Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8)

References

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: www.apd.army.mil.

ADRP 1-03. The Army Universal Task List. 2 October 2015.

ADRP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.

AR 195-5. Evidence Procedures. 22 February 2013.

AR 381-10. U.S. Army Intelligence Activities. 3 May 2007.

AR 525-13. Antiterrorism. 11 September 2008.

FM 2-22.3. Human Intelligence Collector Operations. 6 September 2006.

FM 3-24.2 (FM 7-98, FM 90-8). Tactics in Counterinsurgency. 21 April 2009.

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED PUBLICATIONS

Most Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) products are available online: https://call2.army.mil.

Accessed 28 October 2015.

Army & USMC TTP—Stability Operations and Support Operations (SOSO). CALL Newsletter 03-20.

July 2003.

Interpreter Ops: Multi-Service Reference Manual for Interpreter Operations.

CALL Handbook 04-07. March 2004.

Urban Combat Operations TTP. CALL Newsletter 99-16. 1 November 1999.

Small Unit Leader’s Guide to Urban Operations. CALL Newsletter 03-4. 1 May 2003.

RAND PUBLICATIONS

Most RAND studies are available online: http://www.rand.org/publications/. Search for the document

number. Accessed 27 October 2015.

Aerospace Operations in Urban Environments: Exploring New Concepts. Alan Vick, John Stillion, et

al. RAND Document No. MR-1187-AF. 2002.

The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations. Scott Gerwehr and Russell W. Glenn. RAND

Document MR-1132-A. 2000.

The City’s Many Faces: Proceedings of the RAND Arroyo-MCWL-J8 UWG Urban Operations

Conference, April 13-14, 1999. Russell W. Glenn. RAND Document No. CF-148-A. 2000.

Heavy Matter: Urban Operations’ Density of Challenges. Russell W. Glenn.

RAND Document MR-1239-JS/A. 2000.

Marching under Darkening Skies: The American Military and the Impending Urban Operations

Threat. Russell W. Glenn. RAND Document MR-1007-A. 1998.

Mars Unmasked: The Changing Face of Urban Operations. Sean J.A. Edwards.

RAND Document MR-1173-A. 2000.

Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Operations. Russell W. Glenn and

Jamison Joe Medby. RAND Document MR-1287-A. 2002.

FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES OFFICE

Foreign Military Studies Office publications are available online: http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil. Select

the “Search FMSO Research” link. Accessed 27 October 2015.

Air Operations in Low Intensity Conflict: The Case of Chechnya. Timothy L. Thomas. This article was

previously published in Airpower Journal, Winter, 1997.

Bashing the Laser Range Finder with a Rock. Lester W. Grau. This article was first published in

Military Review, May-June 1997.

23 December 2015

TC 2-91.4

References-3

References

The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat. Timothy L. Thomas. This article was

previously published in Parameters, Summer, 1999.

Diehard Buildings: Control Architecture—A Challenge for the Urban Warrior. Lester W. Grau and

Geoffrey Demarest. This article was previously published in Military Review, September-

October 2003.

The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya, Part 1:

Section 1. Timothy L. Thomas. This article was previously published in Journal of Slavic

Military Studies, June 1995.

The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya, Part 1:

Section 2. Timothy L. Thomas. This article was previously published in Journal of Slavic

Military Studies, June 1995.

The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya III. The

Battle for Grozny, 1-26 January 1995. Timothy L. Thomas. This article was previously

published in Journal of Slavic Military Studies, March 1997.

Changing Russian Urban Tactics: The Aftermath of the Battle for Grozny. Lester W. Grau. This article

was previously published in INSS Strategic Forum, July 1995.

Combat in Cities: The LA Riots and Operation Rio. William W. Mendel. 1996.

A “Crushing” Victory: Fuel-Air Explosives and Grozny 2000. Lester W. Grau and Timothy Smith.

This article was previously published in Marine Corps Gazette, August 2000.

A Face of Future Battle: Chechen Fighter Shamil Basayev. Raymond C. Finch, III. This article was

previously published in Military Review, June-July 1997.

Geopolitics and Urban Armed Conflict in Latin America. Geoffrey Demarest. This article was

previously published in Small Wars and Insurgencies, Spring 1995.

Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned. Timothy L. Thomas. This article was previously

published in Military Review, July-August 2000.

Mars and Hippocrates in Megapolis: Urban Combat and Medical Support. Lester W. Grau and

Charles J. Gbur Jr. This article was previously published in U.S. Army Medical Department

Journal, January-March 2003.

MOUT in Iraq: Population Dependent? Timothy L. Thomas. 2002.

Night Stalkers and Mean Streets: Afghan Urban Guerrillas. Ali A. Jalali and Lester W. Grau. This

article was previously published in Infantry, January-April 1999.

Russian Lessons Learned From the Battles For Grozny. Timothy L. Thomas and Lester W. Grau. This

article was previously published in Marine Corps Gazette, April 2000.

Russian-Manufactured Armored Vehicle Vulnerability in Urban Combat: The Chechnya Experience.

Lester W. Grau. This article was previously published in Red Thrust Star, January 1997.

Russian Snipers in the Mountains and Cities of Chechnya. Lester W. Grau and Charles Q. Cutshaw.

This article was previously published in Infantry, Summer 2002.

“Soft Log” and Concrete Canyons: Russian Urban Combat Logistics in Grozny. Lester W. Grau and

Timothy L. Thomas. This article was previously published in Marine Corps Gazette,

October 1999.

Urban Warfare Communications: A Contemporary Russian View. Lester W. Grau. This article was

previously published in Red Thrust Star, July 1996.

Urban Combat: Confronting the Specter. Lester W. Grau and Jacob W. Kipp. This article was

previously published in Military Review, July-August 1999.

A Weapon For All Seasons: The Old But Effective RPG-7 Promises to Haunt the Battlefields of

Tomorrow. Lester W. Grau. This article was previously published in Infantry,

May-August 1998.

Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya. Raymond C. Finch. Foreign Military Studies Office

Special Study 98-16. August 1998.

References-4

TC 2-91.4

23 December 2015

References

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in Twenty-First Century Warfare. John B. Alexander. New York:

Saint Martin’s Press. 1999.

How They Fight: Armies of the World, volume 4-01, MOUT-Worldwide. National Ground Intelligence

Center. August 2001. Available online (SIPRNET): https://www.ngic.army.

smil.mil/products/htf/NGIC-1122-0062-01/0062.pdf. Accessed 28 October 2015.

The Savage Wars of Peace: Soldiers’ Voices 1945-1989. London: Michael Joseph. 1990.

Small Wars Manual. FMFRP 12-15. 1 April 1987. Reprint of 1940 U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars

Manual. Available online: https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/#.

Urban Generic Information Requirements Handbook (UGIRH). Marine Corps Intelligence Activity.

2000. Available online (SIPRNET): https://intelink.sgov.gov. Accessed 28 October 2015.

PRESCRIBED FORMS

This section contains no entries.

REFERENCED FORMS

Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Web site:

www.apd.army.mil.

DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

23 December 2015

TC 2-91.4

References-5

Index

Entries are by paragraph number unless stated otherwise.

terrain products supporting,

contingency support study, 3-41.

A-35-A-37

conventional forces

activities matrix, A-13, figure A-5

B-C

information requirements for,

air operations, 1-63, 3-19, A-35

table 2-1

Balkans

airspace

U.S. operations in Bosnia,

crime and criminal organizations,

in urban operations, 1-35,

2-10-2-11

1-76, 1-77, A-15

1-36, 1-38

in urban populations, table 1-5

U.S. operations in Kosovo,

air defense artillery, 3-21-3-22

1-76, 1-77, A-11, A-33

information requirements for,

table 2-4

air level. See multidimensional

Bosnia, 1-76, 1-77, A-15

battlefield.

Crimelink, A-4

boundaries, 1-106, 3-58

analysis, 1-35, 1-36, 1-41, A-8

culture, 1-70-1-85

buildings

civil considerations, 1-2-1-4

comparison chart or matrix,

analysis of, 1-27, 1-28,

demographic, A-20, table A-4

A-16

table 4-1

digital feature analysis data

and social structure, 1-70,

in core, 1-25

codes, A-37

1-75, 1-84

as engagement areas, 1-43

geospatial, A-50, A-52

in urban environment, 1-14,

example information

link, 2-6, A-4, A-6-A-14

1-70, 1-73, 4-3, A-16

requirements for, table 1-4,

nodal, 3-37

1-22

pattern, A-4, A-5, figure A-1

as infrastructure, 1-89

plot sheet, figure A-1

debriefing, 4-26-4-29

overlays, A-31-A-34, A-48

structural, 1-37, 1-39, 1-60,

of transportation personnel,

types of, 1-9, 1-31, 1-49,

2-25, A-52

3-36

table 1-4

terrain, 1-5-1-15

denial and deception, 2-14

CBRN, 3-20

terrain and society, 1-16-1-22,

information requirements for,

and military areas, 1-31

1-88-1-92

table 2-5

information requirements,

weather, 1-55-1-68

tables 2-1 and 2-2

digital terrain elevation data, 3-40

tools, A-4-A-23

weather effects on, 1-64

Digital Topographic Support

Analyst Notebook, A-4

civil affairs, 3-23-3-27

System, A-4

ASCOPE, 1-2-1-4, 3-25, 4-3,

assessment of, A-17

figure 1-1, table 4-1

E-F

products, 3-24, A-23

association matrix, A-8, figure A-3

electronic warfare, 2-11, 2-15,

civil considerations, 1-2-1-4, 3-

as software tool, A-4

table 2-5

25, 4-3, figure 1-1, table 4-1

used by military police, 3-29

engagement area, 1-49-1-52

civilians, 1-73-1-87

avenues of approach, 1-33, 1-38

in mobility corridors, 1-44

as aviation hazard, 2-24

in airspace, 1-28, 1-31

engineers, 3-9-3-11

civil information management,

and line of sight overlays,

and building analysis, 1-37,

3-26

A-42, A-43

table 1-4

and mobility corridors, 1-37

combined obstacle overlay, A-37

and communications

in a multidimensional

communications, 1-108-1-110,

infrastructure, 1-109

battlefield, 1-26, 1-27, 1-37

table 1-13. See also

engineers (continued)

and sniper placement, A-43

infrastructure.

city, 1-65

aviation, 3-19

computer network attack, 2-12,

national and local, 1-109

and avenues of approach,

table 2-5

topographic teams, 4-12

1-31

contingency support package,

explosive ordnance disposal

hazards, 2-24

3-42.

operations, 1-31, 2-24

23 December 2015

TC 2-91.4

Index-1

Index

Entries are by paragraph number unless indicated otherwise.

in information collection

facilities. 1-118. See also

subsurface, 1-42, table 1-3

planning, 3-35

medical, facilities.

water, 1-40

information requirements

fire hazards. 2-25

line of sight, 1-53-1-55

for, table 1-19

and vertical mobility corridors,

food distribution, 1-117, table 1-18

overlays, A-44-A-48

1-44

Forward Looking Infrared Radar

petroleum, information

and LOCs, table 4-1

(also called FLIR), 3-22

requirements for, table 1-15

overlay, A-42-A-43

resource and material

G-H

linguists, 3-37

production, 1-116

geospatial intelligence, 3-10,

information requirements

link analysis tools, A-6-A-14

3-11, 3-44-3-45, A-52

for, table 1-17

gridded reference graphic, 3-43

subterranean, 1-121

information requirements

maps, 4-11-4-14

guerrillas, 2-7. See also

for, table 1-22

and topographic teams, 3-10

insurgents.

systems, 1-14

city, sources of, 3-60

detection of, 3-22

transportation, 1-106-1-107

measurement and signature

information requirements for,

information requirements

intelligence, table 2-5

table 2-2

for, tables 1-6-1-12

medical, 3-12-3-18

health issues, 2-17-2-22. See

overlays, A-47

assessments, 3-13, 3-15-3-16

also medical.

in urban environments,

facilities, 1-118

human intelligence, 4-23, A-20

table 4-1

health issues, 2-17-2-22

water and waste, 1-114-1-115

host-nation, 1-105

information requirements

information requirements for,

imagery, A-50, figure A-11. See

for, table 1-16

table 1-19

also geospatial intelligence.

insurgents, 2-7. See also

infrastructure, 1-118,

briefs, 3-44

guerillas.

table 1-19

electro-optical, A-51

in criminal organizations, 2-10

intelligence information, 3-13,

and geospatial intelligence,

information requirements for,

3-17

A-52

table 2-4

National Center for Medical

land satellite, 3-40, 3-41

information collection, 4-6-4-8,

Intelligence, 3-13, 3-14

overhead, 3-46, A-49

4-21

local population requirements

products, 3-41-3-45, 4-9, A-50

assessing, 4-25

for, 1-86, 1-89

urban models, A-51, figure

and civil affairs forces, 3-27

overlays, A-46

A-11

and explosive ordnance

military information support

information operations, 2-12-2-16

disposal, 3-35

operations (MISO), 3-28-3-31

information requirements for,

plan, 4-6, 4-8, 4-15, 4-18

assessment of, A-17

table 2-5

and snipers, 3-6

examples, 1-99, A-18-A-19

influence activities

international/intergovernmental

perception assessment matrix,

target audience for, 1-94

organizations, 3-50-3-52

A-17

target audience of, 1-94

infrastructure, 1-102-1-105

J-K-L

in cities, 1-12

military police, 3-32-3-34

communications, 1-108-1-110

key infrastructure overlays, A-44-

mission variables (METT-TC):

information requirements

A-48

1-2-1-4, 4-2

for, table 1-13

Kosovo. See Balkans.

mobility corridors, 1-44

crisis management and civil

land satellite imagery, 3-40, 3-41

example of, 1-42

defense, 1-120

law enforcement and firefighting.

in multidimensional battlefield,

information requirements

See infrastructure.

1-26, 1-27, 1-37

for, table 1-21

energy, 1-111-1-113

lines of communications, 1-10,

multidimensional battlefield, 1-34-

information requirements

1-46-1-48, 3-36

1-43, 1-34, figure 1-4

for, table 1-14, 1-15

building characteristics, 1-61

firefighting, information

criminal, 2-10

requirements for, table 1-20

digital, 1-53

National Center for Medical

food distribution, 1-117

and gridded reference

Intelligence, 3-13, 3-14

information requirements

graphics, 3-43

National Geospatial-Intelligence

for, table 1-18

and hubs, 1-18-1-19

Agency (NGA), 3-44-3-45

law enforcement

and line of sight, table 4-1

products, 4-12

information requirements

and multidimensional

noncombatant evacuation

for, table 1-20

battlefield, 1-35, 1-44

operation intelligence support

medical

overlay, A-38-A-41

and satellite pattern, 1-20

Index-2

TC 2-91.4

23 December 2015

Index

Entries are by paragraph number unless indicated otherwise.

handbook (also called NISH),

police intelligence operations,

and infrastructure effects,

3-46

3-33

1-28, 1-36, 1-43

nongovernmental organizations

population, 1-86-1-91

staff weather officer, 1-69

(NGOs), 3-53-3-55

information requirements for,

street patterns, tables 1-2 and 1-7

and civil information

table 1-5

radial, 1-25

management, 3-26

infrastructure, 1-101-1-105

radial-ring, 1-25

and food distribution, 1-117

status overlay, 2-7, A-25-A-28,

rayed, 1-22

protection of, 1-117

figure A-8

studies, 3-13

psychological operations. See

area, 3-24

military information support

civil affairs, 3-23-3-24, 3-27

observation

operations.

contingency support, 3-41

aerial, 1-67, 3-19, A-35

medical, 3-13

air defense, 3-20

Q-R

MISO, 3-27-3-31

and line of sight, 1-53

railroads, 1-12

in aviation, 1-38, 3-18

subsurface level. 1-39-1-41,

LOC overlays, A-38, A-40

in supersurface levels, 1-36

figure 1-4. See also

information requirements for,

military aspects of terrain,

multidimensional battlefield.

table 1-9

table 4-1

information requirements for,

reconnaissance, 3-3-3-6

and structures, table 1-3

table 1-15

aerial, 1-38, A-50

mobility corridors, 1-44

obstacles

assets, 3-3

subterranean features,

of buildings, 1-37-1-38

considerations, 1-55

civilians as, 1-86

subterranean features, table 1-15.

and counterinsurgency, 2-7

and digital line of sight, 1-53

See also multidimensional

map, A-37

hubs as, 1-18

battlefield.

and trafficability estimates,

and LOCs, 1-46

1-48

mobility corridors, 1-44

locating, 3-9-3-10, 3-19

and visibility, 1-66

surface level, 1-39-1-41. See also

military areas as, 1-31

unmanned aircraft systems,

multidimensional battlefield.

and overlays, A-37, A-39, A-41

A-50

mobility corridors, 1-44

on streets, 1-12, 1-40

relationship matrix, A-9-A-12

obstacles. See obstacles.

reduction of, 1-66

figure A-4

overlays, 3-10

reporting. See also debriefing.

congregation or mass

terrain

and assessment, 4-26

assembly points, A-29

canalized, 1-18

during execution, 4-21, 4-23

key information, 3-10, A-44,

compartmented, 2-4

and preparation, 4-19

A-46, A-47

Digital Terrain Elevation Data,

timely, 3-36, 3-39

line of communications, A-38,

3-40

A-40

resource and material production.

key, 1-11, 1-45, 1-104, 3-58

line of sight, A-42-A-43

See infrastructure.

in the mission variables

population status, A-25-A-28

roof coverage overlay, A-35

(METT-TC), 1-2, 3-25, 4-2

urban terrain, A-30-A-37,

military aspects of, 1-104,

figure A-10

table 4-1

scouts, 3-3-3-6

terrain (continued)

snipers, 3-3-3-6

overlays, A-30-A-37

paramilitary forces. See also

cover and concealment for,

terrorists. See threat.

threat.

1-29, 1-50

information requirements for,

threat

table 2-1

society (socio-cultural), 1-70-

criminals, 2-10-2-11, table 2-4

1-100

pattern analysis, 2-7

electronic warfare, 2-15

critical nodes, 1-82, 1-103,

overlays, A-5

health, 3-12-3-18

1-113

information operations, 2-12-

plot sheet, figure A-1

cultural awareness, 1-73, 2-3,

software, A-4

2-16, table 2-5

3-37

Urban Tactical Planner, A-4

insurgents, 2-7, 2-10, 3-4,

religious aspects, 1-74-1-75,

3-22, table 2-2

perception. See also military

1-83, 1-84

paramilitary, 1-80, 2-6, 4-3,

information support operations.

special operations command and

table 2-1

assessment matrix, A-17-A22,

control element (also called

TTP, 2-3

figure A-7

SOCCE), 3-8

time event chart, A-14, figure A-6

planning considerations, 4-6-4-18

Special Operations Forces, 3-7-

topographic teams, 4-12

3-8, 3-30

23 December 2015

TC 2-91.4

Index-3

TC 18-01

Special Forces

Unconventional Warfare

November 2010

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only

to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange

Program or by other means. This determination was made on 1 August 2010. Other requests for this document

must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School,

ATTN: AOJK-DTD-SF, 2175 Reilly Road, Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5000.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the

document.

