Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1)

Risk Management

Table B-2. USAF risk assessment work sheet (notional data)

Initial,

Final,

Specific

Likelihood of

Risk Reduction

Risk

Consequence

Risk

Occurrence

Activity

Rating

A. Almost

1. Insignificant

E - Extreme

certain

2. Minor

H - High

B. Likely

3. Moderate

Reduce likelihood

3. Moderate

M - Medium

C. Possible

4. Major

or consequence

4. Major

L - Low

D. Unlikely

5. Catastrophic

N - Negligible

E. Rare

Eliminate

Engineering-

building

standards

Hurricane

Active

Administration-

management

HURREVAC plan

Legend:

HURREVAC hurricane evacuation

Note. More templates are available in the Air Force Hazard-Risk Assessment Tool to determine

the likelihood and consequence ratings.

NEEDS ASSESSMENT, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS, AND

MITIGATION DECISIONS

B-28. The risk assessment process seeks to evaluate and identify risks to the installation and its critical

infrastructure assets missions based on the likelihood of threats and hazards occurring, the associated

degrees of vulnerabilities, and the response capability. The risk mitigation process determines options and

actions to reduce the risk of impact to the installation and its critical infrastructure assets missions. The

options and actions include remediating risk, mitigating the effects of loss once the threat/hazard event

occurs, reconstituting installation and asset capabilities after loss or disruption, acknowledging risk, and

transferring the risk decision to a higher echelon of command.

B-29. The needs assessment identifies additional risk mitigation strategies (procedures, training, activities,

countermeasures, equipment) needed to reduce the probability and consequences of priority threats and

hazards. Risk mitigation strategies that improve recovery are included in the analysis. Multiple layers of

protection (defense in depth) against the most critical risks are considered.

B-30. A key portion of the needs assessment analyzes and prioritizes the costs and benefits of risk

mitigation strategies. Strategies involving equipment, facilities, or additional personnel are prioritized,

tracked, and reported in time to support the budget process.

RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS REVIEWS

B-31. Risk management is a continual process that evolves as hazards are identified, mitigation actions are

completed, prevention capabilities are developed and employed, and EM capabilities are developed to

respond to, and recover from, identified hazards threats. The risk management process is executed as a

cycle. Once the risk management is complete, it is essential that a thorough review of the overall process be

conducted. This is typically done during the annual program review.

B-32. Stakeholders in military and local civilian communities are involved in the review stage of the risk

management process. This coordination or collaboration ensures that supporting plans align with the risk

management process. Stakeholders from the local community can also identify strengths and weaknesses,

focusing on collaboration between military and civilian agencies.

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B-9

Appendix C

Installation Emergency Management Plan

The IEM plan is an important document for the support of installation preparation,

response, and recovery operations. IEM plans assign responsibilities to organizations

and individuals within EM and across installation functional response communities,

including assigned or attached personnel. IEM plans facilitate coordination with

organizational plans in support areas such as LE, medical and public health,

communications, logistics, physical security, training, intelligence support, AT,

F&ES, EOD, and HAZMAT. At a minimum, IEM plans are reviewed annually and

updated, as needed, to incorporate lessons learned and opportunities for improvement

identified during real-life events, exercises, and risk management activities.

KEY ELEMENTS

C-1. As outlined in DODI 6055.17, IEM plans are developed consistently with NRF and NIMS concepts

and address, at a minimum, the following:

Mission, goals, and objectives of the IEM program.

Functional roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for personnel, organizations, and

agencies assigned to the EM response.

Preparedness activities, including—

Risk management.

Prevention planning that establishes interim and long-term actions to reduce or eliminate

identified hazards and threats to the installation.

Mitigation planning that establishes interim and long-term actions to reduce the impact of

hazards and threats that cannot be eliminated.

Training.

Exercises.

Interagency coordination.

Equipment.

Response planning that establishes response actions and assigns responsibilities for carrying out

those actions. Specific response planning considerations include—

COOP planning that identifies mission-essential functions and personnel, procedures, and

resources, contact information of stakeholders to be notified; ERSs to be setup; and

functions to be maintained while the installation is recovering.

Evacuation management and mass care planning that address family assistance, SIP,

lockdown, local and remote safe havens, civilian shelters, personnel accountability, special-

needs management, animal needs management, behavioral health and religious support, and

family assistance centers.

Volunteer and donations management that establishes procedures for IEM plans for

organizing and coordinating the receipt of unsolicited services and goods in a manner that

comports with applicable law and policy and does not interfere with ongoing response and

recovery efforts.

Protocol to allow non-DOD first responders access to the installation during an emergency.

Recovery planning that provides short- and long-term priorities for the restoration of functions,

services, resources, facilities, and infrastructures.

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C-1

Appendix C

Communications through all phases of an emergency that address communication infrastructure

(dispatch centers, enhanced

9-1-1 services, mobile command post and incident command

communication devices), EPI, and mass warning and reporting systems.

DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

C-2. The development of a comprehensive, integrated, and executable IEM plan is the responsibility of

the installation commander. Command involvement is essential in the formation of a successful plan.

C-3. The lead for IEM plan development and maintenance is the installation emergency manager. No

single individual is tasked with the sole responsibility of developing an IEM plan. IEM plan development

and documentation is a collective effort.

C-4. The most effective method of developing and documenting an IEM plan is through the utilization of

a cross-functional working group, such as the IEMWG. This working group includes the ESF managers (or

office representatives) identified by the commander.

C-5. Using the IEMWG enables the participation, input, and “buy-in” of necessary cross-functional

subject matter experts. Everyone involved in IEM plan development and documentation should be

thoroughly familiar with—

Applicable IEM directives.

Previous IEM plans and assessments.

Data developed earlier in the overall IEM plan development process, including the results of

threat, vulnerability, and capability assessments.

C-6. The unpredictability of the IEM mission, with respect to the all-hazards scope of the plan, requires

that the IEM plan provide SOPs and instructions to conduct and coordinate specific EM measures that may

apply to all-hazards situations. Detailed “how to” instructions—

Permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans.

Focus on subordinate activities.

Provide tasks, activities, constraints, and coordinating instructions.

Do not inhibit initiative.

Provide a clear, concise mission statement.

Convey the intent of the commander.

Include annexes and appendixes, if required, to expand the information not readily incorporated

in earlier text, particularly with respect to hazard-specific instructions that may apply in a given

scenario.

C-7. The IEM plan format mirrors the FEMA CPG 101 emergency operations plan format, yet it is

tailored to meet the unique requirements of comprehensive military IEM programs. The following are basic

steps in developing an IEM plan:

Form a collaborative planning team.

Understand the situation, including conducting research and analyzing the information. Gather

and compile the information developed during earlier installation planning processes, including

results of threat, vulnerability, and capability assessments and community profiles.

Determine goals and objectives. IEM plan development and documentation requires a

comprehensive, integrated approach and a strong, clear vision of IEM program requirements.

Develop the plan. Produce a summary and basic plan. The plan summary provides the reader

with a concise synopsis of the scope and purpose of the plan. The basic plan provides the

groundwork for amplifying sections (annexes and appendixes), including SOPs and hazard-

specific appendixes (HSAs). Commander guidance is developed in conjunction with the basic

plan and is used to tailor the language of the plan to meet the mission and goals of the

commander.

Develop and analyze courses of action. Establish a plan of action and task suspense dates for the

completion of the plan and its annexes and appendixes. Identify resources. Determine and assign

responsibility for developing annexes and appendixes. Annexes provide the details not readily

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Installation Emergency Management Plan

incorporated into the basic plan, and they are written to increase the clarity and usefulness of the

basic plan. These are only required if they are deemed necessary. Each annex relates to a specific

aspect of the IEM operation. Appendixes further expand the annexes and contain a more detailed

explanation of the concept IEM operations of the commander. Appendixes can be further

subdivided into tabs and enclosures. The development and documentation of individual annexes

and appendixes are tasked to IEMWG members with a related expertise or responsibility for the

activity. For example, the public affairs representative supervises the development of the public

affairs annex.

Prepare, review, and gain approval of the plan.

Write the plan. Coordinate staff development and review of the plan. Each Service has

published guidance concerning deliberate planning, organization, and staff coordination

(FM 5-0, NWP 5-01, AFI 10-2501, and MCWP 5-1). The Navy has developed additional

focused disaster relief planning guidance within the following pair of Tactical

Memorandums (TACMEMOs): TACMEMO 3-07.6-06, and TACMEMO 3-07.7-06. Also

plan, task, and publish the development of supporting plans. Each subordinate and

supporting commander who is assigned a task in the IEM plan may prepare a supporting

plan. Supporting plans are consistent with supporting commander missions and

responsibilities. Supporting plans are submitted to the supported commander for review and

approval.

Approve and disseminate the plan. Finalize the plan, and submit it through the staff and to

the commander for review and approval. The finalized plan is consistent with the

organization or installation mission and responsibilities; oriented on tactical perspective;

adequately detailed to provide specific actions to be taken; easily understood; and if

required executed quickly and decisively. After commander approval and upon execution,

the IEM plan becomes an operation order.

Refine and execute the plan.

Exercise the plan, and evaluate its effectiveness. The IEM plan remains under constant

review to ensure that it is truly a “living document,” incorporating lessons learned and best

practices identified in training, exercises, real-life events, and changes in risk management

strategies.

Review, revise, and maintain the plan. When the IEM plan is published, the next planning

cycle begins. As preparation proceeds, assessments are continuously updated and may

require revisiting and revising the IEM plan. The IEM plan cannot remain static; rather, as

the situation changes, the plan also changes. The IEM plan is updated at least annually.

C-8.

As part of the development of the IEM plan, resources identified by the installation are allocated to

prioritized requirements. The prioritization is made by the commander with input from the staff.

INSTALLATION EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN FORMAT

C-9. The cover instruction constitutes the legal authority, mission assignments, relevant EM policy

summary, and relevant role assignments and responsibilities associated with the IEM program as

determined and signed by the installation commander. The target audience of the cover instruction is other

commanders above, equal to, and subordinate to the approving commander.

Note. According to FEMA and NIMS policy, there is no mandatory format for emergency

operations plans. The following format provides a recommended structure based on the best

practices among military and civilian EM planners. Unless otherwise directed by individual

Services, installations are authorized to modify their plan formats to best suit the specific

circumstances of the individual installation.

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C-3

Appendix C

C-10. The basic plan establishes the EM capabilities required to support the missions assigned by the cover

instruction. The basic plan establishes the prevention, response, and recovery operational concepts; and

determines and details the linkage between the IEM plan and supporting or supported plans and programs.

The basic plan consists of at least the following sections:

Authorities and references.

Purpose, scope, applicability, and assumptions.

Implementation process.

Community profile (demographic, infrastructure, personnel categorization).

Risk management results summary (list of community hazards, vulnerabilities).

Preparedness strategy and requirements

(community awareness activities, mass warning

notification systems and procedures, personnel accountability procedures).

Response strategies and concepts (command and control of installation, IC [ICS/NIMS], SIP,

evacuation procedures).

Recovery strategies and concepts (how will long- and short-term recovery be planned and

performed?).

Mitigation strategies and activities

(what mitigations are in place, and how will they be

activated?).

Continuity strategies and continuity programs

(COOP/continuity of business policies and

procedures).

Plan management and maintenance efforts.

Supporting plans and programs, including the installation AT plan, the installation F&ES plan,

MTF plans, and tenant command EAPs (what interdependencies exist, and how do these plans

support the overall EM program?).

C-11. Functional area annexes and ESFs are developed for each assigned functional area with

responsibilities in developing, fielding, employing, or sustaining EM capabilities. These annexes consist of

detailed guidance for each assigned functional area related to the development and execution of target EM

capabilities. The annexes assign responsibility to the organization and individuals for carrying out specific

actions at projected times and places in an emergency. These actions are not specific to a particular hazard,

but rather focus on core common components supported by the function itself. As discussed in DODI

6055.17, Services may use the ESF-based organizational model or a functional area-based organizational

model for IEM plans.

C-12. ESFs are an operational level coordinating structure that federal agencies use to organize an

interagency federal response to an event. ESFs are mechanisms for grouping functions most frequently

used to provide federal support in the management of disasters and incidents. Specific functional personnel

are assigned to lead or manage specific ESFs. These designated roles are referred to as ESF managers.

C-13. While neither NIMS nor DOD mandates the use of an ESF structure when a nonfederal entity is

coordinating an emergency under ICS, many state and local agencies use the ESF organization in their

response effort. Therefore, ESF information is provided here for SA to facilitate the interface between

installation and civilian response and recovery operations. An installation may choose to utilize an

alternative functional area or equivalent organizational structure in their approach to readiness and

response. Examples of responsibilities and manager roles for each ESF are shown in table C-1.

C-14. If using the functional area structure, IEM plans include functional area annexes. These functional

area annexes assign responsibility to the organization and individuals for carrying out specific actions at

projected times and places in an emergency that exceeds the routine responsibility or capability of the

functional area. These actions are not specific to a particular hazard, but rather focus on core common

components supported by the functional area. Functional area annexes also identify unmet needs of each

functional area that are necessary for the successful execution of assigned functions.

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Installation Emergency Management Plan

Table C-1. Examples of ESF responsibilities and manager roles

No.

ESF

Scope of Responsibilities

ESF Manager Roles

•

Aviation/airspace management and

•

Advise the IC, ICP, or EOC director

control

on the availability or limiting factors

of transportation resources.

•

Transportation safety

•

Provide transportation for follow-on

•

Damage and impact assessment

on transportation systems and

team members from the assembly

point to the designated ICP as

infrastructure

required.

•

Restoration/recovery of

Transportation

transportation infrastructure

•

Coordinate requests for

transportation support.

•

Movement restrictions

•

Coordinate the evacuation of

equipment from the incident area.

•

Request additional transportation

resources from local agencies

when needed.

•

Strategically plan for future phases.

•

Coordination with

•

Monitor mass notification and

telecommunications and

public warning systems.

information technology industries

•

Supervise and manage IC, ICP,

•

Restoration and repair of

and EOC computer networks to

telecommunications infrastructure

ensure that they are operational

throughout an incident.

•

Protection, restoration, and

sustainment of cyberspace and

•

Provide communications

information technology resources

equipment as needed.

•

Oversight of communications

•

Coordinate and monitor requests

within the incident management

for on-site communications assets.

and response structures, including

•

Coordinate and monitor

Communications

provision of telecommunications

on-site communications support as

capabilities to the ICP, EOC, and

necessary.

other response organizations

•

Determine on-site operating

during response and recovery

frequencies.

efforts

•

Monitor communication networks,

and recommend limiting the

nonessential use of networks.

•

Maintain the communications log.

•

Coordinate communications with

other appropriate entities.

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C-5

Appendix C

Table C-1. Examples of ESF responsibilities and manager roles (continued)

No.

ESF

Scope of Responsibilities

ESF Manager Roles

•

Evaluate available communications

capabilities to support the incident

response. Make a recommendation

to the IC/ICP/EOC director on

whether to request support.

Communications

•

Liaise with augmentation elements

(continued)

to coordinate communications

procedures.

•

Monitor the network operations

status, and advise the IC/ICP/EOC

director of status changes.

•

Strategically plan for future phases.

•

Temporary construction of

•

Request and monitor the deployed

emergency access routes,

damage assessment team when

including streets, roads, bridges,

requested by the IC.

ports, waterways, airfields, and

•

Ensure that water and utilities are

other facilities necessary for the

available for incident site support.

passage of rescue personnel

•

Ensure that environmental

•

Emergency restoration of critical

expertise and technical assistance

public services and facilities,

is available for the IC.

including the supply of adequate

•

Ensure that additional follow-on

amounts of potable water, the

support is available if required.

temporary restoration of water

•

Request follow-on elements from

supply systems, and the provision

Public works

of water for firefighting

installation or civilian sources.

and engineering

•

Emergency demolition or

•

Report public works and

engineering activities to the EOC.

stabilization of designated

damaged structures and facilities

•

Strategically plan for future phases.

•

A technical assistance and damage

assessment, including structural

inspectors

•

Infrastructure protection and

restoration

•

Emergency contracting for

lifesaving and life-sustaining

services

•

Provision of emergency power

•

Command and control

•

Request augmentation or mutual-

establishment

aid assistance before fire service

•

Responder accountability

capabilities are exhausted.

•

Fire suppression

•

Activate MOA/MOU with

Firefighting

local/state/federal/HN fire and

•

Technical rescue

search-and-rescue assets for

•

Victim/patient extrication

augmentation not previously

•

Atmospheric monitoring and

activated.

detection

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Installation Emergency Management Plan

Table C-1. Examples of ESF responsibilities and manager roles (continued)

No.

ESF

Scope of Responsibilities

ESF Manager Roles

•

Establishment of control zones

•

Monitor and obtain an expendable

•

Establishment of entry and/or exit

equipment status from the ICP.

Firefighting

control procedures

•

Request additional equipment as

(continued)

needed.

•

Initial triage (depending on EMS

provisions)

•

Strategically plan for future phases.

•

Alerts and notifications

•

Manage the overall operation of the

•

Deployment and staffing of

EOC.

emergency response teams

•

Provide direct support to the EOC

director.

•

Incident action planning

•

Submit incident situation reports to

•

Coordination of operations,

higher headquarters through the

logistics, and materiel

installation commander.

•

Direction and control

•

Ensure the control and protection of

•

Information management

classified material.

•

Resource acquisition and

•

Coordinate support from additional

management

response elements.

•

Worker safety and health

•

Keep detailed records of decisions

•

Facilities management

and events.

•

Financial management

•

Coordinate support from additional

response elements with local

civilian EM officials.

•

Review and comment on incident

lessons learned/AARs.

•

Strategically plan for future phases.

•

Coordination of bulk distribution of

•

Arrange for mass care.

emergency relief supplies

Mass care,

•

Arrange disaster housing for

emergency

•

Provision of assistance for short-

displaced persons and pets.

assistance,

and long-term housing needs of

•

Arrange for human services.

housing and

victims

•

Strategically plan for future phases.

human Services

•

Provision of victim-related recovery

efforts, such as counseling

•

Emergency relief supplies

•

Arrange resource support (facility

space, office equipment and

•

Facility space

supplies, contracting services).

•

Office equipment and supplies

•

Plan for and coordinate logistics.

•

Telecommunications (in

•

Strategically plan for future phases.

Logistics

coordination with ESF number 2:

management

Communications)

and resource

•

Contract services

support

•

Transportation services (in

coordination with ESF number 1:

Transportation)

•

Security services

•

Personnel

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C-7

Appendix C

Table C-1. Examples of ESF responsibilities and manager roles (continued)

No.

ESF

Scope of Responsibilities

ESF Manager Roles

•

Assessment of public

•

Ensure that EMS are available as

health/medical needs (including

necessary.

behavioral health).

•

Ensure that veterinary services are

•

Public health surveillance.

available as necessary.

•

Medical care personnel.

•

Report potential biological incidents

•

Medical equipment and supplies.

to higher headquarters.

•

Establish reachback guidance and

•

Patient evacuation.

support from USAPHC, USAMRIID,

•

Patient care.

USAMRICD, AFRRI, and other

•

Safety and security of human

Service public health centers as

drugs, biologics, medical devices,

appropriate.

and veterinary drugs.

