Network Intrusions Responder Program (NITRO). Instructor Guide - page 6

 

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Network Intrusions Responder Program (NITRO). Instructor Guide - page 6

 

 

Phases of an Intrusion
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Techniques - Factor Guessing/Cracking, continued
Possible Artifacts
Possible artifacts of authentication factor cracking or guessing
include:
Large numbers of failed authentication attempts for a single
account, as seen in the logs of the authentication system (e.g.,
The Windows Security Event Log, or the /var/log/secure file
on a Linux or Unix system with SSH).
Failed authentication attempts for one or more non-existent
user account names, as seen in the logs of the authentication
system.
Failed authentication attempts that show a series of passwords
that match a pattern indicative of an attack, such as the “aa”,
“ab”, “ac”, etc. that might be seen in a brute force value set.
Authentication logs do not always record the password that
was entered, but they may be visible in a network sniffer log.
IDS logs referencing a password or authentication attack.
User accounts that are locked out due to an unusually high
number of failures.
A list of passwords or password hashes found in a text file in
an abnormal location.
The presence of password/hash dumping utilities such as
pwdump (pwdump.dll).
Authentication attempts (successful or failed) at abnormal
times, or for which the authorized user of the account does not
recall.
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01/09
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Phases of an Intrusion
Techniques - Credential Recovery/Reset
Credential
People lose their credentials (i.e., authentication factors). They
Recovery and
tend to forget their passwords, lose their tokens and sometimes
Reset Mechanisms
cannot remember their user names. To account for this, most
authentication systems include a mechanism for either resetting a
user’s credentials to a new value, or for recovering a copy of lost
credentials. These credential recovery and reset mechanisms
include:
Password reset links on Web sites that allow you to have your
password, or a reset link e-mailed to the address attached to a
given account.
Password reset links on Web sites that will reset a password if
you know the answer to a “secret question.”
Help desk staff (available by phone or in person) that will reset
or unlock an account.
Operating system and directory user account management
interfaces that allow an account with sufficient privilege to
reset the credentials to any other account on the system or in
the directory.
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Phases of an Intrusion
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Techniques - Credential Recovery/Reset, continued
Credential
Examples of credential recovery and reset attack techniques
Recovery/Reset
include:
Attack Techniques
Requesting a password reset, and then capturing the password
from network traffic as it is sent to the user.
Registering a domain name previously belonging to another
person, recreating a previously existing e-mail address at that
domain name, and using that e-mail address as an
authentication factor and recipient for reset credentials
transmissions.
Directly requesting an individual’s credentials, while using
personal information about that individual (birth date, mother’s
maiden name, etc.) as authentication factors necessary for the
reset.
Possible Artifacts
Possible artifacts of attacks against credential reset and recovery
mechanisms include:
Successful authentication attempts for an account that was
believed to be no longer in use, as seen in the logs of the
authentication system
Password resets for an account that was believed to be no
longer in use
Password resets for which the legitimate user of the account
claims to not be responsible
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01/09
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Phases of an Intrusion
Techniques - Credential Injection
Credential
Almost all systems that include a mechanism for authenticating
Injection /
users and programs also include a mechanism for creating new
Modification
accounts when necessary. If an attacker has access to this
mechanism, he or she can use that mechanism to create new
accounts. Techniques for accomplishing this include:
Calling a help desk and requesting the creation of an account.
This will usually require that the attacker masquerade as
someone who can legitimately request such an action.
Using an online mechanism to request an account. This can be
done to gain initial access to information on Web sites that
provide information as long as you register and sometimes pay.
Some Web sites might require that you validate your identify
for registration, using some type of personal information.
Others allow you to input whatever information you choose to
provide.
Directly creating user accounts using an available
administrative utility (e.g., the Active Directory Users and
Computers console), or by directly inserting them into a list of
users (e.g., /etc/passwd).
Possible Artifacts
Possible artifacts of credential injection and modification include:
Existence of a user account in an account repository for which
there is no legitimate authorized user.
Existence of a user account in an account repository that does
not match the account naming convention for the organization.
Recorded logins of an account for which there is no legitimate
authorized user as seen in OS or application
security/authentication logs.
Log entries referencing account creation.
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Phases of an Intrusion
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Techniques - Credential Theft
Credential Theft
Authentication factors may also be stolen. Possible techniques
used to accomplish this include:
Capturing credentials as they are transmitted across a network.
In order to sniff the traffic, this requires that the attacker have
control or be present on one of the network mediums through
which the credentials are sent.
Tricking an individual into revealing his or her credentials by
contacting the individual in person. For example, an attacker
might claim to be a system administrator or security
representative that needs a user’s credentials for some kind of
troubleshooting or verification.
Tricking an individual into revealing credentials by sending an
electronic request for the information. For example, an attacker
might send an e-mail that has been falsified to appear to be
from a legitimate bank or online service.
Physical tokens such as ID cards and USB tokens can be
physically stolen.
Possible Artifacts
Possible artifacts of credential theft include:
Reports of the theft of physical credentials by a user, or reports
of the disclosure of credentials to someone the user believed
was authorized to request such information.
Successful authentication requests at abnormal times, or for
which the authorized user of the account does not recall.
Existence of e-mails in an e-mail repository or logged by a
proxy that include requests for credentials, or links to Web
pages where such requests are made.
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Network Intrusion Responder Program
Phases of an Intrusion
Strategies - Unexpected Input
Unexpected Input Strategies that use unexpected input to conduct an attack are listed
Strategies
below. Each will be described in further detail on following pages.
Excessive Input: Sending more input than a system or
application was expecting, or is able to handle.
Unexpected Input Content: Sending input content that a system
or application will process incorrectly due to the inability to
recognize and/or properly control the input type.
Unexpected Input Timing: Sending input at times that a
system, application or communication session is temporarily
vulnerable to interference.
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Phases of an Intrusion
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Techniques - Excessive Input
Excessive Input
A basic attack method is to supply an excessive amount of input to
an application, operating system, or network. The effect of this
input could be to simply crash the target. Excessive input could
break a control system and allow the attacker to perform additional
unauthorized actions. Techniques for supplying excessive input
include:
Buffer Overflow Attacks
Flooding
Input Size
All attacks that use excessive input to influence target behavior
Validation
take advantage of a lack of input validation. Properly coded
applications should verify that any user-supplied input is of the
proper size, and if not, truncate that input or simply produce an
error message and/or stop the process. Likewise, network devices
should terminate or block all communication from hosts that are
supplying an excessive number of packets or service requests.
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Network Intrusion Responder Program
Phases of an Intrusion
Techniques - Excessive Input/Buffer Overflow
Buffers
A buffer is a temporary storage area, usually in RAM, allocated for
the manipulation of data within a process. For example, when
logging into an e-mail server, there might be a 32-character space
for your user name. This limitation is established in the code of the
e-mail server application and controls how much input will be
accepted from the user.
Buffer Overflow
A buffer overflow attack purposely sends an entry too large for the
Attack
buffer to hold. It sends it in such a way that a portion of the entry
is written to the target computer where program instruction code is
stored.
An attacker uses this method to intentionally cause the execution
of his code. The result of this code execution could be anything,
but will often be a denial-of-service, a command terminal session
sent back to the attacker’s computer or the injection of a DLL
(dynamic link library) or other program code into the remote
process.
Possible Artifacts
Possible artifacts of buffer overflow attacks include:
Unexplained errors in the log files for the application or
service that was attacked. If an OS service was attacked, then
these log entries may exist in the operating system’s main log
files, or supplementary crash logs (such as Dr. Watson).
Intrusion detection system alerts indicating a buffer overflow,
shellcode or NOOPs.
Sniffer logs that show large blocks of repetitive data, such as
0x90 or other hex values.
Sniffer logs that show blocks of data that do not conform to
normal rules for the network protocol being used.
IDS alerts or sniffer logs showing common post-attack events
such as reverse shells, DLL transfer, OS commands, etc.
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Phases of an Intrusion
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Techniques - Unexpected Input Content / XSS Attacks
Web Scripting
Program code executed in the context of a Web page, either by the
server or the client system, is called a Web script.
Cross-Site
Cross-site scripting occurs when an attacker supplies a script that
Scripting (XSS)
is executed by another system’s Web browser or in another
browser window accessing a different site. There are several ways
of accomplishing this. Possible techniques include:
An attacker posts a script to a Web site that will permanently
store the script, and serve it to other systems when they request
the Web page to which it was posted. This allows the attacker
to run code in another person’s browser. These are called
“persistent” or “stored” XSS attacks.
An attacker will embed script in a URL that, if loaded by
another user, will cause a Web server to supply malicious code
to the requesting browser to be executed in the context of the
requested page. These are called “non-persistent” or
“reflected” XSS attacks, and rely upon a user or browser to
load the URL.
Possible Artifacts
Possible artifacts of XSS include:
IDS alerts referencing an XSS attack.
URLs containing scripting (such as the presence of the
“<script>” tag), as seen in Web server and proxy server logs,
or in Web browser history.
Web pages containing embedded scripting, as seen in proxy
server logs where the proxy records full page.
Unusual character encodings in URLs as seen in Web server or
proxy server logs, or in Web browser histories.
