Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8)

Appendix G

Establish and Operate a Reception Station

ELEMENT: Reception Station, ECC

TASK: Establish and Operate a Reception Station (NEO-002) (FM 3-05.131)

ITERATION:

(Circle)

COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U

(Circle)

CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion headquarters requiring establishment of a reception station

within the processing center within a specified time and provided a designated station location with or without

permanent facilities.

TASK STANDARDS: The reception station is operational within a specified time of receipt of order or upon

arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established. The operational environment

is permissive to uncertain.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES

NO-GO

*1.

Station OIC/NCOIC establishes a sheltered reception station.

a. Clearly marks area, including boundaries and routes.

b. Establishes and mark holding and briefing area(s).

Processing team receives evacuees from the ECC security team, from the

marshalling force, or as walk-ins.

a. Ensures evacuees are on an approved list or are authorized by a

representative from the Embassy’s consular affairs office or the DOS.

b. Performs initial search of evacuees, if not previously searched by the

marshalling or recovery team, before allowing the evacuees to enter the

processing center.

Processing team moves evacuees into a holding area.

Processing team welcomes and briefs evacuees.

a. Gives a brief summary of reason for evacuation.

b. Stresses the need for and benefits of evacuee cooperation during processing.

c. Briefly outlines processing stations.

d. Explains purpose of and procedures for latrine use.

e. Explains purpose of and need for personnel and baggage inspection.

Notifies evacuees that the USG will not allow pets.

Notifies evacuees that they may bring one bag.

Notifies evacuees the NEO force will confiscate all weapons.

Ensures that evacuees with authorized weapons sign the weapons in and turn

them over to a representative from the Embassy’s consular affairs office or the

DOS.

Describe contraband items (for example, weapons and illegal drugs), and

provide an amnesty box/area (screened, if possible).

k. Briefly describe the support evacuees can expect at the temporary refugee

holding area.

Describes what refugees can expect in the United States.

m. Describes what the repatriation center will provide.

n. Provides the evacuees with an opportunity to ask questions.

Processing team provides water and any other immediate comfort items.

Processing team establishes and operates a security screening station.

a. Clearly marks the area, including boundaries and routes.

Figure G-2. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and

operating a noncombatant evacuation operation reception station

G-6

FM 3-05.131

16 November 2009

Evacuee Processing Training and Evaluation Outline

Establish and Operate a Reception Station (continued)

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES

NO-GO

b. Establishes and marks holding and individual inspection areas.

c. Screens off all individual inspection areas.

d. Inspects all evacuees and their baggage for restricted items.

e. Confiscates all restricted items.

Impounds all weapons, excluding those of USG personnel, and issues receipts

to the owners.

g. Refrains from searching the persons, property, papers, or family members of

foreign ambassadors or diplomats unless directed by the DOS.

h. Refrains from searching diplomatic pouches.

Separates suspected enemy agents or criminals and escorts them to a

separate screening and interrogation station. This screening should be

voluntary and considered a prerequisite to evacuation.

After their interrogation, continues processing evacuees, sets them free, or

places them in the detainee area.

7. Processing team visually inspects each individual in a rapid manner, looking for

weapons, contraband, and excess baggage.

8. Processing team separates evacuees into manageable groups for processing;

however, the team maintains family integrity.

9. Member of processing team security element escorts groups through the stations.

TASK PERFORMANCE/EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK

ITERATION

TOTAL

TOTAL TASK STEPS EVALUATED

TOTAL TASK STEPS “GO”

TRAINING STATUS GO/NO-GO

*Indicates a leader task step.

Figure G-2. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and

operating a noncombatant evacuation operation reception station (continued)

Establish and Operate a Security Screening Station

ELEMENT: Security Screening Station, ECC

TASK: Establish and Operate a Security Screening Station (NEO-003) (FM 3-05.131)

ITERATION:

(Circle)

COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U

(Circle)

CONDITIONS:

TASK STANDARDS:

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES

NO-GO

*1. Station OIC/NCOIC establishes a sheltered station.

a. Ensures area is clearly marked, including boundaries and routes.

b. Ensures search areas (personnel and baggage are marked.

*2. Station OIC/NCOIC explains the procedure at this station and its purpose.

a. Notifies evacuees that personnel will confiscate all weapons.

Figure G-3. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and

operating a noncombatant evacuation operation security screening station processing center

16 November 2009

FM 3-05.131

G-7

Appendix G

Establish and Operate a Security Screening Station (continued)

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES

NO-GO

b. Ensures evacuees sign for authorized weapons and turn the weapons over to

the Embassy’s consular affairs office or DOS representative.

c. Uses a DA Form 3161, Request for Issue or Turn-In, or like form.

d. Describes contraband items (for example, weapons and illegal drugs) and

provides an amnesty box or area (screened, if possible).

3. Security screening personnel conduct a detailed inspection of the individual and

baggage before allowing the evacuee to enter the processing center. The

marshalling/recovery team(s) or the reception station must conduct an initial

search before an evacuee can enter the processing center.

a. Personnel must not use electronic wands for searches. Wands miss too

much. In addition, wands are difficult to hear in NEO these types of

environments.

b. Personnel should use hand searches, which are quick, provide better results,

and allow better control of the person being searched.

c. Personnel should try to have a female searcher (MP or USAF security forces)

available to search female evacuees.

d. Personnel should try to use three searchers per evacuee, if adequate

numbers of personnel are available. There should be two dedicated searchers

for each side of the person being searched and another moving dedicated

guard that will move to keep from flagging the searchers.

e. Personnel should dedicate one searcher to controlling the gun and one

searcher to controlling the gun-bearer if they find a gun during a search.

4. Security screening personnel tag all bags, one per evacuee, with the evacuee’s

name and control number.

5. Security screening personnel confiscate all weapons.

6. Security screening personnel confiscate all contraband or prohibited items.

7. Security screening personnel confiscate excess baggage and turn it over to the

Embassy’s consular affairs office or a DOS representative.

8. Security screening personnel confiscate all pets and turn them over to the

Embassy’s consular affairs office or a DOS representative.

TASK PERFORMANCE/EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK

ITERATION

TOTAL

TOTAL TASK STEPS EVALUATED

TOTAL TASK STEPS “GO”

TRAINING STATUS GO/NO-GO

*Indicates a leader task step.

Figure G-3. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and

operating a security screening station (continued)

Establish and Operate a Registration Station

ELEMENT: Security Screening Station, ECC

TASK: Establish and Operate a Registration Station (NEO-004) (FM 3-05.131)

ITERATION:

(Circle)

COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U

(Circle)

Figure G-4. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and

operating a noncombatant evacuation operation registration station

G-8

FM 3-05.131

16 November 2009

Evacuee Processing Training and Evaluation Outline

Establish and Operate a Registration Station (continued)

CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion headquarters requiring establishment of a registration station

within the processing center within a specified time and provided a designated station location with or without

permanent facilities.

TASK STANDARDS: The registration station is operational within a specified time of receipt of order or upon

arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established. The operational environment

is permissive to uncertain.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES

NO-GO

*1. Station OIC/NCOIC establishes a sheltered registration station.

a. Ensures area is clearly marked, including boundaries and routes.

b. nsures registration tables/points are established and marked.

*2. Station OIC/NCOIC explains the procedure at this station and its purpose.

*3. Registration personnel ensure each evacuee proves his identity by using a

passport, identification card, or anything that unquestionably establishes his

identity. The COM or his representative must make the final determination not to

evacuation a person.

4. Registration station NCO ensures each evacuee provides his information in

duplicate in an evacuee register (see below). The transportation station uses the

evacuee register for final manifesting purposes.

a. Sends one copy to the TOC.

b. Provides the escort to the transportation station with the second copy.

c. Ensures all evacuees sign the evacuee register.

EVACUEE REGISTER

Waiver of Claims for Damages and Injury by Non-USG Employees

CONTROL

NAME

PERMANENT HOME

EVACUEE

ID NO

CITIZENSHIP

SIGNATURE

NUMBER

ADDRESS

PRIORITY

(TYPE)

(LAST, FIRST, MI)

Shown smaller than actual document.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES

NO-GO

5. Registration personnel post a sign by each registration point that states that any

evacuee who is not a USG employee waives any claims for damage and injury

against the USG and that he does so by signing the evacuee register.

6. The registration NCO fills out the following evacuee information card.

EVACUATION INFORMATION CARD

NAME

CITIZENSHIP

AGE/SEX

CONTROL #

PERMANENT HOME ADDRESS

MEDICAL PROBLEMS

EMERGENCY NEXT OF KIN (NAME, ADDRESS, PHONE)

LOCATION OF REMAINING HOUSEHOLD GOODS

PRIORITY

Figure G-4. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and

operating a noncombatant evacuation operation registration station (continued)

16 November 2009

FM 3-05.131

G-9

Appendix G

Establish and Operate a Registration Station (continued)

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES

NO-GO

a. Color-codes these cards according to evacuation priority.

b. Affixes the evacuee information card to the evacuee so that it can be

easily seen.

EVACUATION PRIORITY CRITERIA AND COLOR CODES

CATEGORY

III

(Left to right.)

AMERICAN

Dependents of

TCN and

Eligible

Others

CITIZENS

AMCITs

Designated

Non-AMCITs

Determined

(Subcategories A,

(AMCITs)

Foreign

(Injured/ill or in

Eligible

B, C, and D only

Service

imminent

help in

National

danger.)

accountability.)

Employees of

the USG

I-A

II-A

III-A

IV-A

V-A

Male Adult

(White)

(Blue)

(Green)

(Yellow)

(Age 18+)

I-B

II-B

III-B

IV-B

V-B

Female Adult

(White)

(Blue)

(Green)

(Yellow)

(Age 18+)

I-C

II-C

III-C

IV-C

V-C

Male Child

(White)

(Blue)

(Green)

(Yellow)

(17 and Under)

I-D

II-D

III-D

IV-D

V-D

Female Child

(White)

(Blue)

(Green)

(Yellow)

(17 and Under)

Note: Personnel will use red to identify evacuees in categories I, II, or III that require immediate medical care and select

VIPs. These will take priority over all others.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES

NO-GO

7. Registration personnel ensure individuals that do not wish to evacuate sign a

waiver of evacuation opportunity.

WAIVER OF EVACUATION OPPORTUNITY

1. Agreement made this _________ day of __________, 20____, between _________________________________

and the military forces of the United States.

2. Whereas the military forces of the United States agree to evacuate

3. Said offer of evacuation is declined by the above-named individual(s) with the understanding the offer will not be

repeated.

4. Evacuee Signature_____________________________________

Evacuee Signature_____________________________________

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES

NO-GO

8. Depending upon the situation, registration personnel provide each evacuee

with a DD form

2585, which they must complete before arrival at the

repatriation center.

9. Registration personnel place all unknowns or problem cases in the holding

area.

Figure G-4. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and

operating a noncombatant evacuation operation registration station (continued)

G-10

FM 3-05.131

16 November 2009

Appendix H

Legal Considerations

International law and ROE govern personnel participating in a NEO. Because of the

complexity of domestic and international law, commanders must include legal

advisors in the planning process for NEO.

GENERAL

H-1. The JSOTF commander and subordinate commanders must ensure that JSOTF personnel abide by

the standards of international law, as well as the provisions of the operation’s ROE. The JSOTF

commander should establish procedures and policies for immediately reporting and investigating

violations. The JSOTF must report all suspected violations in accordance with applicable DOD and Service

regulations. The JSOTF should notify the Embassy of a suspected violation within 24 hours of its

occurrence.

ROLE OF THE JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE LEGAL ADVISOR

H-2. The JSOTF legal advisor will provide guidance on legal issues involving NEOs, in coordination with

higher headquarters, DOS agencies, NGOs, IGOs, foreign governments, and the HN government. The

JSOTF’s legal advisor will focus on the interpretation of and compliance with applicable U.S. laws and

regulations; relevant international agreements, including any pertinent status-of-forces agreements

(SOFAs); and multilateral and bilateral transit agreements affecting NEOs.

LEGAL IMPERATIVES

H-3. Commanders must navigate the many legal imperatives of the U.S. Constitution, domestic law,

international agreements, and customary international law when planning and conducting NEOs. In view

of this governing framework of laws and regulations and the complexity of legal issues relating to NEOs,

commanders must obtain legal guidance at all phases of NEO planning and execution. Legal guidance is

particularly important during the early planning stage.

LEGAL INPUT FOR OPERATIONAL PLANNING

H-4. Commanders should ensure that legal advisors at all levels are full participants in all aspects of NEO

planning, operational guidance and decisions, and national policy directives. The JSOTF legal advisor

should systematically review OPLANs, WARNORDs, commander’s estimates, ROE, OPORDs, executive

orders, and other operational documents. By reviewing these documents, the JSOTF legal advisor ensures

compliance with international and domestic law.

SPECIFIC GUIDANCE AND TERMINOLOGY

H-5. The following paragraphs discuss terminology and guidance related to the legal aspects of a NEO.

FOREIGN DIPLOMAT

H-6. A foreign diplomat of an Embassy staff authorized to go to the United States for evacuation is

entitled to special treatment in accordance with international law. Ideally, personnel are not to search,

detain, or seize the individual or his personal effects or papers. Personnel should extend the same immunity

to the foreign diplomat’s family members unless they are U.S. citizens. The pouches of diplomatic couriers

16 November 2009

FM 3-05.131

H-1

Appendix H

of states that the United States recognizes are also immune from any search, inspection, detention, or

seizure by U.S. personnel.

POLITICAL ASYLUM OR TEMPORARY REFUGE

H-7. CDRJSOTF may not grant political asylum to any foreign national. They may grant temporary

refuge under emergency conditions when there is imminent danger to the safety, health, or life of any

person. The CDRJSOTF should refer all requests for asylum to the available Embassy or senior DOS

representative.

STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

H-8. The CDRJSOTF and the JSOTF legal advisor should review any SOFA between the HN to

determine how it applies, if at all, to the current NEO situation. If time permits, the Embassy should modify

the SOFA, as necessary, before the arrival of the JSOTF. If no agreement exists, the Embassy may

negotiate a temporary agreement with the HN, if time permits, covering criminal jurisdiction, procurement,

customs, and other legal matters. Given the emergency nature of the NEO, however, it is unlikely that the

Embassy will negotiate special SOFA provisions.

STATUS OF DETAINEE

H-9. The Embassy should determine the status of a detainee in advance of the JSOTF deployment. In the

absence of this determination, it is U.S. policy to treat a hostile detainee humanely and in accordance with

international humanitarian law. U.S. forces will accord any individual they actively detain for attempting to

deter or for participating in a hostile action the rights of an enemy prisoner of war (EPW), even though the

individual may not be an EPW within the context of the Geneva Convention. The Embassy, with the HN,

will negotiate the disposition of the detainee.

CLAIMS

H-10. The JSOTF legal advisor or designated claims officer shall develop a plan for the processing and

adjudication of claims against the United States. The plan will be coordinated with the appropriate

Embassy staff member.

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

H-11. The JSOTF legal advisor or designated claims officer should consider the following in reference to

international law:

Law of Armed Conflict. Traditional legal issues associated with the law of armed conflict will

not normally arise in the context of a NEO, since NEOs typically occur during times of

escalating confrontation short of armed conflict. However, the protections afforded civilians, as

well as the sick and wounded, under the law of armed conflict are almost universally accepted

humanitarian norms that are respected in many cases despite the absence of international armed

conflict. NEO planning and execution should consistently adhere as closely as possible to the

principles of international humanitarian law.

National Sovereignty. Commanders must ensure that the NEO does not violate the sovereignty

of foreign nations other than the HN. NEO planners and operators must consider the potential

impact of operations on relations with other nations and of all relevant international agreements,

including pertinent SOFAs and multilateral and bilateral transit agreements.

LEGAL ASSISTANCE

H-12. Implementation plans should include preventive law programs designed to avoid sudden and

overwhelming demands for emergency legal assistance immediately before or during the implementation

of a NEO. To the extent practical, the United States will make legal assistance and advice available at safe

haven and collection processing points in coordination with the U.S. diplomatic mission.

H-2

FM 3-05.131

16 November 2009

Legal Considerations

MILITARY JUSTICE

H-13. The U.S. military will administer justice in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice

and Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces.

REPORTING VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

H-14. Commanders plan and provide for the reporting, investigating, and initiating of appropriate

disciplinary disposition of allegations of law of armed conflict violations as follows:

With respect to alleged violations of the law of armed conflict committed by or against members

of, or persons accompanying or serving with, their commands, promptly investigate, collect, and

evaluate evidence and report in accordance with applicable DOD and military department

guidance. In addition, immediately forward reports through operational command channels.

With respect to alleged violations of the law of armed conflict committed by or against allied

military or civilian personnel, conduct an appropriate preliminary investigation to determine

involvement of JSOTF personnel and report through U.S. operational channels. If the

appropriate authority determines that there was no JSOTF involvement, do not investigate

further without direction to do so by the combatant commander.

With respect to all violations of the law of armed conflict, personnel should immediately send

message notification to the appropriate combatant commander.

Note: Service component commanders should provide notification of reported law of armed

conflict violations as soon as the tactical situation permits, rather than waiting for a complete

investigation. Commanders can provide additional details through supplemental reports.

HOST-NATION SUPPORT

H-15. When planning and executing NEOs, commanders must consider applicable basing rights and the

status of U.S. forces within the country. Commanders must procure the necessary landing, embarkation,

and transit rights required to support a given operation in advance.

H-16. In addition, commanders must consider the changing political and military situation before relying

on previously negotiated HNS agreements. Commanders must accomplish liaison in a timely manner with

DOS officials responsible for the particular NEO site.

