Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8)

Chapter 3

Take Immediate Action

All UXOs found on the battlefield affect maneuver and mission capabilities.

When you find a UXO, you must make some immediate decisions. These

decisions will depend on your current mission, the size and location of the UXO,

and your unit’s capabilities. Figure 3-1 shows a decision chart to help you decide.

This information is also in GTA 9-12-1, which is available at your local TASC.

DETECT UXO

REPORT IMMEDIATLY

YES

AVOID

MARK IT,

YES

EOD, EOCA AVAILABLE

CONTINUE MISSION

NEUTRALIZE

IMMEDIATE ACTION

EVACUATE, ISOLATE,

AND BARRICADE

Figure 3-1. Decision chart

If at all possible, avoiding/bypassing the UXO hazard is the safest option to take

for personnel and equipment. if the UXO hazard is left from a recent enemy

attack, you must consider protecting your personnel and equipment by extracting

them from the area before another attack is targeted on you. See Chapter 5 for

extraction procedures.

If the mission cannot be accomplished due to the presence of the UXO and the

hazard cannot be avoided/bypassed, protective measures must be taken to reduce

the hazard to personnel and equipment. Regardless of the option you choose, the

location of the UXO must be clearly marked with UXO markers and the hazard

reported to your next higher headquarters. See Chapter 4 for procedures on

reporting a UXO hazard.

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3-1

Chapter 3

PROTECTIVE MEASURES

3-1. There are three methods you can use to protect personnel and equipment. You can evacuate,

isolate, or barricade them.

EVACUATE

3-2. Evacuation of all nonessential personnel and equipment is the best protective measure. The

evacuation distances given in Figure 3-2 provide a reasonable degree of safety for unprotected

personnel and equipment. These distances are based on your estimate of the amount of explosive filler

in the UXO. If protective barricades are used around the UXO, these distances can be reduced.

3-3. The general rule for estimating the amount of explosive in an ordnance item is as follows:

Assume that 50 percent of the total ordnance weight equals the NEW. For example, a 500-pound bomb

would be calculated to have 250 pounds of explosive. According to Figure 3-2, the safe distance for

unprotected personnel is 625 meters. Refer to Appendixes B through E for the NEW of general

ordnance items.

3-4. After all personnel and equipment are evacuated, movement within the area should be kept to

essential operations only. If equipment cannot be evacuated, only mission-essential personnel should

be allowed in the area. The equipment should be protected by barricades and personnel should wear all

protective equipment.

Explosive

Evacuation

Weight (pounds)

Distance (meters)

27 and less

300

310

330

350

360

375

100

475

150

550

200

600

250

625

300

675

400

725

500

800

Figure 3-2. Evacuation distances

ISOLATE

3-5. Sometimes, for mission-related, operational, or other reasons, you cannot evacuate personnel

and/or equipment or you cannot leave a particular area. When this happens, you must isolate either

your assets (personnel, equipment, and operations) from the UXO or isolate the UXO from your assets.

See Figure 3-6, 3-7, and 3-8.

BARRICADE

3-6. If your unit is stationary, evacuate all nonessential personnel and equipment out of the hazard

area. Equipment that cannot be moved must be protected with barricades. Personnel who cannot be

evacuated from the area must also be protected from the hazard. You can do this by reinforcing the

fighting positions on the side facing the hazard and by adding overhead cover.

3-7. A barricade is an artificial barrier that provides limited protection by channeling the blast and

fragmentation from the threatened area. Barricades may also be used to lessen the effect of the blast

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FM 4-30.51

13 July 2006

Take Immediate Action

and to reduce the size of the evacuation area. When determining if barricades are needed, you must

estimate the probable damage that would result if the UXO were to explode. Building artificial

barricades is very time consuming and requires a large number of sandbags. Depending on the size of

the UXO, barricades can be built around the UXO to protect the entire area, or they can be built next to

the equipment or areas that cannot be evacuated.

3-8. Use the following general guidelines when building barricades:

Calculate the total destructive power of the UXO hazard. Multiply the number of items by

their NEW.

Determine which assets cannot be moved or evacuated from the area safely.

For those assets that cannot be moved or evacuated, decide on the type of barricade(s) you

will need to protect your assets. Sandbags, or other dirt or water filled barriers can be used.

Concrete barriers are not preferred near the ordnance item as they tend to produce more

fragments.

Determine how many personnel are available to help build barricades. Use the absolute

fewest personnel. Determine what equipment you can use. If earth-moving equipment is

available, you can build earth barriers in place of sandbag barricades.

Calculate the number of sandbags you will need or that are already available to build

barricades. Personnel evacuated from the UXO area can fill sandbags and transport them to

the barricade site.

Make sure that all personnel actually building barricades are wearing all available safety

equipment. This safety equipment includes a kevlar helmet, a flak vest, and hearing

protection.

PLACEMENT AND SIZE OF BARRICADES

3-9. The barricade should be built no closer to the UXO than the height for the barricade plus 3 feet.

Further guidance on the height for barricades is provided later in this section. For example, the

barricade shown in Figure 3-3 is 5 feet tall. By adding an additional 3 feet, the barricade is built no

closer than 8 feet to the UXO. Build the barricade between the building and/or the equipment to be

protected and the UXO. By positioning the barricade in this location, personnel who are in or around

the building or who are using the equipment will be afforded the greatest protection from the blast and

flying fragments. See Figure 3-4. Refer to para 3-11 thru 3-13 for the appropriate height of a barricade.

Figure 3-3. Placement distance for barricade

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Chapter 3

Figure 3-4. Placement of wall barricade

3-10. When building a barricade, the sandbags must be interlocked for stability. See Figure 3-5.

Sandbags that are not interlocked will reduce protection and make the barricade unstable.