FOREIGN DISCLOSURE RESTRICTION (FD 6): This publication has been reviewed by the product developers

in coordination with the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School foreign

disclosure authority. This product is releasable to students from foreign countries on a case-by-case basis only.

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Training Circular

Headquarters

Department of the Army

No. 18-01

Washington, DC, 30 November 2010

Special Forces Unconventional Warfare

Contents

Page

PREFACE

Chapter 1

OVERVIEW

1-1

Introduction to Unconventional Warfare

1-1

The Role of Unconventional Warfare in United States National Strategy

1-2

Feasibility for United States Sponsorship

1-3

Physical and Human Environmental Conditions

1-3

Resistance Movement Characterisics

1-5

The Criticality of the Feasibility Assessment

1-6

Ways the United States Conducts Unconventional Warfare

1-7

The Seven Phases of Unconventional Warfare

1-8

Elements in Unconventional Warfare

1-9

Chapter 2

FUNDAMENTALS OF RESISTANCE AND INSURGENCY

2-1

Why Populations Resist

2-1

Dynamics of Successful Insurgencies

2-3

The Components of an Insurgency

2-8

Additional Elements of an Insurgency

2-12

Infrastructure of a Resistance Movement or Insurgency

2-13

Organization of Medical Support Within the Area Complex

2-17

Insurgent Support Networks

2-18

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their

contractors only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the

International Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on 1 August 2010.

Other requests for this document must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy

Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DTD-SF, 2175 Reilly Road, Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC

28310-5000.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or

reconstruction of the document.

FOREIGN DISCLOSURE RESTRICTION (FD 6): This publication has been reviewed by the product

developers in coordination with the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and

School foreign disclosure authority. This product is releasable to students from foreign countries on a

case-by-case basis only.

Contents

Chapter 3

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT

3-1

Planning for Unconventional Warfare

3-1

Seven Phases of Unconventional Warfare

3-2

Civil Affairs Support to the Seven Phases of Unconventional Warfare

3-8

Logistics Considerations

3-9

Supply Considerations

3-10

Command and Control

3-13

Legal Principles

3-15

Appendix A AREA STUDY

A-1

Appendix B SPECIAL FORCES AREA ASSESSMENT

B-1

Appendix C SAMPLE TRAINING PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION

FOR RESISTANCE FORCES

C-1

Appendix D SPECIAL FORCES CACHING

D-1

GLOSSARY

Glossary-1

REFERENCES

References-1

INDEX

Index-1

Figures

Figure 1-1. Unconventional warfare terminology

1-2

Figure 1-2. Support for an insurgency

1-4

Figure 1-3. Phases of unconventional warfare

1-9

Figure 2-1. Resistance terminology

2-2

Figure 2-2. Structure of an insurgency or resistance movement

2-4

Figure 2-3. Operational cell

2-9

Figure 2-4. Intelligence cell

2-9

Figure 2-5. Parallel cells

2-10

Figure 2-6. Auxiliary cell

2-11

Figure 2-7. Cells in series

2-11

Figure 2-8. Resistance structure with government-in-exile

2-13

Figure 2-9. Area complex

2-14

Figure 2-10. Permanent base security

2-15

Figure 3-1. Unconventional warfare elements

3-2

Figure A-1. Area study outline format

A-1

Figure B-1. Sample principal assessment

B-1

TC 18-01

30 November 2010

Preface

Training Circular (TC) 18-01, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, defines the current United States (U.S.)

Army Special Forces (SF) concept of planning and conducting unconventional warfare (UW) operations. For

the foreseeable future, U.S. forces will predominantly engage in irregular warfare (IW) operations.

PURPOSE

TC 18-01 is authoritative but not directive. It serves as a guide and does not preclude SF units from developing

their own standing operating procedures (SOPs) to meet their needs. It explains planning and the roles of SF,

Military Information Support operations

(MISO), and Civil Affairs

(CA) in UW operations. There are

appropriate manuals within the series that addresses the other primary SF missions in detail.

SCOPE

The primary users of this manual are commanders, staff officers, and operational personnel at the team (Special

Forces operational detachment A [SFODA]), company (Special Forces operational detachment B [SFODB]),

and battalion

(Special Forces operational detachment C

[SFODC]) levels. This TC is specifically for

SF Soldiers; however, it is also intended for use Armywide to improve the integration of SF into the plans and

operations of other special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces.

APPLICABILITY

Commanders and trainers should use this and other related manuals in conjunction with command guidance and

the Combined Arms Training Strategy to plan and conduct successful UW operations. This publication applies

to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS),

and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

The proponent of this TC is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

(USAJFKSWCS). Submit comments and recommended changes on Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028

(Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, USAJFKSWCS,

ATTN: AOJK-DTD-SF, 2175 Reilly Road, Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5000. This TC is designed to be

UNCLASSIFIED in order to ensure the widest distribution possible to the appropriate Army special operations

forces (ARSOF) and other interested Department of Defense (DOD) and United States Government (USG)

agencies while protecting technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the

International Exchange Program or by other means. Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns

and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

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Overview

There is another type of warfare—new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by

guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat, by

infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy

instead of engaging him. It preys on unrest.

President John F. Kennedy, 1962

The Commander, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), defines

UW as activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce,

disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with

an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.

INTRODUCTION TO UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

1-1. The intent of U.S. UW efforts is to exploit a hostile power’s political, military, economic, and

psychological vulnerabilities by developing and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish U.S. strategic

objectives. Historically, the military concept for the employment of UW was primarily in support of

resistance movements during general-war scenarios. While this concept remains valid, the operational

environment since the end of World War II has increasingly required U.S. forces to conduct UW in

scenarios short of general war (limited war).

1-2. Enabling a resistance movement or insurgency entails the development of an underground and

guerrilla forces, as well as supporting auxiliaries for each of these elements. Resistance movements or

insurgencies always have an underground element. The armed component of these groups is the guerrilla

force and is only present if the resistance transitions to conflict. The combined effects of two interrelated

lines of effort largely generate the end result of a UW campaign. The efforts are armed conflict and

subversion. Forces conduct armed conflict, normally in the form of guerrilla warfare, against the security

apparatus of the host nation (HN) or occupying military. Conflict also includes operations that attack and

degrade enemy morale, organizational cohesion, and operational effectiveness and separate the enemy from

the population. Over time, these attacks degrade the ability of the HN or occupying military to project

military power and exert control over the population. Subversion undermines the power of the government

or occupying element by portraying it as incapable of effective governance to the population.

1-3. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.07, Irregular Warfare, recognizes that IW is as

strategically important as traditional warfare. UW is inherently a USG interagency effort, with a scope that

frequently exceeds the capabilities of the DOD alone. There are numerous, uniquely defined terms

associated with UW (Figure 1-1, page 1-2). These terms developed over the years from various military

and government agencies, as well as the academic world. Many of the terms used to define UW appear to

closely resemble one another and most are found in Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, or JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

1-4. The following chapters contain vital information for U.S. forces. In addition, there are four

appendixes. Appendix A provides an example of an area study, Appendix B gives an example of an SF

area assessment, Appendix C contains a sample program of instruction for resistance forces, and Appendix D

details SF caching.

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Chapter 1

Figure 1-1. Unconventional warfare terminology

THE ROLE OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

IN UNITED STATES NATIONAL STRATEGY

1-5. Three documents capture the U.S. national strategy: the National Security Strategy, the National

Defense Strategy, and the National Military Strategy. The National Security Strategy states the President’s

interest and goals. The National Defense Strategy is the DOD contribution to the National Security

Strategy. The National Defense Strategy also provides a framework for other DOD strategic guidance,

specifically for campaign and contingency planning, force development, and intelligence. The goals and

objectives of the President’s National Security Strategy guide the National Military Strategy. In addition,

the National Military Strategy implements the Secretary of Defense’s National Defense Strategy. The

National Military Strategy provides focus for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military

objectives.

1-6. USG support to a resistance or insurgency can manifest in any of the following manners:

Indirect support. In limited-war scenarios, overt U.S. support for a resistance movement is

sometimes undesirable. In these cases, the USG may indirectly render support though a coalition

partner or a third-country location. The USG normally limits indirect support to logistical aid

and training. Limited war presents a much more restrictive environment that requires low-profile

execution of all USG support operations.

Direct support (less combat). In general-war scenarios, the visibility of USG support is less

controversial, which expands the nature of possible USG support to include a wider scope of

logistical support, training, and advisory assistance. U.S. assistance can include advisors in

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sanctuaries or insurgent-controlled areas not in direct combat. The United States can also render

assistance from a neighboring country.

Combat support. Combat support includes all of the activities of indirect and direct support in

addition to combat operations.

1-7. Before providing support to a resistance movement or insurgency, planners must consider how the

ideology and objectives of the resistance movement affect strategic interests in the region. Planners must

ensure leadership clearly defines U.S. national strategy and goals before planners make any determination

regarding the appropriateness of support to a resistance movement or insurgency. Without a clear

understanding of the desired effects and end state for a region or conflict, it is impossible to assess whether

support to a resistance or insurgency would achieve favorable results.

1-8. Successful planners weigh the benefits of providing support to resistance forces against the overall

strategic context of a campaign. They must not allow a desire to conduct UW or to produce a purely

military effect dominate their judgment. Support to resistance forces does not simply contribute to a

military effort; it undoubtedly alters the geopolitical landscape of a given region. Planners may deem a

specific insurgent effort feasible and appropriate to the military effort, but consider it strategically

unfavorable because of the political risk of the effort or the potential for increased regional instability.

FEASIBILITY FOR UNITED STATES SPONSORSHIP

1-9. There are certain environments and situations that make UW the best option. Although outside

forces could alter and shape the existing environment to some degree, they cannot artificially manufacture

or transplant it.

1-10. There are two categories planners use when deciding to provide support. The first category is feasibility.

Feasibility is dependent upon the physical and human conditions of the environment. The second category is

appropriateness. Appropriateness is dependent upon the characteristics of the resistance movement.

1-11. U.S. UW forces possess capabilities that can profoundly affect the human terrain through shaping

operations that influence behavior in support of U.S. objectives. They can also influence resistance

movement characteristics, making them more appropriate to the mission. For example, U.S. UW forces

could emphasize guerrilla adherence to international norms and standards of behavior.

1-12. Planners further break down feasibility and appropriateness into the seven dynamics of an

insurgency. Chapter 2 discusses these dynamics in detail.

PHYSICAL AND HUMAN ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS

1-13. There are specific physical and environmental conditions that allow for a successful resistance or

insurgency. The three main conditions are a weakened or unconsolidated government or occupying power,

a segmented population, and favorable terrain from which an element can organize and wage subversion

and armed resistance.

WEAKENED OR UNCONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT OR OCCUPYING POWER

1-14. Conditions must sufficiently divide or weaken the organizational mechanisms that the ruling regime

uses to maintain control over the civilian population for the resistance to successfully organize the

minimum core of clandestine activities. It is extremely difficult to organize successful resistance under a

fully consolidated government or occupying power with a strong internal security apparatus. Despite the

general dissatisfaction of the society, the resistance has little chance of developing the supporting

infrastructure it needs to succeed. Planners need to recognize the significant differences in the ability of

different elements to exert control over a population. A recent foreign occupier does not have the same

ability as an indigenous long-standing dictatorial regime that has had years to consolidate power.

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WILL OF THE POPULATION

1-15. The population must possess not only the desire to resist but also the will to bear the significant

hardships associated with repressive countermeasures by the government or occupying power. Populations

that the regime subjugates or indoctrinates for long periods are less likely to possess the will required to

sustain a prolonged and difficult struggle. Populations living under repressive conditions generally either

retain their unique religious, cultural, and ethnic identity or begin to assimilate with the regime out of an

instinct to survive. Planners need to distinguish between the population’s moral opinion of their

“oppressors” and their actual willingness to accept hardship and risk on behalf of their values and beliefs.

Populations recently overtaken by an occupying military force have a very different character than those

that have had to survive for decades under an oppressive regime.

1-16. Information activities that increase dissatisfaction with the hostile regime or occupier and portray the

resistance as a viable alternative are important components of the resistance effort. These activities can

increase support for the resistance through persuasive messages that generate sympathy among populations.

1-17. In almost every scenario, resistance movements face a population with an active minority supporting

the government and an equally small militant faction supporting the resistance movement (Figure 1-2). For

the resistance to succeed, it must convince the uncommitted middle population, which includes passive

supporters of both sides, to accept it as a legitimate entity. A passive population is sometimes all a well-

supported insurgency needs to seize political power. As the level of support for the insurgency increases,

the passive majority will decrease.

Figure 1-2. Support for an insurgency

FAVORABLE TERRAIN

1-18. In order to conduct operations, resistance forces require human and physical terrain that provides

safe haven. This terrain must possess enough security for resistance members to train, organize, and

recuperate. The resistance must locate safe havens in relatively inaccessible areas that restrict the ability of

the HN military force to project power and exert control. Examples of favorable terrain include physically

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inaccessible terrain, such as mountains, jungles, and swamps, or artificial safe havens (such as urban

ghettos or an international border). Artificial safe havens replicate actual restrictive terrain. However,

artificial safe havens are only restrictive for as long as the risk of penetrating them remains unacceptable to

HN forces. In contrast, safe havens in physically inaccessible terrain, such as mountains and jungles,

remain restrictive to pursuing counterinsurgent forces.

1-19. An important aspect of the human terrain is the opportunity it presents for the resistance to access

populations in enemy-controlled areas, to disseminate information about the resistance and its objectives,

and to establish beneficial lines of communications (LOCs) with key communicators. Active cultivation of

relationships with key communicators can lower barriers and increase cooperation between U.S. forces and

the resistance movement.

1-20. Elements can sometimes negate the limitations of physical terrain to shape the operational

environment. For example, forces may use shortwave transmitters to broadcast messages in areas where

mountain ranges prevent line-of-sight frequency modulation (FM) radio broadcasting with messages

targeted at a specific segment of the population. Shortwave transmitters (such as those used on EC-130J

Commando Solo) may be able to broadcast the messages to reach the populace in the target area.

Note: The U.S. military uses the specially configured Commando Solo to conduct information

operations to broadcast in amplitude modulation, FM, high-frequency, television, and military

communications bands.

RESISTANCE MOVEMENT CHARACTERISICS

1-21. There are certain characteristics of a resistance movement that make U.S. support favorable.

Characteristics of a favorable movement include the following:

Willingness to cooperate with the United States.

Compatible objectives and ideology.

Capable resistance leadership.

WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED STATES

1-22. A genuine willingness to collaborate and cooperate with the United States must exist within the

leadership of the indigenous force. It is unrealistic to expect a leader to relinquish control of his forces to

the United States. In general, insurgent leaders expect to retain authority and control over their forces while

benefiting their cause by collaborating with the United States. Tailored, persuasive messages targeting key

leaders and groups may increase their willingness to accept U.S. support.

COMPATIBLE OBJECTIVES AND IDEOLOGY

1-23. Successful movements must have compatible objectives and an ideology that binds their forces

together. Organizations bound through some commitment other than common ideology—such as forced

conscription or hired mercenaries—typically are only marginally capable over a protracted period. Armed

groups may find a common bond in ethnicity, religion, or tribal ties. Elements can use persuasive

techniques and messages emphasizing commonalities to unite different groups for a common cause. Once

the groups unite, other messages can reinforce unity by building morale, reinforcing organizational

cohesion, and emphasizing mutual goals.

CAPABLE RESISTANCE LEADERSHIP

1-24. Resistance movement leaders are cautious of quickly forming new partnerships. In order to

understand insurgent leaders, it is critical to understand their motivation and desires. Planners must

consider what the United States is requesting and offering in return from the insurgent’s perspective. The

best leader is not always the one that is the easiest to work with initially. In fact, an overly accommodating

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Chapter 1

leader could be a desperate and incapable leader primarily interested in personal gain. Similarly, a

seemingly indifferent leader could be an effective leader that is unimpressed with offers of support without

an assurance of long-term commitment because of the potential risk involved. The determination of the

appropriateness of U.S. support requires an in-depth understanding of the resistance leadership and

organization. This level of fidelity normally requires a degree of first-hand observation in order to develop

an educated assessment.

1-25. Assessments are important sources of information on the psychological characteristics of leaders and

groups. This analysis provides a degree of prediction about the future behavior of these potential partners.

With prediction comes a degree of confidence in knowing how potential resistance leaders will conduct

themselves in the UW effort. It also provides information on guerrilla leader expectations for their forces in

terms of the method of fighting, treatment of civilians, and other key aspects that can have political and

legal ramifications for the operation. This information aids the commander or other decision-makers in

determining the appropriateness of any support to the movement.

THE CRITICALITY OF THE FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT

1-26. Planning remains limited until leadership validates certain assumptions. If operations proceed

without a proper feasibility assessment, the likelihood of unintended consequences is high. To gain an

accurate picture, operational personnel need to meet with indigenous personnel who represent the

resistance forces. This meeting can take place inside the denied territory, in the United States, or in a third-

party nation. Although meeting representatives in the United States or a third-party nation is safer for an

assessment team, it also provides a less reliable assessment of potential capabilities. Participation of all

components is vital to enable an accurate assessment of potential resistance capabilities. No single ARSOF

element can provide a complete picture of the movement necessary for this crucial step in the UW effort.

1-27. The feasibility assessment analyzes the achievability, acceptability, and suitability of a mission. This

is an assessment based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time

available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) to determine if the necessary means and resources are

available to meet mission requirements. It also addresses whether the potential gain or desired effect

outweighs or otherwise justifies the potential losses or cost. Lastly, the assessment determines if achieving

the desired objectives would accomplish the desired effects.

1-28. The normal areas of concern that make up a feasibility assessment are as follows:

Are there groups that could develop into a viable force with assistance?

Is the United States in contact with or can it make contact with individuals representing the

resistance potential in an area?

Are there any capable leaders, whose goals are compatible with U.S. goals who are willing to

cooperate with the United States?

Can the United States influence the leaders to remain compliant with U.S. goals?

Are the groups’ tactics and battlefield conduct acceptable by the standards established in Field

Manual (FM) 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, and to the U.S. population?

Will the environment geographically and demographically support resistance operations?

Is the enemy effectively in control of the population?

Is the potential gain worth the potential risk? Is this group’s participation politically acceptable

to other regional partners?

1-29. All U.S. UW elements are able to assist the commander in answering these questions. They assist with

individual perspectives for developing a particular resistance capability, as well as for an overall feasibility

assessment.

1-30. Expatriates are a valuable resource, particularly in regions where the culture is largely unfamiliar or

alien to a planner’s frame of reference. However, planners should carefully ensure the individual’s claims

are valid. An expatriate’s influence in a given country can be inversely proportional to the length of time

he has been away from his former homeland. Although there are many reasons an expatriate might

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exaggerate his influence in a region and attempt to exploit the situation in his favor, he may be legitimately

surprised to find his own assessment of his influence to be grossly inaccurate. During normal peacetime

conditions, a person can spend years away from a country and expect to maintain their contacts and

influence. This period significantly shrinks under the pressures of a harsh regime or occupying force.