•

Ensure that a medical intelligence

•

Blood and blood products.

officer or NCO is available to

•

Food safety and security.

provide medical intelligence

information if needed.

•

Agriculture safety and security (in

coordination with ESF 11 -

•

Advise the IC/EOC/ICP on the

Agriculture and Natural

status of medical treatment

Resources).

activities.

•

Worker health and safety.

•

Coordinate with local medical

forces for mutual assistance

•

All-hazards public health and

Public health

requirements on-scene, and

medical consultation, technical

and medical

activate appropriate procedures if

assistance, and support.

services

during nonduty hours.

•

Behavioral health care.

•

Serve as a liaison with the

•

Public health and medical

installation medical facility for on-

information.

and off-installation medical needs.

•

Vector control.

•

Establish contact with the local

•

Potable water, wastewater, and

EOCs and higher headquarters.

solid waste disposal.

•

Ensure that medical personnel are

•

Victim identification, mass fatality

available to provide technical

management, and mortuary

medical information and advice to

services (in coordination with ESF

the IC, including information on the

number 7 - Logistics management

physiological effects of

and resource support).

contamination. Coordinate with

•

Veterinary care, personnel,

local hospitals for bed availability.

equipment, and supplies.

•

Establish contact with local,

•

Protection of animal health.

municipal, state, and federal public

health agencies as required.

•

Establish contact with

state/regional/local public health

laboratories for LRN support as

needed.

•

Strategically plan for future phases.

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Installation Emergency Management Plan

Table C-1. Examples of ESF responsibilities and manager roles (continued)

No.

ESF

Scope of Responsibilities

ESF Manager Roles

•

Lifesaving assistance.

•

Activate the search-and-rescue

•

Search-and-rescue operations.

team.

•

Dispatch the team when requested

and rescue

by the IC.

•

Strategically plan for future phases.

•

Oil and HAZMAT response,

•

Activate installation oil and

including chemical, biological, and

HAZMAT resources, and deploy to

radiological hazards.

the incident site when requested by

Oil and

•

Short- and long-term environmental

the IC.

HAZMAT

cleanup measures.

•

Request augmentation from local

response

civilian agencies and/or higher

headquarters if CBRN or HAZMAT

team capabilities are exceeded.

•

Strategically plan for future phases.

•

Nutrition assistance needs.

•

Advise the IC on natural and

cultural resources and on the

•

Appropriate food supplies and

delivery.

protection and restoration of

historic properties.

•

Disaster food stamp authorizations.

•

Strategically plan for future phases.

•

Animal and plant disease and pest

response (in coordination with ESF

8 - Public health and medical

services).

•

Support for

animal/veterinary/wildlife issues in

natural disasters.

•

Inspection and verification of food

Agriculture and

safety aspects of slaughter and

natural

processing plants, products in

resources

distribution and retail sites, and

import facilities at ports of entry.

•

Laboratory analysis of food

samples.

•

Control of products suspected to be

adulterated.

•

Foodborne disease surveillance (in

coordination with ESF 8 - Public

health and medical services).

•

Field investigations.

•

Conservation, rehabilitation,

recovery, and restoration of natural

resources.

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C-9

Appendix C

Table C-1. Examples of ESF responsibilities and manager roles (continued)

No.

ESF

Scope of Responsibilities

ESF Manager Roles

•

Energy infrastructure assessment,

•

Deploy a damage assessment

repair, and restoration (in

team when requested by the IC.

coordination with ESF 3 - Public

•

Ensure that backup power is

works and engineering).

available to the incident site.

•

Energy industry utilities

•

Provide functional expertise and

coordination.

assistance to the CBRN/HAZMAT

team as required.

Energy

•

Determine the need for additional

follow-on support.

•

Assist with coordination among the

IC, ICP, EOC, and other civil and/or

military authorities involved with the

response.

•

Strategically plan for future phases.

•

Facility and resource security.

•

Monitor incident site perimeter or

cordon security. Deploy additional

•

Security planning and technical

forces as requested by the IC or

resource assistance.

ICP.

•

Public safety and security support.

•

Coordinate additional civilian LE

•

Support to access, traffic, and

support as needed or requested by

crowd control.

the IC or ICP.

•

Perimeter establishment.

•

Ensure the safety of emergency

•

Establishment of entry and exit

responders and the public through

control points.

monitoring the incident situation.

•

Direction of evacuation and/or

Draft and provide safety notices for

sheltering.

EOC director approval.

•

Ensure that personnel in the

immediate area are aware of

potential hazards coming from the

Public safety

site.

and security

•

Monitor the individual equipment

items status, especially during

CBRNE incidents. Request

additional equipment and vehicles

to meet the needs of incident site

security personnel for sustained

operations through the recovery

phase.

•

Request augmentation support

from the EOC director; for example,

when installation commander

approval is needed to obtain

nonemergency responder

personnel support to maintain

incident site perimeter or cordon

security.

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Installation Emergency Management Plan

Table C-1. Examples of ESF responsibilities and manager roles (continued)

No.

ESF

Scope of Responsibilities

ESF Manager Roles

•

Monitor safe routes, and advise

emergency responders of

recommended or needed changes

Public safety

to those routes.

and security

•

Coordinate installation entry

(continued)

requests with appropriate control

centers, agencies, and ESFs.

•

Strategically plan for future phases.

•

Social and economic community

•

Conduct a social and economic

impact assessment.

community impact assessment.

•

Long-term community recovery

•

Recommend long-term community

assistance.

recovery assistance to states, local

•

Analysis and review of mitigation

governments, and private

organizations and individuals that

program implementation.

reside on the installation or are

affected by an installation-related

disaster.

•

Conduct a mitigation analysis and

program implementation. Alert and

notify an SJA EOC representative

to proceed to the incident site or

designated assembly point and

Long-term

report to the IC.

community

•

Determine whether claims should

recovery

be activated.

•

Provide advice and assistance to

the installation commander, EOC,

IC, and ICP members (as

appropriate) on legal issues arising

from the incident and on the

response, including issues

associated with establishing an

NDA and providing military support

to civil authorities.

•

Provide advice and assistance to

responding security forces as

appropriate, including advice on

chain-of-custody and evidence

preservation issues.

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C-11

Appendix C

Table C-1. Examples of ESF responsibilities and manager roles (continued)

No.

ESF

Scope of Responsibilities

ESF Manager Roles

•

Prepare estimates of damage and

injuries if claims teams are

mobilized, and provide dollar

estimates of third-party damages if

possible. Report the status of funds

available at the installation, and

Long-term

determine the potential need for

community

advance payment and additional

recovery

SJA manning.

(continued)

•

Establish a temporary claims office

in proximity to the incident site if

appropriate. Advertise the location,

operating hours, and advance

payment availability.

•

Strategically plan for future phases.

•

EPI and protective action

•

Coordinate with the installation EOC,

guidance.

ICP, and IC for probable timing and

location of the establishment of the

•

Media and community relations.

public information facility.

•

Activate the press center, as

directed by the EOC director or

installation commander. Coordinate

installation access.

•

Ensure that PA representation is

present at the joint information

center, if established.

•

Coordinate a liaison with media

representatives to provide

accreditation, mess facilities,

External affairs

billeting, transportation, and escorts

as authorized and appropriate.

•

Ensure that a PA liaison and

spokesperson is available to the IC

to respond to public requests for

information.

•

Coordinate media access regarding

the incident.

•

Coordinate and monitor the

movement of news media personnel,

and ensure that press passes and

escorts are available.

•

Coordinate media requests for

photographs, interviews, and

biographical and other data.

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Installation Emergency Management Plan

Table C-1. Examples of ESF responsibilities and manager roles (continued)

No.

ESF

Scope of Responsibilities

ESF Manager Roles

•

Answer community concerns, and

deal with the news media at the

incident site.

•

Recommend and coordinate an

emergency information line or a

rumor control line.

•

Prepare, coordinate, and

disseminate public information

alerts.

•

Ensure that information for public

dissemination is reviewed for

compliance with security and policy

requirements.

•

Coordinate public information drafts

with the installation commander or

External affairs

designated representative.

(continued)

•

Obtain approval from the

installation commander for news

releases; the release of

photographs of suspects, victims,

and the immediate scene;

interviews with anyone other than

the commander; and direct

communication with press

personnel and suspects.

•

Make news releases available.

•

Report the facts concerning the

CBRN incident or attack,

government investigation, terrorist

apprehension, recovery operation,

and other stories of interest to the

public as appropriate.

•

Strategically plan for future phases.

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C-13

Appendix C

Table C-1. Examples of ESF responsibilities and manager roles (continued)

Legend:

AAR

after action report

AFRRI

Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute

CBRN

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

CBRNE

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives

emergency management

EMS

emergency medical services

EOC

emergency operations center

EPI

emergency public information

ESF

emergency support function

HAZMAT

hazardous materials

host nation

incident commander

ICP

incident command post

law enforcement

LRN

Laboratory Response Network

MOA

memorandum of agreement

MOU

memorandum of understanding

NCO

noncommissioned officer

NDA

national defense area

No.

number

public affairs

SJA

staff judge advocate

USAMRICD

U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense

USAMRIID

U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases

USAPHC

U.S. Army Public Health Command

C-15. HSAs are developed for each hazard identified in the risk management process. HSAs consist of

detailed guidance specific to the prevention of, response to, and recovery from identified hazards. In

planning for specific hazard operations, the installation can use the results of the vulnerability and risk

assessment to determine and emphasize the most relevant hazards to that installation. HSAs direct the

employment of core EM capabilities mandated in the basic plan in a specific sequence or manner to

prevent, respond to, and recover from a specific hazard. Duties and responsibilities of assigned functional

areas for the management of an emergency resulting from a specific hazard are summarized in each HSA.

C-16. The following list of possible hazard categories is outlined in DODI 6055.17:

Natural hazards

(geological). Earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanoes, landslides, mudslides,

subsidence, glaciers, icebergs.

Natural hazards (meteorological). Floods, flash floods, seiche, tidal surges, droughts, fire

(forest, range, urban, wild land, urban interface), snow, ice, hail, sleet, avalanches, windstorms,

tropical cyclones, hurricanes, tornadoes, water spouts, dust or sand storms, extreme temperatures

(heat, cold), lightning strikes, geomagnetic storms.

Natural hazards (biological). Diseases that impact humans or animals (plague, anthrax, West

Nile virus, foot and mouth disease, severe acute respiratory syndrome, pandemic disease).

Human-caused events (accidental). HAZMAT (explosive, flammable liquid, flammable gas,

flammable solid, oxidizer, poison, radiological, corrosive) spill or release; explosion or fire;

transportation accident; building or structure collapse; energy, power, or utility failure; fuel or

resource shortage; air or water pollution or contamination; dam, levee, or other water control

structure failure; financial issues (economic depression, inflation, financial system collapse);

communication system interruption; misinformation.

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Installation Emergency Management Plan

Human-caused events

(intentional). Terrorism

(CBRNE and cyber), sabotage, civil

disturbance, public unrest, mass hysteria, riot, enemy attack, war, insurrection, strike or labor

dispute, disinformation, criminal activity (vandalism, arson, theft, fraud, embezzlement, data

theft), electromagnetic pulse, physical or information security breach, active shooter, product

defect or contamination.

Technologically caused events. Central computer, mainframe, software, or application (internal

and external); ancillary support equipment; telecommunications; energy (power or utility).

C-17. The decision to develop an HSA for an IEM plan is based on special planning requirements not

common to other hazards addressed within the plan and on regulatory considerations that may require

extensive, detailed planning. The content of an HSA focuses on the special planning needs generated by the

hazard and does not duplicate the information in the larger plan.

C-18. The HSA contains unique and regulatory response planning details that apply to a single hazard. It

addresses the essential operational actions that must be accomplished to facilitate the successful completion

of a particular response function. As appropriate, the HSA quantifies the risk area, geography, and

demography considerations that apply to the hazard.

C-19. While the nature of each HSA will be highly dependent on elements unique to each installation,

some operational commonalities exist for each individual hazard. Excellent guidance on response

operations for specific hazards is located in the incident annexes of the NRF. Although these incident

annexes were written for a civilian government response effort, much of the content of these incident

annexes can be used to frame the development of HSAs for inclusion into a DOD installation EM plan.

C-20. Further detail on the development of HSAs can be found in chapter 6 of FEMA CPG 101, which is a

guide to assist state and local governments in all-hazards emergency operations planning. Elements of this

guidance have to be reconstructed to apply to the installation instead of to a civilian government structure;

however, the basic principles of hazard-specific planning still apply at the installation level.

C-21. Each Service EM program has excellent templates and checklists for hazard-specific events that

pertain for each Service installation. See CNIC INST 3440.17 for response action guides pertaining to

CBRNE events, hurricanes, earthquakes, and fire response operations. See AFI 10-2501 template for

checklists pertaining to major accidents, natural disasters, attack actions, and terrorist use of CBRNE. DA

Pamphlet 525-27 contains guidance for Army installations.

C-22. Support annexes add specific information and direction to the emergency operations plan. Support

annexes focus on critical operational functions and who is responsible for carrying them out. These annexes

clearly describe the policies, processes, roles, and responsibilities that agencies and departments carry out

before, during, and after an emergency. While the basic plan provides broad, overarching information,

these annexes focus on specific responsibilities, tasks, and operational actions that pertain to the

performance of a particular emergency operations function.

C-23. These annexes also establish targets for preparedness

(training, exercises, equipment checks,

maintenance) that facilitate achieving function-related goals and objectives during emergencies and

disasters. This list of emergency response functions is not exhaustive or comprehensive. Each jurisdiction

assesses its own needs, and additional or different annexes are prepared at the discretion of the planning

team.

C-24. General appendixes are the last section of the EM plan. They include basic elements, such as

definitions and acronyms. (See table C-2.)

Table C-2. Examples of EM plan section content

SECTION I: Base Plan

Purpose, scope, and applicability

Recovery CONOPS

Situation and assumptions

10.

Mitigation strategy and activities

Risk management summary

11.

Communications

Installation organization

12.

Resource management

Duties and responsibilities

13.

DSCA

Command and control

14.

Plan management and maintenance

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C-15

Appendix C

Preparedness program

15. Authorities and references

Response CONOPS

16. Supporting plans and programs

SECTION II: Sample Functional Area Annexes

EOC

13. OSHA

Dispatch center

14. Public works

Communications

15. Public affairs

Critical personnel/category I personnel

16. Mass care

EM staff

17. Meteorological

F&ES

18. Fatality management

Emergency medical services

19. Support, logistics, and finance

Security forces

20. Search and rescue

EOD

21. Environmental

10.

Health services

22. Local safe-haven management

11.

Veterinary services

23. Shelter in place management

12.

Industrial hygiene

24. Evacuation management

SECTION III: Standard ESFs

Transportation

Public health and medical services

Communications

Search and rescue

Public works and engineering

10.

Oil and HAZMAT response

Firefighting

11.

Agriculture and natural resources

12.

Energy

Mass care, emergency assistance, housing,

13.

Public safety and security

and human services

14.

Long-term community recovery

Logistics management and resource support

15.

External affairs

SECTION IV: Potential HSAs

Destructive weather

11. Terrorism incidents (active shooter,

Seismic/geological hazards

kidnapping, hijacking)

Fire hazards

12. Chemical terrorism

Pandemic influenza or other infectious disease

13. Biological terrorism

epidemic

14. Radiological terrorism

HAZMAT spill/release

15. Nuclear terrorism

Transportation accidents

16. Explosive or incendiary terrorism

Structural failure/collapse

17. Electromagnetic or cyberterrorism

Infrastructure or utility loss or interruption

18. Civil disturbance

Environmental pollution/contamination

19. Nuclear-reactor accident/incident

10.

Agricultural incidents

20. Nuclear-weapon accident/incident

21. Refugee/migrant operations

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Installation Emergency Management Plan

Table C-2. Examples of EM plan section content (continued)

SECTION V: Support Annexes

MAAs

Shelter in place operations

MOUs/MOAs

10.

Special-needs populations

ISSAs

11.

Animal care management

Support contracts

12.

Volunteer and donations management

Contract development, execution, and

13.

Sampling and evidence collection

management

14.

Personnel decontamination

Evacuation

15.

Inventory management

Personnel accountability

16.

Special-events management

Safe-haven operations

17.

Incident support base

SECTION VI: General Appendixes

Legend:

CONOPS

concept of operations

DSCA

defense support of civil authorities

emergency management

EOC

emergency operations center

EOD

explosive ordnance disposal

ESF

emergency support function

F&ES

fire and emergency services

HAZMAT

hazardous materials

HSA

hazard-specific appendixes

ISSA

inter-Service support agreement

MAA

mutual-aid agreement

MOA

memorandum of agreement

MOU

memorandum of understanding

OSHA

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

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C-17

Appendix D

Response Operations and Emergency Operations Centers

The response phase of an incident is usually the most energy-intensive of all phases;

manpower, infrastructure, and resources are sustained on a 24-hour cycle from the

moment an incident is triggered until the incident is brought under control and

recovery begins. Response activities are managed by the IC on-scene, while support

to the response is managed and coordinated by the EOC for the duration of the

response. These activities are governed by the ICS process and principles.

INCIDENT TRIGGERS

D-1. An initial incident or series of incidents results in a trigger that sets a series of response actions in

motion. The type of trigger will depend on whether it is associated with a warning or no-warning incident,

sometimes referred to as notice or no-notice incidents. Examples of warning incidents include, but are not

limited to, hurricanes and other predictable natural hazards or pandemic disease. Examples of no-warning

incidents include, but are not limited to, earthquakes, flash floods, HAZMAT spills or releases, and terrorist

attacks. Triggers also depend on the speed of event onset, with incidents such as chemical spills considered

immediate onset and incidents such as disease outbreaks considered slow onset.

D-2. Triggers may be the result of a natural hazard or a signal received from deployed detection

equipment, medical surveillance information, visual observance, and/or intelligence analysis. The types of

detection technologies deployed at installations may vary; however, installations have access to—

Intelligence sharing and dissemination. Installations identify multiple intelligence sources

within and outside the DOD (including those that can be obtained through an open source) and

establish the degree to which information sharing is allowable with EM organizations outside the

DOD. These sources may include natural hazards warning systems available within the

community or information gathered with specialized CBRN and explosive detector/surveillance

technology, as available on the installation.

Health threat surveillance and detection. The medical official or designee identifies medical

and public health information needed, ensures medical laboratory support to confirm and

identify hazardous substances in the affected environment, integrates and monitors medical

surveillance systems operations, and monitors the health status of essential personnel and the

general population.

Medical intelligence. The public health or medical functional area designee collects information

from available medical sources, provides medical information to local organizations and private-

sector partners, and works to sustain information and/or intelligence-gathering activities

necessary for assessing emerging health threat information during an incident.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

D-3. During an event, command and control is implemented through the ICS, at times using an EOC or a

mobile command center as a central command location.

INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

D-4. The ICS provides its users with an integrated organizational structure to match the complexities and

demands of single or multiple incidents without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. The resulting

UC not only coordinates the efforts of many jurisdictions, but also provides for and assures joint decisions

on objectives, strategies, plans, priorities, and public communications.

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D-1

Appendix D

D-5. The NIMS requires ICS use for responses and specifies that all levels of government must adopt the

ICS. It is used across the range of incidents, from small to complex and from natural to manmade,

including acts of catastrophic terrorism. The ICS may be expanded to include a UC for complex responses

that require multiagency and/or multijurisdictional resources.

