Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8)

Appendix D

PROCESSING VEGETABLE SAMPLES

•

Step 1. Locate the sampling area.

•

Step 2. Look for the following:

Discoloration.

Withered spots.

Oily droplets.

Any unnatural particularities.

•

Step 3. Take samples from three points for each site (using a different jar at each point), 100 meters

upwind (control sample), GZ, and 100 meters downwind.

•

Step 4. Write the suspected chemical agent contamination (if known) and fill in the sample

documentation.

•

Step 5. Remove from the kit a pair of Nitrile overgloves, if required. Use scissors if necessary to open

packaging. Place Nitrile gloves over MOPP gloves.

•

Step 6. Prepare one jar at a time by removing jar from packaging, opening, and placing Teflon tape

around its threads.

•

Step 7. Use tweezers to grasp material to be sampled and use scissors or another cutting tool to cut

suspected contaminated vegetation. For grasses, cut near the base of the blades. For leaves, cut at

the stem of the leaf. Place three to four samples in each jar. Do not crush or smash vegetation.

•

Step 8. Screw the cap on tightly.

•

Step 9. Remove the 7-inch x 11-inch Whirl-Pak bag from the kit as follows:

Tear off top portion of bag along perforated edge.

Using the white tabs, pull the bag apart to open.

Drop the jar into the bag.

Remove excess air from the bag; holding metal tabs, whirl the bag around three times.

Bend the wire ends onto the bag to secure and store the contents.

Write the Sample Identification Number on the custody seal and apply custody seal over rolled

edge of Whirl-Pak bag.

•

Step 10. Collect other required samples from this site and prepare each one as discussed.

•

Step 11. Place up to three Whirl-Pak bags with jars into the blue sample bag with sample

documentation.

•

Step 12. Remove excess air from the blue sample bag and roll down the top of the bag.

•

Step 13. Wrap tape all the way around the blue sample bag making at least three turns. (After tearing

tape off roll, try to fold a quick-pull tab in tape so it is easy to grasp again.)

•

Step 14. Write sample type (soil, surface, liquid, or air) on tape, the number of samples in the bag,

and the date-time-group. Initial the sample.

•

Step 15. Place all sealed blue sample bags into a single drawstring bag.

Figure D-4. Storing samples in the blue sample bag (continued)

MISCELLANEOUS SAMPLES

D-53. Chemical or biological munitions fragments, whether from a shell, bomb, rocket, grenade, or spent

aircraft spray tanks, can be a highly definitive source of samples. Whole munitions (duds) are highly

desirable but should be disarmed by a qualified EOD expert. If a piece of ordnance is suspected of being a

chemical or biological round, and an EOD expert is not available, the sampler should stand off as far as

possible and use vision aids (binoculars) to identify and note any markings. Small pieces of fragments

should be packaged the same way as soil, water, or vegetation.

D-16

FM 3-05.132

30 November 2009

CBRN Sampling Techniques and Procedures

DANGER

Do not approach unexploded ordnance.

D-54. Used detector kits, gloves, or boots can be packaged and brought out as samples. When packaging

large items such as boots, the sampler should use scissors to remove pieces of the item. He should also

ensure it is double-bagged, sealed, and then placed into another bag.

D-55. Small animals, fish, and birds may be retrieved as samples. If they will fit into a Teflon jar, the

sampler should package them as normal. If they are too big to fit in a jar, he should use a cutting tool to

remove a thumb-sized portion of the intercostal muscle from the areas between the ribs, and then package

it as normal.

CONTROL SAMPLES

D-56. The collection of environmental samples requires the collection of control samples. Control samples

allow the analysis center to compare and determine whether a compound is naturally occurring in the

environment. Soil, water, and vegetation samples should be taken 500 meters upwind of the alleged attack

area. Control samples must be generically the same as those in an alleged attack area. For example, if the

sampler collects leaves from an apple tree in an attack area, he should collect leaves from an apple tree

outside the contaminated area. The size of an environmental control sample should be about the same size

as one taken in the attack area.

SAMPLE REPORTING

D-57. One person other than the sampler or packager will keep a detailed reconnaissance log of pertinent

information in a notebook. All entries are identified by the sample number. The reconnaissance log is

opened when the sampling team leaves the objective rally point (ORP) or hide site and closed after the

team passes the sample to the proper agency. Each entry contains the following:

Sample identification number.

Physical description of environmental sample or object photographed.

Date and time of collection.

Weather at time of sampling.

General description of the area where samples or photos were taken, to include grid coordinates,

azimuths, or distances to known landmarks.

Description of any items of interest in the immediate area

(condition of bodies, craters,

vegetation, dead animals, birds, fish, odors, equipment).

SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION

D-58. To prevent confusion, the sampler uses the sample identification number when referring to the

sample or to information concerning its acquisition. The number contains the following:

Country of acquisition. This two-digit alphabetic code stands for the country from which the

collector took the sample. A complete listing of country codes can be found in FM 3-11.19.

Example: PR = Puerto Rico.

Date acquired. This six-digit numerical code represents the year, month, and day that the

collector took the sample. Example: 2 July 2007 = 070702.

Sample sequence number. The collector assigns this three-digit numerical code. It begins anew

each collection day. Example: The first sample collected is 001, the second 002, and so on.

Sampling unit unit identification code (UIC). This code represents the sampling unit. Example:

WA8TAA.

30 November 2009

FM 3-05.132

D-17

Appendix D

Sampler identification. This two- or three-digit alphabetic abbreviation stands for the sampler’s

first and last name. Example: JD = Joe Dirt who took the sample (Figure D-5). Example of

complete identification number: RQ-070702-001-WFG1AA-JD.

PROJECT CODE: TECH SOIL

SAMPLER: JOE DIRT

SAMPLE NUMBER: SO001-04/MMDDYY/3-5 FEET

TIME COLLECTED:

1435

PRESERVATIVE:

TYPE OF SAMPLE: ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS: ACROLEIN

Figure D-5. Sample label

CHAIN OF CUSTODY

D-59. Samples must be carefully controlled to be of greatest value. A chain of custody must be recorded

using a chain-of-custody form (for example, FM 3-11.19, Figure E-2, Sample or Specimen Custody

Document).

D-60. The Specimen Custody Document (FM 3-11.19) must be completed by the collector. The collector

must ensure he retains a copy of the chain of custody. The country codes are contained in FM 3-11.19,

Table E-2. The collector must also complete the following required reports found in FM 3-11.19:

Sample Chain-of-Custody Form (Appendix E).

Sample CB Incident Interview Form (Appendix E).

D-61. After the sample is taken, it must be evacuated immediately. The sampling unit coordinates its own

assets and transports the sample to the sample transfer point. A qualified escort must accompany the

sample during the entire evacuation process to ensure safety and a proper chain of custody. A technical

escort is preferred during the entire process of evacuation but having one may not always be practical

because of the limited number of TEUs. The technical escort takes the sample to the radiological, chemical,

and biological sample collection point. If the determination is made to send the sample to CONUS for

analysis, an additional technical escort must be coordinated to accompany the sample to CONUS from the

port of debarkation until final hand-off to the receiving laboratory.

WORK AREA AND WASTE MANAGEMENT

D-62. Incremental to sample preparation and validity is having a clean work space. The 112th CRD uses

aluminum foil placed on a flat surface near the sampling area to provide a clean work space to place

equipment. In the event that aluminum foil is not available, commercial tarp material can be substituted.

D-63. Sampling waste can easily become a problem if not properly managed. Each workstation must

maintain a waste area for expended sampling pipettes and hazardous trash. Aluminum foil folded upward

at the corners (to prevent spills) will be used to contain immediate waste at each station. At the completion

of sampling, each station’s waste will be consolidated into one waste bag, whether trash is to be removed

or left in place.

D-18

FM 3-05.132

30 November 2009

Appendix E

Special Operations Forces Element

Decontamination Options

UNSUPPORTED SOF ELEMENT DECONTAMINATION

E-1. When conducting unsupported SOF element decontamination, the initial action to be taken is to

locate and secure an upwind decontamination site (also serves as an ORP). The same personnel tasked to

set up the ORP will secure the site. The remaining members of the element (operational team) will assume

MOPP4 and move to the contaminated area to conduct the mission. As the operational team conducts the

mission, the decontamination site personnel assume MOPP in preparation for the return of the operational

team. As the operational teams return to the ORP, each member is checked for contamination at a liquid- or

vapor-contamination control line (CCL) using available detection equipment. If contamination is detected,

the decontamination procedures outlined in Figure E-1, pages E-1 and E-2, should be followed.

STEPS

ACTIONS

While the operational element moves to the ORP, the decontamination element members at the

ORP set up a modified hasty decontamination site. The site will include a hot line (HL) and a

sump for disposal of contaminated clothing and equipment. As the operational element returns

from the mission, one of the decontamination team members acts as the station operator/monitor,

while the other ORP members provide security for the decontamination site.

Once the operational element reaches the HL, it stops and awaits direction from the site operator.

The site operator directs a decontamination element to check any sample or equipment found for

contamination. If these are contaminated, the decontamination team will perform the required

decontamination procedures.

Once decontamination has been performed, the decontamination teams place the sample or

equipment in a Mylar bag (or other acceptable substitute) and hand it to another “clean” team

member, who then seals the bag and places it on the clean side of the HL.

Once all collected equipment and/or samples have been disposed of, the decontamination team

commences checking the operational teams for contamination. Personal equipment is removed

from the operational team members and checked using the appropriate detectors. If contamination

is found, the equipment will either be decontaminated at that time or placed in the sump (to be

decontaminated at a later time). In either case, the equipment must be rechecked prior to reuse in

order to ensure that it has been properly decontaminated. Once this procedure has been

completed for the first operational team member, the site operator will direct that member to enter

the decontamination site.

Using “buddy system” decontamination procedures, the first team member will decontaminate the

second team member’s protective mask using a personnel and equipment decontamination kit.

The first team member then rolls the protective mask hood of the second member, using extreme

caution to prevent the transfer of contamination to the exposed neck area or the breaking of the

mask seal during the rolling process.

Continuing the “buddy system,” team members remove the chemical protective overgarment

(CPOG), BDO, and chemical protective boots (if worn). The use of knives, scissors, or other

cutting tools is necessary for this step.

Note: The cutting instrument being used must be decontaminated after each cut. Once CPOG,

BDO, and boots have been removed and placed in the sump, that person moves to the next

station (10 to 15 meters away and upwind of the garment removal area).