Figure 3-5. Interlocking sandbags

3-11. Small UXO. For small UXOs such as missiles and rockets less than 70 millimeters in diameter,

for projectiles less than 75 millimeters in diameter, and for submunitions and grenades, a double wall

thickness of sandbags should surround the area of the UXO. The sandbags must be stacked to a height

of at least 3 feet and should be thick enough to protect personnel and equipment from the blast and

fragmentation. This type of barricade may be semicircular or circular. Types of barricades are

discussed later in this section.

3-12. Medium UXO. For medium-sized UXOs such as missiles, rockets, and projectiles up to 200

millimeters in diameter, and for large sized placed munitions on the surface, a four- or five-wall

thickness of sandbags should surround the area. The sandbags must be stacked to a height of at least 5

feet in order to protect assets. This type of barricade is usually semicircular.

3-13. Large UXO. Large UXOs such as projectiles, missiles, and general-purpose bombs are too large

for effective barricades to be built around the ordnance item. In these cases, equipment and personnel

activity areas would need to be barricaded. A wall barricade between the affected area and the UXO

hazard provides the best and easiest protection. Jersey or Texas concrete barriers can be used to protect

assets in this situation since the barrier is further away from the ordnance site.

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FM 4-30.51

13 July 2006

Take Immediate Action

BARRICADE TYPES

3-14. The three types of barricades are circular, semicircular, and wall. The type barricade that you use

will depend on the UXO hazard and the area that requires protection.

Circular. A circular barricade is the best choice for small UXO hazards, because it provides

complete protection for personnel and equipment. A circular barricade that is 8 feet in

diameter, 3 feet tall, and 3 sandbags thick would require approximately 400 sandbags. The

barricade shown in Figure 3-6 will force the blast upwards and contain the majority of the

fragments.

Figure 3-6. Complete circular placement of barricade

Semicircular. A semicircular barricade is used for small- and medium-sized UXO hazards.

It will channel the blast and fragmentation through the open side and away from the

protected area. See Figure 3-7.

Wall. The wall barricade protects specific equipment or personnel areas. It is used when the

UXO hazard is too large to contain by using a circular or semicircular barricade. The

number of wall barricades you need will depend on how much equipment or how many

personnel you must protect. A wall barricade that is 12 feet long, 6 feet high, and 3

sandbags thick would require 700 sandbags. As shown in Figure 3-8, the barricade should

extend beyond and be at least as tall as the equipment or personnel areas to be protected.

Equipment that is barricaded must still be usable. For example, the radar shown in Figure 3-

8 must be left exposed in order to function.

Figure 3-7. Semicircular placement of barricade

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3-5

Chapter 3

Figure 3-8. Wall barricade placement

This item implements STANAG 2002, Edition 7.

MARK UXO

3-15. Marking a UXO hazard is just as important as marking other hazard areas such as CBRNE areas,

minefield, and booby-trapped areas. All of these hazards are marked by using triangular signs, if

readily available, that by their backg3round color indicate the danger involved. The standard UXO

marker is shown in Figure 3-9. The backg3round is red with a white bomb inset. It has the same

dimensions as the other markers.

Figure 3-9. Standard UXO marker

3-16. The UXO marker is placed above ground at waist level (about 3 feet) with the bomb pointing

down as shown in Figure 3-10. The marker should be placed no closer to the hazard than the point

where you first recognized the UXO hazard. The marker should be attached to a stake (Figure 3-10), a

tree, or other suitable holder. Just be sure that the marker is clearly visible.

3-17. You should also mark all logical approach routes to the area. If the hazard is near a road, as a

minimum, put a marker on each side of the road approaching the UXO. If there is a large concentration

of UXO hazards such as submunitions, mark the area as you would a scatterable minefield, with

markers placed about every

15 meters around the area. Refer to FM

3-34.210 for additional

information on marking minefields.

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FM 4-30.51

13 July 2006

Take Immediate Action

Figure 3-10. Marking a UXO with standard marker

3-18. As a general rule, the UXO hazard itself must be easily seen from any of the markers. This helps

to keep others away from the hazard. It also helps the EOD team to find the hazard.

3-19. If standard UXO markers are not available, you may use other suitable materials (such as

engineer tape or colored ribbons). Try using the same color ribbon to avoid confusion. When using

other materials, the same principles used for the standard markers apply for placement of the makeshift

markers. That is, they should be placed about 3 feet off the ground and easily seen from all approach

routes. See Figure 3-11.

Figure 3-11. Marking UXO with alternate type of material

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3-7

Chapter 4

Report the UXO Hazard

As discussed in Chapter 1, UXO hazards on the battlefield have an enormous effect

on command and control decisions for battle planning. The location of these hazards

is vital to the command and control elements when projecting movement and support

of combat units. UXO hazards also have a direct impact on the combat capabilities of

any element that encounters them. To assist commanders, an effective UXO reporting

system must be in place and maintained to allow commanders to concentrate EOD

assets according to priorities and battle plans.

EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS SPOT REPORT

4-1. The EH spot report (formally known as the UXO spot report) is a detailed, swift, reporting system

that makes clear where the UXO hazard areas are, what their priorities are, and which units are affected by

them. The report is used to request help in handling a UXO hazard that is beyond a unit’s ability to handle

and that affects the unit’s mission. This report helps the commander set priorities based on the battlefield

situation. If tactically feasible add a digital photo to the Spot Report. Digital photos can greatly assist EOD

personnel in identifying UXO and therefore providing any subsequent recommendations to the reporting

unit.

4-2. The EH spot report is the first-echelon report that is sent when a UXO is encountered. Information

about this report is also found in GTA 9-12-1 and in the supplemental information section of the signal

operating instructions (SOI), where it is just behind the request for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC).