1-31. While determining the feasibility of a potential campaign, planning personnel must have clear

objectives, a desired end state, and knowledge of exactly what level of support is available and acceptable.

Without these specifics, negotiations with potential resistance forces are futile. If planners determine

conditions are unfavorable during the assessment, then they need to consider any measures that could

transform the current situation into a more favorable one. For example, can the United States—

Persuade a potential resistance group to cease unacceptable tactics or behavior?

Persuade a coalition to accept a specific resistance group’s participation under certain

conditions?

Degrade the enemy’s control over the population?

Bolster the will of the population to resist?

Achieve desired objectives within the given time constraints?

1-32. SF, Military Information Support (MIS), and CA Soldiers can actively engage their resistance

counterparts to encourage adherence to international norms of behavior and law. They can also change

attitudes and beliefs about other groups participating in the resistance effort as part of unity and cohesion

building.

1-33. Planners need to be careful of attempting to overcome a potential resistance shortcoming by creating

surrogate forces that are not indigenous. Historically, the United States has not had success creating and

transplanting these types of resistance forces to the operations environment without an existing clandestine

infrastructure that connects the local population to the foreign forces.

WAYS THE UNITED STATES CONDUCTS

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

1-34. The United States conducts two types of UW. The United States executes UW with the anticipation

of large-scale U.S. military involvement or without anticipation of large-scale U.S. military involvement.

GENERAL WAR SCENARIOS

1-35. There are two possible goals of large-scale involvement. The goal is either to facilitate the eventual

introduction of conventional forces or to divert enemy resources away from other parts of the operational area.

1-36. UW forces can function as effective instruments in the psychological preparation of the population

for the introduction of conventional forces. Furthermore, deception and other measures can convince

enemy leaders to divert resources away from the main area of effort when it is not necessary to do so. For

example, the United States can disseminate messages suggesting guerrilla operations will occur in certain

locations, causing enemy leaders to divert their forces away from the actual route of advance to meet a

nonexistent threat. Examples of this type of UW effort by the United States include the following:

European and Pacific Theaters (1942-1945).

North Korea (1951-1953).

Cold War Contingency Plans for Eastern Europe (1952-1989).

Kuwait (1990-1991).

Afghanistan (2001-2002).

Iraq (2002-2003).

1-37. During large-scale UW, operations focus largely on military aspects of the conflict because of the

eventual introduction of conventional forces. The task is normally to disrupt or degrade enemy military

capabilities in order to make them more vulnerable to the pending introduction of conventional invasion

forces. The United States can use actions and messages to increase the disruption and degradation of

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Chapter 1

enemy capabilities by lowering their morale and unit cohesion. This can increase desertion, surrender, and

malingering among their ranks. Use of such techniques increases the potential for enemy unit breakdown to

the point of rendering them combat-ineffective.

1-38. Resistance forces assume a one-time greater degree of risk in large-scale involvement scenarios by

exposing almost their entire infrastructure in exchange for the possibility of success and linkup with

friendly coalition forces following an invasion. The ultimate challenge is synchronizing resistance efforts

while maintaining a degree of operational security for the invasion.

1-39. If the intent of the UW operation is to develop an area in order to facilitate the entry of an invasion

force, the challenge is to ensure that the operations of the resistance complement (rather than inadvertently

interfere with or even compromise) those of the invasion forces. If the timing is wrong or the conventional

invasion forces fail to liberate the territory and linkup with resistance forces, it is likely that the resistance

organization (guerrillas, underground, and auxiliary personnel) will suffer significant losses.

1-40. With a few exceptions, it is relatively simple for U.S. forces to compel an adversary to commit

forces to an area away from a possible invasion site. The challenge in this scenario is determining which

resistance actions trigger the desirable responses and when to begin those operations to appropriately affect

the adversary’s decision cycle. If U.S. forces do not coordinate these operations with the invasion force or

time the operations incorrectly, they can cause significant negative consequences.

LIMITED WAR

1-41. In general, the United States uses limited-involvement operations to pressure an adversary. Examples

of this type of UW effort by the United States include the following:

The Baltic States (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia-1950s).

Guatemala (1954).

Albania (1949-1954).

Tibet (1955-1965).

Indonesia (1958).

Cuba (1960s).

North Vietnam (1961-1964).

Afghanistan (1980s).

Nicaragua (1980s).

1-42. During limited-involvement missions, the overall operation takes place in the absence of overt or

eventual hostilities from the sponsor. Such operations take on a strategic and sensitive political aspect.

Typically, the United States limits its direct involvement, which mitigates the risks of unintended

consequences or premature escalation of the conflict. During limited-involvement operations, the manner

in which forces operate significantly differs from that of large-scale involvement scenarios. Without the

benefit of a conventional invasion force, the resistance forces must limit overt exposure of their forces and

supporting infrastructure in order to sustain operations over a protracted period. Forces must conduct

operations in a manner that accounts for the enemy’s response and retaliation.

1-43. If retaliation occurs, the resistance can exploit the negative consequences to garner more sympathy

and support from the population by emphasizing the sacrifices and hardship the resistance is enduring on

behalf of “the people.” If retaliation is ineffective or does not occur, the resistance can use this as proof of

its ability to wage effect combat against the enemy. In addition, the resistance can portray the inability or

reluctance of the enemy to retaliate as a weakness, which will demoralize enemy forces and instill a belief

in their eventual defeat.

THE SEVEN PHASES OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

1-44. The seven-phase UW framework is a conceptual construct that aids in planning (Figure 1-3). It

depicts the normal phases of a UW operation. Personnel should not confuse the seven phases of UW with

the phases of development through which friendly resistance forces progress. It is important for planners to

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recognize when factors, such as time, compress or change the normal progression of the seven phases. In

addition, operational elements may only support a portion of the overall campaign and therefore may miss

some of the seven phases. However, all operational elements should understand how their individual

efforts fit into the overall campaign. Chapter 3 contains more information on the seven phases of UW.

Figure 1-3. Phases of unconventional warfare

ELEMENTS IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

1-45. The operational requirements for conducting and supporting UW present some significant challenges

when compared to other types of special and conventional operations. UW efforts are normally of long

duration and primarily occur in denied areas. These conditions require participating forces to have the

capability of operating in a truly decentralized manner without the benefit of well-established LOCs. These

factors make many of the existing techniques for command and control (C2) and logistics inappropriate.

SPECIAL FORCES IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

1-46. Whereas other special operations and governmental organizations support UW, SF are the only unit

specifically designed to conduct UW. Unique SF capabilities include—

Infiltrating denied territory and linking up with resistance forces.

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Chapter 1

Training and advising the guerrilla or underground forces part of a resistance.

Coordinating and synchronizing the various resistance command elements with U.S. efforts.

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

1-47. U.S. forces can use MISO as part of ARSOF capabilities or in conjunction with other USG

capabilities to reduce the need for military force. When military force is necessary, Soldiers conduct MISO

to multiply the effects of the operations. Specifically, MIS elements—

Determine key psychological factors in the operational environment.

Provide training and advisory assistance to insurgent leaders and units on the development,

organization, and employment of resistance information capabilities.

Identify actions with psychological effects that can create, change, or reinforce desired

behaviors in identified target groups or individuals.

Shape popular perceptions to support UW objectives.

Counter enemy misinformation and disinformation that can undermine the UW mission.

CIVIL AFFAIRS IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

1-48. CA personnel augment the SF headquarters (HQ) by providing expertise in civil-military operations

(CMO). Although CMO plays a small role in resistance operations, planning CMO early in the campaign is

critical. CMO efforts can play a significant role in—

Mitigating the suffering of the population during resistance operations through humanitarian

assistance (HA) efforts. (Forces must conduct CMO and HA efforts in a manner that does not

link the population to the resistance effort, thereby bringing the retaliation of adversary forces.)

Planning mobilization of popular support to the UW campaign.

Analyzing impacts of resistance on indigenous populations and institutions and centers of

gravity through CA inputs to intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE).

Providing the supported commander with critical elements of civil information to improve

situational awareness and understanding within the operational environment.

Assisting in stabilization postconflict.

Assisting in the demobilization and transition of former resistance forces postconflict.

Note: FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, contains additional information on CA support to

UW.

OTHER UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

1-49. Because of the military and political nature of UW, the U.S. interagency involvement is critical to

achieving a whole-of-government approach and long-term success. The full integration of joint,

interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational communities is necessary at various stages of an

unconventional conflict.

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Chapter 2

Fundamentals of Resistance and Insurgency

The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.

Mao Zedong

Secret operations are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its every move.

Sun Tzu

Separate definitions exist for resistance movements and insurgencies within the DOD

and various academic communities. However, within this document, the two terms

convey a strategy of insurrection. Planners broadly use the term “insurgency” to

describe the concept of achieving aims through a strategy of armed conflict and

subversion against an indigenous government or occupying power. Planners use the

term “resistance movement” to convey a unique type of insurgency that focuses on

the removal of an occupying power. The difference in terminology is important to the

concept of UW, because planners must understand the significant differences in

dealing with a resistance movement that forms in response to an occupying power,

and an insurgency that grows over time out of discontent for an oppressive regime.

Planners generically use the term

“resistance” to categorize the activities of a

resistance movement or insurgency.

Insurgents are inherently indigenous. There remains confusion regarding external

support elements, such as foreign fighters. Even when the U.S. forces or foreign

fighters support an insurgency or resistance movement, planners should not

categorize them as part of the insurgency. Planners should categorize these elements

as enablers, facilitators, advisors, or supporters.

WHY POPULATIONS RESIST

2-1. Resistance generally begins with the desire of individuals to remove intolerable conditions imposed

by an unpopular regime or occupying power. Feelings of opposition toward the governing authority and

hatred of existing conditions that conflict with the individual’s values, interests, aspirations, and way of life

spread from the individual to his family, close friends, and neighbors. As a result, an entire community

may possess an obsessive hatred for the established authority. Initially, this hatred will manifest as

sporadic, spontaneous nonviolent and violent acts of resistance by the people toward authority. As the

discontent grows, natural leaders, such as former military personnel, clergymen, local office holders, and

neighborhood representatives, emerge to channel this discontent into organized resistance that promotes its

growth. The population must believe they have nothing to lose, or more to gain. Key to transitioning from

growing discontent to insurrection is the perception by a significant portion of the population that they

have nothing to lose by revolting and the belief that they can succeed. In addition, there must be a spark

that triggers insurrection, such as a catalyzing event that ignites popular support against the government

power and a dynamic insurgent leadership that is able to exploit the situation. Figure 2-1, page 2-2, defines

words critical to understanding resistance movements.

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Fundamentals of Resistance and Insurgency

CLANDESTINE RESISTANCE

2-2. People who outwardly follow their normal mode of existence conduct clandestine resistance. This

type of resistance is organized and controlled and conducts the following activities as groups and

individuals:

Political action.

Propaganda.

Espionage.

Sabotage.

Traffic in contraband.

Intelligence gathering.

OVERT RESISTANCE

2-3. Individuals and groups who train along military lines perform overt resistance. Planners refer to this

militant arm of the resistance movement as the guerrilla force. These elements make no secret of their

existence or their objectives. However, resistance leaders compartmentalize the specific relationship of the

guerrilla force to other components of the resistance movement to prevent compromise of the entire

movement.

2-4. Each insurgency or resistance movement has its own unique characteristics based upon its strategic

objectives, operational environment, and available resources. Insurgencies normally seek to change the

existing social order and reallocate power within the country. Typical insurgent goals include:

Removal of the established governing authority, whether an indigenous regime or occupying

military power.

Establishment of an autonomous national territory within the borders of a state.

Extraction of political concessions that the movement cannot attain through nonviolent means.

2-5. The structure of an insurgency or resistance movement is similar to an iceberg

(Figure

2-2,

page 2-4). Most of the structure is below the surface, and only the peak is visible. In building a resistance

structure, insurgent leaders give principal attention to the development of a clandestine supporting

infrastructure. This infrastructure works—

Among the citizens in rural villages, towns, and urban cities.

Within the military, police, and administrative apparatus of government.

Among labor groups and students.

DYNAMICS OF SUCCESSFUL INSURGENCIES

2-6. JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations, lists eight dynamics of an insurgency. JP 3-24 includes

internal support and organizational and operational patterns. FM

3-24, Counterinsurgency, lists six

dynamics of an insurgency. FM 3-24 does not include organization and operational patterns. However, SF

continue to use organization as one of the dynamics of an insurgency to understand the form, function and

logic of insurgent movements.

2-7. Seven dynamics are common to most successful insurgencies. These dynamics provide a framework

for planners to analyze insurgencies. It is some combination of these dynamics that will generally

transform popular disconnect into an organized and effective movement.

LEADERSHIP

2-8. A group committing random political violence is not an insurgency. In an insurgency, the group is

committing directed and focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision, direction,

guidance, coordination, and organizational coherence. The insurgency leaders must make their cause

known to the people and gain popular support. Their key tasks are to break the ties between the people and

the government and to establish credibility for their movement. The leaders must replace the government’s

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meaning to their way of life. The insurgency cannot gain active or passive support without achieving these

goals. This makes the language, culture, and geography of the masses particularly important. Ideology is an

important factor in unifying the many divergent interests and goals among the insurgency membership. As

a common set of interrelated beliefs, values, and norms, ideology is used to manipulate and influence the

behavior of individuals within the group. Ideology will serve as the rallying call for all members of the

population to join the struggle. The ideology of the insurgency and the motivation of the insurgent must

remain linked. Once delinked, the counterinsurgent will be able to address individual grievances and

negate the unity of the insurgency.

OBJECTIVES

2-10. Although insurgency is a strategy, implementation requires intermediate objectives, specifically

strategic, operational, and tactical goals. Tactical goals most directly translate to actions. These actions lead

to operational goals. Insurgents need carefully to choose what efforts to undertake. For example, raids,

ambushes, and supporting propaganda urging enemy forces to serve their tour quietly and go home alive, to

consolidate into large bases away from the cities, or to stay to the roads for their own safety achieves the goals

of disrupting enemy control over territory and weakening enemy commitment to counterinsurgent strategy.

2-11. Operational objectives address how the insurgency will progress towards its strategic goal. Examples

could include the following:

Attaining a level of popular support in a key region.

Gaining international recognition or external support.

2-12. The strategic objective is the desired end state. In general, the strategic objective is to gain

concessions or remove the regime in power. Typically, the strategic objective is critical to cohesion among

insurgent groups. It might be the movement’s only clearly defined goal. Some examples of strategic goals

are as follows:

Political revolution.

Political reformation.

Succession.

Preservation.

Reversion.

ENVIRONMENT AND GEOGRAPHY

2-13. The environment and geography (demographics) greatly affect an insurgency’s strategies and tactics.

Insurgencies may form their base in urban environments, rural environments, or a combination of both. By

maintaining a combination of urban cells and rural bases, insurgencies can often take full advantage of the

benefits of both models (urban and rural) without becoming constrained by the shortcomings of either model.

2-14. Insurgents located in rural areas enjoy the relative safety of remote terrain or safe havens, such as

jungles or mountains. These geographical conditions make it possible for them to form larger guerrilla

bands and conduct large-scale guerrilla operations. Disadvantages of a rural base are—

Length and speed of communications and supply lines.

Displacement of insurgents from the populace.

Susceptibility of insurgents to conventional military counterguerrilla operations.

2-15. Urban insurgencies have overcome the lack of suitable restrictive terrain by operating within ethnic

ghettos or enclaves within sympathetic densely populated urban areas. These areas often create safe havens

that HN forces are unwilling or unable to access. This type of urban basing requires a high degree of

compartmentalization, which makes it more difficult for the group to train and organize for large-scale

operations.

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EXTERNAL SUPPORT

2-16. Historically, insurgencies do not succeed without some form of external support. This support can be

in the form of—

Moral or political support in the international forum.

Resources, such as money, weapons, food, advisors, and training.

Sanctuary, such as secure training sites, operational bases over a border, or protection from

extradition.

2-17. Governments providing support to an insurgency normally share beneficial interests or common

ideology with the insurgency. Ethnic enclaves or diasporas in third-party countries can provide significant

support in terms of political voice, money, personnel, and sanctuary.

2-18. With external support comes a degree of dependency on the foreign power. Insurgencies can view

this as a disadvantage because the foreign power can then attempt to control or manipulate the insurgency

to better serve its goals. To counterbalance the loss of the support from sympathetic foreign governments

since the end of the Cold War, many groups have resorted to alliances with organized crime groups,

narcotics trafficking, and kidnapping to raise funds. This tactic has proven extremely effective for

generating revenue, but counterproductive to the original goals of the movements.

PHASING AND TIMING

2-19. Successful insurgencies pass through common phases of development. Not all insurgencies

experience every phase, and progression through all phases is not a requirement for success. The same

insurgent movement may be in different phases in separate regions of a country. Successful insurgencies

can also revert to an earlier phase when under pressure, resuming development when favorable conditions

return. A common failure of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies is the inability to adapt tactics when

transitioning from one phase of a strategy to another.

2-20. The three-phase construct presented below is a historical representation of how insurgencies mature.

An extremely useful template allows planners to communicate precisely an insurgency’s stage of

development.

Phase I—Latent or Incipient Phase

2-21. During this phase, the leadership of the resistance develops the clandestine supporting infrastructure

upon which all future effort will rely. The resistance organization uses a variety of subversive techniques to

prepare the population psychologically to resist. Some techniques include propaganda, demonstrations,

boycotts, and sabotage. Subversive activities frequently occur in an organized pattern without any major

outbreak of armed violence. Activities include the following:

Recruit, organize, and train cadre.

Infiltrate key government organizations and civilian groups.

Establish cellular intelligence, operational, and support networks.

Organize or develop cooperative relationships with legitimate political action groups, youth

groups, trade unions, and other front organizations. This approach develops popular support for

later political and military activities.

Solicit and obtain funds.

Develop sources for external support.

2-22. An absent government will compromise with insurgent objectives. The goal is to prepare or

transition the population into accepting overt military operations (guerrilla warfare) as permissible. The

goal is to gain the support of the local population and weaken the power of the existing government.

Although the operational goal is to win popular support, the tactical goal is to convince the local

population to avoid collaboration with the government forces. This leads to a condition where the

insurgency can expand operations without the risk of compromise by the local population. It is impossible

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for the insurgency to conduct the operations it desires without the population being aware of it. This

condition allows the insurgency to expand into Phase II (guerrilla warfare).

Phase II—Guerrilla Warfare

2-23. The objective of this phase is to degrade the government’s security apparatus (the military and police

elements of national power) to the point where the government is susceptible to defeat.

2-24. A campaign of guerrilla attacks and sabotage degrade the government’s military and police forces.

Subversive activities continue to build and maintain support from the population. Proinsurgency radio

broadcasts, newspapers, and pamphlets openly challenge the control and legitimacy of established

authority.

