular

support while simultaneously undermining the will, legitimacy, and popular support of

counterinsurgents. This strategy makes the best use of asymmetries between insurgents

and counterinsurgents.

3-88. It need not follow those phases. The insurgents also need not progress to

conventional war. Information and political activities supported by terrorism and/or

guerrilla warfare may be sufficient to defeat counterinsurgents. In some cases,

information and political activities may be effective without any violent action.

3-89. There are many different ways of structuring an insurgent organization to follow

this strategy, and the structure will likely change with both time and location on the

battlefield. However, they tend to rely on a large mass base of supporters. Other

indicators of this strategy are overt violence, heavy use of information and political

activities, and focus on building popular support for the insurgency. Protracted popular

war is best countered by winning the “hearts and minds” of the populace and separating

the leaders, cadre, and combatants from the mass base through information operations,

civil-military operations, economic programs, social programs, and political action.

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Traditional Strategy

3-90. A traditional strategy relies on building an insurgency along the lines of ethnic,

tribal, or religious groups. Such insurgencies draw heavily upon the identity of a group to

differentiate themselves from the government. When this strategy is used effectively,

entire communities may join the insurgency together. This strategy is strongly associated

with liberation insurgencies as insurgent leaders create an “us-and- them” gap between

the government and the ethnic, tribal, or religious group and use this division to

encourage others to join the insurgency. Insurgencies following this strategy tend to have

a large mass base of passive and active supporters built around pre-existing social

networks. There also tend to be many auxiliaries. The number of cadre is generally small,

as the insurgency relies on traditional authority structures and is generally not intent on

spreading a new political system. The number of combatants varies, but there are often

large numbers of part-time combatants. There may or may not be many full-time

combatants. Leaders usually come from traditional leadership positions, such as religious

leaders, tribal chiefs, or tribal councils. Insurgencies using a traditional strategy can be

difficult to counter, particularly if they are fighting to liberate their group from the

government. Generally speaking, political or economic deals are necessary to end the

conflict.

TACTICAL COURSES OF ACTION

3-91. Insurgents base their tactical courses of action on their capabilities and intentions.

The capabilities of an organization are the support, information, political, and violent

capabilities evaluated in the third step of IPB. The intentions come from goals,

motivations, strategy, culture, perceptions, and leadership personalities. It is important to

understand that many different courses of action can happen in any given region at

any given time and that tactical courses of action change with both time and location.

People and their attitudes, both within the nation and often without, are the ultimate

targets of the insurgents in all operations. Therefore, special attention must be paid to

what effects insurgent courses of action have on the people and how the insurgents

achieve those effects. Finally, it is important to note that tactical actions can have

strategic effects. This is because insurgent propaganda and media reporting can reach a

global audience, multiplying the effects of insurgent tactical actions. (Tactical courses of

action are covered in greater depth in Appendix B.)

3-92. The purpose of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations is to

develop the intelligence necessary for addressing the issues that drive the insurgency.

Several factors are particularly important for ISR operations in COIN environments.

These include:

A focus on the local populace.

Collection occurring at all echelons.

Localized nature of insurgencies.

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All Soldiers are collectors.

Insurgent use of complex terrain.

3-93. Intelligence gaps and information requirements determined during IPB may range

from the location of insurgent leaders, to local perceptions of insurgents by the populace,

to the status of the local political parties. In general, collection focuses on the populace,

the insurgents, and the local government.

3-94. The fact that all units collect and report information combined with the localized

nature of insurgencies means that the flow of intelligence in COIN is more bottom up

than top-down. Pushing intelligence collection assets down to the tactical level therefore

benefits all echelons. Its advantages include improving the collection capabilities of

tactical units, ensuring reports go through appropriate channels to reach higher-echelon

audiences, and getting collectors to where the insurgents are.

3-95. While collection may occur in any unit and collectors may be pushed down to the

lowest levels, the overall intelligence synchronization plan (formerly the collection plan)

must remain synchronized so that all echelons receive the information they require. There

are several means of accomplishing this. One is to ensure priority intelligence

requirements (PIRs) are embedded at all echelons. They may be tailored to local or

regional circumstances, but local and theater collection should support one another.

Headquarters monitor requests for information from lower echelons and tasking from

higher echelons so they can get information to units that require it in a timely manner. It

is important to ensure all Soldiers understand the PIRs. This enables them to know when

they should report something they have seen or heard and what they should report.

3-96. Feedback from analysts and operators to collectors is important to synchronize the

ISR effort. This response lets collectors know a report is of interest and that there should

be follow-up. Such feedback may come from any unit at any echelon.

3-97. Also affecting intelligence synchronization is the requirement to work closely with

governmental agencies, national security and intelligence organizations, and third-

country intelligence organizations. Synchronization of the efforts of the various agencies

and organizations is driven by national-level ISR planning, but this coordination occurs at

all echelons. Communication among collection managers and collectors down to the

Kandak level is important to ensuring work is not duplicated unnecessarily and circular

reporting does not occur. (See the Intelligence Collaboration and Fusion section, below).

3-98. Insurgents often seek to use complex terrain to their advantage. Collection

managers do not ignore areas of complex terrain. In addition, insurgents use “seams”

between maneuver units to their advantage (Seams are boundaries between units not

adequately covered by any unit.). Collection managers must have a means of monitoring

seams in order to ensure the enemy cannot establish undetected bases of operation.

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THE INTELLIGENCE-OPERATIONS DYNAMIC

3-99. Intelligence and operations have a dynamic relationship in all operations.

Intelligence drives operations and successful operations generate intelligence. For

instance, an operation increasing the security and general happiness of a town often

increases the amount of information offered by its inhabitants. This results in more

effective operations. The reverse of this is also true. Operations conducted without

accurate intelligence may upset the people and cause them to offer less information.

3-100. In many cases, tactical units new to an AO have little intelligence on the AO.

Operations will be conducted with the purpose of gathering intelligence. Even in

permissive environments where a great deal is known about the enemy, there is an

intelligence aspect to all operations.

3-101. Because intelligence and operations are so closely related, it is important that

collectors be linked directly to the analysts and operators they support and remain

responsive to their requirements. Further, collectors should not passively wait for

requirements, but closely monitor the operational environment and recommend

requirements on their own.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL REPORTING

3-102. Human intelligence (HUMINT) is a category of intelligence derived from

information collected and provided by human sources. During COIN operations, much

intelligence is based on information gathered from people, to include informants

(HUMINT sources) and captured insurgents. HUMINT is often the primary intelligence

category in COIN. Because every Soldier is a potential collector, any interaction with the

populace may result in human intelligence reporting. This means that HUMINT will

often be based on information from operational reporting as well as dedicated HUMINT

collectors.

3-103. The lives of people offering HUMINT are in danger. Insurgents continuously try

to defeat ISR collection operations by intimidating or murdering sources. Soldiers must

protect the identity of HUMINT sources.

3-104. ANA forces should not expect people to willingly provide information if

insurgents have the ability to violently intimidate them. HUMINT reporting increases if

COIN forces protect the populace from the insurgents and people begin to believe the

insurgents will lose the conflict. To maintain increased cooperation from the people, it is

very important that insurgents not be allowed to return and murder or intimidate them. If

insurgents do return to an area, COIN forces lose credibility with its inhabitants.

3-105. Residents may approach patrols and offer them information. Soldiers should take

the information offered and, if appropriate, establish a means of contacting the individual.

Patrol members receiving the information should then report it as part of their debriefing.

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If possible, trained HUMINT personnel should be involved in any contacting of the

source. This is to ensure the safety of both ANA personnel and local residents.

3-106. People will often provide inaccurate information to ANA Soldiers. They may

simply be spreading rumors or providing inaccurate information purposefully to use

ANA forces to settle tribal, ethnic, or business disputes. In some cases, insurgents

provide bad information to Soldiers to lead them into ambushes, to get them to undertake

an operation that will upset the population, to learn about ANA planning time and tactical

procedures, or to stretch ANA forces thin by causing them to react to false reports. For

these reasons, the accuracy of HUMINT should be verified before being used to support

direct action.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS

3-107. An effective means of HUMINT collection is to build a network of HUMINT

sources. A HUMINT network provides the COIN equivalent of the reconnaissance and

surveillance conducted by scouts in conventional operations. These networks serve as

“eyes and ears” on the street and provide an early warning system for tracking insurgent

activity. Although Soldiers will regularly get “walk-in” or “walk-up” intelligence reports

from citizens, the only counterintelligence personnel are trained and authorized personnel

to operate a HUMINT network. With the potential danger informants face if identified,

and the potential danger to troops involved, only counterintelligence personnel should

operate a HUMINT networks and develop HUMINT sources. All Soldiers may record

information given to them by walk-up informants or contacts with whom they have a

regular liaison relationship; however, they may not develop HUMINT sources or

networks.

NONTRADITIONAL HUMAN INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

3-108. As previously stated, the interactions of any Soldier with the populace can

generate HUMINT reporting if troops know PIRs and conduct after-action debriefings. It

is therefore imperative that Soldiers know what information is reportable and that every

patrol is debriefed. These debriefings should be as detailed as possible in order to ensure

PIRs are accurately answered. In addition, because of their continuous contact with the

populace, Soldiers regularly generate new potential sources for HUMINT personnel to

develop. Analysts and HUMINT collectors should work closely with operations staffs

and other personnel to ensure new sources are properly developed. Some valuable

sources of HUMINT include the following:

Patrol debriefings and after-action reviews. Patrols regularly encounter

individuals offering information and observe new enemy tactics and techniques.

Patrol debriefings are especially important to units at brigade level and below,

though the information collected can be of higher echelon significance.

Civil affairs action reports. These are especially useful for gathering

information about politics, economy, and infrastructure. Intelligence personnel

also regularly come into contact with individuals offering information.

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Psychological operations (PSYOP) action reports. Intelligence personnel

conduct opinion polls and gather information on community attitudes,

perceptions, and interests/grievances. Intelligence personnel also regularly

encounter individuals offering information.

Commando reporting. Commandos and other special forces often work closely

with local nationals and produce valuable HUMINT reports.

Leadership liaison. Commanders and leaders regularly meet with their

counterparts in the local government security forces and with community leaders.

These meetings often result in the passing of information or tips.

Contracting. Contracting officers work with national contractors, both local and

external, performing support functions or building national infrastructure.

Contractors may offer information to contracting officers.

Multinational operations centers. These provide a venue for sharing

information between coalition and ANA personnel.

Tips hotlines. Telephone or e-mail hotlines provide a means for local citizens to

provide information without undue exposure to insurgent retribution. They are

especially useful for time-sensitive intelligence, such as warning of an attack, or

the current location of an insurgent.

Local personnel. There will be times when local civilians, such as contractors or

journalists, offer information to Soldiers. In addition, military intelligence

personnel can collect information concerning local people.

CAPTURED INSURGENTS AND DEFECTORS

3-109. Captured insurgents and defectors from the insurgency are a very important source

of HUMINT. The information they provide about the internal workings of an insurgency

are usually better than any other HUMINT source can provide. In addition, they have

valuable insight into the perceptions, motivations, goals, morale, organization, and tactics

of an insurgent organization. Both captured insurgents and defectors should be

thoroughly questioned on all aspects of an insurgency discussed in the IPB discussion,

above. The answers provided should be compared with captured equipment, pocket litter,

and documents to build a better understanding of the insurgency. While properly trained

Soldiers can conduct immediate tactical questioning of captured insurgents or defectors,

only trained HUMINT personnel can thoroughly interrogate such subjects (Refer to

Chapter 7 and Appendix C of this manual, for more information on interrogation of

captured personnel.).

SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE CONSIDERATIONS

3-110. Because all Soldiers and are potential collectors, all day-to-day tactical operations

are ad- dressed in the ISR plan. This means every patrol or mission should be provided

intelligence collection requirements in addition to operations requirements.

3-111. Overt area and zone reconnaissance are excellent means for tactical units to learn

more about their AO, to include the terrain, infrastructure, people, government, local

leaders, and insurgents. Overt reconnaissance by patrols allows commanders to fill

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intelligence gaps and develop relationships with local leaders, while simultaneously

providing security to the populace.

3-112. Covert reconnaissance and surveillance operations employing scouts or concealed

observation posts are often ineffective in urban areas, suburban areas, close-knit

communities, and other places where the populace is alert and suspicious of outsiders.

Under these circumstances, it is very difficult for scouts to conduct reconnaissance or

surveillance without being observed by insurgents or people who may tip off insurgents.

It is important that commanders and collection managers understand that reconnaissance

of a target may be noticed and cause insurgents to leave the area. Likewise, small groups

of scouts may be attractive targets for insurgent attacks if the scouts’ location is known.

For these reasons, the use of a HUMINT network or aerial imagery intelligence platforms

is often preferable to ground-based reconnaissance and surveillance. Successful ground

reconnaissance in populated areas requires leaders to be creative in how they put

personnel in place. For instance, dismounted movements at night, leaving a small “stay

behind” observation post while the rest of a patrol moves on, or secretly photographing a

place of interest while driving by may all be effective. However, commanders weigh the

benefits of these operations with the potential cost of insurgents having early warning of

counterinsurgent intentions.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR OTHER INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES

3-113. An intelligence discipline is a well-defined area of intelligence collection,

processing, exploitation, and reporting using a specific category of technical or human

resources. The following discussion addresses COIN-specific considerations for selected

intelligence disciplines and information types.

OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

3-114. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is a valuable tool for understanding the

environment. It is often more useful than any other discipline for understanding public

attitudes and public support for insurgents and counterinsurgents. OSINT is also an

important means of determining the effectiveness of information operations. Monitoring

a wide variety of media in multiple languages benefits the COIN effort. If possible, this

should occur at every echelon with collection requirements, varying by the kinds of

media that are important at each level. For instance, reporting by major news networks

often matters a great deal at the theater level, while local newspapers or radio stations

may be of importance to a tactical unit.

IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE

3-115. Static imagery, such as photos of facilities, is useful in operational planning and

for detecting long-term changes in structures or activities.

3-116. Real-time video is critical to assessing whether particular locations are likely sites

of insurgent activity and may be used to track insurgents during operations.

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TARGET EXPLOITATION AND DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION

3-117. Documents and pocket litter, as well as information found in computers and cell

phones, can provide critical information analysts need to map insurgent organization,

capabilities and intent. Target Exploitation (TAREX) and document exploitation

(DOCEX) are also of great benefit to interrogators in substantiating what detainees know

and whether they are telling the truth.

3-118. TAREX in a COIN environment is like evidence collection in a law enforcement

environment. Units must have procedures in place to ensure captured equipment and

documents are tracked accurately and attached to the correct insurgents. While this

evidence may not need to be sufficient to convict in a court of law (though in some cases

it does), it needs to be sufficient to justify the use of operational resources to apprehend

the individuals in question. Pushing HUMINT or law enforcement personnel to the

kandak level and below can improve TAREX/DOCEX by tactical units. Procedures for

ensuring that tactical units get the results of higher-level TAREX/DOCEX are also

important. Units must be able to receive intelligence collected from the documents,

equipment, and personnel they capture in a timely manner to fully benefit from the

operation and adapt to their local situation.

PROPERTY OWNERSHIP RECORDS

3-119. Property ownership records include census records, deeds, and other means of

determining ownership of land and buildings. They help counterinsurgents to determine

who should or should not be living in a specific area and aid in securing the populace. In

some cases, it may be necessary for Soldiers to go door to door and collect census data

themselves.

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

3-120. Insurgents often adapt their tactics, techniques, and procedures rapidly. This may

include the use of improvised explosive devices, homemade mortars, and other pieces of

customized military equipment. Technical intelligence on insurgent equipment is of

benefit for understanding their capabilities.

3-121. Insurgents place heavy emphasis on gathering intelligence. They do so using

informants, double agents, reconnaissance, surveillance, open-source media, and open-

source imagery. Insurgents can potentially use any person interacting with ANA or

multinational personnel as an informant. These include all of the same people that ANA

forces use as potential HUMINT sources. This makes operations security very important.

It also means ANA personnel must carefully screen the contractors, informants,

translators, and other personnel working with them.

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3-122. Background screenings should include the collection of personal and biometric

data and a search through available reporting databases to determine that the person is not

an insurgent. Identification badges may be useful for local nationals working on ANA

and local government facilities. However, these badges may be forged or stolen, and

insurgents can use them to identify people working with the government.

3-123. Insurgents, criminals, political organizations, and disaffected individuals may also

provide ANA personnel with false information. They do so to create animosity between

troops and the populace, to get Soldiers to act against local enemies, to learn about the

reaction time and patterns of ANA operations, and to confuse the COP. This means

HUMINT collectors should screen informants and get feedback from analysts and

operations personnel on the accuracy of intelligence provided.