D-6. The ICS is based on proven management principles, which contribute to the strength and efficiency

of the overall system used to implement a response action according to the execution tasks outlined in the

IEM plan. The ICS principles are implemented through a wide range of management features, including the

use of common terminology, clear text, and a modular organizational structure. The ICS emphasizes

effective planning, including management by objectives and reliance on an incident action plan (IAP).

D-7. The principal ICS management functions include—

Command. The IC is responsible for incident or event activity. Although other functions may

be left unfilled, there will always be an IC.

Operations. The operations section is responsible for directing the tactical actions to meet

incident objectives.

Planning. The planning section is responsible for collecting, evaluating, and displaying incident

information; maintaining the status of resources; and preparing the IAP and incident-related

documentation.

Logistics. The logistics section is responsible for providing adequate services and support to

meet incident or event needs.

Finance/administration. The finance/administration section is responsible for keeping track of

incident-related costs and personnel and equipment records and for administering procurement

contracts associated with the incident or event.

Note. Each functional area can be expanded as needed into additional organizational units with

further delegation of authority.

D-8. Because the ICS allows for organizational flexibility, an intelligence/investigation function can be

embedded in several different places within the organizational structure:

Within the planning section. This is the traditional placement for the intelligence/investigation

function and is appropriate for incidents with little or no investigative information requirements

or a significant amount of specialized information.

As a separate general staff section. This may be appropriate when there is an

intelligence/investigative component to the incident or when multiple investigative agencies are

part of the investigative process and/or there is a need for classified intelligence.

Within the operations section. This may be appropriate for incidents that require a high degree

of linkage and coordination between the investigative information and the operational tactics that

are being employed.

Within the command staff. This may be appropriate for incidents with little need for tactical

information or classified intelligence and where supporting agency representatives provide real-

time information to the command element.

D-9. The modular organization of the ICS allows responders to scale their efforts and apply the parts of

the ICS structure that best meet the demands of the incident. There are no hard-and-fast rules for when or

how to expand the ICS organization.

D-10. Many incidents never require the activation of planning, logistics, or finance/administration sections,

while others require some or all of them to be established. A major advantage of the ICS organization is the

ability to fill only those parts of the organization that are required. However, if there is a need to expand the

organization, additional positions exist within the ICS framework to meet virtually any need. For example,

in operations involving responders from a single jurisdiction, the ICS establishes an organization for

comprehensive response management. However, when an incident involves more than one agency or

jurisdiction, responders can expand the ICS framework to address a multijurisdictional incident.

D-2

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Response Operations and Emergency Operations Centers

D-11. An IAP is an oral or written plan communicating the overall incident objectives in the context of

operational and support activities for managing an incident. The creation of an IAP is critical to identifying

operational resources and assignments and allows for management by objectives established in the IAP

process. Every incident has a verbal or written IAP; however, written IAPs are highly recommended. At the

simplest level, IAPs have four elements:

What do we want to do?

Who is responsible for doing it?

How do we communicate with each other?

What is the procedure if someone is injured?

D-12. The IAP process allows for functional organization and management by objectives in the response

effort. The process consists of the following steps:

Step 1. Understand installation, component, and Service policy and direction.

Step 2. Assess the incident, and maintain SA.

Step 3. Establish incident objectives (see the IAP).

Step 4. Select appropriate strategies to achieve objectives.

Step 5. Perform tactical direction, and assign and monitor resources.

Step 6. Provide a follow-up and iterative reevaluation of the process.

D-13. The operational period defines the complete planning cycle. A planning cycle is typically established

by the IC and planning section chief, and an IAP is then developed by the planning section for the next

operational period (usually 12 or 24 hours in length) and submitted to the IC for approval. The creation of a

planning cycle and the development of an IAP for a particular operational period helps to focus the

available resources on the highest priorities/incident objectives. The planning cycle, if properly practiced,

brings together input and identifies critical shortfalls that need to be addressed to carry out IC objectives for

that period.

D-14. The UC is an ICS management process which allows all agencies who have jurisdictional or

functional responsibility for the incident to jointly develop a common set of incident objectives and

strategies. This is accomplished without losing or giving up agency authority, responsibility, or

accountability. The UC is an important feature of ICS. It allows agencies having a legitimate responsibility

at an incident to be a part of the incident command function.

D-15. During the emergency response effort, the transfer of command and/or responsibility may occur

several times as the scope of the emergency shifts or as an operational period begins or ends. During such

transfers, all replacements are briefed on actions taken, actions needed, and the general status of the

operation. Civilian officials are kept in the loop through introductions to new incoming members of the key

workforce.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER

D-16. An EOC is the focal point of operations for the support of the IC and those responders at the incident

site. The EOC is the location where the coordination of information and resources in support of the incident

take place. The EOC is normally located in a permanent facility within the installation; however, an

alternate or temporary location may be utilized when the primary location is unusable.

D-17. The installation commander, or his designee, activates the EOC to manage incident response

resources. The installation commander provides guidance to the EOC on mission priorities. The installation

commander approves, directs, or ensures IC or EOC RFAs from external specialized teams are forwarded

through the higher headquarters component or DOD component commanders. During an incident, the EOC

considers the following initial response actions:

EOC assembly. Based on the magnitude of the incident, the EOC is recalled as the full EOC or

tailored to include only those staff members and ESFs required to handle the incident. When

there is doubt, it is easier to recall the full EOC staff and subsequently dismiss those members

not required.

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D-3

Appendix D

Emergency Operations Center activation. The EOC is activated by the installation

commander. The EOC updates the CAT with incident status reports. The EOC is comprised of

ESFs (or designated functional area equivalents) and other functional agency representation as

needed. Depending on the complexity and size of an event, the EOC may be activated to manage

the operations needed to support contingencies. The EOC coordinates with the IC, civilian

EOCs, EOD, F&ES, communications centers, and medical services.

Initial activation. It is not always necessary to activate the full and complete EOC. During

event planning or predesignated threat warning (such as increased FP conditions or hurricane

conditions), the EOC may be placed in a “warm” status. During small incidents, a few ESFs may

be needed, thus requiring only a partial activation. During large or major incidents and

subsequent recovery, a full activation may be necessary.

Warm status activation. Simply stated, warm status of the EOC means that the lights,

computers, communication, and other key components are turned on in preparation for a higher

level of activity. During warm status, the EOC will run any preactivation or startup checklists.

Partial activation. Partial activation requires that only certain ESFs or functional areas are

recalled to support responders at an incident. There are two ways to conduct a partial activation:

recall and brief the entire EOC and all functional areas, and then release ESFs that are not

needed. Notify only the necessary functional areas.

Full activation. Full activation is recalling all the members of the EOC, all ESF/functional area

offices of primary responsibility, and supporting participants. A major incident and its

subsequent recovery require the full EOC. Alternatively, full activation may be followed by a

situation briefing and a shift to partial activation.

D-18. The EOC provides oversight for the installation commander to support and control emergency or

contingency incidents. The EOC can support multiple ICs simultaneously, while providing strategic senior

officer level command and control for sustained response and recovery operations. The EOC is responsible

for directing the ESFs or functional areas. Once the EOC staff is operating, they coordinate responsive

information and resources that the IC needs to respond to the incident. In addition, the EOC provides the

IC, through the ESFs/functional areas, the support required to control the incident, restore mission

capabilities, and sustain response and recovery activities. The EOC keeps the installation commander fully

informed on the incident response efforts throughout the operation. The EOC establishes and maintains an

accurate and timely SA. It is the responsibility of the EOC to ensure that the entire staff is populating

current incident information through the installation COP.

MOBILE COMMAND CENTER

D-19. Mobile command centers provide for continuous command and control capability during periods

when the primary or alternate EOC will not be in operation, such as when emergency teams are transferring

between a primary and alternate EOC. The mobile command center also provides the capability to provide

command and control for localized field operations.

D-20. IEM programs may consider incorporating a mobile command center into their response capabilities.

The mobile command center provides both operations and communications capability, which may be

divided into separate vehicles that travel together.

D-21. The mobile command center is equipped with basic communications equipment, computers, and

video display systems to provide similar support as the primary EOC. It is of sufficient size to

accommodate the equipment and the primary team members and commanders. The equipment on the

mobile command center is interoperable with EOC systems.

D-22. The mobile command center is maintained in a complete state of readiness. It is self-propelled or

transportable without special equipment and capable of traveling over public roadways, including

unimproved roadway surfaces.

D-4

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Appendix E

Communications

The topic of communications can mean many different things with respect to EM.

Communications may include information management in the formation and

maintenance of a COP, interoperable communication standards and equipment, mass

warning and notification systems, or EPI. But one thing is certain—well-planned,

fully coordinated, interoperable, timely and accurate communication that takes place

consistently throughout the EM process can help to ensure effective planning,

response, recovery, and mitigation.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

E-1. Information management is an important element in supporting a COP. Effective EM and incident

response activities rely on flexible communications and information systems that provide a COP to

EM/response personnel and their affiliated organizations. Establishing and maintaining a COP and ensuring

accessibility and interoperability are the principal goals of the communications and information

management component of NIMS. Properly planned, established, and applied communications enable the

dissemination of information among command and support elements and, as appropriate, cooperating

agencies and organizations.

E-2. The IEM program ensures that information technology requirements are addressed for all appropriate

entities, including mass warning and notification systems, continuity plans, installation dispatch center,

installation EOC, predesignated mass care locations, and other preidentified locations applicable to the

execution of the IEM plan.

E-3. All entities involved in managing an incident use common terminology for communications as

outlined in NIMS. This allows diverse operational, management, and support entities to work together

across a wide variety of incident management functions. Standard common terminology is a key principle

of NIMS; therefore, it is important to limit the unnecessary creation of terminology.

E-4. The IEM programs strive for interoperability with local civil jurisdictions and other military Services

in the vicinity of the installation. Interoperability includes the technical exchange of information and the

end-to-end operational effectiveness of that exchange of information as required for mission

accomplishment. The EM interoperability is more than just information exchange, as it includes systems,

processes, procedures, organizations, and missions over the life cycle and is balanced with information

assurance.

MASS WARNING NOTIFICATION SYSTEMS

E-5. Executive Order 13407 requires the United States to have an effective, reliable, integrated, flexible,

and comprehensive system to alert and warn the American people in times of emergency. Various federal

entities, ranging from FEMA to the National Weather Service and the Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention (CDC), have established programs, standards, and funding mechanisms to ensure that alert and

warning systems are sustained and interoperable at the federal, state, and local levels. The goal of a national

mass notification effort is for citizens to receive rapid, secure, and trustworthy messages in times of

emergency.

E-6. Military installations are also required to provide mass warning notification to their protected

population. DODI 6055.17, the Report of the DOD Independent Review (Protecting the Force: Lessons

from Fort Hood), and the resulting Secretary of Defense memo (Final Recommendations of the Fort Hood

Follow-on Review) require installations to field a mass warning notification system capability in order to

achieve full operational capability.

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E-1

Appendix E

E-7. Mass warning notification systems serve a variety of functions on and off an installation:

FP and other population protection—mass dissemination of alerts to accelerate community

action and response.

Personnel recall—rapid activation of off-base personnel to report for duty.

Personnel accountability—proactive assessment of force status and its ability to perform duties.

E-8. Installations are likely to have multiple redundant systems to maximize the potential for reaching all

personnel:

Networked computers—delivery of audiovisual notifications to personal computers connected to

the Internet protocol network.

Telephone—delivery of alerts as audio messages to any phone, sometimes called “Reverse

9-1-1.”

Text messaging—delivery of text messages and/or e-mail to mobile phones, pagers,

smartphones, or fax machines.

Indoor and outdoor speakers—audio notifications via sirens and the activation of indoor and

outdoor emergency warning and mass notification systems.

Cable television and display boards—text alerts to digital displays.

Radio broadcasts—audio broadcasts to local radio stations.

National Emergency Alert System—delivery of text-based alerts via common alerting protocol

to the National Public Alert System.

Residential route alerting—messages announced to neighborhoods from vehicles equipped with

public address systems.

E-9. Installations with significant on-base or nearby off-base family housing cooperate with local

authorities for access to radio and television emergency communication systems. Overseas, a mass warning

notification system includes warning sponsored family members living off base, ideally by the integration

with local or HN systems.

E-10. Mass warning notification systems are most effective when notices and messages can be developed

in advance of an incident, vetted through the appropriate channels, and placed on standby until needed. In

this way, the installation can identify diverse populations and their communications needs and tailor

messages to fit them under a variety of circumstances. This preevent message development significantly

shortens the lag time between an event and the notification of the population.

INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS

E-11. The NRF describes how communities, tribes, states, the federal government, and private sector and

nongovernmental partners work together to coordinate national response. An integral part of this

multisector coordination is interoperable communications.

E-12. The land mobile radio system is a nontactical radio frequency system that supports installation FP,

public safety, and EM entities. Land mobile radio systems have the capability to interconnect with state and

local counterpart mobile radio networks to foster interdependencies and interoperability with civilian

jurisdictions during incident response. The Association of Public Safety Communication Officials Project

25 (APCO Project 25), also known as Project 25 or P25, is a two-way, digital land mobile radio system

technology suite of standards for use by federal, state/province, and local public safety agencies in North

America to enable them to communicate with other agencies and mutual aid response teams in

emergencies. This standard has not yet been implemented in all localities; however, installations ensure that

newly purchased communications assets are compliant for future capability. The National Emergency

Communications Plan and the Federal Communications Commission have identified interoperable

frequencies for public safety radio bands, and these are programmed within LMRS units whenever

possible.

E-13. Long-term evolution (LTE) is the preferred broadband technology platform for a common air

interface established by the Federal Communications Commission for

700 Megahertz public safety

broadband networks to create a foundation for wireless interoperability and provide a clear path for the

deployment and evolution of a nationwide interoperable public safety broadband network. LTE has the

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Communications

potential to handle voice and data communications. Public safety broadband network providers are required

to submit certification that their networks support required LTE interfaces.

E-14. Some communications technologies offer the ability to fully integrate LTE and APCO Project 25

standards within one system. Additional telecommunications considerations for interoperability may

include base telephone infrastructure, multiplexers, switches, routers, optical fiber, and personal computers

with standard software configured for local area networks and wide area networks, and installation incident

command vehicles.

EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION

E-15. The EPI is based on the integration of complementary crisis communication and risk communication

theories and techniques. In this context, crisis communication is the ability to communicate effectively with

other government agencies, the media, and the general public by delivering accurate and timely information

that is designed to inform, educate, and guide the public in any necessary response actions they need to take

to protect themselves, their families, and their communities. A recommendation to SIP is an example of

crisis communication.

E-16. In concert with crisis communication, risk communication is an interactive process, not an event. The

risk communication process facilitates the exchange of information and opinion (real or perceived) among

individuals, groups, or institutions. Risk communication is proactive and engages with stakeholders about

their issues and concerns in order to communicate the complexities and uncertainties of risk. Risk

communication efforts are the foundation of an effective EPI program during all phases of EM. Many

federal agencies are currently teaching, training, and implementing EPI practices based on this combination

of crisis and risk communication principles.

E-17. In some cases, the foundational EPI principles listed below may run counter to many instinctive

practices. It is human nature to wait until we know everything we can before releasing information in an

attempt to allay fear and reduce the potential for panic. The principles provided below balance these

instincts with behavioral principles that govern how people receive and process information. For example,

we know that panic is actually more likely to occur in the absence of information. We also know that, in

general, people perform at their best under crisis conditions and that the public must have trust and

confidence in the response. We also know that the media is a primary means for communicating with the

public. Given that backg3round, the eight basic EPI principles are described below:

Be proactive; communicate before, during, and after an emergency. The best time to plan

for EPI and build working relationships with other government agencies, the media, and citizens,

is before the stress and strain of a response. Plan to communicate with the potentially affected

public by engaging them in determining—

What information will be needed before, during, and after an emergency?

Who will need to be informed and how?

What are the opportunities for effective information exchange, and how can they be

maximized?

What are the obstacles for effective information exchange, and how can they be overcome?

What questions can be anticipated?

How can the needs of the news media be met?

What message does higher headquarters want to convey?

Take the high ground in an emergency. The first messages are the most important. Get

accurate messages out quickly. Keep it simple. Be consistent. Build trust and confidence by

expressing empathy and caring, competence and expertise, honesty and openness, and

commitment and dedication.

Craft messages carefully. Follow your public information protocols to verify and approve

messages, and then promptly release messages to the public. Stay on message. Avoid jargon. Be

careful with risk comparisons. Recognize the information needs of your different audiences.

Trust people to do the right thing. People often perform best under the most trying

circumstances. Do not focus on alleviating panic. Acknowledge uncertainty. Do not over-

reassure. Tell the truth. Deal with rumors.

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E-3

Appendix F

Resource Management

Resource management involves coordinating and overseeing the application of tools,

processes, and systems that provide incident management personnel with timely and

appropriate resources during an incident. Resources may include personnel, teams,

information, expert knowledge, facilities, technology, equipment, supplies,

specialized training, and funding (financial resources). Resource management takes

place at all levels in support of the incident management activities at the installation

EOC, dispatch center, ICP, and related incident management nodes. To implement

these concepts and principles in performing the primary tasks of resource

management, the IEM program includes standardized procedures, methodologies,

and functions in its resource management processes. These processes reflect

functional considerations, geographic factors, and validated practices within and

across disciplines and are continually adjusted as new lessons are learned.

PRINCIPLES

F-1. Consistent with NIMS, DODI 6055.17, and NFPA 1600, each IEM program employs NIMS-based

resource management procedures to prioritize resource allocation at the installation level. NIMS resource

management consists of four primary tasks, which include—

Establishing systems for describing, inventorying, requesting, and tracking resources.

Activating these systems prior to and during an incident.

Dispatching resources prior to and during an incident.

Deactivating, recalling, or demobilizing resources during or after an incident.

F-2.

The NIMS principles of resource management are—

Advance planning. Preparedness organizations work together in advance of an incident to

develop plans for managing and employing resources in a variety of possible emergency

circumstances.

Resource identification and ordering. Resource managers use standardized processes and

methodologies to order, identify, mobilize, dispatch, and track the resources required to support

incident management activities. Resource managers perform these tasks either at an IC’s request

or according to planning requirements.

Resources organization. Resources are categorized by size, capacity, capability, skill, and other

characteristics. This makes the resource ordering and dispatch process within jurisdictions,

across jurisdictions, and between governmental and nongovernmental entities more efficient and

ensures that ICs receive resources appropriate to their needs.

Support agreements. Preincident support agreements among all parties providing or requesting

resources are necessary to enable effective and efficient resource management during incident

operations. Formal preincident agreements between parties, governmental and nongovernmental,

that might provide or request resources are established to ensure the employment of

standardized, interoperable equipment and other incident resources during incident operations.

Personnel certification and credentialing. Personnel certification entails authoritatively

attesting that individuals meet professional standards for the training, experience, and

performance required for key incident management functions. Credentialing involves providing

documentation that can authenticate and validate the certification and identity of designated

incident managers and emergency responders. This system helps ensure that personnel

representing various jurisdictional levels and functional disciplines possess a minimum common

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F-1

Appendix F

level of training, currency, experience, physical and medical fitness, and capability for the

incident management or emergency responder position that they are tasked to fill.