2-25. Unlike Phase I, in Phase II guerrillas need to gather forces, communicate and coordinate operations,

conduct training, receive logistics, rest and hide after operations, and plan future operations. Their need for

intelligence collection and security also increases in Phase II. As the guerrillas grow in numbers, so must

the clandestine support mechanisms.

2-26. The resistance fighters or insurgents may achieve legal belligerent status from the international

community if they meet the internationally accepted criteria.

Phase III—War of Movement

2-27. The goal of the insurgency in Phase III is to bring about the collapse of the established government

(military or internal actions) or the withdrawal of the occupying power. The insurgency does not

necessarily need to transform into a conventional military, but it must position itself to defeat the

government or occupying power. For example, the insurgency might degrade the enemy’s capabilities to a

point that an urban uprising against the presidential palace would topple the government. This tactic can

only succeed if the insurgency effectively removes the military first.

2-28. As the insurgency gains control over the country, the insurgent leadership becomes responsible for

the population, resources, and territory under its control. If the insurgency fails to plan and execute

posthostility activities, the population may lose confidence in the insurgency and turn to the old

government, a breakaway faction, or a splinter group of the insurgency.

2-29. Based on the conditions set earlier, an effective resistance or insurgency—

Establishes an effective civil administration.

Establishes an effective military organization.

Provides balanced social and economic development.

Mobilizes the population to support the resistance organization.

Protects the population from hostile actions.

Failure to achieve these objectives may cause the resistance movement to revert to an earlier phase.

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONAL PATTERNS

2-30. The organizational and operational pattern of a given movement is similar to its order of battle. From

its outset, the organization has a concept of its development based on its goals. Although there are

numerous traditional models for insurgencies

(for example, conspiratorial, military-focused, urban,

protracted popular war, or terror-based [not a methodology supported as a U.S. option]), the planner must

avoid following a famous model without considering the way that model worked for its historical

environment and if the model is appropriate for the current problem set. The structure of the organization

largely depends on the available resources, security threat, and population distribution. All insurgencies are

unique and rarely follow one model exclusively. It is unlikely the structure would resemble a uniform

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organization, such as the military, in which all units look relatively the same. Function takes precedence

over form. Planners must understand the organization’s—

Various subordinate components and their orientation.

Commands—down to the lowest tactical level.

Supporting infrastructure.

2-31. The organization’s most important component level is the local level, where it obtains and sustains

support and manifests actions. Echelons above the local level coordinate all functions (political, military,

external support, and so on). Overall command provides purpose and direction.

THE COMPONENTS OF AN INSURGENCY

2-32. There are three components of an insurgency. The underground is always present and is the first

component of the insurgency to form. Goals and objectives of the insurgency will determine the level of

development of the—

Underground.

Auxiliary.

Guerrillas.

THE UNDERGROUND

2-33. The underground is a cellular organization within the resistance movement or insurgency that has the

ability to conduct operations in areas that are inaccessible to guerrillas, such as urban areas under the

control of the local security forces. The underground can function in these areas because it operates in a

clandestine manner, which prevents it from receiving legal belligerent status under any international

conventions. Examples of underground functions include the following:

Intelligence and counterintelligence networks.

Subversive radio stations.

Propaganda networks that control newspaper or leaflet print shops and/or Web pages.

Special material fabrication, such as false identification, explosives, weapons, and munitions.

Control of networks for moving personnel and logistics.

Individuals or groups that conduct acts of sabotage in urban centers.

Clandestine medical facilities.

2-34. Underground members normally are active members of the community, and their service is a product

of their normal life or position within the community. They operate by maintaining compartmentalization

and delegating most risk to their auxiliary workers. The functions of the underground largely enable the

resistance movement to affect the urban areas.

2-35. The operation cell is usually composed of a leader and a few cell members operating directly as a unit

(Figure 2-3, page 2-9). The intelligence cell is unique in that the cell leader seldom in direct contact with the

members of the cell, and the members are rarely in contact with one another (Figure 2-4, page 2-9).

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labor, or intelligence collection. Auxiliary members may not know any more than how to perform their

specific function or service that supports the network or component of the organization. In many ways,

auxiliary personnel assume the greatest risk. They are also the most expendable element within the

insurgency. Insurgent leaders sometimes use auxiliary functions to test a recruit’s loyalty before exposing

him to other parts of the organization. Auxiliary functions are like embryonic fluid that forms a protective

layer, keeping the underground and guerrilla force alive. Specific functions include the following:

Logistics procurement (all classes of supply).

Logistics distribution (all classes of supply).

Labor for special materiel fabrication.

Security and early warning for underground facilities and guerrilla bases.

Intelligence collection.

Recruitment.

Communications network staff, such as couriers and messengers.

Propaganda distribution.

Safe house management.

Logistics and personnel transport.

2-37. Parallel cells are frequently set up to support a primary cell (Figure 2-5). The auxiliary cell is

commonly found in front groups or in sympathizers’ organizations. It contains an underground cell leader,

assistant cell leaders, and members (Figure 2-6, page 2-11). The cells in series provide a division of labor

in order to carry out functions, such as the manufacture of weapons, supply, escape and evasion,

propaganda, and printing of newspapers. The task assigned to a particular cell must transition or carry over

(depicted by arrows) to the next cell in order to accomplish the function in its entirety. For example, Cell 1

purchases certain items, cell 2 assembles the items, and cell 3 distributes the assembled item (Figure 2-7,

page 2-11). Based on the assigned mission, cell members do not communicate directly with one another.

However, cell leaders will communicate indirectly through intermediaries.

Figure 2-5. Parallel cells

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strive to maintain and protect this advantage. The guerrilla only attacks the enemy when he can generate a

relative, if temporary, state of superiority. The guerrilla commander must avoid decisive engagements,

thereby denying the enemy the opportunity to recover, regain their actual superiority, and use it against the

guerrilla force. The guerrilla force is only able to generate and maintain the initiative advantage in areas

where they have significant familiarity with the terrain and a connection with the local population that

allows them to harness clandestine support.

2-39. Depending on the degree of control over the local environment, the size of guerrilla elements can

range anywhere from squad to brigade-size groups or larger. In the early stages of an insurgency, the

guerrilla force’s offensive capability might be limited to small standoff attacks. As the guerrilla force’s

base of support from the population grows, its ability to challenge government security forces more openly

with larger-scale attacks increases. At some point in an insurgency or resistance movement, the guerrillas

may achieve a degree of parity with HN forces in certain areas. In these cases, units may start openly

fighting, rather than as guerrilla bands. In well-developed insurgencies, formerly isolated pockets of

resistance activity may eventually connect and create liberated territory, possibly even linking with a

friendly or sympathetic border state.

2-40. It is important to use the term “guerrilla” accurately in order to distinguish between other types of

irregular forces that might appear similar but are in fact something entirely different, such as militias,

mercenaries, or criminal gangs. The DOD defines a guerrilla as someone who engages in guerrilla warfare.

This definition is somewhat overly simple because people generally consider guerrilla warfare a tactic that

any force, regular or irregular, can use. True guerrilla forces normally only exist, for an extended period, as

part of a broader resistance movement or insurgency.

ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS OF AN INSURGENCY

2-41. There are additional elements that may be found in an insurgency. Some typical additional elements

include the following:

Leadership and C2.

Government-in-exile.

Shadow government.

Area command.

LEADERSHIP AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

2-42. Leadership is not a separate type of component as much as it is a function. The guerrilla or

underground component generally performs this function.

GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE

2-43. A government-in-exile does not exist in every situation. A government-in-exile is normally present

only in situations in which an element displaces a government from its country but the government remains

recognized as the legitimate sovereign authority. Whether a government-in-exile does or does not exist, the

insurgency will usually still report to some form of a shadow government in-country. Figure 2-8, page 2-13,

depicts the structure of a resistance with a government-in-exile.

SHADOW GOVERNMENT

2-44. The shadow government is an organization the underground forms in occupied territory. Ideally, the

shadow government can perform normal governmental functions in a clandestine manner and synchronize

those functions with the resistance movement. The shadow government is critical because it exercises a

degree of control, supervision, and accountability over the population at all levels (district, village, city,

province, and so on), and further discredits and delegitimizes the existing government.

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Figure 2-8. Resistance structure with government-in-exile

AREA COMMAND

2-45. Area command is a term planners use to denote the resistance leadership that directs, controls,

integrates, and supports all resistance activities in a region. The area commander’s location should be a

place where he can safely control the insurgency and its activities. Flexibility, intelligence, mobility, and

operations security are essential for survival and success. If the insurgency subdivides the area command

into sector commands, its component units are the subordinate sector commands.

INFRASTRUCTURE OF A RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

OR INSURGENCY

2-46. The infrastructure of a resistance movement or insurgency includes the area complex and the guerilla

bases. Guerrilla bases may be further subdivided into the inner security zone, outer security zone, and

insurgent logistics.

AREA COMPLEX

2-47. An area complex is a clandestine, dispersed network of facilities to support resistance activities in a

given area. The area complex is contested territory or an area that contains clandestine supporting

infrastructure. It is not liberated territory. It represents the insurgent’s area of operations (AO). Insurgent

forces can maintain their clandestine infrastructure in the area complex. The clandestine infrastructure

provides insurgent forces with a measure of freedom of movement and support. These areas overlay areas

under the control of the government or occupying military. These areas can eventually transform into

liberated areas if the enemy’s ability to challenge the insurgent forces degrades to a level of parity with the

guerrilla forces. To support resistance activities, an area complex must include a security system, guerrilla

bases, communications, logistics, medical facilities, and a series of networks capable of moving personnel

and supplies. The area complex may consist of friendly villages or towns under guerrilla military or

political control (Figure 2-9, page 2-14).

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Figure 2-9. Area complex

GUERRILLA BASES

2-48. A guerrilla base is an encampment that affords the guerrilla force the ability to rest, recuperate, plan,

and train. Guerrilla bases may be temporary or semipermanent camps. Their level of complexity is

proportional to the surrounding security situation. The security situation is a combination of the ability of

the guerrillas to receive warning of an enemy advance, the ability of the enemy to project force to the base

area, and the ability of the guerrillas to conceal their signature from all means of enemy detection. Guerrilla

leaders should locate bases in terrain that HN counterguerrilla forces cannot easily access, such as

restrictive rural or urban terrain. In environments that lack suitable restrictive physical terrain, certain

urban environments can serve as guerrilla base locations. Densely populated urban enclaves that are

sympathetic to the guerrilla cause can present an obstacle to counterguerrilla forces. Unlike actual

restrictive physical terrain that always restricts the enemy’s ability to attack, urban restrictive terrain only

serves its purpose while counterguerrilla forces remain unwilling to assume the physical and political risk

of entering the enclave. The security of the guerrilla camp comes from two bands of protection, which

planners refer to as bizonal security (Figure 2-10, page 2-15).

Inner Security Zone

2-49. The inner security zone encompasses normal camp security measures found in any military

encampment. These measures consist of static guard and sentry positions, flank observation posts, and

roving patrols. These measures provide a layer of physical protection and early warning to the potential

surprise of an advancing enemy patrol or attack. The security elements have a coordinated means of

signaling and communicating with the main base, as well as clear instructions that dictate how they will

respond to different threats. Bases have emergency procedures to respond to enemy attacks. These

procedures include plans for rapid evacuation and withdrawal, as well as possible dispersal of the main

body while a dedicated guerrilla element remains behind to temporarily delay any enemy penetration.

Fighting positions, obstacles, command-detonated or personnel-initiated mines, preestablished ambush

positions, mortars, explosives, or traps along probable enemy vehicular and personnel avenues of approach

may support the defense plans. It is essential that the guerrillas avoid becoming decisively engaged while

carrying out their delaying and defensive mission.

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special units. Auxiliary personnel may also be in positions to monitor unsecured telephone and radio

traffic, collect and sort the enemy’s trash, and take advantage of individual security force and soldier

operational security awareness. Auxiliary members may also extort or intimidate enemy security personnel

to procure operational information. Redundant collection methods and secure means of communications

between auxiliary members and guerrilla bases provide the guerrillas with significant information that

allows them to maintain the initiative over enemy security forces.

Insurgent Logistics

2-51. Each resistance organization must develop a logistics system to meet the specific requirements of

their situation. In general, however, a resistance organization meets its logistical requirements through a

combination of internal and external means.

2-52. The area complex must provide the bulk of an insurgent organization’s logistical requirements. The

area commander must balance his support requirements against his need for civilian cooperation. Imposing

excessive demands on the population may adversely affect popular support. Logistical constraints may

initially dictate the size of the resistance organization.

2-53. As the resistance organization expands, its logistical requirements may exceed the capability of the

area complex to provide adequate support. When this situation occurs, an external sponsor provides

supplemental logistical support or the resistance organization reduces the scale of its activities. External

support elements normally limit support to the necessities of life and the essential equipment and supplies

the resistance needs to conduct combat operations. Internal sources of resistance supply include the

following:

Battlefield recovery.

Purchase.

Levy.

Barter.

Production.

Confiscation.

2-54. Successful offensive operations permit resistance forces to satisfy some of their logistical

requirements through battlefield recovery. Capturing supplies from hostile forces also avoids alienating

civilians. The resistance organization normally limits its purchases to critical items unavailable by other

means. Excessive introduction of external currency may disrupt the local economy, which may not be in

the interest of the resistance organization or the United States.

2-55. The resistance organization may organize a levy system to ensure an equitable system for obtaining

supplies from the local population. Under a levy system, the resistance organization provides receipts and

maintains records of levy transactions to facilitate reimbursement at the end of hostilities. Obstacles to a

levy system include—

Chronic shortages among the local population.

Hostile populace and resources control (PRC) measures, including confiscation or destruction of

local resources.

Competition from the hostile power or rival resistance organizations.

Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives

(CBRNE) or other

contamination of local resources.

2-56. Barter may adversely affect the levy system. However, it is sometimes the only method of obtaining

critical services or items, such as medical supplies.

2-57. Resistance forces often have to improvise their own field expedients. They may even have to plant

and raise their own food, dig wells, and tend their own livestock. The area commander may consider

establishing clandestine factories to produce unobtainable items.

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2-58. Confiscation alienates the local population. The resistance organization should use confiscation only

in emergencies or as punishment for individuals who refuse to cooperate or who actively collaborate with

the hostile power. In all cases, resistance leaders must strictly control confiscation to ensure that it does not

deteriorate into looting.

2-59. The resistance organization requires basic medicines and other medical supplies to treat its members.

Preventive medicine is especially important to a resistance organization because it normally does not have

adequate facilities to treat diseases.

2-60. The area commander normally obtains transportation support from the auxiliary on a mission basis.

The guerrilla force may have its own organic transportation system to meet its immediate needs. In remote

or undeveloped areas, the primary means may be human porters or pack animals.

2-61. The area commander caches extra supplies and equipment throughout the operational area. Caching is

not a haphazard affair. Caches must support anticipated operational requirements or specified emergencies.

2-62. The resistance organization obtains repair materiel from the local economy and through battlefield

recovery to perform all maintenance and repairs within its capability. It may establish repair facilities

within the area complex. The sponsor includes necessary maintenance and repair items with all equipment

it provides the resistance. Introducing sophisticated equipment into the area complex may complicate the

maintenance system.

ORGANIZATION OF MEDICAL SUPPORT WITHIN

THE AREA COMPLEX

2-63. The resistance initially confines clandestine medical treatment facilities to emergency and expedient

care, with little preventive medicine. Once the area complex sufficiently develops, the clandestine facilities

can expand and become a semipermanent medical organization, which serves the following purposes:

To sustain and preserve combat power.

To support the population.

MEDICAL REQUIREMENTS

2-64. If the area command has not established a degree of clandestine medical support, the result will be

evident in the guerrilla force’s morale. Historically, a lack of proper medical attention has led to serious

illness and disability that reduced overall unit combat effectiveness.

2-65. Medical elements supporting the resistance forces must be mobile, responsive, and effective in

preventing disease and restoring the sick and wounded to duty. It is unlikely the movement will have a safe

rear area where it can take casualties for treatment. Medical personnel help during combat operations by

operating casualty collection points, which allows the healthy guerrillas to keep fighting. Medical

personnel evacuate casualties from these points to a guerrilla base or civilian care facility.

2-66. Resistance personnel use existing logistics and transportation nets to gain supplies and move

casualties. The movement of wounded personnel across enemy-controlled areas by auxiliary members is a

clandestine operation, not a support function.

AID STATION

2-67. Trained medical personnel provide emergency treatment at aid stations. Evacuation of wounded

personnel from the battle area begins at these stations. Because the condition of the wounded may prevent

movement to the unit base, personnel hide them in secure locations and notify the auxiliary. The auxiliary

cares for and hides the wounded or evacuates them to a treatment facility.

2-68. The evacuation of the dead is important for security reasons. If the enemy identifies the dead, the

families of the guerrillas may be in danger. Personnel evacuate and cache the bodies of those killed in action

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until proper burial or disposal of the bodies in accordance with (IAW) the customs of the local population.

Removal and burial of the dead denies the enemy valuable intelligence concerning indigenous casualties.

GUERRILLA HOSPITAL

2-69. A guerrilla hospital is a medical treatment facility (or complex of smaller facilities) that provides

inpatient medical support to the guerrilla force. The resistance movement establishes a guerrilla hospital

during the organization and buildup phase of its development. The hospital must be ready for operation at

the start of combat operations and must be able to continue providing medical support until the leadership

directs otherwise.

2-70. A guerrilla hospital rarely outwardly resembles a conventional hospital. The requirement for strict

security, flexibility, and rapid mobility prevent visible comparison with conventional military or civilian

medical facilities. As the guerrilla force consolidates its hold on the area complex, all medical support

functions tends to consolidate. Safe areas allow the resistance to establish a centralized system of medical

care. Sophisticated hospitals provide more elaborate care because they provide a wider selection of trained

personnel and specialized equipment. These hospitals can also render more extensive and prolonged

treatment.

CONVALESCENT FACILITY

2-71. The area where guerrilla forces send patients to recuperate is a convalescent facility. A guerrilla

convalescent facility may be a safe house in which one or two convalescents are recuperating with an

appropriate alibi or it could be in any base in guerrilla-controlled areas.

INSURGENT SUPPORT NETWORKS

2-72. Just like other large organizations, insurgencies need support networks. Insurgent support networks

include the following:

Logistics support network.

Communications networks.

Information and propaganda networks.

Transportation networks.

Recruitment networks.

Intelligence and counterintelligence networks.

LOGISTICS SUPPORT NETWORK

2-73. Guerrillas need the ability to acquire, store, and distribute large quantities of supplies without

standard lines of supply and communications. They accomplish this by maintaining a decentralized

network of widely distributed caches instead of large centralized stockpiles. This minimizes the loss of

materiel if a guerrilla base moves quickly or faces destruction. This network allows the guerrillas to

conduct operations across a wide area without a long logistics tail.

2-74. The logistics supply network also includes facilities for materiel fabrication, such as false

documentation, improvised explosives and munitions, and medical aid. If the resistance is receiving external

support, this network will extend to clandestine airstrips, drop zones (DZ), seaports, and border-crossing sites.

COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS

2-75. Guerrillas and underground leaders need to communicate with their subordinate elements in an area

where enemy forces are always actively looking and listening for any indicators that would compromise

the location of guerrilla forces or their supporting mechanism. Because of the likelihood of a high early-

warning threat, especially in the initial phases of the resistance movement, nontechnical communications

should prevail.

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INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA NETWORKS

2-76. Special networks are responsible for providing information to the population, against the will of the

controlling regime. This information will bolster the will of the population to support the insurgent cause,

undermine the legitimacy of the regime or occupying power, and undermine the morale of enemy security

forces. Guerrilla forces may produce and distribute bootleg radio broadcasts, underground newspapers,

Internet sites, and rumor campaigns. Guerrilla propaganda networks also draw new recruits to the

movement. The networks may also coordinate with sympathetic elements outside the country to raise

international favor and support. The resistance or insurgent leadership must have a degree of

communication with the propaganda network to produce a coordinated effort.

TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS

2-77. The resistance requires the capability to move personnel and logistics safely through enemy

controlled areas. Transportation networks include a compartmentalized series of safe houses or similar

hiding locations. These locations allow the transport of personnel and materiel over long distances under

the control of regional personnel who are familiar with the local enemy security measures. Security

requires a complex series of recognition signals and communications that allow the individual segments to

transfer the personnel and materiel safely with minimum exposure of either compartment to the other.

These networks can also facilitate the evacuation of wounded personnel or personnel evading the enemy,

such as downed airmen.

RECRUITMENT NETWORKS

2-78. The insurgency requires new recruits to join all aspects of the movement. The incorporation of these

individuals requires special security measures to prevent the compromise of the components. The

insurgency often sequesters recruits until it can check the recruit’s validity and the recruit can complete

training and possibly participate in an operation to prove his loyalty.

INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE NETWORKS

2-79. Aside from normal intelligence collection requirements, the resistance must recruit new members.

The resistance screens new members to ensure they are not infiltrators. Further details are beyond the scope

of this publication.

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Concept of Employment

Insurgents’ actions are similar in character to all others fought by second-rate troops;

they start out full of vigor and enthusiasm, but there is little level-headedness and

tenacity in the long run.

Clausewitz, On War

It was a critical task of the special operations executive (SOE) to make sure that, where

level-headedness and tenacity were lacking

(among resistance forces), these

characteristics were made available by first-rate organizers (from the SOE), so these

forces could be brought into combat.

M.R. Foot, The SOE 1940-1946

Planning for UW is slightly different from planning for other special operations.

Most SF core missions, other than UW and foreign internal defense (FID), are short-

term operations. UW, however, involves long-term campaigns that require

operational art to put forces in space and time and integrate ends, ways, and means

from the tactical to the strategic levels that attain the desired strategic effects or U.S.

political or military objectives and end states. The sensitivity of the planned action

dictates the level of compartmentalization the United States must use to ensure

operational security. Parallel planning by all levels ensures that each level

understands how their mission integrates with the missions of other levels.

PLANNING FOR UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

3-1. UW operations have a fundamental psychological component in both execution and

effects.

Consequently, UW planning should integrate MIS in all phases of the operation. MIS can develop,

maintain, and reinforce desired behaviors in target groups and individuals, while minimizing undesired

behaviors. MISO are the primary method of fulfilling the ARSOF imperative of anticipating and

controlling psychological effects. A key task of controlling psychological effects is ensuring that

populations in the unconventional warfare operational area (UWOA) understand that operations are for

their ultimate benefit, even if not immediately so. Failure to shape popular perceptions in ways that support

UW objectives leaves the operation vulnerable to enemy information operations that can adversely affect

even the best-planned and executed missions.

3-2. Planners must understand and distinguish between the resistance force’s conceptual campaign-like

activities and the Special Forces operational detachment’s (SFOD’s) immediate tactical operations, such as

infiltration and linkup with resistance forces. Planners base the conceptual portion of the plan on numerous

assumptions that they cannot confirm until after linkup with the resistance forces. Because of the

ambiguous nature of these types of operations, command involvement is critical.

3-3. During SFODA or SFODB planning, the battalion HQ or special operations task force (SOTF)

commander receives a concept brief to ensure synchronization of planning with his intent. This brief also

affords the SOTF commander the chance to interact with the SFODA or SFODB, which builds a degree of

confidence between the two elements.

3-4. The SOTF normally passes operations orders to companies, allowing them to further refine the tasks

assignments of their subordinate units. However, this is not the case in UW. Because of the highly sensitive

and complex nature of UW efforts, SFODAs receive their guidance directly from the SOTF. The mission

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may not require the involvement of an SFODB, but the SFODB may infiltrate and linkup with resistance

forces, as well. In the latter case, the SFODB in isolation stays abreast of the activities of its SFODAs, but

does not provide C2 until successful infiltration of the operational area and linkup with a resistance

counterpart HQ. Until this event occurs, it is more efficient for SFODAs to remain under direct SOTF

control, and the companies or advanced operations base (AOB) to remain focused on their pending tactical

infiltrations or other tasks.

3-5. The SOTF can simultaneously run an isolation facility and a support center with a launch and

recovery site, operations center, and signal center with 24-hour C2 for elements in denied territory. GTA

31-01-003, Detachment Mission Planning Guide, contains a more detailed description of specific planning.

Figure 3-1 contains definitions vital to understanding UW planning.

Figure 3-1. Unconventional warfare elements

SEVEN PHASES OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

3-6. The seven phases of U.S.-sponsored insurgency are a conceptual template that planners use to aid

understanding of a UW campaign effort. As a template, it merely serves as a guide for planning and

execution. With the exception of MIS forces, no other SOF will mirror the seven phases, but may support a

specific portion or phase of the larger UW campaign. Regardless, operational personnel should understand

how their efforts integrate with and contribute to the overall campaign plan.

PHASE ONE—PREPARATION

3-7. The preparation phase must begin with a complete IPOE. UW operations need to include, but are not

limited to, a thorough analysis of the resistance force’s strengths, weaknesses, logistics concerns, level of

training and experience, political or military agendas, factional relationships, and external political ties.

Along with this data, a thorough area study (Appendix A) of the target area is completed. At a minimum,

the area study includes governmental services, living conditions, and political, religious, economical,

environmental, medical, and educational issues.

3-8. The USG begins to shape the target environment as far in advance as possible. The shaping effort

may include operations to increase the legitimacy of U.S. operations and the resistance movement, building

internal and external support for the movement, and setting conditions for the introduction of U.S. forces

into the UWOA. MIS assessments are particularly important during the preparation phase because they

provide the SFODA with vital information on possible insurgent leaders and key communicators that have

psychological relevance with the population. Personnel could conduct these activities proactively in areas

under the control of adversarial regimes or reactively immediately following an act of aggression against

an ally’s territory, such as an invasion. The population of a recently occupied country may already be

psychologically ready to accept U.S. sponsorship, particularly if the country was a U.S. ally before its

occupation. In other cases, psychological preparation may require a protracted period before yielding any

favorable results.

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PHASE TWO—INITIAL CONTACT

3-9. Before the USG decides to render support to a resistance, it establishes contact with representatives

of a resistance organization to assess the compatibility of U.S. and resistance interests and objectives. This

assessment is largely a political negotiation between the USG and the resistance organization. Once the

USG establishes compatibility, it assesses the resistance potential. During the initial contact, planners may

arrange for the reception of a pilot team. If possible, planners may exfiltrate a resistance representative,

referred to as an asset, from the operational area to brief the pilot team during its planning phase and

possibly to accompany the team during their infiltration into the operational area and linkup with resistance

forces.

3-10. The pilot team conducts detailed area assessments (Appendix B) to expand their understanding of the

operational environment, particularly human terrain analysis. This analysis provides information on the

degree of support for the UW effort among the local populations. MIS planners provide the pilot team with

area- and population-specific information requests to facilitate the evaluation of indigenous information

capabilities and the determination of the level of support necessary to fully develop those capabilities and

increase their operational effectiveness. MIS personnel may augment a pilot team.

PHASE THREE—INFILTRATION

3-11. During the infiltration phase, a pilot team clandestinely infiltrates the operational area in order to link

up with the resistance force and conduct or confirm a feasibility assessment. If the operational assessment

is favorable, the pilot team coordinates for the infiltration and reception of follow-on SF teams and

supplies. MIS personnel, attached to follow-on SF teams, provide SFODAs with an early information

capability while developing an indigenous capability. As follow-on teams infiltrate the operational area and

link up with their respective resistance-force counterparts, they begin their own operational assessment to

confirm or deny the assumptions of the overarching UW campaign plan.

3-12. Depending on the situation, circumstances may dictate the infiltration of SFODAs without the

benefit of a prior pilot-team effort, a trusted asset, or a completed feasibility assessment. In this case, the

SFODA will perform many of the required functions normally accomplished by the pilot team. If this

occurs, the SFODAs may need to adjust their infiltration plans to account for the higher risk of infiltration

without the benefit of a reception coordinated by other U.S. personnel.

3-13. Successful infiltration of SFODAs and right-sized C2 to ensure countrywide or theaterwide unity of

effort and apportionment of resources represents a decisive point for the operation, as well as a period of

increased operational risk. Infiltration plans and tactics need to remain focused on successfully achieving

this decisive point. Once the SFODA successfully links up with resistance forces, it must conduct the same

level of operational assessment that the pilot team normally conducts before the implementation of their

plan to render support.

3-14. In limited-war scenarios where the infiltration of U.S. personnel is undesirable, planners could

exfiltrate indigenous resistance personnel out of the target area, provide training in specific required skills,

and infiltrate the personnel back into the target area to function as cadre capable of conducting operations

or training other resistance forces. The enemy’s level of control over the population and the environment

affects how long planners can keep resistance personnel away from their region before they begin to

disconnect from the local population.

PHASE FOUR—ORGANIZATION

3-15. Once U.S. advisors link up with resistance leadership, the objective is to determine and agree upon a

plan to organize the resistance for expanded operations. In addition to physical preparations, this entails a

confirmation of mutual objectives and prior agreements. This requires a period of rapport-building to

develop trust and confidence, as well as a period of discussion of expectations from both sides.

3-16. Before a resistance organization can successfully engage in combat operations, its leadership must

organize an infrastructure that can sustain itself in combat and withstand the anticipated hostile reaction to

armed resistance. During the organization phase, the resistance leadership develops a resistance cadre to

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serve as the organizational nucleus during the buildup phase. The SFODA assists the resistance leadership

in this endeavor by providing training and advice to prepare for the eventual buildup of the resistance

organization.

3-17. MIS elements assist in this phase by organizing and developing a new (or building upon an existing)

resistance information capability. Once the resistance develops this capability, it can incorporate

information elements into insurgent and auxiliary organizations. Development includes training and

mentoring cadre and advising on their employment. The ultimate goal is the employment of resistance

information capabilities that are increasingly self-sustaining.

3-18. Many guerrilla leaders may not enthusiastically accept U.S. advisors but may tolerate them as a

precondition for other U.S. support, such as logistical aid. They may harbor suspicions that the U.S.

intentions are purely self-serving or lack the resolve to maintain their commitment long-term. Guerrilla

leaders are cautious of placing too much reliance in U.S. promises. It is the challenge of the SFODA

leadership to gain the confidence of the resistance leadership and demonstrate the value of cooperation

toward their mutual goals. The SFODA explains its capabilities and limitations and begins to assist the

resistance leadership with the development of the organization. Although rapport eases every aspect of

operations, operational personnel must not perceive rapport as the goal, but rather a means to a goal. The

goal is a strong relationship in which the SF leaders are trusted advisors who can influence the direction of

events. The amount of influence an advisor attains is directly proportional to the total sum of three factors

between himself and his counterpart. These factors equate to rapport, credibility, and continued belief in

the value of the relationship.

3-19. The resistance leader and U.S. advisors must agree upon C2 arrangements within the bounds of

higher-level political and military agreements. The specifics of a resistance organization depend on local

conditions. UW requires centralized direction and decentralized execution under conditions that place great

demands on the resistance organization and its leadership. Armed rebellion inherently creates an

ambiguous and unstructured environment. No two resistance organizations need the same degree or level

of organization. All levels of command should consider the following factors when advising the resistance

leadership concerning organization:

The effectiveness of the existing resistance organization.

The extent of cooperation between the resistance organization and the local population.

The level of hostile activity and security measures.

The political boundaries, natural terrain features, potential targets, and population density of the

operations environment.

The religious, ethnic, political, and ideological differences among elements of the population

and competing resistance organizations.

The proposed type and scope of combat operations.

The degree of U.S. influence with the resistance organization.

3-20. It is important that the SFODAs understand and report the strengths and weaknesses of the resistance

group. With this feedback, higher commanders can develop the UW campaign plan to effectively leverage

the strengths of the different groups while mitigating the inherent weaknesses. MIS assessments are

important sources of information that aid in understanding these strengths and weaknesses. These

assessments aid in understanding the cultural, religious, economic, and social factors affecting the

operational environment and the resistance movement. This analysis also provides key insights into

relationships and other influences affecting the behavior of targeted groups.

3-21. Planners cannot automatically fix the organization of the guerrilla force according to conventional

tables of organization and equipment. Guerrilla force missions and tactics dictate a simple, mobile, and

flexible organization capable of rapid dispersion and consolidation. Each unit must function as an

independent organization with its own intelligence, communications, and logistical systems. Guerrilla

organization normally determines auxiliary organization. Planners should compartment all auxiliary

functions from one another and from the guerrilla force that the auxiliary supports. MIS elements develop

complementary guerrilla and auxiliary information elements that are simple, mobile, and flexible. This

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enables them to provide training in tactics, techniques, and procedures that match the capabilities of those

organizations.

3-22. Once U.S. advisors have an accurate assessment of the situation on the ground, a good working

relationship, and a concept for expanded operations, resistance leaders and planners work out the specifics

of the concept. The two parties work out these specifics at all levels, clearing them through U.S.

interagency channels to ensure concept agreement.

PHASE FIVE—BUILDUP

3-23. During the buildup phase, the resistance cadre improves the organization’s clandestine supporting

infrastructure in order to prepare for expanded offensive operations. When the organization begins to

conduct operations of a wider scope and across a wider area, many of these operations will draw attention

from counterguerrilla forces. The organization must have the supporting clandestine infrastructure to

prepare for and sustain these operations. Possible expansion efforts to prepare the area complex for future

combat operations include—

Increasing intelligence, counterintelligence, and early-warning networks.

Expanding recruiting efforts without compromising security of the force or operations.

Developing and expanding underground capabilities to conduct information, deception, and

sabotage activities.

Expanding the supply distribution and cache networks.

Expanding guerrilla training programs for new recruits or on new materiel supplied by the

SFODA, such as mortars, antitank systems, machine guns, demolitions, medical gear, CBRNE

protective gear, and so on.

Developing mechanisms and networks to support evasion and recovery of coalition forces, such

as downed airmen.

3-24. During this phase, the resistance force may conduct limited offensive operations to gain confidence

and experience, to procure needed materiel and supplies, or to confuse and harass the enemy forces in their

area. However, the emphasis remains on developing the resistance infrastructure to support future

operations. The resistance leadership must not let the organization expand beyond its organic capability to

sustain itself.

3-25. All parties must carefully consider the type and scope of future combat operations that are likely to

achieve each organization’s desired plans, as well as the plans of the overarching resistance C2 in

conjunction with or supporting U.S. efforts. All levels of command must be aware of the theater

commander’s intent for resistance combat operations. During isolation planning, units may focus on some

strategic- to tactical-level targets. It is unlikely the unit would have had the fidelity to determine

appropriate objectives and targets that achieve the theater commander’s desired effects before linkup with

the resistance leadership. After advisors and the resistance leadership agree upon a support plan for the

overall UW campaign, they must determine which actual targets achieve the desired goals.

3-26. The first step toward determining appropriate targets, objectives, and other supporting efforts is to

establish an understanding of the enemy’s capabilities and intentions. What are the enemy’s tactical,

operational, and strategic capabilities and efforts to ensure control over the population? What are the

enemy’s centers of gravity? What are the enemy’s psychological vulnerabilities? Where is the enemy

vulnerable to guerrilla or underground operations? The enemy situation may change drastically from the

current time to the time of a coalition invasion.

3-27. Depending on the length of the campaign effort, it is highly probable that the theater campaign plan

was still in development at the time of the SFODA’s isolation planning and infiltration. The intelligence

derived from the resistance in this phase is critical to the theater planning efforts.

3-28. Each level of SF HQ must identify potential objectives or lines of operations with their resistance

counterparts as part of the overall UW campaign plan. SF units ensure the resistance efforts complement

the theater campaign plans. Planners must take care to minimize the communication signature during

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coordination so that they do not burden or jeopardize resistance units while satisfying conventional

planning procedures.

3-29. Once planners determine the type and scope of operations, they develop supporting capabilities

specific to those efforts. Tasks outlined in the UW campaign plan or operation order drive supporting

capabilities. The SFODA may start to coordinate for specific supplies via airdrop or other resupply

methods. Planners need to prioritize resupply efforts for materials that forces cannot procure by other

means. Every resupply operation comes with the risk of exposure and potential loss of the supporting

apparatus. Planners need to develop and emplace capabilities without compromising the organization or

future operations. If resistance efforts are to support a pending coalition D-Day (start of the coalition

invasion), the capabilities—whether guerrilla, auxiliary, or underground—need to include notification and

activation procedures that allow the synchronization of efforts with conventional forces.

PHASE SIX—EMPLOYMENT

3-30. During the employment phase, the resistance force initiates an expanded scope of offensive operations

to achieve the desired effects. The desired effects can range from causing the enemy to commit limited

resources away from a pending invasion area, support to a pending invasion area (as in general war), or in the

case of a separate insurgency (limited war), the achievement of specific strategic politico-military objectives.

The main activities in this phase consist of interdiction and MISO. The specific tactics and activities that occur

during the conduct of UW are not exclusive to UW. Interdiction operations may include—

Interdicting LOCs.

Attacking C2 nodes, such as power lines, telecommunications towers, and key enemy leaders.

Attacking mobile air defense systems.

Targeting rear-area infrastructure and high-payoff targets, such as munitions and fuel depots,

rail yards, airfields, waterways, power plants, and radio, television, and other mass media

facilities.

Seizing key objectives, such as choke points, prisoner or concentration camps, and critical

national infrastructure, for very limited periods of time.

3-31. Planners need to consider the types of targets guerrilla forces attack. Guerrilla forces might avoid

conducting wide-scale operations in frontline combat areas during the introduction of conventional forces

because guerrilla force presence could inadvertently hinder the rapid advance of invasion forces. In order to

maximize their effect, resistance forces should attack less-than-optimal targets by other means, such as air

interdiction or missiles.