Figure E-1. Operational element decontamination procedures

30 November 2009

FM 3-05.132

E-1

Appendix E

STEPS

ACTIONS

The second station will be located at the CCL. This clearly marked line (approximately 10-15

meters upwind of the clothing removal station) is where personnel are assisted with the removal of

the chemical protective gloves and boots. As with the first station, the boots will need to be cut to

assist with their removal. Again, the cutting tool will need to be decontaminated after each cut. The

assisted person is stopped on the downwind side of the CCL. The gloves are removed by pulling

them inside out as they are being removed. Once removed, they are placed in the sump. After the

gloves are removed, the boots are cut and the Soldier is assisted in removing the boots (one at a

time). As the first boot is removed, the Soldier takes one step over the CCL with that foot. The

second boot is then removed on the downwind side of the CCL. Both boots are then placed in the

sump, and the Soldier proceeds to the final station (on the upwind side of the CCL).

At the final station, each Soldier’s protective mask is checked again for contamination. If

contamination is found, the mask is decontaminated again before removal. If found to be clean, the

mask is removed (after the air has been checked for contamination).

All Soldiers are processed through the decontamination using the stated procedures until the

operational team and decontamination team have been completed, leaving only the station monitor

left in MOPP4.

The station monitor then polices all contaminated material in the decontamination station area and

places it in the sump. The sump is closed, and the station monitor performs personnel

decontamination on himself (removing protective clothing).

The grid coordinates are recorded and forwarded to higher HQ by the decontamination element.

The mission is continued.

Figure E-1. Operational element decontamination procedures (continued)

EXPEDIENT PERSONNEL DECONTAMINATION SYSTEM

E-2. The EPDS is designed to address SOF equipment shortfalls in personnel decontamination procedures

and equipment. The system is a one-man, portable, lightweight system that does not displace an undue

amount of an individual’s combat load. The EPDS is a validated system that provides rapid effective

decontamination procedures that are easily integrated into existing SO tactics. This system weighs less than

20 pounds, can be set up within 10 minutes, and can decontaminate up to 20 personnel at a rate of less than

5 minutes per individual.

E-3. EPDS tactical planning guidelines are as follows:

Decontamination of the force will occur at the closest permissive site to the target permitted by

the tactical situation. In some missions, such as maritime interdiction operations,

decontamination will likely occur directly on the objective after it is secure.

Timely and effective decontamination is critical to prevent CBRN casualties. SOF

contamination challenges may be considerably higher than the standard

10/m2 that

JSLIST-approved material is designed to protect against.

CW breakthrough times on SOF PPE dictate the need to conduct decontamination at the soonest

opportunity consistent with the tactical situation. CW breakthrough times are significantly

reduced in case of saltwater-exposed PPE, further heightening the importance of rapid

decontamination.

The nature of SOF operations in the CBRN environment dictates that the use of a supporting

force to conduct decontamination is often tactically infeasible. The SOF decontamination

capability must reside completely within the force and be effective postmission for both healthy

personnel and casualties.

Contamination control is paramount. The reduction or elimination of the spreading of liquid or

solid contamination off target and back to friendly forces, mission-critical mobility platforms, or

forward staging bases is critical.

The procedure and equipment should not produce undue logistical burdens in terms of training,

acquisition, or maintenance.

E-2

FM 3-05.132

30 November 2009

Special Operations Forces Element

Decontamination Options

E-4. The following is a generic sequence of events for a mission requiring EPDS in a potentially

contaminated area. Figure E-2 depicts a basic layout for an EPDS decontamination site. Figures E-3

(page E-4) and E-4 (page E-5) provide the steps that are involved in one- and two-piece cutout procedures.

A generic EPDS mission sequence is as follows:

Step 1. Determine the presence of contamination or the possibility of contamination. Establish a

contamination control area. Ensure all personnel who are contaminated remain in that area.

Step 2. Call for EPDS.

Step 3. Designate operating and security personnel for EPDS.

Step 4. Establish HL, mark HL, and designate CCL.

Step 5. Set up a decontamination line, considering environmental factors, such as wind, rain, and

poor ventilation. Break out equipment and set it up according to space availability.

Step 6. Upon completion of setup, direct contaminated personnel to begin an equipment drop.

(All personnel working EPDS should decontaminate boots and gloves first.) Place all sensitive

equipment that requires decontamination into equipment bags.

Note: Personnel should work in pairs whenever possible.

Step 7. Establish a litter decontamination line if indicated. Include an emergency medical

treatment (EMT) station in the hot zone.

Step 8. Establish the triage area as the casualty collection point (CCP) and locate it on the clean

side of the CCL.

Step 9. Begin the decontamination process.

Figure E-2. Expedient personnel decontamination site

30 November 2009

FM 3-05.132

E-3

Appendix E

One-Piece Cutout

Step 1: Direct breakout of Mk1 medical kits.

Step 2: Take out M291s and M295s. Place kits in a pile at the hot line.

Step 3: Decontaminate each other’s hoods with the M295. If time permits, decontaminate as much

area as possible to reduce any gross contamination and off-gassing.

Step 4: Direct into first shuffle pit.

Step 5: Decontaminate feet by shuffling feet in pit.

Step 6: Direct to the next shuffle pit. (Cutters begin cut-out procedures).

Step 7: Cut both straps off the hood and loosen the neck cord.

Step 8: Direct contaminated person to bend forward at the waist.

Step 9: Make sure cutter rolls hood up from the rear bottom as far as possible and gathers bottom

into neck cord. (Cutter then cuts tails of cord if needed and decontaminates hands).

Step 10: Cut wrist, waist, and ankle closures as appropriate for the ensemble worn.

(Cutter

decontaminates hands.)

Step 11: Release or cut boot closures. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)

Step 12: Make sure contaminated person steps out of boots. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)

Step 13: Unzip zipper across the back (if fast-rope insertion and extraction system [FRIES]). (Cutter

decontaminates hands.)

Step 14: Start at the lower side of the zipper center (if dry suit, cut from center rear neckline) down

one leg as far as possible. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)

Step 15: Cut down other leg from area of buttocks down as far as possible. (Cutter decontaminates

hands.)

Step 16: Cut up from top edge of zipper through neck dam (if FRIES). (Cutter decontaminates

hands.)

Step 17: Remove suit forward, stripping down, and have contaminated person step out one foot at

a time. Remove glove with garment; if not, strip gloves before CPU removal.

(Cutter

decontaminates hands.)

CPU REMOVAL

Step 1: Start at top rear center and cut down middle of back. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)

Step 2: Make sure contaminated person extends arms forward and down. (Cutter pulls forward and

down, folding it inside out as best as possible to contain external contamination. Cutter

decontaminates hands.)

Step 3: Cut down one side of CPU trouser leg and have contaminated person step out of CPU

trouser. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)

Step 4: Strip off one Gore-Tex sock, then second, then one CPU sock, and then the second, having

the contaminated person step onto safety pad. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)

Step 5: Make sure contaminated person proceeds to mask drop area, decontaminates hands, and

uses breath-hold technique with assisted mask removal from decontamination line.

Step 6: Move to redress area and redress; move to exfiltration area.

Step 7: Monitor and administer buddy-aid, if necessary. Ensure that personnel who develop

symptoms of exposure are taken to the triage area for treatment.

Figure E-3. One-piece cutout

E-4

FM 3-05.132

30 November 2009

Special Operations Forces Element

Decontamination Options

Two-Piece Cutout

Step 1: Direct breakout of Mk 1 medical kits.

Step 2: Take out M291s and M295s. Place kits in a pile at the hot line.

Step 3: Decontaminate each other’s hoods with the M295. If time permits, decontaminate as much

area as possible to reduce any gross contamination and off- gassing.

Step 4: Direct into first shuffle pit.

Step 5: Decontaminate feet by shuffling feet in pit.

Step 6: Direct to the next shuffle pit. (Cutters begin cut-out procedures).

Step 7: Cut both straps off hood and loosen neck cord.

Step 8: Make sure contaminated person bends forward at the waist.

Step 9: Ensure cutter rolls hood up from the rear bottom as far as possible, gathers bottom into

neck cord, and cuts tails of cord, if needed. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)

Step 10: Cut wrist, waist, and ankle closures as appropriate for the ensemble worn. (Cutter

decontaminates hands.)

Step 11: Start at top rear center and cut down the back of the top garment.

(Cutter

decontaminates hands.)

Step 12: Tell contaminated person to extend his arms forward and down, cutter pulls top forward

and down (folding in on itself as best as possible to contain and isolate). Glove should come off

with top; if not, remove gloves. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)

Step 13: Cut down each side of legs. (Cutter decontaminates hands.) Grasp rear center of trouser,

cut straps above where straps cross and allow to fall as contaminated person steps forward and

away.

Step 14: Release or cut boot closures. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)

Step 15: Tell contaminated person to step out of boots. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)

CPU REMOVAL

Step 1: Start at top rear center and cut down middle of back. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)

Step 2: Make sure contaminated person extends arms forward and down. (Cutter pulls forward

and down, folding it inside out as best as possible to contain external contamination. Cutter

decontaminates hands.)

Step 3: Cut down one side of CPU trouser leg, have contaminated person step out of CPU trouser.

(Cutter decontaminates hands.)

Step 4: Strip off one Gore-Tex sock, then second, then one CPU sock, and then the second,

having the contaminated person step onto safety pad. (Cutter decontaminates hands.)

Step 5: Make sure contaminated person proceeds to mask drop area, decontaminates hands, and

uses breath-hold technique with assisted mask removal from decontamination line.

Step 6: Move to redress area and redress; then move to exfiltration area.

Step 7: Monitor and administer buddy-aid if necessary. Make sure personnel who develop

symptoms of exposure are taken to the triage area for treatment.

Figure E-4. Two-piece cutout

E-5.

The basic operating principles of litter decontamination include the following:

Always follow management of life-saving ABCs (check airway, check for breathing, and check

for circulation) first.

Spot decontaminate cutaway of protective garment or mask to facilitate care of ABCs.

Make sure a casualty that is affected in any ABC areas is not in the litter decontamination area.

Always use the current decontamination media: 0.5 percent hypochlorite solution, M291, M295,

and SDS.

Use the Raven decontamination litter.

30 November 2009

FM 3-05.132

E-5

Appendix E

For litter decontamination, use the cutout procedure similar to the onion peel procedure.

Use the exact cut template that corresponds to the ensemble worn (currently JSLIST VII and

FRIES).