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Network Intrusion Responder Program
Phases of an Intrusion
Lesson 4 - Entrenchment
Introduction
Continued, undetected control over a compromised system is
required for any extended operations such as data mining and theft,
or further penetration into a larger network.
Purpose of this
The purpose of this lesson is to explain how an attacker retains
Lesson
remote control of a system and hides or removes any traces of that
control.
Objectives
After completing this lesson, you will be able to:
Explain the goals of entrenchment
List the major strategies used to conduct entrenchment
Explain some of the specific techniques that an attacker can
use to maintain remote access and control
Explain some of the specific techniques that an attacker can
use to hide traces of unauthorized activity
In this Lesson
The following table shows the contents of this lesson.
Topic
See Page
Goals
6-46
Strategies
6-47
Techniques - Log Cleaning
6-48
Techniques - Automatic Execution
6-50
Techniques - Hooking
6-52
Techniques - File Type Manipulation
6-54
Techniques - Naming Conventions and
6-55
Placement
Techniques - Remote Connectivity
6-58
Techniques - File System Date/Time Stamp
6-62
Manipulation
Privilege Escalation
6-63
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Phases of an Intrusion
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Goals
Entrenchment
The access resulting from a successful attack can sometimes be
Goals
tenuous. A buffer overflow may have resulted in a Windows
command shell back channel that will be lost if the user decides to
shut down or reboot the target system. An attack against Internet
Explorer (IE) may last only as long as the IE window stays open.
Despite these scenarios, an intruder may require extended access
for more extensive operations.
Entrenchment is the process of solidifying access to a
compromised system, and is used in pursuit of the following goals:
Attack Pivot Point: The attacker requires continued control of
the system to use it as a pivot point from which to attack other
systems and networks.
Data Theft: The attacker requires continued control of the
system to perform data mining operations on that asset and any
local storage media.
General Control Maintenance: The attacker wants to maintain
control of the system as an asset for various other uses as
required or for a future undetermined use. For example, an
attacker may simply want to maintain control of a network in
order to disrupt it during a future conflict.
Entrenchment
Regardless of goals above, entrenchment requires that the attacker
Goal Attributes
retain some ability to remotely control or manipulate the target,
and also for that method of control to remain undetected.
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Network Intrusion Responder Program
Phases of an Intrusion
Strategies
Entrenchment
Activities conducted during entrenchment include:
Strategies
Log Cleaning: Removing records of unauthorized activities to
hide attacker presence.
Automatic Execution: Adding configuration changes that will
cause unauthorized programs to start when the host OS boots,
or restart if they are unexpectedly terminated.
Naming Conventions and Placement: Naming unauthorized
files, processes and configuration changes in such a way that
they appear legitimate or otherwise benign.
File Type Manipulation: Changing the attributes which identify
a file’s type, such as the signature and extension.
Hooking: Intercepting calls to the operating system to interfere
with any data returned, such as lists of files or processes.
Remote Connectivity: Maintaining one or more channels
through which a compromised system can be remotely
controlled.
Entrenchment and
Because of the requirement for persistent control of a
Unauthorized
compromised system, entrenchment activities typically involve the
Code
installation of some sort of unauthorized code. This code will serve
to perform one or more of the functions identified above including
when a human attacker is not currently administering the system.
Common types include backdoors, rootkits and trojans.
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Phases of an Intrusion
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Techniques - Log Cleaning
Log Cleaning
To entrench properly, an attacker must remove records of
unauthorized activity. A common record of unauthorized activity
is a log entry. Log cleaning is the process of deleting individual
log entries, or clearing entire log files to achieve this goal. This
can be done manually, with specific log cleaner malware, or with a
general-purpose rootkit.
Log Cleaning -
The most precise method of log cleaning is to delete individual log
Record Deletion
entries (records) that correspond to the activity that needs to be
hidden. By deleting those records and leaving all others, there is a
better chance that the act of log cleaning will go undiscovered.
Removing individual records is easy with text logs. The attacker
simply needs to open the log in a text editor, delete the associated
lines and save the file. Proprietary log formats are much more
difficult to handle. To remove a record, either the attacker (or his
or her tools) must understand the format of the log, and be able to
identify the beginning and end of each entry. The log viewers that
correspond to proprietary logs (e.g., The Windows Event Viewer)
do not typically include a function for removing an individual line.
Note: If an attacker can open individual records, he or she may
be able to change the content of an individual record
instead of deleting it. This could be used to achieve the
same goals.
Log Cleaning -
An alternative to deleting individual records is to clear an entire
Log Clearing
log. The log file itself is left, but all records within are removed.
This is done in situations where the attacker is in a hurry or does
not have a mechanism for deleting individual records. Some log
viewing applications include a mechanism for clearing all records.
Within the Windows Event Viewer, you can clear a log by right
clicking on the log name and choosing “Clear All Events.”
The downside of log clearing is that it is quite noticeable.
Therefore, record deletion is preferable. You may also find that an
attacker may clear a log when he or she is not as concerned with
hiding the intrusion as with removing any information that can be
used to trace the attack back to its source, although this is not
characteristic of entrenchment.
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Network Intrusion Responder Program
Phases of an Intrusion
Techniques - Log Cleaning, continued
Log Cleaning -
In lieu of record deletion or log clearing, an attacker may choose to
File Deletion
delete an entire log file. This is the least desirable of log cleaning
methods, as the deletion of an actual log file is the most noticeable,
and may cause system errors or crashes. It is more useful when
dealing with more obscure log files that are not as likely to be
noticed. For example, an administrator is much less likely to notice
that a Dr. Watson dump log has been deleted than a missing IIS
Web server log file.
Log Cleaning -
Possible artifacts of log cleaning include:
Possible Artifacts
File system date/time stamps: File system date/time stamps
may be changed during log cleaning. For example, if a log
were cleared, the NTFS last written time would be updated on
a Windows system at the time of the clearing, meaning that the
attacker may have been active on the system at that time.
Time gaps: Log files that have had specific entries removed
may have abnormal time gaps between remaining entries.
Empty or completely missing log files
Log entry recording the deletion: For example, Event ID 517
corresponds to the clearing of all entries in the Windows
Security Event Log for Windows 2000/XP/2003. It is only
added when the administrator user account performs the
deletion.
Existence of malicious code on a system that includes log
cleaning as one of its functions.
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Phases of an Intrusion
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Techniques - Automatic Execution
Automatically
Computers, especially workstations, are often shut down or
Starting Malware
rebooted. Sometimes they simply lose power. Furthermore,
individual processes are sometimes terminated by anti-virus
software or by a suspicious user or administrator.
Starting Processes
It is extremely common for malicious code to be installed to
at Boot: Registry
automatically start when Windows boots. The main mechanism for
Entries
accomplishing this is by adding a Registry key that will start an
executable file as a new process or load a library into another
process.
There are dozens of Registry keys that can be used to run code.
Some of the more common methods include creating “Run” keys
for executables, installing a new service, or trojanizing a legitimate
service by changing the ServiceDLL key to load a malicious DLL.
See the appendices for a full listing of relevant Registry keys.
Run key:
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Services:
HKLM\System\ControlSet***\Services\<service_name>\
ImagePath
HKLM\System\ControlSet***\Services\<service_name>\
Parameters\ServiceDLL
*** Represents a number, usually 001, 002 or 003. That number
corresponds to one of the control sets used by the Registry for
configuration. There is a typically a “current control set,” and
another set representing the last known good configuration.
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Network Intrusion Responder Program
Phases of an Intrusion
Techniques - Automatic Execution, continued
Directories
During boot, Windows checks certain directories and executes any
files found there. Depending on the version of Windows,
directories that are checked at boot may include:
C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Start
Menu\Programs\Startup
C:\Documents and Settings\<username>\Start
Menu\Programs\Startup
C:\Windows\Tasks
Job Scheduling
Most operating systems include a mechanism for scheduling
executions to occur with various triggers, usually date/time. For
Microsoft operating systems, this is the Windows Task Scheduler.
For Linux/Unix derivatives, this is the “cron” daemon.
Possible Artifacts
Possible artifacts of malware configured to auto-start include:
Existence of Registry entries that load unauthorized
executables or libraries
Unauthorized executables in auto-start directories
Unauthorized executables specified in an INI file used by
Windows or another automatically started program
The existence of “.job” files on Windows which represent a
Task Scheduler (Usually found in C:\windows\tasks or
C:\winnt\tasks). The log file SchedLgU.txt also keeps a record
of Tasks Scheduler job executions.
Entries in the “crontab” file in Linux/Unix derivatives, which
contain a list of scheduled cron jobs.
Malicious code that is found on the system which adds
automatic start configurations when executed.
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Phases of an Intrusion
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Techniques - Hooking
Hooking
Hooking is the process of intercepting calls from one program to
another to interfere with any data exchanged. This can be used to
hide data such as processes, files and specific file contents.
The OS API
An API is an Application Programming Interface. Operating
systems provide an API in order for programs to run on and
interface with the operating system. Common functions that use
this interface include operations such as:
Directory listings
File copy and move operations
File editing operations
Network sending and receiving
Process and thread starting, stopping and enumeration
For example, when you use Windows Explorer to view the
contents of a directory, this is done via a standard API call from
explorer.exe to a Windows OS DLL file.