3-124. Insurgents have their own reconnaissance and surveillance networks. Because they

usually blend well with the populace, they can execute reconnaissance of targets without

easily being identified. They also have an early warning system composed of citizens

who inform them of ANA movements. Identifying the techniques and weaknesses of

enemy reconnaissance and surveillance enables commanders to detect signs of insurgent

preparations and to surprise insurgents by neutralizing their early warning system.

3-125. Insurgents may also have a SIGINT capability based on commercially available

scanners and radios, wire taps, or captured equipment. If Soldiers use unencrypted radios

or phones, it is possible for insurgents to collect information from them. From an

operations security standpoint, it is therefore preferable for troops to not use commercial

radios or phones. If Soldiers have to use commercial equipment or unencrypted

communications, they should employ brevity codes to reduce insurgents’ ability to collect

on them.

3-126. The purpose of analysis is to fuse raw intelligence into products that support

COIN operations. Intelligence analysis in COIN is very challenging. This is due to the

need to understand perceptions and culture, the need to track hundreds or thousands of

personalities, the local nature of insurgencies, and the tendency of insurgencies to change

over time.

3-127. Databases are very important for analyzing insurgent activities and personalities.

At a minimum, there should be a common NATIONAL database of insurgent actions and

another containing all intelligence reporting. These should be accessible by all analysts in

theater and include all reporting from all units and organizations. This is to ensure a

common operational picture can be developed.

3-128. Because all echelons collect and use intelligence, all staffs are heavily involved in

analysis. Units are simultaneously intelligence producers and consumers. While this is

normal at brigade and above, Kandak staffs often do not have the personnel to collect

patrol debriefs, analyze incoming intelligence from multiple sources, produce finished

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intelligence products, and disseminate products to the appropriate consumers. In many

cases brigade intelligence sections may also not be adequate for a COIN environment.

3-129. Pushing additional analysts down to Kandak and brigade staffs is important to

ensure tactical units have the analytical support they require. There are instances when an

analyst can be beneficial at the company level. This is the case when a maneuver

company must collect large amounts of information on the local populace and insurgents.

An analyst can aid the company commander and leaders in the collection and processing

of this information and develop an operational picture of the AO. Pushing analysts down

to the brigade level and below places analysts closer to collectors, improves the COP, and

helps ensure higher echelon staffs receive answers to their PIRs. If no additional analysts

are available, commanders may assign non-intelligence personnel to work in the

intelligence section.

3-130. Tactical analysis at the brigade and below is the basis for operational-level

intelligence developed at higher echelons. This is due to the bottom-up flow of

intelligence in COIN. Kandaks and brigades develop intelligence for their AOs, while

higher echelons fuse it into NATION-wide intelligence of the insurgency. Operational-

level intelligence adds national and international politics and their effects on the

operational environment.

3-131. There are two basic kinds of analysis done at all echelons: analysis of enemy

actions and network analysis. Analysis of enemy actions is commonly known as current

operations. It focuses on what the enemy is doing now. Network analysis focuses on the

people in an AO and develops an understanding of interrelationships between them and

the ideas and beliefs driving their actions. Generally speaking, current operations

information provides threat warning and metrics of enemy capabilities, while network

analysis provides intelligence for targeting and planning.

CURRENT OPERATIONS

3-132. Current operations intelligence supports a commander’s understanding of what the

enemy is currently doing. The basic tasks of analysts working in current operations are:

Conduct analysis on past and current enemy actions (event-pattern analysis) and

look for changes in insurgent tactics or strategy.

Track the effects of friendly operations on the populace and enemy.

Provide intelligence support to ongoing operations.

Disseminate immediate threat warnings to appropriate consumers.

3-133. Intelligence for current operations comes from a variety of sources, but operations

reports are particularly important. This is because current enemy activities are more often

reported by patrols, units conducting raids, or observation posts than they are by

dedicated intelligence collectors. Observation Intelligence (OSINT) will also be

important for tracking the effects of information operations. Current operations analysis

depends on the insurgent actions database for determining changes in insurgent tactics

and techniques.

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NETWORK ANALYSIS

3-134. The purpose of network analysis is to provide commanders with an understanding

of the insurgency and what is driving it. Network analysis requires a large investment of

time. Analysts may have to spend weeks or months going through large amounts of

multiple-source intelligence reporting in order to provide an accurate picture of insurgent

groups. The investment is worth it, however. The more accurate and thorough the

intelligence on insurgent organizations and the operational environment, the more

effective friendly operations become. It is easy for intelligence personnel to be drawn into

current operations due to the time-sensitive and high-profile demands of such activity.

However, commanders must ensure that network analysis still occurs. The tasks of

network analysts are to:

Identify insurgent goals and motivations.

Identify the grievances exploited by insurgents.

Determine how culture, interests, and history inform insurgent and government

decision making.

Understand the links between political, religious, tribal, criminal, and other social

networks.

Determine how various networks and groups interact with insurgent networks.

Determine the structure and function of insurgent organizations.

Identify key insurgent activities and leaders.

Understand popular and insurgent perceptions of the nation, the insurgency, and

ANA military forces and how these affect the insurgency.

3-135. There are many techniques and tools used in network analysis. What makes them

all similar is that they examine interactions among individuals, groups, and beliefs within

the historic and cultural context of the operational environment. One of the more

important products of network analysis is an understanding of how the people in an AO

think. This knowledge allows predictive analysis of enemy actions along with the

development of effective information operations and civil-military operations. Such

cultural analysis is difficult because it requires a Soldier to understand the mindset of an

insurgent or average citizen. However, this knowledge is critical to ensuring operations

are effective (Network analysis is covered in more depth in Appendix D.).

INTELLIGENCE REACH

3-136. Intelligence reach (sometimes called reachback) refers to the ability to exploit

resources, capabilities, and expertise not physically located in the theater of operations.

Deployed or deploying units often use reach capabilities to “outsource” time-intensive

aspects of network analysis or socio-cultural factors analysis. This is particularly useful

when deployments occur with little warning and when organizations used for reach have

a great deal of expertise available on a given subject. Analysts may receive reach

assistance from the commands above them or from external sources.

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CONTINUITY

3-137. The complexity of analyzing an insurgency means it often takes analysts months

to fully understand the operational environment and the insurgency. For this reason,

analysts should maintain situational awareness of the insurgency for as long as possible.

This can be accomplished by having intelligence and other staff sections track the fight

from their home station. This flattens the learning curve of units rotating in to a theater

and increases their effectiveness during the critical first months of deployment.

3-138. The purpose of intelligence collaboration and fusion is to organize the collection

and analytical efforts of various units and organizations into a coherent and mutually

supportive intelligence effort. The common operational picture for an insurgency is

complex. Insurgencies don’t normally lend themselves to generalizations like “if this

leader is removed the insurgency is over” or “this group drives the insurgency.” It is

important not to oversimplify an insurgency. However, analysts and commanders still

require a means of defining and describing the enemy that can be commonly understood.

One means of aiding this process is to track and report the insurgency by region,

insurgent organization, key personalities, or by insurgent goals and motivations.

3-139. As noted earlier, insurgencies are often localized but have national or international

aspects to them. This complicates intelligence fusion between adjacent units and various

echelons. For instance, if numerous insurgent groups operate in one country, adjacent

Kandaks may face very different threats. The higher-echelon analysts must then

understand multiple insurgent organizations and determine what links there are, if any,

between them. Usually, Kandaks focus on the population and insurgents in their AO.

Higher-echelon analysts determine links and interactions among the people and

insurgents across unit boundaries. Theater-level analysts determine the major linkages

within the theater and internationally. Based on these requirements, a common database

based on intelligence reporting is a prerequisite for effective intelligence fusion.

3-140. Also complicating fusion is the fact that many government agencies and foreign

security forces are involved in COIN operations. Analysts must establish good working

relationships with various agencies in order to ensure they are able to fuse intelligence.

INTELLIGENCE CELL AND WORKING GROUPS

3-141. Intelligence community assets operating in an AO work in or coordinate with the

intelligence cell in one of the unit’s command posts under the staff supervision of the unit

intelligence officer. Examples of intelligence community assets operating in a potential

AO include the following:

MOI intelligence assets.

MOD intelligence assets.

HUMINT case officers.

Reports officers.

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Document exploitation teams.

Case officers.

Reports officers.

Special Operations Forces.

Special mission units.

Civil Affairs teams.

PSYOPS teams.

3-142. As necessary, intelligence officers form working groups/boards to synchronize

collection, analysis, and targeting efforts. Cells and working groups conduct regular

meetings to establish and maintain joint situational awareness, share collection priorities,

resolve conflicting activities and operations, discuss target development, and share results

of operations. These meetings build mutual trust and understanding of each member’s

mission, capabilities, and limitations. They are integrated with meetings of other staff

cells and working groups/boards.

3-143. An effective intelligence cell enhances the commander’s knowledge of enemy

activity, local peculiarities, and friendly forces operating in the unit’s AO. Incorporating

local government representatives and multinational partners into the intelligence cell

should also be considered in a COIN environment to foster teamwork, gain insight into

local customs and activities, and prepare the nation to assume the mission when

multinational partners depart the area.

PROTECTING SOURCES

3-144. Protection of sources is another important consideration when sharing intelligence.

Acting on intelligence can compromise its sources. This is why organizations may

sometimes choose to not share intelligence. However, use of the targeting process to

synchronize targeting decisions is usually a better means of protecting sources. This is

because the targeting board draws on information from the COP rather than specific

sources (See the targeting discussion in Chapter 5.).

NATIONAL INTEGRATION

3-145. COIN operations potentially require ANA personnel to work closely with

personnel from other nations. Sharing of intelligence with multinational forces is an

important and effective means of supporting COIN efforts.

3-146. Infiltration of the security forces by insurgents can create drawbacks to

intelligence sharing. Insurgents may learn what is known about them, gain insight into

intelligence sources and capabilities, and get early warning of targeting efforts.

3-147. When sharing intelligence it is important to understand the level of infiltration by

insurgents. Insofar as possible, intelligence should be tailored so required intelligence

still gets to the consumers, but it does not give away information about sources and

capabilities. In addition, care should be taken when providing targeting information and it

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should be done in such a way that insurgents do not receive early warning of an

upcoming operation. This will make the COIN effort more effective.

3-148. What makes intelligence analysis for COIN so distinct and so challenging is the

amount of cultural information that must be gathered and understood. However, to truly

grasp the environment of operations, commanders and their staffs must expend at least as

much effort understanding the people they are supporting as the enemy. All this

information is essential to get at the root causes of the insurgency and to determine the

best ways to combat it. Identifying the real problem and developing solutions is the

essence of the operational design process that is discussed in the next chapter.

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Chapter 4

Designing Counterinsurgency Operations

This chapter describes considerations for designing counterinsurgency campaigns and the

associated planning and operations. While campaign design is most often associated with

a general staff, understanding of design is necessary by all commanders and staffs.

THE IMPORTANCE OF CAMPAIGN DESIGN

4-1. In Chapter 1, insurgency was defined as an organized, protracted politico-military

struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing

insurgent control. Ultimately the long-term objective for both sides in that struggle

remains acceptance by the people of the state or region of the legitimacy of one side’s

claim to political power. If insurgency is a struggle between an insurgent group and

government authorities over the granting of legitimacy by the populace, then where does

the struggle begin and over what? The reason why an insurgency forms to challenge the

existing order is different in each case. For an ANA military commander directed to

counter an insurgency, knowing “why” an insurgency movement has gained support and

the purpose of external involvement is essential in designing the counterinsurgency

(COIN) campaign. Failure to do this can have disastrous consequences, as illustrated by

Napoleon’s experience in Spain.

4-2. Design and planning are qualitatively different yet interrelated activities essential for

solving complex problems. While planning activities receive consistent emphasis in both

doctrine and practice, discussion of design remains largely abstract and is rarely

practiced. Presented a problem, staffs often rush directly into planning without a clear

understanding of the complex environment of the situation, the purpose of military

involvement, and the approach required to address the real core issues. This situation is

particularly problematic when dealing with insurgencies. Campaign design informs and is

informed by planning and operations with an intellectual foundation that aids continuous

assessment of operations and the operational environment. The commander should lead

this design process and communicate the resulting design framework to other

commanders for planning and execution.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DESIGN AND PLANNING

4-3. It is important to understand the distinction between design and planning (See Figure

4-1). While both activities seek to formulate ways to bring about preferable futures, they

are cognitively different. Planning applies established procedures to solve a largely

understood problem within an accepted framework. Design inquires into the nature of a

problem to conceive a framework that can be used for solving that problem. In general,

planning is problem solving, while design is problem setting, Where planning focuses on

generating a plan—a series of executable actions—design focuses on learning about the

nature of an unfamiliar problem.

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4-4. When situations do not conform to established frames of reference—when the

hardest part of the problem is figuring out what the problem is—planning alone is

inadequate and design becomes essential. In these situations, absent a design process to

come to grips with the essential nature of the problem, planners default to doctrinal

norms, developing plans based on the familiar rather than an understanding of the real

situation. Design provides a means to conceptualize and hypothesize about the underlying

causes and dynamics that explain an unfamiliar problem. Design provides a means to

gain understanding of a complex problem and insights towards achieving a workable

solution. Although design should precede planning, design is continuous throughout the

operation, continuously testing and refining to ensure the relevance of military action to

the situation. In this sense, design guides and informs planning, preparation, execution,

and assessment. However, planning is necessary to translate a design into execution.

Figure 4-1. Design Planning Continuum

4-5. Planning focuses on the physical actions intended to have a direct effect on the

enemy or environment. A planner typically is assigned a mission and a set of resources,

and required to devise a plan to use those resources to accomplish that mission. The

planner starts with a design (whether explicit or implicit) and focuses on generating a

plan—a series of executable actions and control measures. Planning generally is

analytical and reductionist. It breaks the design into manageable pieces assignable as

tasks, which is essential to transforming the design into an executable plan. Planning

implies a stepwise process in which each step produces an output that is the necessary

input for the next step.

THE NATURE OF DESIGN

4-6. Given the difficult and multifaceted problems an insurgency presents, dialogue

among the commander, principal planners, members of the interagency team, and

government representatives provides many benefits to the design process. This

involvement of all participants is essential for effective COIN. The object of this

discourse is to achieve a level of situational understanding at which the approach to the

solution of the problem becomes clear. The underlying premise is that when participants

achieve a sufficient level of understanding the situation no longer appears complex; they

can exercise logic and intuition effectively. As a result, design focuses on rationalizing

the problem rather than explicitly developing courses of action.

4-7. COIN campaign design must be iterative because, by their nature, COIN efforts

require repeated assessments from different perspectives to see all the various factors and

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relationships required to gain adequate understanding. Every iteration is an opportunity to

learn more about the situation and make incremental improvements to the design. The

design team engages in constructing and continuously modifying two complementary

logics, or mental models. The first is the governing logic of the problem. The aim here

is to rationalize the problem situation—to construct a logical explanation, in the form of

an abstract model, of events observed in the real world. The second is the counter-logic—

the guiding logic of the campaign that unravels the problem logic. The essence of this

counter-logic is the success mechanism or sequence of interactions envisioned to achieve

a desired end state. This mechanism may not be a military activity—or it may involve

military actions in support of activities in other lines of operations. Once the designers

have constructed these models they are obligated to identify measures of effectiveness

and related information requirements that allow them to test the models over time. This

feedback becomes the basis for subsequent design iterations, which refine or reconstruct

the logics.

ELEMENTS OF DESIGN

4-8. The key elements of the design process include the following:

Discourse.

Systems thinking.

Model making.

Intuitive decision making.

Continuous assessment.

Structured learning.

4-9. Discourse is rigorous and structured critical discussion that provides an opportunity

for interactive learning, deepening shared understanding, and leveraging the collective

intelligence and experiences of many actors to enable design.

4-10. Systems thinking involves developing an understanding of the relationships within

the insurgency and the environment, also the relationships of actions within the various

lines of operations. This element is based on the perspective of the system sciences that

seeks to understand the interconnectedness, complexity, and wholeness of the elements of

systems in relation to one another.

4-11. In model making, the model describes an approach to the COIN campaign, initially

as a hypothesis. The model includes operational terms of reference and concepts that

shape the language governing the conduct (planning, preparation, execution, and

assessment) of the operation. It addresses questions like these: Will planning, preparation,

execution, and assessment activities use traditional constructs like center of gravity,

decisive points, and lines of operations? Or are other constructs—such as leverage points,

fault lines, or critical variables—more appropriate to the situation?

4-12. Intuitive decision making involves the act of reaching a conclusion that emphasizes

pattern recognition based on knowledge, judgment, experience, education, intelligence,

boldness, perception, and character. This approach focuses on assessment of the situation

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vice comparison of multiple options. The design emerges intuitively as understanding of

the insurgency deepens.