Equipment interoperability. Ensure, when possible, that installation emergency response

equipment is interoperable with equipment used by mutual aid partners in local communities.

F-3. Resource management includes identifying the quantity, quality, capabilities, limitations, cost, and

liability connected with each resource and the timeframe within which each resource is required. This

concept of resource management provides a uniform method of identifying, acquiring, allocating, and

tracking resources and increases the effective use of support agreements, mutual aid, volunteer assistance,

and donations through the standard classification and sharing of kinds and types of resources required for

incident management.

F-4. The resource management process can be separated into two parts—resource management as an

element of preparedness and resource management during an incident. The preparedness activities

(resource typing, credentialing, and inventorying) are conducted on a continual basis to help ensure that

resources are ready to be mobilized when called to an incident. Resource management during an incident is

a finite process, specific to the needs of the particular incident, that includes identifying requirements,

ordering and acquiring, mobilizing, tracking and reporting, recovering and demobilizing, and reimbursing.

RESOURCE TYPING

F-5. As outlined in NIMS, resource typing entails categorizing (by capability) the resources that incident

managers commonly request, deploy, and employ. Measurable standards identifying the capabilities and

performance levels of resources serve as the basis for categories. Resource users at all levels identify these

standards and then type resources on a consensus basis, with a national level entity taking the coordinating

lead. Resource kinds may be divided into subcategories (types) to more precisely define more precisely the

resource capabilities needed to meet specific requirements. Resource typing is a continuous process

designed to be as simple as possible to facilitate frequent use and accuracy in obtaining needed resources

(see NIMS for additional details). To allow resources to be deployed and used on a national basis, the

National Integration Center is responsible for defining national resource typing standards.

Note. The Tier One and Tier Two assets discussed below are terms established by DHS and

FEMA for resource typing. There is no correlation or linkage between these asset/resource

descriptions and the installation Tier Designations 2, 1, and 0 established by the Joint Program

Manager Installation Protection Program for the purposes of equipment fielding. NIMS

resources will be listed throughout this publication with designation of Tier One and Tier Two

for delineation.

National Incident Management System Tier One Assets. To allow resources to be deployed

and used on a national basis, the National Integration Center is responsible for defining national

resource typing standards for NIMS Tier One assets (national level resources). NIMS Tier One

assets have strict requirements regarding organization, manning, training, certification,

credentialing, equipment, and past experience with federal and/or state disaster declarations. Past

DSCA operations do not count for previous experience. All installation capabilities are retained

under DOD control and are not nationally deployed by FEMA independent of DSCA mission

assignments. Therefore, under ordinary circumstances it is likely that none of the available

NIMS Tier One resource definitions are applicable to installations.

State and Local National Incident Management System Tier Two Assets. NIMS Tier Two

assets are those resources defined and inventoried by local jurisdictions, including IEM

programs, that are not Tier One resources and are not assigned to interstate mutual aid

deployment under EM assistance compacts. This definition includes all identified IEM program

resources. IEM programs comply with NIMS requirements by developing standardized resource

typing definitions for local IEM programs to the extent possible. Installations type all resources

identified within their jurisdiction or with which they have an approved support agreement or

contract. Installations may develop local typing criteria for additional NIMS Tier Two assets

identified in the planning process.

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Appendix G

Support Agreements

SUPPORT AGREEMENT EXAMPLE

G-1. A sample MAA/MOU template is provided in figure G-1. Verbiage contained in the sample template

in figure G-1 is notional and for illustrative purposes only. An MAA/MOU is only one example of a

support agreement. Other agreements may include MOAs and ISSAs. Seek Service-specific guidance and

approval before entering into any type of support agreement.

MUTUAL AID AGREEMENT (MAA)/MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU)

BETWEEN

(YOUR INSTALLATION)

AND

(LOCAL/STATE/HN GOVERNMENT AGENCY)

FOR

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (EM) SUPPORT

1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this memorandum is to document the reciprocal relationship

between (your installation) and (local/state government agency) as it relates to providing EM

support through expertise, advice, personnel, or equipment.

2. AUTHORITIES/REFERENCES. See attachment 1.

3. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS. See attachment 2.

4. GENERAL.

4.1. Scope. This agreement secures, to each agency, the benefits of mutual aid in EM

capabilities outlined in paragraph 5.1. It defines the scope of support to be provided routinely or

in an emergency. Actions and responsibilities stated herein apply only to the parties of this

agreement and are not intended to supersede existing regulations or agreements, unless

otherwise expressly stated.

4.2. Assumptions.

4.3. Limitations (including discussion of limiting issues and suggested workarounds).

5. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

5.1. Operational support and EM capabilities available for mutual aid.

5.2. Procedures, authorities, and rules for payment, reimbursement, and allocation of

costs.

5.3. Notification procedures

(procedures for requesting and providing assistance). See

attachment 3 for a list of authorized representatives from which to request assistance via this

agreement.

5.4. Response times (for defined normal workday hours, nonworkdays, and after hours,

depending on mission requirements).

5.5. (Your installation) access, internal controls, and limitations.

Figure G-1. Sample MAA/MOU template

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G-1

Appendix G

5.6.

(Local/host nation

[HN] government agency) access, internal controls, and

limitations.

6. INTEROPERABILITY. Interoperability is required according to the National Response

Framework (NRF). The NRF is grounded in doctrine that demands a tested inventory of

common organizational structures and capabilities that are scalable, flexible, and adaptable for

diverse operations. The adoption of the NRF across all levels of government, with businesses,

and with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) will facilitate interoperability and improve

operational coordination.

6.1. Equipment.

6.2. Interoperable communications.

6.3. Plans (including a discussion of emergency operations plans from each agency).

7. RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER AGREEMENTS (identify and reference unique capabilities with

other groups or agencies that may be needed during an incident).

FAMILIARITY VISITS AND EXERCISES.

8.1. Familiarity visits.

8.2. Exercises

(including how often this agreement will be exercised between the two

agencies).

RECOGNITION OF QUALIFICATIONS AND CERTIFICATIONS.

9.1. Emergency responders will be credentialed according to the National Incident Management

System (NIMS) Integration Center National Emergency Responder Credentialing System

where applicable. Credentialing covers education, training, experience, physical/medical

fitness, certification, and licensing.

9.2. Agencies are responsible for their own training, certifications, and credentialing, but are

encouraged to conduct joint training when possible.

10. APPLICABILITY. This agreement is effective upon signature by all parties and it may be

amended by written agreement of all parties. Minor revisions and nonsubstantive

modifications may be made by mutual agreement.

11. TERMINATION. This agreement will be in effect for a period of three (3) years from the

effective date unless superseded or extended by mutual consent of all parties. This agreement

may be rescinded by either party prior to its conclusion. A minimum of thirty (30) days is

required to coordinate and assess residual requirements.

Attachments.

1. Authorities/References

2. Acronyms and Definitions of Terms

3. Contact List

Figure G-1. Sample MAA/MOU template (continued)

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Appendix G

Attachment 3

CONTACT LIST

(YOUR INSTALLATION) AND (LOCAL/STATE/HN GOVERNMENT AGENCY)

EMERGENCY MAMANGEMENT MAA/MOU CONTACT LIST

Authority to

Agency

Title

Activate

Name

Contact information

Agreement

(Your Installation)

Telephone:

Command Post

Cellular Telephone:

(24/7 Contact)

Controller

Fax:

E-mail:

Telephone:

Cellular Telephone:

XXX Installation

Commander

Yes

Fax:

E-mail:

Commander and

Telephone:

Emergency

Cellular Telephone:

XXX

Yes

Operations Center

Fax:

(EOC) Director

E-mail:

Yes

Telephone:

Cellular Telephone:

XXX

Commander

Fax:

E-mail:

Yes

Telephone:

(when emergency

Cellular Telephone:

EOC

EOC Manager

operations center is

Fax:

activated)

E-mail:

Telephone:

Emergency

Cellular Telephone:

XXX

Manager

Fax:

E-mail:

(Local/State Government Agency)

Telephone:

(Local) Dispatch

Cellular Telephone:

EOC Director

Center (24/7 contact)

Fax:

E-mail:

Telephone:

Emergency

Cellular Telephone:

(Local) Office of EM

Yes

Manager

Fax:

E-mail:

Telephone:

(Local) Fire

Cellular Telephone:

Fire Chief

Yes

Department

Fax:

E-mail:

Telephone:

Cellular Telephone:

(Local) EOC

EOC Director

Yes

Fax:

E-mail:

Telephone:

(Local) Emergency

Cellular Telephone:

Services Disaster

Emergency Planner

Fax:

Agency

E-mail:

Figure G-1. Sample MAA/MOU template (continued)

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Appendix H

Evacuation, Shelter in Place, and Lockdown

Under certain conditions, it may become necessary to protect the population from

imminent hazards during an incident. The installation commander decides the best

method for this measure based on the conditions of the incident; for example, the

nature of the hazard, the environmental conditions, or the amount of time before an

incident will occur (in the case of notice events). The three options available to the

installation commander for geographically protecting the installation populous are

evacuation, SIP, and lockdown. Once an installation commander institutes an order

for evacuation, SIP, or lockdown, a personnel accountability program is executed to

keep track of all personnel through the duration of the event.

EVACUATION

H-1. Evacuation removes a population at risk from the hazard(s) at hand and, therefore, significantly

decreases the scope, scale, and impact of any emergency. During an evacuation, an endangered population

is directed to use specified evacuation routes and transportation methods to depart a threatened

area/location. The safe evacuation of threatened populations when endangered by a catastrophic event is

one of the principal reasons for developing an IEM plan.

EVACUATION MANAGEMENT

H-2. Evacuation management is the capability to direct and manage the evacuation of personnel and/or

community members and pets to a local safe haven on the installation, a civilian shelter provided by one or

more civil jurisdictions, or a predesignated, geographically remote installation or location. Evacuation

management includes the phased or simultaneous return of evacuees to on-post residences or businesses

during the recovery phase.

H-3. Evacuation management also includes continuous communication to evacuees during the entire

evacuation process, throughout mass care operations, and during the return of evacuees to their residences

or workplaces on the installation. IEM programs may consider the establishment of an evacuation

management team to coordinate the evacuation of personnel, their families, and pets to a shelter, safe

haven, or other designated location.

EVACUATION PLANNING

H-4. The evacuation planning process includes identifying the available transportation networks and the

capabilities and limitations of each of these transportation methods, especially the carrying capacity of

proposed evacuation routes and existing or potential traffic bottlenecks or blockages caused by traffic

congestion or natural occurrences, such as rising waters. It is important to keep in mind that destructive

weather and seismic events may limit or completely eliminate some transportation methods, especially

bridges, ferries, tunnels, and some mass transit systems.

H-5. Demographic information collected during the planning phase is integral to coordinating and

executing an effective evacuation effort. Prior knowledge of the population, their locations, and their

resource needs (for example, vulnerable populations that may lack transportation or the ability to receive

information through common lines of communication) is pivotal in determining the nature and magnitude

of the evacuation assistance needed.

H-6. In addition, if efforts during the preparedness phase to build a resilient and well-informed community

are successful, much of the protected population may be able to orchestrate a relatively efficient self-

evacuation when there is sufficient notice of the event. Self-evacuating community members still need the

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H-1

Appendix H

benefit of full communication efforts on the nature of the risk and the best methods for evacuation (routes,

safe-haven locations, resources). They also require some assistance with infrastructure preparedness, such

as the contraflow of roads and highways, debris removal, and notification of any bridge or tunnel closures

due to high winds, flooding, or other incidents.

H-7. The evaluation of available evacuation routes is a key component of evacuation planning and directly

impacts the clearance time of an installation or evacuation zone within an installation. Evacuation planning

entails establishing primary and secondary evacuation routes and having these routes clearly marked and

well lit. Evacuation routes include the preevent fielding of evacuation route markers and/or signs, which

can be easily read during an emergency (low-light conditions, rain/ash fall conditions).

H-8. The designation of evacuation routes is closely coordinated with the state/local evacuation plan to

mitigate conflicting routes. Note that the installation population may not have been considered during the

development of the state/local evacuation plan and analysis of clearance times. The determination of

evacuation routes is also closely coordinated with the Department of Public Works and synchronized with

published preincident plans so that families and individuals can use that information in developing their

family or individual preparedness plans.

H-9. In determining potential evacuation routes, consider the following:

The road capacity/load.

Sufficient width to accommodate the number of evacuating personnel.

The route is clear and unobstructed at all times.

The route is unlikely to expose evacuating personnel to additional hazards.

Services along the route such as fuel, food, lodging (hotels, remote safe havens/shelters).

Does the road lead to or contain a bridge, tunnel, or flood zone? This may have an impact on

clearance time, especially for certain types of vehicles (for example, travel trailers, campers,

motor homes, buses, motorcycles, and bicycles).

Evacuation routes can also include waterways, railroads, and airfields, depending on the

availability of boats, trains, and airplanes/helicopters, respectively.

Use of reverse laning and contraflow (authorized/directed change of traffic pattern) to increase

the load of a given route. Challenges to contraflow include increased signage, increased

manpower for control, and acceptable entrance and exit points.

H-10. Evacuation may require extensive coordination with multimodal transportation assets, including

DOD, private, or state/local/federal providers. Transportation assets can come in many forms and from

many sources. A large portion of an installation population may not have access to transportation and

would need transportation assistance. Examples of potential transportation assets include the following:

Personal vehicles (cars, sport utility vehicles, travel trailers, campers, motor homes, motorcycles,

bicycles, and boats).

Motor pool assets.

Mass transit (buses, rail).

Ferries.

Air assets.

Port assets.

National Guard.

MAAs, MOUs, and ISSAs.

H-11. Each type of transportation asset may have limitations, depending on the hazard. These limitations

are considered in planning evacuation and determining clearance time. The use of some or all of these

transportation methods during certain emergencies—especially those involving flooding, high winds,

multiple aftershocks, or volcanic eruption—may be unadvisable and result in blocking the progress of the

evacuation. For example, buses are subject to driving restrictions over bridges during high winds. During a

hurricane evacuation, with wind speeds increasing over time, evacuation plans do not rely on buses or other

large transport vehicles crossing bridges after a certain point in the progression of the hurricane system

toward the area. EPI broadcasts include any prohibitions on the use of these transportation methods.

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Evacuation, Shelter in Place, and Lockdown

H-12. Evacuation

(vulnerability) zones provide a foundation to model traffic movements from one

geographic area to another. It is necessary to include storm surge modeling in the development of the

evacuation zones and to revise these zone models as information changes or is refined based on exercises or

real events. Evacuation zones are designed to meet several functions; for example—

They reflect the areas in each storm scenario which will need to be evacuated due to storm surge

inundation.

They relate as closely as possible to available population data information.

The location and vulnerability of evacuation zones are clearly defined for the protected

population to promote efficient evacuation.

EVACUATION OPERATIONS

H-13. The timely issuance of evacuation orders directly affects the successful evacuation of all designated

personnel. In determining the proper timeframe to issue evacuation orders, consider the weather, traffic,

shelter, geographic, and political conditions at the evacuation sites, on the designated evacuation route(s),

and at the receiving relocation site(s). Preevent evacuation route management with federal, state, local,

other Service, and/or private agencies and the preevent designation of relocation site(s) and coordination

with external shelter and safe- haven providers play a critical role in the management of evacuation

operations. For events with adequate warning, evacuation orders are issued when school is not in session

and when there are at least 8 hours of daylight included in the evacuation time allowed. For more

information on evacuation plans and operations, see the Department of Transportation/Federal Highway

Administration primer on Using Highways During Evacuation Operations for Events With Advance Notice.

H-14. There are two main types of evacuation orders, and the determination of which order to issue is based

on the severity of the hazard, the risk to the population, and the criticality of personnel to the EM effort:

Mandatory evacuation. This is an ordered, nonelective evacuation. Designated mission-critical

personnel are exempt from evacuation orders as required.

Voluntary evacuation. When danger to personnel is remote, but the loss of services is possible,

a voluntary evacuation may be authorized. Designated mission-critical and mission-essential

personnel may be required/requested to remain on base for emergency response and recovery.

H-15. In the event of an evacuation order, it is important to work with mission-critical and mission-

essential personnel to ensure the safety of their family members who are evacuating without them. If they

have any concerns about the ability of their family members to evacuate without them, they will be less

compliant with orders or requests to remain on base.

H-16. Clearance time refers to the time required to clear all evacuees from the evacuation routes and

complete movement to the shelter, safe-haven, or designated receiving relocation site(s). Clearance time

begins with the evacuation order, continues as the first evacuating vehicle enters the transportation

network, and ends when the last evacuating vehicle reaches its destination. Clearance time includes the

time required by evacuees to secure their homes and prepare to leave (mobilization time), the time spent by

evacuees traveling along the road network (travel time), and the time spent by evacuees waiting along the

road network due to traffic congestion (delay time). Clearance time does not refer to the time that a single

vehicle spends traveling on the road network. Note that there may be a decision cutoff point when the

projected clearance time exceeds the time to the onset of the emergency. When that occurs, the area does

not evacuate and personnel SIP or use a local safe haven.

H-17. In calculating clearance times, the participation and occupancy rates of an area are taken into

account. Assuming 100 percent participation in the evacuation and 100 percent occupancy of residences in

the area increases clearance time. However, if clearance time is calculated under the assumption that not all

residents will heed the evacuation orders or that the installation and its surrounding area are not at

maximum capacity, the calculation is significantly less.

H-18. In overseas locations, evacuations follow established DOS evacuation procedures available via the

appropriate embassy. Outside the United States and at forward operating bases, IEM plans include a section

that provides evacuation procedures for noncombatant evacuation operations.

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H-3

Appendix H

H-19. Mass casualty management requires greater numbers of medical treatment personnel to provide

emergency care. A mass casualty situation exists when the number of patients requiring care exceeds the

capabilities of initial responder medical personnel or resources. Medical responders make snap decisions on

how to best manage the casualties to provide the best care for the greatest number. In the event that patient

numbers exceed local capacity for care and treatment, a mass casualty scenario turns into a patient

evacuation problem, which requires many of the same plans, assets, and resources as other evacuations.

H-20. The installation fire department or emergency medical services (EMS) normally provide medical

evacuation from the incident site to the nearest MTF. When organic installation EMS are not available,

MOAs may be established with the off-installation EMS for the provision of these services. Deployable

medical evacuation assets may also be employed in patient evacuation.

H-21. As outlined in DODI 6200.03, the PHEO or his designee assesses the public health aspects of

evacuation management, including noncombatant evacuation operations, so that the impact on the health

and well-being of the vulnerable population is reduced. Consistent with DODI 6055.17, the medical

commander or PHEO/assistant PHEO—

Executes patient care plans and medical MAAs for patient care, medical facilities, and

equipment.

Coordinates and provides medical first responder capabilities, emergency care, mass casualty

care, triage, first receiver care, patient movement, psychological support, and pharmacy, dental,

and veterinary services

Develops patient care, fatality management, and health care system evacuation plans and

procedures appropriate in all-hazards responses

(including mass casualty, isolation, and

quarantine incidents).