LEGAL REVIEW OF THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

H-17. When the use of force is a possibility, planners must involve legal advisors in the planning phases

before execution of the NEO to determine the legal basis for the use of force. Legal advisors must—

Review the proposed ROE.

Assess the legal risks or potential liabilities entailed under international law.

APPLICABLE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

H-18. Commanders at every level must ensure all personnel understand the ROE. Commanders must

handle requests for supplemental ROE in accordance with CJCS instructions.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND CONGRESSIONAL ENACTMENTS

H-19. Consistent with Title

50, USC, Chapter

33, War Powers Resolution, Congress may require

consultation with or reporting to in the conduct of NEOs. The DOS will initiate these reports as required.

16 November 2009

FM 3-05.131

H-3

Glossary

SECTION I - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADVON

advanced echelon

AMCIT

American citizen

administrative officer

AOR

area of responsibility

ARNG

Army National Guard

ARSOF

Army special operations forces

Civil Affairs

CARVER

criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and

recognizability

CDRFORSCOM

Commander, United States Forces Command

CDRJSOTF

commander, joint special operations task force

CDRJTF

commander, joint task force

CDRUSEUCOM

Commander, United States European Command

CDRUSJFCOM

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command

CDRUSPACOM

Commander, United States Pacific Command

CDRUSSOCOM

Commander, United States Special Operations Command

CJCS

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJCSI

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction

COA

course of action

COM

chief of mission

COMDOC

combat documentation

CONPLAN

concept plan

CONUS

continental United States

CSP

contingency support package

Department of the Army

DATT

defense attaché

DCM

deputy chief of mission

Department of Defense (form)

DEA

Drug Enforcement Administration

DHHS

Department of Health and Human Services

DIA

Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD

Department of Defense

DODD

Department of Defense directive

DODI

Department of Defense instruction

DOS

Department of State

EAC

emergency action committee

EAP

emergency action plan

16 November 2009

FM 3-05.131

Glossary-1

Glossary

ECC

evacuation control center

ECOMOG

Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire

Monitoring Group

EPH

emergency planning handbook

EPW

enemy prisoner of war

ESAT

European Command Survey and Assessment Team

FCE

forward command element

field manual, frequency modulation

GCC

geographic combatant commander

GIBCO

geospatial intelligence base for contingency operations

GSO

general services officer

host nation

HNS

host-nation support

IGO

intergovernmental organization

INS

Immigration and Naturalization Service

IPOE

intelligence preparation of the operational environment

ISB

intermediate staging base

ISR

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JCS

Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFACC

joint force air component commander

JFC

joint force commander

JIB

joint information bureau

joint publication

JSOTF

joint special operations task force

JTF

joint task force

landing zone

MAGTF

Marine Air-Ground Task Force

MEDEVAC

medical evacuation

METT-TC

mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support

available—time available, and civil considerations

MEU

Marine expeditionary unit

military intelligence

military police

MSG

Marine security guard

NAVSOF

naval special operations forces

NCO

noncommissioned officer

NCOIC

noncommissioned officer in charge

NEO

noncombatant evacuation operation

NEOPACK

noncombatant evacuation operation pack

NGA

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NGO

nongovernmental organization

Glossary-2

FM 3-05.131

16 November 2009

Glossary

OASD-PA

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

optional form

OGA

other governmental organization

OIC

officer in charge

OPCON

operational control

OPLAN

operation plan

OPORD

operation order

OPSEC

operations security

OSD

Office of the Secretary of Defense

public affairs

PAO

public affairs officer

PIR

priority intelligence request

PLAD

plain language address dictionary

POC

point of contact

POE

port of embarkation

POG

Psychological Operations group

PSO

post security officer

PSYOP

Psychological Operations

ROE

rules of engagement

RSO

regional security officer

RSOD

regimental support operations detachment

SAO

security assistance office

SEAL

sea-air-land team

SecDef

Secretary of Defense

SETAF

Southern European Task Force

Special Forces

SFG

Special Forces group

SITREP

situation report

SOA

special operations aviation

SOAR

special operations aviation regiment

SOCEUR

Special Operations Command, United States European Command

SOF

special operations forces

SOFA

status-of-forces agreement

SOTF

special operations task force

SPOE

seaport of embarkation

SROE

standing rules of engagement

SSF

special security force

T&EO

training and evaluation outline

TALCE

tanker airlift control element

TBD

to be determined

TCN

third-country national

16 November 2009

FM 3-05.131

Glossary-3

References

REQUIRED REFERENCES

These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.

None

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

Army Publications

DA forms are available on the APD Web site (www.apd.army.mil). DD forms are available on the OSD Web

site (www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/infomgt/forms/formsprogram.htm).

DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms)

DA Form 3161 (Request for Issue or Turn-In)

FM 2-0, Intelligence, 17 May 2004

FM 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces, 20 September 2006

FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations, 15 April 2005

FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, 29 September 2006

FM 3-05.50, Army Special Operations Forces Ranger Operations, 30 May 2008

FM 3-05.60, Army Special Operations Forces Aviation Operations, 30 October 2007

FM 3-05.140, Army Special Operations Forces Logistics, 12 February 2009

FM 3-05.160, Army Special Operations Forces Communications System, 15 October 2009

FM 3-06, Urban Operations, 26 October 2006

FM 3-11.11, Flame, Riot Control Agents and Herbicide Operations, 19 August 1996

FM 4-93.4, Theater Support Command, 15 April 2003

FMI 2-01.301, Specific Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Applications for Intelligence

Preparation of the Battlefield, 31 March 2009

Joint Publications

JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 14 May 2007

JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations, 24 September 2008

JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, 22 January 2007

Other Publications

United States codes are available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/uscode/index.html.

DD Form 2585 (Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet)

DODD 3025.14, Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Designated Aliens in Danger Areas

Abroad, 5 November 1990

DODI 5210.56, Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by DOD Personnel Engaged in

Law Enforcement and Security Duties, 1 November 2001

Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, 18 November 1988

OF 28 (Evacuation Documentation)

USC, Title 42, Section 1313, Assistance for U.S. Citizens Returned From Foreign Countries,

3 January 2007

USC, Title 50, Chapter 33, War Powers Resolution, 3 January 2007

16 November 2009

FM 3-05.131

References-1

Index

G-1, G-2, G-4, G-6, G-7, G-

6-4, A-1, A-2, A-5, A-6, A-8,

9, G-11

B-2, E-1 through E-4, F-2

advance party, 3-3, 4-1 through

through F-9

evacuation force, 1-3, 1-4, 2-6,

4-5, 5-1 through 5-3, 5-5,

3-3, 3-4, 4-2, 4-4 through

E-3

4-7, 5-1 through 5-6, 5-11,

leave commercial, 1-5, C-1,

Air Force, A-4

5-12, 5-14, 6-2, A-4, B-2,

C-2

D-1, E-4, G-4

assembly area, 2-6, 3-1, 3-3,

legal aspects of a NEO, H-1

3-6, 4-3, 4-5, 4-6, 5-1

evacuation guidelines, 1-2

through 5-10, C-2, D-3, D-4

logistics element, 5-10

evacuation notice, 5-6, C-3

asylum requests, 5-19

evacuation site party, 4-1

authorized departure, 1-4, 3-2

through 4-3

Marine security guard, 2-2

Marines, A-4

CARVER, 3-7

foreign national, 1-1, 2-5, 3-1,

marshalling element, 5-2

3-2, 5-14, 6-4, G-11, H-2

through 5-5, 5-9, 5-10

Civil Affairs, 1-3, 1-8

forward command element

medical station, 5-12, 5-15,

classification system, 5-17

(FCE), 4-1 through 4-3, 5-2,

G-3, G-5

combatant command, 2-6, 3-3,

A-5, E-3

movement control, 4-5

3-4, 4-4, F-1 through F-10

comfort station, 5-12, 5-16,

G-2, G-3

host nation (HN), 1-1, 1-3, 2-2

Navy, 4-8, 6-1, A-1, A-2, A-4

comfort team, 6-2, 6-4, 6-5

through 2-4, 3-1 through 3-3,

NEO phases, 3-2

3-6, 4-1 through 4-5, 5-1, 5-

counterintelligence, 5-12, 5-14

2, 5-4 through 5-6, 5-10

notification phases, 1-4

country team, 1-5, 1-6, 2-3, 2-4

through 5-12, 6-1 through

6-4, B-2, D-2, E-1 through

E-4, F-1, F-3, F-6, F-9, G-5,

ordered departure, 1-4, 3-2

debriefing station, 5-12, 5-14,

H-1, H-2

G-3

hostile environment, 1-1, 1-4,

defense attaché, 1-2

phases, 1-4, 1-5, 3-7, F-9, H-1,

4-1, 5-2, B-3, F-1

H-3

Department of Health and

human intelligence, 5-12, 5-14

Human Services (DHHS),

policy, 1-1, 1-3, 5-6, 5-18, B-1,

2-4, 2-5

B-2, D-1, E-4, F-9, H-1, H-2

Department of Homeland

Immigration and Customs

post closing, 1-5, C-3

Security, 2-5

Enforcement (ICE), 2-5

processing evacuees, 5-7,

Department of State (DOS),

intelligence, 2-2, 2-3, 3-1, 3-3

5-12, G-7

1-1, 1-2, 1-4, 1-5, 2-1

through 3-8, 4-1 through 4-5,

processing procedures, 5-13

through 2-7, 3-1 through 3-4,

5-3, 6-3, 6-4, D-2, E-1, F-4,

processing team, 6-2, 6-3, 6-5,

4-2 through 4-4, 5-11

F-6

G-3, G-5 through G-7

through 5-14, 5-17 through

intermediate staging base

Psychological Operations

5-19, 6-1 through 6-3, A-1,

(ISB), 1-4, 2-5, 3-3, 3-4, 3-6,

(PSYOP), 1-3, 1-6, 1-7, 1-8,

C-2, C-3, D-1, F-2, F-3, F-7,

4-3, 4-4, 6-4, A-5, A-6, E-3

4-2, 4-3, 5-5, B-2, E-3, E-4

F-9, G-5 through G-8, H-1

through H-4

documents, 1-5, B-2, C-1, G-1,

joint special operations task

Rangers, 1-6, 1-7

H-1

force (JSOTF), 1-3, 1-5, 1-7,

reception station, 5-10, 5-13,

1-8, 2-2, 2-4, 2-6, 3-3, 3-4,

draw down, 1-4, 1-5

G-2, G-5 through G-8

4-1, 4-2, 4-4, 5-11, 5-18, 6-1,

6-2, A-1, A-2, E-4,

reception team, 6-2

H-1 through H-3

Embassy organization, 2-2

regional liaison group, 2-2

joint task force (JTF), 1-2

evacuation control center

registration station, 5-12, 5-14,

through 1-7, 2-3, 3-3, 3-4,

(ECC), 3-6, 4-1 through 4-8,

G-3, G-9

4-1, 4-2, 4-4, 5-10 through

5-2 through 5-19, 6-1

5-12, 5-18, 5-19, 6-1 through

through 6-4, A-5, F-2,

16 November 2009

FM 3-05.131

Index-1

FM 3-18

SPECIAL FORCES

OPERATIONS

M$<

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:

Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect

technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International

Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on 13 May 2014. Other

requests for this document must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F.

Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-CDI-SFD, 3004 Ardennes Street,

Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE:

DESTRUCTION NOTICE. Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or

reconstruction of the document.

FOREIGN DISCLOSURE RESTRICTION (FD 6):

This publication has been reviewed by the product developers in coordination with the United

States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School foreign disclosure authority.

This product is releasable to students from foreign countries on a case-by-case basis only.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

*FM 3-18

Field Manual

Headquarters

Department of the Army

No. 3-18

Washington, DC, 28 May 2014

Special Forces Operations

Contents

Page

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1

THE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL FORCES

1-1

World War II

1-1

Cold War

1-3

Modern Special Forces

1-8

Chapter 2

THE ROLE OF SPECIAL FORCES

2-1

Introduction

2-1

Strategic Context

2-2

Special Forces Operations Within the Range of Military Operations

2-5

Army Unified Land Operations

2-6

Special Forces-Conventional Force Coordination and Integration

2-6

The Nature and Limitations of Special Forces

2-8

Chapter 3

GUIDANCE AND PRINCIPAL TASKS

3-1

Guidance to Conduct Special Forces Operations

3-1

Special Forces Principal Tasks

3-3

Chapter 4

ORGANIZATION

4-1

United States Special Operations Command

4-1

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION. Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only

to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange

Program or by other means. This determination was made on 13 May 2014. Other requests for this document

must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School,

ATTN: AOJK-CDI-SFD, 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE. Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the

document.

FOREIGN DISCLOSURE RESTRICTION (FD 6): This publication has been reviewed by the product developers

in coordination with the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School foreign

disclosure authority. This product is releasable to students from foreign countries on a case-by-case basis only.

*This publication supersedes FM 3-18, 5 March 2012.

Contents

United States Army Special Operations Command

4-1

United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

4-2

United States Army Special Forces Command

4-2

Chapter 5

EMPLOYMENT

5-1

Country Team

5-1

Theater of Operations Organization

5-3

Training Programs

5-23

Chapter 6

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

AND FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

6-1

Unconventional Warfare Considerations

6-1

Foreign Internal Defense Considerations

6-10

Chapter 7

SUSTAINMENT

7-1

Army Special Operations Forces Support to Special Forces Operations

7-1

Host-Nation Support

7-2

Contractor Support

7-3

Statement of Requirements

7-5

Planning and Executing Theater Operations Support

7-6

Army Sustainment Principles

7-6

SOURCE NOTES

Source Notes-1

GLOSSARY

Glossary-1

REFERENCES

References-1

INDEX

Index-1

Figures

Figure 2-1. Role of Army special operations forces

2-7

Figure 3-1. Special Forces principal tasks

3-4

Figure 3-2. Role of Special Forces in unconventional warfare and foreign

internal defense

3-8

Figure 4-1. United States Special Operations Command organization

4-1

Figure 4-2. United States Army Special Operations Command organization

4-2

Figure 4-3. United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) organization

4-3

Figure 4-4. Regional orientation of the Special Forces groups

4-4

Figure 4-5. Special Forces group (airborne) organization

4-5

Figure 4-6. Headquarters and headquarters company (airborne) organization

4-7

Figure 4-7. Group support battalion (airborne) organization

4-8

Figure 4-8. Special Forces battalion (airborne) organization

4-11

Figure 4-9. Battalion headquarters and headquarters detachment

(airborne) organization

4-13

Figure 4-10. Battalion support company (airborne) organization

4-14

Figure 4-11. Special Forces company (airborne) organization

4-16

Figure 4-12. Special Forces operational detachment—bravo organization

4-18

FM 3-18

28 May 2014

Contents

Figure 4-13. Special Forces operational detachment—alpha organization

4-19

Figure 5-1. Country team concept

5-2

Figure 5-2. Theater command structure

5-3

Figure 5-3. Theater and Korean Peninsula special operations commands

5-4

Figure 5-4. Example of distributive command and control

5-6

Figure 5-5. Notional joint task force command and control

5-8

Figure 5-6. Notional theater special operations joint task force

5-10

Figure 5-7. Notional joint special operations task force

5-12

Figure 5-8. Example of Combined Forces Special Operations Component

Command—Afghanistan organization

5-13

Figure 5-9. Notional special operations task force organization

5-15

Figure 5-10. Operations center organization

5-16

Figure 5-11. Notional operations center

5-17

Figure 5-12. Signal center organization

5-19

Figure 5-13. Support center organization

5-20

Figure 5-14. Advanced operations base organization

5-21

Figure 5-15. Example of special operations command and control

element organization

5-23

Figure 6-1. Advanced operations base providing mission command

systems, logistics, and advisory assistance

6-15

Figure 6-2. Special Forces element relationship during the conduct of theater

security cooperation plan events in the steady state

6-16

Figure 6-3. Advanced operations base and special operations task force

providing advisory assistance

6-17

Tables

Table 4-1. Special Forces core attributes

4-23

Table 4-2. Adaptability competencies

4-24

Table 4-3. Advanced skills on a Special Forces operational detachment—alpha

4-29

Table 7-1. Medical personnel structure within the Special Forces group

7-15

28 May 2014

FM 3-18

iii

Preface

FM 3-18 is the principal manual for Special Forces (SF) doctrine. It describes SF roles, missions, capabilities,

organization, mission command, employment, and sustainment operations across the range of military

operations. This manual is a continuation of the doctrine established in the JP

3-05 series, ADP 3-05,

ADRP 3-05, and FM 3-05.

The principal audience for FM 3-18 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army

headquarters serving as joint task force (JTF) or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint

or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers

and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States,

international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their

Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

FM 3-18 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the

glossary and the text.

FM 3-18 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United

States, and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of FM 3-18 is the Special Operations Center of Excellence. The preparing agency is the SF

Directorate, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Send comments and

recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to

Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-CDI-SFD, 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Bragg, North

Carolina

28310-9610; by e-mail to AOJK-DT-SF@soc.mil; or by electronic DA Form 2028. Unless this

publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

All images are courtesy of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

FM 3-18

28 May 2014

Introduction

The United States (U.S.) Army SF represents the premier Department of Defense (DOD) force designed to

conduct special warfare. SF Soldiers are specifically selected, trained, and educated to shape foreign political

and military environments by working with and through host nations (HNs), regional partners, and indigenous

populations. SF provides the United States with a small-footprint option for influencing unfriendly regimes,

addressing insurgencies, and containing conflicts that could destabilize U.S. allies and partners. To accomplish

these missions, SF possesses qualities and capabilities to mix nonlethal and lethal activities designed to shape

the environment, deter conflict, prevail in war, or successfully conduct a wide range of contingency operations.