These operations are common during every day usage of any given
OS. They are important during entrenchment, because these same
API calls can be used to find malicious code. It is therefore
important to prevent these calls from revealing signs of malware
presence.
OS API Hooking Rootkits can be used to hook these API calls by intercepting them
at various points. Sensitive values can then be edited out of any
returned values. For example, a call used to obtain a directory
listing from C:\windows\system32 may be intercepted, and the
name of the unauthorized .exe and .dll files that make up the
rootkit and backdoor programs could then be removed from the
results.
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Network Intrusion Responder Program
Phases of an Intrusion
Techniques - Hooking
Possible Artifacts
Possible artifacts of API hooking include:
OS files that have been hooked through direct modification of
the file on disk will have hashes that do not match those in
hash sets of known-good executables.
For live systems, the results of API directory listings and
Registry key enumerations can be verified by directly checking
the file system for the same data (e.g., looking for files by
reading the file table itself rather than asking the OS).
Mismatches indicate the potential presence of API hooks in
memory. This technique is used by some rootkit detection
programs such as Rootkit Revealer.
Discovery of API hooks during the analysis of malicious code
files found on a compromised system.
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Phases of an Intrusion
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Techniques - File Type Manipulation
File Types
There are many different types of files found on a computer, such
as text files, executables, database files, office documents, etc.
When a user opens a file, the operating system first determines the
file type. Depending on the operating system, this is done by
checking either:
File Extension: Series of letters at the end of a file name,
separated from the actual name by a period. Used primarily by
Windows variants to determine file type.
File Signature: Series of bytes in the file, usually at the very
beginning or end, that marks the file type. Used primarily by
Linux/Unix variants to determine file type.
As an example, a GIF image file could be identified either by the
“.gif” file extension, or by the characters “GIF89” found at the
very beginning of the file.
File Type
The attributes that define a file’s type can be manipulated to hide
Manipulation
that file from general searches and from some specific forensic
analysis strategies. Techniques for manipulating file type include:
Changing the file extension to make the file appear to
Windows or a casual observer as a different file type. For
example, an executable may be disguised by changing its file
extension from “.exe” to “.doc”.
Changing the file signature to make it appear as a different file.
For example, the “GIF89” at the beginning of an image could
be changed to “MZ” to make it appear to be an executable to
someone conducting file signature analysis.
Possible Artifacts
Possible artifacts of file type manipulation include:
File signatures that do not match the extension, or vice versa.
Files that have a matching signature and extension, but which
cannot be read by the appropriate application.
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Network Intrusion Responder Program
Phases of an Intrusion
Techniques - Naming Conventions and Placement
Naming
Some of the simplest methods for hiding unauthorized files,
Conventions and
processes and configuration changes are to name them something
Placement
that appears benign or to place them in a location where they are
less likely to be noticed.
Naming
Naming conventions used to hide activity include:
Convention
Strategies
Giving files/processes the same name as a legitimate file or
process.
Giving files/processes a name that is slightly modified from the
name of a legitimate file or process. For example, a file may be
named lssas.exe, which is similar to the legitimate file
“lsass.exe.”
Assigning a name that appears similar to the names of other
files. For example, there are many DLLs in the System32
directory. Most of those DLLs have names that are not
recognizable to most users and administrators. An attacker
could assign an unauthorized DLL a random 8 character name,
and it would probably go unnoticed.
Use of special characters within names that will either cause
the name to blend in with other files, or will cause the name to
not be rendered in certain interfaces. For example, a directory
could be created named “…”, which would blend in with the
“.” and “..” directories that refer to the current and parent
directories respectively.
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Phases of an Intrusion
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Techniques - Naming Conventions and Placement,
continued
Placement
Placement strategies include:
Strategies
Placing unauthorized files in a directory where an average user
is unlikely to look.
Placing unauthorized files named a certain way into a directory
with other files with similar names. For example, DLLs could
be placed into System32 along with many of the other DLLs
found on a Windows system. There they will be more difficult
to identify.
Using directory names that are normal, but are in the wrong
location. For example, because the name “temp” is commonly
used for directories, a new directory named temp created in
any location would not stand out to most individuals.
Storing files or file fragments in disk space not currently in use
(slack or unallocated space).
Fragmenting a file and inserting it into another file in small
amounts so that the host file can still be opened and read
(steganography).
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Network Intrusion Responder Program
Phases of an Intrusion
Techniques - Naming Conventions and Placement,
continued
Possible Artifacts
Recognizing naming conventions used to hide unauthorized
activity relies heavily upon your knowledge of what is normal and
not normal within the directory structure and running processes of
an operating system. Common artifacts include:
File names, Registry keys and process names that appear to be
misspelled or in the wrong location.
Files with normal names that do not have the appropriate hash
value or file signature.
A process that seems to be running in more than one instance
when that is not typical, or when a process is a child of itself.
Abnormal capitalization patterns in names. For example,
Winhex could be spelled wInhex.
The presence of programs on the system used for file hiding.
File names and directory locations discovered during the
analysis of malicious code found on a compromised system.
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Phases of an Intrusion
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Techniques - Remote Connectivity
Communicating
For extended operations, an intruder will require dependable
with
access to compromised systems. This could be a legitimate
Compromised
channel that an attacker accesses with stolen credentials or a new
Machines
channel created by the attacker.
Subverting
If available, an attacker can use an already existing communication
Legitimate
channel for remote access to a compromised system. Here are
Communication
some examples:
Channels
SMB/CIFS and DCE/RPC: Windows file sharing and remote
procedure protocols can be used to move data to and from, or
even configure a remote system. This requires that the attacker
has credentials to that system. This is most useful for
manipulating a system from another device within the same
network, as these protocols are not allowed to traverse most
Internet-facing network perimeters.
Remote administration applications: Terminal Services, VNC
and Remote Desktop are all examples of applications that
allow someone to open a graphical interface to another system.
The attacker can authenticate to these pre-existing applications
with stolen credentials. Other applications such as SSH and
telnet can also be used to administer a system through a
command line interface.
VPN tunnels: An attacker can utilize tunnels that already exist
to or from a compromised system to jump to other devices
and/or networks.
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Network Intrusion Responder Program
Phases of an Intrusion
Techniques - Remote Connectivity, continued
Remote Backdoors A backdoor is a non-legitimate method for listening for remote
connections from an attacker to a compromised system. This is
typically accomplished by starting a process that listens for remote
connection attempts. That attempt might be a normal TCP
connection attempt, or it may involve a series of packets sent to
specific ports in a specific order which will then cause a full
listening socket to be opened (called “port knocking”).
Outbound
Sometimes, a compromised system may sit behind a firewall that
Initiated Channels
prevents inbound remote connection attempts from reaching the
system. As an alternative to a process listening for inbound
connection attempts, a malicious code package may be configured
to initiate communication outbound from the victim
system/network to an external computer that is controlled by an
attacker (called a “Command and Control Server”). These
connections, called “Reverse Channels,” are frequently successful
due to the fact that firewall egress rules are typically less stringent
than ingress rules.
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Phases of an Intrusion
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Techniques - Remote Connectivity, continued
Possible Artifacts:
Artifacts of the usage of a legitimate communication channel by an
Legitimate
attacker include:
Channel Usage
Unusual login times for an otherwise authorized account. They
are shown in authentication logs such as /var/log/secure or the
Windows Security Event Log.
Login times for an authorized account that the user of that
account claims he/she did not initiate.
Authentication or subsequent activity that occurs to fast for a
human to be manually directing the activity.
The existence of malicious code on a compromised system that
includes functions for connecting to remote administration
applications such as SSH or VNC.
Possible Artifacts: Possible artifacts of the usage of unauthorized backdoor listeners
Backdoors
include:
Abnormal ports open on a system. These may be suspicious
ports that correspond to known backdoors that are visible from
a port scan or from the results of a command such as netstat.
Suspicious processes attached to a listening port. These may be
viewable from the output of programs such as tcpview or fport.
Inbound connection attempts to workstations. Connection
attempts blocked by firewalls or routers may show in the logs
of those devices.
Abnormal patterns of inbound packets or connection attempts.
Again, blocked packets may be recorded in firewall or router
logs. Otherwise this activity would be viewable in a recording
of network traffic.
The existence of malicious code on a compromised system that
is found to start a listening service when executed.
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Network Intrusion Responder Program
Phases of an Intrusion
Techniques - Remote Connectivity, continued
Possible Artifacts:
Possible artifacts of the usage of reverse channels include:
Outbound
Channels
DNS queries for known-bad domain names or DNS hosts, as
seen in the logs of any available DNS servers, or their
upstream forwarders.
Outbound connection attempts to known-bad or suspicious IP
addresses or IP ranges, which may be seen in firewall logs.
Outbound connection attempts occurring over abnormal ports,
which may be seen in firewall logs.
Outbound connection attempts which exhibit abnormal
content. For instance an outbound session that occurs over
TCP port 80, but contains no HTTP headers or HTML. This
may be observed in proxy server logs when traffic is rejected
due to the appropriate content.
The existence of malicious code on a compromised system that
is found to beacon to a domain name or IP address when
executed.
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Phases of an Intrusion
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Techniques - File System Date/Time Stamp
Manipulation
File System
An attacker may attempt to hide unauthorized activity by changing
Date/Time Stamp
associated date/time stamps to make it appear as if the activity is
Manipulation
unrelated.