4-3. The EH spot report lets personnel on the battlefield report found UXOs, improvised explosive

devices (IEDs), and captured enemy ammunition (CEA) through the appropriate channels. It provides a

brief description, location, and recommended priority to assist in determining response categories. The

report consists of nine lines, and is sent by the reporting unit using the fastest means available.

Line 1. Date-Time Group. The DTG that the item was discovered.

Line 2. Reporting Unit and Location. The unit identification code (UIC) of the reporting

activity unit and the location of the explosive hazard in an 8-digit grid coordinate.

Line 3. Contact Method. Provide the radio frequency, the call sign, the point of contact, and the

telephone number.

Line 4. Type of Munition. Note the size, quantity, type of ordnance (dropped, projected, placed,

or thrown), and subgroup, if available. Note if antihandling devices were used. Indicate the

emplacement method and type of initiation device.

Line 5. CBRN Contamination. - If present, be as specific as possible. (Chemical agent monitor

(CAM) detected G Agent at 3 bars; Soldiers are experiencing symptoms of Nerve agent etc….)

Line 6.

Resources Threatened. Report any equipment, facilities, or other assets that are

threatened.

Line 7.

Impact on Mission. Provide a short description of your current tactical situation and

how the presence of the explosive hazard affects your status (for example, delayed, diverted,

cancelled).

Line 8.

Protective Measures Taken. - Describe measures taken to protect personnel and

equipment. (Personnel evacuated to 300M, marked, Sandbag barrier constructed etc…)

Line 9.

Recommended Priority (Immediate, Direct, Minor, No Threat). Recommend a

priority for response by EOD. Ensure that the priority requested corresponds with the tactical

situation you described on line 7 of the report (Impact on Mission). These priorities refer only to

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4-1

Chapter 4

the explosive hazard’s impact on your current mission. A priority of MINOR or NO THREAT

does not mean that the explosive hazard is not dangerous. (See PRIORITIES below)

Line 1.

DTG

131200ZAUG04

Line 2.

Reporting activity

2/505 PIR, BS13221433.

Line 3.

Contact method

F400, Shockwave3 SGT Turner

Line 4.

Type of ordnance

82MM Mortar 1 EA

Yes, the Soldiers have blisters. M8 paper confirms the

Line 5.

CBRN contamination

presence of a chemical agent.

Line 6.

Resources threatened

Personnel, Mortar Emplacement

Line 7.

Impact on mission

Counter fire operations stopped.

Line 8.

Protective measures

Personnel evacuated to 300M, Sandbag barrier constructed

Line 9.

Recommended priority

Immediate

Figure 4-1. Explosive Hazard Spot Report

PRIORITY BASIS

4-4. Priorities are defined by the commanders’ guidance. The EOD commander coordinates EOD incident

categories and priorities with the commanders staff based on the supported commanders priorities. The four

priorities established for EOD support are—

Immediate. This priority stops the unit’s maneuver and mission capability, or threatens critical

assets vital to the mission.

Direct. This priority restricts the unit’s maneuver and mission capability, or threatens critical

assets important to the mission.

Minor. This priority reduces the unit’s maneuver and mission capability, or threatens non-critical

assets of value.

No threat. This priority has little or no effect on unit capabilities or assets.

PRIORITIZING THE SPOT REPORT

4-5. The UXO spot report is forwarded through your chain of command. Each commander in the chain

who receives/reviews the report may change the priority to reflect the current tactical situation or projected

battle plans. It is the responsibility of each commander in the chain to ensure that UXO spot reports are

forwarded through command channels and that the proper priority is set for each report.

4-6. If a higher-level commander in the chain changes a priority, all subordinate commanders, especially

the commander of the reporting unit, must be told. Commanders must keep the following in mind: even

though they may lower a priority, the reporting unit must be able to continue its mission until help comes.

In addition to the priority status, all commanders need to be kept informed of the status of each UXO

hazard in their area.

4-7. The final priority is determined by the reporting unit’s higher headquarters that is supported by EOD.

Based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available (METT-T),

EOD are dispatched to respond to the hazard.

4-2

FM 4-30.51

13 July 2006

Chapter 5

Self-Extraction from UXO Hazards

The use of submunitions and scatterable mines on the modern battlefield will

have a direct impact on mobility, survivability, and logistical support

requirements. All units must be able to maintain their mobility despite these

hazards. Our forces must be able to self-extract from submunition and scatterable

mine threats in order to survive.

EOD units are responsible for the elimination of these threats from the

battlefield, while engineer elements provide breaching and mine-clearing support

for these threats. These elements may not be readily available to all units that

receive submunition or scatterable mine attacks from the enemy. Any unit that

cannot self-extract will risk being destroyed in place by follow-on attacks.

DETECTION

5-1. Detection is the first step in extraction. Submunitions and scatterable mines are very small in

size and are difficult to detect in optimum circumstances. In some terrain, such as dense foliage, tall

grass, or uneven ground, many of them will go undetected. During periods of limited visibility or at

night, detection is almost impossible. Combat vehicle personnel traveling cross-country in a buttoned-

up vehicle will be at a great disadvantage, because they will not be able to see them or to avoid them.

5-2. The unit detecting a submunitions area or scatterable minefield is required to report it, mark it,

and, if so directed, breach through it. All areas will remain marked until they are cleared.

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

5-3. When an operating area becomes contaminated with submunitions or scatterable mines, a certain

amount of confusion is understandable. Therefore, a recognized and rehearsed system of alerting

personnel to the danger and orders on how to evacuate the area are essential. Alerting systems may

include loudspeakers, radios, or runners. A combination of these systems may be the most effective.

5-4. The unit field SOP should include procedures for evacuating personnel from an area and

reestablishing operations at another location. An established and trained evacuation plan will reduce

personnel and vehicle losses. The plan must be flexible so it can be adapted to fit the different

scenarios and environments that might be encountered.