RETURN FROM EVACUATION

H-22. Depending on the impact of the incident and the progress of the subsequent essential-service

restoration efforts, conditions may stabilize to a point that it is safe for some personnel to move back to

their original locations. Based on the feedback from reconnaissance, the installation commander may deem

it safe for personnel to return to their original duty stations. These returning personnel need to be kept

updated on safe and available routes of movement as the recovery efforts continue. A well-executed and

widely disseminated COP significantly improves installation ability to keep evacuation and reentry

operations running smoothly.

H-23. Returning from an evacuation requires extensive planning efforts. Evacuees returning to their homes

or work centers in evacuated areas require the same consideration, coordination, and control as they

received during the original evacuation. Some additional considerations are the availability of utilities,

extent of debris removal, structure inspection and approval for safe occupancy, availability of adequate

water for firefighting, and notification of local authorities regarding an increase in traffic flow to the

installation.

SHELTER IN PLACE

H-24. An installation ensures the capability to prepare for, ensure communication of, and immediately

execute the safe and effective SIP of an at-risk population. SIP means to take immediate shelter without

moving to a new location-this could be at home, at work, at school, or in a vehicle in between. A SIP plan

and checklist for businesses and residences can be found on the Ready America Web site online.

H-25. In emergencies with limited or no warning time, temporary SIP within the individual’s workplace or

residence is the preferred protective action to avoid casualties and fatalities. SIP procedures use existing

buildings, residences, vessels, and vehicles to protect personnel from hazards when it is not practical or

feasible to evacuate personnel in a timely manner. These locations are not certified as shelters and are

staffed only by those personnel present.

H-26. SIP may be required for a natural disaster, such as a storm or earthquake, or for an incident where

chemical, biological, or radiological contaminants are released into the environment. SIP to contain the

spread of an illness in a public health emergency is referred to as isolation and quarantine.

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Evacuation, Shelter in Place, and Lockdown

H-27. A recommendation order to start SIP also requires a follow-up recommendation to end SIP at the

appropriate time. Occupants ideally relocate to a reception center located outside of the hazard area once

the hazard has subsided to an appropriate level. If the shelter is not vacated in a timely fashion, occupants

can be exposed to lingering low levels of contaminants.

H-28. SIP also has the collateral benefits of allowing on-scene responders to focus on lifesaving actions for

people who are outside when the hazard or threat strikes and of providing responders additional time to

isolate damaged infrastructure (for example, downed power lines, broken fuel mains). This focus is

possible since responders do not have to manage large crowds of evacuated personnel or deal with

personnel blocking emergency ingress routes.

H-29. The types of hazards which most lend themselves initially to SIP are as follows:

Destructive weather with little to no advance notice; for example, a tornado.

Seismic event (but not a resultant tsunami if the seismic event occurred underwater).

Utility failure (if not a prolonged outage).

Terrorist-caused event or HAZMAT accident involving chemicals and/or biological agents.

Terrorist or accidental radiological release.

Civil disturbance (including an active shooter).

Volcanic ash fall (depending on the expected time of arrival, amount, and duration and the

availability of alternative sheltering locations).

SHELTER IN PLACE PLANNING

H-30. The following actions ensure the successful execution of SIP:

Install or implement mass warning notification systems.

Implement a geographic information system-based map grid system on medium to large

installations to facilitate the establishment of zones, and coordinate SIP data for buildings in

those zones. If possible, tailor mass warning notification system procedures to these zones.

Ensure that the installation and/or regional dispatch center has the means, authority, and

procedures to activate a mass warning notification system that initiates SIP when directed by the

IC or installation EOC.

Coordinate emergency warning messages with public awareness training materials. Due to the

short time available for emergency messages, there is little opportunity for these messages to

explain what is meant by SIP; this understanding is provided in awareness training.

Identify which buildings and structures are adequate for SIP and provide probable ICs (fire,

security, environmental) with a list of the suitable and unsuitable structures available to them.

Avoid designating structures that have permanent openings and, thus, are not capable of

being isolated from outside air (via doors, windows, and secured ventilation systems).

Avoid structures that must maintain air exchange to keep inside airborne levels from

reaching unhealthy concentrations

(typically industrial-process facilities). Also avoid

chemical and biological laboratories and chemical storage areas.

Identify the closest structures that can be secured for each of the four primary wind

directions (north, east, south, and west). Personnel should not move in the direction of the

hazard. Thus, the IC, dispatch center, or EOC monitors and provides the wind direction at

the hazardous event location so that the proper SIP location can be selected.

Notify personnel who work or live in structures that cannot be secured about information on

their alternative SIP locations.

Include the following as preferable building considerations: HVAC system that can be shut

down quickly, physical security including manual deadbolts, and locking windows.

Use areas with existing collective protection systems, if available.

Establish SIP procedures that are consistent with evacuation procedures. SIP procedures include

on-scene plans, dispatch center procedures, building plans, zone procedures, and EOC

procedures.

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H-5

Appendix H

Consider developing SIP management teams for each building that has been predetermined as

adequate for SIP. The SIP management team consists of zone managers (for medium to large

installations), the EOC sheltering coordinator, and a minimum of four SIP members for each SIP

building, including the building emergency coordinator, floor monitor(s), door monitor(s), and

building manager/maintenance staff. As an initial step, it may be more practical to build on the

organizational structure and personnel already designated in fire evacuation plans. The SIP

management team organization is designed to expand and contract as needed to meet the needs

of the incident. One person can fulfill multiple roles, depending on manpower availability and

the nature and expected duration of the incident.

SHELTER IN PLACE FOR PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES

H-31. As discussed in DODI 6200.03, the PHEO or designee plans and advises on the public health aspects

of SIP so that the impact on the health and well-being of the vulnerable population is reduced during a

public health emergency. The installation commander, in consultation with the PHEO, has the authority to

declare a DOD public health emergency and to implement relevant emergency health powers (as outlined

briefly below) to achieve the greatest public health benefit while maintaining operational effectiveness.

QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION

H-32. If the nature of the incident involves an infectious disease, quarantine or isolation may be needed

during the response and/or recovery phases to prevent contact between healthy populations and those

infected, suspected of being infected with, an infectious disease, whether natural or intentional (such as a

biological weapons attack). These decisions are made by the installation commander after consultation with

the command senior medical advisor and/or PHEO and in coordination with the local CDC quarantine

officer as outlined in DODI 6200.03.

H-33. Quarantine involves the detention of an individual or group suspected of having been exposed to an

infectious disease until it is deemed that they have escaped infection (usually once the incubation period

has lapsed). Isolation is the separation of an infected individual from a healthy population. (The term is

usually used to refer to patients in an MTF.)

H-34. Installation commanders may use other forms of restriction of movement (ROM) to maintain

operational effectiveness in the face of an infectious disease. The goal is to control the spread of the disease

by restricting contact between healthy groups of personnel and those who have, or are suspected of having,

contracted the disease. Personnel covered by ROM do not necessarily need to be removed from operations.

Rather, ROM is implemented in such a way as to allow them to continue their mission. Again, these

decisions are made with recommendations furnished by the command senior medical advisor and/or PHEO.

Note. See DODI 6200.03; Field Manual for the Treatment of Biological Warfare Agent

Casualties; Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service Support in a

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environment; TM 4-02.33; AFI 48-105; and

OPNAVINST 6210.2 for detailed information.

LOCKDOWN

H-35. Lockdown is an announced emergency protocol used as a security measure to confine and restrict

movement. Included in the lockdown procedure are all military uniformed Services, federal employees,

contractor personnel, dependents, or other people on an installation as a guest. Because of extenuating

circumstances, all personnel remain constrained inside the nearest vehicle, structure, or building that

provides a measure of protection.

H-36. During lockdown, no person may enter or exit an area until the all clear is broadcast, unless

movement is required to escape from a dangerous place or situation. All clear is announced over the

installation warning and notification system or through verbal communication by leadership through F&ES

or security forces. Lockdown is broadcast every 15 minutes until all clear is announced.

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Evacuation, Shelter in Place, and Lockdown

PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY

H-37. Consistent with DODI

6055.17, installation commanders approve a process for personnel

accountability during emergencies based on the procedures in DODI 3001.02. The personnel accountability

process is executed immediately upon implementing an order for evacuation, SIP, or lockdown. All

installation personnel, nonemployees (suppliers, visitors), and residents are made aware of the command

decision for evacuation, SIP, lockdown, movement to a safe haven, or movement to a civilian shelter.

H-38. This process identifies virtual (off-site phone number, interactive notification system, Web site, or

collaborative portal) and physical rally points and provides them to all assigned personnel via community

preparedness tools. The personnel accountability process also includes a method of accounting for

nonemployees.

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H-7

Appendix I

Mass Care Operations

Mass care operations consist of all community preparedness, interagency

coordination, mass warning and notification, installation EOC, and field activities

necessary to initiate and manage the care for personnel displaced for any duration due

to any emergency. Mass care operations encompass a broad range of tasks that

operate every aspect of a shelter or safe haven to meet the needs of a displaced

population.

MASS CARE

I-1. Mass care operations include meeting the needs of a displaced population by providing access to a

shelter or safe haven, food and water, emergency supplies, emergency pharmaceuticals, and other goods

from the time they are displaced until the time they return to the original residence or workplace. Sheltering

can occur at civilian community shelters, at local or remote safe havens (on the installation itself or on a

remote installation), or in a SIP scenario.

I-2. Mass care also includes continuous communication to evacuees throughout mass care operations. In

particular, up-to-date information is continuously provided to the displaced population about shelter

locations, transportation options, mass feeding operations, points of distribution for emergency goods and

pharmaceuticals, the evolution of the incident, and the extent and duration of displacement.

I-3. Mass care procedures include the capability to activate and manage the following:

Assistance center on the installation.

Local safe-haven operations consisting of one or more facilities on the installation.

Coordination with one or more civilian shelters provided by one or more civil jurisdictions.

Remote safe-haven operations at one or more predesignated, geographically remote receiving

installations.

Mass feeding operations at one or more locations on the installation.

Point of distribution (POD) operations for the distribution of goods and services at one or more

locations.

Installation call center

(or information hotline) operations for the distribution of approved

information to friends and family of evacuees, casualties, and fatalities.

Preexisting hazard-specific shelter locations (tornado shelters, fallout shelters).

I-4. Agreements with civilian authorities are established, when possible, to assist the installation

population with mass care at local civilian locations. On the installation, basic mass care operations are also

coordinated by organic assets, such as community assistance centers or family assistance centers that are

usually directed by the department of morale, welfare, and recreation. Fleet and family support centers

onboard Navy installations also have organic mass care capabilities that can be leveraged during an

incident.

I-5. For information on mass care, including mass feeding, see ESF 6 in the NRF and FEMA CPG 101.

The American Red Cross disaster services program also has several helpful resources that are available

online.

SAFE HAVENS

I-6. Despite the existence of civilian shelters in the local community, installations are also prepared to

provide and maintain short-term mass care services. These safe havens are able to accommodate the

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I-1

Appendix I

protected population on base during an emergency if it is still safe to remain on base, or they are able to

protect a population from a neighboring base in the event that the incident is occurring elsewhere. Safe

havens are able to operate for a short period of time before transportation to other, off-base

accommodations is secured. The installation emergency manager and the mass care coordinator collaborate

with providers of emergency assistance before an event in order to provide necessary assistance at a safe

haven during an incident. Safe havens and other emergency family assistance centers are able to provide

the following services as outlined in DODI 6055.17 and DTM 10-023:

Registration, tracking, and personnel locator assistance.

Temporary lodging.

Access to sanitary facilities, potable water, food, and sufficient lighting.

Medical triage and information on available medical services.

Family assistance center to integrate victim and family services.

Behavioral health support and psychosocial services.

Religious and pastoral care.

Support services for special needs populations, including medical needs.

Support services for animal needs.

Communication about services available and the nature of the incident.

Adequate security.

Legal and financial assistance.

Coordination with casualty and mortuary affairs.

Transportation.

Translation services.

Child and youth services.

I-7. Local safe havens are generally only capable of providing temporary mass care for 5 to 7 days. After

72 hours (or less depending on the incident and the preparedness of the community), these temporary safe-

haven residents are completely dependent on mass care operations for feeding, emergency supplies, shower

and sanitary facilities, laundry services, and even clothing. Remote safe havens vary significantly, and the

associated timeline for transition to temporary or permanent housing depends on the capabilities of the

receiving DOD installation. During this period, it is imperative that installations quickly identify temporary

housing, on- and off-post and if available on nearby DOD installations in which to relocate safe-haven

residents. Constant, honest engagement with safe haven residents on the process and the expected timeline

is a key component of the ongoing EPI process.

I-8. The safe-haven management team is responsible for the coordination of safe-haven operations. The

safe haven management team plans how to accommodate small- and large-scale evacuation operations for

people sent to or seeking local or remote safe havens. The general rules for safe-haven operation and

special instructions are prepared, distributed, and available in each safe haven. The special instructions

include capacity; facility employees and their family members who will seek shelter in the safe-haven

facility; a list of preassigned personnel designated to the safe haven; limits of the safe-haven area; proposed

layout; and the location of communications facilities, emergency equipment, and utility cutoffs. Telephone

directory and emergency communications procedures are also available. The safe-haven management team

works in coordination with the evacuation management team as described in appendix H.

MASS CARE PLANNING

I-9. The mass care planning process includes identifying the available facilities and services which exist

on the installation and coordinating the use of such facilities and services during the response and recovery

operations. The identification of facilities and services to be used during mass care operations requires the

determination of service capabilities and capacities, the movement of personnel and providers to and from

designated locations (or services to and from designated PODs), and the necessary supporting infrastructure

(vehicles, communications, utilities, generators, compressed gas, information technology) required to

provide the given service at the given location during emergency conditions.

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Mass Care Operations

I-10. As with evacuation management, planning for mass care operations relies heavily on the

demographic information collected during the planning phase. Mass care planning for an installation also

involves determining what organic resources are available to the installation for maintaining safe havens

and what other resources are available in the neighboring community for the mass care of evacuated

installation populations.

I-11. Mass care planning incorporates—

Community preparedness awareness and training.

Mass warning and notification system procedures.

Continued EPI throughout the response and recovery phases.

Personnel accountability procedures consistent with DODI 3001.02.

Facility management procedures, to include the use of pre- and postincident signage, parking

management, access control, accountability, cost accounting, transportation services, and

utility/power services for identified mass care locations/facilities.

Procedures and resources for registration, personnel tracking/accountability, security, health

services, volunteer management, distribution of goods, client services (legal, insurance, travel,

temporary housing, school registration, counseling services), shower/bathroom services, laundry

services, child support/daycare services, pet management, and waste management services.

Procedures and resources for the provision of fuel, water, and emergency supplies to identified

local and remote safe havens and through the use of PODs.

Procedures for supporting and managing medical access and special needs populations, and

personnel with psychological effects.

Procedures for providing transportation assistance to and from mass care locations/facilities for

populations without access to transportation.

Procedures for non-English-speaking personnel and the visually and hearing impaired.

Procedures for further evacuation in case the incident expands or a second incident occurs.

Template mass care information sheets in multiple languages with locations of local safe havens,

civilian shelters, and PODs and information on community assistance center services.

Template safe-haven resident information sheets in multiple languages with rules and guidelines

for local safe havens, to include standardized policies on registration, children, personal

belongings, mobile phone use, animals/pets, smoking, alcohol, drugs, weapons, quiet hours,

music/video player/game use, parking, volunteers, security, and health services.

I-12. Populations in urban environments with lower household income and/or with the lowest fear of

property security (that their home will be protected by LE while away) are the most likely to seek a public

safe haven or civilian shelter when impacted by an emergency or when directed to move to a safe haven or

civilian shelter by authorities. For example, these categories may encompass junior enlisted personnel,

barracks populations, and family housing area residents. Refer to FEMA Community Mass Care

Management Course for more information.

I-13. The safe-haven management team determines suitable locations for safe havens using the following

guidance and presents their findings to the IEMWG for approval by the installation commander. Although

not all of the following considerations/needs must be met, safe havens strive to include as many as

possible:

Safe and secure location.

Suitable space for sleeping quarters.

Secured storage areas.

Suitable space for people with pets.

Adequate supply of drinking water (5 gallons/person/day).

Adequate toilet and bathing facilities (1 toilet/40 people).

Provisions for cooking and serving food, if possible.

Fire and police protection.

Adequate parking.

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I-3

Appendix I

Exterior walls made of concrete block or reinforced concrete.

Load-bearing interior walls.

Doorframes securely attached to the structure and properly braced.

Windows with impact protection from flying debris.

Personnel areas located away from unprotected windows and doors.

Structure able to resist wind uplift forces.

Properly attached roof cladding.

Finished floors at least 15 feet above mean sea level for coastal areas and at least 15 feet above

floodplain level for inland areas. (A structurally sound, multifloor building that is less than 15

feet above mean sea level may still be used as a safe haven with occupancy on floors above that

minimum.)

Inside stairwells and ready access to exits.

No hazardous utility lines (steam, gas, oil) located in or near the safe haven (unless provision is

made to control such hazards via valve alignment or other means).

No units of access and egress less than 28 inches wide. At least two widely separated means of

egress.

Emergency power.

Appropriate size (consider facilities such as churches or restaurants for up to 100 people and

schools, hotels, conference centers, and sport complexes for more than 100 people).

Facility compliance with AT standards.

I-14. Electrical power may or may not be available from normal sources in a disaster situation; however,

consideration is given to the use of local, unit, and installation portable emergency generators to provide

power to safe havens. Where such generators are included in safe-haven plans, the plans also include a 2-

week fuel supply, emergency refueling procedures for each generator, and the electrical tie-in of the

generators to minimum-essential operational and environmental circuitry. Portable generators must never

be operated indoors, or deadly levels of carbon monoxide can accumulate. An OSHA fact sheet can be

obtained online.

RAPID NEEDS ASSESSMENT

I-15. In order to quickly identify postincident mass care, medical care, public health, and behavioral health

needs, installations

develop and execute a rapid needs assessment process. The

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies has published a Disaster

Emergency Needs Assessment training tool and accompanying checklists that can be a useful guide

in tailoring a rapid needs assessment process for an installation.

I-16. Rapid needs assessments are designed to quickly provide accurate and inexpensive population-based

information needed to match a community’s mass care needs with the available resources. Early

assessments combined with rapid mobilization of resources can significantly reduce human suffering and

the potential for secondary medical, public health, and behavioral health impacts.

ACCESS AND FUNCTIONAL NEEDS

I-17. Persons with transportation needs include any individual who, by reason of illness, injury, age,

congenital malfunction, or other permanent or temporary incapacity or disability, is unable without special

facilities or special planning or design to use mass transportation facilities as effectively as persons who are

not so affected. Within the transportation needs category, those with access and functional needs differ in

severity and extent of disabilities; the way in which other people view their physical and mental limitations;

and their income, age, and mobility. Persons with transportation needs are those who find it difficult to

evacuate without aid from community members, caretakers, family members, friends, or rescue workers.

Persons with transportation needs often include the elderly and people with disabilities and can include

persons with medical needs. Persons with transportation needs also include fully mobile people who have

no means of transportation off the installation. This may be due to lack of financial capability to pay for

public transportation, or, where none exists, may be due to a lack of a vehicle (such as, a car).