Possible Artifacts
Artifacts of date/time stamp manipulation include:
Date/time stamps for malicious code executables or DLLs that
match the date/time stamps on Windows files that were created
much earlier than other related activity.
Date/time stamps for suspicious Registry keys that are set
much earlier than other related activity.
The existence of malicious code on a system that is found to
modify date/time stamps on files or Registry keys when it is
executed.
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Network Intrusion Responder Program
Phases of an Intrusion
Privilege Escalation
Escalation/
The Escalation or advancement phase of a network intrusion is
Advancement
where a hacker in possession of a system seeks to elevate
privileges.
What is
Once hackers gain access to a system, they must advance from an
Advancement?
unprivileged user account to a privileged to control the system.
Some of the ways in which privileges are escalated include:
Through local system attacks
Cracked or guessed passwords
Running trojans on the system
Local Attacks
A local attack takes place either sitting directly at the system or
remotely through a command prompt or GUI. A hacker with inside
access has many options available to compromise systems that will
not work over the network. The default installation of most
operating systems has open doors through which attackers can
escalate privileges. These doors are often overlooked, which
makes advancement possible.
Some of the commonly used local attacks are:
Physical abuse
Editing the boot.ini to boot another kernel
Path abuse
Using boot media (Knoppix, Linux-on-a-Floppy)
Null connections
Session Hijacking
Physical Abuse
If hackers can restart a system, they can often boot into a debugger
or recover console, which usually has administrator-level access.
While at this prompt, the hacker can create user names and
passwords, edit access control lists and install programs in start-up
directories that will provide them with administrator-level access
when the system restarts.
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Phases of an Intrusion
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Privilege Escalation, continued
Boot Prompt
Most operating systems use boot loaders to load their default
Attacks
kernel. The boot loader allows other kernels to be chosen in case
the system has difficulty booting. Accessing boot loader
configuration files can be as easy as pressing a key upon boot.
Path Abuse
A path tells the operating system where to look for programs
required to run. If the default path is changed or appended, hacker
installed programs may be executed.
Boot Media
Booting from a CD can bypass logon screens and directly access
the system allowing for the hacker to search, crack, and extract
passwords. Complete operating systems like KNOPPIX or Linux-
on-a-floppy exist, and if the default boot sequence allows for
booting from a floppy, then placing a Linux-on-a-floppy diskette
into the drive will allow hackers to mount and access the system.
This allows them to swap out and edit files that provide root-level
access.
Null Connections
During the reconnaissance phase, a hacker may have created a null
connection while attempting to run services that provide
administrator-level access. A system administrator may have
blocked these service ports at the firewall, but left them open on
local systems. Simply connecting to these ports with a dummy or
null connection, while at a command prompt, can provide
administrator-level access.
Session Hijacking A hacker sniffing the network traffic can detect when a root user is
connected to the network. He can either interrupt the existing
session or wait until the session is almost terminated and block the
end of transmission signal from being sent.
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Network Intrusion Responder Program
Phases of an Intrusion
Privilege Escalation, continued
Local Password
Usernames and passwords are the security mechanisms used to
Cracking
authenticate to a system. If this authentication can be bypassed or
defeated the system can be compromised.
Windows systems store encrypted passwords locally in the
registry, and if a hacker can gain access to these files, he can run a
brute force cracking program. A brute force program uses a
dictionary to encrypt words with various encryption algorithms
and seeks to match encrypted passwords with those stored in the
registry.
Many times, hackers have physical access to a system. Having
inside access to these systems might allow hacker control by
simply pressing a key combination to bypass authentication
mechanisms.
Some of the ways that passwords can be defeated on a local
system are:
Booting from a CD or floppy diskette, extracting the password
files and cracking them offline
Hijacking a connection with administrator privileges
Logging onto the system as a service
Brute force password attacks
Sniffing clear text passwords
Change entries in system critical files for services that
authenticate login and login privileges
Some popular password cracking programs are:
pwdumpX
Crack
John the ripper
L0phtcrack
LSADump
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Phases of an Intrusion
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Privilege Escalation, continued
Trojans in
Trojans are programs that pretend to be normal or useful software
Advancement
tools. Many commands used by the system administrator for
system and network control are often trojanized by hackers. They
can also be batch files (.BAT) with the same name as the program
and execute the program along with the Trojan.
Examples of commonly trojanized binary programs are:
task manager
login
ipconfig
secpol
dir
ntbackup
These executables are often trojanized because only the system
administrator has a right to run them. For example, the system
administrator creates a new user and assigns a password, but uses a
trojanized program that captures the password and sends it back to
the hacker.
A Trojan might also sabotage the installation of security patches
informing the system administrator that updates were installed
when in actuality they were not. Such vulnerabilities might allow
the hacker to gain entry though unpatched security holes.
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Network Intrusion Responder Program
Phases of an Intrusion
Lesson 5 - Infiltration and Extraction
Introduction
Once a hacker becomes entrenched in a system, he uses that
system as a mainstay with which to gather data, mine for useful
information, and launch attacks on other systems.
Purpose of this
This lesson explains how to infiltrate other systems and determine
Lesson
data extraction methods.
Objectives
After completing this lesson, you will be able to:
Explain the purpose and methods of infiltration
Explain the importance of trust relationships
Determine the data types targeted by hackers and how these
types are extracted
In this Lesson
The following table shows the contents of this lesson.
Topic
See Page
Sniffers
6-68
Trust Relationships
6-69
Data Extraction
6-70
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Phases of an Intrusion
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Sniffers
Sniffers
A sniffer is a program that is used to monitor or capture network
traffic. Hackers often eavesdrop seeking data, like usernames and
passwords that they can use to access other systems. This collected
data is usually stored on the compromised system in a hidden file.
Sniffers often run as disguised processes on systems. Some of the
common ways they run as disguised processes include:
Trojanzed device drives
Renamed programs that are configured to start at boot
Trojanized applications
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Network Intrusion Responder Program
Phases of an Intrusion
Trust Relationships
Trust
A trust relationship is a mechanism whereby users who are logged on
Relationships
and authenticated to one server are allowed to access resources on
another server without the need to re-authenticate.
If server A trusts the users logged into server B, then server A has
established what is called a one-way trust.
If server A trusts server B, and server B trusts server A, then they have
established what is called a two-way or absolute trust.
Server A and B have a two-way trust. Server B also trusts server C.
Server C can now access server A through what is called a pass through
or transitive trust.
Server A ¯ ------- Server B (One way trust)
Server A ¯ -------˘ Server B (Two-way or absolute trust)
Server A ¯ -------˘ Server B ¯ -----Server C (Transitive trust)
Some of the ways in which trust relationships are exploited are:
Compromising a trusted system, domain or server
Using or exploiting the LDAP service
Forging or spoofing authentication credentials
Spoofing source information
Piggybacking off an already trusted system
Hijacking a session from a trusted system
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Phases of an Intrusion
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Data Extraction
Data Extraction
Data extraction is the process of obtaining data off a compromised
system. Hackers must find a way to extract collected data in a
stealthy manner so as to avoid detection. To help avoid detection,
the desired data is filtered for relevancy and sent in a way that will
not overload the system or trigger an IDS.
Hackers know that most traffic loggers, IDS, and sniffers are
configured to only capture the beginning of most packets.
Embedding data deep into packets often allows the hacker to
extract the data without being detected.
Sometimes a hacker will schedule a job to send extracted data
during times when network traffic is heavy. This technique
attempts to avoid detection by using the network traffic volume
against the system administrator; much like trying to find a needle
in a haystack.
Some of the common ways data is extracted include:
E-mail
Masked as services like HTTP, DNS or ARP
Backdoor connections
Services run on a regular basis
Ftp or telnet login by the attacker
A print job run to a remote location or file
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National Computer Forensics Institute
NITRO
Network Intrusion
Responder Program
Volume 2 of 2
Course Introduction
Classification
Information contained in this instruction is UNCLASSIFIED.
However, certain methodologies are Law Enforcement Sensitive.
Introduction
NITRO is a three-week course consisting of 14 days of lessons,
incremental practical exams and a final practical exam.
Objective of this
NITRO is designed to introduce the officer to basic network
Course
intrusion investigation techniques.
Learning
After completing this course the trained officer should be able to
Outcomes
successfully conduct a network intrusion investigation.
Course Protocols
Information contained in each section of this student book is
presented in sequential order so that knowledge gained from later
lessons is built on a foundation of what was learned earlier. Other
course protocols include the following:
Practical exercises - Instructors will provide directives and
handouts for practical exercises completed in the lab.
Appendices - Include course related materials provided by the
instructors.
Practical Exercises
Practical exercises in NITRO are hands-on. Each exercise is
instructor-directed. In the exercises, students will:
Perform network wiring and connecting activities
Conduct manual log analysis
Use automated log analysis tools
Perform “Live” network gathering and analysis activities
In addition, every morning the students will have an opportunity to
ask questions and/or review materials discussed on the previous
day. This allows instruction to remain fresh and aids students with
building practical connections to the training.