The two primary missions of SF are unconventional warfare (UW) and foreign internal defense (FID), which

can be considered conceptual opposites. In UW, SF works through resistance movements to coerce, disrupt, or

overthrow unfriendly governments (or occupying powers) through a wide combination of low-visibility direct

and indirect activities in denied areas. In a FID mission, SF works with friendly governments through a wide

combination of military engagement activities that enhance the overall security of that nation. Regardless of the

mission, the selection, training, and education of the SF Soldier to work with indigenous forces while

conducting UW are also applicable to the conduct of FID. In both missions, SF focuses on engaging with and

empowering indigenous partners to act. Both efforts are population centric and can be used to set the conditions

needed for successful unified land operations.

FID activities provide the United States with a means to strengthen our understanding of regional issues and,

through security cooperation, to prevent conflict or intelligently address ongoing conflict. SF provides an

experienced and mature military advisory capability that assists allies and partner nations to develop regional

stability, enhance global security, and facilitate future operations. FID is designed to shape the environment and

prevent or deter conflict. Shaping facilitates potential future offensive, defensive, and stability tasks, such as

humanitarian assistance, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism activities. Prevention is designed to diminish

the creation of adversaries or the initiation of hostilities through security cooperation in support of ongoing

diplomatic and developmental programs. Deterrence dissuades adversaries from contemplated violence by the

development and training of credible and effective HN security forces, enabling them to defeat terrorists or

insurgents in their country before they threaten the United States. Over the long term, persistent engagement

with HNs, regional partners, indigenous populations, and their institutions through FID activities help set

conditions for best possible outcomes.

UW is the primary mission that most distinguishes SF. The inherently interagency, multinational, and widely

dispersed activities of UW are conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency by operating through

or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in denied areas to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow oppressive

regimes. UW operations are politically sensitive activities that involve a high degree of military risk and,

therefore, require distinct authorities and innovative campaign design. The demands of UW missions require

mature SF Soldiers who are adept at interacting with a wide range of actors and agencies capable of, and trusted

with, sensitive and largely independent operations. The payoff—what makes SF UW activities worth the risk to

forces in a denied area—is the subsequent weak defensive posture the enemy must take in order to defend

everything and thereby defend nothing well.

Whether the mission is UW, FID, or simply direct action, SF is designed and trained to understand the balance

between diplomacy and force, and which is most applicable for creating the conditions for a favorable conflict

resolution. This judgment has been honed over decades of engagement with allies, coalition partners, and

indigenous populations and provides the United States a discreet, low-signature, small-footprint alternative to a

JTF or other large military force structure.

Chapter 1 discusses the history of the SF regiment and how it evolved into its current form. It also provides

valuable insight into its design, characteristics, and capabilities.

Chapter 2 covers the role of SF.

28 May 2014

FM 3-18

Introduction

Chapter 3 provides detailed information on guidance and principal tasks of SF.

Chapter 4 details the current SF organization.

Chapter 5 outlines SF employment.

Chapter 6 provides planning considerations for UW and FID.

Chapter 7 discusses the unique sustainment requirements of SF.

FM 3-18 provides a starting point for conducting Army SF operations. It establishes a common frame of

reference and offers intellectual tools Army leaders use to plan, prepare, execute, and assess SF operations. By

establishing a common approach and language for SF, doctrine promotes mutual understanding and enhances

effectiveness during operations. The doctrine in this publication is a guide for action rather than a set of fixed

rules. In Army SF operations, effective leaders recognize when and where doctrine, training, or even their

experience no longer fits the situation, and adapt accordingly.

FM 3-18 does not add or modify any terminology found in the Army lexicon and is not the source document for

any terms.

FM 3-18

28 May 2014

Chapter 1

The History of United States Army Special Forces

In any campaign in the future, the participant who fails to take proper cognizance of

guerrilla warfare, either in the planning or execution stages, may suffer severe setbacks,

if not eventual defeat.

Colonel Russell W. Volckmann

September 1950

There has always been a romantic fascination with special operations forces (SOF).

The idea of secret commandos or Rangers striking from the shadows surprising the

enemy with overwhelming speed, violence of action, and cutting-edge technology

appeals to America’s image of highly trained, elite Soldiers. There is, however,

another Soldier who fights from the shadows. This one is perhaps less known and far

less understood. His real weapons are a deep understanding of terrain, the

relationships built, and the influence developed to motivate and train others to take

up the fight. These Soldiers are the U.S. Army SF, the “quiet professionals” whom

history and popular culture often overlook. Designed to organize, train, and support

indigenous personnel in behind-the-lines resistance activities, SF belongs to an

organization unique in the Army’s history. Founded at the Psychological Warfare

Center at Fort Bragg in 1952 and based upon lessons learned and formation used in

guerrilla warfare during World War II, its sole purpose was UW. The experience in

Vietnam gave SF a second purpose: countering a subversive insurgency. This brief

history identifies the precursors and major developments that created modern U.S.

Army SF.

WORLD WAR II

1-1. In order to understand a thing one should understand its original purpose—its reason for being.

Whereas special operations and irregular forces can trace their origins as far back as the foundation of our

nation, the genesis of SF began in the early days of World War II. Following the German invasion of

Western Europe in June 1940, thousands of people in France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Norway

refused to accept defeat and sought to resist the Axis occupation. To exploit these potential forces behind

the German lines, the British organized a special unit called the Special Operations Executive. This unit

was shrouded in secrecy and known by such innocuous names as the Joint Technical Board or the Inter-

Service Research Bureau in order to conceal its purpose. Unit members and those “in the know” used

another name—the Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare—which revealed its true nature.

1-2. The broad mission of the Special Operations Executive was to attack German war potential wherever

it was exposed, thereby causing a drain on German resources. The Executive was also to organize guerrilla

forces that would give maximum assistance to the forces of liberation when the continent was ultimately

invaded.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

1-3. In the beginning of World War II, America’s intelligence organizations operated independently of

one another and lacked coordination and cooperation. The Army, Navy, Federal Bureau of Investigation,

and Department of State all ran their own separate intelligence operations. In 1941, with war looming on

the horizon, Colonel William J. Donovan—a World War I Medal of Honor recipient—was named the head

28 May 2014

FM 3-18

1-1

Chapter 1

of the Coordinator of Information, America’s first national intelligence agency. Donovan fought to bring

together various activities and functions under one umbrella organization. In 1942, this organization was

renamed the Office of Strategic Services.

1-4. Before America entered the war, Donovan personally studied the Special Operations Executive. He

admired the organization in coordinating the Political Warfare Executive intelligence activities with

psychological warfare and special operations. To Donovan, intelligence penetration provided the basis for

planning and propaganda, which would be followed by special operations involving sabotage, subversion,

commando raids, guerrilla actions, and behind-the-lines resistance movements. Donovan would use the

Special Operations Executive model to organize the Office of Strategic Services into separate but

supporting functions of intelligence, propaganda, and guerrilla warfare.

1-5. Subordinate to the newly formed Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of Strategic Services drew on the

military Services for most of its personnel. Chartered under Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 155/11/D, the

Office of Strategic Services was assigned the responsibility to conduct secret intelligence, research and

analysis, and secret operations and planning. Secret operations consisted of morale subversion

(psychological warfare) and physical subversion or special operations. The Office of Strategic Services

was divided into a number of branches, with each branch being responsible for a particular function. Under

the strategic services operations function the Special Operations Branch was designed to organize and

support sabotage operations behind enemy lines. They furnished agents, communications, and supplies to

underground and guerrilla groups in Norway, France, Denmark, Italy, and China. Special Operations

Branch was sub-organized into special teams designed to work behind the enemy lines for the destruction

of specific targets, the securing of intelligence, and conduct of guerrilla warfare. Working alongside the

British, the Office of Strategic Services/Special Operations Executive combined special operations took on

a new name: Special Forces.

1-6. While the new SF name was used at the headquarters (Special Forces Headquarters) and for liaisons

to various commands (Special Forces Detachments) the Office of Strategic Services special operations

elements remained known by their specific organizational names—the operational groups and the

Jedburghs.

Operational Groups

1-7. Of the two Office of Strategic Services special operations elements, the operational groups most

resembled the modern SF operational detachments. Designated as

2671st Special Reconnaissance

Battalion, Separate (Provisional), in 1944, the operational groups were designed and organized to stand-up

and train guerrilla forces. They received specialized instruction in language, foreign weapons, operation

and repair of indigenous vehicles, communications, demolitions, organizing and training of civilians for

guerrilla warfare, and airborne and amphibious operations. These small teams worked in uniform and could

employ as a headquarters element and two sections comprised of 2 officers and 13 enlisted men, similar to

the organization Colonel Aaron Bank—the first commander of a Special Forces group (SFG)—would use

eight years later.

1-8. The operational groups were the largest Office of Strategic Services effort in France, involving 356

Americans. Prior to and immediately after D-day, the Operational Group Command parachuted teams

behind enemy lines to provide liaison and support to the French resistance, the Maquis. The operational

groups with the Maquis harassed enemy lines of communications, attacked vital enemy installations,

organized and trained the local underground, and furnished intelligence. Operational groups also operated

in Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, Burma, Malaya, and China, training and leading indigenous guerrilla forces.

Jedburghs

1-9. The other Office of Strategic Services units similar in nature to modern SF were the Jedburgh

Teams, also referred to as Jeds. Their mission, Operation JEDBURGH, represented the first real

cooperation in Europe between Special Operations Executive and Office of Strategic Services Special

Operations Branch. Taking their name from the town of Jedburgh in southeastern Scotland (selected at

random from a list of pre-approved code names), these three-man teams were a mixture of Office of

Strategic Services Special Operations Branch, Special Operations Executive, and Free French Bureau

1-2

FM 3-18

28 May 2014

The History of United States Army Special Forces

Central de Renseignements et d’Action personnel. The Jedburgh teams consisted of three men: a commander,

an executive officer, and a noncommissioned officer radio operator. One of the officers would be British or

American, while the other would originate from the country to which the team deployed.

1-10. Like the operational groups, the Jedburgh’s mission in France was to support and coordinate the

French resistance Maquis activities under the sponsorship and guidance of the Supreme Headquarters

Allied Expeditionary Force. As a secondary role, Jedburgh teams engaged in guerrilla warfare and attacks

on German lines of communications. Jedburghs also operated under the South East Asia Command in

1945, including French Indochina and Burma, working with antifascists and Karen tribesmen. If the

operational groups provided the organizational concept for SF, the Jedburghs provided many of the

original personnel. Many former Jedburghs would go on to join SF, including its first commander, Colonel

Aaron Bank.

Detachment 101

1-11. The best-known and most successful Office of Strategic Services guerrilla operation in the war is

attributed to Detachment 101 in Burma, commanded by Colonel William R. Peers. Detachment 101

organized and trained Kachin tribesmen to conduct guerrilla operations against the Japanese in 1943 and

1944 and represented a microcosm of the entire range of Office of Strategic Services capabilities including

the gathering of intelligence, aiding escape and evasion of downed fliers, espionage, counterespionage,

sabotaging lines of communications and activities in support of allied conventional operations. Detachment

101 received the Distinguished Unit Citation from President Eisenhower for its service in the 1945

offensive that liberated Rangoon.

GUERRILLAS WARFARE IN THE PHILIPPINES

1-12. Whereas the personnel and organizational concept for SF primarily came from the Office of

Strategic Services operations in Europe, much of the doctrine came from the Philippines. After the fall of

Bataan in 1942 to the invading Japanese, several U.S. Army officers serving in the Philippines refused to

surrender to the Japanese and organized resistance from the local forces and local population.

1-13. Captain Russell Volckmann, Captain Donald Blackburn, and Colonel Wendell Fertig led Filipino

guerrillas in harassing the Japanese. Upon General MacArthur’s return to the Philippine Islands, they

continued their guerrilla warfare campaign by attacking retreating Japanese forces, capturing bases and

airfields, and helping speed the American advance. Volckmann’s guerrillas collaborated with the 6th

Ranger Battalion and the Alamo Scouts and supported their missions in Luzon, including the rescue of the

prisoners at Cabanatuan. On Mindanao, Fertig led guerrilla forces in hit-and-run attacks and coast-

watching activities. It is estimated that Fertig commanded the equivalent of an Army corps of 36,000

guerrillas, holding down up to 60, 000 Japanese forces and killing at least 7,000. After the war Fertig and

Volckmann would add their experience joining the former Office of Strategic Services members in

standing up the America’s first dedicated guerrilla warfare unit, U.S. Army SF.

COLD WAR

1-14. As World War II ended, so did the perceived need for a full-time organization dedicated to special

operations and intelligence. Executive Order 9621, issued on 20 September 1945, provided only 10 days to

dissolve the Office of Strategic Services, with the Research and Analysis Sections going to the State

Department and the War Department receiving the remainder for salvage and liquidation. Fortunately, the

Assistant Secretary of War, John McCoy, saved the Secret Intelligence (commonly referred to as SI) and

Counterespionage (also called X-2) Branches, which became the nucleus of the Central Intelligence

Agency under the National Security Act of 1947. While the fledgling Central Intelligence Agency assumed

the intelligence functions of the Office of Strategic Services, the Office of Policy Coordination was stood-

up to manage the support to resistance and underground networks previously developed by the Office of

Strategic Services.

1-15. In 1949, the head of Office of Policy Coordination, Frank Wisner, requested assistance from the

Army in the training of personnel for guerrilla warfare. Although the peacetime mission belonged to the

28 May 2014

FM 3-18

1-3

Chapter 1

Office of Policy Coordination, much of the guerrilla warfare expertise still resided in the Army. Training in

guerrilla warfare was established at the Infantry School in Fort Benning, Georgia. Shortly after, Special

Text

31-90-1, Operations Against Guerrilla Forces, written by

(then) Lieutenant Colonel Russell

Volckmann, was published. This document, the U.S. Army’s first dedicated guerrilla warfare doctrine

supported the notion that the master of UW is the best resource for counterguerrilla operations. In 1951,

Volckmann also wrote the first FM on guerrilla warfare—FM 31-21, Organization and Conduct of

Guerilla Warfare [sic], which used the organizational concept of an operational group to refer to the small

unit linking up with guerrilla forces. Its mission was to organize existing guerrilla forces or resistance

groups capable of conducting strategic and tactical operations against an enemy. The theater element

charged with managing and coordinating special operations within the theater command was called the

Special Forces element.

1-16. After World War II, Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower directed that a psychological warfare

capability using experienced personnel be maintained. Principal among those with experience was

Brigadier General Robert McClure, who headed Eisenhower’s psychological warfare effort in the

European theater during the war. Like Donovan, McClure believed in the linkage between morale

operations (psychological warfare operations) and sponsoring resistance forces.

1-17. The outbreak of the Korean conflict heightened interest and the Psychological Warfare Division was

established in September 1950. Shortly after, this organization was renamed the Office of the Chief of

Psychological Warfare, with Brigadier General McClure working directly with the Army Chief of Staff.

Similar to Donovan at the Office of Strategic Services, McClure organized the Office of the Chief of

Psychological Warfare into Propaganda, UW, and Support Divisions. Army Special Regulation 10-250-1,

Organization and Functions, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare,

Special Staff (22 May 1951), gave McClure the authorization to formulate and develop psychological and

special operations plans for the Army and supervise Army programs in this field.

1-18. In May 1952, the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was established. The

Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare Special Operations Division sought out former Office of

Strategic Services officers (such as Bank) and others who had experience with guerrilla warfare—men like

Fertig and Volckmann. Volckmann was working on joint Army-Central Intelligence Agency operations

behind the lines in North Korea. Psychological warfare via McClure provided the platform to sell the Army

on the need for a rebirth of the Office of Strategic Services Special Operations Jedburghs and operational

groups—now generally referred to as Special Forces units.

1-19. The Korean conflict was a devastating blow to the Army. Ranger companies took up to 50-percent

combat losses and were in danger of being disbanded. McClure’s Office of the Chief of Psychological

Warfare authored a study titled Special Forces-Ranger Units that outlined the concept for their proposed

special operations-type operational unit. The new organization was called Special Forces—a designation

derived from the Office of Strategic Services whose operational teams in the field were given the same

name in 1944. Army Field Forces requested the removal of any reference or tie-in to the Rangers because

they “envisioned Special Forces will in all probability be involved in subversive activities” and should

focus SF on using indigenous groups. On 23 August 1951, General Maxwell Taylor decided to deactivate

all Ranger units, at which point McClure and his staff briefed Taylor on the mission and capabilities of an

SF organization. As a result, the personnel spaces needed to create 10th SFG came from those deactivated

Ranger companies.

1-20. The concept of a full-time Army unit dedicated to UW had many opponents after World War II.

Many considered UW a task for conventional formations with no need for another school and another elite

unit, especially during downsizing of the force. The newly formed Air Force, along with many in the newly

formed Central Intelligence Agency, believed their joint capabilities could effectively support, organize,

and utilize resistance forces. McClure’s backg2round and contacts in running psychological operations—not

only during war, but also during the post-conflict years—built his credibility with the men who would be

Army Chiefs of Staffs for years to come. His deep understanding of the inner workings of the War

Department, the Pentagon, and (later) the DOD gave him the ability to find and recruit men like Bank,

Volckmann, Blackburn, and Fertig, and set the necessary conditions to be in the right place at the right time

to stand up a UW capability in the Army.

1-4

FM 3-18

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The History of United States Army Special Forces

1-21. As a result of McClure’s efforts, the Army’s first SF unit was activated at Smoke Bomb Hill on Fort

Bragg, North Carolina, with former Office of Strategic Services Jedburgh Colonel Aaron Bank selected

from McClure’s staff to be the commander. Present for duty on that day—19 June 1952—were seven

enlisted men, one warrant officer, and Colonel Bank. Volunteers were drawn from personnel with guerrilla

warfare experience in World War II or Korea, Office of Strategic Services members, and Lodge Bill

Soldiers

(Eastern European or stateless volunteers in the U.S. Army). The unit designation as the

10th SFG was a nod to its psychological operations backg2round; by starting with the number 10, they

hoped to deceive observers into thinking there were at least 9 other SF units.

