Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1)

FM 31-27

once if possible. When they are done drinking, make sure one of them does

not have a foot over the lead ropes as you start out. Whenever you stop on the

trail for even a short time, always be sure the pack animals are ready to go

before moving out. Often one will be spread out relieving himself and is in no

position to step out.

7-55. One of the most irritating things in leading a pack string is to have a

pack animal in the string that is always going around a tree the opposite way

the rest of the string is going. Often you can shorten the lead rope and correct

this. If that does not work you may have to lead him. This behavior is usually

a sign of a green pack animal and quite often disappears as the animal learns

what is expected of him. Others just do not ever seem to learn. If you have

one of these in your string, remember him well and leave him behind on the

next trip.

CAMPSITES

7-56. Should you have several animals in your outfit and not picket all of

them, you might find it almost impossible to keep the loose animals in the

area if there is insufficient grass. Unless you spend the entire night watching

them, they might wander off in search of good pasture and be gone in the

morning. Grass and water go together. An animal without water will act

much the same as one with insufficient grass. For this reason, every handler

should sleep with his weapon and bridle. A spring of good, sweet, cold water

is by far the best, but make sure these springs run water far enough BELOW

the camp for your stock. Another problem is that there is in most all pack or

saddle stock the tendency to want to return to the last camp, or worse yet, go

home. This urge is even more evident in them if you should be heading

towards home after a few days out on a mission.

SETTING UP CAMP

7-57. If you remember which items are in which pack you will know which

load goes where in the camp area. It will save a lot of time and labor to be

able to lead each pack animal to wherever his load goes. As soon as you get

the pack off the animal, loosen the cinches on the packsaddle.

7-58. Keeping the saddles and pads off the ground even in dry weather is a

sign of good organization. It only takes a minute to lash a pole between two

trees to put the saddles and pads on. A tree limb makes a good hanger for

lash ropes and halters. When unsaddling an animal, always keep the pad and

saddle together. If the saddle is marked for which horse it fits, you won’t have

to refit the pad next time you saddle up. If the weather is clear, let the pads

air out and dry before covering them with the mantas off the pack loads that

evening. While you are unsaddling the animals, you will need the brush and

currycomb. Ruffle the hair on the backs of the animals and check for any

tenderness or sores. If you do have a sore-backed animal, take care of it

before turning him out.

7-59. When setting up for the night, many of the items of pack gear will serve

a dual purpose. Box panniers turn into tables and stools, lash ropes turn into

high lines and corrals, mantas turn into ground tarps and covers, and so on.

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THE HIGH LINE

7-60. The high line is a section of rope strung between two or more trees, with

tie points for the horses. The knot used for these tie points (sometimes called

the high-line knot) can be either the pulley knot used for a single or double

dutchman, a butterfly knot, or a cat’s paw. Use the high line as a place to tie

the horses during the night.

7-61. The high line can often be temporarily put up when first arriving in

camp. It will serve as an ideal place to tie up the pack string while laying out

the camp area. Often, your lariats will serve for the first high line until you

have a lash rope off the packs. By tying up to a line when you first arrive at

camp, you often prevent damaging equipment and gear on a pack. Tying

keeps the pack animal from getting under low limbs or trying to rub the pack

off against the tree he is tied to. A very frequent mistake is tying an animal to

a small dead tree. Quite often just a light pull on the dead tree in the right

direction will cause it to fall, possibly injuring the animal or spooking him

and others into running off. In selecting the area for a high line, pick a spot

that is level and has some shelter for the animals. Shade during the daytime

will usually offer some shelter in a rainstorm.

7-62. To put up the high line, start with the lash cinch and go around an

average-sized tree approximately 7 feet off the ground. Hook the lash cinch

into the rope. If possible, run the line so another tree is approximately in the

center of the line. Tie a high-line knot approximately every 2 feet until you

come to the first tree. Go around this tree and tie high-line knots until you

get approximately 2 feet from the tree to which you intend to tie off. Use the

last knot to set up a dutchman, then go around the tree and pull the whole

line as tight as possible. Some other considerations are as follows:

• When tying to a high line, stagger the animals tied to it: one on one

side and then one on the other side.

• The high line can also make a good line to dry saddle pads when they

are not being used for the animals.

PICKETING

7-63. Picketing is tying an animal up by a line attached to either a stake or a

heavy log. It allows the animal a certain freedom of movement to walk

around and get to grass and perhaps water but does not afford him the

opportunity to wander off.

7-64. You can picket an animal in several ways. Animal handlers normally

use either a halter and picket line or a hobble and picket line off one front leg.

Depending on the animal’s experience with the picket line, picketing by a leg

is the safest. An animal picketed with a halter will sometimes hook a shoe in

the halter while scratching his ear with a hind leg. If the picketed animal

hooks the shoe of his hind leg in the picket halter he usually falls down. If not

found soon after falling, he may just die in this position.

7-65. The anchor end of the picket line can be either a good dry stake driven

into solid ground or a drag log. In selecting picket stakes, make sure they are

stout and not brittle. When placing the stakes, make sure there is plenty of

room between the stakes so two picket lines cannot cross. The drag log, when

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used, should be heavy enough so the animal picketed to it cannot move it, yet

light enough so, if need be, it can be pulled to another picket area using a

saddle animal and a line off the saddle horn.

7-66. In tying off a picket line to the stake, use a small bowline knot. Make

sure it is down at ground level on the stake. This level will let the line turn

around the stake and still not turn the stake and loosen it in the ground. An

animal that pulls a stake and runs loose with the line is a danger to himself

and the mission. Should the animal get into the timber and hang up the stake

and line, it could cause a day’s delay looking for him. Should the animal not

be found, it most likely will die a slow death of thirst and starvation.

7-67. Several things have to be considered when picketing by any method.

You should determine how much feed is in the picket area and if there is any

obstacle in the ring that the picket line can foul on, thus shortening the ring

area. The best area is usually on a good, grassy creek bank where the animal

can get both feed and water off the same picket line.

7-68. When selecting which animals will go on the picket line, pick out any

new animals to the outfit and any of them you know to be the leaders. Also

consider any renegades or loners who hole up by themselves when running

loose. Maybe you have a mare that has a weaner colt at home. She for certain

needs to go on a picket or on the high line. After she has had time to fill up on

grass, she just might decide to go home.

THE NIGHT HORSE

7-69. If you have some of your stock running loose during the night, a night

horse is a must. The night horse is one you keep picketed near where you

sleep for use in emergencies during the night and for running down loose

stock in the morning.

7-70. The night horse does not come in any particular color, size, or shape. He

could easily be the most inefficient looking animal in the outfit. What counts

is what is between his ears. Many an animal used as a pack animal when on

the trail, though not considered a riding horse, might make a good night

horse. The only way to come up with a top night horse is to try them all at

different times. A good night horse has to have several good points. They are

listed here, though not necessarily in order of importance:

• While on a picket, you must be able to trust the animal to graze and fill

up during the night and not just run in circles and whinny at the other

loose animals all night.

• He must handle well while running loose animals. One of the best

reining animals in the whole outfit may develop a lot of bad habits,

such as trying to buck you off, when with loose animals. Worse yet,

after you start the loose animals running, he may just stampede out of

control with you, which is a very dangerous situation.

• He should be easy to approach after dark and able to be ridden

bareback. Quite often, should the loose animals start to leave during

the night, it is possible to turn them very easily if you are right there at

the time. If the animal cannot be ridden bareback, the time it takes to

saddle up might make it too late to easily turn the loose animals.

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7-71. Many night horses develop the habit of watching where the loose

animals go at night. Their hearing is far superior to humans. Often, while

wrangling with a good night horse, he will want to head in a direction you

may believe is wrong. This friction can be a mistake on your part should you

not trust him to help lead you to the loose animals. Quite often a night horse

will want rein so he can smell the ground. Here again, his sense of smell is far

better than yours and he is using it to help locate the other animals.

However, do not leave everything to the horse. You most certainly will want

to be reading tracks along with using the night horse’s senses. Between the

two of you it is usually possible to locate the loose animals in short order.

7-72. The night horse is often required to do quite a bit of running in bringing

in the loose stock. This is bound to heat up the animal. Under such

conditions, cooling out the hot animal is a must. The most common mistake is

for the wrangler to tie up the hot and lathered animal and head for the cook

fire for coffee. In civilian pack outfits, many a supposedly experienced

wrangler has been discharged for this one grave mistake. The best way to cool

out a hot and lathered animal is to first unsaddle the animal. Using a

currycomb and brush, ruffle the hair over the back area. If you have some

gunnysacks available, rub him down. Above all, DO NOT grain the animal or

allow him any water until he is dry and cooled out. It could very possibly kill

the animal or at the least cause a bellyache or colic. Walking the animal will

also keep him from stiffening up. If the animal was good enough to keep on

the night horse picket, he deserves the best of care when his job is done.

7-73. A night horse should be kept on the best grass and water and as close as

possible to the area you intend to sleep. A faint nicker from where the night

horse is picketed may be the first sign you get that the other animals are

moving out. The old mountain men may have slept with their rifles, but you

should sleep with your bridle if you are the one responsible for the night

horse.

TRANSPORTING SICK AND WOUNDED PERSONNEL

7-74. Every situation varies according to what equipment you have with you

when confronted with an emergency. Look over the horses for what

equipment is on them that can be used in your situation. There are many

parts of saddles and gear strapped on them that can be pressed into service

for other than what they were intended. This section is not meant to be an

all-inclusive review of emergency procedures in the field. It is merely a brief

look at things to consider and how you can make expedient use of what you

have with you. By using your imagination and common sense and being

observant of what you have to work with, you can devise almost any type

splint, bandage, sling, stretcher, or rig slings for transportation with

equipment not necessarily intended for that purpose but which is at hand.

7-75. Bear in mind that your use of any part of the equipment may hinder

future plans to ride out for help or transport the victim. Most of the items of

equipment mentioned can be unbuckled or unsnapped rather than cut. If you

must cut off a strap, cut it close to a ring, buckle, or snap. This tip will

possibly save you hours of needless repair later.

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MOVEMENT

7-76. In most cases of back, neck, or any spinal injury, it is best not to

transfer the victim any great distance using horses. There is a lot to take into

consideration, such as whether the victim is on an emergency backboard and

how far it is to the nearest medical help. In most cases where the victim will

need to be transported only a short distance, a hand-held stretcher or travois

pulled by a member of the team will be faster than rigging a horse for

transportation. This way largely depends on how much help you have

available. There are several things you must NOT do when transporting a

victim with horses:

• Do not drape a wounded man head-down across a saddle.

• If the victim is inclined to pass out or is unsteady, do not let him ride

by himself. Find out if the horse will ride double by sliding behind the

saddle yourself, without the victim. If the horse will ride double, ride

behind the victim and hold him in the saddle.

• With a seriously sick or wounded victim, do not, in your haste to get to

help, trot or run the horse the victim is on. A slow, easy walk will get

the victim to assistance in better condition.

• Do not at any time leave a horse unattended with a victim strapped or

tied to the saddle. Maintain control of the horse’s head at all times.

TRAVOIS

7-77. One of the simplest and fastest means of transporting a victim who

cannot ride is a travois drawn behind one horse. This method requires getting

a gentle horse used to pulling the travois before putting the victim on one for

transportation. You can construct a stretcher with two long poles running

through the stirrups on two riding saddles that are cinched on horses. Again,

it takes the horses a little while to get used to this rigging. If you are alone

with the victim and he is conscious, place the victim’s head towards the horse

and have him hold the reins. If this is not possible, tie the bridle reins to the

poles, one on each side. This type of emergency stretcher is good for rough

country or long distance transportation. Most horses will tolerate the

stretcher between them when they have a little time to become accustomed to

the stretcher.

7-78. You can also stretch a large tarp or tent between two saddle horses that

are side by side if you have a wide trail to travel. To rig your horses for this

type of stretcher, it is wise to tie the horses’ tails together to keep them from

turning apart at the rear. A small pole tied between the bridle bits will keep

them together at the head end. Pull the tarp or tent completely over the

saddle and tie to the outside of the saddle. Two small poles, either run

through or laced to the tarp, will make a stretcher in a very short time. In

most cases it is best to have the victim’s head to the rear. Surprising as it

may seem, this type stretcher rides very comfortably.

STRETCHERS

7-79. You can use gunnysacks, canvas panniers, raincoats or saddle slickers,

pannier tarps, saddle pads, and blankets to make a stretcher. In most pack

outfits there are some gunnysacks used either to chink up a pannier or

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possibly to carry grain. By cutting two holes in the bottom corners of the sack

and inserting two good poles, you have a first-class wilderness stretcher.

Largely depending on what packhorses are present at the time, there is

usually a set of deep canvas panniers. These canvas panniers have several

emergency uses. You can make a stretcher with them, as with the

gunnysacks. Another very important use is for lowering or raising an

unconscious victim over such obstacles as a cliff or deep cut. You can cut two

holes the size of the victim’s legs in the bottom corners. Then slip the victim’s

legs through these two holes and pull up the fabric around his chest. Test the

knots used in tying a rope to the pannier with your weight before trusting

them on the injured victim. Raincoats, heavier coats, jackets, and saddle

slickers also make a short distance stretcher by buttoning them up the front.

Zippers are the best and most reliable. Two poles run through the inside of

the garment and out the armholes make an emergency stretcher. Pannier

tarps and large double saddle pads can make an emergency stretcher.

SPLINTS

7-80. You can use stirrup straps and fenders, pack pads, pannier tarps, pieces

of wood, box panniers, and the bars out of packsaddles to make splints. There

are many items of equipment and often items loaded on a packhorse that

make an emergency splint. You can make a backboard by taking wood box

panniers apart and either lashing or using the old nails in the box to nail or

lash the flat boards to two small dry poles. The bars out of a packsaddle

(using the flat surface) can also make a serviceable splint in a situation where

other natural materials are not available. The stirrup straps and fenders out

of a riding saddle are by far the best and simplest to obtain. You can unlace

or unbuckle them and pull them out of the saddle without damaging the

equipment. The stirrup straps and fenders from a riding saddle are already

formed to the legs, and by using both straps and fenders you can completely

immobilize the legs of a victim. These work well also for the arms by using

just one stirrup strap. Several small poles lashed flat and then padded with

pack pads can make a backboard. You can open a rifle scabbard either down

the seam or lay it flat to make a splint.

STRAPS FOR LASHING TO BACKBOARDS

7-81. Latigos, lash cinches, saddle cinches, breast collars, brichens, and bridle

reins can all be pressed into service. There are many large, heavy straps and

cinches on a pack outfit or riding saddle. You can take off almost all of these

very simply and make them serviceable for the bindings of splints or

backboards. As mentioned before, you can take off most all of these items

without cutting them and thus damaging the equipment unnecessarily.

SMALL STRAPS TO BIND BANDAGES AND SPLINTS

7-82. Bridle reins, halter ropes, sling and lash ropes, saddle stirrups, and

many of the straps on a packsaddle are useful as ties to hold things in place.

There are many such straps on packsaddles and riding saddles. Bridle reins,

for example, make a good long strap, and in an emergency that requires

continuous use of the bridle, you can get by in most instances with one bridle

rein. Almost all of the ropes, such as halter ropes and lash and sling ropes,

can be unwound and one strand taken out while still leaving the rope

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serviceable. If small, tight bindings are required, do not overlook tail and

mane hair from the horses you have with you. Do not make the mistake of

using your or the victim’s clothing to bind wounds and leave either of your

bodies unprotected when there are so many other items available on your

equipment. If you should consider leaving the victim and riding for

assistance, your saddle pads laid on the ground under the victim will help in

keeping him warm and dry. Often there are two pads on a horse and, in an

emergency, you could possibly get by with just one.

DIRECT PRESSURE IN SEVERE BLEEDING

7-83. Severe bleeding is always an emergency. If you should find yourself

faced with this situation and not have readily available dressings to stop the

flow of blood, a very good item on your horse is the sheepskin lining on the

underside of a saddle. A small pad of this sheepskin with a clean dressing

between it and the wound will in most instances pass for many layers of other

dressing. If you should have what is called a cool-back saddle pad, it also

makes a good emergency compress for severe bleeding.

7-20

Chapter 8

Organization and Movement

Certain combinations of adverse weather, thick vegetation, and harsh

terrain deny the use of wheeled or tracked vehicles in either a combat or

logistics role. Mountainous terrain often restricts operations to those

conducted by foot infantry. Heavily wooded areas, especially when

associated with steep grades, have the same effect. Swamps, jungle-like

vegetation, and certain types of cultivation may restrict the use of

vehicles in lowlands. Weather, in combination with unfavorable terrain,

may also deny or greatly restrict the use of aircraft in a combat or

logistics role. In such situations, the commander that can move his

troops, weapons, supplies, and equipment with the greatest speed and

facility has a distinct advantage. Properly organizing, training, and

equipping a combat pack animal detachment can give a commander this

advantage.

ORGANIZATION

8-1. The pack animal detachment is usually the smallest fighting element. It

can be a section, squad, or team of 10 to 20 individuals. The number of

animals required to support these elements depends upon both the TOE and

mission requirements.

8-2. The commander may task organize the detachment squads or sections

according to needs and requirements. For example, an 81-mm mortar section

would not need as many individuals and animals to transport the system as a

107-mm mortar section. The mission will also have an impact on the size of

the section; a raid with an 81-mm section will use fewer animals than

sustained operations would employ using the same weapons system. The

squad or section requirements may vary from as few as five animals to as

many as ten to twelve.

8-3. Other factors bearing on the organization of a pack detachment are load

weight and the size of the items to be carried. The greater the total weight of

the load, the more animals you will need to carry it. If the items are large,

even though they may be lightweight, it will take more animals.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

8-4. A pack animal detachment has unique duties and responsibilities. Most

of these are leadership-related and some are skills common to all.

8-5. The train commander is the commissioned officer or senior

noncommissioned officer assigned responsibility for the pack train. He

oversees the training, operation, and administration of the unit.

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8-6. The packmaster should be the platoon or team sergeant and the most

knowledgeable about packing. He provides for the presence, care, and

maintenance of all pack equipment and the animals in the unit. He rides the

entire column to check all loads and to observe the condition of the

individuals and animals. His specific duties include—

• Training personnel in the proper methods of packing, to include

saddling, adjusting equipment, balancing loads, and tying of standard

hitches.

• Training personnel in the proper care of animals and maintenance of

pack equipment.

• Ensuring maximum unit effectiveness through daily inspection of pack

animals for injury.

• Supervising packing, conduct of the march, maintenance of animals

and equipment, and discipline of the soldiers.

• Inspecting loads and making sure the animals on the march are not

injured by shifting loads or saddles, ensuring prompt correction of

deficiencies.

• Inspecting and directing prompt repair of packsaddlery.

8-7. The cargadores, usually squad or section leaders, assist the

packmaster in all his duties and are qualified to perform the duties of the

packmaster in his absence. In addition, cargadores must be able to make all

repairs normally made by the unit saddler. Their specific duties are to—

• Assign a load to each pack animal, ensuring the loads are balanced.

• Assign pack equipment, loads, and animals to the packers.

• Maintain order and discipline among the packers and ensure quiet and

gentle treatment of the animals.

• Select areas for cargo piles and rig line in bivouac.

• Ensure proper care of pack equipment.

• Keep a memorandum of all cargo and equipment under his care,

marking and tagging it if necessary.

8-8. The packers must train and care for both pack and riding animals. In

the field, their duties include the maintenance, adjustment, and use of pack

and riding saddlery and associated equipment. In addition, they prepare the

cargo for packing and sling and lash loads using a variety of hitches. All

detachment personnel should be packer-qualified.

MOVEMENT PROCEDURES

8-9. The pack detachment should begin movement soon after the pack

animals are loaded. Packers mount their riding animals. Two detailed riders

move ahead of the train to contain any animals that are out of control. The

detachment moves out in the march order directed by the commander in pack

strings of no more than five animals. One rider leads each string and another

follows it. You should always lead the strings from the on-side of the pack

animals (the string will be on the rider’s off-side). Normally the detachment

moves in file with the riders keeping the pack strings closed up to ensure

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communication between strings and to maintain column integrity. Keep in

mind, however, that terrain and probability of enemy contact from ground or

air dictates the distance between strings or squads. When moving during

hours of limited visibility, you should keep the column close to facilitate

control. Troops riding on the flanks and rear of the strings make frequent

counts of the animals to ensure against strays. Make halts as necessary to

inspect and adjust loads and saddles. The commander, packmaster, and

cargadores make frequent inspections of the detachment en route, whether

moving during daylight or at night.

STREAM CROSSING AT FORDS

8-10. Pack units will frequently come across streams or bodies of water where

no bridges exist. Although horses and mules can ford fairly deep water and

are generally good swimmers, the crossing of even fordable water requires

care and good judgment. Unit training must include accepted methods and

techniques of stream crossing. Units should conduct ford reconnaissance

before attempting to cross with a loaded pack unit. The load makes the

animal somewhat top-heavy. Try to cross streams with the animals moving

against the current (upstream). The loads in combination with swift current,

water deep enough to bear against the animal’s body, and poor footing may

cause the animal to lose its balance, fall, and drown. Under such

circumstances, you should unload the animals and either lead or herd them

across the stream. You can ferry loads across in the same manner as

described in the following paragraph.

CROSSING UNFORDABLE WATER

8-11. It is impractical to swim animals with loads and packsaddles. Though

the animal might be physically capable of swimming under the load, it upsets

the animal’s natural balance. When the pack unit must cross unfordable

water with nothing but its organic equipment, be sure to unload the pack

animals as close to the water’s edge as possible. Loosen the breeching and

secure it on top of the saddle. Also secure any loose latigo ends. You may or

may not need to unsaddle the riding animals. Selected personnel swimming

their riding animals, herd or lead the pack animals to the far shore and

secure them while others prepare a one-rope bridge and hauling system. You

should pull the equipment load by load to the far shore. If the crossing is too

wide for a one-rope bridge, you can build poncho rafts to ferry the equipment.

8-12. Operating the pack animal detachment with individually led animals is

considered uneconomical in terms of personnel. However, there are certain

circumstances under which other factors are more important. Members of the

weapons crews lead the animals that are assigned to combat units for the

transport of heavy weapons and accompanying ammunition. Animals used in

proximity to known hostile action areas are usually led individually to take

advantage of all available cover and concealment. Evacuating casualties to

aid stations by animal transport also requires this method of operation to

ensure the easiest ride for the casualty as well as to take maximum

advantage of existing cover and concealment. Although training time for this

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operation may be reduced, the following elements of training and operation

need to be remembered:

•

Train personnel to pack both lashed and hanger loads. Although the

animal will normally proceed at a walk, with the rate of march seldom

exceeding 3 1/2 miles per hour, make sure the loads are balanced and

securely tied.

•

Ensure the pack driver

(person leading the animal) only exerts

sufficient control over the led animal to maintain his position on the

trail or in the column. He should not interfere with the animal’s

freedom of movement or balance. A clumsy driver can cause a loaded

animal to fall.

•

Train the driver to lead the animals from the on-side. He should guide

the animal with his right hand grasping the lead rope with the

remainder of the lead rope in the left hand. He should give the animal

enough slack so that there is room enough for the animal to walk

without stepping on him. If there is noise, danger, or confusion on the

off-side, the driver may reverse his position to offer some protection to

the animal and quiet it.

•

Train personnel to regulate the speed of the animal by the gentle, but

effective, use of the lead rope. In column, always maintain the

prescribed interval to prevent accordion action and undue fatigue in

the rear elements.

•

Teach the driver to counter the tendency of the animal to trot down

slopes or jump over obstacles so he can maintain the normal rate of

march and prevent displacement of the load.