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Table of Contents
Network Intrusion Responder Program (NITRO)
Table of Contents - Book II
Topic
Page
Module 7 - Report Writing
7-1
Lesson 1 - Defining an Intrusion
7-3
The Forensic Report
7-4
Examiner Notes
7-5
Forensic Reporting
7-6
Title Page
7-8
Items Analyzed
7-10
Relevant Software
7-11
Glossary
7-12
Details of Findings
7-13
Items Provided
7-16
Creating a Hyperlink in Microsoft Word
7-17
Lesson 2 - Cyber Crime Interviews
7-19
Cyber Crime Interviews
7-20
Interview Process
7-22
Module 8 - Legal Issues
8-1
Lesson 1 - Search Warrants
8-3
Search Warrants
8-4
Search Warrant Exceptions
8-10
Consent Searches
8-11
Search Incident to Arrest or Apprehension
8-14
Other Search Warrant Exceptions
8-16
Lesson 2 - Internet Service Providers
8-19
Legal Framework
8-20
Express Consent
8-24
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Table of Contents
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Topic
Page
Written Consent
8-26
Preservation Letters
8-29
Subpoena
8-30
Search Warrant
8-31
Available Data
8-32
Module 9 - Fundamentals of Log Analysis……………………..9-1
Lesson 1 - Understanding Network Traffic
9-3
Overview of Network Traffic
9-4
Investigation Techniques
9-5
Lesson 2 - The Scientific Method and Intrusion Analysis
9-9
Overview of the Scientific Method
9-10
Digital Forensic Analysis and the Scientific Method
9-12
Lesson 3 - Observing Intrusion-related Activity and Generating a Hypothesis . 9-15
Common Observations
9-16
Hypothesis Formation
9-19
Incident Classification
9-21
Lesson 4 - Predicting the Nature and Location of Intrusion Artifacts
9-25
Predicting the Nature and Location of Intrusion Artifacts
9-26
Relating Observed Events to Network Services and Traffic Types
9-27
Mapping Observed Activity to Traffic Flow
9-29
Using Traffic Flow and Service Type to Predict Artifact Location
9-33
Lesson 5 - Using Log Analysis to Evaluate an Intrusion Hypothesis
9-37
Hypothesis Evaluation
9-38
Acquiring Target Log Files
9-39
Reviewing Target Log Formats
9-40
Establishing Search/Extraction Criteria
9-41
Searching Target Logs and Extracting Relevant Data
9-42
Recording and Correlating Findings
9-43
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Network Intrusion Responder Program
Table of Contents
Topic
Page
Keeping Track of New Leads
9-45
Module 10 - Log Sources
10-1
Lesson 1 - Windows Log Sources
10-3
Windows Logs
10-4
Windows Services Logs
10-6
Lesson 2 - Linux Log Sources
10-9
Linux Logs
10-10
Lesson 3 - Solaris Log Sources
10-13
Solaris Logs
10-14
Lesson 4 - Log Searching
10-15
Log Searching
10-16
Regular Expressions
10-17
Regular Expressions: Literal Characters
10-18
Lesson 5 - IDS Logs
10-19
IDS Logs
10-20
Module 11 - Log Analysis
11-1
Lesson 1 - Binary Traffic Analysis
11-3
Introduction to Wireshark
11-4
Converting Binary Logs to Text Format
11-5
Filtering and Searching in Wireshark
11-6
Filtering Data during Capture with Wireshark
11-7
Filtering Displayed Data in Wireshark
11-8
Colorizing Data Using Filters in Wireshark
11-14
Searching in Wireshark
11-16
Generating Statistics with Wireshark
11-17
Exporting Data from Wireshark
11-22
Lesson 2 - Manual Log Analysis
11-23
Filtering and Searching Text Logs
11-24
Deciding What to Search For
11-25
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Table of Contents
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Topic
Page
Example Log
11-26
Lesson 3 - Automated Log Analysis Tools
11-29
What is Sawmill?
11-30
Installing Sawmill
14-31
Network Log Analysis Using Sawmill
14-38
Module 15 - LiveWire Investigations
12-1
Lesson 1 - Data Collection
12-3
Locating Physical Devices
12-4
Attaching Storage Equipment
12-6
Lesson 2 - Introduction to LiveWire
12-9
Live Digital Investigations
12-10
LiveWire Installation
12-13
LiveDiscover Installation
12-14
Updating LiveWire
12-16
Updating LiveDiscover
12-17
LiveWire Initial Setup
12-19
Lesson 3 - LiveDiscover
12-31
LiveDiscover Network Scanning
12-32
Lesson 4 -Volatile Data Analysis
12-39
LiveWire Initial Inquiry
12-40
System State
12-49
Current User Activity
12-55
Active Network State
12-68
Lesson 5 - Evidence Collection
12-73
File System Status
12-74
Physical vs. Logical
12-78
Collection and Preservation
12-84
Hashing
12-88
Lesson 6 - Malicious Code Analysis
12-93
Malicious Program Search
12-94
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Network Intrusion Responder Program
Table of Contents
Topic
Page
Lesson 7 - Alternate Data Collection Tools
12-99
Windows Forensic Toolkit
12-100
Helix
12-103
Appendices
A-1
Appendix A - Intrusion Report Template
A-1
Appendix B - Volatile Data Collection
B-1
Appendix C - Understanding Computer Hardware
C-1
Appendix D - Data Storage Components
D-1
Appendix E - Input/Output Components
E-1
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II-5
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Report Writing
Module 7
Report Writing
Overview
Investigations require comprehensive reporting that documents
actions and summarizes findings. The best reports are clear,
concise, accurate, and report only information relevant to the facts
of the case.
Purpose of this
The purpose of this module is to introduce you to an acceptable
Module
format and strategy for reporting. You will learn how to
summarize the steps and findings of an investigation involving
digital data.
Objectives
After successfully completing this module, you will be able to:
Discuss the importance of writing an organized, clear, concise
and accurate report
Write an organized, clear, concise, and accurate report
Discuss appropriate questions and interviewing techniques for
computer crimes
In this Module
The following table lists the contents of this module.
Lesson
See Page
Lesson 1 - General Report Writing Techniques
7-3
Lesson 2 - Cyber Crime Interviews
7-19
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7-1
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Report Writing
Lesson 1 - General Report Writing Techniques
Introduction
Forensic reports involving the analysis of digital evidence should
address the same basic information. No matter how well an
investigator conducts analysis, it is of little value if results cannot
be reported in an organized, clear, complete and concise manner.
Purpose of this
The purpose of this lesson is to provide guidance for generating a
Lesson
document to report the forensic analysis results of digital evidence.
Objectives
After completing this lesson, you will be able to create a forensic
report that:
Discusses the purpose and need for forensic analysis
Explains what physical and/or logical evidence was analyzed
Defines programs, terms, and their relevance
Explains findings in an orderly manner
Associates relevant evidence with users
In this Lesson
The following table lists the contents of this lesson.
Topic
See Page
The Forensic Report
7-4
Examiner Notes
7-5
Forensic Reporting
7-6
Title Page
7-8
Items Analyzed
7-10
Relevant Software
7-11
Glossary
7-12
Details of Findings
7-13
Items Provided
7-16
Creating a Hyperlink in Microsoft Word
7-17
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7-3
Report Writing
Network Intrusion Responder Program
The Forensic Report
Introduction
The forensic report is the culmination of a process often involving
intensive and painstaking work. It should reflect the time, effort
and professionalism involved in building the case and acquiring
the information. No matter how overwhelming conclusive the
evidence is in determining guilt or innocence, if the evidence is not
presented in an organized, clear and concise manner, it may be of
little use to its intended audience.
Ultimately you should consider the report a reflection of yourself,
your skills, attention to detail, experience and work ethic. In this
respect, the report is much like a resume. It deserves the same
attention that you would put into the development of your resume.
The report should be well organized, include only relevant
information, and be free of grammatical, punctuation and spelling
errors. The recipient should be able to read it one time and have a
very clear understanding of the message you are trying to convey.
If the reader cannot do that your forensic report may disregarded
or discarded.
The consequences of such a fate for a resume are obvious but the
impact is limited to the individual. The consequences of that
happening to a forensic report could be far more reaching. If the
evidence to convict a child predator was apparent but discarded for
lack of organization and presentation the consequences could be
felt by an innocent child or many children in the future.
Again, consider the report a reflection of your professionalism and
develop it as such. It is a professional document and could very
well be one of the most important reports you will ever write.
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Network Intrusion Responder Program
Report Writing
Examiner Notes
Importance of
The documentation that is created during the analysis process
Documentation
provides the basis for the examiner to report the results of the case.
Remember, all written notes and documentation created during the
investigation should be preserved and may be discoverable in
court.
Examiner notes taken during the execution of a forensic
examination along with the final report of your findings are the
foundation on which many digital media-related cases are built.
Note Taking
Note taking is an essential part of a forensic examination. Your
notes help create a document that will provide a record of all of the
procedures and processes performed. The examination notes
should present a clear timeline of the actions taken and the results
of those actions. For example:
January 15th, 2008
0800 - Performed a signature check on the suspect media, Item
#1, Partition1, NTFS, 6.0GB. There were a total of 243 file
signature mismatches identified.
0835 - Reviewed signature mismatched files and found 23 files of
interest …
0900 - Used Adobe Photoshop 8.5 to review image files for
existence of layered images. None were found.