3-32. MISO seek to achieve two goals simultaneously in phase six. First, MISO exploit guerrilla successes for

their maximum psychological effect. This exploitation can increase the morale of resistance forces and

auxiliaries, which can further increase their operational effectiveness. In addition, success brings positive

attention to the movement and increases support from the indigenous population and external supporters in

terms of logistics, intelligence, and recruitment. Second, MISO exploit guerrilla successes to erode enemy

morale and decrease internal and external support. MISO may also increase dissension, desertion, and

surrender of enemy forces, further decreasing their operational effectiveness. MISO can further exploit enemy

reprisals against populations or the guerrillas to separate the population from the enemy government or

occupying forces.

3-33. Physical attacks that resistance forces conduct can significantly alter psychological effects during this

phase. Planning actions for psychological effect is a deliberate process requiring thorough analysis, detailed

coordination, and careful execution. Although this process is time- and labor-intensive, the effects can

potentially shape the course of the entire UW operation in a profound manner. SF units on the ground

coordinate and synchronize these efforts to ensure a complementary effect, first with partner force and then

conventional force efforts. Other supporting efforts may include—

Gathering and reporting vital intelligence to coalition forces.

Assisting in the evasion and recovery of isolated personnel (downed aircrews).

Reconnoitering and receiving airborne, air assault, or amphibious invasion forces.

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3-34. MISO can enhance the effects of these supporting efforts. They can increase actionable intelligence

obtained from key segments of the population through persuasive messages that increase sympathy and

support for the resistance movement. Information on rewards and other messages can persuade target

groups to aid the evasion and recovery of isolated personnel. In addition, MISO can assist in building local

networks that provide support for incoming invasion forces by consistently emphasizing the benefits of

supporting the UW effort and highlighting the negative aspects of the enemy government or occupying

power.

3-35. In a general-war scenario involving a pending conventional force invasion, planners synchronize

combat operations around an undisclosed D-Day. For operations security, planners do not tell SF personnel

or resistance forces the specific time and date of D-Day, which makes synchronization particularly critical

and challenging. Planners may choose a defining date or event, such as the anniversary of a civil

disturbance, to motivate the guerrilla force and increase popular support for operations. Careful selection of

the D-Day can have significant psychological effects on UW operations. SF HQ coordinate notification

procedures and the amount of advance warning they require with theater HQ before the infiltration of

SFODAs. Resistance forces require time to notify and assemble their forces, recover equipment, and move

into position. Resistance forces must accomplish these tasks without the benefit of secure technical

communications gear and without alerting enemy forces. Based on the expectation of liberation by invasion

forces, the resistance can assume the risk associated with initiating more offensive operations than is

normally permissible. When properly coordinated, these offensive operations can have a devastating

disruptive effect on an adversary’s combat capability. However, if the resistance initiates its efforts too

early, they will alert enemy forces and possibly initiate retaliation. If the resistance initiates its efforts too

late, they may not have the required effect to be of value.

3-36. In a limited-war scenario, this phase still consists of a campaign of guerrilla warfare and subversion,

but forces execute them in a slightly different manner. Combat operations generally do not focus around a

single culminating D-Day event. Forces conduct these operations over a protracted period of time, with the

intent of slowly eroding enemy strength and morale. Guerrilla attacks and acts of sabotage and subversion

drain the hostile power’s morale and resources, disrupt its administration, and maintain the civilian

population’s morale and will to resist. By repeatedly attacking multiple and widely dispersed targets, the

resistance organization confuses, frustrates, and demoralizes hostile forces. Such attacks force the hostile

power to divide its reaction and reinforcement capabilities. This slowly creates an increasing demand on

the enemy to spend a disproportionate amount of strength to maintain its existing state of control over the

population. In either a general-war or limited-war scenario, advisors ensure that resistance activities

continue to support the objectives of the U.S. unified commander, mindful that resistance objectives are

rarely identical to those of the United States.

3-37. Some planners assume the goal is to enable resistance forces to transform and equate to additional

conventional infantry units. It is the responsibility of the SF HQ to ensure that campaign planners

understand the capabilities and limitations of the resistance forces, as well as the associated advantages and

disadvantages.

3-38. As conventional forces near areas with resistance forces, the SF HQ coordinates linkup between the

two forces. Planners arrange how linkup will occur before the SFODA’s infiltration. Successful linkup is

critical to avoid friendly-fire incidents and to give the maneuver commander the benefit of the resistance

force’s intimate knowledge of the local environment. This normally requires the placement of an element

with the advancing conventional force HQ. After linkup, resistance forces revert to some variety of

coalition or national control. These forces may demobilize or transition to a regular military or security

force. Possible missions include employment as—

Rear-area security of critical installations and LOC choke points.

Scouts and guides assigned to coalition conventional units.

PHASE SEVEN—TRANSITION

3-39. Elements conduct UW until they remove the hostile power and the indigenous population becomes

the government. At this point, it is critical to shift mindsets from defeating the adversary regime to

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protecting the newly installed government and its security personnel from insurgency, lawlessness, and

subversion by former regime elements that attempt to organize resistance. Planners should have addressed

transition planning in the feasibility assessment that formed the basis of the determination to support the

resistance organization. Elements must honor their commitment to promises made before transition.

Resistance forces are more likely to demobilize or transition if—

The postconflict government reflects their original expectations.

The belief exists that elements will honor promises made before transition, specifically in terms

of benefits, such as back pay for service to their country or future employment.

3-40. During the period of conflict, it is possible that attitudes of a given force change or allegiances

collapse. It is common for isolated guerrilla units to lose sight of their original objectives in order to

maintain a lifestyle that is now more familiar than their preconflict lives. For this reason, all levels need to

monitor attitudes and reinforce the end state objectives throughout the course of the campaign. MISO units

are particularly useful in disseminating information about the benefits of demobilization, reintegration, and

a reestablishment of society and civilian life. The manner in which the transition occurs affects the postwar

attitudes of the people and the government towards the United States. Perhaps the greatest danger in

transition is the possibility that former resistance members may resort to factional disputes, banditry, or

subversion of the new government. The new government must make every effort to reorient and absorb

former resistance members into a peaceful society and gain their acceptance. To achieve this goal, the new

government must—

Bring arms and ammunition under government control.

Assist resistance members in returning to civilian life.

Use resistance members as local militias or the base for future police and army forces.

Take positive measures to prevent resistance members from beginning or participating in further

political upheaval.

3-41. Because of their knowledge of resistance organization and history, SF teams initially remain in their

operational areas to assist in the demobilization effort or in the transition of former resistance forces into

national regular forces. SF personnel may serve as trainers and advisors to newly formed counterguerrilla

or counterterrorist units, particularly if former resistance forces reject transition and continue to violently

oppose the new indigenous government. During transition and demobilization, CA units are critical assets

in helping the new government meet the needs of the former resistance forces and their families. MISO are

essential during this phase. MIS assists in explaining the demobilization process to the guerrilla forces and

promotes loyalty of guerrilla forces to the new government as part of continuing efforts to maintain support

for the movement’s transition to a working government. The key to long-term strategic success in UW is

the planning and execution of SOF postconflict responsibilities.

CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT TO THE SEVEN PHASES

OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

3-42. CA forces are capable of providing support to all seven phases of a UW campaign. CMO planners

and CA forces are well equipped to assist SFODs in developing the factors that make up the operational

environment of UW operations, in achieving the support or neutrality of various segments of society, or

influencing the JSOA. All Civil Affairs operations (CAO) may support UW, although the most important

role of CAO is facilitating the swift transition of power from the resistance forces to a legitimate

government after the cessation of hostilities.

3-43. CA operational support during phase one of UW may include the following:

Providing detailed civil considerations analysis of the JSOA.

Providing CAO inputs to the IPOE process.

Identifying foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) funding sources.

Initiating transition planning by developing a disengagement concept and identifying the CMO

end state.

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3-44. CA operational support during phase two of UW may include the following:

Integrating with the pilot team-planning cell.

Identifying sources of FHA, to include intergovernmental organizations

(IGOs) and

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Preparing to insert with the pilot team to support initial assessments.

Preparing to provide detailed CAO or CMO analysis of pilot team assessments.

Identifying quick, high-impact projects based on pilot team assessments.

3-45. CA operational support during phase three of UW may include the following:

Validating CA inputs to the IPOE.

Identifying and liaising with key leaders within the indigenous population who may influence

the CAO/CMO plan.

Preparing to insert with the SFOD.

Conducting key leader engagement.

3-46. CA operational support during phase four of UW may include the following:

Refining CA input to IPOE.

Facilitating the build of the resistance force.

Initiating CAO (FHA, nation assistance, and PRC).

3-47. CA operational support during phase five of UW may include the following:

Validating measures of effectiveness (MOEs).

Monitoring or assessing effects

Executing CAO.

3-48. CA operational support during phase six of UW may include the following:

Mitigating impacts on the population.

Surging FHA.

Preparing to execute planned PRC (dislocated civilian operations).

Deconflicting IGO and NGO operations supporting unity of effort.

3-49. CA operational support during phase seven of UW may include the following:

Executing support to civil administration operations to advise and assist the new government.

Supporting posthostility institutions to foster legitimacy and transparency of government.

Supporting the interagency execution of strategic and operational stability operations.

LOGISTICS CONSIDERATIONS

3-50. Logistics support for UW is different from support to other types of special operations. UW missions

often require significant quantities of materiel to support resistance forces, specifically guerrillas. The

materiel includes lethal and nonlethal aid, some of which may not be organic to the U.S. Army supply

system. Every effort must be made to maximize the use of indigenous supply sources within the UWOA. In

addition, confiscation, barters or trades, IOUs, donations or levies, and battlefield recovery and purchase

are leveraged extensively in order to maximize demands of external resupply. Planners need to consider the

ability of the indigenous forces to make use of U.S. materiel. In some cases, the materiel may not be

compatible with other materiel acquired in the operational environment. The introduction of some U.S.

materiel could actually complicate the resistance forces efforts.

3-51. A key area that planners must address in the planning phase is that much of the MIS equipment is

unique to the force and not in the U.S. Army supply system. Furthermore, indigenous information

capabilities rely on locally sustainable equipment that is within their ability to supply and service. The

decentralization and mobility of the insurgent and auxiliary organizations necessitate equipment that

personnel can easily move and set up. Equipment in austere conditions must have minimum maintenance

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requirements. In some cases, personnel will need to conduct production, distribution, and dissemination

using theater resources rather than organic or indigenous assets.

3-52. The lack of established LOCs presents another significant challenge. Personnel must deliver materiel

in a manner that does not compromise the indigenous force’s location. For this reason, planners need to

carefully consider and prioritize external resupply efforts, keeping resupply to essential items only.

Planners need to ensure resupply efforts do not establish a pattern. Personnel should use various methods

and locations throughout the course of the buildup and combat employment phases.

3-53. To facilitate isolation and field planning, the theater special operations command (TSOC) and

subsequent joint special operations task force (JSOTF) must make detachments aware of available materiel.

These elements are responsible for establishing a catalog of available materiel for a campaign effort. This

catalog will include standard and nonstandard materiel. Detachments need to understand if quantities have

already been allocated and the given quota for the number of resupplies they can expect. They also need to

know whether resupply scheduling is by month or by phase (air, sea, and ground). The willingness to

assume risk with platforms to resupply forces may increase as phases progress towards initiation of combat

operations.

3-54. In addition, detachments need to know their allocation for emergency bundles to support evasion and

for resupply in support of their mission requirements. The JSOTF forwards requests for materiel not

immediately available to the TSOC for resourcing. Detachments need to understand the process and time

necessary for nonstandard requests.

SUPPLY CONSIDERATIONS

3-55. There are two main categories of resupply, accompanying resupply and external resupply. External

resupply is comprised of automatic, emergency, and on-call (or routine) resupply. The following sections

discuss each of these categories and subcategories.

ACCOMPANYING RESUPPLY

3-56. The SFODA may take accompanying supplies into the JSOA at the time of infiltration. The SFODA

receives these supplies in isolation at the JSOTF or SOTF. While undergoing mission preparation in

isolation, the SFODA prepares and rigs accompanying supplies for delivery in conjunction with

infiltration. This preparation must include packaging and load consideration to facilitate transportation

subsequent to infiltration. The situation may dictate that these supplies are cached following infiltration for

later use. The threat in the JSOA dictates the quantity and type of supplies and equipment the SFODA can

include. Other influences are the—

Capabilities, size, and responsiveness of the guerrilla force to sponsor assistance.

Enemy capabilities and situation.

Method of infiltration (air, land, or sea).

Requirements for survival, evasion, resistance, and escape.

Available resources in the JSOA.

Size and capability of the reception committee.

Requirements for sustaining operations pending receipt of an automatic resupply.

Need for key items of equipment to partially equip a cadre nucleus of the guerrilla force when

the SFODA expects a reception committee upon infiltration.

Other items of equipment and supplies to help establish rapport with the guerrillas.

EXTERNAL RESUPPLY

3-57. External resupplies are procured and delivered to the UWOA/JSOA by the sponsor (JSOTF), based

on the needs of the resistance force or insurgents, as well as the SFODA. Resupply is planned in isolation

to be delivered after infiltration at a coordinated location and time automatically, as requested, or based

upon a no-communications trigger. The SFODA preselects resupply items and delivery merchandise during

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isolation to replenish or supplement supplies its members consume or to fulfill other requirements. The

SFODA receives these items after infiltration.

Automatic Resupply

3-58. The SFODA plans for automatic resupply before infiltration, coordinating for the delivery time,

location, contents, and the identification marking system or authentication. Personnel deliver automatic

resupply after the SFODA successfully infiltrates and establishes radio contact, unless the SFOD cancels,

modifies, or reschedules the delivery. Automatic resupply augments supplies or equipment that the SFOD

could not carry in on the initial infiltration or were not required until a later date. Automatic resupply also

reinforces U.S. support of the guerrillas. In addition, it fulfills the need for selected items to equip a

nucleus of the guerrilla force should accompanying supplies be unrecoverable during infiltration.

3-59. The JSOTF or SOTF schedules the delivery of automatic and emergency resupply to the SFODAs.

Preplanned automatic resupply provides the guerrilla force with immediate supplies and equipment until

on-call or routine resupply procedures are established. Supply personnel normally pack equipment and

supplies in appropriate aerial delivery containers that have a cargo capacity of 500 pounds or less to ease

handling and transportation within the JSOA. Packers mark door bundles for easy identification once they

arrive on the DZ. To allow rapid clearance of the DZ, personnel ensure the contents of each container are

in man-portable units of about 50 pounds each. Packers must brief DZ parties on these man-portable

containers. If personnel must carry the containers long distances, the SFODA must arrange transportation

assets with the guerrilla support arm (auxiliary). The SFOD can cancel, modify, or reschedule automatic

resupplies, depending on their requirements.

Emergency Resupply

3-60. The purpose of the emergency resupply is to provide essential equipment and supplies in order to

restore operational capability and survivability of the SFODA. Typical items contained in the bundle may

be communications equipment, batteries, weapons, ammunition, money, and handheld global positioning

systems. A coded message, a radio request, or the absence of any detachment communication over a

prearranged period can trigger an emergency resupply. The SFODA and the supporting HQ must clearly

understand the sequence of events, time required, and assets available to deliver the emergency resupply.

3-61. Although detachments can request special items, it is highly likely that all emergency resupply

bundles will contain generic items in order to support numerous detachments. As a minimum, resupply

should consist of communications equipment and enough mission-essential supplies to establish base

contact.

On-Call or Routine Resupply

3-62. When the SFODA establishes communications with the JSOTF or SOTF, external supply begins on

call. Personnel use the abbreviated code of a catalog supply system contained in the signal operating

instructions

(SOI) to request supplies based on operational need. These supplies consist of major

equipment items that units do not consume at a predictable rate. Theater Army area command (TAACOM)

depots, the JSOTF, or the SOTF hold these items in readiness for immediate delivery on a specific mission-

request basis.

3-63. To determine the quantity of supplies to request, the SFODA considers the rate of expansion of the

guerrilla force, the anticipated tempo of operations, and the detachment’s ability to receive, transport, store,

and secure incoming supplies.

3-64. The SFODA also anticipates its operational needs for supplies and equipment in the JSOA. The

mission operations cell at the JSOTF or SOTF packs and rigs the supplies into man-portable loads and

color-codes them before infiltration. The mission operations cell color-codes the supplies IAW the type of

supplies in the load so personnel need not open them for identification.

3-65. As the guerrilla force expands and logistic requirements increase, internal popular support will lose

its ability to provide subsistence for the resistance without creating hardships for or lowering the living

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standards of the civilians. At this point, the force must obtain logistics support from an external source.

This dependence on the external source requires a routine supply system. As the JSOA grows, the need for

external supply normally outgrows the on-call method of requesting supplies.

ORGANIZATION OF SUPPLY

3-66. The area command, with advice from U.S. advisors, plans, develops, operates, and controls the

guerrilla force logistics system. Each element of the area command has a specific role in the logistics

system, and the force develops each system to meet the specific needs and peculiarities of the JSOA.

Elements may centralize or decentralize supply organization systems. During the organization and buildup

phase, the command may centralize logistic operations, moving all supplies into one collection area. The

SFODA procures logistics items from throughout the JSOA, processes them through a centralized or

decentralized collection point, and distributes them to all units of the guerrilla force.

3-67. As the JSOA matures, subordinate units take over a sector in which they are responsible for

establishing a separate and decentralized supply procurement system. They distribute all supplies

throughout the JSOA to several distribution centers. This decentralization improves security because

compromise or destruction of the procurement system in one sector will not destroy the entire apparatus.

Another advantage of this system is that it permits an equitable distribution of the logistics burden on the

civilian population. Elements keep movement of supplies between sectors to a minimum, and personnel do

not pass names, storage sites, and caches from sector to sector. The area commander delegates supply

operations to sector commanders. He retains the responsibility for the overall plans. He also reports supply

needs to the sponsoring power and issues directives covering operations. Plans and directives may

include—

Organization of supply and service support units.

Organization and employment of civilian support units.

Systems of levy and barter on civilians.

Receipt of payment for supplies.

Collection, storage, transportation, and distribution of supplies.

Quantity and type of supplies personnel are to maintain.

Allocation of supplies to major lower commands.

3-68. The area commander provides all supply items to the sector commander. The sector commanders

supply their units and conduct supply operations according to the plans, directives, and orders of higher

HQ. Individual units within their assigned sectors conduct decentralized supply operations. The sector

commander makes his needs known to the next-higher HQ for supplies and equipment not available within

his area. He distributes all supplies and equipment received from higher HQ. Besides supplying his sector,

higher HQ may charge him with supplying adjacent sectors.

DELIVERY SYSTEMS

3-69. The SF detachments in the JSOA deliver all external supplies and equipment to the guerrilla force. It

is essential that personnel control access to sensitive items, such as weapons, ammunition, demolitions,

radios, drugs, or special equipment. An SFODA member must be present at all deliveries of external

supplies to ensure positive control and accountability.

DELIVERY MEANS

3-70. The preferred mission delivery method for external resupply is by sponsor aircraft, surface ship, or

submarine. At first, planners may determine aerial delivery by parachute is the best means of supply to a

JSOA. Personnel may use free-drop techniques for certain hardy items. Later, as the JSOA expands and

comes under greater friendly control, SFODA members use air-landed supply missions. Supply personnel

normally use surface ships or submarines when JSOAs are next to waterways or seas. Resupply operations

require secrecy to protect the resupply platform and the reception element. Personnel normally conduct

these operations during limited visibility.