•

When leading an animal up steep slopes or over very rugged terrain,

make sure the driver precedes the animal with about 3 feet of loose

lead rope so that the animal may pick his footing. If the terrain is very

rough or steep and he falls behind, it may be best to drop the lead rope

and let the animal go. He can then catch the animal after the obstacle

is passed.

CAUTION

Under no circumstances will personnel hold the saddle

breeching or the animal’s tail to assist them in climbing.

BIVOUAC

8-13. The pack animal unit should select its camps based on the results of

both map and ground reconnaissance, if feasible. The selection depends on

the requirements for the safety, health, and comfort of individuals and

animals and the operational plans of the unit. In hostile environments,

concealment from air or ground observation and as much cover as possible

are essential. The first consideration is always security, but unless you are

packing with you all the feed the pack and saddle animals will need, the next

concern should be grass and water for the stock. It is a grave mistake to

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sacrifice grass, water, wood, and shelter for anything but security

considerations. In selecting the grass, make sure it is grass that the stock will

feed on all night. Just because a meadow looks green does not mean it has

plenty of grass in it; ride out and look. Often in high alpine meadows, most of

the vegetation consists of flowers and weeds that a horse will not eat. Should

you be unfortunate enough to camp in such a meadow, your stock will be

weakened from lack of grass the next day on the trail. It is very irritating to

ride or be leading an animal that insists on trying to graze as you go down

the trail. After security, your next concern should always be the care of the

animals. Reconnaissance personnel should next look for the best footing for

animals available in the area. Picket lines, high lines or, in more secure and

extended situations, temporary corrals, should offer level standing and good

drainage with little possibility of flooding in sudden rains. Make sure the

selected area is large enough to provide adequate dispersion and is free from

briers, debris, and poisonous plants. An area convenient to the route of march

offers additional operational advantages.

8-14. The detachment or train commander, accompanied by selected

personnel, precedes the train into camp and selects areas for the rigging line,

high line, and the cargo so that the animals and equipment will be arranged

systematically and readily available night or day. Upon arrival in camp, the

pack train conducts the following procedures:

• Select personnel designate the cooking and sleeping areas, keeping in

mind that they will always be located upstream from the animals.

• Upon arrival of the train, all personnel except for the “wranglers”

dismount, secure their riding animals, unload the cargo and “slack off”

cinches. Personnel unpack all animals before the first is unsaddled.

They coil the lash and sling ropes. The wranglers remain mounted and

ready to stop any animals that try to bolt from the camp.

• Personnel secure the animals as they are unloaded.

• When all loads are removed, the train commander gives the command

to unsaddle.

• If conditions are favorable, handlers turn the animals out to graze or

picket so they may roll and relax. If not, the animals stay on the high

line while personnel clean the equipment and improve the site.

• Handlers feed the animals 45 minutes after arrival and water them 1

hour after arrival. Personnel then prepare their equipment for the next

day’s movement.

8-5

Chapter 9

Tactical Considerations

A pack animal detachment during movement, regardless of its combat

mission once it reaches its destination, is a logistical transportation

element. This fact alone severely limits the detachment’s tactical

capabilities. Even though the detachment may be considered a highly

mobile unit, the presence of pack animals precludes the capability of

maneuver.

The mission of the detachment while moving is the safeguarding and

delivery of the cargo to its destination, not to stand and fight. This point

is not to say that all is lost tactically while moving; it just means that

compensation has to be made for the lack of maneuver and concentrated

fires.

SECURITY

9-1. The pack detachment configured for movement forms into pack strings

and usually in column formation. This alignment presents a long, linear

target for the enemy. The troops are dispersed, making it difficult to bring

concentrated, effective fire to bear upon enemy contact. The diligent use of

scouts and outriders for flank security, along with extreme caution, are

needed to a greater extent than for dismounted troops to make up for

maneuver limitations.

9-2. Two factors figure in not using overwatch formations. First is terrain.

The primary reason for using pack animals is difficult terrain. That

necessitates using column formations. Second, the act of bounding requires

one element to remain static. Animals that are loaded, strung together, and

not moving are an accident waiting to happen. The following paragraphs

explain how the detachment should cross specific types of areas.

9-3. Crossing at Linear Danger Areas (roads, trails, streams). When the

scouts reach a danger area, they conduct a thorough reconnaissance for the

best possible crossing point and attempt to reach the far side. Once they

establish far-side security, the scout leader returns to the column to lead it to

the crossing point. Once the column arrives at the crossing point, the lead

personnel take up far-side security and free the scouts to continue their

mission.

9-4. Crossing Open or Large Danger Areas. Commanders consider large open

areas as dangerous and their use must be negotiated accordingly. The scouts

should provide as much information about the area to the commander as

possible. With this information, the commander decides how best to negotiate

the obstacle. Bypassing the area is by far the best method but is not always

9-1

FM 31-27

practical. However, in arriving at a decision about movement, the leader

must always consider the METT-TC.

9-5. Whether during long or short halts, lead personnel establish and

maintain security using the same procedures as a dismounted combat unit.

The difference is the terrain to be defended and whether the animals will be

in or out of the perimeter. The following principles apply:

• Animals kept on a high line within the perimeter may offer a reduction

to security personnel but unique problems can arise if the position is

attacked. Casualties may arise from animals becoming frightened and

breaking loose or stampeding.

• Animals kept on picket lines outside of the perimeter require listening

posts or observation posts placed at a greater distance. During an

attack on the detachment, these animals are susceptible to both enemy

and friendly fire. The chances are good that a large percentage of the

animals will either flee or be wounded.

COVER AND CONCEALMENT

9-6. The pack detachment must continuously consider concealment options

during movement. Admittedly, it is next to impossible to conceal the evidence

(animal waste, vegetation, devastation, and tracks) that a pack unit has

moved through an area. However, you can take the following precautions to

avoid being observed while on the move.

• Avoid skylining.

• Stay well within the tree line (if any).

• Contour the terrain.

• Camouflage the loads.

• Avoid open areas, if possible, or cross them quickly.

9-7. During extended halts (when loads are unsaddled), use the proper

camouflage. Cover for the animals, while desirable, may not be possible or

practical. Remember to consider animal noise, both vocal and from

movement. Also address the odors associated with animals. There are no

clear-cut solutions to the problems of concealment. Use a common-sense

approach and practice the following tips:

• Use as much natural cover and foliage as possible.

• Use camouflage nets.

• Apply proper field sanitation techniques, to include keeping animal

waste policed.

• Control animal noise as much as possible. If the animals’ vocal cords

have not been cut, keep the animals quiet by maintaining a relaxed

atmosphere.

9-2

FM 31-27

ACTIONS ON CONTACT

9-8. As previously mentioned, a pack detachment organized for movement is

not a maneuver unit. Therefore, it must act accordingly when contact is

made.

9-9. When ambushed, those elements caught in the kill zone escape in any

feasible direction as fast as possible. Forward elements, not in the kill zone,

move in the direction of march as fast as possible. Those in the rear should

move in the direction away from the kill zone, quickly but cautiously. All

elements should make every effort to link up at a preplanned rally point.

Elements not under direct fire should make all attempts to maintain, control,

and safeguard the animals.

9-10. Actions under indirect fire are handled in much the same way as an

ambush. It may not be necessary to move to a rally point. The unit may stay

out of harm’s way until the barrage has been lifted and then continue in the

direction of march. The commander states the actions for these events and

incorporates them in the unit’s SOP before movement.

9-11. The key to surviving an air attack is dispersion and continuous

movement. The pack detachment always accounts for personnel, weapons,

and equipment after it moves to the designated rally point, establishes

security, and reestablishes the chain of command.

NOTE: Common sense, preparation, and good planning are the keys to

surviving as a pack detachment in a hostile environment.

URBAN ENVIRONMENTS

9-12. Use of any kind of animals in an urban environment requires detailed

planning and preparation. Even a clean, secure urban setting wears down the

animal and its shoes rapidly. A damaged city with extensive rubble provides

more danger in the form of sharp rock, broken glass, and other debris that

can permanently damage the animals. The best choice when planning to use

pack animals to support an urban operation is to halt them at a secure

location outside of any built-up areas and move your supplies in by foot.

However, if you must move the animals through a built-up area, be careful to

avoid rubble, broken glass, nails, and other debris that will injure the animal.

9-13. A well-equipped farrier has special shoes for pack animals if the

detachment is expected to stay in an urban environment for any period of

time. Thick rubber horseshoes work well on pavement and concrete, but do

not provide any traction on grass or any kind of dirt. Police departments

sometimes use a complex shoe with a plastic plate to protect the inner hoof, a

steel shoe over that, and carbide bits welded to the shoe. The carbide bits

provide traction on asphalt and concrete, the shoe itself provides traction off

road and the plastic protects the horse’s inner hoof from nails, glass, and

other debris.

9-14. Normally the pack animal detachment will not have access to any

special equipment to protect the animals. As mentioned earlier in this

manual, shoes wear out much quicker on rocky or rough terrain. This is even

more apparent when operating in any kind of urban environment. The

9-3

Chapter 10

Llamas and Other Animals

Although this manual focuses on horses and mules, this chapter provides

basic information about other types of pack animals that a team may

encounter. With the exception of llamas, these animals will normally

come with a native handler that should be considered the primary source

of information for the use of that animal.

LLAMAS

10-1. Llamas are members of the camel (camelid) family. In addition to the

well known, one-humped dromedary camel of the Middle East and the two-

humped Bactrian camel of Asia, there are four native members of the camel

family in the Americas today: the llama, a domesticated beast of burden

regarded throughout the world as the premier symbol of South American

animals; the alpaca; the free-ranging guanaco; and the wild vicuna.

CHARACTERISTICS

10-2. While viewed in the pasture or close contact, all llamas have a striking

beauty owing to their elegant wool and graceful posture. Llama wool ranges

from white to black, with shades of gray, brown, red, and roan in between.

Markings can be in a variety of patterns from solid to spotted. Little variation

is found in guanacos or vicunas, which are light brown with white undersides.

10-3. Mature llamas weigh an average of 280 to 350 pounds, but range from

250 to 500 pounds. Full body size is reached by the fourth year and, while

there are no obvious differences between the sexes, males tend to be slightly

larger. They are long-lived, with a normal life span of 15 to 20 years.

10-4. Like cattle and sheep, llamas are multistomached and chew the cud.

They have a hard upper gum (no upper teeth in front), grinding upper and

lower molars in back, and a cleverly designed upper lip for grasping forage in

unison with the lower incisors. Adult males develop large, sharp upper and

lower canines (“wolf teeth” or “fangs”) for fighting. You should ask your

veterinarian to remove these to prevent injury to males pastured together or

to females being bred.

10-5. The llamas’ unique, specially adapted foot makes them remarkably

surefooted on a variety of terrain, including sandy soils and snow. It is two-

toed with a broad, leathery pad on the bottom and curved nails in front. The

small, oblong, bare patches on the side of each rear leg are not vestigial toes

(“chestnuts” as found on horses), but metatarsal scent glands, suspected to be

associated with the production of alarm pheromones. An additional scent

gland is located between the toes.

10-1

FM 31-27

HOUSING AND FENCING

10-6. Fencing can be woven wire, cattle wire panels, wooden rails or poles,

chain link, or electric. Barbed wire is not recommended. Your fences should

be at least 4 feet high and dog proof if possible.

10-7. The llamas should have a three-sided shelter to provide shade and

protection from extreme heat, cold, wind, and rain. If the area has severe chill

factors in winter, a completely enclosed shed is necessary. Heat stress should

be a concern if there are hot and especially humid summers. You may want to

consider shearing or clipping your llama for this type of weather. If you do

not intend to shear your stock, then a sprinkler, wading pool, or small pond

may be helpful in keeping your llamas cool for the summer.

10-8. If your animals are kept in a large pasture, a small 12- to 20-foot square

catch pen will make it easier to catch them. Feeding and watering troughs

should be clean, high enough to be free of possible fecal contamination, and

spacious enough to allow access by all animals. You should always ensure

that fresh water is available.

TRANSPORTATION

10-9. Llamas are easy to transport and require no specialized equipment. A

covered, windproof pickup, van, and horse or utility trailer with sufficient

room for animals to stand comfortably works well. Good ventilation is

important in both summer and winter. Straw makes excellent bedding in a

windproof enclosure. Be sure to provide hay for food and offer water free-

choice at least every 6 hours depending on heat (it will spoil if left with the

animals). Llamas normally lie down (kush) once the vehicle starts moving.

When transporting babies and mothers on long hauls, stop periodically to

allow nursing.

CARE AND FEEDING

10-10. If you are familiar with the care of other domestic livestock, you will

find llamas comparatively easy to care for, with a minimum of veterinary

assistance required. If you are uncertain of the health of your new animal,

consider isolating it in sight of but separate from your others for the first 2

weeks to prevent accidental introduction of any illnesses and to give you both

a chance to get acquainted. Make sure it is eating and ruminating, and

eliminating pelleted feces.

10-11. If you have not already done so, locate a veterinarian in your area. If

he is inexperienced with llamas, information and assistance is available

through various animal clinics in Canada and the United States. It is

recommended that you have your veterinarian give your newcomer a general

health check and take a fecal sample to determine if worming is necessary.

10-12. Llamas are amazingly hardy animals and have very few problems

with disease. But to ensure good health, you should establish a regular

schedule for cleaning their dung piles and a preventative medicine program

that may include protection from enterotoxemia, tetanus, leptospirosis, and

internal and external parasites. Llamas should be dewormed at least every 6

months. Be sure to check with your veterinarian or agricultural extension

agent to see if any vital trace elements or minerals are deficient or present in

10-2

FM 31-27

toxic amounts in your area. Consult your veterinarian for other preventative

medicine suggestions or to see if any special circumstances (meningeal worm,

selenium levels, toxic plants) are problems in your area.

10-13. Although llamas have long been arid land dwellers, they thrive in the

wide array of temperate environments throughout Canada and the United

States, including Alaska. They are highly adaptable feeders, being both

grazers (grasses and forbs) and browsers (shrubs and trees).

10-14. Because of a relatively low protein requirement due to their efficient

digestive systems, they can be kept on a variety of pastures or hay. They eat

about 2 to 4 percent of their body weight in dry matter each day. Without

pasture, a 100-pound bale of hay will last an adult llama around 10 days,

much longer than the same amount would last an adult horse. If you’re going

to graze your llamas, plan on about three to five animals per acre on a

moderate-producing pasture.

10-15. When good hay is available, grain is recommended only for working

pack animals and nursing females. Sheep mineral blocks and salt blocks

(with selenium wherever necessary) should be available free-choice.

Granulated minerals are somewhat more wasteful than mineral blocks, but

are easier to eat. High-protein grain mixes prepared for other livestock

should generally not be given to a healthy llama on a good diet, unless it’s a

female nursing or close to giving birth. Llamas are not prone to bloat, but

have been known to do so if they get into a grain bin.

10-16. Llamas require less water than most domestic animals, but should

have an unlimited, fresh, clean supply at all times. They tend to drink less in

winter and when on lush, green pasture and more when working or lactating,

especially in summer.

10-17. Unless your llamas are pastured on hard or rocky ground, you may

have to trim their toenails once or twice a year. It’s easy to do yourself with

horse hoof trimmers or sheep toenail nippers, but consult your veterinarian

before your first attempt.

HABITS AND BEHAVIOR

10-18. Llamas have a dignified, aristocratic manner about them. Because of

their curiosity, they have a delightful habit of coming close to sniff strangers.

But despite your natural temptation to hug and cuddle them, they prefer not

to be petted except on their necks and woolly backs. They are gentle, don’t

spook easily, and rarely bite or kick unless provoked. They are highly social

animals and need the companionship of other llamas.

10-19. Llamas communicate their moods with vocalizations and a series of

tail, body, and ear postures. Learning this llama language is one of the joys of

ownership. Humming is a common manner of communication between llamas

and indicates a variety of moods from contentedness to concern. Another

interesting llama expression is the shrill, rhythmic alarm call emitted at the

sight of a strange animal (especially coyotes and dogs) or a frightening

situation.

10-20. Seldom directed at people, spitting is usually related to food disputes

and to establish a pecking order between llamas. The exception to this is if a

10-3

FM 31-27

llama has been mishandled or become imprinted on people (through bottle-

feeding as a baby). As with bottle-fed stallions, bulls, and rams, bottle-fed

male llamas who have not been gelded at an early age can be potentially

dangerous as adults (because they lack a normal fear of people and regard

them as competitors). Therefore, males not intended for breeding and males

that were bottle-fed must be gelded as early as possible to avoid undesirable

behavior.

10-21. Llamas are remarkably clean and even large herds are quite odorless.

Dung-piling behavior is an important means of spacial orientation and

territorial marking for these historically open habitat animals—a

convenience when you clean their pens. By taking advantage of this habit,

you can encourage your animals to establish dung piles in a new pen by

“probating” four to five sites per acre with a shovelful of llama dung. You may

frequently see your llama rolling in the dirt, taking a dust bath to help

maintain a healthy, fluffy coat of wool.

USES AND TRAINING

10-22.

“What are they used for?” is a question commonly asked of llama

owners. The domesticated llama in South America is used for low fat meat,

wool, hide, manure (for fertilizer and fuel), and as a beast of burden. This

multipurpose animal lends itself well to the needs of the South American

people. The llama in North America is used for investment, breeding, wool

production, packing, tourism, sheep guards, shows, competitions, and as a

source of diversification.

10-23. Llama wool production is a multimillion dollar industry in South

America and makes llamas appealing to spinners and weavers here. Llamas

have soft, fine wool for insulation against cold and heat. The llama’s wool can

also be harvested yearly by clipping or shearing and be made into beautiful

garments and blankets. The yearly wool harvest produces 3 to 8 pounds of

grease-free fleece with a fiber length of 4 to 7 inches. Year-round brushing

yields about the same results and leaves the long, coarser guard hairs in

place.

10-24. The llama’s centuries-old ability as a beast of burden has been

rediscovered by hikers, hunters, and forest work crews. The llamas’

hardiness, surefootedness, and common sense make them an excellent pack

animal, trail companion, and even a great golf caddy. They are quiet,

unobtrusive, and so easy to manage that children love to lead them. Their

great agility allows them to negotiate terrain that would be difficult or

impossible for traditional pack animals. Because of their padded feet and

ability to browse, they have minimal impact on the backcountry. When

confronted by other pack stock, unexpected situations, and sudden movement

or noises, llamas remain calm and unruffled.

10-25. Males are most commonly used for packing and, depending on

maturity, weight, and condition, will tote 50- to 120-pound packs 10 to 15

miles a day. A variety of packs and halters are available for llama use.

10-26. Because they are gentle and easy to train, llamas are popular

attractions in parades, shows, fairs, and community events, and are fun to

take to school, hospital, or nursing home visits.

10-4

FM 31-27

10-27. Llamas are fast becoming the choice for protecting sheep flocks from

predators such as stray dogs and coyotes. They are also good competitors.

Conformation is judged at llama shows to determine the best of each halter

class. The llama’s training and disposition are judged in performance

competitions such as obstacle and driving classes.

10-28. Surprisingly, there is a market for llama manure. It is high in

nitrogen, basically odorless, weed-free, and easily collected. It is a valuable

plant and garden fertilizer.

10-29. Their docile nature makes llamas extremely easy to train to accept a

halter, lead, kush, carry a pack, load in and out of a vehicle, pull a cart, or

carry a lightweight rider. With just a few repetitions, they will pick up and

retain any of these skills. Llamas with minimum training are easy to handle

when you are trimming nails, brushing or shearing, or when health problems

necessitate touching them in sensitive places.

DOGS

10-30. The use of dogs as an auxiliary in war is as old as war itself. Primitive

man used dogs to guard his family, his belongings, and himself. He also took

his dog into battle with him when rival tribes clashed. Throughout the history

of warfare, dogs have gone into combat at the side of their masters or have

been used in direct support of combat operations.

10-31. Dogs have long been recognized by the military as important for war

and security purposes. The Army has employed various dog breeds and has

determined the German shepherd to be the most suitable for scouting

because of its working ability, temperament, size, availability for

procurement, and adaptability to all types of climate and terrain. These dogs

are especially good at detecting ambushes. While “reading” the dog, the

handler must prevent him from barking, growling, whining, or otherwise

making a noise, which would be audible to a lurking enemy. Such a reaction

on the dog’s part might be fatal to both dog and handler in combat.

10-32. Next the dog is urged to move silently through built-up areas. After

learning the basic rules, the dog is then trained to detect an enemy decoy

planted farther and farther away. Lessons are repeated under varied

conditions at different times of the day and night until the animal becomes

expert enough to detect an enemy at distances up to 500 yards or more.

10-33. Dogs have many uses in combat and were valued especially by the

infantryman. Taken with patrols into no-man’s-land, their keen senses

reduce the chance of fatal surprise or ambush by giving silent warning of a

concealed enemy. During the hours of darkness or when visibility is poor,

dogs can guard command or observation posts against enemy infiltration, a

problem that was acute in Korea and Vietnam.

10-34. After he develops a strong fondness for two or more handlers, the dog

is taught to run from one to the other. One handler releases the dog and

commands the animal to “report.” As soon as the dog reaches the second

handler he receives warm praise. Just before the dog runs, his “choke” chain

is removed and a “messenger” collar is put on. Soon he learns to associate this

collar with his job of running from one man to the other. As the lessons

10-5

FM 31-27

proceed, the distance between the men is increased beyond the range of the

dog’s vision. He now learns to trail his masters by scent. Frequent repetition

and runs of varied distances over different kinds of terrain finally develop his

dependability as a messenger.

10-35. In training, the dog customarily carries a pack, which can be loaded

with supplies or ammunition. He also learns to lay field telephone wire from

a spool mounted on a specially constructed pulling harness. Before being

graduated as fully trained, he must be able to follow a scent up to distances of

5 miles. He must be able to carry up to 30 pounds of ammunition and supplies

over rough terrain. He must also demonstrate his capability in carrying and

stringing a 1-mile spool of telephone wire between two points. Using dogs as

pack animals has advantages and disadvantages.

10-36. The advantages of using a dog are that he—

• Has intelligence, making him a tool that can be used for tactical

advantage.

• Has keen senses of sight, smell, and hearing.

• Can trail handlers by scent over great distances.

• Can sleep anywhere the handlers sleep.

• Can eat the same food as his handlers.

• Can carry packs up to 35 pounds.

• Can perform various duties; for example, string communications wire

and carry messages.

• Shows early warning against possible enemy, mines, or boobytraps.

• Requires short periods of time to recover.

• Adapts well to changes in climate.

10-37. The disadvantages of using a dog are that he—

• Is a 24-hour-a-day responsibility of the soldier.

• Adds additional stress to the handler by being an additional

responsibility.

• Needs proper equipment to operate continuously in summer, winter,

and in rugged terrain.

• Can have his performance adversely affected by extreme temperatures.

• Can be rendered completely ineffective by pad injuries.

• Needs additional food and water.

• Can be adversely affected by noxious odors.

CAMELS

10-38. There are two basic types of camels: Arabian (short fur, one hump)

and Bactrian (long fur, two humps). Arabians can carry packs weighing 200

to 300 kg for a distance of 30 to 35 km. Bactrians can carry a load of 150 kg

for 7 to 8 hours for a distance of 25 to 35 km. Camels can also pull loads of

1,650 pounds or 3,300 pounds by two, per day at normal walking speed.

10-6

FM 31-27

10-39. Camels have broad, flat, leathery pads with two toes on each foot.

When the camel places its foot on the ground, the pads spread, preventing the

foot from sinking into the sand. When walking, the camel moves both feet on

one side of its body, then both feet on the other. This gait suggests the rolling

motion of a boat, explaining the camel’s “ship of the desert” nickname. They

need very little water and can travel for days without drinking at all. Camels

are clumsy-looking, rather ugly animals, and have a lousy reputation because

they are believed to spit and kick at people. This perception is not accurate

because well-handled camels are safe to work with and be around.