To control the spread of contamination, ensure the hand of the cutter is decontaminated first.

The hands and cutting tool must be decontaminated before each cut.

For successful decontamination, first decontaminate the patient’s boots and gloves.

E-6. The following procedures are specific to the EPDS litter casualty:

Keep litter parallel to EPDS line.

Ensure environmental factors and the casualty flow remain unchanged.

Move casualties from the EMT station to the litter decontamination area on a Raven stretcher.

Note: Although not stated after each step, cutter should decontaminate hands and tools between

every step or touch.

E-7. The decontamination site must have specific personnel on hand. At each site, there should be one HL

director, two scrubbers and cutters, and two or more medical personnel determined by the number of

medical or chemical casualties. The EPDS requires specific equipment and parts. Figure E-5, pages E-6

and E-7, provides the component data for the EPDS rucksack.

DIRTY EXFILTRATION DECONTAMINATION

E-8. The purpose of dirty exfiltration is to remove a contaminated SOF element from its tactical

environment so that decontamination can take place in a permissive environment. Dirty exfiltration

decontamination activities include decontamination for personnel using either a detailed troop

decontamination (DTD) or EPDS, and may or may not include spot decontamination of the exfiltration

platform. Dirty exfiltration decontamination should occur as soon as tactically feasible after contamination.

There are numerous issues to consider regarding the decontamination of exfiltration platforms in dirty

exfiltration. The SOF decontamination element—

Ensures the aircrews remain in place in the aircraft.

Removes any additional protective lining, cover, or equipment from the exfiltration platform

after one contaminated element has exited the platform.

Checks the exfiltration platform for any residual contamination.

Decontaminates the exfiltration platform to the maximum extent possible with available

equipment.

Note: FM 3-11.5 contains additional decontamination details.

Item

Note

Quantity

Water is carried in a 5-gallon collapsible bladder inside a vector

Boundary Bag

pack. If available, seawater may be used. Two boundary bags are

cut down and used for the shuffle pit. One is used for a container.

Baja Bag

Large Hook Knife

Scissors

Blue chemlites are used to mark the bottom of decontamination

Chemlite, Blue

bags or shuffle pits.

Chemlite, Red

Red chemlites are used to mark HL.

Figure E-5. EPDS rucksack component data

E-6

FM 3-05.132

30 November 2009

Special Operations Forces Element

Decontamination Options

Item

Note

Quantity

Chemlite, Green

Green chemlites are used to mark CCL.

Additional waterproof protective mask bags with equipment belts

Electric Scissors

for carrying decontaminated media and cutters.

Poly bags used for containment of removed PPE to reduce off-

Poly Bag (7 ml)

gassing in the decontamination area.

SDS

SDS pads used to step on as a protective barrier after protective

SDS Pad

socks are removed.

68% Calcium

Calcium hypochlorite is carried for biological agents.

Hypochlorite (6 oz)

Head Lamp

Figure E-5. EPDS rucksack component data (continued)

BASIC AIRCREW DECONTAMINATION ACTIONS

E-9. The decontamination actions identify a standard set of instructions to doff aircrew equipment and

clothing after actual or suspected CBRN contamination. Figure E-6, pages E-7 through E-9, depicts how

decontamination stations can be systematically arranged to use equipment and allow aircrew redress.

STATION 1

ATTENDANT: Wipe (bleach, water, and paper towel) crew member above shoulders.

CREW MEMBER: Stow personnel items.

DUST HANDS

ATTENDANT: Dust from knees to boots.

ATTENDANT: Carefully dust blower and hang on rack.

DUST HANDS

ATTENDANT: Unsnap suspension assemblies on manifold from one side and reattach to

other. Dust manifold and hang on rack.

DUST HANDS

ATTENDANT: Remove harness, vest, life preserver unit (LPU), exposure suit, and so on.

DUST HANDS AFTER EACH ITEM

ATTENDANT: Undo flight suit leg zipper and cut bootlaces.

DUST HANDS

CREW MEMBER: Remove boot using the boot remover.

DO NOT LET FOOT TOUCH THE GROUND

ATTENDANT: Tube sock foot. Discard boot. Repeat step.

DUST HANDS AFTER EACH BOOT

CREW MEMBER: Loosen suit cuffs and reattach Velcro.

DUST HANDS

CREW MEMBER/ATTENDANT: Remove and discard Nomex gloves.

DUST HANDS

CREW MEMBER: Ensure next station is clear. Keep equipment away from body and go to

next station.

CREW MEMBER: Remove equipment from rack.

Figure E-6. Aircrew decontamination stations

30 November 2009

FM 3-05.132

E-7

Appendix E

STATION 2

DUST HANDS

CREW MEMBER: Ensure next station is clear. Keep equipment away from body and go to

next station.

ATTENDANT: Hang equipment on rack. Crew member and attendant should dust hands.

Crew member steps into shuffle box and faces rack.

Liquid hazard area (LHA) ATTENDANT: Lower zipper on flight suit.

DUST HANDS

CREW MEMBER: Face vapor hazard area. Assume race dive position.

MAINTAIN EYE CONTACT WITH ATTENDANT

LHA ATTENDANT: Remove flight suit to knees. Remove Butyl gloves. Tube sock hands.

DO NOT TOUCH CREW MEMBER’S SKIN

DUST HANDS

LHA ATTENDANT: Remove suit from legs. Ensure tube socks are retained on crew

member’s feet or replace them. Discard suit.

DUST HANDS

CREW MEMBER: Lift foot back for tube sock removal by LHA. Extend foot forward for tube

sock replacement by LHA. Step out of the shuffle box. Repeat with other foot. LHA removes

shuffle box.

ATTENDANTS DUST HANDS

LHA ATTENDANT: Tighten hood adjustment straps.

DUST HANDS

CREW MEMBER: Face LHA.

LHA ATTENDANT: Release and stow chinstrap and communications connection.

DUST HANDS

LHA ATTENDANT: Remove tube socks from crew member’s hands.

DUST HANDS

Vapor hazard area (VHA) ATTENDANT: Place new tube socks on crew member’s hands.

DUST HANDS

CREW MEMBER: Grasp aircrew eye and respiratory protection (AERP) mask with hand

closest to rack.

STATION 2A

LHA ATTENDANT: Disconnect bayonets and snaps.

DUST HANDS

CREW MEMBER: Face decontamination rack and lean head toward LHA.

LHA ATTENDANT: Remove helmet and stow.

DUST HANDS

LHA ATTENDANT: Check crew member for contamination by using the CAM.

VHA ATTENDANT: Brief crew member on mask removal. (Tell crew member to turn 1/8

toward VHA.)

LHA ATTENDANT: Loosen hood adjustment straps.

DUST HANDS

LHA ATTENDANT: Before removing mask, take tube sock off hand that removes mask and

place hand on stomach.

LHA ATTENDANT: Raise hood apron off shoulders.

Note: Crew member takes several deep breaths, holds breath, and closes eyes tightly.

Figure E-6. Aircrew decontamination stations (continued)

E-8

FM 3-05.132

30 November 2009

Glossary

SECTION I - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR

after action report

ABC

airway, breathing, circulation

hydrogen cyanide

AERP

aircrew eye and respiratory protection

Air Force

area of operations

AOR

area of responsibility

APR

air purifying respirator

ARSOF

Army special operations forces

AUIB

Aircrew Uniform Integrated Battlefield

BDO

battle dress overgarment

BIDS

Biological Integrated Detection System

BVO

black vinyl overboot

biological warfare

BWA

biological warfare agent

command and control

Civil Affairs

CAM

Chemical Agent Monitor

CAO

Civil Affairs operations

chemical or biological

CBR

chemical, biological, and radiological

CBRN

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

CCBA

closed-circuit breathing apparatus

CCDR

combatant commander

CCIR

commander’s critical information requirement

CCL

contamination control line

CDA

chemical detachment A

CDD

chemical decontamination detachment

CNR

Center for National Response

COA

course of action

COLPRO

collective protection

CONUS

continental United States

COTS

commercial off-the-shelf

counterproliferation

CPFC

chemical protective footwear cover

CPOG

chemical protective overgarment

30 November 2009

FM 3-05.132

Glossary-1

Glossary

CPT

captain

CPU

chemical protective undergarment

CPWMD

counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction

CRD

chemical reconnaissance detachment

CRDEC

Chemical Research, Development, and Engineering Center

counterterrorism

chemical warfare

CWA

chemical warfare agent

CWMD

combating weapons of mass destruction

direct action

DNWS

Defense Nuclear Weapons School

DOD

Department of Defense

DPG

Dugway Proving Ground

DRT

decontamination and reconnaissance team

DTRA

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

EAC

Exploitation Analysis Center

ECBC

Edgewood Chemical Biological Center

EMP

electromagnetic pulse

EMT

emergency medical treatment

Executive Order

EOD

explosive ordnance disposal

EPDS

expedient personnel decontamination system

EPW

enemy prisoner of war

ERG

Emergency Response Guide

Fahrenheit

FID

foreign internal defense

field manual

FRIES

fast-rope insertion and extraction system

Sarin

GCC

geographic combatant commander

Soman

GRR

ground radiological reconnaissance

GVO

green vinyl overboot

ground zero

HAZMAT

hazardous materials

mustard agent

HEPA

high-efficiency particulate air

hot line

HMMWV

high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle

host nation

HNS

host-nation support

Glossary-2

FM 3-05.132

30 November 2009

Glossary

headquarters

HTH

calcium hypochlorite

IAW

in accordance with

ICAD

Individual Chemical Agent Detector

ICAM

Improved Chemical Agent Monitor

information operations

IPE

individual protective equipment

IPOE

intelligence preparation of the operational environment

JBPDS

Joint Biological Point Detection System

JCAD

Joint Chemical Agent Detector

joint publication

JSLCBRNRS

Joint Service Light CBRN Reconnaissance System

JSLIST

Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology

JSLSCAD

Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector

JSOTF

joint special operations task force

lethal dose

LHA

liquid hazard area

LSD

lysergic acid diethylamide

MDMP

military decision-making process

MDS

Modular Decontamination System

METOC

meteorological and oceanographic

METT-TC

mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time

available, and civil considerations

milligram(s)