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PACKAGING

3-71. The JSOTF or SOTF support center personnel prepare supplies and equipment for delivery to a

JSOA. The size of the package and the number of packages determines the delivery means. Personnel base

the packaging system on man-portable packages weighing about 50 pounds. With this weight limitation,

members of the reception committee transportation party can easily move the packages from the supply

point to safe sites. Personnel equip man-portable packages with carrying straps and mount the packages on

pack boards. The transportation party color-codes the packages so personnel can easily identify their

contents upon arrival. The JSOTF or SOTF support center personnel ensure each package is—

Waterproofed to permit aboveground and limited underground or underwater cache.

Packed with instructions (in the indigenous language) for all equipment.

Marked with a prearranged code to identify the contents.

Packed with an inventory list to aid in identifying lost or damaged materiel.

Packed to protect sensitive communications and medical items by using clothing, blankets, or

other padding.

3-72. The JSOTF or SOTF support center personnel may put combat and morale supply items in the same

container. They package ammunition and cleaning equipment with weapons and batteries with flashlights.

Personnel may include additional small arms ammunition, by caliber, as an individual package.

SUPPLY PROCEDURES

3-73. SFODA members use a catalog supply system code to accelerate on-call resupply requests and

ensure accurate equipment identification and supply items. The system also reduces radio transmission

time. To permit maximum user flexibility, the system identifies single major equipment items or several

associated items by code words. Personnel catalog these items by class of supplies and group them in

individual packaged items or several associated unit items packed together. The catalog supply system is

not secure, but it reduces message length and transmission time when personnel request a variety of

supplies. The catalog supply system is—

Based on mission requirements, concept plans, and SOPs.

Prepared under the supervision of the group logistics staff section.

Reproduced in miniature form for operational missions and published in the SOI by the group

signal officer.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

3-74. Military commanders must understand that the C2 tactics and techniques used in other special

operations do not transfer well to UW missions. Units cannot communicate with their HQ in the same

manner as during other types of operations. Even if the communication architecture is available, leaders

must exercise great care before placing requirements on units operating from within enemy territory.

Unlike conventional units, UW organizations risk some degree of exposure with every communication.

Personnel must not confuse communications encryption with low electronic signature. Leaders must

balance a HQ commander’s desire for computer-based briefings and real-time communications with the

constraints of the operational environment. Units engaging in UW must operate in a decentralized manner.

They should always operate under the assumption that the enemy is trying to locate their position using

unusual signals in urban and rural areas.

3-75. Unlike conventional operations, the acceptable size and optimum location for the HQ of units

engaging in UW change as the mission progresses. The HQ base their decision to provide C2 from an

adjacent country or from an infiltrated point in the resistance area on where it provides the most value. The

SF company (AOB) and battalion (SOTF) HQ are tactical elements that not only coordinate the actions of

their subordinate units, but also integrate with their resistance force counterparts (sector or area command)

if needed.

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3-76. The U.S. Army specifically designed the SF group to operate in a decentralized manner,

synchronizing the efforts between displaced sector and area commands with their SFODAs and SFODBs.

The group provides SFODAs and SFODBs to perform tactical functions in addition to their inherent C2

responsibilities. Each one of these HQ maintains the ability to operate with its equivalent resistance-force

counterpart. Although the insertion of SFODBs greatly enhances C2 and synchronization with the

resistance force, it also removes the ability of that HQ to perform C2 for other special operations outside of

the area complex.

3-77. Before entering resistance controlled territory, the unit HQ must consider if their signature will

jeopardize the mission and if there is an appropriate level of resistance HQ that could benefit from their

direct interaction. In either case, it is inappropriate for these types of operations, particularly in forward

areas, for a large, unwieldy HQ.

3-78. UW operations present some unique force protection challenges. Because of the low signature of

many UW operations, the normal measures for force protection may be impractical or impossible.

Personnel can mitigate some aspects of the associated risk through good operational security measures and

signature reduction measures.

OPERATIONAL SECURITY

3-79. There are numerous aspects of operations beyond the control of advisors. As such, advisors should

always employ proactive measures to protect operational information regardless of their estimate of the

actual risk at hand. Compromises of operational information may occur hundreds of miles from the

operational area. Personnel should take the following precautions:

Limit the use of proper names with resistance members. Soldiers should not share personal

information with indigenous resistance personnel.

Provide code names for all advisors. This allows secure and unsecure communication regarding

SFODA personnel.

Keep operational information on a need-to-know basis.

Maintain internal communications procedures that indicate a compromise of information.

3-80. The situation may dictate that U.S. personnel reduce their distinctive appearance. This may include

the wear of articles of indigenous clothing, such as a scarf or hat, the carrying of indigenous weapons and

gear, or the adoption of normal customs of appearance, such as a mustache or beard. Signature reduction

measures can allow SF personnel to blend in with indigenous forces and prevent identification by enemy

personnel.

3-81. However, if advisors deviate from their normal U.S. military appearance but not toward that of the

allied military forces it can have the opposite intended effect of drawing attention to the U.S. personnel or

causing a perception of a lack of discipline on the advisor’s behalf. At times, Soldiers can reap significant

benefits from deviating from the normal U.S. military appearance, but this requires an understanding of the

local customs and culture. The Soldier must make deliberate and conscious decision to take this step. The

unit chain of command must approve any deviations from standard appearance and must ensure they

comply with the legal requirements of the operation.

PHYSICAL SECURITY

3-82. Decentralized elements often must rely on indigenous forces for security. However, U.S. personnel

should always maintain a degree of vigilance for their own security, at least passively, if not actively. As

much as the resistance forces are familiar with the local area, U.S. forces must not become complacent with

their trust of the resistance forces. Resistance forces may contain enemy collaborators or infiltrators among

their ranks. SFODAs maintain internal emergency communication signals, rally points, linkup plans and

evasion plans of action.

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LEGAL PRINCIPLES

3-83. The foremost legal concern for UW operations is that every proposed operation receives a specific

legal review and that all aspects of planning and executing UW operations are closely coordinated with

legal advisors.

3-84. UW operations involve many unique and often unsettled legal matters, including authority to

conduct operations, funding, legal status of personnel, and a host of other issues. The legal parameters of

UW are rarely clear and depend on the specifics of a particular mission, campaign, or conflict. SF should

know the potential that individual and small-unit UW operations have to affect matters on the international

level. SF must possess awareness of the standards that apply to UW and the implications of conducting

UW under U.S. and international law. Because of its nature, UW requires close coordination with legal

advisors in all phases of planning and executing operations of this type.

3-85. This section provides general guidance on legal, regulatory, and policy considerations for UW

operations. It is not directive or exhaustive; rather, it serves as a base document of the law and policy that

exist as of the writing of this circular. Law and policy in the area of UW are subject to rapid change. New

U.S. congressional legislation and presidential executive policy can affect and often directly address UW

operations. New treaties, United Nations actions, and shifting views among nations can dramatically

change the international implications of UW operations. These changes often affect specific operations and

theaters while leaving others unaffected. Law and policy concerns have potential long-term effects for SF.

A single violation, real or perceived, can profoundly affect SF operations and organizations. In certain

situations, the fluid nature of UW operations may warrant precautions that exceed the strict letter of the

law. Other situations may require aggressive action that maximizes full use of all legal means at a

commander’s disposal. Consequently, SF commanders must draw on the expertise of their legal staff and

the organic socio-political expertise of SF Soldiers and relevant subject-matter experts before establishing

UW plans and policy. Constant monitoring of the legal ramifications of UW operations is also necessary.

3-86. There is no special body of law for UW. The usual operational authorities govern UW by applying

the unique facts of each operation on a case-by-case basis. A baseline consideration for U.S. UW

operations is that SF cannot do anything through irregular forces that SF could not legally do alone. UW is

not a means to circumvent FM 27-10 or U.S. and international law. U.S. forces must comply with

FM 27-10 in all military operations regardless of the nature of those operations. Further, all U.S. forces

have a duty to report any violations of FM 27-10 to their chain of command, whether committed by U.S.

forces, other regular forces, or irregular forces.

UNITED STATES LAW AND POLICY

3-87. Personnel must conduct UW operations IAW U.S. domestic and international law. U.S. special

assistance and arms transfers programs are subject to specific congressional authorization, appropriation,

and oversight. Commanders and other UW planners must consult with their legal advisors to ensure

operations are conducted IAW current U.S. legislation and policy. In general, legal considerations on the

international level center on the issue of describing the conflict as either international or internal

(insurgency). Legal considerations for the United States often focus on using the proper funds for the type

of mission forces are conducting, although compliance with FM 27-10 and U.S. law and policy is always a

requirement. Specific authorities control transfers and transport of lethal and nonlethal aid, as well as HA,

and examine each on a case-by-case basis. They must also consider additional country-specific issues and

applicable U.S. legislation.

Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces

3-88. The baseline U.S. legal authority for UW is in Section 167(j), Title 10, United States Code (USC).

This provision states that UW is one of the activities of USSOCOM. Per Title 10, USSOCOM has the

authority to prepare, train, equip, fund, and sustain forces for UW. Personnel can only conduct actual UW

operations with specific approval and authorizations from the chain of command, often up to the Secretary

of Defense (SecDef) or executive level. Congress ultimately controls U.S. military operations though

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funding and legislative constraints. Personnel can only conduct UW with funds authorized and available

for that purpose. Failure to use the proper funds for UW missions is one of the greatest potential pitfalls for

commanders conducting UW operations.

3-89. UW operations in which U.S. SF employ lethal force to further national objectives fall under the

same Title 10 authorities as any other employment of U.S. forces. The United States ultimately derives all

rules of engagement (ROE) from Title 10. Typically, SF units receive existing ROE before conducting UW

operations. The President or SecDef may apply specific cautions and additional guidance regarding Title

10 provisions for UW operations on a case-by-case basis to best support U.S. national objectives. These

cautions and additional guidance augment the existing ROE. In given situations, subordinate commanders

may further restrict the ROE IAW applicable policy and regulation.

Title 50, United States Code, War and National Defense

3-90. Title 50 of the USC is a far-reaching document covering areas as diverse as the establishment and

scope of the Council of National Defense and the disclosure of classified information. Chapter 22 of Title

50 contains the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Title 50 also covers several legal aspects of the

intelligence warfighting function. UW planners should coordinate with the intelligence staff, as well as

staff legal personnel, to ensure that they properly classify communications regarding SF executing Title 50

responsibilities. In addition, per U.S. law, SF must comply with FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector

Operations. This requirement applies to all DOD entities and to all DOD civilians and contractors

engaging in human intelligence activities. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 mandated that FM 2-22.3 is

sole authority for interrogation rules and ordered compliance with the Geneva Conventions Common

Article 3 as the minimum standard for all detainees, regardless of the actual status of the detainee. In

certain situations, higher standards may apply.

International Legal Considerations

3-91. Under international law, armed conflicts fall into two broad areas. These areas are those of an

international character and those of a noninternational character.

International Armed Conflicts

3-92. A declaration of war and an invasion of one country by the armed forces of another clearly result in

an international armed conflict. The definition of an international armed conflict is broader, however. As a

rule, if the combat effects of a conflict go beyond a nation’s boundaries and seriously affect other

countries, the conflict is international. All the customary laws of war on hostilities between states govern

international armed conflicts. The 1949 Geneva Conventions and FM 27-10 also apply. Often a Soldier’s

biggest concerns fighting UW is his right to prisoner of war (PW) status if captured and combatant

immunity. Combatant immunity is the practice by which members of a given nation’s military forces are

not subject to prosecution under another nation’s domestic criminal law for legitimate acts of war.

Noninternational Armed Conflicts

3-93. Parties typically recognize noninternational armed conflicts as insurgencies. Clandestine forces

usually engage in hostilities. In general, their purpose is not to hold fixed territory or to engage government

troops in direct combat but to wage a guerrilla war. In this type of war, troops can blend in with the civilian

populace by posing as noncombatants. Insurgents, therefore, are organized bodies of people who, generally

for public political purposes, are in a state of armed hostility against the established government. An

important legal aspect of a noninternational conflict is that captured combatants do not normally enjoy

POW rights. Depending on the circumstances, countries can prosecute combatants as criminals under the

domestic laws of the nation in question. An insurgent’s wear of a uniform does not automatically give him

a protected status under international law in a purely internal, noninternational armed conflict.

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GENEVA CONVENTIONS COMMON ARTICLE 3

3-94. Common Article 3 exists in each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. It provides the primary

source of rights and duties of persons participating in noninternational armed conflicts. The touchstone of

Common Article 3 is the humane treatment of all detainees.

3-95. Common Article 3 has two parts. The first part provides that persons taking no active part in the

hostilities (including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those out of combat

because of sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause), shall be treated humanely in all circumstances.

Humane treatment specifically excludes—

Violence to life and person; in particular, murder, mutilation, torture, or any cruel treatment.

Hostage-taking.

Outrages upon personal dignity; in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.

Passing of sentences and carrying out executions without previous judgment pronounced by a

regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees that civilized peoples recognize

as vital.

3-96. The second part of Common Article 3 requires collecting and caring for the wounded and sick. It

does not grant POW status or combatant immunity to insurgents or irregular forces. It does require the

government to grant them a fair trial in a regularly constituted court before carrying out the court’s

sentence after a guilty verdict. Common Article 3 incorporates basic human rights. Human rights also

include other rights embodied in the phrase “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” such as the right of

free speech, freedom of worship, and freedom of the press. U.S. personnel who notice suspected violations

of basic human rights must report the facts to their chain of command.

3-97. Per U.S. law, all U.S. forces must comply with Common Article 3. The basic test for humane

treatment is a simple Golden Rule-like test: if the enemy were to give the same treatment to a U.S. Soldier,

would the individual consider it abuse? If so, that treatment is probably inhumane. Note that the specific

requirements for any particular detainee in U.S. custody may exceed the minimum standards of Common

Article 3. Commanders must coordinate closely with their legal advisor regarding any detainee in U.S.

custody.

3-98. Critical to building the legitimacy of any irregular forces under international law is engendering a

respect for and adherence to FM 27-10. Humane treatment and respect of the civilian population is also

nearly always an essential element in establishing the legitimacy of irregular forces in the view of the

subject population. Accordingly, SF should not only comply with FM 27-10 as U.S. law requires but

should also recognize the mission-enhancing potential of furthering irregular forces’ respect for humane

treatment and FM 27-10.

LEGAL STATUS OF UNITED STATES FORCES

3-99. U.S. forces performing a UW mission are not automatically immune from the jurisdiction of other

nations. Commanders must coordinate with their legal advisor to find out the legal status of their personnel

and try to obtain any necessary protection if there is no applicable international agreement.

3-100. Usually, anyone present in a foreign nation’s territory is subject to its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is

the legal power a sovereign nation has to make and enforce its laws without foreign direction or control.

When a nation’s troops enter a friendly foreign country, international law subjects them to the territorial

jurisdiction of that nation and any jurisdiction that, because of their status, the sending state wishes to

exercise. U.S. military forces are always subject to the UCMJ. U.S. policy is to maximize U.S. jurisdiction

over the armed forces it may deploy to a foreign nation. International agreement, either by Status of Forces

Agreement, diplomatic notes or agreements, or unique mission or emergency agreements, define the legal

status of U.S. forces in a foreign nation. Normally, these agreements give the United States exclusive

jurisdiction over U.S. forces, and U.S. military personnel are not subject to HN laws and law enforcement

for anything done in the performance of official duty. However, agreements are negotiated individually,

and the level of protection from a given nation’s jurisdiction (and prosecution) can vary from complete

protection to no protection. Accordingly, planners must analyze each operation under the specific

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agreements and authorities regarding the nation or nations in question. U.S. forces performing a UW

mission are not automatically immune from HN jurisdiction. Commanders must coordinate with their legal

advisor to find out the legal status of their personnel and try to obtain any necessary protection if there is

no applicable international agreement.

3-101. The Rome Statute (a Treaty of Rome) of the International Court (ICC), established the ICC as a

court where certain criminal violations of international law may be prosecuted. The ICC entered into force

in 2002 and presently has 139 countries signed to the treaty, and of those, 114 has ratified (as of the date of

this manual). Although, the United States signed the treaty in December 2000, they rejected ratifying the

treaty. Accordingly, without an agreement with the subject nation that U.S. forces are not subject to ICC

jurisdiction, U.S. Soldiers could face prosecution. The United States has executed many agreements with

nations around the world to prevent prosecution of U.S. Soldiers in the ICC. However, commanders and

planners should work closely with their legal advisors concerning any implications the Treaty of Rome or

ICC may have on any specific operation or mission.

3-102. In situations where there are no agreements in place that establish the status of U.S. Soldiers in a

given nation, many of the protections of the Geneva Conventions should still apply under customary

international law of principles. In an international armed conflict involving the United States, the Geneva

Conventions typically entitle U.S. Soldiers to POW status. However, certain conduct may cause U.S.

Soldiers to lose that protected status, primarily through concealing their status as U.S. Soldiers using

nonstandard uniforms or civilian clothing, or committing acts of treachery or disloyalty. In a

noninternational armed conflict, under customary international law, Common Article 3 should entitle

U.S. Soldiers with its minimum protections. However, SF units planning and engaging in UW operations

should understand the possibility that, depending on their particular circumstances, a given nation may

subject them to ordinary criminal jurisdiction.

LEGAL STATUS OF IRREGULAR FORCES

3-103. Legal status of irregular forces is a fluid and fact-specific determination that can change during the

course of UW operations. Commanders should work closely with their legal advisors regarding the

determination of legal status for any irregular forces with whom SF interact.

3-104. In general, the full protections under the Geneva Conventions do not apply to irregular forces.

Protections depend on the type of conflict and the type of person at issue. Members of irregular forces are

not automatically given the protections of the Geneva Conventions.

3-105. Under the Geneva Conventions, several factors influence the determination of protected status for

irregular forces. Typically, when protections apply to irregular forces under the Geneva Conventions, the

protections are those of Common Article 3. However, in certain instances, higher protections than

Common Article 3 may apply. The factors for determining if and what protections apply under the Geneva

Conventions are nonbinding, and no specific checklist applies. Any determination of protections for

irregular forces under the Geneva Conventions should be based on a totality of the circumstances, focusing

on the listed factors and other relevant information. The traditional factors under Article 4, Geneva

Convention III (Treatment of Prisoners of War), to determine entitlement of PW status include the

following:

Have a superior responsible for subordinates (some form of adequate C2).

Wear a fixed, distinctive sign recognizable at a distance (no requirement for a full uniform, but

some method to distinguish members of the force from the civilian population).

Carry arms openly.

Conduct operations IAW FM 27-10.

3-106. Related factors to determine relevant protections under the Geneva Conventions include—

The control of territory.

The consistency of acts and conflict.