10-40. As stated above, camels will come with native handlers to take care of

them. The handler should be considered the detachment’s first choice when

planning operations using a camel.

ELEPHANTS

10-41. Elephants are considered an endangered species and as such should

not be used by U.S. military personnel. There are about 600,000 African

elephants and between 30,000 and 50,000 Asian elephants. Approximately 20

percent are in captivity so it is difficult to estimate their numbers exactly.

The Convention of International Trade in Endangered Species regards both

species as threatened. Elephants are not the easygoing, kind, loving creatures

that people believe them to be. They are, of course, not evil either. They

simply follow their biological pattern, shaped by evolution. The secret of

becoming a good trainer is to learn this pattern. You can then apply it on

yourself and the elephants under your control.

10-7

Glossary

ALICE

all-purpose, lightweight individual carrying equipment

ARSOF

Army special operations forces

auger

Any of various tools or devices used for boring holes or moving

loose material.

BCS

body condition score

btl

bottle

centimeter(s)

CNS

central nervous system

cross tie

A mild form of restraint in which the animal’s head is secured in

a normal raised position by two tie ropes extending from the ring

in the halter to opposite sides of the stall or between two trees.

each

EIA

equine infectious anemia

Fahrenheit

farrier

A person who shoes horses.

field manual

forb

A broad-leaved herbaceous plant, as distinguished from the

grasses, sedges, shrubs, and trees.

gal

gallon

general support

Support that is given to the supported force as a whole and not to

any particular subdivision thereof. (FM 101-5-1)

GRAIL

Soviet SA-7 surface-to-air missile

hackamore

A bridle with a loop capable of being tightened about the nose in

place of a bit or with a slip noose passed over the lower jaw.

harborage

A place of shelter or lodging.

HEENT

head, ears, eyes, nose, and throat

hr(s)

hour(s)

I&D

incise and drain

intramuscular

ISBN

International Standard Book Number

immunizing unit

intravenous

Glossary-1

FM 31-27

kilogram(s)

kilometer(s)

LAW

light antitank weapon

pound(s)

LCE

load-carrying equipment

manta

A piece of canvas, from 7 by 7 feet up to 10 by 12 feet, used to

throw over the load as a cover to protect it.

METT-TC

mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilians

milligram(s)

military operations

Military activities during peace and conflict that do not necessarily

other than war

involve armed clashes between two organized forces.

NSN

national stock number

operational continuum

The general states of peace, conflict, and war within which

various types of military operations are conducted.

pannier

A large container or basket often carried on the back of an

animal.

pcn G

penicillin G

pkg

package

by way of mouth

pair

pint

every

running “W”

A type of restraint where both front legs are restricted by rope

and can be pulled out from under the horse. Should only be done

on soft ground to prevent injuring the horse’s knees.

SAW

squad automatic weapon

special operations

SOP

standing operating procedures

TOE

table of organization and equipment

TOW

tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile

travois

A simple vehicle, drawn behind one horse, that consists of two

trailing poles serving as shafts and bearing a platform or net for

the load or person.

twitch

A loop of rope or chain that is tightened over a horse’s lip as a

restraining device.

U.S.

United States

Glossary-2

Bibliography

AR 40-905. Veterinary Health Services, August 1994.

FM 21-76. Survival, June 1992.

FM 25-5. Training for Mobilization and War, January 1985.

FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations, January 1993.

FM 55-15. Transportation Reference Data, October 1997.

FM 100-1. The Army, June 1994.

FM 100-20. Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, December 1990.

Animal Management, London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1923.

Animal Management, London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1933.

Back, Joe. Horses, Hitches, and Rocky Trails. Boulder: Johnson Books, 1959.

Brelis, Dean, and Peers, William R. Behind the Burma Road. Atlantic-Little, Brown and

Company, 1963.

Cavalry Combat, The Cavalry School, U.S. Army, Norristown: Telegraph Press, 1937.

Daly, H.W. Manual of Pack Transportation. 1917.

Davis, Francis. Horse Packing in Pictures. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975.

de Romaszkan, Gregor. Fundamentals of Riding,. New York: Knuph, 1982.

Encyclopedia Americana, No. 17, Chicago: Encyclopedia Americana, Inc., 1963.

Encyclopedia Britannica, No. 22 and No. 8. New York: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1963.

Green, LTC. The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him, New York: Frederick and Praeger, Inc.,

1962.

History for 1943 Veterinary Service in North Africa and Mediterranean Theater of

Operations, USAMEDS Historical Unit, Office of Surgeon General, Washington, D.C.

Lewis, Lon D. Care and Feeding of the Horse. 2d Ed. Williams and Wilkins, 1996.

Manual of Horsemanship, Equitation and Animal Transport, London: His Majesty’s

Stationary Office, 1937.

Nelson, Bud. Skills of Packing and Shoeing. Vol. 2, Jackson Hole, WY, 1975.

Nutrient Requirements of Horses, 5th Ed. National Academy Press, Washington, DC: 1989.

Bibliography-1

FM 31-27

Osanka, Franklin March, Editor. Modern Guerrilla Warfare, New York: The Macmillan

Company, 1962.

Parrino, Michael F. Pack Transport and Pack Artillery. New York: The Queensland

Publishing Company, 1956.

Randolph, John. Marsmen in Burma. Houston: Gulf Publishing Company, 1946.

Twelveponies, Mary. There Are No Problem Horses, Only Problem Riders. Boston, MA:

Houghton Mifflin, 1982.

United States Army in World War II, China-Burma-India Theater Stilwell’s Command

Problems, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington,

DC, 1956.

U.S. Fifth Army History, 7 October to 15 November, Part II, AVolturno to the Winter Line.

Army, “A Bray for the Army Mule,” CPT Gaspard, George L., USA, March 1964: 70.

Army, “Where the Troops Are,” LTC Rathburn, Frank F., March 1964: 39.

The Army Times, “No Plans for Those Mules, Long Ear Type,” 25 March 1964: 3.

The Marine Corps Gazette, “Guerrilla Warfare in China,” Griffith, James B., June 1951: 20.

The New York Times, “Mules in India,” New York: 7 June 1964.

Animal Management Transportation, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC: May 1964.

Drivers Horse Transport, HQ RASC Training Centre, Malaysia: January 1964.

Employment of Pack Animals, Basic School, Marine Corps School, Quantico, VA: November

1961.

Officers Animal Transport Course, HQ RASC Training Centre, Malaysia: April 1963.

Special Operations Animal Packing Course (SOAP-C), 2nd Battalion, 5th Special Forces

Group, Fort Campbell, KY, 42223-5000, June 1996.

Bibliography-2

Index

first aid

movement procedures, 8-2

through 8-4

animal conformation, 2-1 through

supplies, 4-6, 4-7

2-4

treatment, 4-7 through 4-15

night horse, 7-16, 7-17

bridle, 6-1, 6-2

grooming, 3-1 through 3-3

packsaddles, 5-1, 5-2

pack string, 7-11 through 7-14

camels, 10-7,

halter, 5-3, 5-4

pharmacological listing, 4-17

cinching, 5-9, 5-10

harness, parts of, 5-6

picketing, 7-15

combat considerations

high line, 7-15

weapons, 6-10, 6-11

hobbles, 2-5, 2-6

equipment, 6-12

rations, types of

cover and concealment, 9-2

garrison, 2-13

immunization, 4-16

field, 2-13

emergency, 2-13

detachment personnel, 8-1, 8-2

restraints, 3-11 through 3-14

dogs, 10-5, 10-6

knots, 7-1 through 7-3

riding techniques, 6-6 through 6-8

elephants, 10-7

llamas, 10-1 through 10-5

saddle, fitting of, 5-6 through 5-8

euthanasia, 4-17, 4-18

security, 9-1

slings and hitches, 7-7 through

7-11

medical supply list, 4-16

farrier tools, 3-4, 3-5

mission, enemy, terrain, troops,

time available, and civilians

feeding, 2-9 through 2-13

(METT-TC), 1-1, 6-11

urban environments, 9-3

Index-1

FOREWORD

This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective commands and other

commands as appropriate.

VANCE P. VISSER

RICHARD P. MILLS

Colonel, USA

Lieutenant General, USMC

Commandant

Deputy Commandant for

U.S. Army Chemical, Biological,

Combat Development and Integration

Radiological, and Nuclear School

T.B. KRAFT

DAVID L. REYNOLDS

Rear Admiral, USN

Colonel, USAF

Commander

Navy Warfare Development Command

Headquarters Air Force Civil

Doctrine Center

Engineer Support Agency

This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online

(https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html). To receive publishing

updates, please subscribe at

http://www.apd.army.mil/AdminPubs/new_subscribe.asp.

U.S. Navy Web sites at <https://ndls.nwdc.navy.mil> and

<https://ndls.nwdc.navy.smil.mil>, the U.S. Air Force Web site at

www.e-publishing.af.mil , and the U.S. Marine Corps Web site at

https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/.

Marine Corps PCN: 143 000078 00

*TM 3-11.42

MCWP 3-38.1

NTTP 3-11.36

AFTTP 3-2.83

Technical Manual

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Fort Monroe, Virginia

No. 3-11.42

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Quantico, Virginia

No. 3-38.1

Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Navy Warfare Development Command

Norfolk, Virginia

3-11.36

Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Headquarters Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency

Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida

3-2.82

23 June 2014

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures

for

Installation Emergency Management

Contents

Page

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1

FUNDAMENTALS OF INSTALLATION EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

1-1

National Structure for Incident Management

1-1

Terms of Reference

1-3

Framework

1-4

Operating Environment

1-5

Tasks and Responsibilities

1-7

Summary

1-10

Chapter 2

PREPARE

2-1

Actions

2-1

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. government agencies and their contractors only

due to the sensitive nature of information contained in the manual. This determination was made on 1 July 2012.

Other requests for this document must be referred to one of the Service proponents listed in the preface.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the

document.

*This publication supersedes ATP 3-11.42, dated 26 April 2013.

23 June 2014

TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/NTTP 3-11.36/AFTTP 3-2.83

Contents

Installation Emergency Management Program

2-2

Risk Management

2-5

Installation Emergency Management Plan

2-6

Support for Coordinating Programs

2-7

Civilian Coordination and Interoperability

2-10

Individual and Family Preparedness and Community Awareness

2-11

Training, Exercises, and Evaluation

2-12

Summary

2-14

Chapter 3

RESPOND

3-1

Actions

3-1

Command and Control

3-3

Integration of Support Activities

3-7

Communications

3-7

Resource Management

3-10

Summary

3-12

Chapter 4

RECOVER

4-1

Actions

4-1

Recovery Management

4-2

Sustainment and Restoration of Infrastructure and Operations

4-4

Mass Care

4-5

Debris Clearance and Environmental Remediation

4-5

Resource Management

4-6

Mortuary Affairs

4-6

Public Health

4-7

Summary

4-7

Chapter 5

MITIGATE

5-1

Actions

5-1

Vulnerability Reduction

5-2

Mitigation Planning

5-4

Lessons Learned

5-5

Summary

5-6

Appendix A

METRIC CONVERSION CHART

A-1

Appendix B

RISK MANAGEMENT

B-1

Appendix C

INSTALLATION EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN

C-1

Appendix D

RESPONSE OPERATIONS AND EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS .. D-1

Appendix E

COMMUNICATIONS

E-1

Appendix F

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

F-1

Appendix G

SUPPORT AGREEMENTS

G-1

Appendix H

EVACUATION, SHELTER IN PLACE, AND LOCKDOWN

H-1

Appendix I

MASS CARE OPERATIONS

I-1

GLOSSARY

Glossary-1

REFERENCES

References-1

INDEX

Index-1

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23 June 2014

Contents

Figures

Figure 1-1. The four phases of IEM

1-4

Figure 2-1. Prepare phase

2-1

Figure 3-1. Respond phase

3-1

Figure 3-2. ICS interface

3-4

Figure 4-1. Recover phase

4-1

Figure 5-1. Mitigate phase

5-1

Figure B-1. Risk assessment process

B-1

Figure B-2. USMC threat hazard matrix template (notional data)

B-7

Figure B-3. USAF risk assessment and mitigation matrixes (notional data)

B-8

Figure G-1. Sample MAA/MOU template

G-1

Tables

Table 2-1. Prepare phase functions and actions

2-2

Table 3-1. Respond phase functions and actions

3-2

Table 4-1. Recover phase functions and actions

4-2

Table 4-2. Recommended composition of the recovery working group

4-3

Table 5-1. Mitigate phase functions and actions

5-2

Table 5-2. Potential hazard mitigation controls and techniques

5-3

Table A-1. Metric conversion chart

A-1

Table B-1. U.S.N. relative risk evaluation matrix (notional data)

B-6

Table B-2. USAF risk assessment work sheet (notional data)

B-9

Table C-1. Examples of ESF responsibilities and manager roles

C-5

Table C-2. Examples of EM plan section content

C-15

23 June 2014

TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/NTTP 3-11.36/AFTTP 3-2.83

iii

Preface

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Installation Emergency represents a significant

renaming and revision to the November 2007 publication Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for

Installation CBRN Defense. It expands the scope from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)

defense to all-hazards installation emergency management (IEM), including the management of CBRN events.

This publication defines the roles of Department of Defense (DOD) installation commanders and staffs and

provides the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) associated with installation planning and preparedness

for response to, and recovery from, hazards to save lives, protect property, and sustain mission readiness. The

purpose of this publication is to summarize existing policies, responsibilities, and procedures for IEM programs

at DOD installations worldwide for all hazards, as defined by DODI 6055.17, and to translate this policy into

tactical terms applicable to military installation commanders. The contents have been written to complement

Service IEM program manuals, standard operating procedures (SOPs), response standards, training support

packages, collective task training development products, training center and unit exercises, and Service school

curricula related to IEM.

The principal audience for Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Installation Emergency

Management is military installation commanders, functional and Service component staffs, emergency

managers, nonemergency management personnel performing collateral or additional emergency management

(EM) duties, and civil service and contract EM personnel with application to the joint force command and joint

task force that are tasked with the planning, preparation, and execution of EM. Trainers and educators

throughout DOD will also use this manual.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States

(U.S.), international, and, in some cases, host nation (HN) laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels

ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement (see FM 27-10).

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Installation Emergency implements STANAGs 2047

(Edition 7), STANAG 2521 (Edition 1), STANAG 2873 (Edition 4), and STANAG 4359 (Edition 1).

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Installation Emergency uses joint terms where

applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for

which Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Installation Emergency is the proponent (the

authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. For definitions shown in the text, the term is

italicized, and the number of the proponent follows the definition. This publication is not the proponent for any

new terms.

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Installation Emergency applies to installation

populations in their entirety, including active and reserve component military personnel unless otherwise stated;

DOD civilians; military families; installation tenants; transient military or U.S. government personnel;

contractor personnel; visitors and guests; HN personnel; third country national personnel; and other relevant

populations in the surrounding community outside of the installation.

The proponent of this publication is the U.S. Army CBRN School, who developed this publication with the joint

participation of the approving Service commands. We encourage recommended changes for improving this

publication. Please reference changes by specific page and paragraph, and provide a rationale for each

recommendation. Send comments and recommendations directly to—

TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/NTTP 3-11.36/AFTTP 3-2.83

23 June 2014

Preface

Army.

Commandant

U.S. Army CBRN School

ATTN: ATZT-TDD-C

14001 MSCoE Loop, Suite 2617

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473

Commercial (573) 563-7364

Web site: <http://www.wood.army.mil/cbrns>

Marine Corps.

Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration

ATTN: MCCDC CDD MID DCB C116

3300 Russell Road, Suite 204

Quantico, Virginia 22134-5021

Defense Switching Network (DSN) 278-6233; Commercial (703) 784-6233

Web site: <https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/>

Navy.

Commander

Navy Warfare Development Command

ATTN: N5

1528 Piersey St, Building O-27

Norfolk, Virginia 23511-2699

DSN 341-4203; Commerical (757) 341-4203

Web site: <https://ndls.nwdc.navy.mil/>

Air Force.

Headquarters Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency

ATTN: CEXR

139 Barnes Drive, Suite 1

Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida 32403-5319

DSN 523-6169; Commercial (850) 283-6169

Web site: <www.e-publishing.af.mil>

Appendix A contains a metric conversion chart for this manual. A complete listing of preferred metric units for

general use is contained in Federal Standard 376B.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

23 June 2014

TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/NTTP 3-11.36/AFTTP 3-2.83

Introduction

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Installation Emergency discusses the principles of

EM as they apply to military installations. This publication provides doctrine TTP for planning,

preparedness, execution, and continuous assessment in each of the four phases of EM. During military

operations, this publication is subordinate to current (joint publications [JPs] that address related topics,

such as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management (CM) and defense support

of civil authorities (DSCA). It covers all-hazards and coordinating operations, such as emergency support

functions (ESFs) or functional areas.

The IEM involves the complex coordination of planning and response efforts with the installation

command and staff; tenant command staff; and local, state, federal, and HN civilian authorities. Tenant and

transient installation units also actively contribute resources to IEM mutual assistance plans. Installation

commands strive to become familiar with the local community outside the installation that will impact EM

operations. They are also knowledgeable of the relationship of their operations to federal guidelines

governing civilian EM at national, state, and local levels.

This document addresses the various roles of the installation command for each phase of an EM life cycle.

The primary overlapping phases in an EM life cycle are—

Preparing for installation emergencies.

Responding to installation emergencies.

Recovering from installation emergencies.

Mitigating installation emergencies.

Preparations for an installation emergency are directed toward planning, interoperability, and intelligence.

Preparedness activities increase the resilience of the installation community and the response and recovery

capabilities of the installation through risk management; coordination; task organization; equipment,

training, and certification; exercise; and readiness evaluation.

Response operations include the actions taken from the initial notification of a potential or actual incident

until the transition to the recovery phase begins. Immediate response measures following an installation

emergency include the notification of the affected populace within 10 minutes and the execution of the

Incident Command System (ICS) by installation first responders. The emergency may also require the

activation of emergency operations centers (EOCs). Response roles could extend beyond installation

boundaries. Civil authority support and joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration

(JRSOI) functions also occur during the response phase. Most response functions are conducted using the

ICS and are supported through ESFs or equivalent organizational structures (such as functional areas)

within the EOC.

The installation commander executes recovery operations within his own available organic and

precoordinated resources. Recovery activities emphasize immediate response and mitigation measures to

protect critical infrastructure and restore critical functions to their preincident capability. Short-term

recovery actions seek to restore essential services and ensure that the needs of the installation community

are met. Long-term recovery actions include restoring operations, rebuilding destroyed property, and

reconstituting military operations and services. The main goal of recovery is mission reconstitution and the

restoration of essential operations. The final steps of a recovery operation include capturing lessons learned

and the subsequent required revisions of the EM plan upon reassessment. The National Disaster Recovery

Framework (NDRF) was published in 2001, replacing the National Response Framework (NRF), ESF-14,

Long-Term Community Recovery. The NDRF expands key ESF-14 concepts into a full framework.

Mitigation actions involve the lasting (and often permanent) reduction of, exposure to, probability of, or

potential loss from identified hazards. The goal of mitigation is to reduce the impact of identified hazards

on critical/essential operations, critical assets, critical infrastructure, essential services, assigned personnel,

and government and personal property. Mitigation is an ongoing process that feeds directly into the overall

preparedness of the installation. Mitigation can be accomplished through the implementation of sustainable

development activities, vulnerability reduction measures, and hazard prevention efforts consistent with

command guidance through the vulnerability assessment (VA) process.

TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/NTTP 3-11.36/AFTTP 3-2.83

23 June 2014

Introduction

While the installation EM plan covers the usual activities associated with preparing for, responding to,

recovering from, and mitigating the effects of an incident, the installation command and EM staffs also

coordinate EM activities with various supporting entities established on and off the installation. Plans for

the coordination and execution of ESFs or functional areas, continuity of operations (COOP), and critical

infrastructure protection (CIP) are aligned with the installation EM plan to ensure the appropriate allocation

of resources and manpower in all sectors of emergency response.

The goal of this multi-Service publication is to revise the November 2007 edition of Multiservice Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Installation CBRN Defense to expand the scope from CBRN to all-hazards

EM for individuals on, or assigned to, a DOD installation. Accordingly, this publication is renamed Multi-

Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Installation Emergency Management. The decision to

revise the multi-Service TTP resulted from—

The publication of DODI 6055.17.

The results of the Joint Requirements Office-led, front-end analysis that identified doctrinal gaps in

the passive defense and weapons of mass destruction CM capabilities-based assessments.

The request for feedback results received from the Services.

Note. This publication is now aligned with DOD and federal civilian EM principles, policies,

and guidance for all-hazards incidents.

23 June 2014

TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/NTTP 3-11.36/AFTTP 3-2.83

vii

Chapter 1

Fundamentals of Installation Emergency Management

This chapter establishes the environment for installation EM. It provides the terms of

reference and framework for IEM—prepare for, respond to, recover from, and

mitigate the effects of an incident. It discusses the interface between military doctrine

and federal guidance, such as the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the

ICS, the NRF, and the National Preparedness Goal (NPG). It also presents an

overview of the anticipated tasks and responsibilities of installation command and

staff in the construction and proliferation of an IEM program. These fundamental

principles guide the preparation for, and implementation of, the IEM program

discussed in following chapters.

NATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

1-1. Consistent with DODI 6055.17 and HSPD 5, IEM plans for domestic installations are developed in

compliance with NIMS, ICS, NRF, and NPG procedures. Also consistent with DODI 6055.17, installations

outside the United States implement NRF and NIMS principles as much as possible when executing IEM

programs.

1-2. The national structure for incident management establishes a clear progression of coordination and

communication from the local level to regional and national headquarters levels. Specific elements of this

governing structure are detailed in the following sections.

NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

1-3. For military installations, the use of NIMS supports the interoperability between installations, other

Services, and the civilian community. All DOD components maintain interoperability with the ICS.

1-4. The following are NIMS components:

Preparedness.

Communications and information management.

Resource management.

Command and management, including the ICS.

Ongoing management and maintenance and supporting technologies.

1-5. The NIMS process supports the following:

Integrating incident-related prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery activities.

Improving coordination and integration within the military operational area and with federal,

state, local private-sector, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) partners.

Increasing the efficient use of resources needed for more effective incident management.

Improving situational awareness (SA) within the installation.

Providing timely and accurate information for public awareness.

Facilitating requests for assistance (RFAs) that exceed the installation response capability.

Providing linkage to technical reachback capabilities.

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1-1

Chapter 1

INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

1-6. The ICS is a flexible, standardized, on-scene, all-hazards incident management approach. It is

executed and prioritized according to the principles of life safety, incident stabilization, and property

conservation.

1-7. The ICS enables the coordination and integration of personnel, facilities, procedures,

communications, and equipment among various jurisdictions and functional agencies. It also establishes a

common process for planning and managing resources.

NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK

1-8. The NRF is an all-discipline, all-hazards framework for the management of incidents. Consistent

with DODI 6055.17 and HSPD 5, the DOD implements policy and procedures concordant with the roles

and authorities under the NRF.

1-9. The purpose of the NRF is to establish a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to incident

management; therefore, the elements of an installation response plan are consistent with the roles and

authorities under the NRF.

1-10. The following are the key principles of NRF doctrine:

Engaged partnerships.

Tiered responses.

Scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational capabilities.

Unity of effort through unified command (UC).

Readiness to act.

NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL

1-11. PPD 8 sets a strategic vision for national preparedness by using a comprehensive approach to

preparedness. It also requires the development and maintenance of the NPG.