5-5. When setting up operational bases or work sites, the UXO threat must be considered. Roads are

critical for evacuation. Hard surfaced roads are the best evacuation routes and are also the easiest to

clear. The evacuation plan should include procedures for unit elements to reconnoiter and mark clear

paths or to link paths from other unit positions to their position and to the nearest hard surfaced road.

5-6. A unit that has been directly fired on must presume that more fires are coming. The unit must be

able to self-extract from the area in order to resume operations or be able to protect assets in order to

continue the assigned mission. The extraction procedure resembles an in-stride breach as outlined in

FM 3-34.210 and FM 90-13-1, or in MCWP 3-17.3 for the Marine Corps. Units that are conducting

movement operations can use route clearance procedures to force a cleared lane through the area only

as a last resort. Most units are not equipped to deal with this situation and the results could be as

devastating as the attack itself.

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5-1

Chapter 5

5-7. Combat units that have the assets to conduct an in-stride breach can do so and reduce the hazard

for follow-on forces and continue in the original direction of the march. CS and combat service support

(CSS) units must rely on their OPORD to designate alternate support areas. These units must employ

their organic assets to reconnoiter and create cleared lanes in the direction of the alternate support

location. Not all equipment may be retrievable. The emphasis should be placed on relocating personnel

and operational equipment as quickly as possible.

SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT

5-8. After taking immediate actions to alert personnel, locate the submunitions or scatterable mines,

and provide protection for personnel and equipment, the following operational situation and tactical

factors should be assessed:

Effect of the delay on the mission.

Threat from direct and indirect fire. The risk of casualties from direct or indirect fire may be

greater than that from the submunitions or scatterable mines.

Type of terrain. The terrain determines the effectiveness of submunitions or scatterable

mines, their visibility, and, consequently, their ability to be detected, avoided, or

neutralized.

Alternate routes or positions available.

Degree of protection available.

Availability of specialized support, such as EOD or engineer teams and equipment.

5-9. After assessing the situation, three main options are available, as follows:

Accept the risk of casualties and continue with the assigned mission.

Employ tactical breaching procedures and extract to alternate routes or positions.

Employ preplanned alternate tactical plans according to the current OPORD.

BREACHING TECHNIQUES

5-10. Hazardous areas must be bypassed if at all possible. When bypassing is not feasible, you must

try to neutralize the submunitions and scatterable mines that prevent movement. There is no single

device or technique that will neutralize every submunition or scatterable mine in every situation. The

differences in fuzing, self-neutralization, terrain, and unit mission mean that multiple techniques must

be considered.

5-11. When employing breaching techniques, take all protective measures possible to protect

personnel and equipment. Personnel who are not directly involved should be under cover, away from

the area. Personnel who are directly involved must make use of all available cover. These approved

extraction techniques are listed from least to most hazardous and should be considered for execution in

this order:

Perform area reconnaissance, and mark a cleared route.

Use engineer equipment to remove or destroy items.

Destroy items using explosive charges.

Contain the item by building protective works.

Destroy items using direct-fire weapons.

DANGER

Employing breaching techniques on ordnance other than

submunitions or scatterable mines is not recommended. The

amount of explosives involved would create more of a hazard

to your operations than the UXO itself.

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FM 4-30.51

13 July 2006

Self-Extraction from UXO Hazards

WARNING

Prior to employing breaching techniques, make sure that

none of the items are filled with chemical, radiological, or

biological agents.

UXO CONSIDERATION FOR SELF EVACUATION

5-12. After indirect fire attack immediate action drills for self extraction must include a plan to

mitigate the hazards of UXO.

5-13. If you enter a minefield or UXO saturated area, evacuate by the same route you entered, marking

the route if situation permits.

ENGINEER EQUIPMENT (HEAVY-FORCE BREACHING)

5-14. Using engineer equipment is the preferred method of breaching small submunitions and

scatterable mines. This procedure allows for the quickest clearance of an evacuation route. Suitable

equipment includes a bulldozer

(with mine clearance armor protection if possible), deployable

universal combat earthmover (DEUCE), combat vehicle mounted with a mine clearing blade or roller,

or an armored combat earthmover (ACE). If an unarmored vehicle is used (such as a bulldozer or a

grader), the operator’s cab must be protected by sandbags.

5-15. Four major disadvantages to heavy-force breaching are as follows:

Operators may be killed or injured.

Equipment may be damaged. If either happens, extraction through the area will be

hampered.

Equipment may only partially clear the area, requiring further clearance procedures.

Equipment may bury some submunitions or scatterable mines, which would keep them from

being detected while using the evacuation route.

EXPLOSIVE CHARGES

MINE-CLEARING LINE CHARGE

5-16. The mine-clearing line charger (MICLIC) is a rocket-propelled explosive line charge used to

reduce minefield containing single impulse, pressure-activated AT mines and mechanically activated

AP mines. It has limited effectiveness against magnetically activated mines, including scatterable

mines and those containing multiple-impulse or delay-time fuzes.

5-17. The MICLIC will explosively clear a path through an area. Several MICLICS may be required in

the same area to ensure that a wide enough path is cleared.

5-18. Three major disadvantages to using MICLICs are as follows:

The explosive charges may not be close enough to the submunition or scatterable mine to

cause destruction. This can result in “kick outs” where submunitions or scatterable mines

can be thrown away from the detonation, possibly towards your position.

Further reconnaissance of the area is required prior to using the route for evacuation in order

to detect those submunitions or scatterable mines that are still in place after using MICLIC.

MICLIC cannot be used if high order detonation or explosives in the area is not acceptable.