4-13. Continuous assessment is essential as an operation unfolds because of the inherent

complexity of COIN. Any design or model necessarily has mismatches with reality. The

object of continuous assessment is to identify where and how the design is working or

failing and to consider opportunities for redesign.

4-14. The objective of structured learning is to develop a reasonable initial design and

then learn, adapt, and iteratively and continuously improve that design as more about the

dynamics of the COIN problem become evident.

CAMPAIGN DESIGN FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

4-15. Through design commanders gain an understanding of the problem and the

intervention’s purpose within the strategic context. Communicating this understanding of

the problem, purpose, and context to subordinates allows them to exercise subordinates’

initiative. It facilitates decentralized execution and iterative assessment of operations at

all levels throughout the campaign. While traditional aspects of campaign design as

expressed in service doctrine remain relevant, they are not adequate for a discussion of

the broader design construct for a COIN environment. Inherent in this construct is the

tension created by understanding that military capabilities provide only one component of

an overall approach to a COIN campaign. Design of a COIN campaign must be viewed

naturally. Only a comprehensive approach employing all relevant design components,

including the other instruments of national power, is likely to reach the desired end state.

4-16. Campaign design begins with identification of the campaign’s purpose, as derived

from the policy aim. The purpose of the campaign provides context and logic for

operational and tactical decision making. Consequently, strategic goals must be

communicated clearly to commanders at every level. While strategy drives campaign

design, which in turn drives tactical actions, the reverse is also true. The observations of

tactical actions result in learning and greater understanding that may generate

modifications to the campaign design, which in turn may have strategic implications. The

COIN imperative to “learn and adapt” is essential in making the campaign design process

work correctly. Figure 4-2 (below) illustrates the iterative nature of COIN campaign

design and the large number of factors involved.

THE OPERATIONAL NARRATIVE

4-17. Guided by the purpose of the campaign, commanders articulate an operational logic

for the campaign that expresses in clear, concise, conceptual language a broad vision of

what they plan to accomplish. The operational logic is the commander’s assessment of

the problem and approach toward solving it. Ideally, the operational logic is expressed in

comprehensive terms, such as what the commander envisions achieving with various

components or particular lines of operations. Included in this operational logic is a

narrative of how the commander sees the campaign achieving the desired end state and a

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rationale for the design and required actions. This narrative, or “vision of resolution,” is

expressed as a broad goal. It helps subordinate commanders and planners, as well as

members of other agencies and organizations, see the direction the campaign is going. In

the same way, the vision of resolution can act as a unifying theme for interagency

planning.

COMPLEX PROBLEMS DEMAND COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTIONS

4-18. As in any other operation, effective problem solving is dependant on a detailed

understanding of the environment. This is particularly important in COIN. Although

members of the force never achieve perfect situational understanding, their understanding

should be aspirational—a continuous learning affair. The COIN environment is more

complex and uncertain than that associated with conventional military operations due to

the preeminence of a difficult and tangled web of complicated societal issues.

Identification of the problem is one of the most challenging aspects of COIN operations,

because that task demands an appreciation of how social, cultural, political, economic,

and physical conditions have supported or even fomented discontent among the

population. The problem and potential solutions must therefore be viewed from a

comprehensive campaign perspective. As has been noted earlier, the development of a

campaign should include discourse among joint, interagency, multinational and

governmental partners. Given a shared appreciation of the root causes of discontent, the

respective capabilities of the partners involved in COIN can be applied in a cohesive

way. In order to develop a comprehensive campaign design, the following lines of

operations can be employed as a means to both assess the problem and articulate the

commander’s vision of resolution:

Training and advising security forces.

Essential services.

Economic development.

Promotion of governance.

Information.

Combat operations (protection of the civil populace).

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Figure 4-2 Iterative Campaign Design

4-19. Not intended as a “success template,” these lines of operations require judgment in

application. The mosaic nature of COIN and the shifting circumstances within each area

of operations (AO) requires a different emphasis on and interrelationship among the

various lines. The situation may also require that military forces closely support, or

temporarily assume responsibility for, tasks normally accomplished by other government

agencies and private organizations. By broadly describing how the lines of operations

interact to achieve the end state, the commander provides the operational logic to link the

various components in a comprehensive campaign framework. This framework guides

the initiative of subordinate commanders as they establish local conditions that support

the overall campaign design. It also promotes unity of effort among interagency,

multinational, and government partners.

LOCAL RELEVANCE

4-20. Informed by that operational logic, subordinate commanders tailor and prioritize

their actions within the lines of operations based on the distinct and evolving

circumstances within their respective AOs. While military forces are accustomed to unity

of command, the interagency and multinational nature of COIN operations will likely

make such arrangements unlikely. Not all participating organizations share the same

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attitudes and goals. General cooperation on matters of mutual concern, established

through informal agreements, may be the most practicable arrangement. The campaign

design must therefore guide and empower subordinate leaders to conduct the

coordination, cooperation, and innovation required to achieve the campaign purpose in a

manner best suited to local conditions.

LEARNING IN EXECUTION

4-21. Before commanders deploy their units, they make every effort to mentally prepare

their Soldiers for the anticipated challenges, with a particular focus on environmental

understanding of the anticipated AO. This environmental understanding is only an initial

appreciation, but it is a chance for commanders to establish a common frame of

reference. Design begins based on this initial understanding. Elements of the problem and

the means of solving them do not remain static. Conditions are seldom consistent

throughout any given operational environment and continue to change based on stimulus

from friendly, enemy, neutral, and other involved parties. Rather than being uniform in

character, such environments are likely to consist of a complex and shifting mosaic of

conditions. To be effective, commanders—and indeed all personnel—must continually

develop and enhance their understanding of the mosaic peculiar to their AO. Observing

tactical actions and the resulting changing conditions deepens understanding of the

environment and enables commanders to relearn and refine their design and

implementation actions.

4-22. Initially, understanding of the environment will probably be relatively low and the

campaign design will, by necessity, require a number of assumptions, especially with

respect to the populace and the force’s ability to positively influence their perception of

events. The campaign design can be viewed as an experiment that tests the operational

logic, with the expectation of a less than perfect solution. As the experiment unfolds,

interaction with the population and the insurgents reveals the validity of those

assumptions, identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the design. Effective

assessment, the ability to recognize changing conditions and determine their meaning, is

crucial to successful adaptation and innovation by commanders within their respective

AOs. A continuous discourse among commanders at all echelons provides the feed- back

necessary to refine the campaign design. The discourse is supported by formal

assessment techniques and red teaming to ensure commanders are fully cognizant of the

causal relationships between their actions and the adversary’s adaptations. Accordingly,

assessment is a learning activity and a critical aspect of design. This learning leads to

redesign. Therefore, design can be viewed as a perpetual design-learn-redesign activity,

with the campaign purpose and commander’s vision of resolution providing the unifying

themes.

4-23. The critical role of assessment necessitates establishing measures of effectiveness

during the design of COIN operations. Commanders should choose these carefully so that

they always align with the campaign’s purpose and reflect the emphasis on and

interrelationship among the lines of operations. Sound assessment blends qualitative and

quantitative analysis with the judgment and intuition of all leaders. Great care must be

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applied here, as COIN often involves complex societal issues that may not lend

themselves to quantifiable measures of effectiveness. Moreover, bad assumptions and

false data can undermine the validity of both the measures of effectiveness and the

conclusions drawn from them. Data and metrics can inform a commander’s assessment.

However they must not be allowed to dominate it in uncertain situations. Subjective and

intuitive assessment must not be replaced by a focus on data or metrics. Commanders

must exercise their professional judgment in determining the proper balance.

GOALS IN INTERVENTION

4-24. In an ideal world, the commander of military forces engaged in COIN would enjoy

clear and well defined goals for the campaign from the very beginning. However, the

reality is that many goals emerge only as the campaign develops. For this reason, COIN

forces usually have a combination of defined and emerging goals on which to work.

Likewise, the complex problems encountered during COIN operations can be so difficult

to understand that a clear design cannot be developed at the outset. Often, the best choice

is to create iterative solutions to better understand the problem. In this case, these

iterative solutions allow the initiation of intelligent interaction with the environment.

SUMMARY

4-25. Campaign design may very well be the most important aspect in countering an

insurgency. It is certainly the area in which the commander and staff can have the most

influence. Design is not a function to be accomplished, but rather a living process. Design

should reflect ongoing learning and adaptation and the growing appreciation COIN forces

share for the environment and all actors within it, especially the insurgents, populace, and

the government. Though design precedes planning, it does not stop when aspects are

turned over for planning, preparation, and execution. Rather, it is dynamic, even as the

environment and the counterinsurgents’ understanding of the environment is dynamic.

The resulting growth in understanding requires integrated assessment and a rich dialogue

among leaders at various levels and throughout the entire cross-section of the COIN

force. Design should reflect a comprehensive approach that works across all relevant

lines of operations in a manner applicable for the stage of a campaign in which it exists.

There should only be one campaign and therefore one campaign design. This single

campaign should bring in all players, with particular attention placed on the

governmental participants. Campaign design and operations are integral to the COIN

imperative to “learn and adapt,” enabling a continuous cycle of design-learn-redesign to

achieve the campaign’s purpose.

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Chapter 5

Executing Counterinsurgency Operations

It is a persistently methodical approach and steady pressure which will gradually wear

the insurgent down. The government must not allow itself to be diverted either by

countermoves on the part of the insurgent or by the critics on its own side who will be

seeking a simpler and quicker solution. There are no short-cuts and no gimmicks.

Sir Robert Thompson,

Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam

This chapter addresses principles and tactics for executing counterinsurgency (COIN)

operations. It begins by describing the different stages of a COIN operation and logical

lines of operations that commanders can use to design one. It continues with discussions

of three COIN approaches and how to continuously assess a COIN operation. The chapter

concludes by describing lethal and non-lethal targeting in a COIN environment.

THE NATURE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

5-1. Counterinsurgency (COIN) is a violent political struggle waged with military means.

The political issues at stake for the contestants defy nonviolent solutions because they are

often rooted in culture, ideology, societal tensions, and injustice. Military forces can

compel and secure but cannot, by themselves, achieve the necessary political compromise

among the principle players. A successful COIN force—which includes civilian agencies,

ANA military forces, and multinational forces—purposefully attacks the insurgency

rather than just its fighters and addresses the host nation’s core problems in a

comprehensive fashion. The government leaders must be purposefully engaged in this

comprehensive approach.

5-2. There are five overarching considerations in COIN operations:

The commander and government together must select the logical lines of

operations for attacking the insurgents’ strategy and focusing their effort to

establish government legitimacy.

The government and COIN forces must establish control of one or more areas

from which to operate. The government forces must secure the people

continuously within these areas.

Operations should be initiated from the government’s areas of strength against

areas under the insurgents’ control. The government must regain control of the

major population centers to achieve stability.

Regaining control of insurgent areas requires the government to expand

operations to secure and support the population. If the insurgency has established

firm control of a region, its military apparatus there must be eliminated and its

politico-administrative apparatus rooted out.

Information operations must be aggressively employed to accomplish the

following:

Favorably influence perceptions of government legitimacy and capabilities.

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Garner local, regional, and international support for COIN operations.

Publicize insurgent violence.

Discredit insurgent propaganda.

5-3. COIN operations combine offensive, defensive, and stability operations to achieve a

stable environment for the growth of government legitimacy. COIN operations are

conducted by an integrated joint, interagency, and multinational team working with the

government. The weight of effort in COIN operations generally progresses through three

indistinct stages of development that can be envisioned as a medical analogy.

Understanding this evolution and recognizing the relative maturity of the operational

environment are important for operational design, planning, and execution. With this

knowledge, commanders can ensure that their activities are appropriate to the current

situation.

INITIAL STAGE: “STOP THE BLEEDING”

5-4. Initially, COIN operations are characterized by emergency first aid for the patient.

The intent is to protect the population from further injury, set the insurgency back (break

their initiative and momentum), and set the conditions for further engagement. Limited

offensive operations may be undertaken, but not at the expense of stability operations

focused on civil security. During this stage, civil security, force protection, the common

operational picture, intelligence collection, and initial assessments and estimates are

being developed. COIN forces also begin shaping the information environment, including

the expectations of the local populace.

MIDDLE STAGE: “IN-PATIENT CARE—RECOVERY”

5-5. This stage is characterized by efforts aimed at assisting the patient through long-term

recovery or restoration of health—which in this case is stability. The COIN force is most

active here, working aggressively along all lines of operations. The desire in this stage is

to develop and build resident capability and capacity in the government and security

forces. As civil security is assured, focus expands to include civil control, provision of

essential services, and the stimulation of economic development. Relationships with

government counterparts and the local population are developed and strengthened. With

the establishment of these relationships with the local government agencies, the public,

and the local security forces comes an increase in the flow of human intelligence and

other types of intelligence. These facilitate measured offensive operations against the

insurgency in conjunction with the security forces. The nation increases its legitimacy

through the provision of security for its people, the expansion of effective governance

and provision of essential services, and achieving incremental success in meeting the

public’s expectations.

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LATE STAGE: “OUT-PATIENT CARE—MOVEMENT TO SELF-

SUFFICIENCY”

5-6. Stage three is characterized by the expansion of stability operations across contested

regions, ideally using governmental forces. The main goal for this stage is on transition to

local leadership and execution of operations. In this mature stage, the multinational force

works with the host nation in an increasingly supporting role, turning over responsibility

wherever and whenever appropriate. Reaction forces and fire support capabilities may

still be needed in some areas, but more functions along all lines of operations will be per-

formed by governmental forces with the low-key assistance of multinational advisors. As

the security, governing, and economic capacity of the nation increases, the need for

foreign assistance is reduced. At this stage, the nation has established (or re-established)

the requisite systems needed to provide effective and stable government that supports and

sustains the rule of law. The government secures its citizens continuously, sustains and

builds legitimacy through effective government, effectively isolates the insurgency, and

is able to manage and incrementally meet the expectations of the nation’s entire

population.

LOGICAL LINES OF OPERATIONS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

5-7. The technique of logical lines of operations (LLOs) emerged to address situations

when positional reference to enemy or adversary forces has little relevance. Using LLOs

is an appropriate technique for synchronizing operations against an enemy that hides

among the population. A plan based on LLOs unifies the efforts of interagency,

multinational, and governmental forces toward a common purpose. Each LLO represents

a conceptual category along which the government and commander of the COIN force

intend to attack the insurgent strategy and establish government legitimacy. The LLOs

are closely related and depend upon closely coordinated action among all elements of the

COIN force.

5-8. Success in one LLO complements activities in other LLOs. Progress in each LLO

contributes toward the attainment of a stable and secure environment for the host nation.

Stability is reinforced by popular recognition of the legitimacy of the local government,

improved governance, and progressive, substantive reduction of the root causes of the

insurgency. LLOs combine the following:

Information operations.

Offensive, defensive, and stability operations.

Training and employment of governmental security forces.

Establishment or restoration of essential services.

Better governance.

Support for economic development.

LLOs attack the insurgency’s subversive strategy on multiple fronts to weaken the

insurgency’s ability and will to continue the struggle.

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5-9. LLOs are not exclusive to any level of conflict. In the same way that a

comprehensive campaign is designed at the strategic or operational level by a

commander, commanders and their staffs at lower levels may also use LLOs. Their

operations, also comprehensive in nature, are nested with the higher echelon’s

operational design, but should be specifically formulated to each unit’s specific

environment.

5-10. The commander’s vision of resolution and LLOs serve as expressions of the design

for a COIN operation where conventional objectives like terrain features or enemy

positions have little relevance. The commander and staff orchestrate and integrate the

LLOs to gain unity of effort. This approach ensures the LLOs converge on a well-

defined, commonly understood end state.

5-11. LLOs are directly related to one another and internally connect actions within the

operation that, when achieved or accomplished, support the overall purpose. Operations

designed to use LLOs typically employ an extended, event-driven timeline with short-,

mid-, and long-term goals combining the complementary, long-term effects of civil-

military operations as well as cyclic, short-term events like combat operations and

provision of essential services. Figure 5-1. is an example of counterinsurgency lines of

operation, while working in another country. Each and every insurgency has different

lines of operation, based on the type of insurgency and the different areas stressed by

military and political leadership.