1-12. The NPG defines the core capabilities necessary to prepare for the incidents that pose the greatest

risk to national security. The NPG establishes concrete, measurable, prioritized objectives to mitigate

specific threats and vulnerabilities—including regional variations of risk—and emphasizes actions intended

to achieve an integrated, layered, accessible, and all-of-nation/whole community preparedness approach

while optimizing the use of available resources.

MISSION ANALYSIS

1-13. The overarching objective of a comprehensive, all-hazards IEM program is to maintain DOD

operational readiness throughout, and subsequent to, disasters or emergencies on or near DOD installations

worldwide. Consistent with DODI 6055.17, the goals of the DOD IEM program are to—

Prepare DOD installations for emergencies.

Respond appropriately to protect personnel, save lives, and protect property.

Recover and restore operations after an emergency.

1-14. It is also DOD policy that IEM programs—

Maintain DOD readiness by establishing and maintaining a comprehensive, all-hazards IEM

program on DOD installations worldwide.

Support and assist U.S. civil authorities, as directed, in EM activities.

Coordinate preparedness, response, and recovery requirements and capabilities with state, local,

and tribal governments; other military departments; or HN partners by using an all-hazards

approach that balances risk management (threat, vulnerability, consequence), resources, and

need.

Align with federal guidance, which is outlined in the NIMS, ICS, and NRF and is consistent

with HSPD 5.

1-2

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23 June 2014

Fundamentals of Installation Emergency Management

STRATEGIC TO TACTICAL

1-15. IEM planning involves strategic, operational, and tactical level plans. Strategic planning usually

occurs at the higher echelon levels, and individual IEM plans develop operational and tactical level plans

that support and adhere to the strategic guidance from higher headquarters.

Strategic. At this level, decisionmakers determine broad objectives and develop high-level

guidance for the IEM program. Lower-level plans developed by IEM personnel adhere to this

guidance and accomplish these objectives.

Operational. Operational objectives support strategic objectives, sequence events, initiate

actions, and apply resources to begin and sustain activities. Operational planning is also

conducted and sustained across the IEM program range of operations

(prevent, respond,

recover). Plans written at this level are more narrowly scoped and more detailed than strategic

plans.

Tactical. Tactical planning is more focused and detailed than operational planning. Activities

are focused on the arrangement of resources in relation to each other and to a specific threat or

hazard. Tactical plans are developed to support the objectives of operational plans.

Services. Each of the Services has developed IEM programs based on unique Service

requirements and existing DOD doctrine. While many aspects of the Service programs are

similar, there are select differences that will be addressed by exception when necessary.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

1-16. The following terms of reference and complementary doctrine apply throughout this document:

All hazards. All hazards are any incident, natural or manmade, including those defined in DODI

6055.07, that warrants action to protect the life, property, health, and safety of military members,

dependents, and civilians at risk, and minimize any disruptions of installation operations (DODI

6055.07).

CBRN consequence management. CBRN CM is the response activities that require resource

allocation beyond CBRN passive-defense capabilities for all deliberate and inadvertent release

of CBRN hazard(s).

Consequence management. CM is the actions taken to maintain or restore essential services

and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural,

manmade, or terrorist incidents. It is a military-unique function that is coordinated with EM. (JP

3-28)

Emergency management. EM is the coordination and integration of all activities necessary to

build, sustain, and improve the capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover

from, or mitigate against threatened or actual natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other

manmade disasters (NRF).

Emergency management alignment with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

defense activities. EM is not a military-unique function and is complementary to CBRN defense

activities. IEM plans are developed in coordination with CBRN defense plans, including the

recognition of potentially overlapping capabilities and resources. IEM capabilities and functions

are not exempt from applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration

(OSHA)

standards, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health guidelines, or the guidelines

of other applicable federal agencies. Additional information can be found in Multiservice

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Consequence Management Operations.

Geographic locations. U.S. military installations support operational forces in domestic and

foreign environments. The installation location is critical in determining the laws and regulations

that must be applied and in establishing the level of military authority that the installation

commander may have in determining response actions, including the level of personal protection

for the response force.

Domestic locations. Domestic locations are the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii,

the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the U.S. territories of Guam,

23 June 2014

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1-3

Chapter 1

American Samoa, Jarvis Island, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands, the

Freely Associated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall

Islands, and the U.S. possessions of Wake Island, Midway Island, Johnson Island, Baker

Island, Howland Island, Palmyra Atoll, and Kingman Reef (DODI 2000.21).

Foreign locations. Foreign locations are any geographic area not reflected in the definition

of domestic (DODI 2000.21).

Installations. Installation is a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, or other activity under the

jurisdiction of the secretary of a military department or, in the case of an activity in a foreign

country, under the operational control of the secretary of a military department or the Secretary

of Defense. The term installation does not include leased facilities. (DODI 6055.17)

FRAMEWORK

1-17. Chapters 2 through 5 describe the phases of IEM that can occur sequentially or simultaneously

before, during, or after an emergency incident (see figure 1-1). The following are the phases of IEM:

Prepare.

Respond.

Recover.

Mitigate.

Figure 1-1. The four phases of IEM

PREPARE

1-18. The installation EM plan drives preparation efforts and facilitates response and recovery operations.

Preparation and planning are based on an assessment of the operating environment. Operational

assessments enable commanders and emergency managers to identify the minimum standards for training,

organizing, equipping, and protecting resources. The implementation and approval of the EM plan (and

related agreements) increase readiness through training and exercises. Chapter 2 discusses the preparation

phase in more detail.

1-19. Because of the breadth and scope of disasters that a comprehensive program must cover, IEM plans

and programs are detailed and flexible. An IEM program will gain strength and substance through

coordination with installation tenants and with local, state, federal, tribal, territorial, and HN authorities.

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Fundamentals of Installation Emergency Management

RESPOND

1-20. Actions taken during this phase address the short-term, direct effects of an incident. Response

measures include those actions taken to save lives, protect property, and continue essential services and

operations. Chapter 3 discusses the response phase in more detail.

RECOVER

1-21. The focus of recovery activities is the restoration of mission capability and the essential public and

government services interrupted by the incident. The recovery phase also includes completing the

mitigation of the immediate hazard. Chapter 4 discusses the recovery phase in more detail.

MITIGATE

1-22. Sustainable development and vulnerability reduction measures are initiated during the mitigation

phase in support of hazard prevention and suppression of known hazards. Chapter

5 discusses the

mitigation phase in more detail.

1-23. IEM programs are comprehensive and address all hazards that the installation may experience,

including natural and manmade incidents. These events may be intentional or accidental, foreseen or

unpredictable. Employing an all-hazards approach encourages interoperability; enables the effective use of

resources; and protects critical operations, personnel, assets, and the environment during likely emergency

events.

OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

1-24. IEM planning accounts for every relevant component of the operating environment on an installation.

These components include threat considerations; geographic frameworks; political, military, economic, and

social infrastructures; information systems; geographically remote locations; physical environments; and

the technological facts detailed below.

THREAT

1-25. There are common threat considerations that apply to military installations across the range of

military operations, ranging from stable peace to general war conditions. Installations receive intelligence

summaries that provide information on local or regional threats. Threats and hazards can range from

adversarial actions, to manmade incidents, to natural disasters. Threat and hazard assessments are

coordinated with similar assessments created by state and local civilian authorities. These authorities often

have specific intelligence regarding natural hazard threats, such as information on hurricane susceptibility

that would be useful in the preparation of a threat assessment for the installation. (See appendix B for

additional information on threat and hazard assessments.)

GEOGRAPHIC FRAMEWORK

1-26. The IEM plan accounts for the entire assigned operational area and the associated areas of interest.

The operational area controls response actions and establishes boundaries within which the installation

commander operates. The area of interest represents the environment external to the operational area for

which the installation commander must maintain SA and may include surrounding communities and civil

authorities with whom the installation commander establishes agreements for coordinated notification,

response, and recovery operations.

POLITICAL SYSTEMS

1-27. The political environment often impacts decisions to develop, approve, and honor support

agreements between jurisdictions, especially in large-scale emergencies with the potential to impact the

populace of another jurisdiction. Military authority, jurisdictional authority, and established agreements are

among the important political and legal considerations for the installation commander.

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Chapter 1

MILITARY SYSTEMS

1-28. Regardless of the scope or nature of an incident, military systems function under the appropriate

designated military chain of command. Military units supporting an emergency on an installation or in

support of a civil jurisdiction are always under the command of military authorities, even though these

forces may provide support to civil authorities as directed under DODD 3025.18.

ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

1-29. Installation commands operate within the usual economic system parameters in terms of

appropriations for supplies and other resource requirements during the preparation and mitigation phases.

During the response and recovery phases, emergency cost account codes are developed to track and

manage response and recovery costs for submission to higher headquarters for supplemental funding

requests and for reimbursement based on local support agreements.

SOCIAL SYSTEMS

1-30. Installation commanders consider cultural, ethnic, and religious attitudes and behaviors that may

impact operations. Installations have varying degrees of social environments confined within a small

jurisdictional area. These environments range from long-term residents in family housing to short-term

student populations, and from large, special-event crowds from local civil jurisdictions to cohesive

combatant units stationed on post or transiting the installation for training and exercises. The social

environment usually extends into local civil jurisdictions, with potentially large components of the military

community residing outside the jurisdictional boundaries of the installation commander. The social

environment often includes foreign nationals, including multinational partners and third-country nationals

with varying social norms. The important political, legal, and cultural issues that the installation

commander must address include—

Jurisdictional authority.

Established agreements and contracts.

Continuous media interaction.

Local customs.

INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS

1-31. Infrastructure systems determine specific requirements for transportation, utilities, communication,

preparedness elements (evacuation and mutual aid timelines), and specific material requirements for

response and recovery actions. Additional mitigation and prevention requirements may be required to

ensure the protection and robustness of critical infrastructure.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS

1-32. The installation commander strives to achieve enhanced SA and understanding through

interoperability with other military and civil authorities. The installation commander determines the sources

of information (including intelligence) and the appropriate stakeholders for information sharing. Certain

incidents may require notification procedures among military commanders and civil authorities. These

notification procedures are based on common agreements and preestablished methods.

GEOGRAPHICALLY REMOTE LOCATIONS

1-33. Installations may be further defined by their location relative to local civil jurisdictions and

supporting resource providers. Remote installation defines an installation that, due to its remote location in

relation to other U.S. or HN response assets, may require additional capabilities to adequately respond to,

and recover from, an emergency.

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Fundamentals of Installation Emergency Management

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

1-34. Key components of the physical environment include the effects of terrain and weather, the

geographic framework that influences the installation commander’s plan, and the installation commander’s

ability to exercise authority. Physical conditions drive mitigation and prevention requirements and

determine the specific requirements for response and recovery operations in terms of area-specific

organizing, training, equipping, and exercising personnel.

TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS

1-35. The technological infrastructure and operations present on and around the jurisdiction directly impact

the IEM program across all phases. These technological conditions may include the—

Transit, storage, manufacture, or use of hazardous materials (HAZMAT).

Ignition sources for available fuel loads.

Potential for aviation, maritime, or land transport accidents.

Increased reliance on cyber and electronic systems for daily operations.

Distributed financial management and distribution systems.

Additional sources of environmental pollution or contamination.

1-36. These technological factors may indicate the presence of specific technological hazards (structural

collapse, transportation accidents, HAZMAT release). Technological conditions may determine specific

requirements for transportation and mobility, including evacuation, mutual aid timelines, and specific

material requirements such as structural-collapse rescue capabilities.

TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1-37. The tasks and responsibilities identified in paragraphs 1-43 through 1-45 are assigned to designated

leaders and leadership groups to ensure the creation, maintenance, and proliferation of a functional,

comprehensive, and integrated all-hazards EM program on each military installation worldwide.

Note. For a checklist of additional and coordinating responsibilities, see the Initial Operational

Capability Checklist and the Full Operational Capability Checklist found in DODI 6055.17.

INSTALLATION COMMANDERS

1-38. Within the DOD, installation commander is defined as the individual responsible for all operations

performed by an installation. For the purposes of this publication, it is further defined as the commander at

the lowest local level, excluding regional-level commanders, who may assume control of an installation

during the course of an emergency.

1-39. All installation commanders (including those located in domestic and foreign environments) are

required to—

Establish an IEM program that is—

Comprehensive for all hazards.

Coordinated with appropriate military and civilian authorities.

Integrated with the overall protection mission for the installation.

Designate, in writing, an installation emergency manager with the responsibility for overall

program coordination and integration with other response elements of the installation (or as

coordinated with external sources) according to DODI 3020.52 and DODI 6055.17.

Ensure that the installation emergency manager and staff develop a comprehensive, all-hazards

IEM plan and that the plan is trained, rehearsed, and exercised.

Direct installation activities and allocate resources to support the IEM program and plan.

Create, in concert with the installation emergency manager, an installation emergency

management working group (IEMWG) to provide recommendations to the command on how to

improve the planning, training, and exercising of the IEM program.

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Chapter 1

Designate and establish an installation EOC.

Direct inspections and assessments of IEM readiness and preparedness.

Create, maintain, and execute applicable inter-Service support agreements

(ISSAs),

memorandums of understanding (MOUs), memorandums of agreement (MOAs), and mutual aid

agreements (MAAs) with tenant units or local civilian jurisdictions to provide mutual aid.

Review memorandums annually.

Appoint, in writing, a public health emergency officer (PHEO) based on the guidance set forth in

DODI 6200.03 to provide public health and medical advice to the command during a public

health emergency.

Ensure that tenant organizations participate in the IEM planning process, are included in the

IEM plan, and participate in the requisite EM training and exercises on the installation.

Ensure that tenant organization EM plans, checklists, and operating instructions implement the

execution tasks outlined in the IEM plan.

Ensure the health, well-being, and safety of the entire installation populace through the

integration and enforcement of appropriate public health and safety actions during an emergency

event, consistent with relevant OSHA safety standards and health service support guidelines.

INSTALLATION COMMANDERS IN FOREIGN OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS

1-40. In addition to the requirements listed above, installation commanders located in foreign operating

environments must also—

Integrate installation and HN emergency response capabilities to support the sustainment of

installation capabilities and readiness according to status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs).

Coordinate IEM measures with respective area or base cluster commanders.

Identify interoperability requirements and mitigation measures to help meet emergency response

requirements.

Monitor or support negotiations and/or implement MOUs and/or MOAs with HNs as necessary.

Support HN EM and response assistance.

Coordinate training opportunities with supporting HN resources to periodically exercise existing

MOUs and/or MOAs.

Review and approve exercise scenarios for exercises that are consistent with the regional threat

assessment.

Receive briefings on SOFAs and other international agreements affecting HN emergency

response capabilities appropriate to the installation.

INSTALLATION EMERGENCY MANAGER

1-41. The installation emergency manager, designated by the installation commander, has overall lead

responsibility for the integration and synchronization of installation all-hazards planning and response

activities. The installation emergency manager—

Develops and maintains the comprehensive, all-hazards IEM plan; supporting annexes;

associated instructions; SOPs; and checklists.

Collaborates and coordinates with installation responders; state, local, and tribal governments;

other military departments; and HN emergency managers to achieve the highest possible level of

IEM plan integration and interoperability.

Ensures that critical infrastructure, threat/hazard, vulnerability, consequence, and response

capability assessments are integrated into the IEM plan.

Coordinates with the PHEO and medical treatment facility (MTF) emergency manager to ensure

that medical resource management activities are coordinated and included in the IEM plan.

Coordinates with installation responders; tenants; local, state, tribal, and territorial governments;

and HN agency emergency managers to ensure that EM plans are mutually supporting and are

properly integrated.

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Fundamentals of Installation Emergency Management

Employs resource management activities to coordinate the prioritization and allocation of

installation resources.

Integrates installation emergency response requirements into resource planning.

Ensures that installation emergency response teams and personnel training occur across the

range of installation operations.

Periodically assesses installation emergency response capabilities.

Ensures that community awareness is incorporated into emergency planning, preparation, and

training.

Provides subject matter expertise to support communication regarding installation-specific, all-

hazards planning.

Serves as program coordinator for the IEMWG.

Note. The Air Force uses a medical EM representative to meet the MTF EM requirements of

DODI 6200.03.

INSTALLATION EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT WORKING GROUP

1-42. Consistent with DODI 6055.17, the installation commander establishes an IEMWG (see chapter 2 for

additional information regarding the IEMWG). The IEMWG performs the following functions:

Develops and maintains the community profile.

Executes the IEM program implementation plan.

Conducts the continual risk management process.

Develops and maintains the IEM plan.

Coordinates the development of emergency action plans (EAPs) by tenant commands as directed

by the IEM plan.

Coordinates the implementation of preparedness phase activities according to the IEM plan.

Coordinates and supports installation community preparedness.

Coordinates NIMS implementation.

Supports NIMS resource management activities.

Coordinates with and supports installation continuity programs.

Coordinates the development of command, control, and communications capabilities according

to the IEM plan.

Coordinates the development of evacuation management and mass care capabilities.

Coordinates preincident recovery planning and preparations, including facility surveys for use in

damage assessment activities.

Reviews training and certification reports for compliance with plan requirements.

Reviews exercise and evaluation reports for compliance with plan requirements.

Reviews after action reports (AARs), improvement plans (IPs), and corrective-action plans

(CAPs) to identify plan deficiencies and make applicable updates on an annual basis or as

required.

Coordinates the implementation and completion of CAPs.

Supports installation status reporting, including EM-related service areas.

Collects, validates, and prioritizes budget and financial requirements for submission into the

program objective memorandum process.

TENANT AND TRANSIENT UNITS

1-43. Tenant and transient unit commands, located on military installations worldwide, perform the

following functions:

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Chapter 1

Reports the EM status and capabilities to the installation emergency manager upon arrival at the

installation and updates that status annually. The installation emergency manager includes these

capabilities into the IEM plan as appropriate.

Provides the applicable staffing, resources, and training to support coordinated and sustained

operations.

Coordinates installation responder and tenant EM plans, checklists, and operating instructions

with the IEM plan; and ensures that installation responder and tenant IEM plans integrate

assumptions and resources between them.

Participates in IEM training and exercises as requested by the installation commander.

Participates in IEMWG.

SUMMARY

1-44. In the United States, EM is structured according to the guiding national principles found in the NRF,

NIMS, NPG, and ICS. All IEM plans and activities comply with this guidance. This instruction

promulgates a comprehensive, all-hazards EM framework that is organized into the following four

integrated phases: prepare, respond, recover, and mitigate. In the planning and execution of an IEM

program, installation commanders consider the unique factors of their own operating environment.

Installation staffs are cognizant of their roles and responsibilities in the creation and implementation of an

IEM program.

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Chapter 2

2-2. Table 2-1 outlines the major functions and corresponding activities associated with the prepare

phase.

Table 2-1. Prepare phase functions and actions

Functions

Actions

IEM program

•

Designate key personnel.

•

Establish the IEMWG.

•

Select an EOC and alternate location.

Risk management

•

Conduct a VA.

•

Perform a hazard and/or threat assessment.

•

Develop a capabilities assessment.

•

Review and update at least annually or as needed.

IEM plan

•

Analyze the outcome of the risk management process.

•

Identify writing assignments.

•

Use the appropriate template, vetted through the corresponding Service.

•

Coordinate the plan with support agreements.

•

Review and update the plan at least annually or as needed.

Support for

•

Coordinate the IEM plan with AT/FP.

coordinating

•

Coordinate the IEM plan with other associated plans (for example, COOP plans

programs

for mission-essential functions and CIP plans for CIKR).

Civilian coordination

•

Establish, review, and maintain applicable support agreements with neighboring

and interoperability

civilian agencies as appropriate.

•

Coordinate IEM planning efforts with tenant and transient units, and ensure that

IEM plans and procedures are incorporated into tenant and transient unit plans.

•

Ensure that the plans and resources are interoperable with installation entities

and neighboring civilian agencies to the greatest extent possible.

Individual and family

•

Create an informed installation community through targeted outreach programs

preparedness and

for individuals and families.

community

•

Build community resilience through awareness.

awareness

Training, exercises,

•

Ensure regular, cross-functional training and exercise opportunities for

and evaluation

installation personnel.

•

Standardize, report, and evaluate training and exercise efforts.

Legend:

antiterrorism

CIKR

critical infrastructure and key resources

CIP

critical infrastructure protection

COOP

continuity of operations

EOC

emergency operations center

force protection

IEM

installation emergency management

IEMWG

installation emergency management working group

vulnerability assessment

INSTALLATION EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

2-3. Consistent with DODI 6055.17, DOD installations develop, implement, and sustain IEM programs to

encompass all hazards. The goals of each program include preparing for, responding appropriately to, and

recovering from emergencies.

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KEY PERSONNEL

2-4. The installation emergency manager is the day-to-day coordinator of the installation IEM program

and is essential to the success of each program. Installation emergency manager responsibilities are listed in

chapter 1 and in DODI 6055.17.

2-5. Each IEM program categorizes personnel by using the definitions outlined in DODI 2000.16 to

identify and manage personnel resources of emergency responders, first responders, critical personnel, and

essential personnel.

INSTALLATION EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT WORKING GROUP

2-6. The IEMWG is a key element of the IEM program and provides a mechanism for coordination of

installation functions and delineation of EM responsibilities within the installation. Consistent with DODI

6055.17, the IEMWG—

Is established under the direction of the installation commander and the installation emergency

manager.

Meets at least quarterly.

Includes the following suggested members:

The installation commander or commander’s representative.

The program coordinator (such as the installation emergency manager).

The senior installation chaplain.

Representatives from antiterrorism

(AT), CBRN, explosive ordnance disposal

(EOD),

medical, disaster behavioral health, safety, public health, logistics, legal, security, fire and

emergency services (F&ES), public affairs, and tenant and subordinate commands and units.

Ensures that the activities associated with establishing and sustaining the IEM program are

performed according to this and other appropriate instructions and directives.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER

2-7. Consistent with DODI 6055.17, an EOC is the distinctive location at which the coordination of

information and resources to support the incident commander (IC) occur. The EOC is activated to support

on-scene response during an escalating incident by relieving the burden of external coordination and

securing additional resources.

2-8. The EOC consists of personnel and equipment appropriate for the incident level and can manage

multiple incidents and planned events.

2-9. The EOC is usually located near the center of the base or installation, close to the administrative

offices and other emergency services such as fire response and medical services. This allows prompt

response for commanders, support personnel, and emergency response team members. EOC management

administrative offices are located in the EOC, and all EOC team members have rapid access to the EOC.

Base commander offices are usually nearby. Also, careful consideration of the EOC location with respect to

supplemental EOC staff resource locations, will allow for a timely response. Such a location and the day-

to-day use of the EOC help ensure the immediate availability of key personnel and communications.

Note. UFC 4-141-04 is the DOD source document for establishing and updating an installation

EOC according to HSPD-5.

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Chapter 2

2-10. If a risk area is identified, the EOC is located away from the area of highest risk. Risk areas may

include major fault lines; flood surge zones; floodplains; dam inundation zones; fire pathways; central areas

subject to conflagration; avalanche paths; areas of unstable soil; HAZMAT production or storage facilities;

nuclear plants, waste storage, or transportation pathways; and railways that transport HAZMAT. The

following are additional location considerations:

Determine the level of mitigation that may be required in response to the hazard if the location

options place the EOC within—

A hazard source zone.

The explosive safety quantity distance arc.

A prescribed 10-mile radius of a nuclear power plant emergency planning zone.

Identify utility locations, including underground and overhead lines for electrical power, water

supply, sewer, gas or petroleum, communications, and other utilities that may be in the planning

zone.

Ensure that the EOC is located in an area where it can be secured.

Identify site perimeters, perimeter barriers and fences, control gates, and other means of securing

site perimeters.

Make soil bores to determine subgrade conditions that could impact EOC survivability in a

disaster incident.

Identify where the command administration is located, and provide access for military command

personnel to the EOC.