Properly recorded notes provide a repeatable roadmap of your
examination. Another examiner should be able follow your notes
to reproduce the same results obtained in the original exam.
You should number, date, and initial all note pages using the [page
#] of [total # of pages] numbering schema to account for all note
pages. It is not uncommon for extensive periods of time to pass
between the time of the examination and prosecutorial action.
Thorough note taking will help ensure that you can accurately
testify to actions taken during the examination. When taking
examiner notes, always follow the rule, “If it wasn’t documented,
it didn’t happen.”
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7-5
Report Writing
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Forensic Reporting
Introduction
A forensic analysis report should contain all of the relevant
evidence that you find during your examination. Your final report
must clearly identify persons related to the examination including
you, the requestor, suspects, and any other pertinent individuals.
Your report should:
Provide details about the purpose for the forensic analysis
Describe the physical and/or logical evidence analyzed
Define related programs, terms and their relevance
Most importantly, the forensic report must clearly and concisely
explain the items of evidentiary value that were found on the
suspect media as a result of your analysis. It must also identify the
location and relevance of the items of evidentiary value as relating
to the reason for the analysis and/or the investigation.
Report Contents
Each completed forensic report should always contain the
following information, although the headings used within your
report may vary from organization to organization:
Report heading
Support requested, reason or purpose for analysis
Summary of findings
Digital media analyzed
Analysis/Suspect Software Listings
Glossary of Technical Terms
Detail of Findings
Items Provided
Your forensic report should define all technical terms using
common language that non-technical investigators and prosecutors
can understand. It should clearly indicate relevant items you
discovered, how they were discovered, where they were located,
and how the evidence relates to the case and/or investigation.
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Network Intrusion Responder Program
Report Writing
Forensic Reporting, continued
Note Taking
It is important to distinguish between note taking and reporting.
versus Reporting
The forensic report is the final result of your analysis and its focus
is to respond to the allegations or charges that led to the
investigation, defined by:
The request or purpose for the analysis
Information compiled as the case progressed including search
authorization documents
Information provided by other sources, legal, victims, and
informants
Your experience as a forensic examiner
The report should include those items that directly relate to and are
relevant to the allegations or charges in the request for analysis.
Notes, however, should include references to all steps taken by the
analyst during the examination with either positive or negative
results. The primary goal of note taking is to document all steps
taken as well as to serve as a chronicle of the examination. It may
be used as a reference later during prosecution.
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7-7
Report Writing
Network Intrusion Responder Program
Title Page
Contents of the
The title page provides an overview of the case, including:
Title Page
Report Header
Support Requested
Current Case Status
Summary of Findings
Description
In the table below, you will find standard information that should
be included in the title page of all reports. A sample report follows
this chart.
Item
Description
Title (To:)
Indicates report’s recipient and date. This
information is usually directly related to the
charging document or request for service.
From
Identifies report’s author, including name,
organization, and contact information.
Subject
Indicates the type of work performed, as well as
any suspect and/or local case reference
information.
Support
Concisely states what charges or allegations
Requested or
were addressed by the analysis, charging
Purpose for
jurisdiction or entity, with regard to a specific
Analysis
investigation.
Status
Indicates the current case status, usually Open
or Closed. This may change the nature from a
report to a status update.
Summary of
A short narrative describing the type and nature
Findings
of any evidentiary items located during analysis
with respect to the specific allegations or
charges. The failure to locate items that support
the allegations should also be indicated here, as
well as items that may exonerate.
Footer
Includes author’s name, title/rank, and a
“Released” field for approval signature. Footer
may include a legal disclaimer. All pages of the
report should be numbered in the Page X of X
format.
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Title Page, continued
Title Page Example
Computer Forensic Analysis Report
MEMORANDUM FOR Trooper William Barksdale, MD State Police
January 30, 2008
FROM:
Trooper Michael Ghaler, Forensic Examiner
MD State Police Forensics Laboratory
Pikesville, Maryland 21208-3899
SUBJECT:
Forensic Media Analysis Report
Subject(s):
John M. Smith
Born:
October 11, 1960
Case Number:
2008-0123A
1. Support Requested
Trooper Barksdale, MD State Police requested the examination of the submitted digital media
seized as the result of an ongoing criminal investigation related to the theft and subsequent sale of
weapons from a U.S. Army facility in Baltimore, Maryland. The request asked that the submitted
media be examined for any evidence related to the theft and/or sale of explosives, particularly C4,
and the existence of possible co-conspirators who participated in, or facilitated the unlawful activity.
2. Status: Pending (or closed)
3. Summary of Findings
The examination of submitted media, which was conducted during the period of 2008/01/14 and
2008/01/18 resulted in the discovery of numerous image files depicting the type of explosives
indicated in the Request for Analysis. A number of the image files also showed the suspect,
SMITH, in possession of the materials. Additionally, a review of Internet activity resulted in the
discovery of a number of instances where the suspect’s computer was used to access Internet
auction sites in an attempt to sell explosive materials. While the suspect received numerous email
correspondences from individuals apparently responding to his auction advertisements and
participated in newsgroup conversations regarding the sale of explosives, little information was
found which indicates the existence of a conspiracy between the suspect and any other individuals
in this activity.
Trooper Michael Ghaler
Computer Forensic Analyst
Released by: ______
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Items Analyzed
Introduction
The Items Analyzed section of the report describes in detail the
analyzed physical and/or logical evidence. It should always
include the original and verified hash values of all evidence items.
Physical Items
The Items Analyzed section of the report may contain a reference
to the actual physical evidence. Give a detailed description,
including:
Manufacturer
Model, serial, and part number (when possible)
Item description
Any specific markings
Logical Items
The Items Analyzed section of the report details images sent to
you for analysis as well as any “original” evidence items you may
receive for examination. In addition to listing the physical
containers, you should also list the image files. Do this by original
file name and include any hash or other validation mechanism. An
example follows.
Items Analyzed Example
Items Analyzed
Tag # 01 Western Digital Caviar 31600 Hard Drive
Serial #: WT2891586134
Size: 40GB
Hash Provided: 1234567890ABCDEF1234567890ABCDEF
Tag # 02 One Memorex DVD-R disk containing image files derived from a Fujitsu
M1636TAU Hard Drive, Serial #: 08613105, Size: 1226MB:
Suspect_dvd.e01
Suspect_dvd.e02
Suspect_dvd.e03
Suspect_dvd.e04
Hash Provided: ABCDEF1234567890ABCDEF1234567890
Verified Hash: ABCDEF1234567890ABCDEF1234567890
Hash values indicated above are for the entire device image. Individual file hash
values were not provided.
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Relevant Software
Introduction
This section of the report identifies the software found on the
evidence media that is relevant to the case as well as the identity of
forensic software used to perform the examination.
Analysis Software
List all software applications used during the forensic examination
to process or analyze the suspect media, including the primary
analysis tool. Be sure that all applications in this listing include the
appropriate software version information and a brief description of
the software’s functionality or use.
Suspect Software
Identifying the software on a suspect’s machine is a necessary
component of the case. Also include any software that may have
created and/or interacted with data of evidentiary value located
during the forensic examination. Include any software that you can
identify as being deleted from the suspect’s machine. Pay
particular attention to software which is commonly used to hide
data or securely erase data from the device. Each software listing
should include the:
Software name and version
The full path to where the application was located on the
suspect media
A brief description of the program functionality and how it
relates to the Request for Analysis and/or investigation
You should be prepared to further explain items in this listing
during prosecution
Relevant Software Example
Analysis Software:
Program Name/Version
Program Description
LiveWire Investigator 2007
Live Forensic Analysis Suite
Sawmill Professional 7.2.14
Forensic Log Analysis Tool
Suspect Software:
Program Name/Version
Directory Location
Program Description
AOL Instant Messenger
C:\Program Files\AIM
Internet Chat Application
Microsoft Internet Explorer
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer
Internet Browsing
Application
Microsoft Outlook Express
C:\Program Files\Outlook Express
Email Application
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Glossary
Glossary
The Glossary defines any technical terms, document formats, and
procedure details referenced within your report that may not be
readily understood by the average non-technical reader. Only
define the terms that are integral to the understanding of your
examination findings as presented in the report.
Glossary Example
Glossary
Term
Definition
HTML (Hypertext Markup
One of the authoring languages used to create documents
Language)
on the World Wide Web.
IRC (Internet Relay Chat)
A multi-user chat system, which is real-time
communication between two users via computer. Once a
chat has been initiated, either user can enter text by
typing on the keyboard and the entered text will appear
on the other user’s monitor. It is often used on the
Internet.
JPG (Joint Photographic
A graphic image file format.
Experts Group)
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Details of Findings
Introduction
The Details of Findings section provides detailed information
about any items of evidentiary value found on the suspect media
during the forensic examination. The information in this section
should be thorough, yet concise, and only contain details relevant
to the request for analysis and/or the investigation. It should not
contain information about processes executed that did not produce
relevant information, unless the negative result is relevant.
Information about these non-productive processes should be
included in your notes.
Organization
There are several different ways to organize your report. You may
find yourself using different organizational strategies on different
investigations. You might, for example, organize a report on a case
that contained many pieces of media by listing all of the items
found on each piece of media as one section.