1-22. First and foremost, the

10th SFG was created in the Office of Strategic Services Special

Operations/Special Operations Executive model to stand-up indigenous resistance forces in the eventuality

that Communist forces—namely the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact—invaded Europe. The key replacement

for the Maquis partners would then be émigrés from Eastern Europe who had the regional and language

expertise for the UW mission, recruited under the 1950 Lodge-Philbin Act (commonly known and the

Lodge Act).

FIRST EMPLOYMENTS

1-23. During the Korean conflict, when the 8th Army retreated from the Yalu in 1950, as many as 10,000

Korean irregulars declared their willingness to fight with the United States against the Communist forces.

Most of these partisans fled to friendly-held islands off the Korean coast and formed the United Nations

Partisan Forces, Korea. Volckmann had been reassigned from Fort Benning, where he was developing

counterguerrilla training, to Korea in order to work with these partisan and plan behind-the-lines

operations. The partisans were trained, supported, and directed by the Army, Air Force, and Central

Intelligence Agency. In 1951, the partisans—organized as the 8240th Army Unit—were given the mission

to establish a resistance net in North Korea in anticipation of a United Nations offensive to liberate all or

part of North Korea—an offensive that never did occur. The primary United Nations objectives were to

maintain the status quo and negotiate a peace. As a result, the original covert mission gave way to small-

scale harassment against the enemy coastal flanks. The force strength of the partisans peaked at

approximately 23,000 before they eventually were inducted into the Republic of Korea Army. Partisan

forces reported

4,445 actions, resulting in

69,000 enemy casualties. This was the U.S. Army’s first

experience employing partisans against a Communist enemy, using some 200 U.S. Army personnel, and

would represent the first chance for the fledgling SF to conduct its designated mission. Very few SF

Soldiers made it to Korea, and most of those were individual replacements for conventional forces.

Although they contributed to the guerrilla warfare effort, their participation would not prove to be the event

that validated the new concept.

1-24. The first unit mission came as a result of an aborted uprising in East Germany on 11 November

1953. The possibility of capitalizing on this resistance to Communist occupation led to the decision to

deploy half of the 10th SFG to Bad Tolz, West Germany. Those SF Soldiers still in training at Fort Bragg

who did not deploy remained under the command of former Philippine guerrilla leader (then) Colonel

Donald Blackburn and were redesigned as the

77th SFG. As detachments became qualified and

operational, they were deployed to pre-stage in Thailand, Taiwan, Japan, Hawaii, and Vietnam. Several of

these detachments later relocated to Okinawa and formed the nucleus of the 1st SFG, activated in 1957.

The 77th SFG at Fort Bragg would later be redesignated the 7th SFG.

1-25. These original operational detachments were designed around the Office of Strategic Services

operational group construct and it was understood that they were independent or “detached” for operations.

The original designation for the operational element called the force area team A (FA) team came from

Volckmann’s 1951 FM 31-21, which referred to the forward element under SF as Guerrilla Force Area A.

Two years later, an FA team (equivalent to the modern SF operational detachment—alpha [ODA]) consisted

of 15 men and was designed to advise a regiment of 1,500 guerrillas. A force area team B (FB) team

(equivalent to a modern SF operational detachment—bravo [ODB] or SF company headquarters) was also

principally a guerrilla advisory element, but could also command two or more FA teams. A force area team C

(FC) team (SF operational detachment C or SF battalion headquarters equivalent) was the next level of

advisory and could also command FA and FB teams. The force area team D (FD) team, called the group

headquarters, could command the entire group and manage guerrilla campaigns in two or more countries.

28 May 2014

FM 3-18

1-5

Chapter 1

1-26. All these elements were to deploy under the command and control of a theater SF command later

designated the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force. Administrative teams (AA and AB teams) were

support elements for the FA and FB teams before deployment. Once teams went forward to link up with

area guerrilla forces, AA and AB teams melded with the group headquarters. The organization was very

flexible when forward. In the rear, it appeared as teams run by captains within companies run by lieutenant

colonels, under one group headquarters commanded by a colonel. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the

force was organized into groups, battalions, companies, and teams—similar to a conventional infantry

formation.

1-27. The Cold War provided other opportunities for employment of SF units. During August 1956, six SF

operational A detachments of the 10th SFG stationed at Flint Kaserne in Bad Tolz, West Germany, were

reassigned to West Berlin under the 7761st Army Unit (subsequently known as 39th Special Forces

Operational Detachment) and embedded within Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 6th Infantry

Regiment. Their mission was stay-behind UW. In April 1958, the unit found its final home at Andrews

Barracks, West Berlin, and was assigned to HHC, U.S. Army Garrison Berlin, with a new name—

Detachment A (or Det. A). Later the unit became Detachment A, Berlin Brigade, U.S. Army Europe, which

it remained until its deactivation in 1984.

1-28. In 1955, SF received its first publicity—two articles in the New York Times announcing the existence

of a U.S. Army “liberation force” designed to fight behind enemy lines. The Times correspondent noted the

distinct foreign nature of the SF, as many of its volunteers were refugees from Eastern Europe.

Photographs showed 10th SFG troops wearing berets with their faces blacked out in the photos to conceal

their identity. As the 10th SFG became established in Germany, a new item of headgear—the green

beret—appeared in rapidly increasing numbers. The group commander, Colonel Eckman, authorized the

wear of the beret and it became unit policy in 1954. By 1955, every SF Soldier in Germany was wearing

the green beret as a permanent part of his uniform. The Department of the Army, however, did not

recognize the headgear.

INDOCHINA

1-29. The Peoples Revolution in China and the Korean Conflict set the stage for the Cold War sweeping

across Asia. Stopping the spread of Communism became foreign policy in the region—much like stopping

the spread of global terror is today. In 1953, Dwight Eisenhower appointed Office of Strategic Services

founder William Donovan as the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand. Brigadier General McClure, who stood up

the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, was retasked by Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton

Collins to become the chief of the U.S. military mission to Iran. McClure participated in Operation AJAX,

considered the Central Intelligence Agency’s first successful covert regime change/UW operation. Around

the world, pieces were being put into place by the United States to resist Communism and establish stable

governments that would serve as allies in the same effort. With the onset of nuclear deterrence, men like

Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor identified the need to fight limited warfare. General Taylor’s

book, The Uncertain Trumpet, was used by (then) Massachusetts Senator, John F. Kennedy, during the

1960 presidential campaign to criticize Eisenhower’s defense policies.

1-30. In 1959, 149 members of 77th SFG (redesignated the 7th SFG in 1960) deployed to Laos to enhance,

and later replace, the French Military Mission in order to train and advise the Royal Laotian Army in a

then-clandestine mission Operation HOTFOOT. This mission marked the first SF deployment to a country

to counter an active insurgency. At the same time SF teams worked with the Central Intelligence Agency in

northern Laos, which had been acknowledged as a separate state in the 1954 Geneva Accords, to train and

advise over 30,000 indigenous Mien, Khmu, and Hmong hill tribesmen in an ongoing Central Intelligence

Agency-run UW operation against the communist Pathet Lao and Viet Minh occupiers. A principal

objective of North Vietnam was to maintain access into South Vietnam through Laos. The second rotation,

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Arthur “Bull” Simons, brought in 12 more ODAs as mobile training

teams in what was then called Operation WHITESTAR. President Kennedy authorized the withdrawal of

WHITESTAR Teams in 1962, and the Military Assistance Advisory Group was moved to Thailand.

Today, a granite monument located on the way to the John F. Kennedy memorial at the Arlington National

Cemetery commemorates the Hmong and other ethnic tribesmen for the military support given during the

fight against Communism in Laos.

1-6

FM 3-18

28 May 2014

The History of United States Army Special Forces

1-31. In 1960, the U.S. Army assigned an official lineage to SF consisting of various elite special-purpose

units (such as Roger’s Rangers, World War II Ranger battalions, and 1st Special Service Force). In

response, Colonel Bank wrote that “the only precursor of U.S. Army Special Forces is the Office of

Strategic Services.” In 1986, the Ranger lineage was removed and made part of the lineage of the newly

created Ranger battalions. Lineage and honors are established by the Center for Military History in

accordance with AR 870-5. When units are scheduled for activation, the Center for Military History

reviews all inactive units and selects the one with the best history in an effort to establish continuity, entitle

honors and heraldic items, and pass on organizational historical property. The problem with SF’s lineage is

that the true origin was a civilian organization—the Office of Strategic Services—which could not be

considered. Disbanded elite units were the next-best option; therefore, the 1st Special Service Force is the

official heritage for 1st Special Forces, along with all its campaign participation credits from World War II.

It is for this reason that 1st Special Forces and all the SFGs in the regiment are given credit for Aleutian

Islands, Naples-Foggia, Anzio, Rome-Arno, Southern France, and Rhineland. Secondly, and perhaps of

greater relevance in this case, the Secretary of the Army may endow honors to an organization when there

is no lineal connection in order to entrust an active organization to properly conserve the heritage of a

magnificent military unit. This heritage has been entrusted to 1st Special Forces Regiment.

1-32. In 1961, President Kennedy inherited a defense policy based on nuclear deterrence. To meet this

challenge, the Air Force chose bomber wings, the Navy chose nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers, and

the Army chose large pentomic divisions geared to fight nuclear warfare, which soon after evolved into

brigades of armor and mechanized infantry. The Marine Corps was the only ground force that might be

suitable for counterguerrilla operations, but they were reluctant to opt for organizing around small units

and chose a vertical envelopment concept using rotary-wing aviation. Up to this point, SF had remained

small and insignificant. This would all change when President Kennedy decided that a counterinsurgency

capability was a critical missing piece in his defense strategy. Under Kennedy’s leadership, SF expanded

rapidly. The 10th SFG in Bad Tolz, the 1st SFG in Okinawa, and the 7th SFG at Fort Bragg increased

fourfold in authorized strength to 1,500 men each. Other groups were planned to cover responsibilities in

other parts of the world. Three groups were activated in 1961: the 11th SFG, the 12th SFG, and the 5th

SFG, which saw extensive action in Vietnam. Three more groups were activated in 1963—the 6th SFG to

cover Southwest Asia, the 8th SFG in the Panama Canal Zone and responsible for Latin America, and the

3d SFG at Fort Bragg to cover Africa and parts of the Middle East. The President also authorized the wear

of the green beret as a mark of distinction.

1-33. President Kennedy issued National Security Action Memorandum 124, Establishment of the Special

Group Counter-Insurgency, in January 1962. National Security Action Memorandum 124 stated that

subversive insurgency (what the Soviets called “wars of national liberation”) is a major form of politico-

military conflict “equal in importance to conventional warfare.” The Special Group would ensure that such

recognition is reflected in the organization, training, equipment, and doctrine of the U.S. Armed Forces.

The specific areas of interest named were Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand. On 6 June 1962, Kennedy

addressed the graduating class at the United States Military Academy at West Point:

Whatever your position, the scope of your decisions will not be confined to the

traditional tenets of military competence and training. You will need to know and

understand not only the foreign policy of the United States but the foreign policy of all

countries scattered around the world who 20 years ago were the most distant names to

us. You will need to give orders in different tongues

You will be involved in

economic judgments

In many countries, your posture and performance will provide

the local population with the only evidence of what our country is really like. In other

countries, your military mission, its advice and action, will play a key role in determining

whether those people will remain free. You will need to understand the importance of

military power and also the limits of military power, to decide what arms should be used

to fight and when they should be used to prevent a fight, to determine what represents

our vital interests and what interests are only marginal. Above all, you will have a

responsibility to deter war as well as to fight it. For the basic problems facing the world

today are not susceptible of a final military solution.

28 May 2014

FM 3-18

1-7

Chapter 1

1-34. The Overseas Internal Defense Policy issued by the State Department in September 1962 called on

the DOD to develop U.S. military forces trained for employment in UW and counterguerrilla and other

military counterinsurgency operations, and to develop language-trained and area-oriented U.S. forces for

possible employment in training, advising, or operational support to indigenous security forces. Internal

defense is defined at the full range of measures taken by a government to protect its society from

subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

1-35. After the Kennedy years, the modern era of SF began. Green Berets now had their two principal

capabilities—UW and FID (the former by design and the latter by Cold War exigencies). In the years that

followed, SF would be called upon to conduct all types of contingency operations, but would stand out

most in UW and FID missions. The basic organization, doctrine, recruitment, and training designed by

Bank, Fertig, and Volckmann proved to be flexible, durable, and versatile for a broad range of military

operations especially against problems that proved resistant to an orthodox military approach.

VIETNAM

1-36. In Vietnam, SF was among the first military units into the theater in the late 1950s and by the early

sixties was positioned throughout South Vietnam. SF teams worked as advisors to the Vietnamese Army

and the Civilian Irregular Defense Group, trained and led quick-reaction units called Mike Forces, and

conducted cross-border operations through such units as the Military Assistance Command Vietnam—

Studies and Observation Group. Vietnam became a watershed in the history of SF, spanning over 14 years

from 1956, when a 16-member detachment deployed to Vietnam to train a cadre of indigenous Vietnamese

SF teams. Throughout the remainder of the 1950s and early 1960s, the number of SF advisors in Vietnam

increased steadily. The 5th SFG had been activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to handle the increasing

scope and complexity of missions in Vietnam. Signed

28 June

1961, National Security Action

Memorandum 57, Responsibility for Paramilitary Operations, directed all overt SF paramilitary activities

be transferred from the Central Intelligence Agency to the DOD.

1-37. By February 1963, the 5th SFG established a permanent headquarters in Nha Trang, making

Vietnam the exclusive operational province of the

5th SFG. SF troops eventually established

approximately 254 outposts throughout the country—many of them defended by a single A team and

hundreds of friendly natives. Responsible for training thousands of Vietnam’s ethnic tribesmen in the

techniques of modern warfare, SF Soldiers took the Montagnards, the Nungs, the Cao Dei, and others, and

molded them into the 60,000-strong Civil Irregular Defense Group. Other missions included civic-action

projects, in which SF Soldiers built schools, hospitals, and government buildings, provided medical care to

civilians, and dredged canals. These missions were designed to win the “hearts and minds” of the local

population. Gradually, SF turned over its camps to the South Vietnamese, and on 5 March 1971, the

5th SFG returned to Fort Bragg.

1-38. The role of SF in Vietnam was not completely over as some Soldiers continued to serve in various

covert missions. In Vietnam, Communist forces depended upon the Ho Chi Minh Trail as their logistical

lifeline. Located in Cambodia and Laos, the trail was considered off-limits to U.S. forces. To gather

intelligence on supply movements down the trail and to interdict operations, the Military Assistance

Command Vietnam—Studies and Observation Group was formed to run clandestine combat operations

across the border. The teams from Military Assistance Command Vietnam—Studies and Observation

Group were American-led and manned with indigenous forces. In this example of the versatility of SF,

these teams and successor units provided needed and timely intelligence for the conventional Army. In

recognition of their actions in Vietnam, the men assigned to the 5th SFG received 16 of the 17 Medals of

Honor awarded to SF Soldiers in theater (the other was awarded to a Soldier from the 7th SFG).

MODERN SPECIAL FORCES

1-39. After Vietnam, lessons learned were quickly forgotten. The 1st, 3d, 6th, and 8th SFGs were

deactivated. Among military leadership, counterinsurgency fell into disrepute. The country was

disillusioned with military intervention after a second unsatisfying incursion in Southeast Asia. The Army

doctrine once again focused on fighting the modern mechanized forces of the Warsaw Pact. The Army capstone

manual—FM 100-5, Operations (1976)—focused exclusively on battle in central Europe. Winning wars

1-8

FM 3-18

28 May 2014

The History of United States Army Special Forces

required superior weapons combined with crews and leaders who could effectively employ them to best

effects. In that environment, SF found relevancy by providing reconnaissance in support of conventional

forces in major combat operations. Special operations budgets dropped from $1 billion in 1969 to less than

$100 million in 1975. Army SF declined from 13,000 string in 1971 to less than 3,000 Green Berets in

1974. Throughout those lean years, the focus of Army SF training at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare

Center changed little since its inception in 1952. The school for special warfare continued to select and

train SF personnel to organize, train, and employ a guerrilla force. Military involvements once known as

low-intensity conflicts lay ahead and with them came the need for both special warfare capabilities—

counterinsurgency and UW.

1-40. During the 1980s, defense received renewed emphasis. 1st SFG was reactivated to cover threats in

the Pacific Rim nations. The 3d SFG was reactivated in 1990, reflecting increased concerns in the

Caribbean and the African continent. The 7th SFG played a critical role in suppressing the rise of guerrilla

movements and containing the spread of Communism in Central and South America by strengthening

military capabilities of democratic regimes. This group deployed to El Salvador and developed an effective

counterinsurgency force. Soldiers from the 7th SFG also helped the Honduran military resist and defeat an

invasion from Nicaragua and a Communist-supported insurgency. During the second half of 1980, the

7th SFG assisted in counternarcotics operations in Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.

1-41. SF would be institutionally revitalized by way of the

1987 Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the

Goldwater-Nichols Act. This legislation effectively placed SOF and low-intensity conflict advocates in the

upper levels of the DOD, formalizing the view that SOF were the most appropriate service elements to

conduct low-intensity conflict.

1-42. This brief history focuses on the genesis of SF—when Green Berets developed the skill sets needed

for special warfare. Those early years created the organization, methods, and mindset that set the stage for

a renaissance of UW after 11 September 2001, when operational detachments played a central role in a

crushing defeat of our nation’s enemies in Afghanistan during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. UW

gained national prominence with images of

“horse Soldiers.” Operation IRAQI FREEDOM also

showcased how small numbers of SF teams, linked with indigenous resistance, could support major combat

operations by preventing 13 Iraqi divisions from reinforcing units defending Baghdad.