Identify the location of emergency response and support services including law enforcement

(LE), fire, medical, transportation, public works and engineering, munitions range control, and

other relevant support services.

Locate the EOC where congestion will not hinder access and where other contiguous facilities

cannot impair EOC functions.

Locate the EOC where radio and other communication systems can operate most

advantageously, have the most coverage, and are away from radio interference such as power

lines and tall metal structures.

Verify that the site has an adequate area for the EOC building, required setbacks, and parking.

Determine the type of available parking (surface versus garage) and if the parking can be

secured.

Determine if the site can accommodate helicopter access.

Identify flight paths near the EOC site.

Identify nearby active commercial, private, and military airports.

Ensure that the EOC is not exposed to overhanging trees or forest from which wind-blown

debris can strike the EOC.

Note. Debris and dust can damage essential EOC equipment such as antennas; heating,

ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC); and generator motor filter systems.

2-11. The EOC site should be easily and quickly securable in the event of an emergency. This includes the

protection of—

Staff.

Buildings.

Communication systems.

Utility services.

Transportation services.

2-12. The location within a building is an important factor. The first consideration is given to subgrade

locations where the EOC is protected from blast, windborne debris, windstorms, and other hazards. Special

caution is given when EOC locations are proposed on upper floors of structures since access can be

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Prepare

hindered by nonworking elevators and compromised egress stairs. Upper floors may also be more

susceptible to windstorm damage.

2-13. Verify that the facilities selected for EOC use have ample area to create large operations and

communication rooms and that they have the additional area necessary for support spaces. Verify that the

facility has, or can accept, the infrastructure to support the protection, cabling, and environmental control

necessary in the EOC. Verify that the exterior envelope is at, or can be upgraded to, the necessary EOC

protection levels.

2-14. The EOC should not be located in a high-rise building or next to a high-rise building that can

collapse. The following are additional areas of concern:

Possible expansion requirements when locating the EOC.

Compatibility of other functions with the EOC if the proposed facility will be occupied by those

other functions.

Increased security necessary for the EOC during full operations impairs the functions of other

tenants.

Subgrade water when locating EOCs in subgrade building areas.

Note. Although designs may be contrived to withstand groundwater pressure during normal

operating procedures, damage to EOC subgrade structures may allow water (under pressure from

bomb or earthquake shock, liquefaction, or flooding) to enter into the EOC.

2-15. Plan an alternate site for the EOC. In addition to the primary EOC, an alternate location is planned in

the event that the primary EOC cannot perform its function. The alternate EOC becomes the primary

command and control point when the primary EOC is disabled.

2-16. The secondary site is prepared and is capable of immediate activation, and relocation plans for

moving staff and essential items (such as secure documents) to the alternate site are in place. The alternate

site is selected to minimize, to the greatest extent possible, the degree to which the major hazards that

impact the primary EOC will affect the alternate site. Usually, criteria that apply to the primary EOC will

apply to the alternate EOC. The following are some considerations for selection of a secondary site:

Consider the relationship of the alternate EOC to the base or installation administrative centers

and emergency services.

Consider the accessibility of the site by the emergency operations team. (While the alternate

EOC is at a different location to avoid both centers being disabled by the same event, access for

staff from their normal duty posts is an essential concern.)

Consider placing the alternate EOC at a site served by roadways other than those that serve the

primary EOC. (Particular attention is given to access routes that could be blocked by flooding,

rail lines, traffic congestion, or other features that can be circumvented by the alternate site.)

Verify that the alternate EOC has adequate parking.

Determine how the resident function will be performed during an incident if the alternative EOC

has a dual-use function.

Verify that the resident function will be suspended during EOC use of the alternate facility.

Note. The EOC has redundant power and telecommunications. It is fed from two grids and has a

second telecom network in the building.

RISK MANAGEMENT

2-17. EM planning is predicated on critical asset, threat/hazard, vulnerability, consequence, and response

capability assessments. These assessments are used to evaluate the ability of an installation to respond to a

threat/hazard, protect the population on the installation, and implement strategies to mitigate risks.

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2-5

Chapter 2

2-18. Risk management is a comprehensive process and a critical planning element of IEM that allows for

the estimation of the necessary elements before, and continuous with, the development of the IEM plan.

(Additional information regarding risk management is outlined in appendix B.)

2-19. IEM risk management is a continuous process. After the IEM plan is promulgated, the installation

senior staff members schedule periodic follow-ups to reassess IEM preparations. These periodic follow-ups

help ensure that necessary resources remain properly deployed, prepared, and synchronized to successfully

execute IEM tasks. Reassessments occur at least annually before an update or review of the IEM plan and

concurrently with changes in threat or unit and resource availability.

2-20. Issues that justify and prioritize hazards/threats used for planning are well documented so that the

facts governing these decisions can be reviewed with each risk management process review.

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

2-21. The VAs allow commanders to take a holistic look at installation strengths and weaknesses compared

to the operating environment and identified threats. VAs are conducted annually (before the update or

review of the IEM plan) consistent with DODI 6055.17. The assessment results determine the basis and

justification for IEM program enhancements, program planning, and budget requests.

THREAT/HAZARD ASSESSMENT

2-22. Consistent with DODI 6055.17, installations perform threat/hazard assessments in coordination with

the assessments performed for AT and the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP). Threat/hazard

assessments use the joint staff, Service guidance, or combatant command guidance to address the broad

range of hazards/threats to the installation and personnel. The assessment identifies hazards/threats and the

likelihood of them occurring. After the threats/hazards are assessed, efforts are necessary to mitigate their

potential effects and to prevent them from affecting the installation and its associated mission-essential

functions.

CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT

2-23. Consistent with DODI

6055.17, installations conduct capability assessments and consider

contingency planning activities. The objectives of the capability assessment are to—

Consider the range of identified and projected response capabilities necessary for responding to

hazards.

List installation resources by type to provide an asset capability report.

Review policy, guidance, and planning documents to identify the mission-essential tasks and

functions assigned to the organization.

List installation personnel who have mission-essential EM responsibilities.

Identify costs associated with assessment outcomes for future budget planning.

INSTALLATION EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN

2-24. Consistent with DODI 6055.17, each installation IEM plan is comprehensive, covers all hazards, and

is designed to support preincident planning, mitigation, emergency response, and recovery. The IEM plan

is flexible enough for use in all emergencies and is detailed enough to provide a course of action for

installation commanders to apply to an unexpected event. Elements of the IEM plan are further detailed in

appendix C.

2-25. The IEM planning and development begin with reviews of the operating environment and the

structure of the installation command and staff. Military planning processes develop these assessments and

estimates into the final IEM plan. Some Services may use the FEMA CPG 101 to structure their planning

process.

2-26. IEM plans are reviewed at least annually (sooner if conditions warrant) to ensure the integration of

changes in threats, VAs, capabilities, and command relationships with civil authorities. Other appropriate

triggers for IEM plan review include results and AARs from training, exercises, and actual events.

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2-27. The installation commander and staff have the primary responsibility for ensuring the development

and maintenance of the IEM plan. Under the direction of the command, the installation emergency manager

and the IEMWG develop, maintain, execute, and revise the IEM plan according to the specifications of this

and other instructions and directives, as appropriate.

2-28. IEM plans are developed with a clear understanding and identification of the mission-essential

functions of the installation. According to the DOD mission assurance strategy, the first pillar of mission

assurance is the identification and prioritization of mission-essential functions and supporting assets and

systems. The COOP community has defined a mission decomposition architecture that can be used to

define these assets. Installations should review this architecture on a routine basis as part of operational

planning.

2-29. The individual elements of the IEM plan are included in applicable installation-specific EM exercises

to ensure that assigned personnel are well prepared in their individual roles. All IEM plans are coordinated

with tenant, federal, state, local, other Service, and/or private (or HN) response and/or recovery partners.

For details on plan development and maintenance, including the construction of the threat/hazard

vulnerability and risk assessment, see appendixes B and C.

2-30. Installation preparedness includes tracking and disseminating information about the threat

environment. The installation may use different methods to track and disseminate specific threat/hazard

information. These mechanisms are considered for incorporation into the IEM plan.

SUPPORT FOR COORDINATING PROGRAMS

2-31. IEM programs coordinate with existing installation protection programs to the extent that their

objectives and responsibilities overlap or complement one another. IEM maintains an active dialogue with

the AT, COOP, and CIP programs on the installation to ensure the coordination of efforts and resources.

ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION

2-32. Consistent with DODI 2000.16, the AT program is one of several security-related programs that fall

under the overarching combating terrorism and force protection (FP) programs. The AT program is a

collective, proactive effort focused on the prevention and detection of terrorist attacks against DOD

personnel, their families, facilities, installations, and infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment and

on the preparation to defend against, and plan for, the response to the consequences of terrorist incidents.

AT and EM programs coordinate plans for terrorism CM preparedness and response measures and

continued essential military operations.

CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS

2-33. The purpose of a COOP program is to provide for the continual operation of installation mission-

essential functions and associated critical mission facilities (CMFs) throughout an emergency. A COOP is a

separate process from EM; however, the management of emergencies is interrelated with, and highly

dependent on, full COOP planning efforts and the coordination of EM plans with COOP plans at

installation, local, and regional levels. The responsibility of the installation is to support such efforts and

ensure that installation level services required to execute the COOP plan of the mission-essential function

are developed and made available during a contingency requiring the activation of the COOP plan. It is the

responsibility of the commander in charge of the mission-essential functions to sign the applicable COOP

plan, finance the identified requirements, and coordinate COOP requirements with the installation,

specifically through the IEMWG.

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2-34. A COOP program involves—

Protecting infrastructures deemed critical to force and materiel readiness and operations in

peace, crisis, and war.

Mitigating the loss or disruption of mission-essential functions and planning for timely

restoration or recovery of mission-essential functions through an appropriate devolution of the

operations plan.

Planning for the dependence on other assets (infrastructures, utilities, facilities, private sector

services, other government departments and agencies) to help accomplish the installation

mission.

Coordinating with private and nonmilitary asset owners on the security and protection of critical

civilian infrastructures and assets.

Maintaining information sharing, cooperative agreements, and outreach efforts with the private

sector, including partnerships with state and local governments and HNs.

2-35. Based on DODD 3020.26 and DODI 3020.42, certain mission-essential functions and associated

CMFs are capable of remaining uninterrupted or resuming function during the first 12 hours after the

occurrence of an emergency and through the full resumption of all functions. During an emergency, most

of the mission-essential functions may be relocated to a complementary CMF at another location or at a

designated emergency relocation site (ERS). The capability to perform mission-essential functions at

alternate sites is fully operational as soon as possible, but no later than 12 hours after COOP activation.

Detailed information on COOP planning and implementation can be found in DODI 3020.42.

2-36. The identification and criticality of mission-essential functions are examined by determining the

consequences of their nonperformance. After a function has been deemed mission-essential, it is prioritized

in relation to other mission-essential functions. Consistent with DODI 3020.42, areas for consideration as

mission-essential include, but are not limited to—

Command and control.

Command decisions and strategies.

Crisis communications.

Crisis data storage, retrieval, and security.

Legal obligations.

Fiscal and contractual obligations.

Personnel.

Critical support to or from other DOD installations, components, agencies, or departments.

2-37. The COOP plan provides preplanned processes, assets, and the concept of operations that the

organization is required to have in place to manage the response, recovery, and reconstitution of mission-

essential functions after an event. COOP planning involves identifying and documenting mission-essential

functions and supporting CMFs. The COOP plan is built on the results of a thorough VA. The installation

and the accompanying commands of each mission-essential function and supporting CMF develop and

maintain a COOP plan pertaining to their organization. Each of these COOP plans aligns with the other

coordinating COOP plans as appropriate. Mission-essential functions and associated CMFs review their

COOP plan annually and submit changes to the supporting installation emergency manager.

2-38. COOP plans also contain—

Organizational structure, succession to command, and delegation of authority to appropriate staff

data.

Personnel manning requirements and procedures to ensure that sufficient, qualified personnel are

available throughout the duration of the emergency.

Logistics plans to sustain operations at the ERS.

Lists of mission-essential documents and equipment to be made available at the alternate site.

A plan for the devolution of operations.

Higher headquarters reporting requirements.

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Training requirements for COOP positions critical to maintaining command and control during

emergencies, including personnel designated to staff the ERS.

A security element personnel requirement to protect staff and safeguard classified references and

material.

2-39. An excellent series of templates for COOP and devolution of operations planning can

be found online. These templates were constructed for federal agencies; however, they can be customized

for use at the military installation level.

2-40. FEMA has constructed a continuity assistance tool for nonfederal entities to identify continuity

strengths and areas for improvement. It can be easily tailored to fit the needs of an installation evaluating its

own continuity readiness.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

2-41. The CIP program identifies, assesses, and enhances the security of physical and cyberspace assets

and associated infrastructures essential to the execution of the National Military Strategy. Military

operations are heavily dependent on shared critical infrastructure and key resources

(CIKR). This

interconnectivity better enables mission accomplishment; however, it also increases vulnerability to human

error, natural hazards, and physical or cyberspace attacks. Therefore, it is imperative to identify, protect,

and ensure the continuity of mission-critical infrastructures. As with COOP, CIP is a separate process from

EM, yet the management of emergencies is interrelated with, and highly dependent on, full CIP planning

efforts and coordination of EM plans with CIP plans at installation, local, and regional levels.

2-42. Consistent with the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS) Critical Infrastructure and Key

Resource Center documents, critical infrastructures are the assets, systems, and networks, whether physical

or virtual, whose damage or destruction would weaken national defense or economic security, as in the

elimination of critical services or capabilities to an identified mission-essential function or associated CMF.

Key resources include publicly and privately controlled resources essential to the operations listed above.

2-43. The CIP program involves—

Identifying critical resources, assets, systems, and networks.

Identifying internal and external vulnerabilities to those resources and assessing their risks.

Recognizing the relationship between vulnerabilities and operational readiness.

Prioritizing assets in relation to their operational criticality and risk level.

Mitigating/managing the vulnerabilities and employing resiliency strategies, if possible.

Measuring the effectiveness of mitigation efforts.

Planning for contingencies, including dependence on others assets (infrastructures, utilities,

facilities, services of the private sector, other government departments and agencies) to help

accomplish the installation mission.

2-44. A risk management-based CIP plan is developed and maintained. The plan aligns with other

coordinating CIP plans, including neighboring civilian agency plans, as appropriate. When requested, host

installation and tenant commands develop and submit local plans for CIP remediation and mitigation, CIP

tabletop and field exercises, and local CIP best practices. Each installation evaluates existing support

agreements (including MOUs, MOAs, MAAs, and ISSAs) as the basis for integrating their CIP tasks. The

evaluation of support agreements identifies installation risks and vulnerabilities that are created by a

reliance on other Service, government, or civil sector infrastructures and key resources. The evaluation also

identifies tools to reduce risks and vulnerabilities or to ensure the protection of those assets and mitigate

their associated risks.

2-45. On an installation level, CIP is not usually within the purview of the installation command or the

IEM staff. The owners or operators of the utilities or services are usually responsible for this function. As

on the federal level, building partnerships with controlling agencies increases the likelihood that

infrastructure and resources are available to the installation during an emergency.

2-46. Each installation emergency manager maintains information sharing, cooperative agreements, and

outreach efforts with the private sector (including partnerships with state and local governments and HNs)

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to identify collaborative avenues in the protection of infrastructure that is vital to the installation and its

mission.

2-47. DODI 2000.16 delineates the needed installation and higher headquarters review and reporting for

CIP from an AT perspective. For more information on CIP, see DODD 3020.40 and DODI 3020.45 and

review the FEMA Emergency Management Institute courses available online.

CIVILIAN COORDINATION AND INTEROPERABILITY

2-48. A major objective of preparedness efforts is to ensure mission integration and interoperability in

response to emergent crises across functional and organizational lines and between public and private

organizations. This integration effort includes interagency coordination, coordination with tenant and

transient units on the installation, and the interoperability of procedures and resources with civilian

counterparts.

COORDINATION

2-49. Responding to an incident on an installation may require all existing installation first and emergency

responder assets. If installation organic response capabilities are exceeded or do not exist for a particular

hazard or threat, installation commanders may require assistance from nearby federal, state, local, other

Service, and/or private (or HN) capabilities to effectively respond to, and recover from, an incident. Close

liaison with these agencies and departments in advance is essential to ensure that adequate resources are

available when required.

2-50. Each installation ensures that IEM plans of various components and tenants within the installation

have been thoroughly coordinated with each other; with the response plans of local, state, and federal

organizations; and with the plans of joint task forces, multinational forces, or HN forces and organizations.

Coordination is necessary to identify and update responsible points of contact, emergency protocols, and

expectations in the event of an incident on (or of an incident that impacts) a DOD installation consistent

with DODI 2000.16, DODI 6055.06-M, and NFPA 1600®. Coordination also helps ensure the sharing of

information pertaining to locally available technologies and capabilities that may provide early warning of

a potential threat or hazard (biomonitoring, chemical or radiological detection, intrusion detection, decision

support tools).

2-51. Consistent with DODI 6055.17, installation commanders may develop or provide input to support

agreements with local emergency services, including local EM agencies. These support agreements include

MAAs or other support agreements written as MOAs, MOUs, ISSAs, SOFAs, or support contracts.

Installation legal counsel personnel assist in the preparation of the agreements and perform a legal review

of them before execution. The support agreements are reviewed and exercised at least annually, and the

contents of each support agreement are seamlessly integrated into the IEM plan.

2-52. MAAs enable installations and local, state, and federal organizations to provide resources, facilities,

services, and other required support to one another during a life-threatening or significant property-

threatening incident. Preestablished MAAs with private organizations are necessary to facilitate the timely

delivery of assistance at the appropriate organizational level during incidents. MAAs include, at a

minimum, the following elements or provisions:

Definitions of key terms used in the agreement.

Roles and responsibilities of individual parties.

Procedures for requesting and providing assistance.

Procedures, authorities, and rules for payment, reimbursement, and allocation of costs.

Notification procedures.

Protocols for interoperable communications.

Relationships with other agreements among organizations.

Procedures for workers’ compensation.

Immunity and liability rules and treatment.

Recognition of qualifications and certifications.

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Sharing agreements, as required.

Periods for review.

Cancellation procedures.

2-53. Maintaining effective coordination and liaison between installation, tenant, and transient units is the

responsibility of all those concerned. Preferably, before their first arrival at an installation, the EM

representative of the transient unit will initiate specific coordination measures and information exchanges

with the installation command regarding operational, intelligence, or logistics needs that the transient unit

may require, or be able to provide to, the installation.

2-54. Adequate preparation and coordination is essential to the success of the liaison and coordination

activities from the installation and a tenant, transient unit, or annex. Coordination is an integral part of the

planning process, and it is important that the tenant and transient units maintain a full understanding of the

installation commander’s emergency response plan.

2-55. Consistent with DODI 6200.03, each MTF or equivalent ensures that force health protection

measures and public health EM are integrated into existing DOD installation and/or military command

emergency preparedness and response plans and agreements. Each installation coordinates with the nearest

MTF command to ensure parallel efforts and synchronized expectations for preparedness and response

between the installation and MTF. Medical response plans for the installation and MTF interface with

corresponding local, state, federal, or HN agency EM activities.

INTEROPERABILITY

2-56. Consistent with DODI 6055.17, DODI 3020.52, and PPD 8, IEM programs are interoperable with

EM efforts in their civilian mutual aid community or HN to ensure an effective and efficient emergency

response. Interoperability includes the technical exchange of information, IEM systems, processes,

procedures, organizations, and missions and is balanced with information assurance.

2-57. The interoperability requirements of equipment, communication systems, and other EM capabilities

are identified and improved through interagency collaboration, coordination, and participation in all aspects

of EM. Interoperability efforts can also be improved through the mutual inclusion of civilian agencies in

installation exercises and training and through the participation of key installation personnel in local

community exercises.

INDIVIDUAL AND FAMILY PREPAREDNESS AND COMMUNITY

AWARENESS

2-58. Individual and community preparedness is a time and resource multiplier for the installation

emergency response effort. Help may not always arrive when expected; therefore, an installation can

implement individual and family preparedness efforts to ensure that personnel, their families, and other

community members are prepared to immediately respond to emergencies on their own until help becomes

available. A well-informed community will prevent an unnecessary delay of response efforts, and their

resilience will allow activated responders to concentrate on mitigating the hazard and initiating recovery

operations.

INDIVIDUAL AND FAMILY PREPAREDNESS

2-59. Per PPD 8 and HSPD 21, the responsibility for proper emergency preparedness extends to the family

and individual level. The proper preparedness of both the individual and the family is essential to the

overall success of an IEM program, especially due to the reliance on evacuation, movement to safe haven,

movement to shelter, lockdown, and shelter in place (SIP) as the primary protective strategies for many

families and individuals associated with the installation community. Installation personnel are highly

encouraged to develop a personal or family emergency plan (including a plan for pets) and to develop and

maintain a personal or family emergency kit.

2-60. Military families and individuals

(especially those stationed abroad) have unique emergency

readiness considerations that distinguish them from the general population. Families and individuals

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associated with an installation have likely often moved to new locations and may not have a strong

understanding of possible evacuation routes or locations of emergency supply stores if they are new to the

area. They also may not speak the native language of their HN. In addition, while much of the general

population relies on other family members in their area during an emergency, members of the military

community are less likely to live near extended family. On the positive side, because installation

community members are accustomed to relocating often, they are uniquely prepared for certain aspects of

emergency readiness, such as the collection and recording of important personal and financial records

before an evacuation.

2-61. Detailed preparedness guidance, especially regarding planning and family or individual preparedness

kits, is available at the FEMA Web site. This site also has a section dedicated to the unique considerations

of military family preparedness that links to Service-specific public awareness programs.

COMMUNITY AWARENESS

2-62. Successful response operations begin with building a resilient military community that is actively

engaged in installation preparedness efforts. Installation personnel may recognize the hazard first and

notify the installation dispatch center by dialing 9-1-1 or another local emergency number. Installation

personnel may also be inclined to actively engage in response efforts, including organizing evacuation and

sheltering plans, performing initial treatment of the wounded, and gathering and providing information to

first responders.

2-63. Achieving a resilient community requires a targeted public awareness program and quality outreach

products. Service-specific programs (such as Ready Army, Ready Air Force, and the Navy’s Operation

Prepare) are proactive programs that increase the survivability and resilience of military community

members by informing them about relevant hazards, appropriate response procedures, and contamination

avoidance measures and by encouraging them to have an emergency plan and kit.

2-64. It is imperative that the community be engaged early and often in the planning and preparation

process of the IEM program. Key partners in the installation effort to build a resilient community may

include Fleet and Family Readiness (United States Navy [USN]); the public affairs office; morale, welfare

and recreation; housing and welcome centers; and others. Community awareness programs are regularly

scheduled events that can occur at in-processing or during annual training and are recurring throughout the

year via various venues, such as the post newspaper or family assistance Web sites.

2-65. Before an event, the community can be involved in a dialogue with the installation and its key

partners to provide outreach materials tailored to address local emergency threats. This awareness program

can also target specific audiences (families with children or pets, special-needs individuals, unmarried

people) and convey the following information:

Where to get information before, during, and after an emergency.

What actions are required of them in the event of an incident on or near the installation.

How to prepare individual and family preparedness plans and why they are important.

How to prepare emergency kits for themselves, their families, and their pets.

What services to expect from the installation before, during, and after an incident.

TRAINING, EXERCISES, AND EVALUATION

2-66. IEM organizations and personnel at all levels have opportunities for individual, collective, and

collaborative training and exercises to effectively provide the installation with an all-hazards incident

management capability. The value of these training and exercise programs is continually and consistently

evaluated internally and externally to ensure relevance and validity for IEM capability development.