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5-12. Commanders determine which LLOs are applicable to their operational

environment and how they connect with and support one another. For example,

establishing continuous security for the public as part of stability operations behind a

shield of offensive and defensive operations creates a safe environment in which

activities for life support and reconstruction operations can take place. People may

perceive that the environment is safe enough to leave their family at home while they

seek employment or conduct public economic activity. This perception facilitates the

further provision of essential services and development of greater economic activity, and

can facilitate the attraction of outside capital for further development. Neglecting one

LLO will inevitably create vulnerable conditions in another LLO that the insurgency can

exploit. Achieving the desired end state requires linked successes on all LLOs. At the

operational level, proper execution along the LLOs should lead to increased popular

support for a legitimate government (See Figure 5-2).

Figure 5-2. The Effect of Proper Application of LLOs in Counterinsurgency

5-13. The LLOs are analogous to a rope. Each LLO is a separate string, which by itself

may be relatively weak and incapable of addressing the weight of issues in a COIN

operation. However, a strong rope is created when strands are woven together. The

overall COIN effort is further strengthened through information operations, which

support and enhance the operation by highlighting the successes in each LLO

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(See Figure 5-3.).

Figure 5-3. The Strengthening Effect of Interrelated LLOs

5-14. Using LLOs, tactical commanders develop missions and tasks, allocate resources,

and assess the effectiveness of operations. The commander ought to specify the LLO that

is the decisive operation and those that have a shaping role. This prioritization usually

changes as insurgency vulnerabilities are created, the insurgency reacts or adjusts its

activities, or the environment evolves. In this sense, commanders adapt their operations

not only to the state of the insurgency, but also to the condition of the overall

environment, which ideally should be moving toward greater stability.

5-15. LLOs are mutually supportive between echelons as well as adjacent organizations.

For example, similar LLOs among brigade combat teams produce complementary

effects; while the collective set of brigade accomplishments reinforce the goals at the

corps level. LLOs are normally used at brigade and higher levels, where the leadership,

staff, and unit resources are sufficiently robust to plan and employ them; however,

Kandaks can use the LLOs in a similar fashion to that of their higher headquarters.

Commanders at various levels may expect their subordinate commanders to converse

with them in these terms.

5-16. LLOs are formulated and coordinated during the course of action development step

of the military decision-making process. Beginning with the broadly defined end state,

conditions for success, and other aspects of the commander’s intent, the commander and

staff perform a mission analysis of the situation and environment to determine the

objectives necessary to set those conditions and achieve the intent. Related objectives are

grouped based on their purpose to ensure unity of effort. If decisive actions can be

identified, these are expressed within the context of an LLO, and a logical connection is

made between these actions deemed decisive and the commander’s intent. The

operational design, including the LLOs, is translated into missions, objectives, and tasks,

and then assigned to subordinate commanders.

COMMON LOGICAL LINES OF OPERATIONS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

5-17. Commanders at all levels should select the LLOs that relate best to what they desire

to achieve in the manner they envision achieving it. This following list is not all

inclusive, but gives commanders a place to start:

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Information.

Combat operations.

Development of government security forces.

Essential services.

Governance.

Economic development.

These lines can be customized, renamed, changed altogether, or simply not used. LLOs

should be used to isolate the insurgency from the population, address and correct the root

causes of the insurgency, and create or reinforce the societal systems required to sustain

the legitimacy of the government. The sections that follow discuss six common LLOs

that appear in most operations. Though information operations (IO) is a separate strand in

the coil of LLOs, it is probably the most important, since it is interwoven throughout all

the others and surrounds them.

INFORMATION

5-18. The information LLO is decisive in that it assists in setting conditions for success of

all other LLOs. By publicizing government policies, the actual situation, and

counterinsurgent accomplishments, IO can neutralize insurgent propaganda and false

claims. The major task categories follow:

Identify all the audiences (local, regional, and international), the various news

cycles, and how to reach them with the government’s message.

Manage local population expectations regarding what COIN forces can achieve.

Develop common, multi-echelon themes based on and consistent with

government policies and the operation’s objectives, and sustain unity of the

message.

Coordinate and provide a comprehensive information preparation of the

operational environment using all communications means and incorporating the

activities of all other LLOs.

Remember actions always speak louder than words—every Soldier is an integral

part of IO communications. IO is executed every day through the actions of firm,

fair, professional, and alert Soldiers on the streets with the people.

Information Operations

5-19. Commanders and staffs orchestrate IO in harmony and cooperation with the

activities in the other LLOs. The information LLO should address and manage the

public’s expectations by explaining what the government and COIN forces are doing and

why. The information LLO can effectively address the subject of root causes the

insurgency uses to gain support.

5-20. Information should be localized to address the concerns of the inhabitants of each

AO. IO should educate the public regarding successfully completed projects and

improvements within all LLOs, including accomplishments in security, infrastructure,

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essential services, and economic development. This information facilitates popular

acceptance of the legitimacy of the government.

5-21. The information LLO should use consistent themes based on policy, facts, and

deeds—not claims or future plans, because these can be thwarted. Themes must be

reinforced by actions along all LLOs. Making unsubstantiated claims can undermine the

credibility and legitimacy of the government in the long term. COIN forces should never

knowingly make a promise or obligate themselves to an action that cannot be completed.

However, when a promise cannot be fulfilled, COIN forces should take the initiative and

publicly address the reasons why this occurred in order to reduce the negative impact.

5-22. Information themes are based on policy and should be distributed simultaneously or

as soon as possible using all available means, such as radio, television, newspapers,

flyers, billboards, and the Internet. Polling and analysis should be conducted to determine

which media allow the widest dissemination of the themes to the desired audiences at the

local, regional, national, and international levels.

5-23. Insurgencies are not constrained by truth and create propaganda that serves their

purpose. Insurgent propaganda may include lying, deception, and creating false causes to

gain support for the insurgency. Historically, insurgencies change their message to

address whatever issue gains them support in the changing environment. The information

LLO should publicly identify the insurgency’s propaganda and lies to the local populace.

Doing so creates doubt in the mind of the uncommitted public and supporters of the

insurgency regarding the viability of the insurgents’ short- and long-term intentions.

5-24. Impartiality is a common theme for information activities when there are political,

social, and sectarian divisions in the nation. COIN forces should avoid taking sides, if

possible, as perceived favoritism can exacerbate civil strife and make the COIN force a

more desirable target for sectarian violence.

Media and the Battle for Perceptions

5-25. Effective commanders directly engage in a dialogue with the media and

communicate IO themes. With the proliferation of sophisticated communication

technologies throughout the global information environment, the nature of media

coverage has a significant impact on COIN operations at all echelons. Civilian and

military media coverage influences the perceptions of the political leaders and public in

the nation and throughout the international community. The media directly influence the

support of key audiences for COIN forces, the execution of their operations, and

theopposing insurgency. Recognition of this influence creates a war of perceptions

between insurgents and COIN forces that is conducted continuously through the

communications media.

5-26. The media are a permanent part of the information environment and effective

media/public affairs operations are critical to successful military operations. Every aspect

of a military operation is subject to immediate scrutiny. Well planned, properly

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coordinated, and clearly expressed IO significantly clear the fog of war and improve the

effectiveness and morale of COIN forces, the will of the Afghan public, and the support

of the people for their government. The right messages can reduce misinformation,

distractions, confusion, uncertainty, and other factors that cause public distress and

undermine the COIN effort. Constructive and transparent information enhances

understanding and support for continuing operations against the insurgency.

5-27. There are numerous methods available to commanders for working with the media

to facilitate accurate and timely information flow. These include the following:

Embedded media.

Press conferences.

Applying resources.

Network with media outlets.

5-28. Embedded media representatives get to know the Soldiers’ perspectives in the

context of the COIN environment. Embedding for days rather than weeks runs the risk of

media representatives not gaining any real understanding of the context of operations and

may lead to unintended misinformation. Media representatives embedding for weeks

become better prepared to present an informed report. The media should be given access

to the young men in the field. These young people nearly always do a fantastic job

articulating the important issues for a broad audience and, given a chance, can share their

courage and sense of purpose with the Afghan people.

5-29. Weekly press conferences might be held, particularly with media, to explain

operations and provide transparency to the people most affected by COIN efforts. Such

venues also provide an opportunity to highlight the accomplishments of COIN forces and

the government.

5-30. Commanders should apply time, effort, and money to establish the proper

combination of media outlets and communications to transmit the repetitive themes of

government accomplishments and insurgent violence against the populace. This might

require COIN forces to be proactive, alerting media to news opportunities and perhaps

providing transportation or other services to ensure proper coverage. Assisting in the

establishment of effective media is another important COIN requirement. A word of

caution here: there can be no perception by the populace or the media that the media is

being manipulated by COIN forces. Even the slightest appearance of impropriety here

can undermine the credibility of the COIN force and the nation.

5-31. Establishing relationships between COIN leaders and responsible members of the

media is in the interests of the Nation. Without a clear understanding of the COIN efforts,

media representatives relay a message to the Afghan public as best they can. Through

these professional relationships, the military can ensure Afghan citizens better understand

what their military is doing in support of the Nation’s interests. Operations security must

always be maintained, but that should not be used as an excuse to create a media blackout

that can lead to misinformation. Similar relationships can be established with

international media sources.

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5-32. The media are ever present and influence perceptions of the COIN environment.

Therefore, successful leaders engage the media, create positive relationships, and help the

media tell the story. Otherwise the media develops a story of its own that may not be as

accurate and may not include the COIN force perspective.

5-33. In developing the information LLO consider the following:

Consider word choices carefully. Words are important—they have specific

meanings and describe policy. For example, is the COIN force a liberator or an

occupier? Occupiers generate a “resistance,” whereas liberators may be welcomed

for a time. Soldiers can be influenced likewise. In a conflict among the people,

terms like “battlefield” influence perceptions and confuse the critical nature of a

synchronized approach. Refrain from referring to and considering the area of

operations (AO) as a “battlefield” or it may continue to be one.

Publicize insurgent violence and use of terror to discredit the insurgency.

Admit mistakes (or actions perceived as mistakes) quickly, and explain these

mistakes and actions—including mistakes committed by COIN forces. However,

do not attempt to explain actions by the government. Instead encourage officials

to handle such information themselves. They know better the cultural implications

of their actions, and honesty should help to build legitimacy.

Highlight government and COIN force successes promptly. Positive results speak

loudly and resonate with people. Do not delay communications waiting for all

results. Initiate communications immediately to let people know what the COIN

force is doing and why. Delaying announcements creates “old news” and misses

news cycles.

Respond quickly to insurgent propaganda. As stated above, delaying a response

can let the insurgent story dominate many news cycles, allowing their version of

events to become widespread and accepted. This consideration may require giving

increased information assets and responsibilities to lower-level leaders, since they

are also at the “point of the spear” for IO.

Shape expectations of the populace. Generally people expect too much too soon,

and when the government or COIN force is slow to deliver, people become easily

and perhaps unfairly disgruntled.

Give the people some means to voice their opinions and grievances, even if that

activity appears at first to cause short-term friction with ongoing efforts. This

applies not just to the formal political process, but even more to the informal,

local issues (where government actually touches the people). Develop a feedback

loop from populace to local government to ensure needs are identified and

perceptions aligned.

Keep troops engaged with the people. Presence patrols facilitate Soldiers

mingling with the populace. The communication flow works both ways, as the

people and COIN forces learn to know each other better.

Conduct ongoing audience analysis and seek to identify key personnel that

influence the people at the local, regional, and national levels. Seek to determine

with great specificity the relevant lines of loyalty of a population.

Take a census as soon as is practicable. Help the local government do this. This

information can be helpful for learning about the people and meeting their needs.

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Assist the government in the production and distribution of identification cards.

This is an effort to register all citizens—or, at least those nearing a predetermined,

adult age. Identification cards may help to track people’s movements, which are

useful in identifying illicit activity.

Treat detainees professionally and publicize their treatment. Arrange for local

leaders to visit and tour your detention facility. Consider allowing them to speak

to detainees. If news media visit your detention facility, allow them as much

access as is prudent. (Provide a guided tour and explain your procedures.)

Consider initiating a dialogue with the opposition. This does not equate to

“negotiating with terrorists,” and is an attempt to open the door to mutual

understanding. There may be no common ground and the enmity may be such that

nothing specifically or directly comes of the dialogue. However, if COIN forces

are talking, they are using a positive approach—and may learn something.

Consider adopting a “We understand why you fight” mentality—and maybe

stating this to the insurgents.

Work to convince insurgent leadership that the time for resistance has ended and

that there are other ways to accomplish what they desire.

Take the insurgents’ demands and turn them on the insurgents. Examine the

disputed issues objectively, and then work with the government to resolve them

where possible. Then communicate any success as a sign of responsiveness and

improvement.

Communicate the message that the COIN force is robust and persistent, and will

assist the population through their present difficulty.

Learn the insurgent’s messages or narratives and develop counter-messages and

counter-narratives to attack the insurgents’ ideology. An understanding of

indigenous culture is required for this activity, and government personnel can play

a key role.

COMBAT OPERATIONS

5-34. This line of operations is the most familiar to military forces. Care must be taken

not to apply too many resources to this LLO at the expense of other LLOs that facilitate

the development or reinforcement of the legitimacy of the government.

5-35. An inherent trait of an insurgency is the use of unlawful violence to weaken a

government, intimidate people into passive or active support, and murder those who

oppose the insurgency. There is always some element of measured combat operations

required to address insurgents who cannot be co-opted into operating inside the rule of

law. However, COIN is “war amongst the people.” Combat operations must therefore be

executed with an appropriate level of restraint on the use of force to minimize or avoid

killing or injuring innocent people who are not involved with the conflict. Not only is

there a moral basis for the use of restraint or measured force; there are practical reasons

as well. The COIN force does not want to turn the will of the people against the COIN

effort by harming innocents. Discriminating use of fires and calculated, disciplined

response should characterize performance in COIN, where kindness and compassion can

be as important as killing and capturing.

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5-36. In general, Kandak-sized and smaller unit operations are often the most effective

for countering insurgent activities. The COIN force needs to get as close as possible to

the people to secure them, glean the maximum amount of quality information, and

thereby gain a fluidity of action equal or superior to that of the enemy. This does not

mean larger unit operations are not required. The brigade is usually a synchronizing

headquarters while the corps shapes the environment to set conditions and facilitate

brigade and Kandak success. The sooner the COIN force can execute small unit

operations effectively, the better.

5-37. In developing this LLO, consider the following:

Develop cultural intelligence, which assumes a prominent role. Make every effort

to learn as much about the environment as possible. Human dynamics tend to

matter the most.

Ensure that rules of engagement adequately guide Soldiers and engaged in combat

while encouraging the prudent use of force commensurate with mission

accomplishment and self-defense.

Consider how the populace might react when planning tactical situations, even for

something as simple as a traffic control point. Understand how people will

respond to the operation.

Identify and focus the COIN force on legitimate tasks for the supporting COIN

force. These are tasks the government and population generally perceive to be

productive and appropriate for an outside force.

Win over, exhaust, divide, capture, or eliminate the senior- and mid-level

insurgent leaders as well as network links.

Frustrate insurgency recruitment.

Disrupt base areas and sanctuaries.

Organize local security and support forces.

Deny outside patronage (external support). Make every effort to stop the

insurgency from importing material support across international and territorial

borders.

When executing any form of unit sweep operation, clear only what the unit

intends to hold— otherwise, reconsider the operation and its goals.

When Soldiers interact with the population, encourage them to treat people with

respect to avoid alienating anyone and assisting the insurgency.

DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

5-38. Security is the key facilitating mechanism for most societal and government

functions. Although Afghan and multinational forces can provide direct assistance to

establish and maintain security, this situation is at best a provisional solution. Ultimately,

the nation must secure its own people.

5-39. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan military, working with other government

agencies and multinational partners, is able to help the host nation develop the security

forces required to establish and sustain stability within its borders. This assistance can

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take many forms, to include the development, equipping, training, and employment of

security forces. The assistance may extend to operations in which multinational military

units fight alongside the newly formed, expanded, or reformed government forces.

5-40. Though this LLO is discussed in detail in Chapter 6, some ideas are worth

highlighting here. In developing this LLO, consider the following:

Understand the security problem. The function, capabilities, and capacities

required for governmental security (military and police) forces should align with

the theater strategy and the threat they face.

Start at the earliest planning stage with a comprehensive approach to local needs

in consultation with local representatives. This process should be undertaken in

partnership with the government and military authorities, and in consultation with

multinational partners and those international organizations that may be involved.

Establish separate training academies for military and police forces. Staff them

with multinational personnel if available. (Tap into the talents of as many nations

as possible for this).

Establish mobile training teams.

Train the government cadres first, and focus on identifying leaders. When trained,

these key personnel can establish new units, staff the training academies, and in

some cases, staff mobile training teams.

Create general-purpose forces and special-purpose forces. These special-purpose

forces should be based on need and ideally should be limited. For police, this

consideration could entail the development of a special intelligence branch like

the British have to prevent espionage and subversion as well as to provide

security for key targets and public figures.