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Mass Care Operations

I-18. Persons with medical needs include those with potentially life-threatening conditions and/or chronic

medical/physical conditions requiring specialty care or follow-up support more than once a year. Medical

needs persons also include those with current and chronic behavioral health conditions, those who have

required inpatient or intensive outpatient behavioral health service from any provider within the last five

years or at the present time. Other qualifications include a diagnosis of asthma or other respiratory-related

diagnosis with chronic recurring wheezing which meets specified criteria and a diagnosis of attention

deficit disorder/attention deficit hyperactivity disorder that meets the specified criteria, requires adaptive

equipment, requires assistive technology devices or services, and/or requires environmental/architectural

considerations.

I-19. All persons with access and functional needs must have access to the same safe havens as persons

without access and functional needs. Although not required, if deemed appropriate by the IEM, safe havens

for persons with access and functional needs may be set up; however, all other safe havens still accept

persons with access and functional needs. The IEMWG considers the following in planning for those with

access and functional needs:

Ensure accessible entrances, toilet and bathroom facilities, and safe haven area for those with

wheelchairs and scooters.

Ensure adequate refrigeration or cooler availability for those with medications.

Ensure safe haven staff are properly trained to assist those with access and functional needs

before a disaster strikes.

Include persons with access and functional needs in safe havens; persons with access and

functional needs should not be separated from any other persons in the safe haven except where

necessary due to conflicts with companion animals and persons with allergies.

Allow companion animals, seeing animals, retrieval animals, and all other pets that assist access

and functional needs persons into the safe haven, and allow the animals to remain with their

owners.

Ensure availability of generators.

Ensure that all safe haven information and announcements are accessible to those who are deaf,

hard of hearing, blind, or visually impaired.

ANIMAL NEEDS MANAGEMENT

I-20. A plan for addressing the needs and care of animals in the event of an evacuation is also developed

for each IEM program. Whether pets are to be allowed in a safe haven is the decision of the installation

commander. If pets are allowed in remote safe havens, there is a signed agreement between the two

installations.

I-21. Keeping animals and their owners together is a way of reducing stress on disaster victims. Dealing

with separated owners and their animals can become a predominant issue in large-scale evacuations. Close

cooperation with the animal-care community is the best way to plan for and respond to these issues. Local

community veterinarians and animal control or humane shelter directors can be asked to coordinate

evacuations and rescues of animals in an organized manner.

COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE CENTER

I-22. IEM programs establish procedures for creating a community assistance center (or similar center) to

provide services based upon the needs of the specific emergency. The community assistance center (or

similar) provides the following services:

Mass care registration services.

Personnel accountability liaison.

Volunteer management service.

Donations management service.

Support services for non-English-speaking, hearing impaired, visually impaired, and physically

impaired populations.

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I-5

Appendix I

Information on safe haven and civilian shelter locations, transportation routes and services,

laundry locations, shower/bath facility locations, PODs, and utilities and power outages.

Service liaisons: health services, access and functional needs populations, animal needs

populations, utility providers (gas, water, power, waste management), and U.S. Postal Service.

Client services: individual assistance programs, legal counsel, banking services, insurance claim

services, travel services (aviation, rail, bus, ferry, and rental cars), school/childcare/daycare

registration, counseling services, and housing coordination services.

PUBLIC HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS

I-23. As outlined in DODI 6200.03, the PHEO or his designee plans for and advises on the public health

aspects of mass care and access and functional needs populations so that the impact on the health and well-

being of the vulnerable population is reduced during a public health emergency.

I-24. Consistent with DODI 6055.17, DOD installations develop a mass prophylaxis plan for ensuring the

mass distribution of prophylactic and/or curative medications during a public health emergency. In

executing mass prophylaxis, each installation leverages its own inherent capability as well as the

capabilities of supporting resources (for example, civilian institutions, local health departments, or access

to the Strategic National Stockpile [SNS]). Medical logistics tracks mass prophylaxis and other medical

supplies.

I-25. Logistics, facilities, security, and medical support functions coordinate a unified effort to set up one

or more PODs for the allocation of prophylactic and/or curative medications. The location and supply of

PODs is usually coordinated with parallel civilian support functions, since receipt and distribution of

medications and supplies within the SNS is coordinated with the state or local entity governing SNS

distribution.

Note. Marine Corps installations are prohibited from serving as open PODs for the general

public.

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Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army

and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which FM 3-81

is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent publication for other

terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR

after action report

ADRP

Army doctrine refrence publication

AFMAN

Air Force manual

AFPD

Air Force policy directive

AFI

Air Force instruction

AFTTP

Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

APCO

Association of Public Safety Communication Officials

Army regulation

antiterrorism

ATP

Army techniques publication

attn

attention

CAP

corrective-action plan

CBRN

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

CBRNE

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives

CDC

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CEMP

comprehensive emergency management plan

CFR

Code of Federal Regulation

counterintelligence

CIKR

critical infrastructure and key resources

CIP

critical infrastructure protection

CJCS

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJCSI

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction

CJCSM

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual

consequence management

CMF

critical mission facility

CNIC

Commander, Navy Installations Command

COMM

commercial

COOP

continuity of operations

COP

common operational picture

CPG

Comprehensive Preparedness Guide

Department of the Army

DCIP

Defense Critical Infrastructure Program

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Glossary-1

Glossary

DHS

Department of Homeland Security

DIA

Defense Intelligency Agency

DOD

Department of Defense

DODD

Department of Defense directive

DODI

Department of Defense instruction

DOS

Department of State

DSCA

defense support of civil authorities

DSN

Defense Switched Network

DTM

directive-type memorandum

EAP

emergency action plan

emergency management

EMS

emergency medical services

EOC

emergency operations center

EOD

explosive ordnance disposal

EPA

Environmental Protection Agency

EPI

emergency public information

ERS

emergency relocation site

ESF

emergency support function

ESOH

environment, safety and occupational health

F&ES

fire and emergency services

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FCM

foreign consequence management

FDR

foreign disaster relief

FED STD

federal standard

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency

field manual

force protection

G-2

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence

HAZMAT

hazardous materials

host nation

HSA

hazard-specific appendix

HSEEP

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program

HSPD

Homeland Security Presidential directive

HVAC

heating, ventilation, and air conditioning

IAP

incident action plan

incident commander

ICP

incident command post

ICS

Incident Command System

IEM

installation emergency management

IEMWG

installation emergency management working group

INST

instruction

improvement plan

Glossary-2

TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/NTTP 3-11.36/AFTTP 3-2.83

23 June 2014

Glossary

ISSA

inter-Service support agreement

JITF-CT

Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism

joint publication

JRSOI

joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration

law enforcement

LTE

long-term evolution

MCO

Marine Corps order

MAA

mutual aid agreement

MCRP

Marine Corps reference publication

MCWP

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication

MOA

memorandum of agreement

MOU

memorandum of understanding

MSCoE

Maneuver Support Center of Excellence

MTF

medical treatment facility

NAVMED

Navy medical

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC

nuclear, biological, and chemical

NDRF

National Disaster Recovery Framework

NFPA

National Fire Protection Agency

NGO

nongovernmental organization

NIMS

National Incident Management System

NPG

National Preparedness Goal

NRF

National Response Framework

NTTP

Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

NWP

Navy Warfare Publication

OPNAVINST

Chief of Naval Operations instruction

NTRP

Navy tactical reference publication

OEH

occupational and environmental health

OSHA

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

PHEO

public health emergency officer

POD

point of distribution

PPD

Presidential policy directive

RFA

request for assistance

ROM

restriction of movement

situational awareness

SIP

shelter in place

SNS

Strategic National Stockpile

SOFA

status-of-forces agreement

SOH

safety and occupational health

SOP

standard operating procedure

STANAG

standardization agreement

TACMEMO

tactical memorandum

technical manual

23 June 2014

TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/NTTP 3-11.36/AFTTP 3-2.83

Glossary-3

References

Field Manuals and selected joint publications are listed by new number followed by old number.

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.

ADRP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 24 September 2013.

JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 8 November 2010.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

AIR FORCE

AFI 10-2501. Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operations. 24 January

2007.

AFI 48-105. Surveillance, Prevention, and Control of Diseases and Conditions of Public Health or

Military Significance. 1 March 2005.

ARMY

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online at <www.apd.army.mil >.

AR 25-30. The Army Publishing Program. 27 March 2006.

AR 525-27. Army Emergency Management Program. 13 March 2009.

DA Pamphlet 525-27. Army Emergency Management Program. 20 September 2012.

FM 5-19. Composite Risk Management. 21 August 2006.

FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.

TM 4-02.33. Control of Communicable Diseases Manual. 1 June 2009.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOD Independent Review. Protecting the Force: Lessons From Fort Hood. January 2010.

DOD O-2000.12-H. DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Handbook. February 2004.

DODD 2000.12. DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program. 1 March 2012.

DODD 3020.26. Department of Defense Continuity Programs. 9 January 2009.

DODD 3020.40. DOD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure. 14 January 2010.

DODD 3025.18. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). 29 December 2010.

DODD 5100.46. Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR).6 July 2012.

DODD 5530.3. International Agreements. 11 June 1987.

DODD 7730.65. Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). 3 June 2002.

DODI 2000.16. DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards. 2 October 2006.

DODI 2000.21. Foreign Consequence Management (FCM). 10 March 2006.

DODI 3001.02. Personnel Accountability in Conjunction With Natural or Manmade Disasters. 3 May

2010.

DODI 3020.42. Defense Continuity Plan Development. 17 February 2006.

DODI 3020.45. Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) Management. 21 April 2008.

DODI 3020.52. DOD Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield

Explosives (CBRNE) Preparedness Standards. 18 May 2012.

23 June 2014

TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/NTTP 3-11.36/AFTTP 3-2.83

References-1

References

DODI 6055.06-M. DOD Fire and Emergency Services Certification Program. 23 February 2006.

DODI 6055.07. Mishap Notification, Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping. 6 June 2011.

DODI 6055.17. DOD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program. 13 January 2009.

DODI 6200.03. Public Health Emergency Management within the Department of Defense. 5 March

2010.

Secretary of Defense Memorandum. Final Recommendations of the Ft. Hood Follow-On Review. 18

August 2010.

JOINT

Most joint publications are available online at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm >.

JP 3-07.2. Antiterrorism. 24 November 2010.

JP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 31 July 2013.

JP 3-29. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 3 January 2014.

JP 3-41. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear Consequence Management. 21 June 2012.

JP 4-06. Mortuary Affairs. 12 October 2011.

MARINE CORPS

MCWP 5-1. Marine Corps Planning Process. 24 August 2010.

NAVY

CNIC INST 3440.17. Navy Installation Emergency Management Program Manual. 23 January 2006.

OPNAVINST 6210.2. Quarantine Regulations of the Navy. 29 June 2006.

OTHER SOURCES

AFI 10-2501. Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operations. 31 January

2014.

APCO Project 25. Statement of Requirements. 3 March 2010. Can be accessed at

https://www.apcointl.org/images/pdf/SOR-2010.pdf , accessed on 1 May 2014.

Continuity Assistance Tool (CAT), July 2009. Can be accessed at

http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/org/ncp/cat.pdf , accessed on 1 May 2014.

Department of Transportation. Emergency Response Guidebook. 2012.

Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration. Using Highways During Evacuation

Operations for Events With Advance Notice. December 2006.

DTM 10-023. Emergency Family Assistance. 10 December 2010. Can be accessed at

http://www.militaryonesource.mil/12038/Project%20Documents/MilitaryHOMEFRONT/Serv

ice%20Providers/DoD%20Conferences/MFPP/Eligibility/DTM_10-023.pdf, accessed 2 May

2014.

Executive Order 13407. Public Alert and Warning System. 26 June 2006.

Federal Standard 376B. Preferred Metric Units for General Use by the Federal Government. 27

January 1993. accessed at <http://www.nist.gov/pml/wmd/metric/upload/fs376-b.pdf >,

accessed on 28 April 2014.

FEMA CPG 101, Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans. 1 November 2010. Can

be accessed at at

<http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?fromSearch=fromsearch&id=5697>, accessed

on 29 April 2014.

FEMA Incident Annexes, Can be accessed at

<http://usasearch.fema.gov/search?query=incident+annexes&affiliate=fema>, accessed on2

May 2014.

References-2

TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/NTTP 3-11.36/AFTTP 3-2.83

23 June 2014

References

FEMA. National Disaster Recovery Framework. September 2011. Can be accessed at

https://www.fema.gov/pdf/recoveryframework/ndrf.pdf , accessed 1 May 2014.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). 1 April 2013. Can be accessed at

https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/32326 , accessed 1 May 2014.

HSPD 5. Management of Domestic Incidents. 28 February 2003.

HSPD 21. Public Health and Medical Preparedness. 18 October 2007.

National Incident Management System. December 2008. Can be accessed at

https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf , accessed on 1 May 2014.

NFPA 1600®. Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs.

2013 Edition.

Public Law 93-288. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. Amended

through PL 113-2 enacted 29 January 2013. Can be accessed at

http://www.house.gov/legcoun/Comps/Robert%20T.%20Stafford%20Disaster%20Relief%20

And%20Emergency%20Assistance%20Act.pdf, accessed on 1 May 2014.

Public Law 107-296. The Homeland Security Act. 25 November 2002. Can be accessed at

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf , accessed 1 May 2014.

PPD 8. National Preparedness. March 30, 2011.

Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (18 USC § 1385). 18 June 1878. Can be accessed at

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCODE-2011-title18/USCODE-2011-title18-partI-

chap67-sec1385, accessed on 1 May 2014.

The National Military Strategy of the United States of America. 2011. Can be accessed at

<http://www.army.mil/info/references/docs/NMS%20FEB%202011.pdf >, accessed on 29

April 2014.

STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS

STANAG 2047. Emergency Alarms of Hazard or Attack (CBRN and Air Attack Only)-ATP-85, Edition

A. 7 November 2013.

STANAG 2521 (Edition 1). CBRN Defence on Operations-ATP-3.8.1, Volume 1. 14 January 2010.

STANAG 2873 (Edition 4). Concept of Operations of Medical Support in Chemical, Biological,

Radiological, and Nuclear Environments-AMedP-7 (D). 6 December 2007.

STANAG 4359. NATO Handbook for Sampling and Identification of Chemical Warfare Agents-AEP-

10. 29 January 1991.

PRESCRIBED FORMS

None.

REFERENCED FORMS

Most Army forms are available online at <www.apd.army.mil >.

DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

WEB SITES

Army Knowledge Online, <https://www.us.army.mil>, accessed on 28 April 2014.

Army Knowledge Online, Doctrine and Training Publications. Can be accessed at

<https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html >, accessed on 28 April 2014.

Army Publishing Directorate, Army Publishing Updates. Can be accessed at

<http://www.apd.army.mil/AdminPubs/new_subscribe.asp >, accessed on 28 April 2014.

Biological Incident Annex. Can be accessed at

<http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf_BiologicalIncidentAnnex.pdf>, accessed on10

April 2014.

23 June 2014

TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/NTTP 3-11.36/AFTTP 3-2.83

References-3

References

Catastrophic Incident Annex. Can be accessed at

<http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf_CatastrophicIncidentAnnex.pdf>, accessed on

10 April 2014.

Critical Infrastructure Resource Center. Can be accessed at

http://www.dhs.gov/topic/critical-infrastructure-security >, accessed on 29 April 2014.

Cyber Incident Annex. Can be accessed at < http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1825-

25045-8307/cyber_incident_annex_2004.pdf >, accessed on 29 April 2014.

Disaster Emergency Needs Assessment. Can be accessed at

<http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Disemnas.pdf>, accessed on 10 April 2014.

FEMA Building Science. Can be accessed at <www.fema.gov/rebuild/buildingscience>, accessed on

29 April 2014.

FEMA Continuity Assistance Tool. Can be accessed at at

<http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/org/ncp/cat.pdf>, accessed on 29 April 2014.

FEMA HSEEP. Can be accessed at <https://hseep.dhs.gov/pages/1001_HSEEP7.aspx>, accessed on 29

April 2014.

FEMA Lessons Learned Information Sharing. Can be accessed at <www.llis.dhs.gov>, accessed on 11

April 2014.

FEMA Mitigation Best Practices Portfolio. Can be accessed at <http:

www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/bestpractices/index.shtm>, accessed on 11 April 2014.

FEMA Mitigation. Can be accessed at <http://www.fema.gov/government/mitigation.shtm>, accessed

on 11 April 2014.

FEMA NIMS Guide. Can be accessed at <http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/ng_0001.pdf>,

accessed on 11April 2014.

FEMA Preparedness Guidance. Can be accessed at at <http://www.ready.gov>, accessed on 11April

2014.

FEMA Resource Management. Can be accessed at <http://www.fema.gov/resource-management>,

accessed on 11April 2014.

Food and Agriculture Incident Annex. Can be accessed at

<http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf_FoodAgricultureIncidentAnnex.pdf>, accessed

on 11April 2014.

Mass Evacuation Incident Annex. Can be accessed at

<http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf_massevacuationincidentannex.pdf>, accessed

on 11April 2014.

Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex. Can be accessed at at

<http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf_nuclearradiologicalincidentannex.pdf>.

accessed on 11April 2014.

OSHA Fact Sheet, Using Portable Generators Safely. Can be accessed at at

<http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/data_Hurricane_Facts/portable_generator_safety.pdf >,

accessed on 11April 2014.

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Guidelines (NIOSH). Can be accessed at

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ , accessed 2 May 2014.

U.S. Air Force e-Publishing. Can be accessed at <www.e-publishing.af.mil>, accessed on 11April

2014.

U.S. Army CBRN School. Can be accessed at

< http://www.wood.army.mil/newweb/chemical/index.htm>, accessed on 11 April 2014.

U.S. Marine Corps Doctrine. Can be accessed at <https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/>, accessed on

11April 2014.

U.S. Navy Doctrine Library System. Can be accessed at <https://ndls.nwdc.navy.mil>, accessed on

11April 2014.

References-4

TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/NTTP 3-11.36/AFTTP 3-2.83

23 June 2014

References

RECOMMENDED READINGS

29 CFR. Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

10 USC. Armed Forces.

32 USC. National Guard.

42 USC. The Public Health and Welfare.

A National Strategy for CBRNE Standards. May 2011. Can be accessed at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/chns_cbrne_standards_final_24

_aug_11.pdf, accessed on 1 May 2014.

AFI 34-242. Mortuary Affairs Program. 2 April 2008.

AFMAN 10-2502. Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS) Standards and Procedures. 25

September 2009.

AFMAN 10-2504. Air Force Incident Management Guidance for Major Accidents and Natural

Disasters. 13 March 2013.

AFPD 10-25. Emergency Management. 28 April 2014.

Air Force. Installation Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP 10-2) template. Can be

accessed at

http://www.linkformtemplate.com/detail_form_template/a/i/Air_Force_Cemp_10_2___PDF_

documents_248230.html, accessed on 2 May 2014.

AR 25-30. The Army Publishing Program. 27 March 2006.

ATP 3-11.36. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological,

Radiological, and Nuclear Aspects of Command and Control. 1 November 2013.

ATP 4-02.84/MCRP 4-11.1C/NTRP 4-02.23/AFMAN 44-156-IP. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques

and Procedures for Treatment of Biological Warfare Agent Casualties. 25 March 2013.

ATP 3-11.37. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological,

Radiological, and Nuclear Reconnaissance and Surveillance. 25 March 2013.

CJCS. National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. 13 February 2006.