1-43. When President Kennedy visited Fort Bragg in 1961, SF had grown to over 3,000 Soldiers in three

SFGs and the Special Warfare Center and School. Through his endorsement—formal and informal—the

President ensured that the U.S. Army SF would be known worldwide as the Green Berets. With President

Kennedy’s advocacy and direct support, SF grew from three to 11 SFGs by the end of 1963, with seven

active SFGs and four additional SFGs in the National Guard and Army Reserve. His words to the SF

Commander at Fort Bragg, Brigadier General William P. Yarborough, continue to inspire:

I know that you and the members of your command will carry on for us and the free

world in a manner which is both worthy and inspiring. I am sure that the Green Beret

will be a mark of distinction in the trying times ahead.

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Chapter 2

The Role of Special Forces

This is another type of warfare—new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by

guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, and assassins—war by ambush instead of combat, by

infiltration instead of aggression—seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the

enemy instead of engaging him

It requires, in those situations where we must

counter it if freedom is to be saved, a wholly new kind of strategy, a wholly different

kind of force, and therefore a wholly new and different kind of military leadership and

training.

President John F. Kennedy, 1962

Characterized by a highly adaptive culture and a versatile organization, SFGs

conduct operations that have operational and strategic implications. SF Soldiers

operate across the range of military operations, integrating their capabilities with

joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational interaction, or with force-

multiplying operations with indigenous groups and coalition forces as part of a larger

effort. At any given time, SF teams are conducting these types of operations in

dozens of countries worldwide.

INTRODUCTION

2-1. SF conducts operations in all operational environments, but is best suited for hostile and uncertain

environments. SF can be tailored to achieve not only military objectives through application of SOF

capabilities for which there are no broad conventional force requirements, but also to support the

application of the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power. SF operations

are typically low visibility or clandestine. SF activities are applicable across the range of military

operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces,

other government agencies, or HNs/partner nations, and may include operations with or through

indigenous, insurgent, and/or irregular forces. SF operations differ from conventional operations in degree

of political sensitivity and operational risk, dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous

assets, operational techniques, and modes of employment.

2-2. The sensitivity of these operations requires a highly mature and culturally intelligent force that is

effective in ambiguous, asymmetric, and often austere environments. SF Soldiers are adaptive—a quality

based on a selection process that evaluates critical thinking, comfort with ambiguity, acceptance of prudent

risk, and the ability to make rapid adjustments based upon a continuous assessment of the situation. The

key to SF success is a selection and training program designed to identify and educate Soldiers with the

character and attributes necessary to thrive in complex and ambiguous environments. SF training and

education programs develop complex problem solvers that can thrive as force multipliers in hostile and

unfamiliar environments. Central to the development of the SF Soldier are a deep understanding of cultures

and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to fight alongside indigenous combat

formations in a permissive or uncertain environment. These skills are built upon continued training in

regional orientation and language qualification, skills in team building, cross-cultural communication, and

interpersonal relations. While other SOF may share some of the SF principal tasks, the SF role is unique

and characterized by its emphasis on UW capabilities. SF Soldiers are routinely entrusted to conduct

autonomous operations in remote places and in uncertain—and often hostile—environments. In these

circumstances a U.S. Army captain or staff sergeant can create strategic effects as they develop indirect

solutions by working with and through indigenous populations

28 May 2014

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2-1

Chapter 2

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

2-3. SF operations historically have been used to shape the environment, to conduct condition-setting

activities, and to enable maneuver warfare or other operations. The discreet, precise, and scalable nature of

SF operations often makes them a more attractive option in instances where a large force structure may be

inappropriate or counterproductive or may incur political risk. When used effectively, these types of

operations can yield disproportional benefits.

2-4. SF operations are one means by which the President of the United States, Secretary of Defense,

Department of State country teams, and geographic combatant commanders

(GCCs) can shape an

environment to support the U.S. National Security Strategy. The National Security Strategy prepared by the

Executive Branch for Congress, outlines the major national security concerns of the United States and how

the administration plans to deal with them. It provides a broad strategic context for employing military

capabilities in concert with other instruments of national power. SF contributes to the National Security

Strategy in the following ways:

As an instrument to implement or enforce U.S. National Security Strategy outside of an overt

military campaign, SF specializes in persistent engagement. SF implements the National

Security Strategy developed within a strategic security environment characterized by

uncertainty, complexity, rapid change, and persistent conflict. They possess capabilities that

enable both lethal and nonlethal missions specifically designed to influence threat, friendly, and

neutral audiences. They shape foreign political and military environments by working with HNs,

regional partners, and indigenous populations and their institutions. Such proactive shaping can

help prevent insurgencies and/or conflicts from destabilizing partners and ultimately deter

conflict, prevail in war, or succeed in a wide range of potential contingencies.

In support of a military campaign, SF acts as a force multiplier through UW and extends the

operational reach to influence and strike enemy forces throughout their depth. The use of SF to

organize, train, and employ indigenous forces operating in the enemy rear area prevents

effective employment of reserves, disrupts command and control and logistics, and forces the

enemy to cope with U.S. actions throughout its entire physical, temporal, and organizational

depth. Utilizing indigenous information networks provides powerful tools for leaders to

synchronize efforts. Synchronized efforts between conventional and unconventional forces offer

Army leaders with the capability to integrate actions along with interagency and multinational

efforts to overwhelm the enemy and achieve decisive results. UW is the signature excellence of

SF. Whether used as a supporting effort to major combat operations or as an alternative, UW

strikes the enemy in times, places, and manners for which the enemy is not prepared, seizing the

initiative by forcing the enemy to defend everywhere at once.

2-5. Two keys in achieving tactical, operational, and strategic successes are flexibility and adaptability.

U.S. Army SF Soldiers work in small teams and are well known for taking initiative, acting quickly, and

having an affinity for innovation in thought, plans, and operations—all important factors in a flexible

organization. This type of flexibility allows small-footprint, politically sensitive responses when large-scale

military employment may be inappropriate or denied. Adaptability first requires an understanding of the

operational environment. Sustained engagement around the world, along with scalable features, makes SF

teams the most ubiquitous ground forces with both lethal and nonlethal capabilities. Their low profile and

an inherent need to network with interagency partners, indigenous populations, and indigenous systems

reflect the adaptive nature of SF teams. Their widespread and persistent engagement makes SF teams agile

and responsive to rapidly changing regional situations that affect our national security interests.

2-6. The

2010 National Security Strategy reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to retaining its global

leadership role and defined U.S. enduring national interests as follows:

The security of the United States, its citizens, allies, and partners.

A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that

promotes opportunity and prosperity.

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The Role of Special Forces

Respect for universal values at home and around the world.

An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and

opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.

2-7. The National Security Strategy and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review together guide the

establishment of U.S. national military objectives as follows:

Counter violent extremism.

Deter and defeat aggression.

Strengthen international and regional security.

Shape the future force.

2-8. The

2012 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for

21st Century Defense articulates

strategic guidance for the DOD after a decade of war. It shapes a joint force for the future that will be

smaller and leaner, but agile, flexible, technologically advanced, and ready to confront and defeat

aggression anywhere in the world. It projects a changing security environment of complex challenges and

opportunities. Basic tenets include the following:

Rebalance engagement toward the Asia-Pacific region while continuing defense efforts in the

Middle East.

Conduct counterterrorism and irregular warfare.

Deter and defeat aggression in one region while committed to large-scale operations elsewhere.

Project power despite anti-access and area-denial challenges.

Counter weapons of mass destruction.

Operate effectively in cyberspace and space.

Maintain a nuclear deterrent.

Defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities.

Provide a stabilizing presence abroad during a significant reduction in resources.

Conduct limited stability and counterinsurgency operations.

Conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations.

2-9. SF plays a vital role in supporting U.S. national strategy. Through varying applications of UW, FID,

counterinsurgency, preparation of the environment, security force assistance, direct action, special

reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, SF has proven

its utility in conflict, cold war, and contingency operations. SF discretely shapes the operational

environment in both peace and complex uncertainty. SF strengthens U.S. interests by sustained

engagement with allies and partners.

2-10. SF units normally conduct special operations supporting the theater special operations command

(TSOC) within the GCC’s area of responsibility. These operations are conducted in support of the U.S.

Ambassador and country team or in conjunction with joint operations being conducted in accordance with

a command relationship established by the designated joint force commander (JFC). In either situation, SF

offers military options for situations requiring subtle, indirect, or low-visibility applications. The small size

and unique capabilities of SF give the United States a variety of appropriate military responses. These

responses typically do not entail the same degree of political sensitivity or risk of escalation normally

associated with the employment of a larger and more visible force.

LEVELS OF WAR

2-11. SF units conduct operations in either an overt, low-visibility, or clandestine manner at the tactical

level; however, the effects of these operations can have significance at the operational and strategic levels

of war. All members of SF must pay close attention to how tactical tasks lead to campaign objectives and

how those campaign objectives meet national security goals.

2-12. Operations at the strategic level focus on meeting the end-state objectives of national and theater

policy. Decisions at this level reflect national and multinational goals, integrate the instruments of national

power, provide forces, and determine constraints and restraints necessary for the effective use of available

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forces. The President, Secretary of Defense, and the GCCs determine the strategic national and theater

objectives. They also determine the manner of military means to meet these objectives. The President,

Secretary of Defense, or the GCCs may directly or indirectly (through subordinate commanders) integrate

and employ SF in pursuit of these objectives.

2-13. The operational level focuses on theater campaigns and major operations. JFCs determine

operational objectives that lead to the attainment of strategic theater objectives. These objectives are

obtained through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations, which in turn

guide tactical events. A GCC or subordinate commanders (through the GCC) can request SF as part of the

joint force organization to achieve these operational goals.

2-14. The tactical level of operations focuses on battles and engagements. Decisions at this level apply

combat power to create advantages while in contact with or close to the enemy. SF may support tactical

actions (offense, defense, and stability tasks) designed to have significant effects in obtaining operational

objectives. Tactical-level operations normally rely on standard Army small-unit tactics but may include

advanced methods of infiltration and/or exfiltration, as well as special equipment and techniques.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

2-15. SF conducts operations in all operational environments, which are defined as “a composite of the

conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the

decisions of the commander” (JP 3-0). Permissive environments are those in which host-country military

and law enforcement agencies have control, as well as the intent and capability, to assist operations that a

unit intends to conduct. In uncertain environments, host-government forces, whether opposed or receptive

to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have effective control of the territory and population in

the intended operational area. These operational environments are not static. This ability of SF to work in

both environments allows a tailored mix of the offensive, defensive, and stability tasks that results in

deterrence of conflict or a favorable conflict resolution. Denied areas are areas that are operationally

unsuitable for conventional forces because of political, tactical, environmental, or geographical reasons. It

is a primary area for SOF (FM 3-05). Physical movement is what is commonly referred to when access or

movement is denied, such as the East/West Wall that existed in Berlin. This is not the case when dealing in

today’s dynamic world with all of the variables that it has to offer, to include cyberspace.

Permissive Environment

2-16. SF provides a unique capability for the GCC’s peacetime campaign strategy to gain or maintain U.S.

access to strategically important foreign countries, to demonstrate U.S. commitment or resolve, or to

otherwise contribute to collective security. An example of this includes sustained engagement through the

theater security cooperation plan in which SF conducts joint combined exchange training, counternarcotics

training, and other activities in support of the GCC. Strategies for peacetime SF operations are to prevent

conflict through early intervention or to deter a crisis. SF units can be employed to help convince hostile

powers to respect U.S. and HN national interests and to refrain from acts of international aggression and

coercion.

Uncertain Environment

2-17. As crises develop, regional expertise and sustained engagement enable SF teams to assess, as well as

shape, events. SF conducts a variety of missions based upon the GCC’s campaign plan. Early use of SF to

preempt or resolve a crisis can preclude the need to involve U.S. conventional forces. In addition, early use

of SF can help set the conditions for successful rapid and decisive operations through preparation of the

environment. The broad distribution of SF missions and training activities in a given theater during

peacetime or periods of uncertainty make SF widely available to precede conventional forces into a hostile

area.

2-18. In the early stages of developing crises, the commitment of conventional combat forces may be

premature, inappropriate, or infeasible, and may risk further escalation. In these situations—when political,

economic, and diplomatic means are inadequate to respond to a conflict—the SFGs give the President and

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The Role of Special Forces

Secretary of Defense options for discriminate engagement precluding or limiting the need to employ

conventional combat forces. The low visibility of SF operations helps the United States and its allies to

maintain diplomatic flexibility. SF operations may also allow other powers (friendly, neutral, and hostile)

to accept the outcome of multinational operations because they avoid the publicity of a more obvious use

of military force.

2-19. When providing support to HNs and partner nations during FID, counterinsurgency, or

counternarcotics operations, SF maintains a predominantly proactive (rather than reactionary) posture.

Whenever suitable and feasible, SF organizes, trains, and supports (or directs) indigenous combat forces to

locate and destroy hostile insurgent forces in contested areas. An example of this would be the partnership

between SF and Afghan commando units. While some SF elements worked with Afghan local police in a

primarily local defensive posture generating intelligence packets, SF and Afghan commando elements

supported this by conducting limited offensive strikes against identified targets. Another example is the

support SF has given to Colombian counterinsurgent and counternarcotics units, thereby enabling them to

aggressively take the fight to the enemy.

Denied Areas

2-20. Whether already present or able to move quickly because of proximity, SF can usually be in a denied

area well before conventional forces. SF can provide early critical information and ground truth to the

commander and help set the conditions for conventional force operations unilateral special operations.

Such operations may discreetly extend into the homeland of a hostile power. During war, the strategic role

for SF is to focus on the long-term capacity of the hostile power to continue hostilities. SF may infiltrate

into denied areas to support resistance forces and to collect and report information of national strategic

importance.

2-21. The GCC may employ SF to interdict the advance of hostile forces to gain more time for employing

conventional forces. SF may perform special reconnaissance tasks at the theater strategic level to identify

hostile capabilities, intentions, and activities of importance to the GCC. As a strategic economy of force,

SF can be employed to delay, disrupt, or harass hostile reinforcing forces or divert them to secondary areas

of operations to alter the momentum and tempo of hostile operations. One of the core proficiencies of SF is

the role of the combat advisor. In the context of UW, SF elements function as advisors and trainers to

indigenous forces in denied areas.

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS WITHIN THE RANGE

OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

2-22. The United States employs SF capabilities in support of national security goals. These employments

vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity within the range of military operations. These operations extend

from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence, to crisis response and limited contingency

operations and, if necessary, major operations and campaigns. In support of unified land operations—Army

capstone doctrine—SF provides forces adept at running simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability

tasks or defense support of civil authorities. SF is further defined through the use of its critical capabilities:

special warfare and surgical strike. Special warfare is the execution of activities that involve a combination

of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep

understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build

and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.

(ADP 3-05). Surgical strike is the execution of activities in a precise manner that employ special operations

forces in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or

damage designated targets, or influence threats (ADP 3-05). These capabilities are relevant and valuable

throughout the entire range of military operations. Use of SF capabilities in military engagement, security

cooperation, and deterrence activities helps shape the operational environment and can keep the day-to-day

tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining U.S. global

influence. Many of the missions associated with limited contingencies, such as foreign humanitarian

assistance, do not require combat. Others, such as the humanitarian mission turned broader stability

mission in Somalia in the early 1990s, for example, can be extremely dangerous and require a significant

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Chapter 2

effort to protect U.S. forces while accomplishing the mission. Individual major operations and campaigns

often contribute to a larger, long-term effort. For example, as significant as combat and other activities

have been in Afghanistan and Iraq since 11 September 2001, they are only a part of global operations

against terrorist networks. The nature of the security environment is such that SF is often engaged in

several types of joint operations simultaneously.

ARMY UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

2-23. The term “unified land operations” describes the Army’s warfighting doctrine. It is based on the

central idea that the Army units seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain position of relative advantage

over the enemy. This foundation of unified land operations is built on initiative, decisive action, and

mission command. Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability tasks or defense support of

civil authorities simultaneously to set the conditions for conflict resolution. This operational concept

recognizes the three-dimensional nature of modern warfare and the need to conduct a fluid mix of

offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. Unified effort among friendly forces—across all operational

environments and against diverse and unpredictable threats—is critical to success.

2-24. The SF persistent presence around the world, the cultural expertise developed through education and

sustained regional engagement, and advanced (often classified) skills make SF especially valuable during

the shape and deter phases of an operational plan (Figure 2-1, page 2-7), and described in greater detail in

ADP 3-05). As part of a dedicated UW campaign, SF, along with Army special operations forces

(ARSOF), joint, and interagency partners, may even prevent situations from developing into major combat

operations. Concurrently in these early phases, SF can conduct FID in countries adjacent to the targeted

area, which can indirectly influence (shape) the situation.

2-25. Army special operations are executed throughout the range of military operations; however, Army

special operations in the shape and deter phases focus on preventing conflict. The graphically extended

shape phase depicted on both ends of the notional operational plan phases (Figure 2-1, page 2-7) highlights

the disproportionate amount of time that should be spent in this phase. During the seize initiative and

dominate phases, SF capabilities to unilaterally conduct direct action, special reconnaissance,

counterterrorism, and other operations could be an integral part of the larger campaign plan. Initiative can

be gained by organizing, leading, and amplifying the effects of indigenous partners and by integrating their

activities with the larger campaign. UW or FID in support of larger conventional efforts provides the JFC

with potentially crucial options in economy of force, surprise, maneuver, and otherwise unavailable

intelligence advantages.