Put liaison officers with multinational units.

Identify insurgents who might seek to join the security forces under false pretext.

However, encourage insurgents to change sides—welcome them in with an

“open-arms” policy. Vetting “turncoats” is a task for the government in

partnership with the military.

ESSENTIAL SERVICES

5-41. The essential services LLO addresses the life support needs of population. The

military’s primary involvement is normally to provide a safe and secure environment that

facilitates planning and actions to develop the supporting services or infrastructure

needed to provide or restore essential services. Due to security problems, the military

may initially have the leading role. Other agencies may not be initially present to assume

this role or might not have sufficient capability or capacity. Therefore, the military must

be prepared to conduct these tasks for an extended period.

5-42. The COIN force should work closely with the government in establishing

achievable goals. If lofty goals are set and not achieved, both the COIN force and the

government can lose the respect of the population. The long-term objective for this LLO

is to transition to complete government responsibility and accountability. Establishing

activities that the government will be unable to sustain on their own may be

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counterproductive. IO must be nested within this LLO to manage expectations and ensure

that the public has a coherent understanding of the problems requiring redress, to include

infrastructure sabotage by insurgency forces. The major categories follow:

Transportation and public works.

Public utilities.

Telecommunications and public communications.

Public health and sanitation.

Life-support and humanitarian relief.

Education.

5-43. Figure 5-4. (below) illustrates how a unit might apply the essential services LLO

through the acronym SWEAT-MS. Each category includes a set of missions that set the

conditions for success. Those conditions, in turn, contribute to achieving the higher

commander’s desired end state.

Figure 5-4. Unit Application of the Essential Services Logical Lines of Operations

5-44. In developing this LLO, consider the following:

Make this effort a genuine partnership between the COIN force and government

authorities. Use as much local leadership, talent, and labor as soon as possible.

Plan for a macro and a micro assessment effort. Acknowledge up front what is

known and not known about the environment—and begin an honest appraisal of

what needs to be accomplished. The macro assessment concerns operational

design functions and is long term in focus. The micro assessment effort, by

necessity, focuses on the local level and determines, with regional sensitivity,

what the actual and specific needs are in the immediate future.

Appreciate local desires. A needs assessment must reflect a great deal of cultural

sensitivity; otherwise great attention (time and expense) could be wasted on

something the people do not consider to be of real value. Ask, How do I know this

effort is important from a local perspective? If there is no answer to that question,

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it may not be. Authorities are a good place to start with this question, and local

polling of the populace may be useful.

Make a point of establishing realistic, measurable goals, and put in place methods

of assessment towards the achievement of those goals. Form interagency planning

teams to discuss design, assessment, and redesign. Learn early to understand and

use an interagency language and recognize and understand other agencies’

institutional cultures. COIN activities are interagency activities—whether

agencies beyond the military are initially present or not.

Meet with representatives from organizations beyond the government team.

Nongovernmental organizations seldom want to give the appearance of being too

closely aligned with the COIN effort. Encourage their participation in planning,

even if it means holding meetings in neutral areas. In your meetings with these

organizations, help them understand that there are mutual interests in achieving

the COIN force objectives of local security, stability, and relief.

Be as transparent as possible with the local people. Do your best to help people

understand what the COIN force is doing, and the basis for decisions that affect

them.

Consider the role women play in the society and how this cultural factor may

influence activities in this LLO.

Consider that, in some situations, the local people may form an impression that

the COIN force (especially the military side of it) has arrived to “save the day,” or

in contrast, that their arrival will only cause greater problems. Such reactions are

especially likely concerning essential services. Understanding these phenomena

and working to keep expectations manageable avoids the frustrations that

inevitably result from unrealized local expectations.

GOVERNANCE

5-45. This LLO relates to the capability and capacity of the government to secure its

people, establish and maintain order, and perform all necessary government activities that

pertain to a legitimate, sovereign nation.

5-46. In more rudimentary cases, where no government exists at all, this LLO may

involve creating and organizing a governmental capability and capacity to govern. In the

long run, the activities in this LLO will probably affect the lives of the people the most

and may lead to the elimination of the root causes for the insurgency. Activities in this

LLO are among the most important of all in establishing lasting stability for a region or

nation.

5-47. Good governance is normally a key requirement to achieve legitimacy for the

government. Necessary activities include the following:

Security activities (military and police isolating the insurgency as part of public

safety).

Establishing and enforcing the rule of law.

Public administration.

Justice (judiciary system, prosecutor/defense representation, and corrections).

Property records and control.

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Public finance.

Civil information.

Historical, cultural, and recreational services.

Electoral process for representative government.

Disaster preparedness and response.

5-48. In developing this LLO, consider the following:

Encourage local leaders to step forward and participate. If no local council exists,

encourage the populace to create such a body. Teachers, businessmen, and others

who enjoy the respect of the community should be strongly encouraged to come

together and form a temporary council to serve in such capacity until a more

permanent organization can be elected.

Assist (or encourage) the government to remove or reduce genuine grievances,

expose imaginary ones, and resolve contradictions where possible immediately.

Note that this consideration may be very difficult to achieve because:

o Genuine grievances may be hard to ascertain. Solutions might involve the

government giving up power or control in a fashion they are unable or

unwilling to accommodate.

Make only such promises as can be fulfilled in the foreseeable future.

Help the government develop and empower competent and responsive leaders and

strengthen their civil service and security forces. This is traditionally difficult to

do, and backing an incompetent (or worse) local leader can backfire. Do not be

afraid to step in and make a bold change where necessary. A corrupt official, such

as a chief of police who is working at the behest of both sides, can be doing more

harm than good. You may be forced to replace him. If so, move decisively.

Arrange the removal of all officials necessary such that, although the pain of the

affair may be acute, it is brief and final. Wherever possible, have other

government authorities conduct the actual removal.

Provide accessibility to ensure two-way communications with the populace.

Establish rapport with the local public for national government and military

forces.

Encourage the host nation to grant local demands and meet acceptable aspirations.

Some of these might be driving the insurgency.

Emphasize the national perspective in all governmental activities, downplaying

sectarian divides.

Provide liaison officers to government ministries or agencies. Even better, do this

in an interagency fashion, using a team approach. Obviously these proposed

teams differ in composition, depending on function.

Once the legal system is established or reestablished, send someone to observe

firsthand a person or persons moving through the legal system (arrest by police,

trial, and punishment by confinement to a correctional facility). Ask to see the

docket of the judges at the provincial courthouse. If there is no one on the docket

or if it is full and there are no proceedings, there may be a problem.

Create a system for citizens to pursue legal redress for perceived wrongs by

authorities. Rule of law must include a citizen’s right and ability to petition the

government for redress of wrongs committed by the government—or to petition

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the COIN force for redress of wrongs perpetrated by that force (intentionally or

otherwise).

Provide adequate security for the populace to resume their lives and livelihoods.

This is an essential requirement for effective governance.

Whenever and wherever possible, build on extant capabilities. The host nation

often has some capability and supporting COIN forces may just need to help it

develop greater capacity.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

5-49. The economic development LLO includes both a short-term and a long-term aspect.

The short-term aspect deals with immediate problems, such as large-scale unemployment

and means to jump-start an economy from the local level through the national level. The

long-term aspects of the LLOs should work to stimulate an indigenous capability and

capacity that produces robust and broad economic activity for the local population. Any

stability a nation enjoys may be directly related to its population’s economic situation and

adherence to the rule of law. The basic economic health of a nation is also dependent on a

government’s ability to continuously secure its population.

5-50. Formulating a plan for economic development requires planners to understand the

society, culture, and the operational environment. For example, in a rural society, land

ownership and the availability of agricultural equipment, seed, and fertilizer may be the

chief components of any economic development plan. In a more urban and diversified

society, the availability of jobs and the infrastructure to support commercial activities

may be more important for constructive economic development. With the exception of

completely socialist economies, governments do not create jobs except in the public

bureaucracy. However, the micro-economy can be positively stimulated through the

advancement of small businesses. To jump-start small businesses, there is a requirement

for microfinance in the form of some sort of banking activities. So then, work in this LLO

requires attention to both the macro-economy and the micro-economy.

5-51. Without a viable economy and employment opportunities, the public is likely to

pursue false promises offered by an insurgency, which may be fostering the very

conditions keeping the economy stagnant. Insurgencies attempt to exploit a lack of

employment/job opportunities to gain active and passive support for their cause and

ultimately delegitimize a government. The major categories of economic activity include

the following:

Fossil fuels, mining, and related refining infrastructure.

Generation and transmission of power and energy.

Transportation and movement networks.

The banking industry.

Manufacturing and warehousing.

Building trades and services.

Agriculture, food processing, fisheries, and stockyard processing.

Labor relations.

Education and training.

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5-52. In developing this LLO, consider the following:

To draw the most out of the local population, work with the host nation to

strengthen the economy and quality of life. In the long run, success in COIN is

about supporting the livelihoods of the populace.

Create an environment where business can thrive. In every state (except perhaps a

completely socialist one), business drives the economy. To strengthen the

economy, find ways of encouraging and supporting legitimate business activities.

Even the provision of security is part of this positive business environment.

Work with the government to reduce unemployment to a manageable level.

Seek to understand the impact of military operations on business activities and

vice versa in the AO. Understand the impact of outsourcing and military support

on the local economy and the level of employment. Focus on governmental

capability and capacity.

Use economic leverage for entry into new areas and to reach new people.

Remember that in many societies, monies are distributed though the tribal or clan

networks. For instance, making sure an important clan leader gets a large

contracting job may ensure that many local men are employed—and therefore not

as available to the insurgency. It may be necessary to pay more than seems fair for

a job, but this form of economic leverage is cheap if it keeps people from

supporting the insurgency.

Ensure that noncompliance with government policies has an economic price.

Likewise, show early that compliance with those policies is profitable. In the

broadest sense, the operational design should reflect that “peace pays.”

Program funds for commanders to use from the beginning of any intervention for

economic projects in their AO. No one has a better appreciation of the specific

situation than those “on the ground.” Creating these funds may require ministerial

action. A more detailed description of relevant funding sources is in Appendix C.

COUNTERINSURGENCY APPROACHES

5-53. There are many approaches to using LLOs to achieve success in a COIN effort.

Each approach consists of components that are not mutually exclusive to any particular

strategy and are often shared among multiple strategies. The strategies described below

are not the only choices available, are neither discrete nor exclusive, and may be

combined depending on the environment and resources available. But the following

methods and their components are offered as examples that have proven effective in the

past. Making any of these methods effective in the future requires adapting them to the

demands of the local environment. The three examples of approaches discussed are:

Clear-hold-build.

Combined action.

Limited support.

CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD

5-54. COIN efforts should begin by controlling key areas. Security and influence then

spread out from these secured areas like an oil spot. The pattern of this approach is to

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clear, hold, and build one village, area, or city, and then to expand to other areas,

reinforcing success. This approach aims to develop a long- term, effective governmental

framework and presence that secures the people and facilitates the meeting of their basic

needs, thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of the government. The primary tasks to

accomplish clear-hold-build are:

Provide continuous security for the local populace.

Eliminate insurgent presence.

Reinforce political primacy.

Enforce the rule of law.

To create success that can spread, a clear-hold-build operation should not begin by

assaulting the main insurgent stronghold or by focusing on areas where the population

overtly supports the insurgents.

5-55. Clear-hold-build objectives require a considerable expenditure of resources and

time. ANA commanders and their government counterparts should prepare for a long-

term effort. All operations require a focused unity of effort by civil authorities,

intelligence agencies, and security forces. Coherent IO is also needed. A clear-hold-build

operation is executed in a specific, high-priority area experiencing overt insurgency and

has the following objectives:

Creating a secure physical and psychological environment.

Establishing firm government control of the population and the area.

Gaining the support of the population as manifested by their participation in the

government programs to counter the insurgency.

5-56. Clear-hold-build operations should expand outward from a secure base, such as an

urban industrial complex whose population supports the government effort and where

security forces are in firm control. No area or its population that has been subjected to the

intensive organizational efforts of a subversive insurgency organization can be won back

until certain conditions are created:

The commander responsible for the clear-hold-build operation has security forces

clearly superior to the insurgent force known or suspected to be operating in the

area or immediately available in an adjacent area.

Sufficient nonmilitary resources are allocated to effectively carry out all essential

improvements needed to provide basic services and control the population.

The insurgency is cleared from the area.

The insurgency organizational infrastructure and its support have been neutralized

or eliminated.

A government presence is established to replace that of the insurgency, and the

local population willingly supports this presence.

5-57. The following discussion describes some examples of activities involved in a clear-

hold-build approach. It execution involves activities across all LLOs. There can be

overlap between required steps, especially between hold and build, where relevant

activities are often conducted simultaneously.

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Clearing the Area

5-58. Clear is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy

forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned area. Clearing operations lead to

the destruction or retreat of insurgent combatants. This task is most effectively initiated

by a clear-in-zone or cordon-and- search operation to disperse insurgent forces or force

reaction by major insurgent elements in the area. Once this action has been initiated, units

employ a combination of offensive small unit operations, such as area saturation

patrolling and interdiction ambushes.

5-59. These combat operations are only the beginning, not the end state. Removal of the

visible insurgent forces does not remove the entrenched insurgent infrastructure. While

their infrastructure exists, insurgents continue to recruit among the population, attempt to

undermine the government, and try to coerce the populace through intimidation and

violence. After insurgent combatant forces have been eliminated, removing the

infrastructure begins. This should be done in a way to minimize the impact on the local

population and is essentially a police action that relies heavily on courts and legal

processes.

5-60. If insurgent combat forces are not eliminated but instead are expelled or have

broken into smaller groups, they must be prevented from re-entering the area in force or

re-establishing an organizational structure inside the area. Once COIN forces have

established their support bases, security elements cannot remain static. They should be

mobile and establish a constant presence throughout the area. Use of special funds should

be readily available for all units to pay compensation for damages that occur while

clearing the area of insurgent forces. Combat actions continue to maintain gains and set

the stage for future activities by:

Isolating the area to cut off external support and to catch insurgents trying to

escape.

Conducting periodic sweeps of the area to identify, disrupt, eliminate, and/or

expel insurgents.

Employing security forces and government representatives throughout the area to

secure the people and facilitate follow-on stages of development.

5-61. Clearing operations are supplemented by IO focused particularly on two key

audiences: the local population and the insurgents. The purpose of the message to the

population is to gain and maintain their overt support for government security forces with

promises to protect the people from insurgent forces and activities. Conversely, the

population should understand that if they actively support the insurgency, they are

prolonging combat operations and creating a risk to themselves and their neighbors. The

purpose of the IO message to the insurgents is to convince them that they cannot win

against the government efforts, and that the most constructive course of action is to

surrender or cease their activities.

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Holding with Security Forces

5-62. Ideally this part of the clear-hold-build approach is handled by ANA and ANP

elements. Establishment of security forces in bases among the population facilitates the

continued disruption, identification, and elimination of the local insurgent leadership and

infrastructure. The success or failure of the effort depends on effectively and

continuously securing the populace, and then on the effectiveness of reestablishing a

government presence (and operational systems) at the local level. Measured combat

operations will continue against insurgent combatants as opportunities arise, but the main

effort is focused on the population.

5-63. Key infrastructure must be secured. Since resources are always limited, those

elements of the infrastructure that are both vital for stability and vulnerable to attack

should be protected. Ask in planning, What elements of infrastructure are in jeopardy?

For instance, a glass-making factory may be important for economic recovery, but it may

not be at risk of insurgent attack and therefore may not require security.

5-64. There are three key IO audiences during the hold stage:

Populace.

Insurgents.

COIN force.

5-65. The IO message to the population should affirm that security forces supporting the

government are in the area to accomplish the following:

Protect the population from so-called “revolutionary justice.”

Eliminate insurgent leaders and infrastructure.

Improve basic life support where possible.

Reinstate government presence.

IO should also state that the security forces will remain for several years and will not

leave. This message of a persistent presence can be reinforced by making long-term

contracts with the local populace for various supply or construction requirements.

5-66. The IO message to the insurgents calls on them to surrender or leave the area,

emphasizing the permanent nature of the government victory and presence. The

government might try to exploit success by offering a local amnesty. Insurgent forces will

most likely not surrender, but may cease hostile actions against the government in that

area.

5-67. The commander’s message to the COIN force should explain the changes in

missions and responsibilities that are associated with creating or reinforcing the

legitimacy of the government. The importance of securing the people to protect them,

gaining the people’s support by assisting them, and using measured force when fighting

the insurgents should be reinforced and understood.

5-68. Operations during this stage are designed to:

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Continuously secure the population to separate them from the insurgency.

Establish a firm government presence and control over the area and population.