CJCSI 3125.01C. Defense Response to Chemical Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN)

Incidents in the Homeland. 4 June 2012.

CJCSM 3150.05D. Joint Reporting System Situation Monitoring Manual. 31 January 2011.

DOD 3025.1-M. Manual for Civil Emergencies. 6 June 1994.

DODD 4715.1E. Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health (ESOH). 19 March 2005.

DODI O-3020.43. Emergency Management and Incident Command on the Pentagon Facilities. 6

March 2007.

DODI 1100.22. Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix. 12 April 2010.

DODI 3025.21. Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies. 27 February 2013.

DODI 6055.1. DOD Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Program. 19 August 1998.

DODI 6055.05. Occupational and Environmental Health (OEH). 11 November 2008.

Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986. Can be accessed at

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title42/html/USCODE-2010-title42-

chap116.htm, accessed 1 May 2014.

EPA 550-F-00-009. First Responders' Environmental Liability Due To Mass Decontamination Runoff.

July 2000.

Executive Order 12196. Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Federal Employees. 26

February 1980.

Federal Continuity Directive 1: Federal Executive Branch National Continuity Program

Requirements. 17 January 2013. Can be accessed at <https://www.fema.gov/media-

library/assets/documents/30478>, accessed 2 May 2014.

23 June 2014

TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/NTTP 3-11.36/AFTTP 3-2.83

References-5

References

Federal Continuity Directive 2: Federal Executive Branch Mission Essential Function and Candidate

Primary Mission Essential Functions Identification and Submission Process. July 2013. Can

be accessed at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-

data/1cb0be27f0ab8f8d2568ba514c9e3492/FCD+2+Signed+.July+2013.pdf, accessed 2 May

14.

FM 3-11/MCWP 3-37.1/NWP 3-11/AFTTP (I) 3-2.42. Multi-Service Doctrine for Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations.1 July 2011.

FM 3-11.3/MCRP 3-37.2A/NTTP 3-11.25/AFTTP (I) 3-2.56. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Contamination Avoidance. 2

February 2006.

FM 3-11.4/MCWP 3-37.2/NTTP 3-11.27/AFTTP (I) 3-2.46. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Protection. 2 June 2003.

FM 3-11.5/MCWP 3-37.3/NTTP 3-11.26/AFTTP (I) 3-2.60. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Decontamination. 4 April

2006.

FM 3-11.21/MCRP 3-37.2C/NTTP 3-11.24/AFTTP(I) 3-2.37. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques and

Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management

Operations. 1 April 2008.

FM 4-02.7/MCRP 4-11.1F/NTTP 4-02.7/AFTTP 3-42.3. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Health Service Support in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Environment. 15 July 2009.

FM 4-20.64. Mortuary Affairs Operations. 9 January 2007.

FM 8-284/ NAVMED P-5042/AFMAN (I) 44-156/MCRP 4-11.1C. Field Manual for the Treatment of

Biological Warfare Agent Casualties. 17 July 2000.

HSPD 7. Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection. 17 December 2003.

JP 3-11. Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments. 4

October 2013.

JP 3-35. Deployment and Redeployment Operations. 31 January 2013.

JP 3-40. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. 10 June 2009.

JP 3-57. Civil-Military Operations. 11 September 2013.

JP 3-68. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.23 December 2010.

JP 4-0. Joint Logistics. 16 October 2013.

JP 4-02. Health Service Support. 26 July 2012.

JP 5-0. Joint Operation Planning.11 August 2011.

STANAG 7193 . Incident Command System for Fire and Emergency Services Responses to Incidents.

7 February 2013.

References-6

TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/NTTP 3-11.36/AFTTP 3-2.83

23 June 2014

Index

action planning process, D-3

incident action planning, D-3

National Incident Management

animal needs, I-5

System, 1-1

incident command system, 3-3,

antiterrorism, 2-8

D-2, D-3

National Preparedness Goal,

1-2

Incident Command System, 1-

National Response

capability assessment, 2-7, B-5

Framework, 1-2

incident support base, 3-11, 3-

command and control, 3-3, 3-4,

needs assessment, B-10

D-1

information management, E-1

common operational picture, 3-

installation emergency

5, 3-9

personnel accountability, H-7

management plan, 2-7, C-1

communications, 3-8, 3-10, C-

public awareness, 2-13

installation emergency

5, C-6, E-1

public health, 4-7, C-8, D-1, H-

management program, 2-3

community awareness, 2-12, 2-

4, H-6, I-6

Installation Emergency

Management Working

consequence assessment, B-5

Group, 1-9, 2-3

quarantine, H-4, H-5, H-6

continuity of operations, 2-8

installation emergency

critical infrastructure protection,

manager, 1-8, 2-3

2-10

interoperability, 2-11, 2-12, E-

rapid needs assessment, I-4

criticality assessment, B-2

1, E-2, E-3, F-2, G-2

resource management, 3-11

isolation, H-4, H-5, H-6

resource typing, F-2

restriction of movement, H-6

defense support of civil

authorities-, 3-6

risk management, 2-6, B-1

joint reception, staging, onward

movement, and integration,

3-12

emergency operations center,

safe havens, I-1

2-3, 3-5, D-3

shelter in place, H-4, H-5, H-6

emergency operations centers,

lessons learned, 5-5

special needs

D-1

lockdown, H-6

See access and functional

emergency public information,

needs, I-4, I-5

3-9, E-3

support agreements, 2-11, G-1

mass care, I-1, I-2

emergency support functions,

support annexes, C-15, C-17

3-8, C-4, C-5, C-16

mass prophylaxis, I-6

evacuation, H-1, H-2, H-3, H-4

mass warning notification, E-1,

E-2

tenant and transient units, 1-9

evaluation, 2-15

memorandums of

threat assessment, B-2

exercises, 2-14

understanding, 2-11, G-1

training, 2-13

mission command, 3-3, 3-4, D-

transfer of command, D-3

family assistance center, I-1, I-

mission-essential functions, 2-

force protection, 2-8

8, 2-9

unified command, 1-2, 3-5, D-

2, D-3

functional area, C-16

mobile command center, D-4

functional areas, 3-8

mortuary affairs, 4-6, 4-7

Multiagency Coordination

vulnerability assessment, 2-7,

System, 3-6

B-4

hazard assessment, B-2, B-3

mutual aid agreement, 2-11, G-

vulnerability reduction, 5-2

hazard-specific appendixes, C-

14, C-16

23 June 2014

TM 3-11.42/MCWP 3-38.1/NTTP 3-11.36/AFTTP 3-2.83

Index-1

Electronic Warfare

PREFACE

The foundations for Canadian Land Force (LF) doctrine are

the capstone and keystone manuals in the B-GL-300 series. An

understanding of the capstone and keystone doctrine is fundamental to

the understanding of any of the supporting doctrinal publications. Of

particular importance to this publication is B-GL-300-005/FP-001

Information Operations. It is the keystone manual that establishes the

intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance

(ISTAR) concept and defines electronic warfare (EW) as an integral

component of Canadian LF information operations. It should be read

in conjunction with this publication.

The introduction of the ISTAR concept in

B-GL-300-005/FP-001 Information Operations marked the beginning

of the Army’s transition from machine age warfare to information age

warfare. This publication follows that path and explains the doctrinal

and operational framework within which LF EW fits. It must be

understood that a fundamental precept of LF operations stipulates that

EW is an integral element of a formation ISTAR capability. In this

regard B-GL-352-001/FP-001 LF Information Operations: ISTAR

should also be read.

Of note the LF doctrinal model is in transformation from the

six combat functions—command, information operations, manoeuvre,

firepower, protection and sustain—to the five operational

functions—command, sense, act, shield and sustain. For the purposes

of this publication the transformation is irrelevant, as the content

herein remains unchanged as the combat capability of EW moves from

information operations to Sense and Act in terms of a doctrinal model.

However, until the keystone manuals for Sense and Act are written,

B-GL-300-005/FP-001 Information Operations remains the keystone

manual pertaining to EW.

The LF does not conduct operations in isolation. This

publication represents LF tactical EW doctrine only. An

understanding of joint and combined operations as they pertain to EW

is necessary but beyond the scope of this publication.

B-GG-005-004/AF-000 CF Operations (dated 2000-12-18) and

B-GG-005-004/AF-010 CF Information Operations (dated

1998-04-15) provide the CF Joint doctrinal position wrt EW.

This publication introduces a few new doctrinal concepts,

which are already employed by the Army. It introduces the light,

medium and heavy troop structure employed by the EW squadron as

iii

B-GL-358-001/FP-001

SECTION 2 EW DEFINITION

Introduction

SECTION 3 ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT

MEASURES (ESM)

Introduction

SECTION 4 ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES

(ECM)

SECTION 5 ELECTRONIC PROTECTIVE MEASURES

(EPM)

Introduction

SECTION 6 THE ROLE OF EW

SECTION 7 ELECTRONIC WARFARE CAPABILITIES

SECTION 8 EW SUPPORT

SECTION 9 ORGANIZATION: FORCE GENERATION

Light EW

Heavy EW

SECTION 10 ORGANISATION: FORCE EMPLOYMENT

CHAPTER 3 COMMAND & CONTROL OF EW

SECTION 1 GENERAL

SECTION 2 COMMAND OF EW

SECTION 3 EWCC

Electronic Warfare Operations Centre (EWOC)

Electronic Warfare Liaison Officers (EWLOs)

CHAPTER 4 THE OPP, IPB, TARGETING, ISTAR & EW

PROCESSES

SECTION 1 THE OPERATIONAL

PLANNING PROCESS

SECTION 2 EW AND THE IPB PROCESS

SECTION 3 EW AND THE TARGETING PROCESS

SECTION 4 THE ISTAR PLANNING PROCESS

Guidance

PIR

IPB

Electronic Warfare

Operations Plan Development

SECTION 5 ISTAR PLAN

SECTION 6 THE EW PROCESSES

CHAPTER 5 ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT

MEASURES

SECTION 1 GENERAL

SECTION 2 SEARCH & INTERCEPT FUNCTION

SECTION 3 DIRECTION FINDING

SECTION 4 ANALYSIS

SECTION 5 ELINT ESM

CHAPTER 6 ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES

SECTION 1 GENERAL

SECTION 2 ELECTRONIC JAMMING

Control of Jamming

Jammer Platforms

Expendable Jammers

ECM as EPM: Jamming in Non-EW Units

SECTION 3 ELECTRONIC DECEPTION

SECTION 4 ELECTRONIC NEUTRALIZATION

ANNEX A

RESTRICTED FREQUENCY LISTS

Introduction

SECTION 2 RFL PRODUCTION AND DISSEMINATION .. 67

Standard Formation TABOO and PROTECTED List

RFL Maintenance Procedures

RFL FORMAT

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A RFL FORMAT & EXAMPLE

ANNEX B

ELECTRONIC DECEPTION

Introduction

ED Planning

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B ED PLANNING

CHECKLIST

CHAPTER 7 ELECTRONIC PROTECTIVE

MEASURES

vii

Electronic Warfare

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1-1: The Spectrum of Conflict

Figure 1-2: Combat Power Model

Figure 1-3: Battlefield Framework

Figure 1-4: Electronic Warfare in Information Operations

Figure 1-5: Mapping EW onto the Op Function Model

Figure 2-1: The Electromagnetic Spectrum

Figure 2-2: National to Tactical EW Op Support

Figure 2-3: SEWOC

Figure 2-4: SEWCC

Figure 2-5: EW Sqn Deployment Orbat

Figure 2-6: NEO EW Tm

Figure 2-7: EWCC/MEWT

Figure 2-8: Rapid Deployment EW Tp

Figure 3-1: EW Coordination

Figure 3-2: JFC EWCC Integration & Relationships

Figure 3-3: Centralized SEWOC Deployment

Figure 3-4: Dispersed SEWOC Deployment with Fwd Search,

Intercept, DF & Analysis

Figure 4-1: EW in the Targeting Process

Figure 4-2: ESM Process

Figure 4-3: ECM process

Figure 5-1: EW Operational Support

Figure 6A-1: The RFL Process

Figure 6B-1: The ED Process

Figure 7-1: Electronic Counter-Countermeasures

Figure 7-2: Antenna Techniques

Electronic Warfare

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

SECTION 1

THE STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL

CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION

Electronic warfare (EW) has been practiced in every conflict

since World War I. Fundamentally, the practice of EW has not

changed. However, the context in which EW must operate has. The

Canadian Land Force has developed new doctrine and has placed a

greater emphasis on joint and coalition operations. As well, closer

relationships with national and strategic agencies have had significant

impacts on the conduct of EW. The purpose of this chapter is to place

EW in context of these new developments.

DEFENCE OBJECTIVES

Mission. Canada faces no direct military threat to its

sovereign territory. Nevertheless, there remain direct and indirect

threats to our national security for which a military response may be

required. The Canadian Forces are responsible to defend Canada and

Canadian interests and values while contributing to international peace

and security.¹ In B-GL-300-000/FP-000 Canada’s Army, strategic

doctrine sets the context for all Canadian Land Force doctrine.² That

doctrine divides the mission for the Land Force into three separate

defence objectives:

Defence of Canada. The Land Force defends

Canada by operating alone or jointly with the air and

maritime forces. They assist in the conduct of

surveillance and control of Canada’s territory,

airspace and maritime areas of jurisdiction and

respond to requests from provincial authorities for

¹ Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020 (June 1999).

² B-GL-300-000/FP-000 Canada’s Army, We Stand on Guard for Thee

provides a more detailed explanation of the subjects covered here.

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Electronic Warfare

aid of the civil power. The Land Force contributes

by providing humanitarian and disaster assistance at

home and assisting law enforcement agencies within

Canada.

Collective Security. When directed, Canada’s

forces operate in combined operations to deter or

contain aggression against Canada and Canada’s

allies. These missions may be in defence of the

North American land mass in concert with the

United States or abroad as part of NATO or a

coalition force.

Contribute to Global Stability and Peace. Canada

contributes to global stability by the provision of

forces to peacekeeping mission under the auspices

of the United Nations, through arms control

verification and humanitarian and disaster relief

abroad.

SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

Armed forces are employed throughout a spectrum that runs

from peace to war.³ The Land Force will be required to operate

throughout that spectrum. It does this by a combination of combat and

non-combat operations. Combat operations are operations where the

use or threatened use of force, including lethal force, is essential to

impose our will on an opponent or to accomplish a mission. Non-

combat operations are ones in which weapons may be present, but

their use or threatened use is for self-protection and is not otherwise

essential to accomplish a mission. While there is some overlap,

combat operations are generally consistent with war fighting and

non-combat operations predominate in operations other than war

(OOTW).

³ B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Conduct of Land Operations - Operational Level

Doctrine for the Canadian Army provides additional information.

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Introduction

Figure 1-1: The Spectrum of Conflict

LEVELS OF CONFLICT

There are three levels of conflict. The strategic level entails

the application of a nation’s resources—moral, economic, scientific,

technological and military—to achieve political objectives. At this

level, national aims are established, direction is given and resources

are allocated. At the operational level, the strategic aims and

direction are considered and allocated resources are employed in

military campaigns and major operations. They are usually joint and

often combined in nature. At the tactical level, battles and

engagements are planned and executed in accordance with the

operational plan. It is at the tactical level that combat and non-combat

operations take place. It is important to understand that each of these

levels is defined by the intended outcome and not by the size of the

force involved.

FUTURE WARFARE SCENARIOS

In “The Future Security Environment,” the Army has adopted

the NATO concept that there are two views of future conflict. In

“View 1,” conflict is between the near mirror image armed forces of

nation states. This type of conflict is expected to be expeditionary,

joint and combined in nature. This view of warfare is expected to be

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mobile and fast paced, spread over a larger area with fewer forces, but

not necessarily of a short duration. In “View 2,” conflict involves

non-state actors and is likely to be characterized by the presence of

more irregular forces than View 1. Opponents will not necessarily be

soldiers or even dressed in military uniforms. Our forces will be more

vulnerable to attacks on lines of communication in View 2 conflict.⁴

MANOEUVRE WARFARE

Manoeuvre warfare has the following objective: to defeat the

adversary by shattering his moral and physical cohesion, his ability to

fight as an effective coordinated whole, rather than by destroying him

physically through incremental attrition. This approach strikes a

balance between use of physical destruction and moral coercion,

emphasizing the importance of the latter, to attack the adversary’s will.

The following characteristics further clarify manoeuvre warfare⁵:

It aims to defeat the adversary by destroying his will

and desire to continue by seizing the initiative and

applying constant and unacceptable pressure at the

times and places least expected.

The emphasis is on the defeat and disruption of the

adversary rather than attempting to hold or take

ground for its own sake.

Generally, it aims to apply strength against

vulnerability, in contrast to attrition warfare where

strength tends to be applied against strength.

COMBAT POWER

Combat power is the total means of destructive and/or

disruptive force which a military unit or formation can apply against

an opponent at a given time and place. It is generated by the

integration of a number of elements referred to as combat functions.

The Army defines six combat functions: command, information

⁴ DLSC Report 99-2 “The Future Security Environment,” pp., 57-63.

⁵B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Conduct of Land Operations - Operational Level

Doctrine for the Canadian Army and B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Land Force

Command are sources of more information on manoeuvre warfare.

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Introduction

operations, manoeuvre, firepower, protection and sustainment. The

aim is to convert the potential of forces, resources and opportunities

into actual capability that is greater than the sum of the parts.

Integration and coordination are used to produce violent, synchronized

action at the decisive time and place required to find, fix and strike the

adversary. The application of tempo, designation of a main effort and

synchronization generate combat power through the integration of the

combat functions.⁶

Figure 1-2: Combat Power Model

MISSION COMMAND

Mission command,⁷ the Army's philosophy of command

within the manoeuvre warfare approach to fighting, has three

underlying principles:

a subordinate must clearly understand his superior

commander's intent;

⁶B-GL-300-001/FP-000 Conduct of Land Operations - Operational Level

Doctrine for the Canadian Army provides additional information.

⁷ B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Land Force Command is the source for more

information on manoeuvre warfare.

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that subordinate is responsible to fulfill his superior

commander’s intent; and

that subordinate’s decision-making must be timely.

While subordinates must act within the framework of their

commander's intentions, they must also be granted the freedom to act.

This requires a style of command that promotes decentralized

decision-making, freedom and speed of action, and initiative. Mission

command meets this requirement and is thus key to the Army's

doctrine. Under the mission command philosophy, commanders must:

give orders in a manner that ensures that

subordinates understand intent, their own tasks and

the context of those tasks;

tell subordinates what effect they are to achieve and

the reason why it needs achieving;

allocate appropriate resources to carry out missions

and tasks;

use a minimum of control measures not to limit

unnecessarily the freedom of action of subordinates;

and

allow subordinates to decide within their delegated

freedom of action how best to achieve their missions

and tasks.

BATTLEFIELD FRAMEWORK

10.

At the operational and tactical levels, the battlefield is

organized for combat⁸:

Area of Operations. Each commander is allocated

an area of operations (AO), which is the volume of

space in which that commander has the authority for

the conduct of military operations. For any one

level of command, AOs will never overlap.

⁸ B-GL-300-002/FP-000 Land Force, Vol 2, Land Force Tactical Doctrine

explains these subjects in more detail.