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5-3

Chapter 5

PLACED EXPLOSIVE CHARGE

5-19. This is the most effective way to clear an evacuation route. If at all possible, the explosive

charges should be remotely placed to the side of the UXO as close as possible without touching it. If it

can not be done remotely hand emplacement of the charge is the most hazardous and time consuming

procedure. The explosive charge should be large enough to consume the item and placed to the side of

the UXO that is closest to the unit’s position. This will direct most of the fragmentation away from the

unit. Enough time delay should be used to allow personnel to return to a safe area prior to the

detonation.

5-20. Four major disadvantages to using placed charges are as follows:

They are very labor intensive to use and expose personnel to a greater risk, especially if the

submunitions use magnetic, delay, or trip-wire fuzing.

Their use is very slow and time consuming, because all items must be detected, marked, and

destroyed individually.

They cannot be used if detonation of the submunitions or scatterable mines will cause

unacceptable damage to the operational area and/or equipment.

They should not be used in heavy concentrations of submunitions or scatterable mines. The

detonations will cause “kick outs.”

CONTAINMENT

5-21. For containment see Chapter 3.

There is one major disadvantage to containment. Building barricades is time consuming and

thereby exposes a large number of personnel to the UXO.

UXO DIRECT-FIRE WEAPONS

5-22. This is the least preferred method of clearance. Submunitions and scatterable mines can be

destroyed or disabled by the use of direct-fire service weapons. The goal of this procedure is to

produce a disabling reaction that rapidly reduces or eliminates the designed fuze functioning of the

submunition or scatterable mine. Service weapons such as the 5.56 millimeter, the 7.62 millimeter, the

.50 caliber, and the 25 millimeter will most likely produce the desired effect. The person firing the

service weapon should approach the UXO only close enough to be able to fire accurately. However,

this person should never be closer than 300 meters to the item. When performing the direct-fire

procedure, the aiming point is center mass. Single shots should be fired until the item is hit. On some

larger items, multiple hits may be required to be sure that the submunition or scatterable mine has been

disabled. Frontal protection is required for mounted and dismounted personnel. Figure 5-1 shows the

dismounted procedure, while Figure 5-2, shows the light-vehicle mounted procedure with sandbags

being used for frontal protection. If several persons are being used to clear a large area, ensure that

each person is protected sufficiently from all areas. No one person should be closer than 300 meters to

any item being engaged.

5-23. This technique has many variables and must only be performed by personnel with the

appropriate training. Certain smaller caliber weapons will have little to no effect on some ordnance

items and leave it in a more hazardous state. If personnel are trained in UXO direct-fire techniques this

by no means implies that they are qualified to use direct-fire techniques for IEDs or other specific

ordnance items.

5-24. Five major disadvantages to direct-fire destruction are as follows:

It is very slow and time consuming. Each item must be individually located, and each

person can only engage one target at a time.

Some submunitions are too small to engage effectively with direct-fire weapons from a

distance of

25 meters. The terrain has a major affect on this procedure. Because

submunitions and scatterable mines are so small, it does not take very much vegetation or

loose dirt to hide them.

5-4

FM 4-30.51

13 July 2006

Chapter 6

UXO Response to the Battlefield

EOD units are responsible for identifying, rendering safe, recovering, evaluating,

disposal, threat mitigation, and reporting (EOD and Intelligence) of unexploded US

and foreign explosive ordnance. This includes chemical, biological, and radiological

weapons which have been fired, dropped, or placed in such a manner so as to

constitute a hazard to installations, personnel, materiel or operations. The mission of

EOD is to eliminate or reduce hazards and to protect the commander’s combat power.

CAPABILITIES

Render Safe UXO hazards.

Identify UXO hazards.

Destroy UXO hazards.

Move UXOs to Safe Holding or Disposal areas within the limitations of their organic

transportation Assets.

Perform Technical Intelligence on new or first seen ordnance items.

Perform post-blast forensic analysis.

Perform specialized demolition techniques and procedures.

SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

Security forces.

Medical Support.

Fire Fighting Support.

Supported unit provides and builds protective measures.

OTHER SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS

Combat Engineer Companies.

Military Intelligence Company/Teams.

Army Explosive Ordnance Clearance Agents (EOCA).

ARMY EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CLEARANCE AGENT (EOCA)

6-1. The design of the Army EOCA is to enhance the engineer’s ability to assure mobility and provide

maneuver units with a limited alternative capability to counter unexploded ordnance. Army EOCAs are

combat engineers who have attended and graduated from the Army EOCA course. The “Army Explosive

Ordnance Clearance Agent (EOCA) Identification Guide” provides more information on Army EOCA. To

perform in an Army EOCA capacity, these Soldiers must pass the Army EOCA course at the Ordnance

Munitions and Electronic Maintenance School (OMEMS), Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

6-2. Army EOCA personnel are trained to perform limited battlefield disposal of UXOs as outlined in

Army EOCA Identification Guide and JOA UXO supplemental list. If the UXO is out of the scope of

operations for the Army EOCA, EOD Soldiers must respond. Army EOCA Soldiers can assist EOD Soldiers

in disposing of other EH as requested. Properly trained and certified Army EOCA Soldiers capabilities

include:

UXO reconnaissance. Army EOCA personnel are trained to perform detailed reconnaissance of

suspected UXO.

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FM 4-30.51

6-1

Chapter 6

UXO identification. Army EOCA can perform limited identification of items listed in EOCA

Identification Guide and JOA UXO supplemental list. Items that the Army EOCA cannot

positively identify must be reported to EOD personnel.

UXO area marking. Army EOCA personnel mark UXO area in accordance with the standard

UXO marking system.