Recruit, organize, equip, and train local people to provide area security.

Establish a government political apparatus to replace the insurgency apparatus.

Develop a dependable network of informants.

5-69. Major actions occurring during this stage include:

Designating and allocating area-oriented security forces to continue offensive

operations in the area. Other security forces that participated in clearing actions

are released or are assigned to other tasks.

Thorough population screening to identify and eliminate remaining insurgents and

to identify any lingering insurgent support structures.

Conducting area surveys to determine resources and specific needs of the people

and area. Local leaders should be involved.

Constructively influencing the people’s motivation through environmental

improvements designed to convince the population to support and participate in

the active security of their area and in the area reconstruction effort.

Training of local paramilitary security forces, including arming and integrating

them in successful operations against the insurgents.

Establishing a communications system integrating the area into the larger secure

communications grid and system.

Building Support and Protecting the Population

5-70. The population in the AO must be protected from the insurgents in order to make

any progress in building support for the government. If the people are not secure or they

perceive they are not, then COIN efforts are greatly hindered. The security forces must

conduct patrols and use measured force against insurgent targets of opportunity on a

continuous basis to ensure the protection of the people in the AO.

5-71. This contact with the population is critical to the success of the local COIN effort.

Actions designed to completely eliminate the remaining covert insurgent political

infrastructure must be continued, as its presence will continue to threaten and influence

people.

5-72. Special funds (or other available resources) should be available as wages to

reimburse the population for accomplishing applicable required tasks. Tasks that provide

an overt and direct benefit for the population and for which reimbursement is appropriate

are key, initial priorities. These tasks can begin the process of securing and reconciling

the population to the government. Some sample tasks are:

Collecting and clearing trash from the streets.

Removing or painting-over insurgency symbols or colors.

Building and improving roads.

Digging wells.

Preparing and building indigenous local security force infrastructure.

Securing, moving, and distributing supplies.

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Providing guides, sentries, and translators.

Monitoring the Population

5-73. Population control measures include determining who lives in the area and what

they do. This process requires research into family, clan, tribe, interpersonal, and

professional relationships. Establishing control normally begins with a census and the

issuing of identification cards. A census must be advertised and executed systematically.

Census tasks include establishing who resides in which building and the responsible

family head for each household. Those responsible for the household are held

accountable to report any future changes to the appropriate agencies. The collected

census records provide intelligence regarding real property ownership, relationships, and

business associations.

5-74. Insurgents may try to force the people to destroy their identification cards. The

incentive for the people to retain their identification cards must be sufficient. Insurgents

will participate in the census to gain valid identification cards themselves. Requiring

applicants to bring two men from outside their family to swear to their identity is a

method to reduce this probability. Those who affirm the status of the identification card

applicant are accountable for their official statements made on behalf of the applicant.

Identification cards should have a code that indicates where the holders live.

5-75. Some other control measures are:

Establishing and enforcing a curfew.

Setting up a pass system administered by security forces or civil authorities and

establishing limits on the length of time people can travel.

Establishing limits on the number of visitors from outside the area.

5-76. Once control measures are in place, the government should have an established

system of punishments for various offenses. These should be announced to the population

and enforced. The establishment of this system should be initiated by the government to

ensure the same system is enforced everywhere, and there is consistency with the rule of

law throughout its territory. The government must have the means to impose fines and

other punishments for civil infractions of this nature.

Increasing Popular Support

5-77. COIN forces should use all available resources and capabilities to capitalize on

every opportunity to help the population and meet its needs and expectations. Projects to

improve their economic, social, cultural, and medical needs can begin immediately.

Actions speak louder than words. Once the insurgent political infrastructure has been

destroyed and local leaders begin to establish themselves, any necessary political reforms

can be implemented. Other important tasks include:

Establishing agencies of the government to carry out routine administrative

functions and to begin improvement programs.

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Providing government support to those willing to participate in reconstruction.

Selection for participation should be based on determinations of need and ability

to help. People should also be willing to secure what they create.

Begin progressive efforts—such as participation of the population in local

elections of leaders, community-sponsored environmental improvement,

formation of youth clubs, and other projects—to develop regional and national

consciousness, and rapport between the population and its government.

5-78. There are key IO audiences and messages in this stage, as well.

5-79. The IO message to the population has three facets.

First, it should aim to gain understanding or approval for the actions of security

forces that are affecting the population, such as the control methods or a census.

This is relatively easy to achieve by telling the people what is to be done and for

what purpose.

The second aim is to establish human intelligence sources that lead to

identification and destruction of any remaining insurgent infrastructure in the

area.

The third aim should be to win over those people who are still passive or neutral

by demonstrating how the government is going to make their life better.

5-80. The IO message to the insurgents should aim to create divisions between the

leadership and the mass base by emphasizing failures of the insurgency and successes of

the government. Success is indicated when elements of the insurgency abandon it and

return to work with the government.

5-81. The commander should emphasize to COIN forces that they must remain friendly

towards the populace while staying vigilant against insurgent actions. Commanders must

ensure Soldiers understand their rules of engagement, which will become even more

restrictive as peace and stability return.

5-82. The most important activities during the build stage are conducted by nonmilitary

agencies. Government representatives reestablish political offices and normal

administrative procedures. National and international development agencies rebuild

infrastructure and key facilities. Local leaders are developed and given authority. Life for

the area’s inhabitants begins to return to normal. Activities along the combat and security

force LLOs become secondary to those involved in essential services, good governance,

and essential services LLOs.

COMBINED ACTION

5-83. Combined action is a technique that involves joining ANA and local troops in a

single organization, usually a platoon or company, to conduct counterinsurgency

operations. This technique is appropriate in environments where large insurgent forces do

not exist or they lack resources and freedom of maneuver. Combined action normally

involves joining an ANA rifle squad or platoon with a local platoon or company,

respectively. The purpose of this approach is to hold and build while providing a

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persistent COIN force presence among the populace. This approach attempts to first

achieve security and stability in a local area, followed by offensive operations nearby

enemy forces now denied access or support. Not designed for offensive operations

themselves, combined action units rely on more robust combat units for this task.

Combined action units can also establish mutual support among villages to secure a wider

area.

5-84. Combined action programs can only be instituted in areas with limited insurgent

activity and should not be used to isolate or expel a well established and supported

insurgent force. Combined action is most effective after an area has been cleared of

armed insurgents.

5-85. The following geographic and demographic factors can also influence the

probability of success:

Towns relatively isolated from other population centers are simpler to

continuously secure.

Towns and villages with a limited number of roads passing through are easier to

secure than towns with many routes in and out, because all these approaches must

be guarded.

Existing avenues of approach into a town should be observable from the town to

facilitate the interdiction of an insurgent force and the control of population

movements.

The town’s population should be small and constant, where people know one

another and can easily identify outsiders. In towns or small cities where a large

number of inhabitants are not acquainted with each other, conducting a census is

the most effective tool to establish initial accountability for everyone.

The town and combined action/local defense force must establish mutual support

with other adjacent or nearby towns where combined action forces are operating.

Larger reaction or reserve forces as well as close air support, attack aviation, and

air assault support should be quickly available to assist each combined action unit.

5-86. Combined action unit members must develop and build positive relationships with

their associated government security forces and with the town leadership. By living

among the people, combined action units serve an important purpose. They demonstrate

the commitment and competence of COIN forces while sharing experiences and

relationships with the local people. These working relationships build trust and enhance

the legitimacy of the government. To further build trust, ANA members should request

that the local security forces provide training on local customs, key terrain, possible

insurgent hideouts, and relevant cultural dynamics, as well as provide a description of

recent local events.

5-87. While combined action units are integrated into a regional scheme of mutually

supporting security and influence, they should remain an organic asset of the parent unit

from which they are drawn. Positioning reinforced squad-sized units (9 to 11 Soldiers)

among local citizens creates a dispersal risk the parent unit can mitigate with on-call

reserve and reaction forces along with mutual support from adjacent villages and towns.

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5-88. The thorough integration of ANA and local combined action personnel supports the

effective teamwork that is critical to the success of each team and the overall program.

ANA members should be drawn from some of the parent unit’s best personnel.

Commanders should designate potential members prior to deployment to facilitate

specific training and team-building to enable the success of the combined action unit

once it arrives in the area of operation. Preferably, team members should have had prior

experience in the area. Other desirable characteristics for combined action members

include:

Ability to operate effectively as part of a team.

Strong leadership qualities, among them:

o Communicates clearly.

o Shows maturity.

o Leads by example.

o Makes good decisions.

Ability to apply the commander’s intent in the absence of orders.

Possession of cultural awareness and understanding of the local environment.

Absence of any obvious prejudices.

Mutual respect when operating with local personnel.

Experience with the language or the ability to learn languages.

Patience and tolerance when dealing with language and translation barriers.

5-89. Combined action units should be used in cleared and semi-cleared areas to work

with the local people, help provide continuous security in towns, and train and conduct

operations with local security forces. Secondary missions include conducting civic action

along established LLOs in support of their parent unit, gathering information for COIN

forces, and providing other appropriate assistance to the local government to further

develop its legitimacy.

5-90. Appropriate tasks include but are not limited to the following:

Assisting local security forces in maintaining entry control points and providing

reaction force capabilities through the parent unit.

Conducting multinational, coordinated day and night patrols to secure the town

and area.

Facilitating local contacts to gather information in conjunction with local security

force representatives. (Ensure information gathered is made available promptly

and on a regular basis to the parent unit for timely fusion and action.)

Conducting training in leadership and general military subjects so local security

forces can secure the town/area on their own.

Conducting operations with other multinational forces and units, if required.

Operating as a team with local security forces to instill pride, leadership, and

patriotism.

Assisting government representatives with civic action programs to establish an

environment where the people have a stake in the future of their town and nation.

Protecting and assisting judicial and government representatives in establishing

the rule of law.

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LIMITED SUPPORT

5-91. Not all COIN efforts require deployments of large combat formations. In many

cases, support is limited, focused on missions like security forces advisory duty, fire

support, or logistic sustainment. The purpose of the limited support approach is to focus

on building local capacity and capability. Local security forces are expected to conduct

combat operations, including any clearing and holding that has to be accomplished.

ASSESSMENT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

“The two best guides, which can not be readily reduced to statistics or processed through

a computer, are an improvement in intelligence voluntarily given by the population and a

decrease in the insurgents’ recruiting rate. Much can be learnt merely from the faces of

the population in villages that are subject to clear-and-hold operations, if these are

visited at regular intervals. Faces which are at first resigned and apathetic, or even

sullen, six months later are full of cheerful welcoming smiles. The people know who is

winning”.

Sir Robert Thompson

5-92. Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and

progress of an operation. Commanders, assisted by the staff, continuously assess the

environment, situation, and the progress of the operation, and compare it with the

commander’s visualization and intent. Assessment precedes and is integrated into every

operations-process activity. Assessment involves comparing projected outcomes to actual

events, using conceptual tools to determine progress toward success. It entails two

distinct tasks:

Continuously monitoring the current situation (including the environment) and

progress of the operation.

Evaluating the operation against established criteria using measurement tools and

criteria.

Based on their assessments, commanders adjust the operation and associated activities to

better achieve the desired end state.

DEVELOPING MEASUREMENT CRITERIA

5-93. Commanders and staffs want to know why and when they are achieving success

within the LLOs. Traditionally, they look for discrete quantitative and qualitative

measurements to indicate success. However, the complex nature of COIN makes progress

difficult to measure. Subjective assessment at all levels is essential to understand the

diverse and complex nature of COIN problems and to measure local success or failure

against the overall operation’s purpose. Additionally, since commanders want to know

how effectively the LLO are working together, planners must evaluate not only progress

along each LLO, but also how they are affecting activities along other LLOs.

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ASSESSMENT TOOLS

5-94. Assessment tools help commanders and staffs determine:

Completion of tasks and their impact.

Level of achievement of objectives.

Whether a condition of success has been developed or established.

Whether the operation’s end state has been attained.

Whether the commander’s intent was achieved.

For example, planning for transition of responsibility to the local government is an

integral part of COIN operational design and planning because of the fundamental

requirement to support development of the local government’s legitimacy. Assessment

tools may be used to assess the geographic and administrative transfer of control and

responsibility to the local government as it develops its capabilities. Assessments differ

for every mission, task, and LLO, and for different phases of an operation. Leaders adjust

assessment methods as the insurgents adapt to COIN force tactics and the environment

changes.

5-95. The two most common assessment measures are measures of effectiveness (MOEs)

and measures of performance (MOPs).

5-96. A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior,

capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end

state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. MOEs focus on the results or

consequences of actions. MOEs answer the question, Are we achieving results that move

us towards our desired end state, or are additional or alternative actions required?

5-97. A measure of performance is a criterion to assess friendly actions that is tied to

measuring task accomplishment. An MOP answers the question, Was the task or action

performed as the commander intended?

5-98. Leaders may use observable, quantifiable, objective data as well as subjective

indicators to assess progress measured against expectations. A combination of both types

of indicators is recommended to reduce the chance of misconstruing trends.

5-99. All MOEs and MOPs for assessing COIN operations should be designed with the

same characteristics. These four characteristics are:

Measurable. MOEs and MOPs must have quantitative or qualitative standards

against which they can be measured. The most effective measurement would be a

combination of quantitative and qualitative measures to guard against an

inaccurate view of results.

Discrete. Each MOE and MOP must measure a separate and distinct aspect of the

task, purpose, or condition.

Relevant. MOEs and MOPs must be relevant to the measured task, outcome, and

condition. Local, regional, and national leaders and nongovernmental

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organization personnel may provide practical, astute, and professional ideas and

feedback to craft relevant MOPs and MOEs.

Responsive. Assessment tools must detect environmental/situational changes

quickly and accurately enough to facilitate the commander’s development of an

effective response or counter.

BROAD INDICATORS OF PROGRESS

5-100. Numerical and statistical indicators have limits when measuring social

environments. For example, in South Vietnam U.S. forces used the body count as an

indicator of success or failure within what this chapter describes as the combat LLO. Yet,

the body count indicator only communicated a small part of the information commanders

needed to assess their operations and was therefore misleading. Body count can only be a

partial and effective indicator when adversaries and their identities can be verified

through a uniform or possession of an insurgent political identification card.

Additionally, COIN forces require the exact number of insurgent armed fighters initially

present to gain an accurate appreciation of what the number of insurgent casualties might

indicate in respect to enemy strength or capability. This discrete indicator fails to inform

as to which side the local population blames for collateral damage, whether this fighting

and resultant casualties damaged the insurgent infrastructure and affected the insurgency

strategy in that area, and where the families of the dead insurgents reside and how they

might react. For another example, within the essential services LLO the number of

schools built or renovated does not equate to the effective operation of an educational

system.

5-101. Planners should start with broad measures of social and economic health or

weakness when assessing environmental conditions. Here are some possible examples of

useful indicators in COIN:

Refugees. Refugees are a product of the deliberate violence associated with

insurgencies and their counteraction. People and families exiled from or fleeing

their homes and property and people returning to them are measurable and

revealing. The number, population, and demographics of refugee camps or the

lack thereof are a resultant indicator.

Human movement and religious attendance. In societies where the culture is

dominated by religion, activities related to the predominant faith may indicate the

ease of movement and confidence in security, people’s use of free will and

volition, and the presence of freedom of religion. Possible indicators include the

following:

o Flow of religious pilgrims or lack thereof.

o Development and active use of places of worship.

Value of the regional and/or national currency. If the currency is traded on

international markets, the international perception of its stability, and by inference

that of the economy as a whole, can be evaluated by whether the currency is

rising, falling, or stationary against other currencies.

Presence and activity of small- and medium-sized businesses. When danger or

insecure conditions exist, these businesses close.

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Level of agricultural activity. Is a region/nation self-sustaining, or must life-

support-type foodstuffs be imported? Has the annual need increased or decreased?

Presence or absence of associations. Formation and presence of multiple

political parties, independent, professional associations, and trade unions.

Participation in elections, especially when an insurgency publicly threatens

violence against those who participate.

Government services available, such as:

o Police stations operational and police officers present throughout the area.

o Clinics and hospitals in full operation, and new whether facilities

sponsored by the private sector are open and operational.

o Virtually all schools and universities are open and functioning.

Industry exports.

Employment/unemployment rate.

TARGETING

5-102. The targeting process focuses operations and the use of limited assets and time.

Commanders and staffs use the targeting process to achieve effects that support the lines

of operations in a COIN campaign plan. It is important to understand that targeting is

done for all operations, not just attacks against insurgents. The targeting process can

support IO, civil-military operations, and even meetings between commanders and local

leaders, based on the commander’s desires. The targeting process occurs in the targeting

cell of the appropriate command post.