2-26. Developed relationships and operational experience between SF teams and their indigenous partners

who supported U.S.-led major combat operations will ultimately make the JFC’s task easier in the stabilize

and enable civil authority phases. SF and other ARSOF in Civil Affairs (CA) and Military Information

Support (MIS) are excellent resources for transitioning from conflict to a steady state. Although some

combat roles for SF teams and their indigenous partners may continue in these phases—especially if the

operation becomes a counterinsurgency effort—most likely SF will then concentrate on FID and assistance

with integrating Civil Affairs operations (CAO) and Military Information Support Operations (MISO) to

build capacity and confidence in the security sector, which will enable success in all other sectors needed

for development. Sustained SF engagement in the complex postconflict environment provides the civil

authorities with experience and mature forces that understand the population and can perceive the

transitional threats before they become entrenched obstacles to stabilization.

SPECIAL FORCES-CONVENTIONAL FORCE COORDINATION

AND INTEGRATION

2-27. Recent operations overseas often produced situations where conventional forces and SF operated

simultaneously in the same area of operations and in close proximity. FM 6-05 establishes tactics,

techniques, and procedures and aids conventional and SOF commanders and staffs. It provides the

information and coordination required to ensure effective integration and interoperability between

conventional forces and SOF.

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The Role of Special Forces

Figure 2-1. Role of Army special operations forces

2-28. In order to generate increased operational effectiveness, SF and conventional forces must not lose

key lessons learned and must plan, coordinate, and synchronize operations to achieve the maximum

effectiveness of their respective capabilities. This necessitates greater interoperability and, in specific

situations, the integration of SF and conventional force processes, capabilities, and/or units to achieve

operational objectives. A more cohesive SF and conventional forces effort to enhance interoperability and

integration improves the ability to execute operations by combining the capability advantages of each

force.

2-29. Key to the successful integration of SF and conventional forces is understanding and appreciating

the capabilities and limitations of each force, especially by the leaders of each. This should include the

capability to support differing missions, specific force limitations and shortfalls, HN and multinational

force capabilities, and unique operational capabilities. Input from exchanged liaison officers is essential to

provide this understanding to unit planners and staffs.

2-30. Commanders and staffs must understand the command and support relationships. Once JFC

establishes the command and support relationships, the SF and conventional force commanders must

clearly understand the supported and supporting command relationship. It is important that both

commanders achieve a common understanding of the supported and supporting relationships during

operations, fires, logistics, and unified action partners’ integration.

2-31. Even when supporting and supported relationships are established, it is critical to clearly state what

support is to be provided when and where by each force to the other, with particular emphasis on

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Chapter 2

intelligence, fires, and sustainment support. Further, both forces must understand the control measures in

place by each force for maneuver, fires, and aviation in order to ensure support is provided when and

where needed and to avoid any possibility of fratricide or delayed support.

2-32. Conventional forces and SF units should meet and integrate early to foster the relationship, instill the

one team—one fight mentality, understand each other’s staff planning procedures, and defuse any

misconceptions or friction points. If possible, units should attend training events together at training centers

or as part of joint exercises. Best practices include traveling to one’s home station, briefing each other’s

capabilities and limitations, mission goals, and linking up staff function sections. Ideally, a relationship is

already established through a regional focus and habitual relationship with the corresponding TSOCs.

2-33. During operations, commanders must understand and synchronize each other’s mission planning

cycle, operations and intelligence processes, and mission approval processes. Mission type orders are

optimal to convey the commander’s intent to permit flexibility, initiative, and responsiveness. Coordinated

rehearsals between conventional forces and SOF provide the best means of reducing missed opportunities,

unnecessary delays, and the potential for fratricide during operations.

2-34. Conventional forces and SF intelligence sharing and collaboration must occur at every level to find

and develop targets and aid in preparing for future operations. Information considered unimportant to one

may be the critical missing piece for the other. Conventional forces and SF intelligence personnel should

keep in constant contact with each other. To facilitate this constant sharing, organizations can establish

fusion centers to integrate conventional forces and SOF information and operations. The information and

intelligence produced and disseminated by a fusion center assists commanders and staffs in developing

future operations (for example, targeting [nonlethal or lethal actions]).

2-35. Fusion centers mark a significant improvement to dynamic operational support by integrating

mission command with focused analysis within a single centralized entity. Whereas intelligence fusion

centers may be the most common or well known, these centers are not necessarily intelligence-led

organizations. A fusion center is an ad hoc collaborative effort between several units, organizations, or

agencies that provide resources, expertise, information, and intelligence to a center with the goal of

supporting the rapid execution of operations by contributing members. These centers are primarily

designed to focus collection and promote information sharing among multiple participants within a specific

geographic area or mission type. These centers are not operations centers. Commanders at various echelons

create fusion centers to manage the flow of information and intelligence, focus information collection to

satisfy information requirements, and process, exploit, analyze, and disseminate the resulting collection.

THE NATURE AND LIMITATIONS OF SPECIAL FORCES

2-36. SF is the largest component of ARSOF. As such, the nature and limitations of SF are represented in a

number of conceptual guidelines. These include operational characteristics and planning factor, special

operations mission criteria, and ARSOF (SF) capabilities, characteristics, and imperatives. It is essential

that JFCs commanding, cooperating with, or supporting SF clearly understand these criteria.

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONAL MISSION CRITERIA

2-37. The employment of SF in support of the joint force campaign or operation plan is facilitated by five

basic operational mission criteria. During operational planning, SF planners must be integrated with the

appropriate levels of authority to explain the capabilities and limitations of their units. The following five

criteria provide guidelines for conventional and SF commanders and planners to use when considering the

employment of SF:

It must be an appropriate SF mission or activity. SF should be used to achieve effects that

require its specific skills and capabilities. If the effects do not require those skills and

capabilities, SF should not be assigned. SF should not be used as a substitute for other forces.

The mission or tasks should support the JFC’s campaign or operation plan or special activities.

If the mission does not support the JFC’s campaign or major operation plan, more appropriate

missions available for SF should be considered instead.

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The Role of Special Forces

The mission or tasks must be operationally feasible. SF is not structured for attrition or force-on-

force warfare and should not be assigned missions beyond their capabilities. SF commanders

and their staffs must consider the vulnerability of SF units to larger, more heavily armed or

mobile forces, particularly in hostile territory.

Required resources must be available to execute the mission. Some SF missions require support

from other forces for success. Support involves aiding, protecting, complementing, and

sustaining employed SF. Support can include airlift, intelligence, communications, fires,

information operations, medical, logistics, space, weather, and security. Although a mission may

be appropriate for SF, insufficient resources may invalidate employing SF for that mission.

The expected outcome of the mission must justify the risks. Commanders must make sure the

benefits of successful mission execution justify the inherent risks. Risk management considers

not only the potential loss of SF units and equipment but also the risk of adverse effects to U.S.

diplomacy because of mission failure. Although SF may offer powerful tools for the JFC’s

campaign or operation, there may be some operations that SF can and will execute that make

only a marginal contribution.

SPECIAL FORCES CAPABILITIES

2-38. The signature capabilities of SF are a function of the quality of SF Soldiers, the training and

education of those Soldiers, and the mission profiles the Soldiers must execute. The challenging SF

selection process, coupled with advanced tactical training, language skills, and education produce an SF

Soldier who is adaptable, mature, innovative, culturally aware, self-assured, and self-reliant. Thus, policy

decisionmakers use SF to expand the range of available options. SF skills enable it to work as effectively

with civilian populations as with other military forces to influence situations favorably toward U.S.

national interests. This ability to apply discreet leverage is an invaluable SF contribution to the National

Security Strategy.

2-39. SF is a specially organized, trained, and equipped military force. It conducts special operations to

achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by generally unconventional means in

hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. SF operations differ from conventional force operations by

their degree of acceptable physical and political risk, their modes of employment, and their operational

techniques. SF may allow the GCC or JFC to achieve objectives typically beyond the capabilities of

conventional forces.

2-40. SF expands the options of the President, Secretary of Defense, country teams, and GCCs,

particularly in crises and contingencies that fall between wholly diplomatic initiatives and the overt use of

large conventional forces. The small size, rapid-reaction capability, and self-sufficient nature of SF

elements provide military options that do not involve the risk of escalation normally associated with larger,

more visible conventional forces. The use of SF provides decisionmakers with an option to prevent a

conflict or to limit its scope.

SPECIAL FORCES CHARACTERISTICS

2-41. To ensure missions selected for SF are compatible with their capabilities, commanders must be

familiar with the following SF characteristics:

SF personnel undergo careful selection processes or mission-specific training beyond basic

military skills to achieve entry-level special operations skills. Being proficient in these skills

makes rapid replacement or generation of personnel or capabilities highly unlikely.

Mature, experienced personnel make up SF. Many SF Soldiers maintain a high level of

competency in more than one military specialty.

Most SF Soldiers are regionally oriented for employment. Cross-cultural communication skills

are a routine part of their training.

SF conducts specific tactical operations by small units with unique talents that directly strike or

engage strategic and operational aims or objectives.

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Chapter 2

Planning for SF operations may begin at the combatant command, joint, or interagency level for

execution that requires extensive, rigorous rehearsal.

SF operations are frequently clandestine or low-visibility operations, or they may be combined

with overt operations. SF operations can be covert but require a declaration of war or a specific

finding approved by the President or the Secretary of Defense. SF can deploy at relatively low

cost with a low profile less intrusive than that of larger conventional forces.

Selected SF units often conduct activities at great distances from operational bases. These units

employ a sophisticated communications system and means of insertion, support, and extraction

to penetrate and return from hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.

SF operations occur throughout the range of military operations.

SF operations influence the will of foreign leadership to create conditions favorable to U.S.

strategic aims and objectives.

SF operations are often high-risk operations that have limited windows of execution and require

first-time success.

Employment of SF may require patient, long-term commitment and support to achieve U.S.

national goals in an area of operations. SF is ideally suited to perform operations through or

with indigenous populations.

SF operations require theater and, frequently, national-level intelligence support.

Selected SF operations require a detailed knowledge of the cultural nuances and languages of a

country or region where employed.

SF operations are inherently joint and sometimes multinational, requiring interagency and

international coordination. The contribution of SF to national security is greatest when SF is

fully integrated into the JFC’s plan at the earliest stages of planning.

SF can be task organized quickly and deployed rapidly to provide scalable responses to

situations.

SF can gain access to hostile and denied areas.

SF Soldiers can provide limited security and medical support for themselves and commonly rely

on indigenous capabilities.

SF can live in austere, harsh environments without extensive support. For long-duration

operations, SF requires support from the Army Service component command.

SF can survey and assess local situations and rapidly report these assessments.

SF works closely with regional military and civilian authorities and populations.

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IMPERATIVES

2-42. The following 12 ARSOF imperatives from ADRP 3-05 also apply to SF. These imperatives are the

foundation for planning and executing special operations in concert and integrated with other forces,

interagency partners, and foreign organizations. SF includes the applicable imperatives in their mission

planning and execution. The imperatives are—

Understand the Operational Environment. SF cannot shape the operational environment

without first gaining a clear understanding of the joint operations area, including civilian

influence and enemy and friendly capabilities. SF applies the political, military, economic,

social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, time operational variables to analyze

the operational area. SF must identify the friendly and hostile decisionmakers, their objectives

and strategies, and the ways they interact. The conditions of conflict can change and SF must

anticipate these changes in the operational environment and exploit fleeting opportunities.

Recognize Political Implications. Many SF operations are conducted to advance critical

political objectives. SF must understand that its actions can have international consequences.

Rules of engagement provide a framework that considers political implications. However, rules

of engagement cannot anticipate every situation. SF must understand the intent of the rules of

engagement and act accordingly, despite any military disadvantage that may result. The

advancement of the political objective may take precedence over the military disadvantages.

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The Role of Special Forces

Facilitate Interagency Activities. SF must actively and continuously coordinate its activities

with all relevant parties (U.S. and foreign military and nonmilitary organizations) to ensure

efficient use of all available resources and maintain unity of effort.

Engage the Threat Discriminately. SF discerns differences in the threats and engages each

accordingly. A direct action solution for one threat may be inappropriate for another, especially

if that threat could be bypassed or marginalized without loss or co-opted for great material or

political advantage.

Consider Long-Term Effects. SF must consider the political, economic, informational, and

military effects when faced with dilemmas because the solutions will have broad, far-reaching

effects. SF must accept legal and political constraints to avoid strategic failure while achieving

tactical success. SF must not jeopardize the success of national and GCC long-term objectives

by the desire for immediate or short-term effects. SF policies, plans, and operations must be

consistent with the national and theater priorities and objectives they support. Inconsistency can

lead to a loss of legitimacy and credibility at the national level.

Ensure Legitimacy and Credibility of Special Operations. Significant legal and policy

considerations apply to many SF activities. Legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing

and maintaining internal and international support. The United States cannot sustain its

assistance to a foreign power without this legitimacy. The concept of legitimacy is broader than

the strict legal definition contained in international law. The concept also includes the moral and

political legitimacy of a government or resistance organization. The people of the nation and the

international community determine its legitimacy based on collective perception of the

credibility of its cause and methods. SF, as a frequent choice as an early-entry force, must

ensure its actions and communications with the local populace and forces it is working with are

consistent with stated U.S. policy. Consistency of message and action is critical to legitimacy

and credibility. Without legitimacy and credibility, SF will not gain the support of foreign

indigenous elements, the U.S. population, or the international community. SF legal advisors

must review all sensitive aspects of SF mission planning and execution.

Anticipate and Control Psychological Effects. All special operations have significant

psychological effects that often are amplified by an increasingly pervasive electronic media

environment and the growing influence of social media. SF must integrate MISO and public

affairs into its activities, anticipating and countering threat information themes, as well as

managing the second- and third-order effects of operations on a population.

Operate With and Through Others. The primary role of SF in multinational operations is to

advise, train, and assist indigenous military and paramilitary forces. The supported non-U.S.

forces then serve as force multipliers in the pursuit of mutual security objectives with minimum

U.S. visibility, risk, and cost. SF also operates with and through indigenous government and

civil society leaders to shape the operational environment. The long-term self-sufficiency of the

HN militaries and civil authorities must assume primary authority and accept responsibility for

the success or failure of the mission. All U.S. efforts must reinforce and enhance the

effectiveness, legitimacy, and credibility of the supported foreign government or group.

Develop Multiple Options. ARSOF maintain their agility by developing a broad range of

options and contingency plans to provide flexible national and regional options. Keys to

operational flexibility include—

Developing contingency plans that anticipate problems during critical events.

Using a collaborative, deliberate, and interactive planning and rehearsal process.

Having the same people plan, rehearse, and execute the mission. These types of actions on

the objective become a common point of departure, not inflexible blueprints.

Note: Under these circumstances, the participants understand all the critical elements of the

plan, as well as alternate courses of action, reasons for discarding alternate courses of action,

and unstated assumptions underlying unexpected difficulties.

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Chapter 2

Ensure Long-Term Engagement. SF recognizes the need for persistence, patience, and

continuity of effort in addressing security issues abroad. When supporting a U.S. policy of

enduring engagement, planners and those executing missions must work to ensure programs are

sustainable

(within the capabilities of the HN), consistent

(properly timed to maintain

continuity), and durable (sufficiently resourced).

Provide Sufficient Intelligence. Success for SF missions dictates that uncertainty associated

with the threat and environment must be minimized through the application of intelligence

operations and procedures. Because of the requirement for detailed intelligence, SF typically

accesses theater and national systems to ensure that complete and predictive intelligence is

applied. SF units also provide intelligence through area assessments, special reconnaissance, and

post-operational debriefing of units. Human intelligence is often the only source that can satisfy

critical intelligence requirements.

Balance Security and Synchronization. Security concerns often dominate special operations,

but overcompartmentalization can exclude key special operations forces, conventional forces,

and indigenous personnel from the planning cycle. Insufficient security may compromise a

mission. Excessive security may cause the mission to fail because of inadequate coordination.

SF must constantly balance the two and resolve these conflicting demands on mission planning

and execution.

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Chapter 3

Guidance and Principal Tasks

Unconventional warfare . . . remains uniquely Special Forces’. It is the soul of Special

Forces: the willingness to accept its isolation and hardships defines the Special Forces

Soldier. Its training is both the keystone and standard of Special Forces training: it has

long been an article of faith, confirmed in over forty years of worldwide operations, that

if you can do the unconventional warfare missions, you can do all others. The objective

of unconventional warfare and Special Forces’ dedication to it is expressed in Special

Forces’ motto: De Oppresso Liber (to free the oppressed).

Robert M. Gates

Remarks at the dedication of the Office of Strategic Services Memorial, Langley, VA

12 June 1992

This chapter discusses the generation of the SF nine principal tasks from the ARSOF

11 core activities and provides an overview of current doctrine for each. Although

discussed separately, the nine principal tasks are all interrelated and reflect the

inherent modifications and additions to training, organization, and equipment needed

to meet the operational requirements of the GCCs.

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) organizes, trains, and

equips SF to perform its principal tasks of UW, FID, security force assistance,

counterinsurgency, preparation of the environment, direct action, special

reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and counterproliferation of weapons of mass

destruction. Through the conduct of these principal tasks, SF operations support the

accomplishment of USASOC’s specified SOF core activities. SF missions are

dynamic and constantly evolving in response to political-military considerations,

technology, and other considerations. A change in national security policy, National

Military Strategy, global or regional social structure, or technology may radically

alter the manner in which SF conducts its principal tasks.

GUIDANCE TO CONDUCT SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS

3-1. Special operations activities are founded in law and guided by joint and Army doctrine. Command

structures ensure special operations units are trained and equipped to conduct their respective activities and

tasks. The following paragraphs describe the higher military doctrine, command structures, and authorities

from which SF units derive their nine principal tasks.