Protective works. Army EOCA can provide blast and fragmentation danger area of identified

UXOs. Army EOCA may provide estimated blast and fragmentation danger area for items

similar to but not included in Army EOCA Identification Guide and JOA UXO supplemental

list. Army EOCA will advise the on scene commander on recommended personnel and

equipment protection measures. When the commander determines that certain personnel or

equipment can not be removed from the hazard area, protective works must be established to

protect those personnel and assets from the effects of the UXO. Army EOCA will recommend

and supervise the appropriate protective works to be completed.

UXO Disposal. Army EOCA personnel are authorized to destroy by detonation individual UXOs

identified in Army EOCA Identification Guide and JOA UXO supplemental list.

ARMY EOCA LIMITATIONS

No reconnaissance or handling of IEDs or Large Vehicle Improvised Explosive Devices

incidents.

Can only perform CEA operations under the direct supervision of EOD personnel.

Cannot move, combine, and/or destroy multiple UXOs.

6-3. Army EOCA Soldiers are not to be used for explosive hazard response calls.

6-4. The US Marine Corps does not have Explosive Ordnance Clearance Agent and relies on EOD to clear

UXOs and IEDs, unless passing through an area containing UXO or IEDs is deemed a mobility requirement by

the commander, in which case engineers will create a “breach” through the affected area much the same as they

would breach through an explosive obstacle on the battlefield.

Emergency destruction of CEA that is 90mm and smaller is taught to Marine Corps engineer officers

and NCOs at Marine Corps Engineer School. Positive identification of all ordnance items to be destroyed is

required and a necessity must exist to justify the destruction of CEA by engineers; for example, in order to

prevent ordnance from falling into enemy hands. Key portions of the course taught at Marine Corps Engineer

School (MCES) pertaining to destruction of CEA are identification of ordnance items, calculating the net

explosive weight of the CEA plus the charge used to destroy it, calculating the minimum safe distance needed

to destroy CEA, and the use of a decision process when assessing a CEA situation.

As new counter-IED technologies become available, for example, the Buffalo and MARCbot robot,

MCES plans to include the TTPs required for successful employment in its programs of instruction.

6-2

FM 4-30.51

13 July 2006

Ammunition Color Codes

Table A-2. Former Soviet Union color codes for bombs

Nose Band

Body Band

Type

Green

Blue

Fragmentation

Green

Blue and Green

Fragmentation and Chemical

Orange

Semi-armor Piercing

Blue

Armor Piercing

Red

Blue

Incendiary

Red

Incendiary Dispenser

Red

Green

Persistent Chemical

Green

Non-persistent Chemical

White

Parachute Flare

Blue

Black

Rocket Assisted

Red

White

Practice

Table A-3. Former Soviet Union color codes for projectiles

Color Codes (Bands)

Type

Red

Incendiary

Blue

Concrete Piercing

Black

Smoke

White

Illumination

Yellow

Ball Shrapnel

Khaki

Bar Shrapnel

One Green Band

Non-persistent Agent

Two Green Bands

Persistent Agent

Table A-4. Former Soviet Union markings for chemical munitions

Marking

Chemical Filler

P-4

White Phosphorus

P-5

Mustard Agent

Lewisite Agent

P-10

Phosgene Agent

P-15

Adamsite (DM)

Thermite

13 July 2006

FM 4-30.51

A-5

Glossary

Acronym/Term

Definition

AMAT

antimateriel

armor piercing

antipersonnel

APFSDS

armor-piercing fin-stabilized, discarding sabot

antitank

BFA

battlefield functional area

CAM

chemical agent monitor

CBRNE

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive

CEA

captured enemy ammunition

combat support

CSS

combat service support

DOD

Department of Defense

dual purpose

depleted uranium

explosive hazards

EMR

electromagnetic radiation

EOCA

explosive ordnance clearance agents

EOD

explosive ordnance disposal

EOR

explosive ordnance reconnaissance

FASCAM

family of scatterable mines

field manual

FMFM

fleet marine force manual

GTA

graphic training aid

high explosive

HEAT

high explosive antitank

HEP

high explosive plastic

headquarters

IED

improvised explosive devices

MAGTF

Marine Air ground task force

MCRP

Marine Corps

MCWP

Marine Corps warfighting publication

MEDEVAC

medical evacuation

mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time

METT-T

available

MICLIC

mine clearing line charge

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

13 July 2006

FM 4-30.51

Glossary-1

References

SOURCES USED

These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS

CJCSM 3500.04C, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). 1 Jul 2002

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 Apr 2001

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

AR 75-15, Responsibilities and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal, 22 Feb 2005

FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, 21 Sep 2004

FM 3-0, Operations, 14 Jun 2001

FMI 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations, Aug 2004

FM 3-34, Engineer Operations, 2 Jan 2004

FM 4-0, Combat Service Support, 29 Aug 2003

FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, 20 Jan 2005

FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data, 30 Aug 1999

FM 9-15, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service and Unit Operations, 20 Mar 1989

FM 20-32, Mine/Counter Mine Operations, 1 April 2005

FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, 8 Jul 1994

FM 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Techniques, 28 Feb 1991

GTS 9-12-1, Unexploded Ordnance Procedures

Instructional Video No. 710288 “The UXO Hazard”

Safety Video No. 709919 “Danger UXO”

STP 21-1-SMCT, Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks, Skill Level 1, 11 Oct 2005

STP 21-I-MQS, Military Qualification Standards I Manual of Common Tasks (Recommissioning

Requirements), 31 May 1990.

STP 21-II-MQS, Military Qualification Standards II Manual of Common Tasks (for Lieutenants and

Captains), 31 January 1991.

MARINE PUBLICATIONS

FMFM 13-8, MAGTF Explosive Ordnance Disposal, 20 Dec 1993.

FMFRP 13-5, Engineer Field Data, 30 Aug 1999.

MCWP 3-17.3, MAGTF Breaching Operations, 13 June 1994.