5-103. Targeting in a COIN environment requires the creation of a targeting board or

working group at all echelons. The intelligence cell provides representatives to the

targeting board/working group to synchronize targeting with intelligence sharing and ISR

operations. The goal is to prioritize targets and determine the best means of engaging

them in order to have effects on the people, nation, and insurgency that support the

commander’s intent and operation plan.

5-104. The focus for targeting is on people, both insurgents and noncombatants. There

are two major types of targets: key personalities and areas. Key personalities include

insurgent personnel, community or political elites, and other individuals with power over

the populace. Areas include segments of the population and regions under insurgent

control.

5-105. Personality and area targets can be further broken down into lethal targets and

non-lethal targets. Lethal targets are best addressed via operations to capture or kill, while

non-lethal targets are best dealt with via civil-military operations, IO, negotiation,

political programs, economic programs, social programs and other non-combat methods.

Non-lethal targets are usually more important than lethal targets and will never be less

important.

5-106. Personality targets include the following:

Lethal. Insurgent leaders to be captured or killed.

Nonlethal.

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o Personnel such as community leaders and insurgents, who should be

engaged through outreach, negotiation, meetings, and other interaction.

o Corrupt local leaders who may have be replaced.

5-107. Area targets include the following:

Lethal.

o Insurgent bases and insurgent logistic depots or caches.

o Smuggling routes that can be interdicted.

Lethal and nonlethal mix.

o Populated areas where insurgents commonly operate.

o Populated areas controlled by insurgents where the presence of ANA

personnel providing security could undermine support to insurgents.

Nonlethal. Populations potentially receptive to civil-military operations or IO.

5-108. The basic targeting process are:

Decide what targets must be addressed.

Detect the targets.

Deliver (conduct the operation).

Assess the effects of the operation.

5-109. The first two activities are often switched in sequence, however. Rather than

decide-detect-deliver, assess, the process may become detect-decide-deliver-assess. This

is because the targets are individuals or groups of people rather than a fixed enemy order

of battle. It is impossible to decide who/what to target without first knowing who/what

the targets are.

DETECT

5-110. The detect activity is performed on a continuous basis. It requires a great deal of

analytical work by intelligence personnel. They analyze large quantities of all-source

intelligence reporting to determine the validity of threats, how important different

potential targets actually are, what means should be used to engage the targets, and the

expected effects of engaging the targets. This requires a detailed understanding of social

networks, insurgent networks, insurgent actions, and community atmospherics. (See

Appendix D)

5-111. As noted earlier, attention must be paid to intelligence regarding the perceptions

and interests of the populace. This intelligence is crucial to IO and civil-military

operations targeting. It is also important for developing political, social, and economic

programs.

DECIDE

5-112. The decide activity is the culmination of previous intelligence work. Intelligence

personnel, with the commander and other staff members, must decide when analysis is

sufficiently developed to warrant engagement. Continuous staff integration and regular

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meetings of the intelligence cell and targeting board smooth and enable this process. Staff

personnel take finished intelligence products, fuse them with their own understanding of

the AO, and help the commander and operations officer make decisions about who/what

to target and how. Intelligence personnel provide information on the relative importance

of different target personalities and areas, and the projected effects of lethal or nonlethal

engagement.

5-113. At the end of the decide activity, the targeting board has produced a prioritized list

of targets and a recommended course of action associated with each. Fragmentary orders

by operations personnel often come about based on the decide activity. Each of these

orders is an operation that should be nested with the higher headquarters’ plan and the

commander’s intent. The intelligence synchronization plan may have to change, based on

targeting decisions.

DELIVER

5-114. The deliver activity is simply executing the missions decided upon by

thecommander.

ASSESS

5-115. The assess activity occurs continuously throughout an operation. During

assessment, it is critical that collectors and analysts review the results of the operation

and change intelligence synchronization plans and analyses appropriately. In addition to

assessing changes to their own operations, intelligence personnel look for reporting that

indicates the effects on all aspects of the operational environment, to include insurgents

and civilians. Relevant reporting can come from any of the intelligence disciplines, open

sources, or operational reporting. Depending on the effects, commanders may choose to

expand the operation, maintain it as is, halt it, initiate a branch or sequel, or take steps to

correct the damage of a mistake. Therefore, an accurate after-action assessment is very

important. Metrics often include the following:

Changes in local attitudes.

Changes in public perceptions.

Changes in the quality or quantity of intelligence provided by individuals or

groups.

Changes in the economic or political situation of an area.

Changes in insurgent patterns.

Captured/killed insurgent personnel.

Captured equipment and documents.

5-116. As indicated in Chapter 3, detainees, captured documents, and captured equipment

may provide a great deal of additional information. Its exploitation and processing into

intelligence often adds to the overall understanding of the enemy and precipitates

additional targeting decisions. In addition, the assessment of the operation should be fed

back to collectors. This allows them to see if their intelligence sources are credible. In

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addition, effective operations often cause locals to provide more intelligence, which

drives future operations.

LEARNING AND ADAPTATION

5-117. Once the operation plan has been initiated, a commander may conduct operations

to develop the situation to gain a more thorough understanding of specific elements of the

environment. This increased environmental understanding represents a form of

operational learning and applies across all LLOs. The commander and staff should expect

to adjust the operation’s design and plan based on what they learn. The result is an

ongoing design-learn-redesign cycle.

5-118. COIN operations involve complex, changing relations among all the direct and

peripheral participants, and these participants adapt, respond, and react to each other

throughout an operation. A cycle of adaptation usually develops between insurgents and

the counterinsurgents in which both sides continually adapt to neutralize existing

adversary advantages and develop a new (albeit usually short-lived) advantage of their

own. Victory is gained through a tempo or rhythm of adaptation that is beyond the other

side’s ability to achieve or sustain. Therefore, the COIN force should seek to gain and

sustain advantages over insurgents through emphasis on the learning and adaptation that

is emphasized throughout this manual.

5-119. This process of learning and adapting in COIN is made even more difficult

because of the complexity of the problems to be solved. Generally, there is not a

monolithic adversary that can be singularly classified as the enemy. Many insurgencies

consist of multiple competing insurgency groups (more than 40 groups in some historical

cases such as Sri Lanka). The government and COIN force must adapt based on

understanding this very intricate environment. But the key to effective COIN operational

design and execution remains the ability to adjust better and faster than the insurgents.

SUMMARY

5-120. The challenge of COIN is complex, demanding, and tedious in execution. There

are no simple or quick solutions. Success may often seem elusive. However, contributing

to the complexity of the problem is the manner in which the environment is viewed by

the COIN force and how success is defined. The specific architecture of the COIN

operation and the manner in which it is executed must be based on a realistic treatment of

the environment and remain focused on the commander’s vision of resolution. Success

will be gained from unity of effort across all LLOs to achieve goals that relate directly to

the purpose for the COIN operation—to establish legitimacy for the government and gain

popular support. Operational design and execution cannot really be separated. They are

both part of the same whole.

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Chapter 6

Developing National Security Forces

“Helping others to help themselves is critical to winning the long war”.

This chapter addresses aspects of developing national security forces. It begins with a

discussion of the challenges involved and the resources required. It provides a framework

for organizing the development effort. It concludes with a discussion of the role of police

in counterinsurgency operations.

OVERVIEW

6-1. Success in COIN requires the establishment of a legitimate government which has

the support of the people and is able to address the fundamental causes that the insurgents

use to gain popular support. Achieving these goals requires the nation to defeat or render

irrelevant the insurgent forces, uphold the rule of law, and provide a basic level of

essential services and security for the population. Key to all these tasks is the

development of an effective security force.

6-2. Just as an insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) are defined by a complex array

of factors, the job of training the national security forces is also affected by a variety of

determinants. These include whether sovereignty in the nation is being exercised by an

indigenous government or by a multinational element. The second gives the COIN force

more freedom of maneuver, but the first is important for legitimate governance, a key

goal of any COIN effort. If the nation is sovereign, the quality of the governance it

provides also has an impact. The scale of the effort is another factor; what works in a

small country might not work in a large one. Terrain and civil considerations are also

important. A nation that is compartmentalized by mountains, rivers, or ethnicity presents

different challenges for the COIN effort. A large “occupying” force or international

COIN effort is a factor that can facilitate success in training local security forces, but also

clearly complicates the situation. There are certainly many more factors: what type of

security forces previously existed, whether the effort requires “building from scratch” or

“simply” changing what already exists, sectarian challenges within the forces, resources

available, popular support, and so fourth. This chapter describes some doctrinal

foundations for training security forces. However, these foundations must be adapted to

the situation on the ground and the particular insurgency at hand.

6-3. The term “security forces” in this chapter includes all forces under national control

with the mission of protecting against internal and external threats. Elements of the

security forces include, but are not limited to, military forces, police, corrections

personnel, and border guards at the local through national levels. With this in mind, this

chapter addresses methods to develop security forces, realizing that the range of

assistance varies depending on the situation.

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CHALLENGES, RESOURCES, AND END STATE

6-4. Each instance of developing security forces will be as unique as each insurgency.

Many factors influence the amount and type of aid required. These are discussed in more

detail later, but include the following:

Existing capabilities of the national security force.

Character of the insurgency.

Terrain, the culture.

Level of commitment and sovereignty of the nation.

Level of commitment from the external sources.

6-5. While U.S. and multinational forces may be required to assist the nation in

improving security; the insurgency will use the presence of foreign forces as another

reason to question the legitimacy of the government. A government reliant on foreign

forces for internal security runs the risk of not being recognized as legitimate. While

combat operations with significant multinational participation may be necessary,

multinational combat operations are secondary to enabling the Islamic Republic of

Afghanistan’s ability to provide for its own security.

CHALLENGES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF EFFECTIVE SECURITY

FORCES

6-6. There have been a number of common problems and issues in the training missions

undertaken by various countries. These problems generally fall under differing national

perspectives in one of four broad categories:

Resources.

Leadership.

Exercising power.

Organizational structures.

6-7. Governments must properly balance national resources to meet the expectations of

the people. Funding for services, education, and health care can limit resources available

for security forces. The result of the nation’s spending priorities may be a security force

capable of protecting only the capital and key government facilities, leaving the rest of

the country unsecured. Conducting effective COIN operations requires an allocation of

resources that ensures integration of efforts to develop all aspects of the security force.

Recognizing the interrelationship of security and governance, the central government

must also ensure adequate resources are devoted to meeting such basic needs as health

care, clean water, and electricity.

6-8. The existing national approach to leadership may need to be adjusted. Leaders may

be appointed and promoted on the basis of family ties or on the basis of membership in a

party or faction, rather than on demonstrated competence or performance. Leaders may

not seek to develop subordinates. The need to ensure the welfare of the troops may not be

a commonly shared trait. In some cases, leaders enforce the obedience of their

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subordinates by pure fear and use their position to exploit them. Positions of power can

also lead to corruption, which can also be affected by local culture.

6-9. The behavior of national security force personnel is often a primary cause of public

dissatisfaction. The corrupting influences of power must be guarded against. Cultural and

ethnic differences within a population may lead to significant discrimination within the

security forces and by the security forces against minority groups. In more ideological

struggles, the prejudicial treatment may be manifested against personnel of other political

parties, whether in a minority cultural group or not. Security forces that abuse civilians do

not win the trust and confidence of the population. A program of comprehensive security

force development requires identifying and addressing biases along with improper or

corrupt practices.

RESOURCES

6-10. The mission of developing national security forces is more than just a task assigned

to a few specialists. The scope and scale of training programs today and the scale of the

programs likely to be required in the future is now a core competency of the ANA and

other national assets. Multinational partners are often willing to help a nation fight

insurgency by assisting with training national forces. Partner nations may develop joint

training teams or assign teams to a specific element of the security force or a particular

specialty. Training resources may be received from the following organizations and

programs:

Special Operations Forces

6-11. With their focus on specific regions of the world and study of languages and

cultures, multinational special operations forces (SOF) have long been the lead

organization in training and advising foreign armed forces. While SOF personnel may be

ideal for some training and advisory roles, their limited numbers restrict their ability to

carry out large-scale missions to develop national security forces. In a low-level COIN,

SOF personnel may be the only forces assigned to the training mission; at the higher end

of the spectrum, SOF may be allocated to training only their counterparts in the ANA.

Ground Forces

6-12. Large-scale training and advisory missions require the employment of large

numbers of land forces that may not have SOF language training or regional expertise.

However, such conventional forces may have some advantages in training members of

the ANA with similar missions. Linguistic augmentation and additional cultural training

are required for both SOF and conventional ground forces. Assignment of the best-

qualified personnel to training and advisory missions is necessary.

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Interagency/Intergovernmental Resources

6-13. Interagency resources can be applied in numerous ways to support training security

forces. Perhaps most important is training nonmilitary security forces. The Ministry of

the Interior has the capability of sending law enforcement specialists to train and advise

the ANP. During intensive counterinsurgencies, the effectiveness of civilian police

advisers and trainers may be limited by the high-threat nature of the environment. These

forces are most effective when operating in a benign environment or when security is

separately provided.

Multinational Resources

6-14. Multinational partners also assist materially in training security forces. Some

nations may be more willing to train ANA forces than to provide troops for combat

operations. Some multinational forces come with significant employment restrictions.

Each international contribution is assessed on its own merits, but decisions to decline

such assistance are rarely made.

Contract Support

6-15. In some cases, additional training support is contracted to enable uniformed forces

to be more efficiently utilized. Contractor support can be used to provide training and

education to include the following:

Institutional training.

Development of security ministries and headquarters.

Establishment of administrative and logistic systems.

Contracted police development capabilities can provide expertise that is not resident in

the military.

Organizing Forces to Develop Security Forces

6-16. Developing security forces is a complex and challenging mission. The Islamic

Republic of Afghanistan and its multinational partners can only succeed if that mission is

approached with the same deliberate planning and preparation, energetic execution, and

appropriate resourcing as the combat aspects of the COIN operation. Accordingly, the

force commander and staff need to consider the task of developing security forces as part

of their initial mission analysis. That task must then be an integral part of all assessments,

planning, coordination, and preparation.

6-17. As planning unfolds, mission requirements should drive the initial organization for

the unit charged with developing security forces. To achieve unity of effort, a single

organization should be given this responsibility.

6-18. In an area in which COIN operations are already being conducted, the development

of security forces could be assigned to a specific unit, such as a Kandak or a support unit.

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6-19. For large, long-duration missions, a separate organization with the sole

responsibility of developing security forces and subordinate to a corps commander may

be required. Such an organization may be multinational, and interagency.

6-20. The internal structure of the organization charged with developing security forces

must reflect the desired end state of those security forces. For example, if army, police,

air, and special forces are being developed, the organization in charge of those programs

requires teams charged specifically with each of those tasks. If civilian security

components, such as a ministry of defense or interior, are being developed, then

ministerial teams are also required. Because the quality of the developing security forces

in terms of professionalism and ethics is so important, a separate training element focused

on those values may be needed.

6-21. The designated force responsible for these programs also requires a headquarters

and staff task-organized for all the functions required to support the full all aspects of the

development of security forces. (See paragraph 6-31.) In addition to traditional staff

functions, some or all of the following may require a more robust capability than normal:

Comptroller, for managing the significant monetary resources required for

training, equipping, and building security forces. A separate internal auditor may

be required as a check to ensure the nation’s resources are safeguarded and

effectively managed.

Staff judge advocate, with specific specialties and a robust capability for contract

law, military justice, and law of land warfare.

Construction engineer management, to oversee and manage the construction of

security forces infrastructure, such as bases, ranges and training areas, depots and

logistics facilities, and police stations.

Political-military advisers, to ensure integration of the development of security

forces with the development of civilian ministries and capabilities.

Public affairs, with a focused capability to build confidence of the population in

their security forces and to develop the public affairs capability of the ANA/ANP

forces.

Force protection and focused intelligence staff, to address the challenge of and

threats to the relatively small teams that may be embedded with security forces

and not co-located with robust ANA forces or bases.

Materiel management, until such a capability is developed in the security forces.

The equipping and supplying of new security forces is critical to their

development and employment.

Health affairs, since security forces personnel will be more likely to stay in new

units and fight if they are confident that they will be properly treated if wounded.

Additionally, disease is a significant threat that must be addressed with preventive

medicine and robust care.

Security assistance to manage the external training efforts and foreign military

sales, and employ well-developed procedures for purchasing weapons, equipment,

goods, and services. In a COIN these functions are likely embedded in the staff

elements of the higher headquarters.

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Staff officers with a civilian law enforcement backg1round or actual civilian law

enforcement personnel can play a vitally important role in advising the

commander.