JOINT PUBLICATION 3-05

3-2. JP 3-05 provides fundamental principles and guidance for the Services, combatant commanders, and

subordinate JFCs to prepare for and conduct special operations. It describes those military operations and

provides general guidance for military commanders to employ and execute command and control of SOF

assigned or attached to a GCC, subordinate unified commander, or a JTF commander.

ARMY DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 3-0

3-3. ADP 3-0 describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a

position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and

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Chapter 3

stability tasks in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable

conflict resolution. It provides fundamental guidance for the three-dimensional nature of modern warfare

and the need to conduct a fluid mix of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil

authorities tasks simultaneously. It acknowledges that strategic success requires the full integration of U.S.

military operations with interagency and multinational partners. The doctrine supports the use of SF as an

adaptable component of land operations that can conduct simultaneous operations with multiple partner

forces and agencies in support of comprehensive campaigns involving offense, defense, stability tasks, or

defense support of civil authorities.

3-4. ADP 3-05 describes the role of U.S. ARSOF in the U.S. Army’s operating concept to shape

operational environments in the countries and regions of consequence, prevent conflict through the

application of special operations and conventional deterrence, and, when necessary, help win our nation’s

wars. It outlines the ARSOF requirement to provide in the nation’s defense unequalled surgical strike and

special warfare capabilities. Together these two different but mutually supporting forms of special

operations comprise the American way of special operations warfighting.

3-5. ADRP 3-05 provides a broad understanding of Army special operations by describing how executing

the two mutually supporting critical capabilities of special warfare and surgical strike contribute to unified

land operations. ADRP 3-05 provides a foundation for how the Army meets the JFC’s needs by appropriate

integration of ARSOF and conventional forces.

FIELD MANUAL 3-05

3-6. FM 3-05 describes the ARSOF strategic landscape, fundamentals, core activities, capabilities, and

sustainment involved in the range of military operations and serves as the doctrinal foundation for

subordinate ARSOF doctrine, force integration, materiel acquisition, professional education, and individual

and unit training. FM 3-05 provides the linkage from joint special operations and Army doctrine to ARSOF

doctrine and provides guidance for ARSOF commanders who determine the force structure, budget, training,

materiel, and operational requirements necessary to prepare ARSOF to conduct their core activities.

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

3-7. Created by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the

Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act of 1987, USSOCOM was activated

on 16 April 1987 at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, in order to prepare SOF to carry out assigned

missions and, if so directed, to plan for and conduct special operations. Special operations are operations

requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in

hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following:

time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring

regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk (JP 3-05).

3-8. SOF are those forces identified in Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 167, Unified Combatant Command

for Special Operations Forces, or those units or forces that have since been designated as SOF by the

Secretary of Defense. Under Title 10, the Commander, USSOCOM, shall be responsible for and shall have

the authority to conduct the functions relating to special operations activities. These functions include

training, equipping, and providing SOF for the GCCs.

3-9. USSOCOM Directive 10-1cc, Terms of Reference—Roles, Missions, and Functions of Component

Commands, provides terms of reference to the component commands in order to identify command

relationships, missions, functions, and responsibilities. Headquarters, USSOCOM, through its component

and subunified commands, specifically organizes, trains, and equips SOF to accomplish the following 11

core activities:

UW.

FID.

Security force assistance.

Counterinsurgency.

Direct action.

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Guidance and Principal Tasks

Special reconnaissance.

Counterterrorism.

MISO.

CAO.

Counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Information operations.

UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

3-10. USASOC possesses the capabilities to support USSOCOM’s roles, missions, and functions as

directed by Congress in Title

10, U.S. Code, Section 164, Commanders of Combatant Commands:

Assignment; Powers and Duties; and Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 167, Unified Combatant Command for

Special Operations Forces.

3-11. USASOC provides trained and ready SF, Ranger, special operations aviation, MIS, and CA

personnel to GCCs and U.S. Ambassadors. Commander, USASOC, exercises command of continental

United States-based Regular Army SOF. He also oversees and evaluates continental United States-based

Army National Guard SOF. USASOC is responsible for the development of ARSOF doctrine; tactics,

techniques, and procedures; and materiel. USASOC is organized, trained, and equipped specifically to

build the capability to accomplish the following 12 core activities:

UW.

FID.

Security force assistance.

Counterinsurgency.

Preparation of the environment.

Direct action.

Special reconnaissance.

Counterterrorism.

Counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

MISO.

CAO.

Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief.

UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND

3-12. The U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) comprises five Regular Army SFGs and two

Army National Guard SFGs. When tasked by USASOC to fill personnel requirements for validated

missions in current and projected war plans, USASFC may recommend both Regular Army and Army

National Guard units and direct training priorities to meet requirements for assigned missions. USASFC

and its SFGs transform this guidance into mission-essential tasks for the battalion, company, and

detachment based on collaboration with subordinate units and mission analysis.

SPECIAL FORCES PRINCIPAL TASKS

3-13. SF is organized, manned, trained, and equipped to execute its nine principal tasks. These tasks are

derived from the 12 core activities of USASOC. Although conventional forces also conduct many of these

tasks (for example, FID, security force assistance, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism), SF conducts

these tasks using specialized formations, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Use of SF with conventional

forces creates an additional and exceptional capability to achieve objectives that may not be otherwise

attainable. SF can arrange and package its capabilities in combinations to provide DOD options applicable

to a broad range of strategic and operational challenges. Additionally, using the capabilities developed to

conduct the principal tasks, SF can perform other tasks of a collateral nature, such as counterdrug

operations and noncombatant evacuation operations. Preparation of the environment is a specialized core

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Chapter 3

task used as a shaping activity that supports all special operations. Figure 3-1 depicts the SF principal tasks

arrayed against the USASOC two critical capabilities—special warfare and surgical strike. Special warfare

capabilities emphasize working with HNs, regional partners, and indigenous populations. Those tasks

generally include UW, FID, counterinsurgency, and security force assistance. On the other hand, surgical

strike is executed by certain small-unit operations with extensive training for extreme risk and precise

execution while delivering high-payoff results. Within SF, only the crisis force is trained to execute

surgical strike missions. Those missions are generally counterterrorism, counterproliferation, unilateral

direct action, and special reconnaissance. Preparation of the environment supports both capabilities.

Figure 3-1. Special Forces principal tasks

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

3-14. UW is the core task and organizing principle for Army SF. UW capabilities provide the method and

skill sets by which all other SF missions are accomplished. SF is specifically organized, trained, and

equipped for the conduct of UW. SF is regionally oriented, language-qualified, and specifically trained to

conduct UW against hostile nation-states and non-state entities to achieve U.S. goals.

3-15. UW is defined as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce,

disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground,

auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.” The United States may engage in UW as part of a major

theater war or limited regional contingency as an effort to support an insurgency or resistance movement.

Experiences in the 1980s in Afghanistan and Nicaragua proved that support for an insurgency could be an

effective way of putting indirect pressure on the enemy. The cost versus benefit of using UW must be

carefully considered before employment. Properly integrated and synchronized UW operations can extend

the application of military power for strategic goals. UW complements operations by giving the United

States opportunities to seize the initiative through preemptive or clandestine offensive action.

3-16. UW is inherently a joint and interagency activity. For its part, SF units are designed to accomplish

the following significant aspects:

Infiltrating denied territory and linking up with resistance forces.

Assessing resistance forces for potential sponsorship by the U.S. government.

Providing training and advisory assistance to the guerrilla forces or the underground.

Coordinating and synchronizing the resistance activities with U.S. efforts.

Transitioning guerrilla forces into post-conflict status as well as anticipating and influencing

situations where former resistance elements could develop into an armed insurgency against the

newly formed U.S.-sponsored government.

3-17. Planning for UW is different from planning for other special operations. UW involves long-term

campaigns that require operational art to put forces in space and time and integrate ends, ways, and

means that attain the desired U.S. political or military end states. The sensitivity of the planned action

dictates the level of compartmentalization the United States must use to ensure operational security.

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Guidance and Principal Tasks

Parallel planning by all levels ensures that each level understands how their mission integrates with the

missions of other levels.

3-18. Military leaders must carefully consider the costs and benefits prior to making a decision to employ

UW. Properly integrated and synchronized UW complements other operations by giving the United States

or HN opportunities to seize the initiative through preemptive covert or clandestine offensive action

without an overt commitment of a large number of conventional forces.

3-19. The goal of UW operations is a change in political control and/or perceived legitimacy of regimes.

Hence, UW has strategic utility that can alter the balance of power between sovereign states. Such high

stakes carry significant political risk in both the international and domestic political arenas and necessarily

require sensitive execution and oversight. The necessity to operate with a varying mix of clandestine and

covert means, ways, and ends places a premium on excellent intelligence of the UW operating area. In UW, as

in all conflict scenarios, SF must closely coordinate activities with joint, interagency, intergovernmental,

and multinational partners in order to enable and safeguard sensitive operations.

3-20. A TSOC typically tasks SF to lead a UW campaign. UW will usually require some interagency

support and possibly some support by conventional forces. The prevailing strategic environment suggests a

TSOC and staff must be able to effectively conduct and support UW simultaneously during both traditional

warfare and irregular warfare. In some cases, SF conducting UW will be the main effort, with conventional

forces playing a much smaller and supporting role.

3-21. Each instance of UW is unique; however, UW efforts generally pass through seven distinct phases:

preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, buildup, employment, and transition. These phases

may occur simultaneously in some situations or may not occur at all in others. For example, a large and

effective resistance movement may only require logistical support, thereby bypassing the organization

phase. The phases may also occur out of sequence, with each receiving varying degrees of emphasis. One

example of this is when members of an indigenous irregular force are moved to another country to be

trained, organized, and equipped before being infiltrated back into the UW operations area.

Phase I: Preparation

3-22. The preparation phase for UW is part of a three-step process that consists of intelligence preparation

of the battlefield, war planning, and shaping activities. First, intelligence preparation of the battlefield

attempts to graphically represent the current reality and predict probable enemy courses of action in the

UW operating area. Second, war planning describes possible or probable future military operations. Third,

shaping activities work to modify the UW operating area to make it more conducive to all types of future

operations. SF personnel should be cautious and deliberate using terms regarding preparation to avoid

confusion or misinterpretation. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is an Army term; it is not a joint

term and certainly is not an interagency term. Intelligence preparation of the operational environment is the

joint term. Preparation of the environment is not synonymous with either.

Phase II: Initial Contact

3-23. Ideally, a pilot team should make initial contact with an established or potential irregular element.

A pilot team is a deliberately structured composite organization composed of SF operational detachment

members, with likely augmentation by interagency or other special skilled personnel, designed to infiltrate

a designated area to conduct sensitive preparation of the environment activities and assess protraction of a

resistance movement or insurgency for the conduct of UW in support of U.S. objectives. This team might

also include members from multinational or partner nations. During initial contact, pilot team personnel

begin to assess the potential of conducting UW in the UW operating area and the compatibility of U.S. and

indigenous irregular element interests and objectives with the UW operating area. This procedure allows

for an accurate assessment of UW feasibility in the UW operating area and arranges for the reception and

initial assistance of additional elements, typically SF. If deemed necessary, the TSOC may arrange to

exfiltrate an asset from the UW operating area to brief the U.S. planning elements during mission planning.

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Chapter 3

Phase III: Infiltration

3-24. During this phase, SF Soldiers infiltrate the UW operating area. Infiltration may be as overt as using

a chartered civilian flight or as discreet as a clandestine insertion. The mission requirement—analyzed with

respect to mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil

considerations—determines the most desirable method of infiltration. The infiltration phase concludes

when follow-on SF units link up with the pilot team or irregular force. During and following infiltration,

SF Soldiers continue the area assessment initiated by the pilot team to confirm or refute the information

previously reported. Throughout the mission, SF must continue to report all relevant operational

information to higher headquarters.

Phase IV: Organization

3-25. During the organization phase, SF Soldiers determine whether the organization of the resistance or

insurgency is appropriate for the conditions of the UW operating area. As necessary, SF then reorganizes

the resistance or insurgency elements and begins to develop the capability of the irregular force. Depending

on the size and scope of the effort, the size of this force can range from one individual to a resistance

element of potentially any size. Planners traditionally conceive UW with an emphasis on guerrilla warfare.

Such efforts may entail the organization of guerrilla units to conduct combat operations. However, UW is

not solely a guerrilla warfare effort. The organization of resistance or insurgent elements may involve other

SOF personnel, such as MIS, CA, or other skill sets. Although each irregular force or organization in UW

is unique, the traditional SF practice of conceiving UW as U.S. support to an insurgency or resistance

movement provides a unifying general concept for irregular force organizational structure. SF attempts to

subdivide an insurgency into three components—guerrillas, underground, and auxiliary. These components

are designed to work together toward the same end.

3-26. The area command is not a separate physical node like the three standard components of the

insurgency. The area command is instead integrated throughout these components at all levels of the irregular

organization. The area command is made up from the leadership cells of the underground, auxiliary, and

guerrillas, as well as members of SF when present in the UW operating area. Many of these leaders may

function as deliberate or de facto leaders of a shadow government within the UW operating area or as a

government-in-exile, if it exists. Key movement leaders who provide strategic political direction may also

be identifiable in the shadow government or government-in-exile.

3-27. The guerrillas represent the most commonly recognized portion of the insurgency. They are a group

of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct paramilitary

operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. Guerrillas carry out most of the armed conflict that

openly challenges the regional authority.

3-28. The underground is a cellular organization within the irregular movement that is responsible for

subversion, sabotage, intelligence collection, and other compartmentalized activities. Most underground

operations will take place in and around population centers. As such, the underground must have the ability to

conduct operations in areas that are usually inaccessible to the guerrillas, such as areas under government

military control. Underground members often fill leadership positions, overseeing specific functions that

auxiliary workers carry out. The underground and auxiliary—although technically separate units—are, in

reality, loosely interconnected elements that provide coordinated capabilities for the irregular movement. The

key distinction between them is that the underground is the element of the irregular organization that

operates in areas denied to the guerrilla force.

3-29. The auxiliary is the primary support element of the irregular organization. The structure and

operations of the auxiliary are clandestine in nature and its members do not openly indicate their sympathy

or involvement with the irregular movement. This support enables the guerrilla force, and often the

underground, to survive and function. This support can take the form of logistics, labor, or intelligence.

Members of the auxiliary are sometimes characterized as

“part-time members” of the irregular

organization, continuing to participate in the life of their community. The populace appears concerned only

with their normal occupations while at the same time engaging in irregular operations to varying degrees.

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Guidance and Principal Tasks

3-30. The mass base is the larger relevant indigenous population from which the irregular forces are

drawn. Although not traditionally considered a component of a U.S.-sponsored insurgent or resistance

movement, the mass base must be an organizational consideration. UW is an elemental irregular warfare

activity; as such, influence over a relevant indigenous population is critical. Communist insurgents of the

20th century, such as those under the aegis of Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung, referred to the general

population

(in a UW operating area) as the “mass base.” Insurgent leaders tasked elements of the

underground with infiltrating civil institutions and manipulating popular grievances and overt indigenous

political activities to support insurgent objectives. With the appropriate levels of approval and planning

integration, the core SOF task of MISO could be utilized to develop and execute programs to increase the

moral and physical support of the relevant mass base audiences for the irregular forces while

simultaneously countering the propaganda and information activities of the threat.

Phase V: Buildup

3-31. The buildup phase involves the expansion of the irregular elements and their capabilities to meet

mission objectives. SF tasks include infiltration or procurement of equipment and supplies to support this

expansion and subsequent operations. During the buildup phase, SF assists the indigenous cadre in

expanding into an effective organization that is capable of conducting operations against the existing

government or occupying forces.

Phase VI: Employment

3-32. During the employment phase, indigenous or other irregular forces increasingly operate in a combat

environment. These operations build in scope and size to support the joint objectives of the U.S.

Government and the resistance movement or insurgency to overthrow the government or occupying force.

If UW operations are part of a larger theater operation, SF ensures that the effects of these operations

continue to support the goals of the theater commander or the GCC. These operations range from

interdiction with guerrilla forces designed to drain the morale and resources of the hostile power through

combat to active intelligence collection with an indigenous informant network. Regardless of the type of

operation, the overall purpose is to achieve strategic political-military objectives.

Phase VII: Transition

3-33. Transition is the final, most difficult, and most sensitive phase of UW operations. The planning for

transition begins when the U.S. Government decides to sponsor an irregular organization and ends in the

UW operating area upon cessation of operations. Transition does not necessarily mean demobilization or

the commencement of FID operations. Successful transition from combat operations requires a

comprehensive approach to stability tasks where the drawdown of irregular indigenous forces support lines

of efforts in security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance, governance and participation, and

economic stabilization and infrastructure. Achieving the desirable end state (stable governance, sustainable

economy, and safe and secure environment) will involve diverse objectives. Those distinctive SF

characteristics, such as cross-cultural communication skills and interagency/international coordination, will

prove highly useful in ensuring the transition from relatively simple warfighter objectives to complex

stability objectives that support civil authority.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

3-34. JP 3-22 defines FID as “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the

action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its

society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.” Like UW,

FID is an umbrella concept that covers a broad range of activities. Its primary intent is to help the

legitimate host government address internal threats and their underlying causes. Commensurate with U.S.

policy goals, the focus of all U.S. FID efforts is to support the HN program of internal defense and

development.