In other cases it may be more effective to organize the data by date
and time. This approach works particularly well in cases where the
organization of data such as e-mail, chat and downloads is easier
to understand if organized in chronological order.
Another method of organizing your report would be to organize
evidence by its relationship to a particular criminal charge and
subject. This approach works well for criminal prosecution. It
allows the prosecutor to quickly see the evidence, which is
relevant to a particular charge and subject.
As shown in the following example, the evidence can also be
ordered or segregated by device. This would be a good
organizational choice for a case that has many pieces of media
such as a large quantity of CDs or DVDs. This organizational
strategy is not normally the best choice when all of the evidence is
located on one device.
If the evidence has multiple partitions, you should further
subdivide your results by individual partition. Make sure you
detail the partition’s file format and size. To further clarify
evidence, you may also want to divide your findings by each user
account or profile. You should detail important files, structure,
data, and discrepancies. Explain your techniques, methodology,
and the relevance of information in brief narrative statements
whenever possible.
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Details of Findings, continued
Organization,
If the analysis of a particular item of evidence did not result in the
continued
discovery of any items of evidentiary value, a simple statement
should be included stating the negative results to ensure that the
reader does not misinterpret an omission as the failure to analyze
evidence.
Include in the report the techniques you used to locate or extract
evidence. Later, you can refer to your report if asked in court how
you found a specific piece of evidence. For example, if you found
the file by manually inspecting the drive, then state this.
Remember, not every search has to be done with an automated
tool.
You should take time to develop an organized structure for your
report before writing it.
Hyperlinks
If your report is included on a CD or other large media, use
hyperlinks where possible to illustrate items of evidentiary value.
Hyperlinks allow the reader to click on a description of the
document, or data, when viewing the electronic copy of the report
and display the actual file on the screen.
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Details of Findings, continued
Details of Findings A skeletal example of the layout for the Details of Findings section
Example
follows.
Details of Findings
A complete analysis of all computer media analyzed (listed above) revealed the following
information pertinent to the Request for Analysis and/or of evidential value to this investigation.
Analysis of the Tag #1, image files Suspect.E01 through E04 from 3.0262GB Maxtor hard drive
revealed:
Partition 0, NTFS 2.0GB
[Detail your findings in this section relative to the indicated partition located on
the hard drive specified. Use narratives, tables, lists, etc. to describe what you
found, where, and relevance to the case, etc.]
Partition 1, FAT32, 1.0GB
[Detail your findings in this section relative to the indicated partition located on
the hard drive specified. Use narratives, tables, lists, etc. to describe what you
found, where, and relevance to the case, etc.]
Disk Free Space, 0.0262GB
[Detail your findings in this section relative to the indicated disk area located on
the hard drive specified. Use narratives, tables, lists, etc. to describe what you
found, where, and relevance to the case, etc.]
Analysis of Tag #2, black Memorex floppy disk revealed:
[Detail your findings in this section relative to any items of evidentiary value
located on the floppy disk. Use narrative, tables, lists, etc. to describe what you
found, where, and relevance to the case, etc.]
Analysis of Tag #3, SONY CD-R media labeled “My Plan” revealed:
[Detail your findings in this section relative to information located on the CD. Use
narrative, tables, lists, etc. to describe what you found, where, and relevance to
the case, etc. In the event of multiple session CDs, it may be necessary to further
subdivide this information by specific session.]
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Items Provided
Items Provided
This section details all of the physical items returned to the
requestor with this report. It should include all of the items
specified in the Items Analyzed section. Be sure to include items
that were generated as a result of your analysis, such as a ZIP disk,
floppy disk, CD-Rs, and hard copy documents.
Example
Items Provided
1)
Tag # 01
Western Digital Caviar 31600 Hard Drive
Serial #: WT2891586134
Size: 40GB
2)
Tag # 02
One Memorex DVD-R disk containing the image files listed below
derived from a Fujitsu M1636TAU Hard Drive, Serial #: 08613105, Size: 1226MB:
Suspect dvd.e01
Suspect dvd.e02
Suspect dvd.e03
Suspect dvd.e04
3)
One CD Labeled “Findings of Case Number: 2004-0123A”, which contains
information referred to in this document.
4)
One printed document consisting of three pages, entitled “C4 - What’s it good
for?” that explains the uses of C4 and methods to surreptitiously sell it using
publicly available Internet auction web sites.
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Report Writing
Creating a Hyperlink in Microsoft Word
Introduction
Hyperlinking is a good way to direct readers to items referred to in
a written report on electronic media. It is often not practical to
display certain items in the actual report. For example, the report
may reference an offensive, graphic image of child pornography.
Some readers may not have the need to view the image. Others
may be required to do so in order to confirm its existence. In this
scenario, a simple hyperlink would allow those with the need to
inspect the file while sparing others from having to view it.
Additionally, there may be so many items of interest that it would
be too cumbersome to include all of the actual images in the
written report. In this situation, a hyperlink could lead to an entire
directory that contains multiple files.
These are both excellent examples of when hyperlinking would
compliment your report.
Procedure:
Use the following procedure to create a hyperlink in Microsoft
Create a
Word.
Hyperlink in
Microsoft Word
Step
Action
1
Use the mouse to highlight the reference item.
3
From Microsoft Word’s pull-down menu, select Insert
> Hyperlink.
4
In the Insert Hyperlink dialog box, traverse the
directory structure until you locate the file or directory
to which you want to establish a link.
5
Click OK. The reference item should change color to
indicate that it is now a hyperlink.
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Lesson 2 - Cyber Crime Interviews
Introduction
Interviews are an essential element of developing information that
is relevant to a criminal investigation. When conducting a cyber
crime investigation, investigators must prepare for the interview,
develop rapport with interview subjects, ask questions that
generate corroborative information and leads, and terminate the
interview in a way that leaves the door open for further questions.
Purpose of this
In this lesson, you will learn guidelines that will assist you in
Lesson
conducting interviews for cyber crime investigations.
Objectives
After completing this lesson, you will be able to:
Develop a plan to conduct interviews in a cyber investigation
Explain the psychology and culture of the technology world
and ways to apply that knowledge to the interview process
Ask questions that will provide you with information that will
assist the investigation
In this Lesson
The following table shows the contents of this lesson.
Topic
See Page
Cyber Crime Interviews
7-20
Interview Process
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Cyber Crime Interviews
Overview of Cyber
When most investigators think about cyber crime investigations,
Crime Interviews
they think of the data stored on the digital media, volatile data
from the physical devices associated with the incident, and logs
from witness devices. All of these items contain information that is
valuable to the case and should not be overlooked by an
investigator.
However, none of this data completes the picture by itself because
machines do not act on their own free will. In order to complete
the puzzle that the investigator is trying to solve, he/she must
obtain information from all of the people who are involved with
the incident.
The witnesses and victims of a crime can help direct the
investigation and assist the investigator in understanding the nature
of the crime, locating more evidence, and identifying suspects. A
proper interview of a suspect may assist in revealing the true scope
of the investigation and provide the information needed to ensure
the conviction of a suspect.
Interviews are an integral part of any investigation because the
victims, witnesses, and perpetrators of a crime all have pieces of
the puzzle that the investigator is trying to put back together.
When confronted with an incident that involves complex technical
issues and multiple sources of evidence, an investigator must
skillfully navigate the human landscape to develop leads, confirm
events, and obtain a complete picture of the crime.
Accusatory versus
There is a difference between an interview and an interrogation.
Non-Accusatory
The purpose of an interview is to gather information that will
Interviews
confirm events, develop suspects and leads, and identify facts that
lead an investigator to identify the root causes of the incident being
investigated.
Interviews are not focused on getting an individual to confess, but
on developing information. In order to obtain the information he
needs, an investigator develops rapport with the subjects and
conducts interviews in a non-confrontational manner.
Interrogations focus on presenting the facts of the case to the
suspect and eliciting statements that confirm the suspect’s
involvement in the incident.
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Cyber Crime Interviews, continued
Accusatory versus
Understanding the difference between an interview and an
Non-Accusatory,
interrogation is critical to the investigator’s success. If the
continued
investigator takes an aggressive and accusatory approach to
communicating with interview subjects, there is a strong
possibility that this type of interaction will close the door for any
further effective communication.
The investigator must also take into account the perceptions of the
interviewees. Many of the people that you will encounter during
the initial interviews of a cyber crime investigation have little to no
exposure to law enforcement outside of what they have watched
on television. The subjects may also view any interaction with
government agents through the lens of their personal attitudes,
experiences, and beliefs about law enforcement.
In the hacker culture, law enforcement is often cast in a negative
light and government agents are seen as dimwitted and
overbearing. By taking these issues into account, an agent can
prepare for the interview process and maximize the amount of
information he can obtain.
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Interview Process
Interview Process Interviews are often open-ended, free flowing conversations that
develop information and enhance an investigator’s understanding
of the case. Following a structured process that progresses from
basic to detailed questions provides more relevant results to the
case agent.
Interviews during a cyber crime investigation are the first and best
opportunity to determine what has happened and obtain
clarification. The crime scene and evidence are not visible to an
investigator during a computer incident. Therefore, investigators
need to gather information about the victim network and machines
from other people. The individuals who control the machines
understand the geography of the digital environment. An
investigator must obtain this information from these people.