TRAINING

2-67. IEM programs establish minimum training standards for the effective management of all-hazards

emergencies. Installations train to perform individual and collective EM tasks as units and joint forces.

Licensing and certification standards vary based on geographical locations and available equipment on the

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installation. Commanders ensure that operators are fully trained to complete their assigned missions.

Training is provided to HN military and civilian work forces and U.S. contractors on the installation.

2-68. To ensure an effective response, an installation-wide, cross-functional training program is

implemented. Thorough training is required to prepare individuals and emergency teams to safely and

efficiently respond to an incident at their required level of proficiency.

2-69. The implementation of a strong IEM training program creates awareness across the installation and

enhances the skills of individuals with assigned EM functions or responsibilities. The active use of such

readily available training and educational materials also helps ensure an appropriate level of competency of

installation commanders, responders, technicians, specialists, and the base population.

2-70. Consistent with DODI 6055.17, the lead functional area for each mission-essential task tracks and

reports the training provided to personnel. Reporting is consistent with DODD 7730.65 and may be

augmented by DOD component-specific policies and procedures.

2-71. Numerous courses and training opportunities are available from various government and private

sources. The installation emergency manager can tailor program training needs to meet specific mission

requirements. Minimum training requirements for general all-hazards awareness, EM personnel, and first

responders at all levels of the management structure can be found in DODI 6055.17.

EXERCISES

2-72. Education and training are not enough to prepare an installation for an incident. The use of realistic

exercises ensures that the installation is prepared for, and can efficiently conduct operations under,

emergency conditions. Exercises are conducted at regular periodicity as directed.

2-73. Exercises are conducted according to DODI 6055.17. Examples of guidance and information found

in this reference include—

A capability gap analysis.

A response capability assessment.

Frequency and functional requirements for exercise design and execution.

An exercise evaluation.

Corrective-action mechanisms.

2-74. Exercises include participants from all emergency response functions on the installation and, when

possible, from appropriate tenants and local, state, federal, and HN participants using existing support

agreements to ensure the proper integration into the IEM plan. Each exercise includes realistic scenarios

that the installation could face based on the current hazard assessment. Each exercise is designed to

evaluate specific critical missions or tasks within the overall training scenario.

2-75. When appropriate, installations located outside the United States align their installation exercise and

training schedules with those of the combatant commander, the HN, and the Department of State (DOS).

Installations located within the United States consider aligning their installation exercise and training

schedules with those of the Department of Justice, the DHS, and state and local preparedness programs, as

appropriate. Such synchronized training and exercise opportunities will further foster well-synchronized

responses to IEM incidents.

2-76. Each exercise provides realistic master scenario event lists that exercise each element of the

installation emergency response plan. Unexpected challenges

(such as disabling key personnel and

equipment) are included to assess the resiliency of the response process.

2-77. Tabletop exercises can be used to provide installation leadership and staff with opportunities to war-

game multiple scenarios. Tabletop training exercises are specifically designed to train leaders to execute

critical missions and critical collective tasks.

2-78. Consistent with DODI 6055.17, ensure that all members of the installation exercise evaluation team

are familiar with the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program

(HSEEP). HSEEP is a

capability- and performance-based exercise program that provides a standardized methodology and

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terminology for exercise design, development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning.

Information on HSEEP courses are available online.

EVALUATION

2-79. A critical weakness in training and exercises is the failure to evaluate each task every time it is

executed. Every training opportunity or exercise provides the potential for evaluation feedback. Each

evaluation is a training session. Trainers and leaders continually evaluate training and exercises as they are

executed to ensure an optimized training and exercise program.

2-80. Evaluations can be internal or external:

Internal evaluations are conducted at all levels and are implemented into all training and

exercises. Installation exercise evaluation teams are established to conduct these internal

evaluations.

External evaluations are administered at the discretion of the chain of command to evaluate its

ability to perform critical response missions.

SUMMARY

2-81. Consistent with NIMS, preparedness consists of the activities, tasks, programs, and systems

developed and implemented before an emergency that are used to support the prevention of, mitigation of,

response to, and recovery from emergencies. These activities can include developing plans and SOPs;

assessing and managing risk by conducting hazard assessments and VAs; coordinating functional

responsibilities throughout the installation enterprise; and implementing training, exercise, and evaluation

procedures.

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Respond

Response operations consist of the actions taken from the initial notification of a

potential or actual incident until the transition to the recovery phase. Each installation

response occurs under different circumstances, but follows the common framework

and incident command structure under NIMS and the NRF, regardless of the type of

incident. An installation response depends on whether the installation is in a

peacetime or contingency environment, what organic resources are available, what

resources must be obtained from off the installation, and what threats currently face

the installation.

Note. United States Air Force

(USAF) installations employ the Air Force Incident

Management System when responding to all-hazards incidents. The Air Force Incident

Management System is consistent with the framework of NIMS and the NRF.

ACTIONS

3-1. The respond phase is highlighted in figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1. Respond phase

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Chapter 3

3-2. The key components of response include command and control, support activity integration,

communication, and resource management. Table 3-1 provides an overview of response actions that are

integral to typical emergency responses. Each of these areas is discussed in further detail throughout this

chapter.

Table 3-1. Respond phase functions and actions

Functions

Actions

Command and

•

Conduct an initial scene assessment.

control

•

Activate the ICS.

•

Maintain SA.

•

Organize and conduct on-scene response operations (firefighting, emergency

medical services, search and rescue, LE, HAZMAT, public works response

operations).

•

Coordinate and manage response operations through the EOC as required.

•

Manage the sustainment and protection of critical operations and infrastructure.

•

Conduct personnel accountability operations.

•

Coordinate and manage emergency cost accounting.

Support activity

•

Conduct, coordinate, and manage operations for applicable ESFs and functional

integration

areas and support annexes (evacuation, mass care, medical and public health,

mortuary affairs).

Communications

•

Activate and manage the joint information center.

•

Develop a COP.

•

Conduct and maintain an incident reporting process.

•

Coordinate with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and HN

agencies.

•

Conduct EPI operations.

•

Activate and manage a community assistance center.

Resource

•

Identify requirements.

management

•

Activate and manage support agreements and contracts.

•

Order and acquire needed resources.

•

Mobilize resources.

•

Manage EOD response operations.

•

Track and report resource usage.

•

Recover nonexpendable resources, and demobilize expendable resources.

•

Track reimbursement requirements.

•

Maintain inventory.

Legend:

COP

common operational picture

EOC

emergency operations center

EOD

emergency ordnance disposal

EPI

emergency public information

ESF

emergency support function

HAZMAT

hazardous materials

host nation

ICS

Incident Command System

law enforcement

situational awareness

Note. The U.S. Army uses the term mission command versus command and control.

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COMMAND AND CONTROL

3-3. Command and control of the response phase follows the NRF/NIMS framework for the

establishment and execution of command functions during a response. Key command elements in a

response are discussed in the following sections.

INITIAL RESPONSE ACTIONS

3-4. The initial response phase includes—

An initial observation and report by the person who discovered the incident.

The establishment of command and control.

Mass, internal, and external notifications.

Immediate and continuous health and safety protection actions.

Immediate and continuous evaluations of the safety of possible responses.

Immediate steps to control the source of the hazard, when applicable.

The activation of local response resources.

A constant assessment of the situation and maintenance of SA.

3-5. The initial IC usually manages the response by using a series of informal meetings and conversations

to gather information from the initial response team and provide response guidance.

3-6. Depending on the size or impact of the incident, demands on the IC can increase quickly and

additional personnel can be assigned to critical tracking and communications functions. These initial

assignments form the core of a response management organization, performing crucial ICS functions even

before a formal ICS process is initiated. If the initial IC determines that an expanded ICS organization will

be needed to manage the response, an incident briefing will end the initial response phase.

Note. The USAF utilizes an initial response force, which is the nearest military installation that

has a disaster response capability to a major accident involving DOD resources. The Air Force

initial response force responds unless directed otherwise. Subject to its capabilities, the initial

response force may be tasked to perform rescue operations; accident site security; firefighting;

EOD procedures; radiation monitoring; command, control, and communications operations;

public affairs activities; and casualty management.

INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

3-7. The ICS is a standardized, on-scene, all-hazards incident management approach that—

Allows for the integration of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications

operating within a common organizational structure.

Enables a coordinated response among various jurisdictions and functional agencies, both public

and private.

Establishes common processes for planning and managing resources.

Note. For details on the ICS TTP, see appendix D.

3-8. The ICS is used throughout the United States and is the recognized standard for on-scene incident

management. The ICS is specifically designed to allow response agencies to adopt an integrated,

organizational structure equal to the complexity and demand of single or multiple incidents without being

hindered by jurisdictional boundaries.

3-9. As outlined in DODI 6055.17, DOD installations have adopted procedures consistent with ICS

principles for the management of emergencies covered by the DOD IEM program. Agencies use the system

on a day-to-day basis for routine situations and for major emergencies.

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3-10. There are two functional centers on the installation during an incident response. They are the incident

command post (ICP) and the EOC:

ICP. The ICP is responsible for on-scene response activities and is under the direction of the IC.

The IC reports to the installation commander.

EOC. The EOC is responsible for the entire installation-wide response to the event and provides

overall command and control (on behalf of the installation commander) of the incident.

Note. USAF organizations employ a third command and control node. This command and

control node includes the installation commander and key staff and is called the crisis action

team, which operates out of the ICP. This vital command and control node links ongoing

incident response actions with the execution of the installation mission operations and maintains

vital linkage with higher headquarters.

3-11. Figure 3-2 details the notional interfaces among the installation commander, the IC, the ICP, on-

scene operations, and the EOC. The ICP and the EOC are discussed in detail in the following text.

Figure 3-2. ICS interface

INCIDENT COMMAND POST

3-12. When an incident occurs, trained installation personnel initiate the ICS and establish an ICP for on-

site response. The ICP is the tactical-level, on-scene incident command and management organization and

is typically located at, or in the immediate vicinity of, the incident site.

3-13. Initial safety zones for the establishment of an ICP are defined in the most recent version of the

Department of Transportation Emergency Response Guidebook. The Emergency Response Guidebook

Table of Initial Isolation and Protective Action Distances provides first responders with initial guidance

until technically qualified emergency response personnel are available. Distances from the area of impact

show areas likely to be affected during the first 30 minutes after materials are spilled. The size of these

areas could increase with time.

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3-14. The senior installation first responder on the scene of an incident who has the requisite training

implements the ICS. The responder assumes the role of the IC and is responsible for directing and

controlling resources by virtue of explicit legal, agency, or delegated authority. As the installation response

further progresses, the role of the IC may change hands as more qualified first responders arrive on-scene

or are appointed by the installation commander. At some point, a UC may be established depending on the

magnitude of the event or an incident of national significance.

Note. USAF installations employ fire emergency services as the IC for an incident involving two

or more response agencies. Security or medical forces may function as the IC when an incident

or accident involves only a medical or security response.

3-15. The IC is responsible for all aspects of the response, including developing incident objectives and

managing incident operations. The IC sets priorities and defines the ICS organization for the particular

response. Even if other positions are not assigned, the IC is designated. The IC may assign deputies, who

must have the same qualifications as the person for whom they work, as they must be ready to take over the

IC position at any time.

Note. The IC is solely the tactical commander of the incident and is in charge of running the

response and initial recovery for the event. The command of the installation remains with the

installation commander throughout the incident, and the installation commander is ultimately

responsible for all efforts on the installation.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER

3-16. EOCs have SOPs for monitoring incident development. They provide the following functions,

consistent with DODI 6055.17:

COP. The EOC uses a COP and incident management system to execute and support actions

required by the IEM plan and to facilitate the coordination of incident information.

Interoperable communications. The EOC ensures interoperable communications that support

the first responder and first receiver missions of the Service component and are encouraged to

ensure interoperable communications with civil authorities.

Mass warning and notification. DOD installations maintain mass warning and notification

capabilities to warn personnel immediately, but no longer than

10 minutes after incident

notification and verification.

Continuous warning point. The heads of the DOD components ensure a continuous capability

that serves as the contact or warning point for emergency situations.

3-17. The EOC functions as an ICS liaison who coordinates support for the IC/ICP in all functional areas

and follow-on elements. The EOC controls functional-area response and installation support elements so

that taskings or requests from the incident site are supported, and it keeps higher headquarters informed.

Each installation EOC is NIMS-compliant while using the incident or UC system organizational structure

to provide a collaboration point and operations center for installation staff. The EOC supports the execution

of the IEM plan, the installation AT plan, other supporting plans, DSCA missions, operational/contingency

plans of assigned unit commanders, and the NRF.

3-18. Just as every incident will not require the activation of the EOC, not every EOC activation will

invoke the full range of EOC capabilities. EOC activation levels (partial or full) can be scaled based on the

scope of the incident and the extent to which the EOC was already activated at the time of the incident. (For

example, if the EOC is already in a warm status of activation due to an exercise at the time of the incident.)

For more details on the TTP of the EOC, see appendix D.

MULTIAGENCY COORDINATION SYSTEM

3-19. As defined in NIMS, the Multiagency Coordination System is a combination of facilities, equipment,

personnel, procedures, and communications integrated into a common system with responsibility for

coordinating and supporting domestic-incident management activities. The Mulitagency Coordination

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Chapter 3

System is focused on strategic and operational tasks at the installation level and on the support of the IC.

The primary Multiagency Coordination System functions are to support incident management policies and

priorities; facilitate logistics support and resource tracking; inform resource allocation decisions using

incident management priorities; manage incident-related information; and coordinate interagency and

intergovernmental issues regarding incident management policies, priorities, and strategies. The

Multiagency Coordination System provides central locations for operational information sharing and

resource coordination in support of on-scene efforts. Direct tactical and operational responsibility for

conducting incident management activities at the tactical level remains with the IC.

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

3-20. All DOD directives should be consulted before support is provided to civilian authorities. Usually,

the response to an emergency in the local community is the responsibility of local and state governments.

Military response occurs—

At the direction of the governor of the affected state for state National Guard forces.

Upon declaration by the President as requested by the governor of the affected state.

At the direction of Service secretaries for capabilities not assigned to geographic combatant

commanders (bases, installations).

Through immediate response authority.

3-21. Consistent with DODI 3020.52 and DODD 3025.18, the DOD, because of its capabilities and

resources, may be requested through established channels to provide temporary, short-duration emergency

support to civil authorities during an emergency when local and state resources have been overwhelmed

and RFAs have been submitted by civilian authorities via the procedures detailed in the NRF.

3-22. Consistent with DODD 3025.18, federal military commanders, heads of DOD components, and

responsible DOD civilian officials (referred to collectively as DOD officials) have immediate response

authority. “A Federal military commander’s, DOD Component Head’s, and/or responsible DOD civilian

official’s authority temporarily to employ resources under their control, subject to any supplemental

direction provided by higher headquarters, and provide those resources to save lives, prevent human

suffering, or mitigate great property damage in response to a request for assistance from a civil authority,

under imminently serious conditions when time does not permit approval from a higher authority within the

United States. Immediate response authority does not permit actions that would subject civilians to the use

of military power that is regulatory, prescriptive, proscriptive, or compulsory.”

3-23. There are several statutory authorities that DOD may use to provide support and be reimbursed.

These are detailed in JP 3-28, but the Homeland Security Act and the Stafford Act are discussed below:

Homeland Security Act. The Homeland Security Act was amended with respect to the

organization and mission of the FEMA in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations

Act and established DHS as an executive department of the United States. The Homeland

Security Act consolidated component agencies, including FEMA, into the DHS. The Secretary

of Homeland Security is the head of DHS and has direction, authority, and control over it. All

functions of all officers, employees, and organizational units of DHS are vested in the Secretary.

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. The Robert T. Stafford

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act was also amended in the Department of

Homeland Security Appropriations Act. It describes the programs and processes by which the

federal government provides disaster and emergency assistance to state and local governments,

tribal nations, eligible private nonprofit organizations, and individuals affected by a declared

major disaster or emergency. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance

Act covers all hazards, including natural disasters and terrorist events.

Posse Comitatus Act. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits federal, state, and local authorities

from using Title 10 forces for any direct civil LE activities unless a constitutional or act of

Congress exception applies. The Posse Comitatus Act does not prohibit federal forces from

assisting state and local organizations with humanitarian disaster relief.

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3-24. Overseas installations coordinate their efforts with the supported geographic combatant command

and, consistent with geographic combatant command guidance and DODD 5530.3, with appropriate DOS

officials and HNs. DSCA does not apply to support in response to foreign disasters. (Refer to DODD

5100.46 and JP 3-29.) All international agreements comply with the procedures and regulations outlined in

DODD 5530.3.

3-25. DOD units supporting an installation emergency response will be under the command and control of

defense authorities, yet they may work in support of the civil authorities assisting the installation. The legal

considerations for emergency response on an installation are complex and vary by the location, affected

area, and incident type. Commanders consult their legal staff at the beginning of the planning process to

incorporate, understand, and train staffs and responders on the limitations that a particular installation

might face.

INTEGRATION OF SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

3-26. As outlined in DODI 6055.17 and the NRF, ESFs organize and provide structure to federal

interagency emergency response activities. Installations apply the ESF structure or equivalent functional

area structure to installation emergency planning. Installations have the latitude to choose an organizational

structure other than ESFs to provide functional area support to the emergency response effort. Details on

the ESFs are provided in the NRF and appendix C. Appendix C also contains guidance for using functional

areas in lieu of the ESF structure.

3-27. The following ESFs are outlined in the NRF:

Transportation.

Communications.

Public works and engineering.

Firefighting.

EM.

Mass care, emergency assistance, housing, and human services.

Logistics management and resource support.

Public health and medical services.

Search and rescue.

Oil and HAZMAT response.

Agriculture and natural resources.

Energy.

Public safety and security.

Long-term community recovery.

External affairs.

3-28. The support functions of communications and resource management are integral to the operation of

the EOC and are major, overarching components of NIMS. They are therefore discussed in more detail

below and in appendixes E and F, respectively. Appendix G contains a sample MAA support agreement,

while appendix H contains TTP on the support function for evacuation, SIP, and lockdown. Appendix I

contains TTP for the mass care support function.

COMMUNICATIONS

3-29. Communication needs during a response span from communicating with and among responders to

communicating emergency information to the installation community. The following elements of

communication are critical to ensuring timely, widespread, accurate information delivery throughout the

response effort.

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EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION

3-30. The construction and delivery of emergency public information (EPI) throughout an incident is

critical in creating and maintaining a resilient, trusting, empowered, and cooperative installation

community. The delivery of key EPI messages begins immediately after an incident occurs (as vetted

through the public affairs officer in the EOC, through the joint information center, or at higher

headquarters) and continues throughout response and recovery.

3-31. EPI is an ongoing process throughout all phases of EM and is designed to engage and inform

personnel potentially affected by an emergency. EPI is typically implemented through the use of a joint

information center.

3-32. In coordination with local civil jurisdictions, installation commanders preselect at least one primary

and one alternate site near the installation for the establishment of a joint information center. The preferable

site for a joint information center, in order to support joint and interagency staffing with federal, state,

local, and other authorities, is outside the jurisdictional boundaries of the installation. Locating the joint

information center outside installation boundaries is necessary to preserve the adequate exchange of public

information when and if the installation is closed to the public during an emergency.

3-33. The requirement for EPI does not end immediately after termination of the response phase of an

incident. There is a continued need to exchange information with the full range of affected public during

the recovery phase. Installations continue communication during recovery operations by providing

pertinent information, such as conveying the impact and analyses of the incident. Additionally, installations

provide opportunities for stakeholders to submit information on community impacts, lessons learned, and

other relevant information from the community, supporting local, state, and federal agencies; the media;

and members of the general public.

3-34. Providing pertinent information and assistance to military members, civilian employees, and their

families is extremely important. Military personnel will be better able to concentrate on mission recovery if

they are confident that their family needs (medical, housing, legal, counseling, pet care, food, clothing) are

being met. The primary method of providing this assistance is to activate an emergency family assistance

control center or similar assistance center. This serves as the focal point for family assistance services and

operates in conjunction with the installation EOC and appropriate ESFs and functional areas.

3-35. Using current guidelines, the installation can leverage social media to convey information and

monitor message response. Appendix E provides additional information regarding all aspects of

communications TTP, including EPI.

COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE

3-36. During the response phase, a common operational picture (COP) is established to provide the

installation commander and his staff with a quick, timely, usable, precise, and reliable view of the status of

an incident. As explained in DODI 6055.17, the COP provides consistency at all levels of incident

management across jurisdictions, as well as between various governmental jurisdictions and private-sector

and nongovernmental entities.

3-37. The COP is capable of supporting all aspects of response operations (hazard locations, evacuation or

SIP requirements and locations, unit response capabilities, unit exposure status, updated risk assessments)

to the greatest extent possible. To be effective, the COP is constantly updated during the response phase.

3-38. A key benefit of a good COP system is that it allows the installation to quickly relay to its tenant and

transient units the identical, graphic display of relevant information for SA. The same information can be

relayed to local officials. In the case of foreign operations, it is feasible that U.S. embassy personnel could

relay these details to HN representatives as appropriate. Thus, a good COP facilitates collaborative

planning throughout the response effort.

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INCIDENT REPORTING

3-39. Incident reporting and documentation procedures are standardized to ensure that SA is maintained

and that EM and response personnel have easy access to critical information. Detailed instructions for

operational and situation reports can be found in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Manual

3150.05C.

3-40. Situation reports offer a snapshot of the past operational period and contain confirmed or verified

information regarding the explicit details (who, what, when, where, how) relating to the incident. Status

reports, which may be contained in situation reports, relay information specifically related to the status of

resources (such as the availability or assignment of resources).

3-41. The information contained in incident notification, situation, and status reports is standardized to

facilitate processing without preventing the collection or dissemination of information unique to a reporting

organization. The transmission of data in a common format enables the passing of pertinent information to

appropriate jurisdictions and organizations and to a national system that can handle data queries and

information and intelligence assessments and analysis.

MASS WARNING AND NOTIFICATION

3-42. DODI 6055.17 directs installations to develop mass warning and notification capabilities to warn

personnel immediately, but no longer than 10 minutes after incident notification and verification. The mass

warning and notification gives response direction using intelligible voice communications, visible signals,

texts, text messaging, computer notification, and tactile or other communication methods. Mass warning

TTP are outlined in appendix E.

3-43. Based on the Report of the DOD Independent Review (Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort

Hood) and the resulting Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Final Recommendations of the Fort Hood

Follow-on Review), DODI 6055.17 requires mass notification and warning systems to be a required

capability for installations to achieve IEM full operational capability. Existing and future elements may

include—

A giant voice for outdoor areas.

In-building speaker systems.

Telephone alert systems for phone calls and text alerts.

Software alert systems for computer and e-mail alerts.

DISPATCH/EMERGENCY CONTROL/EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS

3-44. The installation dispatch or emergency communications center provides emergency call taking; alarm

monitoring; sensor monitoring; video monitoring and control; communications support; channel, frequency

assignments, and allocation; and emergency notification to response personnel. In some cases, these

services are provided regionally or in collaboration with civil authorities.

3-45. DODI 6055.17 requires a capability for enhanced 9-1-1 service on the installation. Enhanced 9-1-1 is

a telephone system consisting of network, database, and enhanced 9-1-1 equipment that uses the single

three-digit number for reporting police, fire, medical, or other emergency situations to a central location,

while automatically associating a physical address with the telephone number of the calling party.

3-46. The 9-1-1 systems are interoperable with civilian authorities to allow incoming and outgoing

transfers of voice and location data. Dispatch centers include capabilities for interoperable communication,

weather monitoring, mass warning system control, and COP system access. Dispatch centers may also

include capabilities for the provision of emergency medical dispatch instructions and monitoring of the

National Warning System.