MICAD

Multipurpose Integrated Chemical Agent Detector

MOPP

mission-oriented protective posture

mph

miles per hour

MSG

master sergeant

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVSOF

Navy special operations forces

NBC

nuclear, biological, and chemical

NCO

noncommissioned officer

NCOIC

noncommissioned officer in charge

NFPA

National Fire Protection Association

NIOSH

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

NMS-CWMD

National Military Strategy for combating weapons of mass destruction

NRC

National Response Center

NSN

National Stock Number

NVG

night vision goggle

OIC

officer in charge

OPLAN

operation plan

30 November 2009

FM 3-05.132

Glossary-3

Glossary

ORP

objective rally point

OSHA

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

public affairs

PAPR

powered air-purifying respirator

PCISE

plan, coordinate, integrate, synchronize, and execute

PIR

priority intelligence requirement

POL

petroleum, oils, and lubricants

PPE

personal protective equipment

PSYOP

Psychological Operations

radiological agent

RCA

riot control agent

R-CBATEB

Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Analysis and Technical Evaluation

Board

R-CBSCE

radiological-chemical and biological sampling control element

RGR

Ranger

ROE

rules of engagement

S-1

personnel officer

S-2

intelligence officer

S-3

operations officer

S-4

logistics officer

S-5

plans officer

S-6

command, control, communications, and computer systems directorate officer

SB(SO)(A)

Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne)

SCBA

self-contained breathing apparatus

SCPE

Simplified Collective Protective Equipment

SCUBA

self-contained underwater breathing apparatus

SDS

Sorbent Decontamination System

Special Forces

SFC

sergeant first class

SFG(A)

Special Forces group (airborne)

SFODA

Special Forces operational detachment A

SGT

sergeant

SME

subject-matter expert

special operations

SOA

special operations aviation

SOAR(A)

special operations aviation regiment (airborne)

SOF

special operations forces

SOFSE

special operations forces site exploitation

SOP

standing operating procedure

SOTF

special operations task force

SPC

specialist

Glossary-4

FM 3-05.132

30 November 2009

Glossary

special reconnaissance

SSE

sensitive site exploitation

SSG

staff sergeant

STB

super tropical bleach

TEU

technical escort unit

TIB

toxic industrial biological

TIC

toxic industrial chemical

TIM

toxic industrial material

technical manual

TSOC

theater special operations command

TTP

tactics, techniques, and procedures

USAJFKSWCS

United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

USASOC

United States Army Special Operations Command

USG

United States Government

USSOCOM

United States Special Operations Command

unconventional warfare

VHA

vapor hazard area

ethyl-S-dimethylaminoethyl methylphosphonothiolate

WARNORD

warning order

WMD

weapons of mass destruction

SECTION II - TERMS

aerosol

A liquid or solid composed of finely divided particles suspended in a gaseous medium. Examples of

common aerosols are mist, fog, and smoke.

agent

See biological or chemical agent. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this

publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

biological agent

A microorganism that causes disease in personnel, plants, or animals, or causes the deterioration of

materiel. (JP 1-02)

biological weapon

An item of materiel which projects, disperses, or disseminates a biological agent including arthropod

vectors. (JP 1-02)

blister agent

A chemical agent which injures the eyes and lungs, and burns or blisters the skin. Also called vesicant

agent. (JP 1-02)

blood agent

A chemical compound, including the cyanide group, that affects bodily functions by preventing the

normal utilization of oxygen by body tissues. (JP 1-02)

chemical agent

A chemical substance which is intended for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or

incapacitate mainly through its physiological effects. The term excludes riot control agents when used

for law enforcement purposes, herbicides, smoke, and flames. (JP 1-02)

30 November 2009

FM 3-05.132

Glossary-5

Glossary

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense

Measures taken to minimize or negate the vulnerabilities and/or effects of a chemical, biological,

radiological, or nuclear incident. Also called CBRN defense. (JP 1-02)

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment

Conditions found in an area resulting from immediate or persisting effects of chemical, biological,

radiological, or nuclear attacks or unintentional releases. Also called CBRN environment. (JP 1-02)

chemical contamination

See contamination.

chemical warfare

All aspects of military operations involving the employment of lethal and incapacitating munitions/

agents and the warning and protective measures associated with such offensive operations. Since riot

control agents and herbicides are not considered to be chemical warfare agents, those two items will be

referred to separately or under the broader term “chemical,” which will be used to include all types of

chemical munitions/agents collectively. Also called CW. (JP 1-02)

chemical weapon

Together or separately, (a) a toxic chemical and its precursors, except when intended for a purpose not

prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention; (b) a munition or device specifically designed to

cause death or other harm through toxic properties of those chemicals specified in (a) above, which would

be released as a result of the employment of such munition or device; (c) any equipment specifically

designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions or devices specified in (b)

above. (JP 1-02)

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

The CWC, which entered into force for states parties on 26 April 1997, bans the acquisition,

development, production, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. It prohibits the use of riot control

agents as a method of warfare. It provides for the destruction of all chemical weapons stocks and

production facilities within 10 years after entry into force. It contains a vigorous challenge regime to

ensure compliance. The United States ratified the CWC on 25 April 1997.

coalition

An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02)

collective protection

The protection provided to a group of individuals which permits relaxation of individual chemical,

biological, radiological, and nuclear protection. Also called COLPRO. (JP 1-02)

combatant command

A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander

established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice

and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have

geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

contaminated remains

Remains of personnel which have absorbed or upon which have been deposited radioactive material,

or biological or chemical agents. (JP 1-02)

contamination

1. The deposit, absorption, or adsorption of radioactive material, or of biological or chemical agents on

or by structures, areas, personnel, or objects. 2. (DOD only) Food and/or water made unfit for

consumption by humans or animals because of the presence of environmental chemicals, radioactive

elements, bacteria or organisms, the byproduct of the growth of bacteria or organisms, the

decomposing material (to include the food substance itself), or waste in the food or water. (JP 1-02)

Glossary-6

FM 3-05.132

30 November 2009

Glossary

contamination control

A combination of preparatory and responsive measures designed to limit the vulnerability of forces to

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and toxic industrial hazards and to avoid, contain, control

exposure to, and, where possible, neutralize them. (JP 1-02)

decontamination

The process of making any person, object, or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making

harmless, or removing chemical or biological agents, or by removing radioactive material clinging to

or around it. (JP 1-02)

deliberate planning

A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that

occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions

regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed. (FM 1-02)

detection

In chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments, the act of locating chemical, biological,

radiological, and nuclear hazards by use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear detectors or

monitoring and/or survey teams. (JP 1-02)

dirty

Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense contaminated.

dispersion

1. A scattered pattern of hits around the mean point of impact of bombs and projectiles dropped or fired

under identical conditions; 2. In antiaircraft gunnery, the scattering of shots in range and deflection about

the mean point of explosion; 3. The spreading or separating of troops, materiel, establishments, or

activities which are usually concentrated in limited areas to reduce vulnerability; 4. In chemical and

biological operations, the dissemination of agents in liquid or aerosol form. (JP 1-02)

electromagnetic pulse

The electromagnetic radiation from a strong electronic pulse, most commonly caused by a nuclear

explosion that may couple with electrical or electronic systems to produce damaging current and

voltage surges. Also called EMP. (JP 1-02)

Executive Order 11850

The Executive Order dated 8 April 1975, Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of Chemical

Herbicides and Riot Control Agents, that renounced the first use of herbicides in war (except for

specified defensive uses) and the first use of riot control agents (RCAs) in war except for defensive

military modes to save lives.

ground zero

The point on the surface of the Earth at, or vertically below or above, the center of a planned or actual

nuclear detonation. (JP 1-02)

hot spot

Region in a contaminated area in which the level of radioactive contamination is considerably greater

than in neighboring regions in the area. (JP 1-02)

immediate decontamination

Decontamination carried out by individuals immediately upon becoming contaminated to save lives,

minimize casualties, and limit the spread of contamination. This may include decontamination of some

personal clothing and/or equipment. (JP 1-02)

individual protective equipment

In chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear operations, the personal clothing and equipment

required to protect an individual from chemical, biological, and radiological hazards and some nuclear

hazards. (JP 1-02)

30 November 2009

FM 3-05.132

Glossary-7

Glossary

industrial chemicals

Chemicals developed or manufactured for use in industrial operations or research by industry,

government, or academia. These chemicals are not primarily manufactured for the specific purpose of

producing human casualties or rendering equipment, facilities, or areas dangerous for human use.

Hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, phosgene, and chloropicrin are industrial chemicals that also

can be military chemical agents.

joint special operations task force

A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry

out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or

other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional non-special operations

units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF. (JP 1-02)

lysergic acid diethylamide

Formerly lysergide, commonly known as acid, is a semi-synthetic psychedelic drug of the ergoline

family. Also called LSD.

mission-oriented protective posture

A flexible system of protection against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear contamination.

This posture requires personnel to wear only that protective clothing and equipment (mission-oriented

protective posture gear) appropriate to the threat level, work rate imposed by the mission, temperature,

and humidity. Also called MOPP. (JP 1-02)

mission-oriented protective posture gear

Military term for individual protective equipment, including suit, boots, gloves, mask with hood, first

aid treatments, and decontamination kits issued to military members. Also called MOPP gear.

(JP 1-02)

Mylar

A trademark used for a thin, strong polyester material.

nerve agent

A potentially lethal chemical agent which interferes with the transmission of nerve impulses. (JP 1-02)

nonpersistent agent

A chemical agent that when released dissipates and/or loses its ability to cause casualties after 10 to 15

minutes. (JP 1-02)

nuclear defense

The methods, plans, and procedures involved in establishing and exercising defensive measures

against the effects of an attack by nuclear weapons or radiological warfare agents. It encompasses both

the training for, and the implementation of, these methods, plans, and procedures. See also CBRN

defense.

off-gassing

Vapor release of biological or chemical agents.

pathogen

A disease-producing microorganism that directly attacks human tissue and biological processes.

(JP 1-02)

persistency

In biological or chemical warfare, the characteristic of an agent which pertains to the duration of its

effectiveness under determined conditions after its dispersal. (JP 1-02)

persistent agent

A chemical agent that, when released, remains able to cause casualties for more than 24 hours to

several days or weeks. (JP 1-02)

Glossary-8

FM 3-05.132

30 November 2009

Glossary

protection

Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary

personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastrucure deployed or located within or outside

the boundaries of a given operational area. (JP 1-02)

protective mask

A protective ensemble designed to protect the wearer’s face and eyes, and prevent the breathing of air

contaminated with chemical and/or biological agents. (JP 1-02)

radionuclide

A nuclide (type of atom specified by its atomic number, atomic mass, and energy state, such as carbon

14) that exhibits radioactivity.

riot control agent

Any chemical, not listed in a schedule of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,

Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction which can produce

rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time

following termination of exposure. Also called RCA. (JP 1-02)

sensitive site exploitation

A related series of activities inside a captured sensitive site to exploit personnel documents, electronic

data, and material captured at the site, while neutralizing any threat posed by the site or its contents.