DOCUMENTS NEEDED - NONE

READINGS RECOMMENDED - NONE

13 July 2006

FM 4-30.51

References-1

Index

Former Soviet Union markings

Placement and Size of

for chemical munitions, A-5

Barricades, 3-3

Ammunition Color Codes, A-1

Fragmentation, A-5, D-1

PRIORITIZING THE SPOT

Antipersonnel Mines, 2-21

Fragmentation Grenades, 2-18

REPORT, 4-2

antitank, C-4

Fuzes, 2-3

PRIORITY BASIS, 4-2

Antitank Grenades, 2-19

PROJECTED ORDNANCE, 2-

Antitank Mines, 2-22

AP, C-12, E-1

projectiles, C-4, C-5

ARMY EOCA LIMITATIONS,

GENERAL SAFETY

PROJECTILES, 2-10

6-2

GUIDELINES, 1-1

PROTECTIVE MEASURES, 3-

ARMY EXPLOSIVE

grenades, C-12, C-13, D-1, D-2,

ORDNANCE CLEARANCE

D-3

PURPOSE, vii

AGENT, 6-1

GUIDED MISSILES, 2-16

AT, E-2, E-3, E-4

Attached Dispensers, 2-6

Recognize UXO, 2-1

Identification of DU UXO, 2-12

Report the UXO Hazard, 4-1

illumination, C-7

RIFLE GRENADES, 2-17

Barricade, 3-2

Illumination, A-5, D-3

rocket, C-9, C-10

Barricade Types

Illumination Grenades, 2-20

rockets, C-8

Circular; Semicircular, 3-5

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS, 5-1

ROCKETS, 2-14

Bombs, 2-1

Interlocking sandbags, 3-4

BREACHING TECHNIQUES,

Isolate, 3-2

5-2

SCOPE, vii

Self-Extraction From UXO

land mines, E-1, E-2, E-3, E-4

Hazards, 5-1

CAPABILITIES, 6-1

Large UXO, 3-4

Semicircular placement of

Complete circular placement of

barricade, 3-5

SITUATIONAL

Containment, 5-4

ASSESSMENT, 5-2

Small UXO, 3-4

MARK UXO, 3-6

Smoke, A-5, D-2

Marking, A-5

Smoke Grenades, 2-19

Medium UXO, 3-4

DEPLETED URANIUM (DU),

stabilized, C-3, C-4, C-5, C-6, C-

Mine-Clearing Line Charge, 5-3

2-12

MORTARS, 2-14

7, C-8, C-9, C-10

DETECTION, 5-1

STABILIZING DEVICES, 2-3

DISPENSERS, 2-5

Standard UXO marker, 3-6

SUBMUNITIONS, 2-6

Dropped Dispensers, 2-6

DROPPED ORDNANCE, 2-1

SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS,

net explosive weights (NEW), 2-

6-1

NEW, C-3, C-4, C-5, C-6, C-7,

C-8, C-9, C-10, C-11, C-12,

ENGINEER EQUIPMENT

C-13, D-1, D-2, E-1, E-3

(HEAVY-FORCE

nonessential personnel, 3-2

Take Immediate Action, 3-1

BREACHING), 5-3

Thrown, D-1

Evacuate, 3-2

THROWN ORDNANCE, 2-18

TRAINING STRATEGY, viii

EXPLOSIVE CHARGES, 5-3

EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS SPOT

Offensive Grenades, 2-19

REPORT, 4-1

OTHER SUPPORTING

ORGANIZATIONS, 6-1

US and NATO color codes, A-2

USER INFORMATION, viii

UXO CONSIDERATION FOR

Former Soviet Union color codes

for bombs, A-5

SELF EVACUATION, 5-3

Placed Explosive Charge, 5-4

UXO Direct-Fire Weapons, 5-4

Former Soviet Union color codes

PLACED ORDNANCE, 2-21

for projectiles, A-5

13 July 2006

FM 4-30.51

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION TO THE OCIO-ITS SECURITY POLICY MANUAL

Purpose

Scope

Special Instructions/Cancellations

Authorities

Executive Branch Policy

Applicable Laws, Guidelines, Regulations, and Guidance Directives

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publications

USDA Cyber Security Policy

OCIO-ITS Security Policy Summary

Security Policy Administration

Security Policies

Security Program Plans, Procedures, Standards and Guidelines

Security Administration

Security Violations

Waiver Requirements

Roles and Responsibilities

USDA Associate OCIO for Cyber Security

OCIO-ITS Chief Information Officer (CIO)

OCIO-ITS Information Systems Security Program Manager (ISSPM)

Senior Management, Line Managers, Division Directors, System Managers, and Supervisors

System, Network, and Firewall Administrators

End Users

CHAPTER ONE: ACCEPTABLE USE SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

(1).

Official Business

(2).

Rules of Behavior

(3).

Personal Use

(4).

E-Mail Use

(5).

Internet Use

CHAPTER TWO: AUDIT SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

(1).

Security Audit

(2).

Security Audit Follow-Up

CHAPTER THREE: AUTHORIZATION AND ACCESS CONTROL SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

(1).

Authorization and Access Guidelines

(2).

User Account and Password Guidelines

(3).

Administrative and Non-User Account and Password Guidelines

(4).

Periodic Validation of User Access and Account Privileges

(5).

Administrative Guidance for User Passwords

CHAPTER FOUR: CAPITAL PLANNING AND INVESTMENT CONTROL (CPIC) SECURITY

POLICY

OCIO-ITS Security Policy Manual - FINAL - Version 1.0

Page ii

Number 3602-001

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

CHAPTER FIVE: CERTIFICATION AND ACCREDITATION SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

(1).

Security Certification and Accreditation

(2).

Federal Information Security Management Act

(3).

Certification and Accreditation Program

(4).

Identification of Included Information Systems

(5).

Participation

(6).