3-47. The IEM program coordinates plans with the responsible office for the dispatch function to ensure

that emergency notifications to responders are communicated in a timely manner. The dispatch center is

included in IEM exercises and training events as appropriate.

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Chapter 3

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

3-48. Resource management occurs at all levels in support of incident management. Installation resources

supply assets for installation level response efforts and potentially provide support for incident support base

and JRSOI missions. Support agreements are in place in advance of an event and are enacted during an

event as needed to maintain supplies.

SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS

3-49. Maintaining an accurate and up-to-date picture of resource availability and utilization is a critical

component of resource management. Resource management includes processes for categorizing, ordering,

dispatching, tracking, and recovering resources. Resource management also includes processes for the

reimbursement of resources, as appropriate.

3-50. As outlined in NIMS, incident management personnel use various resource inventory systems to

assess the availability of assets provided by public, private, and volunteer organizations. Installation

emergency managers are responsible for the consolidation of resource inventory entries and submissions by

assigned ESFs or functional areas. ESFs or functional areas on installations are responsible for entering the

resources available for deployment into the resource inventory maintained at the installation. This resource

data is made available to the supporting installation dispatch center and installation EOC. ESFs or

functional areas are also responsible for resource and financial management related to life cycle

management of assigned resources. For more information regarding resource management and resource

typing, see appendix F.

INCIDENT SUPPORT BASE

3-51. Installations selected as an incident support bases are expected to continue military mission

operations, in addition to those imposed by the incident support base mission. Installation commanders are

prepared to request personnel, material, and equipment augmentation as necessary. Incident support base

support is temporary in nature and uses resources not required for the preparation or conduct of military

operations.

3-52. The term incident support base is now used by DHS and FEMA to replace the previous terms of base

support installation, operational staging area, national logistics staging area, and mobilization site.

Consistent with DODD 3025.18 and JP 3-28, an incident support base is a DOD installation that provides

specified, integrated resource support to the DSCA.

3-53. Incident support base requirements from JP 3-28 and JP 3-41 state that an incident support base is a

DOD installation or leased facility of any DOD component which is in or near an actual or projected

domestic operational area and which has the capability to serve in general support of DOD forces involved

in civil disaster response operations.

3-54. The designation as an incident support base may require the installation to provide one or more

installation support roles, including ports of embarkation, ports of debarkation, intermediate staging bases,

and/or forward operating bases. Consistent with DODD 3025.18 and JP 3-28, incident support bases have

the following capabilities:

Close proximity to the incident site (less than 100 miles).

Close proximity to a major airfield.

Life support services (billeting, food service, fuel, contracting, medical support, FP).

Open and covered areas for the staging of supplies and equipment.

Adequate transportation network to and from the incident site.

Communications infrastructure sufficient to meet the surge of forces arriving in the area.

3-55. Depending on the nature and scope of assets organic to an installation, the installation may or may

not be requested to provide support in the form of an incident support base. However, every installation

commander is aware of the assets that may be requested of their installation in this event. In addition,

installation commanders understand the planning considerations for an installation to function as an

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incident support base. Consistent with DODD 3025.18 and JP 3-28, incident support base planning

considerations take into account key functions of logistics for operations, including—

A concise concept of purpose and a description of the functions that the installation will support.

The forces required to support the operation and phasing for the induction of logistic elements.

A joint field office in the affected area.

A FEMA mobilization location.

The length of time that the installation will provide support.

Transportation suitability.

Adequate supply, maintenance, transportation, civil engineering, medical, and other service

support on the installation.

Note. For more details and a checklist on incident support base planning considerations, see JP

3-41.

3-56. To maximize the economy of force and to focus the response force on DSCA operations, the incident

support base is responsible for the JRSOI of forces flowing through the incident support base, as described

in detail below. JRSOI requirements are detailed in the mission assignment so that installations can

determine their ability to provide support.

JOINT RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION

3-57. JRSOI is the critical link between the deployment and employment of response forces in an

operational area. The reception of forces and the subsequent staging at the incident support base are key to

the JRSOI.

3-58. Consistent with JP 3-41, the deploying force (usually a joint task force) utilizes organic assets when

possible to assist and expedite reception and staging operations. Depending on the size and scope of the

deploying response force, the incident support base may require additional equipment and personnel with

specialized capabilities to conduct JRSOI. Installations identify shortfalls in equipment, personnel, and

other resources through their operational chain of command. Special requirements of the deploying force

(such as armory or kennel services or classified material storage) are coordinated early in the planning

process to ensure their availability.

3-59. An incident support base may be tasked to support the medium- to large-scale staging of logistics

assets, including tractor trailers, portable facilities, and supply and logistic centers. An incident support

base may also be tasked to support the forward staging (mobilization site) of manpower and ground/air/sea

transportation assets for direct movement to the emergency site in place of the staging of heavy logistic

assets and depots.

3-60. IEM programs facilitate the planning for, preparing for, developing required capabilities for, and

supporting JRSOI during DSCA. However, the decision to designate an installation as an incident support

base or to provide support to JRSOI is dependent on whether or not the installation has the organic

capability to support those needs. The installation does not preplan for such a response until a standing

executive order directs the installation to do so.

ACTIVATION OF SUPPORT AGREEMENTS

3-61. Support agreements are activated through predetermined activation and reporting mechanisms to

meet the needs of the emergency incident. These agreements may be activated through the EOC or by the

on-scene IC as outlined by the agreement and IEM plan.

3-62. IEM plans include procedures for the eventual demobilization of supplied resources through existing

support agreements.

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Chapter 4

4-2. Table 4-1 provides an overview of recovery actions that are integral to an emergency response. Each

of these areas is discussed in further detail throughout this chapter.

Table 4-1. Recover phase functions and actions

Functions

Actions

Recovery management

•

Establish a recovery working group.

•

Conduct recovery planning, including establishing recovery

priorities.

Sustainment and restoration of

•

Sustain critical operations.

infrastructure and operations

•

Restore and/or maintain essential operations.

•

Sustain critical infrastructure.

•

Restore and/or maintain essential infrastructure.

•

Conduct damage assessments.

Mass care

•

Establish long-term housing/safe havens, including the

coordination of long-term feeding operations.

•

Support and manage behavioral health and counseling

operations.

Debris clearance and environmental

•

Conduct debris clearance operations.

remediation

•

Conduct environmental remediation operations.

Resource management

•

Manage the final disposition of resources.

•

Manage support agreements and contracts.

•

Manage emergency cost accounting.

Mortuary affairs

•

Support and manage mortuary affairs operations.

Public health

•

Coordinate a health risk assessment.

•

Manage risk mitigation.

•

Coordinate risk communication.

•

Manage the public health needs of safe havens.

•

Coordinate with mortuary affairs.

•

Evaluate and protect food and water supplies.

RECOVERY MANAGEMENT

4-3. In part, the NRF defines recovery as “ … the development, coordination, and execution of service-

and site-restoration plans; the reconstitution of government operations and services; individual, private-

sector, nongovernmental, and public-assistance programs to provide housing and to promote restoration;

long-term care and treatment of affected persons; additional measures for social, political, environmental,

and economic restoration; evaluation of the incident to identify lessons learned; postincident reporting; and

development of initiatives to mitigate the effects of future incidents.”

4-4. The primary tasks of an installation during the initial recovery phase are to complete any remaining

mitigation of the immediate hazard and finish restoring mission capability and essential public and

government services interrupted by an event. The primary tasks of an installation during long-term

recovery are to restore full operations and public services and to rebuild destroyed property.

RECOVERY WORKING GROUP

4-5. Consistent with DODI 6055.17, the installation commander establishes a recovery working group

early in the recovery phase of every emergency where recovery operations require coordination in the

judgment of the installation commander. The recovery working group is preidentified for likely events

within the IEM plans. The recovery working group is a task-organized working group focused on the

evaluation, prioritization, and coordination of recovery requirements. The recovery working group, with the

technical direction of the installation emergency manager and the installation public works/civil

engineering representative, conducts recovery planning at the installation level.

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4-6. The recommended composition of the recovery working group is shown in table 4-2.

Table 4-2. Recommended composition of the recovery working group

Core Membership

Task-Specific

Optional

Public works

Airfield operations

Installation commander (or

Recreation services

Port operations

designee)

Installation emergency manager

Housing office

Reserve tenant commands

Installation PHEO

Information technology

DOD schools and daycare

Environmental

Chaplain

Engineering

Audit

Transportation

Tenant command representatives

Supply/logistics

Community group liaisons

NGO liaisons

F&ES

EMS (if separate from F&ES)

Community/morale and welfare

services

Public affairs

Legal

Contracts

Health and safety

Legend:

DOD

Department of Defense

EMS

emergency medical services

F&ES

fire and emergency services

law enforcement

NGO

nongovernmental organization

PHEO

public health emergency officer

RECOVERY PLANNING

4-7. During the recovery phase, additional information is obtained and a recovery plan is developed and

implemented. The recovery plan provides detailed, incident-specific procedures for short-term and long-

term recovery. The EOC uses the IEM plan to assist in developing a detailed recovery plan based on

damage assessment information and priorities established by the installation commander.

4-8. While the IEM plan facilitates response and short-term recovery, the recovery plan provides detailed,

incident-specific processes and procedures, including the immediate restoration of transportation and

communication capabilities, search and rescue operations, utility reconstruction, community reconstruction,

site remediation, medical care or mitigation, and other activities necessary for successful long-term

recovery.

4-9. During the transition to follow-on operations, the installation commander balances between focusing

resources on mission-essential tasks versus completing recovery tasks. Limitations of resources require

installation decisionmakers to prioritize and concentrate on the tasks needed to recover installation missions

and operations to full capability.

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Chapter 4

4-10. As in the response phase, an up-to-date COP is invaluable during the recovery phase for providing

the installation commander and his staff with a quick, timely, usable, precise, and reliable view of the status

of an incident. During the recovery phase, the COP is capable of supporting all aspects of the recovery

operations (hazard locations, unit response capabilities, unit exposure status, updated risk assessments).

4-11. Long-term recovery after a major event usually takes years to complete. Installation commanders

establish recovery priorities consistent with the installation mission. Consideration is given to operational

mission priorities and the reestablishment of the normal operating environment, as well as activities such as

housing/facility construction, transportation restoration, community reconstruction, environmental

remediation, and continued delivery of EPI.

SUSTAINMENT AND RESTORATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND

OPERATIONS

4-12. The restoration of the installation infrastructure involves coordination with the installation public

works department and civilian jurisdiction service providers, public or private. IEM programs coordinate

infrastructure recovery plans before an incident to effectively restore infrastructure after the incident

occurs.

4-13. The restoration, in concert with mission continuation tasks, officially begins when the IC advises the

EOC director that the incident has been sufficiently controlled or terminated and the security of the

situation is sufficient to begin restoration activity. Consequently, the EOC directs and coordinates

infrastructure recovery inspections and reports damage by using “quick looks” and detailed assessments.

4-14. The damage assessment and impact analysis are essential to determining the magnitude, scope, scale,

and extent of an emergency. Damage assessment results guide the determination of priorities, identification

of required resources, and justification for assistance and supplemental funding requests. The public works

asset may conduct physical damage assessments, if such a capability exists within the installation.

Installations establish processes for damage assessment and debris clearance. These capabilities support

short-term (less than 2 weeks in duration) recovery efforts and initial damage assessments, resource

projections, and recovery planning requirements. The damage assessment process begins as soon as

possible after an incident occurs to assess the level of human suffering and infrastructure impacts and

continues throughout the recovery phase.

4-15. A reliable, rapid field damage assessment increases the likelihood that recovery funds and other

resources are properly prioritized and targeted. Damage assessments also provide policymakers with

guidance for planning and implementing mitigation measures. The field-based assessment acts as ground

truth for larger, more comprehensive assessments, such as satellite-based assessments. The objective of

rapid field damage assessments is to get a quick, reliable overview of the following damage-related issues:

Is there damage to the environment?

What is the damage to utilities and other supportive infrastructure?

Are there impacts to livelihood because of the damage?

What role, if any, did preincident mitigation measures play in reducing the impact of the

incident, and under what circumstances and to what extent did this occur?

4-16. After basic reconstruction activities have been completed, the long-term process of recovery begins.

Restoration decisions focus installation resources on critical and essential operations and infrastructure,

including maintaining safety, preventing the further loss of combat power, maintaining or restoring

installation integrity and security, restoring command and control over forces, restoring the primary

mission, and supporting other forces. Restoration capabilities include measures required to restore the

force, units, facilities, and equipment to near-normal operating conditions after a major accident or natural

disaster. These measures include decontamination operations and the effective supply and sustainment of

response assets.

4-17. Restoration actions, in progress or intended, are recorded and are a part of the recovery plan. From

this record, several actions are enabled. Those actions include estimating repair costs and determining

whether the repairs will be accomplished in-house or by contract, estimating the recovery date and time,

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Recover

ascertaining required assistance, and assessing the impact on the combat readiness status of installation

forces.

MASS CARE

4-18. Care for the base populace during recovery includes providing temporary housing and behavioral

health and counseling services. Detailed TTP for mass care are included in appendix H, but the

fundamentals are discussed below.

HOUSING OPERATIONS

4-19. Temporary housing is where displaced personnel live from the time they leave a safe haven or

civilian shelter until the time they return to their previous home or a new home. Temporary housing is in a

livable condition; has sufficient utilities and services; is pest-, mold-, and mildew-free; and is properly

prepared (ventilated and cleaned) by safe-haven residents before occupancy. Before occupancy, personnel

need to fully understand the rules, timelines, and responsibilities concerning the use of temporary housing,

such as the expected occupancy time, financial responsibilities (utilities, damages, supplies, appliances),

general logistics (parking, utilities, supplies, quiet hours), and expected behavior. Examples of temporary

housing include barracks, dormitories, bachelor quarters, visitors quarters, previously available family

housing units, recreational lodging, hotels, rented apartments or homes in the local economy, mobile

homes, and vacation properties. The coordination of temporary housing needs is the responsibility of the

installation housing office in support of the recovery working group. Temporary housing needs for pets is

also considered and identified.

4-20. Installations should not rush into permanent housing solutions until a revised community profile has

been completed and the installation has the infrastructure and services necessary to support the estimated

population. It is important to address changes in the installation populace, especially designated place

relocations, during this process.

BEHAVIORAL HEALTH COUNSELING

4-21. A critical recovery operation that is often overlooked during the planning process is the provision of

behavioral health and counseling services to anyone affected by the incident in the installation community.

This important process begins the day of the incident and remains ongoing until full recovery is established.

The behavioral health and well-being of the installation community is the most vital component to a

complete and sustainable recovery effort.

DEBRIS CLEARANCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION

4-22. Installations establish contracting vehicles to be used for debris clearance and environmental

remediation in the event of an incident requiring these services. These contracts include, but are not limited

to, MAA/MOU/MOA/ISSAs, indefinite quantity contracts, the logistics civil augmentation program, and

the emergency construction capabilities contract. Contracts should not be limited to local vendors or

commands, because these capabilities may be lost or overtasked during an emergency.

4-23. The debris management process begins as soon as possible after an incident occurs to permit access

to the incident site by designated personnel, to remove life safety and environmental hazards, and to

mitigate further environmental contamination throughout the recovery phase. Debris management

capabilities at an installation may be restricted by safety considerations and may be limited to providing

initial clearance operations and consolidating debris at one or more sites.

4-24. Remediation begins upon the completion of a contamination survey and continues until all

contamination has been removed or remediated. The scope and duration of the remediation depends on the

agent or material. The postevent assessment includes medical, environmental, and public works.

4-25. Remediation operations follow the neutralization and removal of CBRN contamination. Imminent

threats to personnel or the environment are alleviated during neutralization or removal operations, so

remediation operations normally take place in a nonemergency setting.

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4-5

Chapter 4

4-26. Remediation is usually performed by civilian environmental consultant firms under contract to the

Service or under the supervision of the Environmental Protection Agency or the Department of Energy,

depending on the nature of the event. The identification, investigation, research, development, and cleanup

of contamination from hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants are to be carried out subject to,

and consistent with other federal regulatory guidance.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

4-27. Recovery involves the final disposition of all resources. During this process, resources are

rehabilitated, replenished, disposed of, and retrograded.

4-28. While many recovery activities can occur by utilizing organic and precoordinated capabilities

available to the installation, many longer-term recovery actions require external requests and coordination

for assets unavailable to a typical installation command. Consistent with DODI 3020.52, installation

commanders utilize reachback assets and support agreements to sustain and complete the recovery mission.

4-29. Resource management in recovery continues to include processes for categorizing, ordering,

dispatching, tracking, and demobilizing resources and personnel. Resource management during recovery

may also include processes for the reimbursement for resources, as appropriate.

4-30. Reimbursement provides a mechanism to fund critical needs that arise from incident-specific

activities. Reimbursement processes also play an important role in establishing and maintaining the

readiness of resources. Processes and procedures are in place to ensure that resource providers are

reimbursed in a timely manner. These include mechanisms for tracking expenditures, collecting bills,

validating costs against the scope of the work, ensuring that proper authorities are involved, and accessing

reimbursement programs.

4-31. Emergency cost accounting is a key function during an emergency. Emergency cost accounting can

be accomplished by the IC or EOC finance and administration sections or by another installation entity

after the EOC/IC are stood down. It is important to develop and standardize procedures to rapidly develop

and manage emergency cost accounting codes to track emergency-related expenses, including those

incurred under support agreements and support contracts. These emergency and special purpose codes are

issued by a designated Service authority. It is also important to consolidate and forward cost estimates

identified during the damage assessment process to the appropriate installation-owning command as

directed. It is the responsibility of installation-owning commands to develop the overarching emergency

funding lines necessary to consolidate multiple emergency cost account codes that may be in use by

multiple installations at the same time.

4-32. The installation business office or comptroller develops and approves procedures for expediting

fiscal decisions during emergencies consistent with established authorization levels and fiscal policy. This

framework provides for maximum flexibility to expediently request, receive, manage, and apply funds in a

nonemergency environment and in emergency situations to ensure the timely delivery of assistance. The

administrative process is documented through written procedures. The program is also capable of capturing

financial data for future cost recovery, as well as identifying and accessing alternative funding sources and

managing budgeted and specially appropriated funds.

MORTUARY AFFAIRS

4-33. Fatality management is a medical function with a logistics component regarding the management,

transportation, handling and, if necessary, temporary internment of human remains. Mortuary affairs is a

larger function of identifying the human remains; notifying and assisting the family of the deceased;

transporting the remains, if necessary; and conducting permanent interment. As discussed in DODI

6055.17, IEM programs coordinate with the supporting MTF and their logistics lead on the availability and

capabilities for fatality management.

4-34. IEM plans include predetermined responsibilities and procedures for the identification,

decontamination (if applicable), and handling of human remains, including mass fatality incidents. This

may require support from the civilian medical examiner in the event that installation assets are

overwhelmed.

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4-35. Consistent with JP 4-06, mortuary affairs support may be requested by civil authorities in the event

of a mass casualty incident. The support provided by DOD mortuary affairs personnel is then tailored to the

needs of the requesting authority. The request could vary from personnel transporting human remains, to an

identification process, to a complete excavation of a disaster site.

PUBLIC HEALTH

4-36. The public health of the protected populace requires continued monitoring and actions throughout

recovery. Health risks, such as a lack of access to safe drinking water and safe and approved food sources

and animal feed, can severely disrupt the recovery process. The core functions of public health are health

risk assessment, risk mitigation, and communication of health risks to the public.

4-37. Other public health considerations include—

Establishing sanitary conditions for workers and residents.

Establishing vector control of mosquitoes, rats, and other disease vectors.

Managing mold and mildew assessments and removal operations necessary for housing

reoccupation.

Managing public health issues resulting from a lack of water treatment facilities.

Managing wastewater pump and treatment operations.

Managing solid waste collection and disposal operations.

Continuing syndromic surveillance operations.

Continuing medical surveillance of response personnel.

Expanding coverage to include personnel injured or exposed to hazardous conditions during

response and recovery operations.

Coordinating with mortuary affairs for the safe handling of human remains.

SUMMARY

4-38. Recovery is a long-term process that begins as an overlap with the response phase. Of the four

phases, recovery is the most time- and resource-intensive. Depending on the nature of the incident, full

community and economic recovery can take many months to many years and require significant budgetary

expenditures. Prioritizing the tasks necessary to recoup losses will help with time and budget management

as the installation commander and staff start down the long road to recovery.

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4-7

Chapter 5

Mitigate

Mitigation actions involve the lasting reduction of, exposure to, probability of, or

potential loss from identified hazards. The goal of mitigation efforts is to reduce the

impact of identified hazards on critical and essential operations, critical assets,

critical infrastructure, essential services, assigned personnel, and government and

personal property. Mitigation activities provide a critical foundation in the effort to

reduce injuries and the loss of life and property from natural and/or manmade

disasters by avoiding or lessening the impact of a disaster. Mitigation efforts are

taken before and after an emergency and should be an ongoing process that feeds

directly into the overall preparedness of the installation. Multiple functional areas

execute mitigation tasks as a normal part of their operations.

ACTIONS

5-1. The mitigate phase is depicted in figure 5-1.

Figure 5-1. Mitigate phase

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5-1

Chapter 5

5-2. Table 5-1 outlines the major functions and corresponding activities associated with the mitigate

phase.

Table 5-1. Mitigate phase functions and actions

Functions

Actions

Vulnerability

• Understand and comply with zoning and building code requirements.

reduction

• Create inventories of existing structures and their vulnerabilities.

• Analyze hazard-related data to determine where it is safe to build in normal times, to

open shelters in emergencies, and to locate temporary housing in the aftermath of a

disaster.

• Educate businesses and the public on simple measures that they can take to reduce

loss and injury.

Mitigation

• Use results from the risk management process to understand inherent vulnerabilities

planning

of the installation.

• Coordinate pre- and postevent mitigation efforts through an installation mitigation

strategy.

• Ensure the integration of strategies and plans with applicable functional leads, on

and off the installation.

Lessons

• Document lessons learned in the AAR following an exercise, event, or incident.

learned

• Use lessons learned to construct an IP and a CAP.

• Share lessons learned with other entities (military and civilian) as appropriate.

Legend:

AAR

after action report

CAP

corrective action plan

improvement plan

VULNERABILITY REDUCTION

5-3. Vulnerability reduction tools assist in the identification of mitigation efforts that may negate or

reduce the effects of identified hazards. Vulnerability reduction measures tie into the results from the risk

management process that takes place throughout the EM cycle (see appendix B).

5-4. Examples of vulnerability reduction and mitigation activities include—

Understanding and complying with zoning and building code requirements for rebuilding in

high-hazard areas.

Creating inventories of existing structures and their vulnerabilities.

Analyzing hazard-related data to determine where it is safe to build in normal times, to open

shelters in emergencies, and to locate temporary housing in the aftermath of a disaster.

5-5. Vulnerability reduction also can involve educating businesses and personnel on the measures that

they can take to reduce loss and injury, such as fastening bookshelves, water heaters, and file cabinets to

walls to keep them from falling during earthquakes.

5-6. Key areas of concern regarding mitigation activities include—

Utility systems, especially power and water treatment distribution.

Dams and levees.

Lightning and power surge protection.

Landslide and mudslide containment structures.

Earthquake retrofit requirements.

5-7. Mitigation actions can be grouped into the following categories:

Prevention. Prevention actions are the administrative or regulatory actions or processes that

influence the ways in which land and buildings are developed and built. These actions also

include public activities to reduce hazard losses. Examples include planning and zoning,

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Mitigate

building codes, capital improvement programs, open space preservation, and storm water

management regulations.

Property protection. Property protection actions involve the modification of existing buildings

or structures to protect them from a hazard or the removal of property from the hazard area.

Examples include acquisition, elevation, relocation, structural retrofits, storm shutters, and

shatter-resistant glass.