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Introduction

Area of Interest. Beyond this area, a commander

has an area of interest (AOI). This area helps the

commander identify and monitor factors, including

adversary activity, which may affect the

commander’s future operations. A commander will

decide for himself how far he must look, in both

time and space.

Area of Influence. The area of influence is the

volume of space in which a commander can engage

the adversary. The range of systems under

command determines the size of the area of

influence.

Area of Intelligence Responsibility. The area of

intelligence responsibility (AIR) is an area allocated

to a commander, in which he is responsible for the

provision of intelligence, within the means at his

disposal. This area is within a commander’s AO;

however, it may extend beyond his weapons

engagement range, especially in OOTW, and may be

assigned to him in regard to the capability of his

organic collection systems to fulfill his higher

commander’s requests for intelligence.

Figure 1-3: Battlefield Framework

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Electronic Warfare

11.

Within the AO, further distinction is made between deep,

close and rear operations. Deep operations are normally those

conducted against the adversary's forces or resources not currently

engaged in the close fight. They prevent the adversary from using his

resources where and when he wants to on the battlefield. Close

operations are usually the corps and division current battle and

include the engagements fought by brigades and battalions. Rear

operations assist in providing freedom of action and continuity of

operations, logistics and command. Their primary purpose is to

sustain the current close and deep operations and to posture the force

for future operations.

SECTION 2

INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND ELECTRONIC

WARFARE

THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

12.

Commanders rely upon information to make decisions. With

the advent of the information age, military commanders are faced with

a great deal of information. We define the environment in which they

operate as the information environment. The global information

environment (GIE) is comprised of all sources of information that are

available. The GIE includes all individuals, organizations or systems,

most of which are outside the control of the military or government.

The military information environment (MIE) is that portion of the GIE

relevant to military operations. The MIE includes sources under the

direct control of a particular commander, sources from superior

headquarters and from open sources. The interaction of the GIE and

the MIE introduces many more players into the AO, compresses the

traditional levels of conflict in time but expands them in space and

gives operations a simultaneous and continuous character. Tactical

military operations are more likely to have political and social

implications, requiring additional focus on non-military factors in

planning and execution.⁹

13.

The information age has expanded a commander’s AOI to

include portions of the GIE and MIE that are relevant to his mission.

His AOI may now include activities in the host nation’s political,

⁹ For more detail on the GIE and MIE see B-GL-300-005/FP-001 Land Force

Information Operations.

B-GL-358-001/FP-001

Introduction

economic and social environment. It will include opinions, attitudes

and events that occur back in Canada, whether they are directly

relevant to his mission or not. It may also include statements made by

leaders of large international bodies like the UN, NATO or the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

14.

The information age has also allowed the commander to

access more information from within his expanded AOI. National

communications and intelligence links provide him access to all the

resources of the CF, in addition to the forces allocated to his

command. It allows a commander to have access to specialist advisors

as required. This allows economy of effort since such advice may

only be rarely required, and the deployment of the specialist may not

be feasible. Specialist intelligence analysis is an example of this type

of advice.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS¹⁰

15.

Information operations (IO) are an essential element of

combat power that allows modern commanders to exercise mission

command within the manoeuvrist approach to operations in the

information age. In its simplest form it encompasses all operations

that gain information and knowledge that enhances friendly execution

of operations, while denying the adversary similar capabilities by

whatever means possible. The principal objective of IO is to achieve

superiority and relative advantage between the friendly commander’s

decision-action cycle and that of the adversary and to use that

advantage to enhance and enable other elements of combat power.

The application of IO enhances battlefield visualization and improves

designation of main effort, control of operational tempo and

synchronization. Information operations is divided into four support

components and two action components.

Support Components. The four support

components of IO are:

(1)

communications and information systems

(CIS);

(2)

relevant information;

¹⁰ B-GL-300-005/FP-001 Land Force Information Operations is the source for

IO doctrine.

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Electronic Warfare

(3)

civil-military cooperation (CIMIC); and

(4)

public affairs (PA).

Action Components. The two action components

of IO are offensive information operations (Off IO)

and defensive information operations (Def IO). The

elements of these components are:

(1)

operations security (OPSEC);

(2)

counter-intelligence (CI);

(3)

military deception;

(4)

psychological operations (PSYOPS);

(5)

counter-PSYOPS;

(6)

EW;

(7)

computer network attack (CNA);

(8)

special information operations (SIOs); and

(9)

physical destruction.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS

16.

Electronic warfare has been placed in the IO combat function.

Although it has been placed as an action component of IO, EW crosses

all aspects of IO and several of the other combat functions. Electronic

warfare consists of three components: EW support measures (ESM),

electronic countermeasures (ECM) and electronic protective measures

(EPM).¹¹ In general these components provide exploitation, disruption

and denial of information within the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum.¹²

17.

Each of the components of EW corresponds directly with IO

support and action components, off and def IO. ESM are a “single

source” of information assisting in the development relevant

information as part of IO support. ECM is a component of off IO

aimed at attacking and/or disrupting the adversary’s use of information

in conjunction with the other IO action components. ECM can also be

¹¹ ESM, ECM and EPM will be defined in Chapter 2.

¹² See Chapter 2.

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Introduction

considered a firepower asset and requires close coordination with

other firepower assets through the targeting process. EPM are a

component of def IO aimed at protecting friendly information and our

ability to use the EM spectrum. EPM is also a component of overall

protection of the force.

Figure 1-4: Electronic Warfare in Information Operations

SECTION 3

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, TACTICAL

ACQUISITION AND RECONNAISSANCE AND ELECTRONIC

WARFARE

INTRODUCTION

18.

The essence of the manoeuvre warfare approach to operations

is to focus on the adversary, determine his weaknesses, attack them

and shatter his will. A comprehensive intelligence, surveillance,

tactical acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capability is essential

for successfully applying this approach. The role of ISTAR is to

provide commanders with situational awareness (SA) and to cue

manoeuvre and offensive strike assets.

19.

An ISTAR system can be defined as a structure within which

relevant information, collected through systematic observation, is

integrated and processed in order to meet the commander’s

intelligence requirements. It also permits the detection, identification

and location of targets in sufficient detail and in a timely enough

manner to allow their successful engagement by weapon systems. It is

a system which comprises the following:

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Electronic Warfare

sensors, which act as collection assets;

processors, which act as an information collection

and analysis system;

an information and sensor management system; and

an effective system linking ISTAR assets and the

commander.

20.

The ISTAR system integrates sensor capabilities and the

intelligence process that provides the direction and processing of

sensor data. These capabilities have been resident in Canadian

doctrine for many years. Information technology has made the

integration of the data and information from the sensor systems more

effective, and a synergy results from this new system. As an

integration of existing capabilities, ISTAR is a system of systems

comprising the following component parts:

Intelligence.¹³ Intelligence encompasses three

things: a process, a product and an organization. In

the case of ISTAR, the “I” stands for intelligence as

a function that processes data and information from

all sources and single-source intelligence into

predictive estimation of an adversary’s capabilities

and intentions. Intelligence is the combination of

Red and Brown SA. It is knowledge as expressed in

the cognitive hierarchy.

Surveillance.¹⁴ Continual surveillance provides for

the collection of information on an adversary. It is

conducted by observation of the adversary and

terrain using optics, electronic detection, thermal

imagery, radar, satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles

¹³ Intelligence. The product resulting from the processing of information

concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or

areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity,

which results in the product, and to the organizations that engage in such

activity (A-AD-121-F01/JX-000 Canadian Forces Manual of Abbreviations).

¹⁴ Surveillance. Systematic observation of the aerospace, surface or

subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic,

photographic or other means (A-AD-121-F01/JX-000 Canadian Forces

Manual of Abbreviations).

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Introduction

(UAVs), ground sensors and all other means

available. Surveillance implies that the adversary

must act, move or radiate before it can be detected;

it is reactive in nature.

Target Acquisition.¹⁵ Target acquisition (TA)

provides detailed information about the location of

adversary forces, locating them with sufficient

accuracy to enable weapon systems to engage those

elements selected as targets. It includes TA for both

direct and indirect fire weapons.

Reconnaissance.¹⁶ Reconnaissance is proactive (in

contrast to surveillance, which is reactive) in nature.

Friendly assets are assigned a mission to obtain

information about the adversary, regardless of its

activities. Reconnaissance includes activities

performed by reconnaissance units but is not

restricted to those units. Many elements of the

ISTAR system can perform reconnaissance

functions.

21.

As ISTAR is defined as a system of systems, EW, from a

combat systems perspective, is one of those systems tasked to conduct

ops in support of the intelligence, surveillance, TA and reconnaissance

components of ISTAR.

SECTION 4

ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND THE OPERATIONAL

FUNCTION MODEL

22.

As mentioned in the Foreword, the Land Force is adopting a

new doctrinal model, the Operational Function Model of command,

¹⁵ Target Acquisition. The detection, identification and location of a target in

sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons (A-AD-121-

F01/JX-000 Canadian Forces Manual of Abbreviations).

¹⁶ Reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or

other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an

adversary or potential adversary, or to secure data concerning the

meteorological, hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area

(A-AD-121-F01/JX-000 Canadian Forces Manual of Abbreviations).

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Electronic Warfare

CHAPTER 2

ELECTRONIC WARFARE FUNDAMENTALS

SECTION 1

GENERAL

INTRODUCTION

Any future adversary is likely to make use of a full range of

modern communications, surveillance and weapon systems operating

throughout the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. They may also be

aware of the threat posed by our own electronic warfare (EW)

resources. In general, all sides will attempt to dominate the EM

spectrum by targeting, exploiting, disrupting, degrading, deceiving,

damaging or destroying their adversary's electronic systems in support

of military operations while retaining their own ability to make use of

the same systems. There is a general perception that EW is in the

realm of specialists. This is simply not the case. Electronic warfare

has aspects that are clearly all arms and aspects that are specialized.

As a consequence, it is essential that commanders at all levels have a

clear understanding of EW, be supported by experienced EW staff and

maintain an appropriate focus for the conduct of the battle to dominate

the EM spectrum. Since EW has an impact on a large cross section of

staff activities and battlefield functional areas, coordination of EW

activities at all levels is essential. Specifically, close coordination

between forward deployed Land Force (LF) EW assets and the

Canadian Forces (CF) signal intelligence organization, CF Information

Operations Group (CFIOG), is essential to ensure that maximum value

is derived from the synergy of both activities.

THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM

Visible light is a form of energy. When it travels through the

atmosphere, it is partly absorbed and reflected by all objects in its

path. This action creates a pattern of light, shade and colour that

enables the human eye to recognize objects. This form of energy is

related to radio, radar and X-rays. All of these forms of energy have

similarities and, collectively, are known as electromagnetic energy.

The main similarity is that all electromagnetic energy travels in form

of a wave. The wavelength of the energy (the distance between the

wave crests) determines the form of energy, and there are an infinite

variety of wavelengths. The whole range of wavelengths is known as

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Electronic Warfare

the electromagnetic spectrum (see Figure 2-1). All EM waves,

regardless of their position in the EM spectrum, travel at the speed of

light, which is approximately 300,000,000 metres per second. The

EM spectrum is the domain of operations for LF EW.

APPLICATION OF EW RESOURCES

Electronic warfare may be conducted by a broad range of

assets, ranging from a single soldier with man-portable equipment to a

full squadron operating under armour. In order to maximize the

capabilities of the CF signal intelligence system and LF EW assets,

EW operations will, wherever possible, be integrated with coalition

and CF EW and signal intelligence agencies.

Figure 2-1: The Electromagnetic Spectrum

SECTION 2

EW DEFINITION

INTRODUCTION

The concept and doctrine of EW are derived from a series of

definitions that, in general terms, explain the “boundaries” of the

activity. The central definition for EW, from which subordinate

definitions are derived, is as follows:

B-GL-358-001/FP-001

Electronic Warfare Fundamentals

Military action to exploit the electromagnetic (EM)

spectrum which encompasses the interception and

identification of EM emissions, the employment of

EM energy, including directed energy, to reduce or

prevent hostile use of the EM spectrum and actions

to ensure its effective use by friendly forces.¹⁷

The three components of EW are:

EW support measures (ESM);

electronic countermeasures (ECM); and

electronic protective measures (EPM).

SECTION 3

ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT MEASURES

INTRODUCTION

Electronic warfare support measures are defined as: that

division of EW involving actions taken to search for, intercept and

identify EM emissions and locate their sources for the purpose of

immediate threat recognition. It provides a source of information

required for immediate decisions involving ECM, EPM and taking

other tactical actions.¹⁸ It provides information that contributes to

production of signals intelligence (SIGINT).

ESM systems collect data and/or produce information or

intelligence which can be used to:

contribute as a “single source” of information for the

production of Red situational awareness (SA) within

the intelligence, surveillance, tactical acquisition and

reconnaissance (ISTAR) system;

provide targeting information for ECM operations;

initiate self-protection measures;

¹⁷ NATO Military Committee (MC) 64 NATO EW Policy, NATO ATP 51(A)

EW in the Land Battle and AAP-6 (U) NATO Glossary of Terms and

Definitions.

¹⁸ MC 64 NATO EW Policy.

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Electronic Warfare

support EPM efforts;

create or modify SIGINT data bases; and

provide warning to the supported commander.

ESM products are:

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). The generic term

used to describe communications intelligence

(COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT)

when there is no requirement to differentiate

between these two types of intelligence. The term

SIGINT is also used to represent a fusion of

COMINT and ELINT.¹⁹

Electronic Intelligence (ELINT). Technical

material and intelligence information derived from

EM non-communications transmission (e.g., radar,

navigational aids, jamming transmissions) by other

than intended recipients.²⁰

Communications Intelligence (COMINT).

Technical material and intelligence information

derived from EM communications and

communications systems (e.g. Morse, voice,

teleprinter, facsimile) by other than intended

recipients.²¹

SECTION 4

ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES

Electronic countermeasures are defined as: That division of

EW involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an adversary's

effective use of the EM spectrum through the use of EM energy.

There are three subdivisions of ECM—electronic jamming, electronic

deception and electronic neutralization²²:

¹⁹ MC 101 NATO Signals Intelligence Policy, ATP 51(A) EW in the Land

Battle and AAP-6 (U) NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

²⁰ MC 101 NATO Signals Intelligence Policy.

²¹ MC 101 NATO Signals Intelligence Policy.

²² MC 64 NATO EW Policy.

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Electronic Warfare Fundamentals

Electronic Jamming. The deliberate radiation,

re-radiation or reflection of EM energy with the

object of impairing the effectiveness of electronic

devices, equipment or systems being used by an

adversary.²³

Electronic Deception. The deliberate radiation, re-

radiation, alteration, absorption or reflection of EM

energy in a manner intended to confuse, distract or

seduce an adversary or his electronic systems.²⁴

Electronic Neutralization. The deliberate use of

EM energy to either temporarily or permanently

damage adversary devices, which rely exclusively

on the EM spectrum.²⁵

SECTION 5

ELECTRONIC PROTECTIVE MEASURES

INTRODUCTION

10.

Electronic protective measures are defined as: That division

of EW involving actions taken to ensure friendly effective use of the

EM spectrum despite the adversary's use of EM energy. There are two

sub-divisions of EPM:

Active EPM. Detectable measures, such as altering

transmitter parameters as necessary, to ensure

friendly effective use of the EM spectrum.

Passive EPM. Undetectable measures, such as

operating procedures and technical features of

equipment, which are meant to ensure friendly

effective use of the EM spectrum²⁶.

²³ MC 64 NATO EW Policy.

²⁴ MC 64 NATO EW Policy.

²⁵ MC 64 NATO EW Policy.

²⁶ MC 64 NATO EW Policy.

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SECTION 6

THE ROLE OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE

11.

The role of EW organizations is to provide the framework to

carry out ESM and ECM. They also support defensive EW carried out

by all arms/services. Specifically, the following tasks can be carried

out by tactical EW organizations:

provide immediate threat warning;

provide “single source” tactical SIGINT in the form

of EW summaries (EWSUMs) or tactical reports

(TACREPs), which supports current operations and

future planning;

provide target acquisition of adversary

electromagnetic emitters;

provide ECM support; and

provide EPM advice.

SECTION 7

ELECTRONIC WARFARE CAPABILITIES

12.

General Capabilities. To perform the roles/tasks assigned to

them, EW elements must have the following basic capabilities:

a 24/7, all weather ESM coverage of the

commander's area of interest;

a capability to conduct ECM—the range of a

commander’s ECM capabilities contributes to his

overall area of influence along with other combat

systems;

the capability to process and secure highly classified

information and special materials based on national

policies and security orders;

a secure and reliable communication means within

the EW organization, to the supported formation

HQ, to the higher EW organization and to the

national level organizations;

a capability to operate in an EW and/or nuclear,

biological and chemical (NBC) environment;

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Electronic Warfare Fundamentals

the ability to operate either under armour (heavy

EW) and using highly mobile platforms or

man-packs (light EW) in order to effectively

compliment the supported formation; and

enough redundancy to sustain operations.

13.

Equipment and System Capabilities. EW equipment tends

to be highly specialized and is required to adapt quickly to an

ever-changing EM target presented by various adversaries. EW

equipment forms modular components that can be integrated to allow

multi-tasking and highly responsive, adaptable operations by ESM

detachments. In brief, each ESM detachment has the technical

capability to perform intercept and direction finding (DF) across the

spectrum, including both COMINT and ELINT targets. These

capabilities are organized and deployed depending on mission

specifics and the target environment. They are as follows:

ESM—Search/Intercept Capability. These ESM

capabilities consist of the personnel and equipment

whose purpose is to search the EM spectrum for

targets and gather detailed information on detected

targets. A search/intercept component requires the

following capabilities:

(1)

broad band coverage search;

(2)

interoperable with national strategic

systems;

(3)

the ability to be used in vehicle (platform

independent) and/or dismounted operations;

(4)

the ability to integrate with the DF

capability to provide a single package

capability;

(5)

the ability to detect and track low

probability of intercept (LPI) signals (e.g.,

frequency hopping);

(6)

the ability to exploit targets throughout the

threat spectrum;

(7)

recording and storage capabilities; and

(8)

the ability to interface directly with the EW

analysis component.

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Electronic Warfare

ESM—Communications Direction-Finding (DF)

Capability. This ESM component consists of a

number of detachments with modular equipment that

form baselines to provide location information of

target communication emitters. The DF components

require the following capabilities:

(1)

sufficient accuracy to allow cueing of other

sensor systems such as UAVs;

(2)

broad band coverage to the greatest extent

possible and in step with intercept

capabilities;

(3)

the ability to integrate with search and

intercept capability to provide a single

package capability;

(4)

the ability to locate LPI emitters;

(5)

the ability to be used in mounted (platform

independent) and/or dismounted operations;

and

(6)

the ability to interface directly with the EW

analysis component.

ESM—ELINT Capability. This ESM component

is deployed in detachments with modular equipment

that forms a baseline. The ELINT components

provide search, intercept, direction finding and

analysis of target non-communications emitters.

The equipment conducts analysis by comparing

emitter data to a database, which determines the

radar type and associated equipment. An ELINT

component must be capable of the following:

(1)

broadband coverage of the radar frequency

band;

(2)

interoperability with national and other

service systems;

(3)

flexible, platform independent deployment;

(4)

rapid reprogramming of new signals by

field operators;

B-GL-358-001/FP-001

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1) - page 32