Also called SSE. (JP 1-02)

special operations command

A subordinate unified or other joint command established by a joint force commander to plan,

coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations within the joint force commander’s assigned

operational area. Also called SOC. (JP 1-02)

sterilize

To remove from material to be used in covert and clandestine operations, marks or devices which can

identify it as emanating from the sponsoring nation or organization. (JP 1-02)

survey

The directed effort to determine the location and the nature of a chemical, biological, and radiological

hazard in an area.

toxic industrial biological

Any biological material manufactured, used, transported, or stored by industrial, medical, or

commercial processes which could pose an infectious or toxic threat. Also called TIB. (JP 1-02)

toxic industrial chemical

A chemical developed or manufactured for use in industrial operations or research by industry,

government, or academia. For example: pesticides, petrochemicals, fertilizers, corrosives, poisons, etc.

These chemicals are not primarily manufactured for the specific purpose of producing human

casualties or rendering equipment, facilities, or areas dangerous for human use. Hydrogen cyanide,

cyanogen chloride, phosgene, and chloropicrin are industrial chemicals that also can be military

chemical agents. Also called TIC. (JP 1-02)

toxic industrial material

A generic term for toxic or radioactive substances in solid, liquid, aerosolized, or gaseous form that

may be used, or stored for use, for industrial, commercial, medical, military, or domestic purposes.

Toxic industrial material may be chemical, biological, or radioactive and described as toic industrial

chemical, toxic industrial biological, or toxic industrial radiological. Also called TIM. (JP 1-02)

toxin

Poisonous substances that may be produced naturally (by bacteria, plants, fungi, snakes, insects, and

other living organisms) or synthetically. (JP 1-02)

30 November 2009

FM 3-05.132

Glossary-9

References

SOURCES USED

These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

FM 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces, 20 September 2006

FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations, 15 April 2005

FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, 29 September 2006

FM 3-6, Field Behavior of NBC Agents (Including Smoke and Incendiaries), 3 November 1986

FM 3-11.3, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

and Nuclear Contamination Avoidance, 2 February 2006

FM 3-11.4, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

(NBC) Protection, 2 June 2003

FM 3-11.5, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

and Nuclear Decontamination, 4 April 2006

FM 3-11.14, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

Vulnerability Assessment, 28 December 2004

FM 3-11.19, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

Reconnaissance, 30 July 2004

FM 3-11.86, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Biological Surveillance,

4 October 2004

FM 3-61.1, Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 1 October 2000

FM 4-02.7, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service Support in a

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environment, 15 July 2009

TC 3-10, Commander’s Tactical NBC Handbook, 29 September 1994

TM 3-4230-204-12&P, Operator’s and Unit Maintenance Manual (Including Repair Parts and

Special Tools List) for Decontaminating Apparatus, Portable, DS2, 1 1/2 Quart, ABC-M11

(NSN 4230-00-720-1618), 31 October 1986

TM 3-4230-214-12&P, Operator’s and Unit Maintenance Manual Including Repair Parts and Special

Tools List for Decontaminating Apparatus: Portable, 14 Liter, M13 (NSN 4230-01-133-4124)

and Decontaminating Apparatus: Portable, 14 Liter, M13 (Practice) (4230-01-345-5172),

15 August 1992

TM 3-4230-216-10, Operator’s Manual for Decontaminating Kit, Skin: M258A1 (NSN 4230-01-101-

3984) and Training Aid, Skin Decontaminating: M58A1 (6910-01-101-1768), 17 May 1985

TM 3-4230-228-10, Operator’s Manual for Decontaminating Apparatus: Power-Driven, Lightweight,

M17 (NSN 4230-01-251-8702), 15 May 1989

TM 3-4230-229-10, Operator's Manual for Decontaminating Kit, Skin: M291, (NSN 4230-01-251-8702),

2 October 1989

TM 3-4240-280-10. Operator’s Manual for Mask, Chemical-Biological: Aircraft, ABC-M24 and

Accessories and Mask, Chemical-Biological, Tank, M25A1 and Accessories, 15 March 1988

TM 3-4240-341-10. Operator Instructions for Mask, Chemical-Biological: M45 (NSN 4240-01-414-4034)-

Extra Small (EIC 123); (4240-01-414-4035)-Small (EIC 123); (4240-01-414-4051)-Medium

(EIC 123); (4240-01-414-4052)-Large (EIC 123), 20 May 1998

TM 3-4240-342-10, Operator’s Manual for Mask, Chemical-Biological, Aircraft: Apache Aviator,

M48 (NSN 4240-01-386-0198)-Small (4240-01-386-4686)-Medium (4240-01-386-0201)-

Large (4240-01-386-0207)-Extra Large, 13 September 2002

30 November 2009

FM 3-05.132

References-1

References

TM 3-4240-342-20&P, Unit Maintenance Manual Including Repair Parts and Special Tools List for

Mask, Chemical-Biological: Aircraft, Apache Aviator, M48 (NSN 4240-01-386-0198)-Small

(4240-01-386-4686)-Medium (4240-01-386-0201)-Large (4240-01-386-0207)-Extra Large

13 September 2002

TM 3-6665-312-12&P, Operator’s and Organizational Maintenance Manual Including Repair Parts

and Special Tools List for M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm (NSN 6665-01-105-5623)

and Auxiliary Equipment M10 Power Supply (6665-00-859-2225); M10A1 Power Supply

(6665-00-093-2739); M228 High Profile Mounting Kit (6665-00-859-2212); and M182 Low

Profile Mounting Kit (6665-00-110-9492), 17 March 1985

TM 3-6665-319-10, Operator’s Manual for Water Testing Kit, Chemical Agents: M272

(NSN 6665-01-134-0885), 30 November 1983

TM 3-6665-349-12&P, Operator’s and Unit Maintenance Manual Including Repair Parts and Special

Tools List for Alarm, Biological Agent, Automatic: Integrated Detection System, M31

(NSN 6665-01-392-6191) (EIC: 5AP), 13 July 2001

TM 3-6665-426-10, Operator’s Manual for Detector Kit, Chemical Agent: M256A2 (NSN 6665-01-

563-7473), 2 November 2009

JOINT PUBLICATIONS

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 September 2006

JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 December 2003

JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID),

30 April 2004

JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments,

26 August 2008

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Executive Order 11850, Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of Chemical Herbicides and Riot

Control Agents, 8 April 1975

References-2

FM 3-05.132

30 November 2009

Index

detection equipment, 1-10, A-1

through A-3, E-1

agent characteristics, D-8

radiological agents, 1-10

direct action (DA), 1-4, 1-6, 3-1

agent persistency, 6-3, 6-4

reachback, iv, 1-12, 2-4

agent toxicity, 6-3

risk assessment, 1-3, 6-4, 6-11

electromagnetic pulse (EMP),

aircraft decontamination, 4-3

1-10, 1-11, 4-2, 4-3

special CBRN reconnaissance,

employment, 1-1, 1-6 through

1-7, 6-12

biological agents, 1-7 through

1-8, 5-3 through 5-5, 6-1, 6-7

1-10, 2-2, 3-2, 6-11, 7-2, A-2

special reconnaissance (SR),

expedient personnel

through A-4, D-9, E-8

1-3, 1-6

decontamination system

(EPDS), 1-6, 2-3, 2-4, 3-2,

3-3, E-2, E-3, E-7, E-8

chemical agents, 1-7 through

toxic industrial biological (TIB),

1-10, 2-2, 3-2, 6-11, 7-2, A-2

2-2, 3-2

through A-4, D-9, E-8

foreign internal defense (FID),

toxic industrial chemical (TIC),

chemical decontamination

1-2, 1-3, 1-5, 1-7, 6-8

2-2, 3-2, A-3, B-1, B-3

detachment (CDD), iv, 1-1,

toxic industrial material (TIM),

1-3, 1-5, 2-1, 2-3 through

1-1, 1-7 through 1-9, 1-11,

2-5, 3-1, 5-4, B-1, C-1

host nation (HN), 1-6, 2-1, 2-3,

2-4, 2-5, 3-3, 4-1, 5-3, 6-2,

3-3, 5-1, 6-2, 6-6, 6-7, 6-9,

chemical defense, 4-1, 4-2

6-4, 6-5, B-1, B-4, B-5

6-10, 6-13

chemical reconnaissance

hostile environment, 1-1, 2-1,

detachment (CRD), iv, 1-1,

3-1, 5-1

uncertain environment, 1-1,

1-3, 1-4, 2-1 through 2-3,

2-1, 3-1, 5-1

3-1, 4-1, 5-3, 5-5, 6-12, 7-1,

A-3, B-1, C-1, D-6, D-18

joint special operations task

Civil Affairs operations (CAO),

force (JSOTF), 5-1, 5-2, 5-4,

warning order (WARNORD),

1-3, 6-6

6-9

5-5, 6-4

commander's critical

weapons of mass destruction

information requirement

(WMD), 1-1, 1-2, 1-6, 1-7,

(CCIR), 6-4

mission, enemy, terrain and

2-2, 3-2, 5-1, 5-3, A-3, C-1

commander's intent, 6-1, 6-4,

weather, troops and support

through C-3

6-7, 6-8

available, time available, and

civil considerations

counterproliferation (CP), 1-5,

(METT-TC), 6-3

1-6

mission planning, 5-1, 5-3, 6-1,

counterterrorism (CT), 1-3, 1-6,

6-5, 6-6, 6-8, 6-10

1-7, C-1

multinational force, 6-7

deployment, 2-2, 2-4, 2-5, 3-3,

3-4, 4-1, 4-2, 5-3, 5-4, 6-5,

passive protection, 1-5

7-1

permissive environment, 1-1,

2-1, 3-1, 5-1, E-7

30 November 2009

FM 3-05.132

Index-1

FM 3-05.131

Army Special Operations Forces

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

November 2009

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their

contractors only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under

the International Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on

30 October 2009. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commander, United States

Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DTD-JA, Fort Bragg, NC

28310-9610.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or

reconstruction of the document.