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Chapter 3

Role of Special Forces in Foreign Internal Defense

3-35. U.S. military involvement in FID has traditionally focused on support of HN counterinsurgency

efforts of allies and friendly nations. Counterinsurgency remains an important aspect of military FID

operations. However, the primary SF mission in FID is to organize, train, advise, assist, and improve the

tactical and technical proficiency of the HN forces. The major difference in the way that SF and

conventional forces conduct FID operations is in the area of advisory operations. Although conventional

forces conduct a great deal of training in support of HN forces, their role as advisors is like an additional

duty. Their core training is in a specific field, whereas SF Soldiers are trained and expected to be advisors

to a resistance.

3-36. As a force multiplier, SF units have and maintain advanced skills and capabilities (such as language)

that enable them to conduct advisory operations with the HN for extended periods. Improved proficiency

enables the HN forces to defeat internal threats to their stability, thereby limiting direct U.S. involvement.

The emphasis is on training HN cadres, who will in turn train their compatriots. The capabilities that SF

employs to perform its FID mission are those inherent to its UW mission. Only the operational

environment is changed. The USSOCOM is the only combatant command with a legislatively mandated

FID mission.

3-37. An SF FID mission may require assets ranging from a single SF team to a reinforced SFG. In the

early stages of a nation’s need for assistance, the level of SF participation may be as small as one ODA. In

the more advanced stages, an SF company or battalion may establish an operational base (within or outside

of country) and exercise operational control of SF units. Operational and support elements may be assigned

to the base on a rotational or permanent basis. When the entire SFG deploys to the country, it normally

establishes a special operations task force (SOTF). The SOTF may then elect to establish one or more SF

advanced operations bases (AOBs). SF units participate in a variety of operations to accomplish their FID

mission. The HN needs as well as the U.S. and HN agreements will dictate the quantity and level of

support required to support the HN internal defense and development program. Internal defense and

development is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from

subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Figure 3-2 depicts the role

of SF in both UW and FID.

Figure 3-2. Role of Special Forces in unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense

3-38. FID is not restricted to times of conflict. It can also take place in the form of training exercises and

other activities that show U.S. resolve to and for the region. These exercises train the HN to deal with

potential internal threats. FID usually consists of indirect assistance, such as participation in combined

exercises and training programs, or limited direct assistance without U.S. participation in combat

operations.

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Guidance and Principal Tasks

Joint and Multinational Exercises

3-39. Exercises conducted are designed to support the GCC’s objectives within a specific theater or region.

They are conducted to improve relations, enforce U.S. commitment to the region, improve interoperability

with HN forces, and enhance U.S. warfighting skills. These exercises can be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff-, GCC-, and Service-sponsored events.

3-40. There are various programs and exercises SF personnel can be involved with when supporting

military FID operations. These missions can involve training, advising, and involvement in exercises

sponsored through Department of State and DOD initiatives.

3-41. A program specific to SF is the joint combined exchange training program. The program is designed

to train the SOF of the combatant command and is authorized under Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 2011,

Special Operations Forces: Training With Friendly Foreign Forces. SF teams gain most of their

experience training HN forces through the joint combined exchange training program. Added benefits to

SF are regional familiarity, cross-cultural understanding, and access to numerous countries throughout the

world not normally afforded to conventional forces.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

3-42. Described in FM 3-24 and JP 3-24, counterinsurgency is defined as “comprehensive civilian and

military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances.” SF contributes to

counterinsurgency by providing highly adaptable and regionally experienced teams with the ability to

operate discreetly in local communities through indigenous security forces. SF conducts counterinsurgency

utilizing a balanced approach, simultaneously incorporating counterguerrilla, information collection,

counterintelligence, and other operations as necessary to secure the general population and foster

legitimacy in the HN government.

Special Forces Approaches to Insurgent Strategy

3-43. Each insurgency is unique, calling for unique approaches. Direct approaches use a shape, clear, hold,

build, and transition method. Indirect methods use negotiation as well as identify, separate, isolate,

influence, and reintegration approaches. Insurgencies vary their strategies from urban or terror approaches

to rural strategies that progressively deny government control. SF, through close contact with the

population and as experienced advisors to security forces, develops a firsthand understanding of the

situation and can develop access in troubled areas to influence conditions on the ground. With capabilities

for lethal and nonlethal action, SF teams have the maturity to choose approaches and methods that lead

toward an acceptable steady state, where grievances supporting the insurgency are resolved.

3-44. SF counters urban approaches by penetrating intelligence activities, locating enemy nets and cells,

and conducting direct action. SF countered rural insurgent movements with several methods throughout

history. Among these were the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups in Vietnam, the Joint Commission

Observers in the Balkans, and Village Stability Operations in Afghanistan.

Village Stability Operations

The Village Stability Operations program personifies the U.S. Government’s

objectives and doctrine with the understanding of the counterinsurgency environment

as it begins with understanding the population, then the insurgents, and finally the

counterinsurgent. Living among the people, simultaneously focused on security,

governance, and development with all efforts committed to protecting the populations

at the village level, is one of the preventative measures that keeps the environment

from being hostile.

(continued)

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Chapter 3

Village Stability Operations (continued)

For SF, this is a very comfortable line of operations. Since its inception, SF has been

successful with this concept and the application of counterinsurgency and FID

operations, to include living among the local populations within those countries when

deployed. The Civilian Irregular Defense Groups in Vietnam and the Joint

Commission Observers in the Balkans reflect operations that SF units have been

conducting for the last 50 years.

By building capacity and capability with the Afghan government and the Afghan

people, this available resource—also known as the “through-and-with” concept—

applies a process of developing the capability and capacity needed to meet the

security objectives within a system that the local population finds palatable, as they

are now the enforcers.

Because of the immediacy and severity of security challenges found in rural conflict

areas, such as Afghanistan, political and military reconsiderations of restrictions

previously imposed upon some populations are driving centric counterinsurgency

strategies. Civilian populations, identified as the centers of gravity in this insurgency,

are normally found in the urban built-up areas. The bottom-up approach provides

stability for rural villages within key districts and empowers the local government

structure, which facilitates the village leadership to connect with the Government of

the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. As a major line of operations, Village Stability

Operations transform an area of conflict as it develops a community base by

providing a resistance to the insurgent’s policies and practices, thus keeping the

community out of the conflict.

The Village Stability Operations program not only protects the population, but it

enables the population to protect itself. Village Stability Operations blend formal and

informal forms of governance into cohesive, trust building, and dynamic communities,

and ensures that integrated systems of development, governance, and security are

shared to establish stability. Village Stability Operations are an essential supporting

component nested within the International Security Assistance Force operational

objectives and the U.S. strategic military objectives.

Special Forces Regional Knowledge

3-45. SF Soldiers and their operations are particularly valuable during a counterinsurgency. These Soldiers

have an appreciation of the essential nature and nuances of the conflict, and a close-up understanding of

the motivation, strengths, and weaknesses of the insurgents and other actors located in their area of

operations. This region-specific knowledge combined with their ability to gather special intelligence make

SF Soldiers ideally suited to contribute to the overall counterinsurgency strategy. By using indigenous

agencies and sources, the ODA can assemble and relay intelligence information to the SOTF and

combatant commander, providing best estimates of the situation. This ground truth and the proximity of SF

teams to the population offer commanders and planners with potent tools to counter insurgent tactics and

strategies.

3-46. SF teams committed to counterinsurgency have a dual mission. They must assist the HN forces to

defeat or neutralize the insurgent forces so that they may resume normal policing functions in what were

once contested or insurgent-controlled areas. In addition, SF teams support the overall counterinsurgency

program by conducting an advisory mission, influencing government agencies and forces to address

grievances. Doing so provides an environment where the HN government can win the trust and support of

its people and become self-sustaining. Both aspects of the counterinsurgency mission are of equal

importance and must be conducted at the same time. A full treatment of the nature of counterinsurgency

can be found in FM 3-24.

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Guidance and Principal Tasks

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

3-47. Security force assistance and FID overlap without being subsets of each other. JP 3-22 defines

security force assistance as “the Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the

U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and

their supporting institutions.”

3-48. Security force assistance is DOD’s contribution to unified action to develop (organize, train, equip,

rebuild, and advise) the capacity and capability of foreign security forces from the ministerial level down to

units of those forces. Foreign security forces include, but are not limited to, the military; police; border

police, coast guard, and customs officials; paramilitary forces; forces peculiar to specific nations, states,

tribes, or ethnic groups; prison, correctional, and penal services; infrastructure-protection forces; and the

governmental ministries and departments responsible for foreign security forces. At operational and

strategic levels, both security force assistance and FID focus on developing the foreign security forces’

internal capacity and capability. However, security force assistance also prepares foreign security forces to

defend against external threats and to perform as part of an international coalition. FID and security force

assistance are similar at the tactical level where advisory skills are applicable to both. SF teams performing

security force assistance initially assess the foreign security forces they will assist and then establish a

shared, continual way of assessing throughout development of the foreign security forces.

Organizing

3-49. Security force assistance includes organizing institutions and units, which can range from standing

up a ministry to improving the organization of the smallest maneuver unit. Building capability and capacity

in this area includes personnel, logistics, and intelligence and their support infrastructure. Developing HN

tactical capabilities alone is inadequate; strategic and operational capabilities must be developed as well.

HN organization and units should reflect their own requirements, interests, and capabilities—they should

not simply mirror existing external institutions.

Training

3-50. Training occurs in training centers, academies, and units. Training includes a broad range of subject

matter, to include security forces responding to civilian oversight and control.

Equipping

3-51. Equipping is accomplished through traditional security assistance, foreign support, and donations.

Equipment must be appropriate for the HN’s ability to sustain it. The equipment must also be appropriate for

the physical environment of the region and the HN’s ability to operate and maintain it.

Rebuilding

3-52. In many cases, particularly after major combat operations, it may be necessary to rebuild existing or

build new infrastructure to support foreign security forces. This infrastructure includes facilities and

materiel but may also include other infrastructure, such as command systems and transportation networks.

Advising

3-53. Advising HN units and institutions is essential to the ultimate success of security force assistance.

Advising benefits both the state and the supporting external organizations. To successfully accomplish the

security force assistance mission, advising requires specially trained ARSOF personnel who—

Understand the operational environment.

Provide effective leadership.

Build legitimacy.

Manage information.

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Ensure unity of effort and unity of purpose.

Can sustain the effort.

SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE

3-54. JP 3-05 defines special reconnaissance as “reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a

special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of

strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional

forces.” Special reconnaissance may include information on activities of an actual or potential enemy or

secure data on the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. Special

reconnaissance may also include assessment of chemical, biological, residual nuclear, radiological, or

environmental hazards in a denied area. Special reconnaissance includes target acquisition, area

assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance.

3-55. Special reconnaissance complements national and joint operations area intelligence collection assets

and systems by obtaining specific, well-defined, and time-sensitive information of strategic or operational

significance. It may complement other collection methods constrained by weather, terrain-masking, or

hostile countermeasures. Selected ARSOF conduct special reconnaissance as a human intelligence activity

to place “eyes on target,” when authorized, in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive territory. Special

reconnaissance typically provides essential information for a commander’s situational awareness for a

command decision, follow-on mission, or critical assessment.

3-56. In the operational environment, the SF and conventional command relationship may be that of

supported and supporting, rather than tactical control or operational control. Use of SF with conventional

forces by a JFC creates an additional capability to achieve objectives that may not be otherwise attainable.

Using SF for special reconnaissance enables the JFC to take advantage of SOF core competencies to

enhance situational awareness and facilitate staff planning of and training for unified action. However,

such use does not mean that SF will become a dedicated reconnaissance asset for conventional forces.

Instead, the JFC (through a joint special operations task force [JSOTF] or a TSOC) may task an SF element

to provide special reconnaissance information to conventional forces that may be operating for a period of

time within a joint special operations area or may task an SF element on a case-by-case basis to conduct

special reconnaissance within a conventional force area of operations. In addition, SF and conventional

elements working within the same area of operations may develop formal or informal information-sharing

relationships that enhance each other’s operational capabilities. SF may also employ advanced

reconnaissance and surveillance sensors and collection methods that utilize indigenous assets.

DIRECT ACTION

3-57. Direct action is short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special

operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military

capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct action differs

from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and

the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives (JP 3-05). In the conduct

of these operations, SF may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics (including close-quarters battle);

emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime

platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; conduct independent sabotage; and

conduct antiship operations.

3-58. Normally limited in scope and duration, direct action operations usually incorporate an immediate

withdrawal from the planned objective area. These operations can provide specific, well-defined, and often

time-sensitive results of strategic and operational critical significance.

3-59. SF may conduct direct action independently or as part of larger conventional or unconventional

operations or campaigns. Although normally considered close combat, direct action also includes sniping

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and other standoff attacks by fire delivered or directed by SF. Standoff attacks are preferred when the

target can be damaged or destroyed without close combat. SF employs close combat tactics and techniques

when the mission requires—

Precise or discriminate use of force.

Recovery or capture of personnel or materiel.

3-60. Direct action missions may also involve locating, recovering, and restoring to friendly control

selected persons or materiel that are isolated and threatened in sensitive, denied, or contested areas. These

missions usually result from situations that involve political sensitivity or military criticality of the

personnel or materiel being recovered from remote or denied areas. These situations may arise from a

political change, combat action, chance happening, or mechanical mishap. Direct action operations differ

from personnel recovery by the use of—

Dedicated ground combat elements.

Unconventional techniques.

Precise survivor-related intelligence.

Indigenous assistance.

3-61. Direct action may be unilateral or combined actions, but are still short-duration, discrete actions.

SF Soldiers execute direct action to achieve the supported commander’s objectives. Additional information

regarding the conduct of SF direct action operations can be found in FM 3-05.203.

COUNTERTERRORISM

3-62. JP 3-26 defines counterterrorism as “actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly

to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks.” SF units

possess the capability to conduct these operations in environments that may be denied to conventional

forces because of political or threat conditions.

3-63. HN responsibilities, Department of Justice and Department of State lead agency authority, legal and

political restrictions, and appropriate DOD directives limit SF involvement in counterterrorism. The role

and added capability of SF is to conduct offensive measures within the overall combating terrorism efforts

of the DOD. SF units conduct counterterrorism missions as special operations by covert, clandestine, or

low-visibility means. SF activities within counterterrorism include—

Intelligence operations to collect, exploit, and report information on terrorist organizations,

personnel, assets, and activities. SF has the capability to conduct these operations in an overt,

covert, or clandestine manner.

Network and infrastructure attacks to execute preemptive strikes against terrorist organizations.

The objective is to destroy, disorganize, or disarm terrorist organizations before they can strike

targets of national interest.

Hostage or sensitive materiel recovery to rescue hostages or to recover sensitive materiel from

terrorist control. These activities require capabilities not normally found in conventional military

units. Ensuring the safety of the hostages and preventing destruction of the sensitive materiel are

essential mission requirements.

Nonlethal activities to defeat the ideologies or motivations that spawn terrorism by nonlethal

means. These activities could include FID and a range of information-related capabilities

integrated though information operations.

Note: Most counterterrorism activities are classified. Further discussion of counterterrorism is

beyond the scope of this publication.

COUNTERPROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

3-64. JP 3-40 defines counterproliferation as “those actions taken to defeat the threat and/or use of

weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our forces, allies, and partners.” JP 3-40 defines

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weapons of mass destruction as “chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high

order of destruction or causing mass casualties and exclude the means of transporting or propelling the

weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon.” The major objectives of

combating weapons of mass destruction policy, which include nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and

consequence management activities, are to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and

delivery systems, to roll back proliferation where it has occurred, to deter and defeat the use of weapons of

mass destruction and their delivery systems, to adapt U.S. military forces and planning to operate against

the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and to mitigate the effects of

weapons of mass destruction use. The continued spread of weapons of mass destruction technology can

foster regional unrest and provide terrorist organizations with new and potent weapons. SF provides the

following capabilities for this core activity:

Expertise, materiel, and teams to supported combatant command teams to locate, tag, and track

weapons of mass destruction, as required.

Capabilities to conduct direct action in limited access areas, as required.

Partnership-building capacity for conducting counterproliferation activities.

Capabilities to coordinate the employment of information-related capabilities integrated through

information operations.

Note: Specific counterproliferation activities conducted by SF are classified. Further discussion

of counterproliferation is beyond the scope of this publication.

PREPARATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT

3-65. SF conducts preparation of the environment as a type of shaping activity supporting the other

principal tasks that may be conducted in the future. Preparation of the environment is an umbrella term for

actions taken to prepare the operational environment for potential operations. Preparation of the

environment consists of operational preparation of the environment, advanced force operations, and

intelligence operations (USSOCOM Directive 525-16).

Operational Preparation of the Environment

3-66. Operational preparation of the environment is the conduct of activities in likely or potential areas of

operations to prepare and shape the operational environment. Combatant commanders conduct operational

preparation of the environment to develop knowledge of the operational environment, establish human and

physical infrastructure, and for general target development. Operational preparation of the environment

activities include passive observation, area familiarization, site surveys, mapping the information

environment, military source operations, developing nonconventional assisted recovery capabilities, use of

couriers, developing safe houses and assembly areas, positioning transportation assets, and cache

emplacement and recovery (USSOCOM Directive 525-16).

Advanced Force Operations

3-67. Advanced force operations are conducted to refine the location of specific, identified targets and

further develop the operational environment. Advanced force operations encompass many operational

preparation of the environment activities, but they are intended to prepare for near-term direct action.

Advanced force operations include close target reconnaissance; tagging, tracking, and locating; reception,

staging, onward movement, and integration of forces; infrastructure development; and terminal guidance.

Unless specifically withheld, advanced force operations also include direct action in situations when failure

to act means loss of a fleeting opportunity for success (USSOCOM Directive 525-16).

Intelligence Operations

3-68. Intelligence operations include human intelligence activities (including military source operations);

counterintelligence activities; airborne, maritime, and ground-based signals intelligence; tagging, tracking,

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