The interview process has been broken down into the following
model which can be used to structure the approach taken when
interviewing subjects from a technical backg0round.
Planning/Research
Opening/Rapport
General Questioning
Detailed Questioning
Interview Termination
Planning and
Prior to conducting an interview, it is a good idea to conduct
Research
preliminary research on the interviewee and the organization that
he or she represents. Understanding a person’s training,
experience, area of expertise, the nature of his or her daily
business, and role within an organization can help the investigator
draft appropriate questions and an interviewing approach that will
be successful in a specific corporate culture.
Investigators who are knowledgeable and comprehend a technical
subject’s area of expertise present a professional and approachable
image to the interview subject. The knowledge gained through
planning and research also sets the stage for establishing a
situation where the interviewer can ask more intelligent questions.
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Interview Process, continued
Opening/Rapport The initial contact with subjects in a cyber crime investigation is
critical to obtaining cooperation during an interview. Showing
respect for the needs of the individual and the organization and
explaining the importance of the interview questions are vital steps
in obtaining a subject’s cooperation. You should explain to the
interview subjects that you will need their assistance in
determining the facts of the case and understanding some of the
issues that are involved.
General
Start with open-ended questions that allow the subject to relate to
Questioning
you his or her knowledge of the events. These questions should
develop a general framework of the incident that is derived from
the subject’s personal knowledge of factual events. During a
technical investigation, it is important that an investigator obtain
the general outline of the events that transpired in order to
document information that is relevant to the case.
You should obtain the following information:
Key incidents that brought the situation to light
Hardware that was involved (routers, firewalls, IDS)
Specific individuals who were involved in the incident and the
physical actions they took with any evidence
Physical locations of effected machines and people
Technology that will need clarification during the Detailed
Questioning phase
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Interview Process, continued
Detailed
After obtaining a general picture of the incident, the investigator
Questioning
can probe deeper into issues that are relevant to the case. The
investigator can ask the subjects to describe in more detail how
they became aware of the incident, what physical actions they
took, and how they came to any conclusions. These questions are
important to obtaining a complete picture for the investigator.
The following information should be pursued and collected at this
stage:
Software and hardware model numbers and versions
Network monitoring and logging setup
Collection of current logs
Network diagrams
User policies
List of people who had logical and physical access
Ownership and authorized access of systems
User account information
Statements of how the systems are used
Individual access to relevant systems and/or data
Specific commands or tools used during the discovery of the
incident
Security video or proximity card logs
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Interview Process, continued
Interview
It is not uncommon for the investigator to go back for more details
Termination
as his knowledge of the incident grows or if he needs assistance
explaining a complex technical subject to other people. The
investigator should ask the subject for contact information in case
the investigator needs to clarify or elaborate upon material
discussed during the interview. By terminating the interview in
this manner, the investigator has another opportunity to speak with
people that may become suspects at a later time.
Interview
Investigators should take into account the subject’s perspective
Psychology
and culture. Many times people in the computer field are
distrustful of government agents and often have a skewed
perception of what sort of evidence an investigator may need or
want. System administrators from a college campus or library will
typically have very different values and perceptions than a system
administrator that has worked in a DoD environment. By
identifying the work place environment, professional experience
and culture, and common characteristics that influence the
interviewees, the case agent can determine the best approach to
building rapport with the individuals that hold insight to key
elements of the case.
Establishing the right tone for an interview is important in making
sure that the interviewer is obtaining all of the necessary
information that is available from the subject.
The approach an investigator takes to a case differs depending on
whether the investigator initiates contact with an organization for
information or whether the investigator is called in by the
organization who is a victim of the crime. This issue will
determine how the investigator structures his approach to the
interviews.
When an organization calls in an investigator, most of the
organization’s key players are already involved in the incident.
Upper management will typically support the initial stages of the
investigation. In this situation, you should obtain written
documentation from everyone involved in the incident and begin
working on controlling the investigation. It is important to
minimize the mishandling or destruction of evidence and the
spread of information about the investigation to keep potential
suspects in the dark.
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Interview Process, continued
Investigator
When an investigator is tracking down a cyber incident, the case
Initiated Contact
will often lead to an external organization that may have computer
logs or actual systems that are relevant to the case.
First the investigator must identify a point of contact within that
organization. This can be done by looking up registration
information for the company via an Internet search engine and
then identifying the legal counsel and network administrator.
There are also a wide variety of state, federal, and private registries
that contain this information and will provide it to law
enforcement agencies. You can also find several Internet service
provider lists that include contact information for major
communications providers such as AOL, Microsoft, Google,
Yahoo, and others.
Then investigators must decide how they will contact a complex
organization that they may know nothing about. These are some of
the considerations that an investigator should take into account:
Is the system administrator or someone with root access
responsible for the activity?
Do they know the suspect and are they relaying information
about the investigation to their associate?
Are there any regulatory or legal barriers to the organization
giving information to the investigator (ECPA, PPA, FERPA,
HIPPA, Organizational Policy, etc.)
How critical is the evidence held by the company to the case?
Is a life or national security at stake?
Does the investigator have access to request the legal
instruments such as subpoenas, search warrants, FISA, or other
items in a timely manner?
Does the investigator have the technical knowledge to handle
the systems or logs that will be obtained from the scene or will
he need additional assistance?
Will the evidence be contained all at one physical location or
spread out over a national or global network infrastructure?
Does the investigating agency have the manpower, technical
knowledge, and resources to obtain what they need from the
target organization?
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Interview Process, continued
Investigator
When an investigator reaches out to an organization, it is best to
Initiated Contact,
identify the senior management, legal counsel, and technical heads
continued
prior to making contact. If the investigation allows, you should
start at the top of the organization’s hierarchy and work down
towards individuals who are responsible for managing or using
various computer and network services. An investigator can
address legal issues, business impact, and concern for the
organization’s needs in order to gain more cooperation.
If an investigation could be compromised by reaching out to the
organization in this manner, the investigator should avoid “tipping
off” the organization or individuals. The investigator can then do
the research and case preparation to obtain the most effective legal
authority that will allow him to gather evidence and interviews in
the most effective and efficient manner possible.
Organization
If the victim organization is reaching out to the investigator to
Initiated Contact
report an incident, the investigator will more than likely have
cooperation. At this point, the victim performed an internal
investigation that may or may not have been done properly. The
investigator will still need to follow up to ensure the accuracy of
any information provided by the victim organization. Again,
properly document any actions taken by people at the company.
It can be very important to work with the organization’s legal
counsel and network administrators. The legal counsel can assist
with collecting information that is governed by organizational
policies.
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Interview Process, continued
Organization
Many organizations are ignorant of the investigation’s process and
Initiated Contact,
do not use proper evidence handling procedures. Common
continued
practices used by organizations to minimize or repair damage
caused by an incident will often hamper the investigation. Some of
these issues are:
When a machine has been compromised it is common practice
to just restore the machine from a base image.
Many times untrained system administrators or management
will work on live systems and alter system artifacts and time
lines.
There is more concern for system/network integrity compared
to retaining any evidence or identifying the cause of the
incident.
Chain of custody issues are often not followed
Lack of network maps and diagrams
Incomplete knowledge of system functions and passwords
Poor documentation of system builds, organizational policies,
or security controls
Investigators should address these issues in advance to minimize
problems with this type of situation.
Witness and
These individuals often provide the investigator with the initial
Victims
foundation of a case and the information needed to build the
framework for the investigation. A system administrator or a user
of an online database may be the first to notice strange system
behavior or altered data in a critical database. A relative or friend
may discover suspected child pornography images on a computer
and report it to the police. In either situation, the investigator will
need to elicit information from people to obtain facts that will lead
them to a suspect.
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Interview Process, continued
Witness and
Investigators must keep in mind that anyone could be a suspect.
Victims, continued
During the initial response and interviews, an investigator needs to
obtain clear and concise written documentation from the people
involved with the incident. This documentation should consist of
any actions taken by the witnesses and events observed by them
during the incident. Your documentation is an important part of
freezing the crime scene and creating a permanent record of events
that occurred during the discovery of the crime.
Investigators should keep in mind that the people who are being
interviewed may have had little contact with law enforcement and
may not recognize the type of evidence needed to further the
investigation. It is the investigator’s job to develop a rapport with
the interview subjects and guide the interview in a direction that
will obtain the most relevant and complete information possible.
Issues to be
There are various issues that should be addressed during
Addressed During
interviews with witnesses. Here are some important questions:
Interviews
Are system administrators or people with administrative
powers potential suspects? If so, the investigator must move
quickly and efficiently to build the case. If immediate action is
not an option, the investigator must ensure that the suspect’s
access to evidence or sensitive material is removed. Covert
tactics may become necessary if you have the proper
administrative approval, legal documents, and technical
capabilities in place.
Obtaining witness statements about the suspect’s access to the
machine or data is also important. Investigators should
supplement any network logs and/or forensic analysis with as
much traditional detective work as possible.
Do people share machines, use passwords, or share passwords?
Have there been any strange phone calls or repairmen asking
for user accounts, passwords, or other sensitive technical
information? If so, these incidents may have been a suspect
trying to obtain information about the victim organization in
order to commit the crime.
01/09
For Official Use Only - Law Enforcement Sensitive
7-29

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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