FOREIGN DISCLOSURE RESTRICTION (FD 6): This publication has been reviewed by the product

developers in coordination with the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and

School foreign disclosure authority. This product is releasable to students from foreign countries on a

case-by-case basis only.

Headquarters, Department of the Army

*FM 3-05.131

Field Manual

Headquarters

Department of the Army

No. 3-05.131

Washington, DC, 16 November 2009

Army Special Operation Forces

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Contents

Page

PREFACE

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1-1

National Policy

1-1

Special Considerations

1-2

Rules of Engagement

1-3

Noncombatant Evacuation Operation Environments

1-3

Notification Phases

1-4

United States Army Special Operations Forces

1-5

Chapter 2

UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS AND ROLES

2-1

Department of State

2-1

Embassy Organization

2-2

Country Team

2-3

Other Agencies

2-4

Geographic Combatant Commanders

2-5

Army Service Component Command

2-6

Special Responsibilities

2-6

Chapter 3

CONTINGENCY AND PREDEPLOYMENT PLANNING

3-1

Early Action Plans

3-1

Notification Methods

3-1

Military Planning and Planning Assistance

3-2

Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to

protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange

Program or by other means. This determination was made on 30 October 2009. Other requests for this document

must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School,

ATTN: AOJK-DTD-JA, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610.

Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the

document.

Foreign Disclosure Restriction (FD 6): This publication has been reviewed by the product developers in

coordination with the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School foreign disclosure

authority. This product is releasable to students from foreign countries on a case-by-case basis only.

*This publication supersedes FM 3-05.104, 2 February 2004.

Contents

Chapter 4

DEPLOYMENT

4-1

Preparation and Planning

4-1

Forward Command Element

4-1

Evacuation Site Party

4-2

Chapter 5

EVACUATION FORCE OPERATIONS

5-1

Main Body Headquarters

5-2

Marshalling Element

5-2

Security Element

5-9

Logistics Element

5-9

Withdrawal of the Evacuation Force

5-10

Evacuation Control Center Organization

5-11

Evacuation Control Center Procedures

5-12

Classification, Priorities, and Consideration for Evacuees

5-16

Request for Asylum or Temporary Refuge

5-17

Chapter 6

TEMPORARY SAFE HAVEN OPERATIONS

6-1

Temporary Safe Haven Site

6-1

Organization and Functions

6-2

Appendix A

HISTORICAL NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

A-1

Appendix B

GUIDELINES FOR RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

B-1

Appendix C

NOTIFICATION FORMS

C-1

Appendix D

EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN CHECKLISTS

D-1

Appendix E

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION STAFF-PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS FOR NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION

OPERATION GUIDANCE

E-1

Appendix F

NOTIONAL COMBATANT COMMAND PUBLIC AFFAIRS PLAN FOR A

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION (HOST NATION)

F-1

Appendix G

EVACUEE PROCESSING TRAINING AND EVALUATION OUTLINE

G-1

Appendix H

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

H-1

GLOSSARY

Glossary- 1

REFERENCES

References- 1

INDEX

Index- 1

Figures

Figure 2-1. Noncombatant evacuation operation chain of command

2-1

Figure 3-1. Evacuation notification methods

3-2

Figure 3-2. Typical joint special operations task force

3-4

Figure 4-1. Option one, evacuation force lands at the evacuation control center

4-5

Figure 4-2. Option two, marshalling teams land at multiple assembly areas

4-5

Figure 4-3. Option three, single-point evacuation

4-6

Figure 4-4. Beach operation

4-7

FM 3-05.131

16 November 2009

Contents

Figure 5-1. Organization of evacuation force

5-1

Figure 5-2. Marshalling area

5-7

Figure 5-3. Sample evacuee logbook

5-9

Figure 5-4. Evacuee screening at a medical station

5-14

Figure 5-5. Evacuation by air transport

5-15

Figure 5-6. Classification of evacuees

5-16

Figure A-1. Children aboard the United States Ship Merrill during Operation

FIERY VIGIL

A-2

Figure A-2. Monrovia and Liberia timeline

A-3

Figure A-3. Organization of Operation ASSURED RESPONSE

A-4

Figure A-4. A helicopter landing at the Embassy in Monrovia

A-5

Figure A-5. Special Forces Soldiers escort evacuees from a transportation station

A-5

Figure A-6. Cote d’Ivoire timeline of events

A-6

Figure B-1. Sample rule of engagement card for Soldiers

B-1

Figure C-1. Example stand fast notice

C-1

Figure C-2. Example leave commercial notice

C-1

Figure C-3. Example evacuation notice

C-2

Figure C-4. Example Embassy or post closing notice

C-3

Figure C-5. Example waiver of evacuation opportunity

C-3

Figure D-1. Example checklist for evacuation assisted by the United States military

D-1

Figure D-2. Example checklist for assembly area

D-2

Figure D-3. Example checklist for helicopter landing zone

D-3

Figure D-4. Example checklist for airfield survey

D-3

Figure D-5. Example checklist for seaport survey

D-4

Figure F-1. Example notional combatant command Public Affairs plan for

noncombatant evacuation operation

F-1

Figure G-1. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for

establishing and operating a noncombatant evacuation operation

processing center

G-2

Figure G-2. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for

establishing and operating a noncombatant evacuation operation

reception station

G-6

Figure G-3. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for

establishing and operating a noncombatant evacuation operation

security screening station processing center

G-7

Figure G-4. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for

establishing and operating a noncombatant evacuation operation

registration station

G-8

Tables

Table A-1. Past noncombatant evacuation operations

A-1

Table G-1. Noncombatant evacuee processing training and evaluation outline tasks

and task numbers

G-2

16 November 2009

FM 3-05.131

iii

Preface

Field Manual (FM) 3-05.131 establishes Army special operations forces (ARSOF) doctrine for planning,

coordinating, and executing noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) across the entire continuum of

operational environments. NEOs are inherently joint operations. History demonstrates that joint forces

conducted the vast majority of NEOs. This manual describes ARSOF operating within that context, thus the

content of this manual mixes joint and Army terminology where appropriate. This manual does not duplicate or

supplant established doctrine dealing with tactical or strategic operations, but it does provide a specific

framework to apply that doctrine. Commanders tasked to conduct NEOs should ensure that their planning staff

is familiar with referenced publications.

PURPOSE

This manual provides direction to ARSOF commanders and staffs charged with conducting NEOs. It clarifies

procedures and terminology between the Department of Defense (DOD) and other government agencies

(OGAs) that may interact for NEOs. It outlines the necessary considerations for conducting, planning,

preparing, and executing NEOs. The considerations contained within this manual provide a doctrinal basis to

assist commanders as they lead their unit’s military decision-making process.

SCOPE

The manual reflects and supports ARSOF doctrine as stated in FM 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces. In

addition, it reflects and supports the joint doctrine found Joint Publication (JP) 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation

Operations and provides an ARSOF-specific focus on that doctrine. This publication is not a stand-alone

reference; rather, it is intended for use in conjunction with existing doctrine. Examples and graphics illustrate

principles and doctrine—they do not serve as prescriptive responses to tactical situations.

APPLICABILITY

FM 3-05.131 provides guidance for ARSOF commanders who determine the force structure, budget, training,

materiel, and operations and logistics requirements necessary to prepare ARSOF to conduct their missions. It

provides a reference for the staffs of ARSOF commanders to facilitate planning, preparation, and subsequent

execution of NEOs. This publication applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army

National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise

stated.

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

This manual is unclassified to ensure Army-wide dissemination and to facilitate ARSOF in the planning,

preparation, and execution of NEOs. Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do

not refer exclusively to men. The proponent of this manual is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special

Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Submit comments and recommended changes on DA Form 2028

(Recommended Changes to Publication and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN:

AOJK-DTD-JA, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610, or by e-mail to JAComments@soc.mil.

FM 3-05.131

16 November 2009

Chapter 1

Introduction

The DOD conducts NEOs to assist the Department of State (DOS) in evacuating

civilian noncombatants and nonessential military personnel from foreign locations to

designated safe havens in the United States (U.S.) or elsewhere. NEOs primarily

focus on evacuating U.S. citizens endangered by hostile environment or natural

disaster. NEOs may also include the evacuation of U.S. military personnel and

dependents, selected citizens of the host nation (HN), and third-country nationals

(TCNs). NEOs begin with the swift insertion of a force and temporary occupation of

a safe area and end with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the evacuation.

The operational environment, political implications, and interagency activity

combine to make a NEO a unique military operation. Appendix A describes historical

executions of NEOs.

NATIONAL POLICY

1-1. The DOS directs NEOs. During a NEO, the welfare of in-country U.S. personnel is the paramount

consideration. However, the decision to evacuate the Embassy and the order to execute a NEO also affect

political elements that may influence the timing of an evacuation. U.S. foreign policy objectives are the

determining factor in the timing of an evacuation. The following paragraphs discuss the national policy

concerning NEOs.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12656

1-2. Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, the

DOS is responsible for protecting and evacuating U.S. citizens and nationals abroad and for safeguarding

their overseas property. The DOS is the lead agency for planning and conducting NEOs.

Executive Order 12656 also directs the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to advise and assist the Secretary of

State in preparing and implementing these plans.

EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN

1-3. Every U.S. Embassy and Consulate must maintain an emergency action plan (EAP). One section of

the EAP covers the military evacuation of U.S. citizens and designated foreign nationals. The appropriate

geographic combatant commander (GCC) reviews the EAP to ensure it is accurate and adequate to allow

military support. Evacuation operations differ from other military operations in that the senior DOS

representative directs the operation at the time of evacuation. The DOS representative’s order to evacuate is

usually a political decision with extensive ramifications. The DOS or Ambassador may not give an

evacuation order at the most opportune time. The representative may delay the order until the last moment

to save political face by avoiding actions seen as a tacit admission of political failure. The DOS or the

Ambassador may initiate the evacuation process or plan. Evacuation transportation options, in order of

preference, are—

Commercial transportation (already scheduled).

Commercial charter.

U.S. military charter.

U.S. military transportation.

1-1

FM 3-05.131

16 November 2009

Chapter 1

Note: Transportation options must be coordinated through the Washington Liaison Group

(WLG).

EVACUATION GUIDELINES

1-4. The DOS or the Ambassador can order the following personnel to depart. These personnel are

eligible for evacuation assistance. Once evacuated, the DOS and chief of mission (COM) must approve

their return. Personnel in this category are—

U.S. civilian employees of United States Government (USG) agencies, except mission-essential

DOD employees of military commands.