The response or lack of response from the government in question, using regular forces or

civilian law enforcement. Response from regular armed forces could indicate a military-

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to-military conflict, whereas responding with civilian law enforcement could indicate the

government regards the irregular forces as mere criminals. Mere criminals are not entitled to

protection under the Geneva Conventions.

3-107. The later Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions modified the above factors. Additional

Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (1977) introduced a more relaxed standard for allowing protected

status to irregular forces. For several reasons, the United States is not a party to Additional Protocol I, but

many nations are. Accordingly, Soldiers should consider the provisions of Additional Protocol I in

situations involving nations that recognize Additional Protocol I as binding authority. These more

contemporary factors only require that the members of the force—

Carry arms openly during the attack and while visible to the adversary when maneuvering for

that attack.

Be commanded by a person responsible for the actions of the force or organization.

Comply with FM 27-10.

Be subject to an internal discipline system of the force or organization.

3-108. Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions further modified the determination of what

protections apply in a given circumstance by introducing the control of territory as a factor. As with

Additional Protocol I, the United States is not a party to Additional Protocol II. All the above factors

notwithstanding, in any situation, the determination of status depends on the facts and circumstances of the

particular armed conflict and the persons at issue.

3-109. In most internal armed conflicts, the government in question is unlikely to recognize irregular

forces as meriting protected status. Typically, governments classify irregular forces as criminals subject to

domestic criminal law and given no protections under international law. The criminal designation gives the

government maximum flexibility in dealing with the members of the irregular forces without international

constraints. Classifying the irregular forces as mere criminals also diminishes the legitimacy of those forces

in the eyes of the civilian population and the international community. SF Soldiers should work diligently

to ensure that any irregular forces they interact with do not merit that type of classification. Whereas the

United States and other nations may recognize the irregular forces as having protections under international

law, the subject nation will usually seek to regard them as domestic criminals.

USE OF ENEMY UNIFORMS

3-110. The Hague Conventions of 1907 prohibit the improper use of the enemy’s uniform, such as

wearing the enemy’s uniform while engaged in combat. It permits some use of the enemy’s uniform, but it

is difficult for personnel to discern the proper use. Although wearing the uniform while engaged in actual

combat is unlawful, U.S. forces may wear it to allow movement into and through the enemy’s territory.

U.S. policy states that Soldiers may use the enemy’s uniform for infiltration behind enemy lines. However,

Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions prohibits this and other uses of the enemy’s uniform. An

enemy nation party to Additional Protocol I may consider the use of its uniform by U.S. forces as a war

crime.

USE OF CIVILIAN ATTIRE

3-111. Use of civilian attire by U.S. forces in any military operation is a sensitive matter that can only be

undertaken IAW all relevant regulations and policies. U.S. forces should closely coordinate with their legal

advisor in the use of nonstandard uniforms or civilian clothing in any military operation. Many of the

principles regarding the use of enemy uniforms apply to the use of civilian attire in military operations as

well. Wearing civilian attire while engaged in actual combat is unlawful; however, U.S. forces may wear it

to allow movement into and through the enemy’s territory. Under the Geneva Conventions, the failure to

use a “fixed sign recognizable at a distance” could factor into a nation’s decision to deprive captured U.S.

forces of POW status. Further, if an enemy nation can deem such use treachery, it may consider the use by

U.S. forces of civilian clothing in military operations as a war crime and take remedial action.

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Chapter 3

ACTS OF TREACHERY

3-112. An act of treachery, also called perfidy, is a violation of FM 27-10. Soldiers commit treachery

when they commit acts that gain advantage by falsely convincing enemies that they cannot engage without

violating international rules of law. In other words, acts of treachery are acts that use an adversary’s

compliance with FM 27-10 against him to gain an advantage. Ruse or tactical deception is generally legal

under international law and U.S. policy as long as forces are still complying with FM 27-10 and their

actions are in good faith. The use of enemy codes and signals is a time-honored means of tactical deception

or ruse. However, misuse of distress signals or of signals exclusively reserved for the use of medical

aircraft would qualify as an act of treachery. FM 27-10 allows the use of deception measures, such as

camouflaging a military structure to thwart attack. However, falsely convincing the enemy not to attack a

military target by marking it as a hospital is an act of treachery. Under the Geneva Conventions, feigning

civilian noncombatant status to avoid targeting by enemy forces can qualify as an act of treachery.

CONTRACTORS

3-113. It is possible for enemy nations to prosecute contractors with U.S. forces in contingency

operations for criminal acts. Commanders and contracting authorities should work closely with their legal

advisors to ensure that all contractors involved in UW operations fully comply with all applicable laws and

regulations. There are two primary authorities for holding contractors accountable under U.S. criminal law,

the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act

(18 USC 3261) and Article

2, UCMJ. The Military

Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act only applies outside of the continental United States and now covers other

agency contractors acting in support of DOD. A 2006 revision to Article 2, UCMJ, extends jurisdiction in a

time of war or contingency operation to persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field.

There is no geographic limitation to this jurisdiction. However, historically, “in the field” meant that the

individuals were acting against, in the presence of, or in action geared towards engaging the enemy. The

plain language of this article does not limit itself to contractors, but simply states “persons.” However, in

most circumstances, nonmilitary personnel subject to Article 2 would most likely be contractors of some

type. Any individual applying the UCMJ to individuals that are not members of U.S. military forces must

approach this area with caution and detailed legal analysis. Commanders must work closely with their legal

advisor when taking action against contractor personnel.

FUNDING

3-114. A critical legal consideration for commanders conducting UW operations is using the proper

funding authorizations for the mission. The two major types of funding are operations and maintenance

(O&M) funding for U.S. forces and what is commonly known as Section 1208 funding for irregular forces.

The restrictions on both types of funding are significant, and personnel should not use either for anything

other than the stated purposes of the funds. Misuse of funds could result in criminal liability. Problems in

this area usually arise when personnel use O&M funds for projects that require Section 1208 funding.

Personnel should observe the following general fiscal principles when conducting UW operations to ensure

that all activities are within the limits of U.S. law. Commanders must—

Know fiscal law principles to avoid possible violation of the Antideficiency Act (ADA).

Individuals may report violations to Congress, which can result in both civil and criminal

penalties. Commanders cannot make expenditures in advance or in excess of available

appropriations.

Ensure expenditures reasonably relate to the purpose of the appropriation; using the wrong type

of funds can result in an ADA “purpose” violation.

Disallow any expenditure the law prohibits.

Ensure the expenditure does not fall specifically within the scope of some other category of

appropriation.

Know that if two appropriations permit the expenditure, commanders may use either but not in

combination or interchangeably.

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3-115. Section 1208 National Defense Authorization Act passed in the fiscal year (FY) 2005, and updated

in the FY 2010 National Defense Authorization Act. Section 1208 authorizes funds for U.S. SOF to

provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaging in support operations,

or facilitating ongoing military operations by U.S. SOF to combat terrorism. The primary limitation on

Section 1208 funds is that any operations of the irregular forces must be in support of ongoing U.S.

operations against terrorism and not completely independent of or unrelated to actual U.S. missions. This

requirement is easily met in certain areas, but in other areas, it is more difficult to establish the required

link to ongoing U.S. operations. Section 1208 does not ordinarily fund training and equipment. Section

1208 funding is a USSOCOM-administered program, under the direct authority of the SecDef. Section

1208 funds are limiters to the support of irregular forces only (no U.S. forces), and require specific

approvals before individuals can expend any funds under this authorization. Even with these constraints,

Section 1208 is an agile method of funding UW operations. Typically, leaders develop a concept in-theater

at the unit level and staff it through the chain of command. The timeline for this process can progress

rapidly, depending on the theater and the proposed operation. U.S. forces should closely coordinate with

their legal advisor for the most recent guidance on funding requests and coordinating approvals at higher

levels.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

3-116. UW operations may involve HA to benefit populations sympathetic or potentially sympathetic to a

particular UW effort. Humanitarian crises or conditions that arise during the course of UW operations may

trigger HA. In these cases, SF units may provide and coordinate HA that supports UW operations.

Although not necessarily factored into a UW strategy, timely HA may greatly facilitate UW operations and

ultimate objectives. HA programs and authorities change often and vary from theater to theater. U.S. SF

commanders and Soldiers should closely coordinate any requests for HA with legal and related advisors to

maximize the sources available to a given mission at a particular time. A full discussion of all U.S. HA

programs is beyond the scope of this manual. However, the basic HA most readily available to U.S. SF is

known as de minimus HA. The basic rule for de minimus HA is, “a few Soldiers, a few dollars, a few

hours.” Leadership generally recognizes “a few dollars” as $2,500 or less of O&M funds for unplanned

HA opportunities. Other HA may exist for a given operation or mission, and commanders working closely

with their legal advisor should explore those avenues.

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Appendix A

Area Study

This appendix provides an outline format for an area study (Figure A-1, pages A-1

through A-5). This format provides a systematic means for compiling and retaining

essential information to support SF operations. Although the basic outline is general,

it is flexible enough to permit detailed coverage of a given area. As time is available

for further study, the preparer should subdivide various subjects and assign them to

detachment members to produce a more detailed analysis of specified areas of

interest.

Area Study Outline

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1. Purpose and Limiting Factors.

a. Purpose. Delineate the area being studied.

b. Mission. State the mission the area study supports.

c. Limiting Factors. Identify factors that limit the completeness or accuracy of the area study.

2. Geography, Hydrography, and Climate. Divide the operational area into its various definable

subdivisions and analyze each subdivision using the subdivisions shown below.

a. Areas and Dimensions.

b. Strategic Locations.

(1) Neighboring countries and boundaries.

(2) Natural defenses, including frontiers.

(3) Points of entry and strategic routes.

c. Climate. Note variations from the norm and the months in which they occur. Note any extremes in

climate that would affect operations.

(1) Temperature.

(2) Rainfall and snow.

(3) Wind and visibility.

(4) Light data. Include begin morning nautical twilight (BMNT), end of evening nautical twilight

(EENT), sunrise, sunset, moonrise, and moonset.

(5) Seasonal effect of the weather on terrain and visibility.

d. Relief.

(1) General direction of mountain ranges or ridgelines, and if hills and ridges are dissected.

(2) General degree of slope.

(3) Characteristics of valleys and plains.

(4) Natural routes for and natural obstacles to cross-country movement.

(5) Location of area suitable for guerrilla bases, units, and other installations.

(6) Potential landing zones (LZs), DZs, and other reception sites.

Figure A-1. Area study outline format

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Appendix A

Area Study Outline (continued)

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Land Use. Note any peculiarities especially in the following:

(1) Former heavily forested land areas subjected to widespread cutting or dissected bypaths and

roads. Also note the reverse—pastureland or wasteland that has been reforested.

(2) Former wasteland or pastureland that has been resettled and cultivated and is now being

farmed. In addition, note the reverse—former rural countryside that has been depopulated and

allowed to return to wasteland.

(3) Former swampland or marshland that has been drained, former desert or wasteland now

irrigated and cultivated, and lakes created by dams.

Drainage (General Pattern).

(1) Main rivers, direction of flow.

(2) Characteristics of rivers and streams, including widths, currents, banks, depths, kinds of

bottoms, and obstacles. Note seasonal variations, such as dry beds, flash floods.

(3) Large lakes or areas with many ponds or swamps. Include potential LZs for amphibious

aircraft.

Coast. Examine primarily for infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply points.

(1) Tides and waves. Include winds and current.

(2) Beach footing and covered exit routes.

(3) Quiet coves and shallow inlets or estuaries. General direction of mountain ranges or ridgelines,

and if hills and ridges are dissected.

Geological Basics. Identify types of soil and rock formations. Include areas for potential LZs for light

aircraft.

Forests and Other Vegetation.

(1) Natural or cultivated.

(2) Types, characteristics, and significant variations from the norm at different elevations.

(3) Cover and concealment. Include density and seasonal variations.

Water. Note ground, surface, seasonal, and potable.

Subsistence.

(1) Seasonal or year-round.

(2) Cultivated. Include vegetables, grains, fruits, and nuts.

(3) Natural. Include berries, fruits, nuts, and herbs.

(4) Wildlife. Include animals, fish, and fowl.

3. Political Characteristics. Identify friendly and hostile political powers and analyze their capabilities,

intentions, and activities that influence mission execution.

a. Hostile Power.

(1) Number and status of nonnational personnel.

(2) Influence, organization, and mechanisms of control.

b. National Government (Indigenous).

(1) Government, international political orientation, and degree of popular support.

(2) Identifiable segments of the population with varying attitudes and probable behavior toward the

United States, its allies, and the hostile power.

(3) National historical backg3round.

(4) Foreign dependence or allies.

(5) National capital and significant political, military, and economic concentrations.

c. Political Parties.

(1) Leadership and organizational structure.

Figure A-1. Area study outline format (continued)

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Area Study

Area Study Outline (continued)

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(2) Nationalistic origin and foreign ties (if single dominant party exists).

(3) Major legal parties with their policies and goals.

(4) Illegal or underground parties and their policies and goals.

(5) Violent opposition factions within major political organizations.

d. Control and Restrictions.

(1) Documentation.

(2) Rationing.

(3) Travel and movement restrictions.

(4) Blackouts and curfews.

(5) Political restrictions.

(6) Religious restrictions.

Economic Characteristics. Identify those economic factors that influence mission execution.

a. Technological Standards.

b. Natural Resources and Degree of Self-Sufficiency.

c. Financial Structure and Dependence on Foreign Aid.

d. Monetary System.

(1) Value of money and rate of inflation.

(2) Wage scales.

(3) Currency controls.

e. Black Market Activities. Note the extent and effect of those activities.

f. Agriculture and Domestic Food Supply.

g. Industry and Level of Production.

h. Manufacture and Demand for Consumer Goods.

Foreign and Domestic Trade and Facilities.

Fuels and Power.

k. Telecommunications Adequacy by U.S. Standards.

Transportation Adequacy by U.S. Standards.

(1) Railroads.

(2) Highways.

(3) Waterways.

(4) Commercial air installations.

m. Industry, Utilities, Agriculture, and Transportation. Note the control and operation of each.

Civil Populace. Pay particular attention to those inhabitants in the area of operations who have

peculiarities and who vary considerably from the normal national way of life.

a. Total and Density.

b. Basic Racial Stock and Physical Characteristics.

(1) Types, features, dress, and habits.

(2) Significant variations from the norm.

c. Ethnic and/or Religious Groups. Analyze these groups to determine if they are of sufficient size,

cohesion, and power to constitute a dissident minority of some consequence.

(1) Location or concentration.

(2) Basis for discontent and motivation for change.

(3) Opposition to the majority or the political regime.

(4) Any external or foreign ties of significance.

Figure A-1. Area study outline format (continued)

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Appendix A

Area Study Outline (continued)

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d. Attitudes. Determine the attitudes of the populace toward the existing regime or hostile power, the

resistance movement, and the United States and its allies.

e. Division. Division between urban, rural, or nomadic groups.

(1) Large cities and population centers. Rural settlement patterns.

(2) Area and movement patterns of nomads.

f. Standard of Living and Cultural (Educational) Levels.

(1) Extremes away from the national average.

(2) Class structure. Identify degree of established social stratification and percentage of populace

in each class.

g. Health and Medical Standards.

(1) General health and well-being.

(2) Common diseases.

(3) Standard of public health.

(4) Medical facilities and personnel.

(5) Potable water supply.

(6) Sufficiency of medical supplies and equipment.

h. Traditions and Customs (Particularly Taboos). Note wherever traditions and customs are so strong

and established that they may influence an individual’s actions or attitude even during a war

situation.

Military and Paramilitary Forces. Identify friendly and hostile conventional military forces (Army, Navy,

and Air Force) and internal security forces (including border guards) that can influence mission

execution. Analyze nonnational (indigenous) forces using the subdivisions shown below.

a. Attitude. Morale, discipline, and political reliability.

b. Size. Personnel strength.

c. Structure. Organization and basic deployment.

d. Appearance. Uniforms and unit designations.

e. Identification. Ordinary and special insignia.

f. Control. Overall control mechanism.

g. Communication. Chain of command and communication.

h. Leadership. Note officer and noncommissioned officer corps.

External Control. Nonnational surveillance and control over indigenous security forces.

Practices. Training and doctrine.

k. Tactics. Note seasonal and terrain variations.

Mobility. Equipment, transportation, and degree of mobility.

m. Logistics.

n. Effectiveness. Note any unusual capabilities or weaknesses.

o. Internal Security. Vulnerabilities in the internal security system.

p. Past and current reprisal actions.

q. Information Network. Use and effectiveness of informers.

r. Populace. Influence on and relations with the local populace.

s. Mind-set. Psychological vulnerabilities.

t. Activity. Recent and current unit activities.

u. Counterinsurgency Activities and Capabilities. Pay particular attention to reconnaissance units,

special troops (airborne, mountain, ranger), rotary-wing or vertical-lift aviation units,

counterintelligence units, and units having a mass CBRNE delivery capability.

Figure A-1. Area study outline format (continued)

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Area Study Outline (continued)

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v. Guard Posts and Wartime Security Coverage. Note the location of all known guard posts or

expected wartime security coverage along the main LOCs (railroads, highways, and

telecommunications lines) and along electrical power and petroleum, oil, and lubricant lines.

w. Forced Labor and Detention Camps. Note exact location and description of the physical

arrangement (particularly the security arrangements).

x. PRC Measures. Note locations, types, and effectiveness of internal security controls. Include

checkpoints, identification cards, passports, and travel permits.

Resistance Organization. Identify the organizational elements and key personalities of the resistance

organization. Note each group’s attitude toward the United States, the hostile power, various elements

of the civil populace, and friendly political groups.

a. Guerrillas.

(1) Disposition, strength, and composition.

(2) Organization, armament, and equipment.

(3) Status of training, morale, and combat effectiveness.

(4) Operations to date.

(5) Cooperation and coordination between various existing groups.

(6) Motivation of the various groups and their receptivity.

(7) Quality of senior and subordinate leadership.

(8) General health.

b. Auxiliaries and the Underground.

(1) Disposition, strength, and degree of organization.

(2) General effectiveness and type of support.

(3) Responsiveness to guerrilla or resistance leaders.

c. Logistics Capability.

(1) Availability of food stocks and water. Include any restrictions for reasons of health.

(2) Agricultural capability.

(3) Type and availability of transportation of all categories.

(4) Types and location of civilian services available for manufacture and repair of equipment and

clothing.

(5) Medical facilities, to include personnel, medical supplies, and equipment.

(6) Enemy supply sources accessible to the resistance.

Targets. (The objective in target selection is to inflict maximum damage on the hostile power with

minimum expenditures of men and materiel. Initially, a guerrilla force may have limited operational

capabilities to interdict or destroy hostile targets.) Study the target areas. Identify and analyze points of

attack. List targets in order of priority by system and IAW mission requirements. As appropriate,

address both fixed and mobile (generic) targets.

9. Effects of Characteristics. State conclusions reached through analysis of the facts developed in the

previous paragraphs.

(1) Effects on hostile courses of action.

(2) Effects on friendly courses of action.

Figure A-1. Area study outline format (continued)

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