Site Certification and Accreditation

(7).

New Information Systems

(8).

Commercial Off-The-Shelf and Government Off-The-Shelf Applications

(9).

Existing and Outdated Information Systems

(10).

Periodic Review of Information Systems

(11).

Non-OCIO-ITS Systems

(12).

Non-OCIO-ITS Sites and Facilities

CHAPTER SIX: CONTINGENCY AND DISASTER RECOVERY SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

(1).

Contingency and Disaster Recovery Planning

(2).

Alternate Operating Capability, System Redundancy, and Back-Up/Recovery

CHAPTER SEVEN: DATA MANAGEMENT SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

(1).

Data Security

(2).

Data Usage

(3).

Data Ownership

(4).

Data Media Marking

(5).

Data Protection

(6).

Data Sharing

(7).

Data Transmission

(8).

Data Storage

(9).

Data Disposal

(10).

Data Content

(11).

Data Classification

CHAPTER EIGHT: FIREWALL MANAGEMENT SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

(1).

Firewall Protocols

(2).

Firewall Management Access

(3).

Firewall Configuration

(4).

Firewall Physical Security

(5).

Firewall Logs

(6).

Incident Reporting

CHAPTER NINE: GOVERNMENT-OWNED LAPTOP COMPUTERS AND PED SECURITY

POLICY

General Policy Statement

OCIO-ITS Security Policy Manual - FINAL - Version 1.0

Page iii

Number 3602-001

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

b. Policy Detail

(1).

Classification of Government-Owned Laptop Computers

(2).

Government-Owned Laptop Computer Security

(3).

Government-Owned Portable Electronic Devices (PED)

10.

CHAPTER TEN: INCIDENT IDENTIFICATION, DECLARATION, REPORTING, AND HANDLING

SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

(1).

Computer Security Incidents

(2).

Reporting Process

11.

CHAPTER ELEVEN: INFORMATION CLASSIFICATION SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

(1).

Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) Information Protection

(2).

For Official Use Only (FOUO) Information Protection

(3).

Encryption

12.

CHAPTER TWELVE: INTRUSION DETECTION MANAGEMENT SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

(1).

IDS Access

(2).

IDS Configuration Standards

(3).

IDS Physical Security

(4).

IDS Logs

(5).

IDS Implementation

(6).

Change Request

13.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: MEDIA SANITATION AND DISPOSAL SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

(1).

Sanitization of IT Equipment and Electronic Media

(2).

Sanitization of Hard Drives

(3).

Overwriting Specifications

(4).

Degaussing Specifications

(5).

Physical Destruction

(6).

Sanitization of Other Computer Media

(7).

Disposal of OCIO-ITS Equipment

14.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: NETWORK ACCESS SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

(1).

Warning Banners

(2).

Remote Access

(3).

Telework

(4).

Wireless Technology

15.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN: NON-GOVERNMENT OWNED LAPTOP COMPUTER AND PED

SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

OCIO-ITS Security Policy Manual - FINAL - Version 1.0

Page iv

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(1).

Non-Government Owned Laptop Computers Security

(2).

Non-Government Owned Portable Electronic Devices (PED)

16.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN: PATCH MANAGEMENT SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

(1).

Patch Prioritization and Scheduling

(2).

Patch Testing

(3).

Change Management

(4).

Audit and Assessment

(5).

Notification of Users

17.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: PHYSICAL ACCESS SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

(1).

Large IT Facility Security Requirements

(2).

IT Restricted Space within Large Office IT Facilities

(3).

Facility Security for Field Offices

18.

CHAPTER EIGHTTEEN: PRINTER MANAGEMENT SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

(1).

Printer Management Access

(2).

Waiver and Configuration Change Requests

(3).

Network and Multipurpose Printer Services

(4).

Special Provisions for Large Scale Printer/Copy Stations

(5).

Incident Reporting and Response

19.

CHAPTER NINETEEN: PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

(1).

Privacy Impact Assessment

(2).

SDLC Methodology

20.

CHAPTER TWENTY: RISK MANAGEMENT SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

21.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE: ROUTER AND SWITCH MANAGEMENT SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

(1).

Router and Switch Configuration

(2).

Router and Switch Management

(3).

Router and Switch Management Access

(4).

Router and Switch Information Access

(5).

Router and Switch Logs

(6).

Change Request

(7).

Router and Switch Implementation

(8).

Implied Authority

(9).

Incident Reporting and Response

OCIO-ITS Security Policy Manual - FINAL - Version 1.0

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22.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO: SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FRAMEWORK MANAGEMENT

SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

23.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE: SECURITY AWARENESS, TRAINING, AND EDUCATION

SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

24.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR: SECURITY PLAN MANAGEMENT SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

(1).

Federal Requirements

(2).

Security Plans

Policy Detail

(1).

Security Plan Development

(2).

Determining General Support Systems and Major Applications

25.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE: SERVER MANAGEMENT SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

(1).

Server Configuration

(2).

Server Specification Settings

(3).

Server Management Access

(4).

Server Classification

(5).

Server Information Access

(6).

Server Logs

(7).

Server Implementation

(8).

Server Change Requests

(9).

Server Services

(10).

Implied Authority

(11).

Incident Reporting and Response

26.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX: SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

(1).

Initiation Phase

(2).

Development Phase

(3).

Implementation Phase

(4).

Operations and Maintenance Phase

(5).

Disposition Phase

27.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN: VIRUS PROTECTION SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

(1).

Virus Protected Systems

(2).

Virus Software Configurations and Scanning Policy

28.

CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT: VULNERABILITY SCAN SECURITY POLICY

General Policy Statement

Policy Detail

(1).

New Equipment/Equipment Upgrade

OCIO-ITS Security Policy Manual - FINAL - Version 1.0

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Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8) - page 31