6-22. An effective security force development organization is flexible and adaptive. The

requirements for developing the type, character, composition, and quantity of security

forces will change with the growth of security forces and the maturity of the COIN

operation. The organization must be able to anticipate such changes. Temporary duty and

contract personnel support may be used to provide niche capabilities or to fill gaps until

more permanent individuals or units can be added to the organization.

DESIRED END STATE

6-23. Training security forces is a slow and painstaking process, and does not lend itself

to any “quick fixes.” Real success does not appear as a single decisive victory. To ensure

long-term success, the end state of training programs needs to be clearly stated at the

start. The end state is usually a set of military characteristics common to all militaries.

Those characteristics have nuances in different states, but a well-trained security forces

should:

Be able to provide reasonable levels of security.

Be able to provide reasonable levels of internal security without infringing upon

the citizens’ civil liberties.

Be founded upon the rule of law.

Be sustainable by the nation after external supporting forces depart.

6-24. Because of the demands of dealing with an insurgency, the military and police

forces may be performing functions that are not normally considered conventional. The

military may be filling an internal security role usually reserved for the police, and the

police may have forces that are so heavily armed that they would normally be part of the

military. In the near term, the security forces should:

Be focused on COIN operations, integrating military capabilities with those of

national, regional, and local police.

Maintain the flexibility to transition to more conventional roles of external and

internal defense, based on long-term requirements.

6-25. To meet both near and long term objectives, trainers remember the cumulative

effects of training. Effective training programs have impacts in the short, mid, and long

terms.

6-26. To achieve this end state and intermediate objectives, the nation should develop a

plan—with multinational assistance, when necessary—that simply and accurately

addresses all aspects of force development. ANA doctrine divides force development into

the following domains: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and

education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF). Doctrine is listed first, but these

elements are tightly linked, simultaneously pursued, and difficult to prioritize. The

commander monitors progress in all domains. There is always a temptation for Soldiers

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involved in such programs to impose their own doctrine and judgment on the nation.

National security force doctrine, like the remaining DOTMLPF domains discussed

throughout this chapter, must be appropriate to national capabilities and requirements.

6-27. The objective of development programs is to create security forces with the

following characteristics:

Flexible, a force that is capable of accomplishing the broad missions required by

the nation—not just to defeat insurgents or defend against outside aggression, but

to increase security in all areas. This requires an effective command and

organizational structure that makes sense for the nation.

Proficient.

Security forces that are capable of working effectively in close coordination with

each other to suppress lawlessness and insurgency.

Military units that are tactically and technically proficient, capable of ensuring

their aspect of national security, and capable of integrating with allies.

Nonmilitary security forces that are competent in maintaining civil order,

enforcing laws, controlling borders, and detaining criminal suspects.

Nonmilitary security forces that are thoroughly trained in modern police ethos and

procedures, and understand the basics of investigation, evidence collection, and

proper court and legal procedures.

Self-sustained, forces capable of managing their own equipment throughout its

lifecycle (procurement to disposal) and conducting administrative support.

Well led, leaders at all levels who possess sound professional standards and

appropriate military values, and are selected and promoted based on competence

and merit.

Professional.

Security forces that are honest, impartial, and committed to protecting and serving

the entire population, operating under the rule of law, and respecting human

rights.

Security forces that are loyal to the central government and serve national

interests, recognizing their role as servants of the people and not their masters.

Integrated into society, a force that is representative of the nation’s major ethnic

groups and is not seen as the instrument of just one faction. Cultural sensitivities

toward the incorporation of women must be observed.

FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT

6-28. The mission to develop national security forces can be organized around these

processes:

Assess.

Organize.

Build.

Train.

Equip.

Advise.

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These incorporate all DOTMLPF requirements. Although described sequentially, these

processes will normally be conducted concurrently. For example, training and equipping

operations must be integrated and, as the operation progresses, assessments will lead to

changes.

ASSESS

6-29. As with every major military operation, the first step is to assess the situation. The

assessment should be one part of the comprehensive program of analyzing the insurgency

and normally includes a social and economic analysis. Assessment of the security

situation and its influence on other lines of operation must be continuous. From the

assessment, planners develop short-, mid-, and long-range goals and programs, but those

goals and programs must remain responsive to changing circumstances. A raging

insurgency might require the employment of national forces at various stages of

development. Some existing security forces might be discovered to be so dysfunctional or

corrupt that they have to be disbanded rather than rehabilitated. In some cases, leaders

will need to be replaced in order for the unit to become functional.

6-30. While every situation is different, the following factors should be assessed

throughout planning, preparation, and execution of the operation:

Social structure, organization, demographics, interrelationships, and education

level of the elements of the security force.

Methods, successes, and failures of national COIN efforts.

State of training at all levels and the specialties and education of leaders.

Equipment and priority placed on maintenance.

Logistics and support structure and its ability to meet the requirements of the

force.

Level of sovereignty of the government.

Extent of acceptance of ethnic and religious minorities.

Laws and regulations governing the security forces and their relationship to

national leaders.

6-31. The mission analysis should provide a basis for determining the scope of effort

required. The national security forces may require complete re-establishment, or they

may only require assistance to increase capacity. They may be completely devoid of a

capability (for example, internal affairs, federal investigative department, corrections,

logistics for military forces, formal schools for leaders), or they may only require

temporary reinforcement. As with other military operations, efforts to assist security

forces should reinforce success. For example, instead of building new police stations in

every town, improve the good stations and use them as a model for weaker organizations.

6-32. Decisions are needed on what shortfalls to address first. The extent of the

insurgency combined with resource limitations inevitably forces the commander to set

priorities. Follow-on assessments should start by reviewing areas to which resources have

been restricted, determining where resources should be committed or redirected, and

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deciding where additional resources should be requested. It is always better to take efforts

to legitimize the local leaders by including them in decisions.

6-33. The process of developing a strategic analysis and outlining a strategic plan for

training the forces of a country facing an insurgency is not necessarily a long one. In fact,

the characteristics of a situation featuring a security vacuum or very active insurgency

often require the initiation of necessary programs as soon as possible. Assessment is a

continuous, and a quick initial assessment and the programs it inspires can be adjusted as

more experience and information is gained.

ORGANIZE

6-34. The best organization for national forces depends on the social and economic

conditions of the country as well as cultural and historical factors and the security threat

the nation faces. The aim is to develop an effective an efficient organization with a

command, intelligence, logistic, and operational structure that makes sense for the host

nation. General-purpose forces with limited special purpose teams (such as explosive

ordnance disposal and special weapons and tactics [SWAT]) are preferred, as elite units

divert a large share of the best leadership and remove critical talent from the regular

forces. Doctrine should be standard across the force, as should unit structures. The

organization must facilitate the collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence

across and throughout all security forces.

General Organizational Considerations

6-35. To the maximum extent possible, decisions on the structure of security force

organization should be made at the national level. The nation may be amenable to

proposals from multinational forces, but should at least approve all organizational

designs. As the government gets stronger, external leaders and trainers should expect

increasingly independent organizational decisions. These may include changing the

numbers of forces, types of units, and internal organizational designs. Culture and

conditions might result in security forces in nontraditional roles and missions. Police may

be more paramilitary than other models, and the military may have a role in internal

security. Eventually, the role of police should be to counter crime and the role of the

military should be to address greater threats, though the exact nature of these missions

depends on the situation in that nation. Police and military roles should be clearly

delineated.

6-36. Units should be organized to include all appropriate warfighting functions, or some

adaptation for police forces. Some systems may be initially excluded for a variety of

reasons (for ex- ample, artillery is expensive, takes a large investment in training and is

not easily applied to a counterinsurgency), but organizational plans should foresee

eventual establishment of all appropriate capabilities.

6-37. Organization should address all elements of the security forces, from the ministerial

level to the patrolling police officer and soldier. The complex matrix of simultaneous

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development programs is illustrated in Figure 6-1 (below). Building a competent civilian

infrastructure—including civilian command and control systems—is critical for success

in COIN. The force commander should work with ministries responsible for national and

internal security, including the ministry of defense, the interior ministry, and the justice

ministry. The strengths and weaknesses of the ministerial organization should be

assessed, as well as the requirements for training of civilian defense officials and

employees.

Figure 6-1. Matrix of Security Force Development

6-38. A thorough review of national military and police doctrine is a necessary first step

in setting up a training program. Advisers should review security force regulations to

ensure they provide clear and complete instructions for discipline, acquisitions, and

support activities. Doctrine (including tactics, techniques, and procedures) should be

reviewed and refined to address COIN operations. Regulations should be appropriate for

the level of education and sophistication of the security force personnel. The treatment of

prisoners, detainees and suspected persons should be spelled out clearly and be consistent

with the norms of international and military law.

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Organizational Personnel Issues

6-39. Organizing a security force requires resolving issues related to the following areas:

Recruitment.

Promotion screening/selection.

Pay and benefits.

Leader recruitment and selection.

Personnel accountability.

Demobilization of security force personnel.

Recruitment

6-40. Recruitment is critical to the establishment of security forces. The recruitment

program should be crafted by the nation and take local culture into account, using themes

that resonate with the local population. It should ensure that all the major demographic

groups are properly represented in the security forces. A mobile recruiting capability

should be established in order to target specific areas, ethnic groups, or tribes to ensure

demographic distribution within the security forces. Moderate groups and factions within

hostile or potentially hostile ethnic groups should be contacted and the members of

minority factions encouraged to support recruitment of their group members into the

security forces. Even moderate success in recruiting from disaffected ethnic groups

provides an enormous payoff in terms of building the legitimacy of the security forces

and in quieting the often legitimate fears of such ethnic groups regarding their

relationship with the government. An effective disarmament, demobilization, and

reintegration strategy for former insurgent individuals and groups must be a component

of the overall COIN operation and must therefore be accounted for in the recruitment

effort.

6-41. A clear set of appropriate mental, physical, and moral standards needs to be

established and enforced. Ideally, recruits are centrally screened and inducted.

Recruitment centers need to be in areas that are safe and secure from insurgent attacks, as

these centers are attractive targets for insurgents. All recruits should undergo a basic

security check and be vetted against lists of suspected insurgents. As much as possible,

this process should be conducted by national agencies and personnel. Membership in

illegal organizations needs to be carefully monitored. Past membership need not preclude

joining the security forces, but any ongoing relationship of a recruit with an illegal unit

needs constant monitoring, and care is required to en-sure that no single military or police

unit contains too many prior members of an illegal unit, tribal militia, or other militant

faction.

Promotion Screening/Selection

6-42. Selection for promotion based on proven performance and aptitude for increased

responsibility is essential. Objective evaluations ensure promotion is by merit and not

through influence or family ties. Two methods may be worth considering for selecting

leaders. One is to identify the most competent performers, train them, and recommend

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them for promotion. The second is to identify those with social or professional status

within the training group, then train and recommend them for promotion. The first

method may lead to more competent leaders but could be resisted for cultural reasons.

The second method ensures the new leader will be accepted culturally, but may sacrifice

competence. The most effective solution is often a combination of the two methods.

Pay and Benefits

6-43. Appropriate compensation levels help prevent a culture of corruption in the security

forces. It is cheaper to spend the money for adequate wages and produce effective

security forces than to pay less and end up with corrupt and abusive forces that alienate

the population. This is especially important for the police, who have the greatest

opportunity for corruption in the nature of their duties and contact with the civilian

community. Some important considerations concerning pay are the following:

Pay for commissioned officers, NCOs, and technical specialists should be

competitive with other professions in the nation. Police officers need to be paid a

sufficient wage so that they do not have to supplement their income with part-

time jobs, or resort to illegal methods to supplement their salary.

Pay should be disbursed through national government channels.

Cultural norms should be addressed to ensure that any questionable practices such

as the “taxing” of subordinates are minimized.

Good pay and attractive benefits must be combined with a strict code of conduct

that allows for the immediate dismissal of corrupt security personnel.

Pensions should be available to compensate the families of security force

members in the event of a service-related death.

Pay for military forces should come from central government budgets and

specifically not from kickbacks or locally procured revenue. If this happens, the

military’s loyalty will always be in question and corruption will be likely.

6-44. Effective security forces can help improve the social and economic development of

the nation through the benefits each member receives. Every recruit should be provided a

basic level of literacy, job training, and morals/values instruction.

Leader Recruitment and Selection

6-45. Officer candidate standards should be high. Candidates should be in good health

and pass an academic test set to a higher standard than enlisted recruits. Officer

candidates should be carefully vetted to ensure that they do not have close ties to any

radical or insurgent organization.

6-46. NCOs should be selected from the best of the enlisted security force members.

Objective standards, including proficiency tests, should be established and enforced to

ensure that promotion to the NCO ranks is by merit and not through influence or family

ties.

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Personnel Accountability

6-47. Accountability of personnel in the security force units must be tracked carefully.

Proper personnel accountability reduces corruption, particularly in manual banking

systems where pay is provided in cash. In addition, the number of personnel failing to

report for duty can be an indicator of possible attacks, unit morale, or insurgent and

militia influences upon the security forces.

Demobilization of Security Force Personnel

6-48. Programs should be developed to prevent the formation of a class of impoverished

and disgruntled former officers and soldiers who have lost their livelihood. During the

conflict it will be necessary to remove officers and NCOs from the security forces for

poor performance or for failure to meet the new, higher standards of the force. Some

form of government-provided education grants or low-interest business loans will enable

them to earn a living outside the military. Officers and NCOs who have served for several

years and who are then removed should be given a lump sum payment or a small pension

to ease their transition to civilian life. These programs should not apply to those who are

guilty of human rights abuses or major corruption.

6-49. As a conflict winds down, some security forces may need to be disarmed,

demobilized, and reintegrated into civil society. To avoid producing a pool of recruits for

the insurgency, programs should be established to ensure that large numbers of

demobilized security force members do not become immediately unemployed. Civil

service departments should provide a strong hiring preference to people who have

completed an honorable term of service. Government-financed education programs for

the demobilized members are another possibility.

BUILD/REBUILD FACILITIES

6-50. Requirements for sustaining security forces include the infrastructure necessary to

support the force: barracks, ranges, motor pools, and other military facilities. Because of

the long lead times required for construction, early investment in such facilities is

essential if they are to be available when needed. Force protection must be considered in

any infrastructure design, including headquarters facilities, as they will be attractive

targets for insurgents.

6-51. During an insurgency, the military and police forces are likely to be operating from

a variety of local bases. A long-term force-basing plan needs to be established for

building training centers and unit garrisons. If possible, garrisons should include housing

for the commissioned officers, NCOs, and families; government-provided medical care

for the families; and other amenities that make national service attractive.

6-52. Extensive investment of time and resources might be required to restore or create

the nationwide infrastructure necessary to effectively command and control security

forces. Communications facilities are especially important. Besides building local bases

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and police stations, functional regional and national headquarters and ministries are

required.

TRAIN

6-53. Analysis should address shortfalls at every level with the purpose of establishing

training systems that are self sustaining. This may come from national assets or external

multinational assets.

Establishing Training Standards

6-54. Although the nature of insurgencies and their corresponding responses from

targeted governments, vary widely, clear metrics for individual, leader, and unit training

for security forces can still be established. These sets of standards include many of the

same skills required for individuals and units to be effective in conventional military

operations as well as additional requirements for COIN. Due to the small unit nature of

most COIN operations, effective COIN forces require a high level of junior leadership.

Values training should be integrated into all levels of training for all components. Metrics

to evaluate units should include subjective measures, such as loyalty to the national

government, as well as competence in purely military tasks. Soldiers are familiar with the

evaluation of military training. However, the more difficult task of gauging the

acceptance of values, such as ethnic equality or the rejection of corruption, could very

well provide more important measures of the training effectiveness in some COIN

situations.

6-55. Effective training programs require the establishment of clear individual, leader,

and unit performance standards in detail, taking into account cultural factors that directly

affect the ability of the individual or unit to operate. For example, training a unit to

conduct effective operations requires more time where the average soldier is illiterate.

Similarly, staff training is more difficult in a country with a varying educational level.

With this in mind, it is usually advantageous to take advantage of existing military

personnel to form units and cadres for units, rather than starting from the beginning. As

previously mentioned, a vetting process may be required, but this is still usually better

than the alternative.

6-56. Poorly trained leaders and units are far more prone to human rights violations than

well-trained, well-led units. Leaders and units unprepared for the pressure of active

operations tend to employ indiscriminate force, target civilians, and abuse prisoners—all

actions that can threaten the popular support and government legitimacy so essential for

success in COIN. Badly disciplined and poorly led security forces have served very

effectively as recruiters and propagandists for the insurgents.

6-57. Setting realistic objective and subjective metrics for security forces and following

through on training plans are time consuming. The pressure will be strong to find training

shortcuts, employ “quick fixes,” or to train personnel on the job. Such approaches should

be resisted for, in the long term, they create more problems than they solve. However,

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