Public education and awareness. Public education and awareness actions inform and educate

the installation populace about hazards and potential ways to mitigate them. Such actions include

outreach projects, hazard information centers, and school-age and adult education programs.

Natural resource protection. In addition to minimizing hazard losses, natural resource

protection actions preserve or restore the functions of natural systems. These actions include

sediment and erosion control, stream corridor restoration, watershed management, forest and

vegetation management, and wetland restoration and preservation.

Emergency services. Emergency service actions protect people and property during and

immediately after a disaster or hazard event. Services include warning systems, emergency

response services, and critical facility protection efforts.

Structural projects. Structural project actions involve the construction of structures to reduce

the impact of a hazard. Such structures include dams, levees, floodwalls, seawalls, retaining

walls, and safe rooms.

5-8. The role of the installation emergency manager in mitigation activities is to participate in planning

mitigation efforts under an integrated strategy through the IEMWG to ensure a cohesive and effective

effort. Mitigation activities are executed by the applicable functional leads. Mitigation phase activities draw

from a large number of resources established by federal and private sources. Many of these resources are

available at the FEMA mitigation Web site online and at the FEMA Building Science Branch Web site

online.

5-9. The installation coordinates pre- and postevent mitigation efforts with owners of specific

technological hazards (dams; levees; airfields; rail transportation systems; mass transit systems; ferry

systems; (petro) chemical facilities; related manufacturing, storage, or transportation systems) with the

potential or historical impact to the installation. A best practice for this process is to coordinate these

activities with the emergency managers of local civil jurisdictions.

5-10. Table 5-2 outlines potential hazard mitigation controls and techniques that can be utilized.

Table 5-2. Potential hazard mitigation controls and techniques

Hazard Type

Sample Mitigation Control Options

Tropical cyclones

• Installing hurricane straps to attach a roof to the walls and foundation.

• Installing storm shutters on windows.

• Implementing flood control measures (dams, levees, water runoff areas).

• Acquiring flood insurance (where applicable).

• Using concrete building materials.

• Raising foundation levels.

• Installing breakaway walls, windows, and doors.

Earthquakes

• Implementing earthquake-resistant building codes.

• Reinforcing buildings with steel frames.

• Installing vibration isolation bearings that are designed to dampen earthquake

ground movements before they reach the building to help the building move as

a unit.

• Bracing or supporting chimneys.

• Installing windows that use wider frames and include a compressible material

between the frame and the window glass to avoid direct contact between the

window and the frame.

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Chapter 5

Table 5-2. Potential hazard mitigation controls and techniques (continued)

Hazard Type

Sample Mitigation Control Options

Tsunamis

•

Implementing early warning and notification capabilities, coupled with public

awareness regarding the actions to take when there is an earthquake or when

a tsunami watch or warning is issued.

•

Ensuring that people are ready to evacuate.

Volcanoes

•

Implementing early warning and notification capabilities, coupled with public

awareness regarding the actions to take when there is an eruption or a watch

or warning is issued.

•

Ensuring that people are ready to evacuate or shelter in place, depending on

the nature of the incident.

Tornadoes

•

Building safe rooms.

•

Installing early warning systems.

Chemicals hazards

•

Implementing mass warning and notification systems to instruct people to

(accidental or

evacuate or shelter in place.

intentional release)

•

Identifying the locations where HAZMAT is used and stored and ensuring that

proper procedures are in use by the facility.

Biological hazards

•

Offering vaccinations and/or mass prophylaxis.

(natural or intentional

•

Installing biological-agent detection sensors.

release)

•

Executing epidemiological surveillance measures.

Radiological hazards

•

Coordinating with LE and intelligence agencies.

(accidental or

•

Complying with laboratory safety and security guidelines and procedures.

intentional release)

•

Shelter in place, depending on the type or amount of radiation released

(alpha, beta, gamma).

Nuclear hazards

•

Coordinating with LE and intelligence agencies.

(accidental or

•

Complying with nuclear safety and security guidelines and procedures.

intentional release)

Explosives

•

Coordinating with LE and intelligence agencies.

•

Installing blast-resistant windows.

•

Establishing and implementing building standoff distances.

Wild fires (accidental

•

Clearing dead trees; brush; and tall, dry grass 30 feet from buildings and

or arson)

homes.

•

Planting fire-resistant trees and shrubs.

•

Keeping vegetation well-watered.

•

Landscaping with gravel.

•

Pruning tree limbs that are within 6 to 10 feet above the ground.

•

Constructing homes and buildings with noncombustible roof and siding (like

metal roofs and steel siding).

Legend:

HAZMAT

hazardous materials

law enforcement

5-11. For more information on vulnerability reduction and mitigation activities, see the FEMA Mitigation

Best Practices Portfolio which is an online collection of case studies that depicts how organizations and

communities have worked to reduce or prevent damage from disasters.

MITIGATION PLANNING

5-12. According to FEMA, mitigation planning is the process used to identify risks and vulnerabilities

associated with natural disasters. It is also used to develop long-term strategies for protecting people and

property in future hazard events. The process results in a mitigation plan that offers a strategy for breaking

the cycle of disaster damage, reconstruction, and repeated damage and presents a framework for developing

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Mitigate

feasible and cost-effective mitigation projects. Cost-effective mitigation measures are the key to reducing

disaster losses in the long term.

5-13. Mitigation planning is considered by the IEMWG with the technical direction of the installation

emergency manager and in coordination with appropriate functional area representatives (public works,

AT, information technology). While the functional area representatives are wholly responsible for the

planning and implementation of mitigation measures on the installation, the IEMWG mitigation plan

captures the interim and long-term actions and goals of the installation to reduce the impact of hazards and

threats that cannot be eliminated. A mitigation plan is a supporting plan to (or a plan element or component

of) the IEM plan. The best practice is to identify a mitigation committee of select members of the IEMWG

to create and maintain this plan.

5-14. The installation mitigation plan is used to guide the combined mitigation efforts of relevant

functional areas. It describes the physical, information technological, and nonmaterial mitigation strategies

associated with hazards identified during the risk management process.

5-15. A mitigation plan includes—

A discussion of the planning process and partners involved.

A discussion of the hazards and associated potential losses.

Goals aimed at reducing or avoiding losses from identified hazards.

Mitigation actions that help accomplish established goals.

Strategies that detail how the mitigation actions will be implemented and administered.

A description of how and when the plan will be updated.

LESSONS LEARNED

5-16. Just as with the evaluation of training or an exercise, lessons learned from a real-world incident on an

installation are documented and acted on to strengthen the IEM program and mitigate effects of future

incidents. Immediately following an incident, installation staff who were active in the response and

recovery efforts participate in a debriefing activity to capture best practices and lessons learned for

inclusion in an AAR on the incident.

5-17. The AAR includes recommendations for the remediation of current IEM practices to reflect lessons

learned during the incident. AARs also include dissemination and notification of successes and shortfalls,

installation-wide response checklists, deficiencies, deficiency correction plans, required training efforts,

implementation dates, corrective actions, follow-up actions, and lessons learned. Higher headquarters

establishes internal after-action reporting procedures to ensure that reporting objectives are met, problems

are solved, and results are disseminated.

5-18. As outlined in NIMS and HSEEP, lessons learned documented in the AAR are used to construct an

IP and CAP, as described below. The IP and CAP are used (at a minimum) to restructure the IEM plan for

better readiness and response.

5-19. The IP converts lessons learned from the incident into concrete, measurable steps that result in

improved EM capabilities. It specifically details the actions that will be taken to address each

recommendation presented in the AAR, who or what agency will be responsible for taking the action, and

the timeline for completion.

5-20. The CAP tracks and assesses progress on enhancing preparedness and incorporating information into

the emergency planning process. This process may identify needs for additional coordination, plans,

procedures, organization, manning, training, equipment, and exercises. The CAP includes the incorporation

of recommendations into updates to the risk management process and the annual revision of the IEM plan

consistent with DODI 6055.17. The CAP is closed out when improvements have been implemented and

validated through subsequent exercises and records are maintained on file as appropriate.

5-21. Lessons learned are key outputs of the AAR and reflect best practices, consistent challenges and

issues, and recommended solutions based on the evaluation of the incident. The Joint Lessons Learned

Program is a knowledge-sharing process established to enhance joint capabilities through discovery,

knowledge development, implementation, and the sharing of lessons from joint operations, training events,

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Chapter 5

exercises, and other activities. The Joint Lessons Learned Program applies to the full range of joint

operations, including training, exercises, experiments, real-world events, and other activities involving

DOD assets of the Armed Forces of the United States.

5-22. Installations are also encouraged to engage with the federal Lessons Learned Information Sharing

initiative and associated Web portal operated by DHS. The posting of lessons learned on the portal is

permitted if approved by the installation commander after a legal review by the installation legal office.

SUMMARY

5-23. Vulnerability reduction efforts are critical to implementing an effective mitigation strategy on an

installation. The installation emergency manager, through the IEMWG, participates in the development of

an installation mitigation strategy that is captured in the installation mitigation plan. This plan may support,

or be a component of, the IEM plan. Throughout the EM cycle, installation emergency managers

coordinate installation-wide mitigation efforts that are led by appropriate functional area representatives.

Following an event or exercise, installation staff captures lessons learned during response and recovery

phases and uses them to better inform their mitigation activities in the future. Lessons learned on an

installation and from other collaborating partners are integral to enhancing an installation mitigation

strategy.

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Appendix B

Risk Management

IEM planning is predicated on threat/hazard, vulnerability, and capability

assessments. These assessments are used to evaluate the ability of an installation to

respond to a threat or hazard, protect the population on the installation, and

implement future strategies to mitigate risks.

PROCESS

B-1. Risk management is a continuous process of reviewing critical infrastructure, assets, missions,

hazards, threats, vulnerabilities, consequences, and existing response capabilities to determine what

additional actions are needed to achieve or maintain a desired level of readiness and to protect the

population on the installation. As shown in figure B-1, a full-scale risk assessment process is configured on

the probability of a threat or hazard occurring; the vulnerability of an installation against that threat or

hazard; the consequence or magnitude of negative effects of the threat or hazard; the relative value of

critical infrastructure, assets, and missions; and the existing response capabilities for the mitigation of

effects postevent.

Figure B-1. Risk assessment process

B-2. At a minimum, a risk assessment is dependent on a comprehensive, all-hazards process that

includes—

Hazard threat assessments.

A VA.

A capability assessment.

A risk evaluation.

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B-1

Appendix B

B-3. A risk assessment may also include assessments of criticality, consequence, cost-benefit, and need.

Risk factors from these assessments are combined in a risk evaluation that qualifies and/or quantifies risks

and impacts future decisions for mitigation measures on an installation. When the resultant risk assessment

is expressed in a manner that delineates which hazards and threats have more risk, it is called a relative risk

assessment.

B-4. These assessments incorporate information and recommendations from a variety of sources

including, but not limited to, higher headquarters assessments, joint staff integrated VAs, CIP planning and

assessments, COOP planning activities, and exercise deficiencies.

B-5. As outlined in DODI 6055.17, the risk management process is performed and documented by the

IEMWG under the authority of the installation commander and in coordination with functional areas such

as AT, CBRN, and CIP. The completion of the risk management process occurs before the development of

the initial IEM plan or IEM plan update and is an ongoing process. Effective risk management requires

support from the IEMWG and, as appropriate, from state, local, and tribal governments; other military

Services; or HN partners in the local community.

B-6. The intent of the risk management process is not to fixate on a 100 percent solution or on the

resolution of every variable to a defined quantity, but rather to provide a context in which to view relative

risk across the entire enterprise in as much of an objective manner as possible, given the hazards. The risk

management process provides a logical process to prioritize the development of specific capabilities and

the application of limited financial and human resources to specific capabilities. Using the risk management

process, the IEMWG can prioritize investments into those capabilities most applicable to local conditions

and needs. The process identifies key preparedness, mitigation, and prevention opportunities, which reduce

overall risk to the installation.

B-7. Risk decisions are ultimately the responsibility of the installation commander and are made at the

lowest possible level, except in extreme circumstances. Leaders and staffs manage risk. Staff members

continuously look for hazards associated with their areas of expertise and then recommend controls to

reduce risks. The role of the IEMWG in the installation risk management process is to identify controls,

develop a process to implement them, recommend solutions to the installation commander, and implement

the resulting decision.

CRITICALITY ASSESSMENTS

B-8. Some Services use criticality (also referred to as critical asset or critical infrastructure) assessments

as inputs to their risk evaluation as shown in figure B-1, page B-1. In most cases, these criticality

assessments have already been developed by AT or CIP programs.

B-9. The criticality assessment evaluates command missions and functions capabilities and determines

mission impact or the consequence of the loss of assets that support command mission execution. Critical

assets can be people, physical entities, systems, or information that provides a service or capability. The

analysis examines those assets for which degradation or destruction impact the command ability to

complete its assigned missions or functions.

B-10. DODI

3020.45 describes the critical asset identification process

(also see JP

3-07.2). There are other assets that may not be critical to the execution of the mission or function that may

be identified in this criticality process and included in the overall risk assessment process. These noncritical

assets could include assets like high-population facilities, such as theaters, commissaries, and base

exchanges.

HAZARD AND/OR THREAT ASSESSMENTS

B-11. The development of an all-hazards threat assessment accomplishes two goals:

The identification of a comprehensive list of threats and hazards.

The likelihood or probability of occurrence of each threat or hazard. In the context of assessing

risk, the higher the probability or likelihood of a threat or hazard occurring, the higher the risk of

loss will be to the asset.

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Risk Management

B-12. Consistent with DODI 6055.17, IEM considers all hazards that may impact the installation. These

hazards vary among installations. For example, hurricanes may be a significant natural hazard concern in

the Southeast Region, but not in the Pacific Northwest. Tsunamis are of concern in the Pacific Northwest,

but generally not in the Southeast. Toxic industrial materials are of concern at almost all installations.

FEMA recommends including several other factors into the hazard assessment, including the time available

until the onset of the hazard and the possibility of a single event to cascade and cause other failures. It is

also beneficial for installation EM programs to coordinate threat and hazard assessments with state, local,

and HN EM agencies.

B-13. The federal government has a number of hazard-specific organizations that provide hazard

information for specific geographic areas. Examples include—

National Weather Service.

National Hurricane Center.

National Climatic Data Center.

U.S. Geological Survey.

National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

U.S. Volcanic Observatories.

National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program.

National Tsunami Hazards Reduction Program.

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program.

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program.

FEMA Office for Domestic Preparedness.

Environmental Protection Agency.

Department of Transportation, National Response Center.

National Interagency Fire Center.

B-14. FEMA has a number of programs for consolidating and providing hazard information to state

governments. In addition, each state and local jurisdiction applying for federal grant funding completes a

thorough hazard assessment as part of the grant process. HN programs vary greatly, but most nations,

provinces, and cities include a hazard assessment as part of their EM or civil defense programs. See DODI

3020.52 for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives

(CBRNE)-specific

guidance.

B-15. Terrorism and sabotage threats to strategic, operational, and mission-essential assets are also

assessed. Installation commanders utilize existing threat assessment methods to gather and analyze the

threats potentially impacting the installation on an ongoing basis and no less than annually. Threat

information is integrated to meet the collective needs of EM, CBRNE preparedness, AT, CIP, and COOP

planning. Installation commanders continuously ensure that forces are trained to maximize the use of threat

assessments and intelligence derived from liaisons to civil and military LE and public safety agencies and

departments and from EM, meteorological, environmental, public health, and medical syndromic

surveillance processes and procedures.

B-16. Each Service maintains its own terrorist threat analysis capability. Although DOD threat levels may

only be set by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), special investigation offices and information fusion

centers can provide valuable assessments to installation commands regarding terrorist threats for specific,

localized areas. The following are primary sources of terrorism threat assessment data that contribute to

indications and warnings for U.S. military forces:

Marine Corps Forces Intelligence Department (G-2) or Information Fusion Center. The

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (G-2) is the focal point for the intelligence support for FP-

related intelligence, information, and counterintelligence (CI) issues for U.S. Marine Corps

assets within their respective area of responsibility. The Information Fusion Center oversees the

correlation of LE information in order to provide a domestic summary consistent with other

DOD intelligence oversight directives.

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B-3

Appendix B

Naval Criminal Investigative Service Multiple Threat Alert Center threat products.

Products include time-sensitive spot or suspicious activity reports, warning reports, CI terrorism

supplements, annual regional threat assessments, port threat assessments, and baseline study

reports.

Army Counterintelligence Center threat products. Products include monthly international

terrorism summaries, multidisciplined CI threat assessments, and Army Counterintelligence

Center information papers.

Air Force Office of Special Investigation threat products. Products include CI notes and the

Blue Line-a daily synopsis of global incidents of interest to Air Force personnel.

DIA Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT). Disseminates

intelligence on foreign terrorist threats, including the specific warning of threats against DOD

personnel, facilities, and other DOD material resources. Additionally, DIA produces a threat

assessment triennially, or if required, more frequently.

Geographic combatant command area of responsibility. A specific supplement to the DIA-

produced global threats report.

DHS Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) intelligence and analysis reports. FBI field

intelligence groups are the hub of the FBI Intelligence Program. These reports contribute to local

and regional perspectives on threats and serve as the primary intelligence link between the FBI

and fusion centers.

DHS intelligence reports. Includes DHS daily open-source infrastructure reports, digital library

critical releases, advisory system threat levels, daily infectious disease reports, daily drug

trafficking and smuggling reports, central digests, and daily cyber reports.

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

B-17. Vulnerability is a measure of the robustness of in-place installation and asset safeguards that are

taken to prevent or mitigate a threat or hazard from impacting an installation. Vulnerabilities define the

weaknesses or susceptibilities of an installation, system, asset, or application and identify its dependencies

that could cause it to suffer a degradation or loss (incapacity to perform its designated function) as a result

of having been subjected to a certain level of threat or hazard effects. The VA consists of the determination

of the potential vulnerability of an installation or specific function to an identified hazard.

B-18. Vulnerabilities to a critical asset can result from a wide variety of factors (design and construction

flaws, environmental factors, proximity to other structures or systems, factors influencing accessibility,

personal behaviors of people working in or around the critical assets, operational practices associated with

the critical assets or the installation). Vulnerabilities of a critical asset can also be determined by

vulnerabilities to other assets or areas that are not in close proximity to the critical asset. For instance,

vulnerabilities in access or perimeter control of an installation may lead to an adversary gaining access to

the installation and, ultimately, to the critical asset located somewhere inside the installation.

B-19. Installation commanders conduct a local AT VA as outlined in DODD 2000.12 and DODI 2000.16

for facilities, installations, and critical nodes within their areas of responsibility on an annual basis or, as

required, more frequently. This VA addresses the broad range of threats to the installation and personnel.

Existing AT VAs are used to establish the vulnerability of an installation or specific function to terrorist

threats, but installation EM personnel still conduct a thorough VA for natural and manmade hazards not

included within the AT scope.

B-20. VAs of installations—

Focus on the overarching EM and AT programs of the command.

Determine asset-specific vulnerabilities applicable to particular threats and hazards.

Assess the vulnerability scope of an asset, such as a single weakness or multiple weaknesses in

the safeguard system.

Assess the degree of difficulty in exploiting the vulnerability.

Analyze installation structure and activities from the perspective of an adversary to obtain a

basis for understanding real vulnerabilities. This may be accomplished through written

questionnaires and surveys.

B-4

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Risk Management

Are classified according to appropriate security classification guides.

Are disseminated for internal use at least annually.

B-21. Process tools and resources for conducting VAs include—

DOD O-2000.12-H, including checklists and aids.

The Joint AT Program Manager’s Guide.

DTRA AT VA team guidelines.

Preexisting higher headquarters assessments and DTRA joint staff integrated vulnerability

assessments, performed every 3 years for installations of greater than 300 personnel.

CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENTS

B-22. Some Services also perform consequence assessments and use them as inputs to their risk evaluation

as shown in figure B-1, page B-1. The consequence assessment determines the potential consequences that

an identified hazard may have on an installation or on a specific function at the current level of EM

capability of the installation. Consequence assessments include estimates for deaths, injuries, rebuilding

infrastructure costs, and the magnitude of disruption in mission capabilities.

CAPABILITY ASSESSMENTS

B-23. The capability assessment determines the current level of EM capability of the installation based on

the integrated nonmaterial and material readiness of supporting functional areas. Capability assessments

factor in the mitigating effects of existing emergency response manpower, procedures, training, equipment,

and exercises to more accurately predict consequences. The capability assessment is especially important in

the identification of capability gaps (needs) that are addressed to reduce the consequence of a specific

hazard on an installation or on a specific function.

B-24. The objectives of the capability assessment are to—

Consider the range of identified and projected response capabilities necessary for responding to

a hazard.

List installation resources by type to provide an asset capability report.

Review policy, guidance, and planning documents to identify the organization mission-essential

tasks and functions assigned to the organization.

List installation personnel with a mission-essential task responsibility as identified in DODI

6055.17.

Identify costs associated with assessment outcomes for future budget planning.

RISK EVALUATIONS

B-25. Effective risk management requires that the assessment of each hazard be evaluated in terms of

vulnerability, consequence, and the capability of the installation to manage the resulting emergency. All

hazards are not equal in terms of probability or severity; therefore, risk evaluation can be used to establish

relative risk in order for the installation commander to conduct risk management across the entire

jurisdiction vice solely basing it on vulnerability or consequence of a specific hazard to a specific mission.

B-26. Risk factors resulting from assessments for the various threats and hazards to each critical

infrastructure asset mission are compared against each other to determine relative risks. This relative risk

evaluation assists in future resource allocation, prioritization, and acquisition planning. Costs and benefits

may need to be considered when deciding to acquire new resources.

B-27. Service-specific examples of risk evaluation templates and matrices are provided in table B-1, page

B-6; figure B-2, page B-7; figure B-3, page B-8; and table B-2, page B-9. The threats and hazards

evaluated in each figure are notional and represent a small fraction of the total risks that an installation may

need to evaluate. For details on using these tables and calculating risk, refer to Commander, Navy

Installations Command (CNIC) Instruction 3440.17; FM 5-19; Marine Corps Order 3440.9; and the Air

Force Hazard-Risk Assessment Tool.

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B-5

Appendix B

Table B-1. U.S.N. relative risk evaluation matrix (notional data)

Threat Hazard

RC Factors

Factors

Terrorism

CBRE

Threat/

Factors

Attacks

Natural

Hazard

Factors

RRF

(0.1, 1, 2,

(1 to 4)

Tech

Scenarios

(0.1 to 4.5)

(1 to 12)

10)

(0.1, 1, 2,

(0.1 to 12)

Hazards

10)

Nuclear

(2 to 8)

Attacks

(0.1 to 2)

Earth-

quake,

building

4.0

1.25

15.0

structural

collapse

Tsunami

3.0

1.25

11.3

Fire (forest,

wilderness,

2.1

1.25

7.9

urban

structural)

Transpor-

tation

accidents

(aircraft,

2.0

1.25

11.3

ship, barge,

rail,

vehicle,

bus)

Power

energy

2.1

1.25

2.0

utility

failure

HAZMAT

spill

2.5

1.25

4.7

release

Note. RRF = (CI) x (T or H) x (V) x [(C) (RC)]; templates and instructions are available in CNIC Instruction 3440.17 to evaluate

each factor in the relative risk calculation.

Legend:

consequence

CBRE

chemical, biological, radiological, and high-yield explosives

critical infrastructure

CNIC

Commander, Navy Installations Command

hazard

HAZMAT

hazardous materials

not applicable

response capability

RRF

relative risk factors

threat

TECH

technical

vulnerability

B-6

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Appendix B

Risk Assessment Matrix

Probability

Frequent

Likely

Occasional

Seldom

Unlikely

Severity

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1) - page 31