U.S. military personnel assigned to the Embassy, such as Marine security guards, defense

attaché (DATT), and security assistance personnel.

Peace Corps volunteers.

USG contractors, if the contract provides for evacuation assistance.

Dependents of those listed above.

Dependents of other U.S. military personnel, including those assigned to military commands.

1-5. The DOS or Ambassador cannot order the following personnel to depart, but these personnel are

entitled to evacuation assistance. They may return at their discretion and expense. These personnel are—

U.S. employees of non-USG organizations.

U.S. employees employed by or assigned to international organizations.

U.S. employees that the host government directly contracts, even if the USG funds the contract.

U.S. employees of private entities, such as relief organizations, even if the employer receives

USG funding.

Fulbright grantees and private U.S. citizens.

Family members of private U.S. citizens, to include alien spouses, children, and other bona fide

residents of the household.

Other individuals the DOD designates eligible.

1-6. Legal, permanent U.S. residents (green card holders) are not entitled to any special assistance unless

they fall into one of the above categories. As a rule, if the USG is controlling the evacuation, the priorities

for assistance are as follows:

Priority I: U.S. citizens.

Priority II: Alien immediate family members of U.S. citizens.

Priority III: TCNs and designated foreign-service national employees of the USG.

Priority IV: Seriously ill or injured eligible non-U.S. citizens in imminent peril as determined by

the DOS (but who do not qualify for a higher priority).

Priority V: Other individuals the DOS determines eligible.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

1-7. GCCs plan and conduct NEOs in support of the DOS. Upon receipt of an execution order from the

SecDef, the GCC orders assigned and or attached forces to conduct evacuation operations in support of the

DOS and the appropriate U.S. Ambassador.

1-8. The GCC can execute the NEO with forces from a single Service. However, the most common

response is for the GCC to form and deploy a joint task force (JTF). By using a JTF, the commander takes

advantage of all available Service’s capabilities. Historically, JTFs for NEOs consisted of assigned or

deployed in-theater forces. Special operations forces (SOF) are often the most available and best-prepared

forces to conduct these operations. Forward-positioned forces may form the core of a larger force when the

situation affords the time for other forces to flow into the theater or operational area.

1-2

FM 3-05.131

16 November 2009

Introduction

1-9. NEO planners must prepare for the contingency of multinational operations. The HN’s ability to

support the operation influences the operational environments, as well as the development of courses of

action (COAs). In addition, the situation prompting evacuation may prompt other countries to evacuate

their citizens. For military or political expedience, the USG may choose to employ multinational forces for

this reason. SOF are uniquely prepared to participate in and lead multinational operations. For this reason,

combatant commanders often consider using them as the core or lead force for a JTF or joint special

operations task force (JSOTF).

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1-10. The rules of engagement (ROE) (Appendix B) for all NEOs should reflect the limited military

objective Soldiers are to accomplish. ROE are positive restrictions on the use of military force to prevent

violations of USG national policy. NEO ROE will be limited to the minimum military force needed to

successfully complete the mission, provide for the self-defense of evacuation forces, and defend the

noncombatant evacuees. Dissemination and enforcement of clearly defined ROE are critical. Planners must

consider the use of crowd-control agents

(FM 3-11.11, Flame, Riot Control Agents, and Herbicide

Operations, gives policy on use) and the employment of Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations

(PSYOP) teams to assist in the extraction of evacuees or to discourage hostilities. During a NEO,

objectives include preventing the destruction of adversaries and avoiding armed conflict whenever

possible. These objectives are often difficult to achieve, but well-planned ROE facilitate the achievement

of the objectives.

1-11. The environment may require that the evacuation force commander defend the evacuation from

adversaries without first informing higher authorities. Thus, if given the opportunity, the commander must

influence the ROE to allow for use of force where necessary. Upon arrival in-country, if practical, the

commander discusses the ROE with the Ambassador. Dynamic situations may warrant modifications to the

ROE. The appropriate authority, via the supported GCC, approves recommended modifications to the

established ROE.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION ENVIRONMENTS

1-12. The military command conducting a NEO tailors its planning and action for evacuation assistance

according to the anticipated situation. The three operational environments that the military may face in

evacuation operations are permissive, uncertain, and hostile. These environments may exist because of an

unfavorable political environment, a conflict, or a natural disaster in the HN. Typically, the more

unfavorable the environment is in the HN, the larger the force necessary to conduct the NEO.

PERMISSIVE

1-13. In a permissive environment, the NEO force expects no resistance to evacuation operations. This

type of environment requires little or no assembly of combat forces in-country. In a permissive

environment, the host government typically does not oppose an orderly departure or U.S. military

assistance. The U.S. military usually limits its assistance to medical, logistical, transportation, and

administrative processing. Planners analyze both existing and potential threats and tailor the security force

to give it the ability to counter both.

UNCERTAIN

1-14. In an uncertain environment, the host-government forces, whether opposed or receptive to the NEO,

do not have total, effective control of the territory and population in the intended area or country of

operations. Because of this uncertainty, the commander, joint task force (CDRJTF) may elect to reinforce

the evacuation force with more security units or a reaction force. The JTF disseminates the ROE through

subordinate commanders to ensure timely training of the force. In an uncertain environment, it is critical

that unit commanders strictly enforce the ROE to keep Soldiers from taking actions that escalate hostilities.

16 November 2009

FM 3-05.131

1-3

Chapter 1

HOSTILE

1-15. In a hostile environment, the NEO force may operate under conditions ranging from civil

disobedience or terrorist actions to full-scale combat. The CDRJTF may elect to deploy a sizable security

element with the evacuation force. He may position a large reaction force either with the evacuation force

or at an intermediate staging base (ISB). The environment may require forced-entry operations and the

establishment of defensive perimeters, escorted convoy operations, and personnel-recovery operations.

1-16. Regardless of the environment at the onset of the operation, the commander must plan for the

possibility that it may change. The volatile situations that trigger NEOs can also cause spontaneous or

organized violence. Unfortunately, U.S. citizens are often targets of this violence.

NOTIFICATION PHASES

1-17. How and when the United States notifies noncombatants of the need to evacuate are important

aspects for military NEO planners. The Ambassador requests approval for evacuation from the DOS and,

once approved, informs potential evacuees. The manner in which the evacuation is to take place is

described in two notification phases, draw down and evacuation. The NEO force further breaks these down

into subordinate phases.

DRAW DOWN

1-18. A draw down is less than a full evacuation of the post or Embassy, which is why it is the first phase

of notification. During a rapidly developing crisis, the draw down phase may be extremely short. The

decision to draw down requires the Embassy to develop a list of personnel who will remain at the post and

assist with the evacuation

Authorized Departure

1-19. The Ambassador must request authorized departure status from the DOS. The Ambassador must

grant approval for employees and family members wishing to leave. When the DOS terminates the

authorized departure status, the official evacuees must return to the post.

Ordered Departure

1-20. If the situation significantly deteriorates, the Ambassador may order family members and certain

employees to leave the post for their safety. If the Ambassador issues orders to these people, it is not

optional; they must leave. When the Ambassador terminates ordered departure status, official evacuees

must return to the post.

EVACUATION

1-21. USG leaders initiate the evacuation of personnel only after deciding to draw down. When feasible,

notification of potential evacuees involves communicating through the established warden system.

(Wardens are in-country personnel selected to prepare and maintain phone and address rosters of U.S.

citizens.) GCCs should use written messages rather than oral messages whenever possible. As a rule,

written messages are more reliable. The evacuation phase consists of four subordinate phases: stand fast,

leave commercial, evacuation, and Embassy or post closing. Appendix C provides sample notices of each

subordinate phase.

Stand Fast

1-22. Sometimes, the political or security environment deteriorates and the Ambassador perceives a threat

to U.S. citizens but an evacuation either is not necessary or is temporarily impossible. In this situation, the

Ambassador requests all U.S. citizens to stand fast. However, he does give preliminary instructions for

evacuation preparation. The Embassy identifies the wardens and activates its emergency action

1-4

FM 3-05.131

16 November 2009

Introduction

organization. Embassy personnel review the plans, options, and support requirements. At this time, the

Ambassador may consider requesting military assistance.

1-23. The GCC may direct the deployment of a liaison or assessment team, activate crisis-action response

or planning teams, and assign a subordinate joint force commander (JFC), as appropriate. Each GCC has

different options available based upon his subordinate commands or forces. For example, in the United

States European Command (USEUCOM), the theater special operations command (TSOC) forms the core

of the European Command Survey and Assessment Team (ESAT). The ESAT is the favored choice for

establishing a forward presence. The ESAT provides reliable and important information back to the

command to aid planning and to advise the Ambassador as well.

Leave Commercial

1-24. In grave situations where adequate commercial transportation is available, the Ambassador orders

nonessential U.S. citizens to depart using commercial transportation at the first opportunity.

Simultaneously, he may improve the security situation for the remaining essential personnel by—

Augmenting the Embassy’s internal security force with additional Marine forces and DOS

security personnel.

Requesting the deployment of a small, military staff element to the Embassy to assist in

evacuation planning in anticipation of an evacuation assisted by the U.S. military.

Requesting military assistance in the form of additional military forces.

Evacuation

1-25. Once the deterioration of the political or security environment threatens the safety of U.S. citizens,

the Ambassador, with DOS approval, will order the evacuation of those citizens, keeping only

mission-essential members of the country team. The Embassy assembles, documents, and assists the

movement of U.S. citizens, TCNs, and host-country nationals to designated safe haven sites. The situation

may require a mix of commercial charter, private, and military transport, depending on the availability of

scheduled commercial transportation. At some point in this phase, the Ambassador might request military

assistance, either because of inadequate transportation means or because of the severity of the threat to the

evacuees. Once requested, the GCC, upon direction from the SecDef through the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), commences military evacuation operations. These operations may range from

simple transportation support to the deployment of the JTF or JSOTF.

Embassy or Post Closing

1-26. The final notification phase occurs when the situation deteriorates to the point that the Embassy must

close and all remaining U.S. citizens and Embassy employees (including mission-essential personnel) must

evacuate. This does not include private U.S. citizens and dependents that desire to remain in the country.

Personnel may not require assistance until this phase of the evacuation. Military operations could range

from removing the remainder of the country team to full-scale evacuation operations.

UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

1-27. ARSOF include Special Forces (SF), Rangers, special operations aviation (SOA), PSYOP, and CA—

all supported by the Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne). The attributes of ARSOF make

them a preferred choice for executing NEO. ARSOF are responsive, versatile, agile, lethal, and capable of

rapidly reversing human suffering. ARSOF units provide unique capabilities for GCCs. Language skills,

cross-cultural knowledge, regional orientation, and contextual political understanding of operational

environments make ARSOF unparalleled when operating in complex environments. As individuals,

ARSOF Soldiers are adaptable, mature, innovative, culturally aware, self-assured, and self-reliant. Special

skills enable ARSOF Soldiers to work effectively with civilian populations or agencies, as well as with

other military forces. ARSOF execute their missions based upon the foundations established in their core

16 November 2009

FM 3-05.131

1-5

Chapter 1

competencies and capabilities. They also execute their missions utilizing their unique skill sets. Special

operations Soldiers are—

Highly trained. ARSOF Soldiers provide the maturity, experience, and professionalism that

politically sensitive operations, such as NEOs, require. Special operations Soldiers receive

mission-specific training beyond basic military skills to achieve special operations entry-level

skills.

Culturally aware. ARSOF units are regionally oriented. They possess linguistic capabilities.

The personnel within ARSOF units have broad experience bases. These attributes enable

ARSOF units to execute sensitive NEO tasks effectively.

Experienced in joint, interagency, and multinational operations. Theater special operations

experience, forward presence, and specialized training facilitate ARSOF units serving as the

core or major subordinate component of a joint interagency task force or multinational

organization executing a NEO.

Flexible, tailored responsive force packages. The following characteristics of ARSOF units

permit the rapid and precise tailoring that is unique to ARSOF:

ARSOF are modular.

ARSOF are able of conducting low signature, politically acceptable operations.

ARSOF are capable of lethal and nonlethal force.

ARSOF are capable of rapid deployment.

1-28. The combination of tactical proficiency, specialized skills, and strategic awareness makes ARSOF an

ideal choice for politically sensitive NEOs. FM 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces, as the Army’s

keystone publication for ARSOF, describes the ARSOF strategic landscape, fundamentals, core tasks,

capabilities, and sustainment involved in the full range of military operations.

SPECIAL FORCES

1-29. The United States Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) consists of five Active Army Special

Forces groups (SFGs) and two Army National Guard (ARNG) groups. SF are U.S. Army forces organized,

trained, and equipped to conduct special operations with an emphasis on UW capabilities. SF Soldiers

make up a unique and unconventional organization. SF units possess an extraordinary degree of versatility

and level of training. They can plan and conduct special operations across the range of military operations.

1-30. Language capabilities, unique force structure, regional orientation, cultural awareness, and

interpersonal relations are the keys to the success of Special Forces in the field. Blending these skills and

experiences enables SF Soldiers to navigate the political, social, religious, and humanitarian aspects of

today’s uncertain environments and provides a flexible option for NEO support. SF units have the ability to

serve as any of the following:

A core staff of a JSOTF.

A component of a JTF.

A primary extraction force.

An assistance or planning team.

A reconnaissance element.

A security or extraction element of sensitive personnel.

1-31. SF units often have existing relationships with country teams that make them ideally suited to serve

in an advisory or planning role in the Embassy or on the JTF staff. Soldiers should refer to current SF

operations doctrine for more information on Special Forces capabilities and employment.

RANGERS

1-32. The 75th Ranger Regiment is ARSOF’s light infantry force with specially trained, organized, and

equipped Soldiers who stand ready to deploy a credible military force quickly to any region of the world.

1-6

FM 3-05.131

16 November 2009

Introduction

The 75th Ranger Regiment, with three Ranger battalions and the Ranger Special Troops Battalion,

performs specified missions with other SOF and conventional forces.

1-33. The regimental headquarters has the capability to exercise operational control of the logistics assets

of conventional forces and other SOF for limited periods. The regimental support operations detachment

(RSOD) plans and coordinates organic and external logistics support to assigned and attached units. The

RSOD provides liaison elements for support integration within theater, host-nation, joint, and coalition

logistics infrastructures.

1-34. Ranger units execute missions with a profound degree of risk and a requirement for precise,

discriminate use of force, which differentiates them from conventional infantry units. Specialized

equipment; special tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and training in multiple means of infiltration

and employment make the Ranger regiment ideally suited to conduct forcible entry into hostile

environments in support of a NEO. FM 3-05.50, Army Special Operations Forces Ranger Operations,

contains more information on the capabilities and employment of Rangers.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION REGIMENT

1-35. The U.S. Army SOA unit, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), supports other

SOF units with a regimental headquarters, a headquarters company, and four SOA battalions. The 160th

SOAR provides SOA planning and support to SOF units at all planning and execution levels.

1-36. The specialized organization, training, and equipment of the 160th SOAR give them a unique

capability for precision infiltration, resupply operations, and exfiltration. This capability makes the

160th SOAR an asset of particular use for a NEO requiring low signature, precision operations conducted

by ARSOF. FM 3-05.60, Army Special Operations Forces Aviation Operations, contains more information

on SOA capabilities and employment.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1-37. ARSOF’s PSYOP capability resides in the only Active Army PSYOP group, the 4th Psychological

Operations Group, Airborne (POG[A]). The 4th POG(A) consists of a research and analysis division,

regional battalions, a tactical battalion, a dissemination battalion, and a headquarters and headquarters

company. The research and analysis division and the regional battalions are geographically oriented to

support each GCC. The 4th POG(A) provides PSYOP support that ranges from area and target analysis,

product development, and media production, to information collection and product distribution and

dissemination.

1-38. The ability to analyze and deal with complex politicomilitary problems characterizes PSYOP

Soldiers. Their varied skills include techniques in persuasive, cross-cultural, and mass media

communications; practical knowledge of social and behavioral psychology; cultural and situational

awareness; and foreign language proficiency. The organic media capabilities of the 4th POG(A) enable a

commander to bridge communication gaps caused by a loss or lack of infrastructure in the target country.

PSYOP organization modularity allows the 4th POG(A) to provide rapid, viable support with a small

footprint. These skills and unit attributes make PSYOP units a force of choice to support NEOs.

FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations, contains more information on PSYOP capabilities and

employment.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

1-39. ARSOF’s CA capability resides in the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade. The brigade’s four regionally

aligned CA battalions are composed of CA generalists. The battalions provide the GCC with immediate

operational access to CA assets and CA operations planning and execution at all levels. CA operations are

military operations planned, supported, executed, or transitioned by CA forces through, with, or by

indigenous populations and institutions, intergovernmental organizations

(IGOs), nongovernmental

organizations (NGOs), or OGAs to modify behaviors, to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society and to

assist in establishing the capacity for deterring or defeating future civil threats in support of civil-military

operations and other U.S. objectives.

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1-40. The unique mission and specially trained forces of the 95th CA Brigade make it ideally suited to

support NEOs. The brigade’s core tasks of populace and resource control, foreign humanitarian assistance,

nation assistance, support to civil administration, and civil information management ensure a capable force

that can support many of the critical tasks a NEO requires. The brigade’s subordinate units are capable of

conducting initial and follow-up assessments of the area of operations in order to validate the commander’s

information and to collect NEO-relevant information. The brigade’s core tasks facilitate minimizing

population interference with operations and establishing and maintaining liaison with Embassy officials.

1-41. Liaison with Embassy staff is critical for effective interagency coordination. Effective interagency

communication aids in identifying required and planned activities and delineating responsibility between

and for military units and government agencies for those activities. Examples of these activities include

obtaining civil or indigenous assistance to support the execution of the operation; identifying U.S. citizens

and others to be evacuated; and receiving, screening, processing, and debriefing evacuees. FM 3-05.40,

Civil Affairs Operations, contains more information on CA capabilities and employment.

SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE

1-42. The 528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) has two battalions, the Special

Troops Battalion and 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion. The brigade plans, coordinates, and

provides logistics and sustainment support to ARSOF; plans, coordinates, and provides operational and

tactical communications for JSOTF commanders; and provides signal force packages in support of

ARSOF.

1-43. The brigade has unique capabilities that allow it to support SOF. The brigade’s knowledge of joint

operations and ability to interface for logistics support throughout a theater make all SOF more viable and

sustainable forces. The brigade’s support to SOF multiplies the benefits that make ARSOF units a preferred

choice for supporting and executing NEOs. FM 3-05.140, Army Special Operations Forces Logistics, and

FM 3-05.160, Army Special Operations Forces Communications System, provide more information on the

brigade’s capabilities and employment.

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Chapter 2

United States Organizations and Roles

A variety of government agencies, DOD elements, combined working groups, and

military organizations support NEOs. It is through effective planning and

coordination by these entities that ARSOF and other military units successfully

complete these complex, sensitive missions. Figure 2-1 shows the chain of command

for a NEO.

Figure 2-1. Noncombatant evacuation operation chain of command

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

2-1. The DOS, acting on the advice and recommendation of the COM, decides when to initiate a NEO.

Evacuation normally commences according to the Embassy EAP and requires scheduled commercial

transportation, commercial charter transportation, or U.S. military transportation. The DOS Under

Secretary for Management arranges charter transportation—civilian or military.

2-2. If evacuation requirements exceed the capability of the diplomatic mission, the Secretary of State

may request military assistance from the DOD. The need for military assistance may occur when the threat

to U.S. citizens makes it impractical to wait for other means of evacuation or if military forces are

necessary to actively protect U.S. citizens.

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2-3. The CJCS, when directed by the SecDef, tasks this mission to the appropriate GCC. The GCC

initiates appropriate military planning and coordinates with the DOS chair or his regional liaison group.

EMBASSY ORGANIZATION

2-4. The primary responsibility for NEOs lies with the DOS. The COM is the Ambassador. He is the

ranking U.S. official in-country and is directly responsible to the President of the United States. In the

absence of the Ambassador, the deputy chief of mission (DCM) becomes the chargé d’affaires. As the

President’s representative in-country, the Ambassador is the senior representative of the USG and is

therefore ultimately in command. The COM, not the senior military commander, is ultimately

responsibility for successfully completing the NEO and safeguarding the evacuees. Embassy organization

varies from country to country. Some embassies may be responsible for more than one country; some are

fully staffed, while others have minimum staffing. DOS agency name and organizational changes affect

Embassy organization as well. JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, 22 January 2007, contains

further details on Embassy organization.

2-5. The administrative officer (AO) is often the third in command in the Embassy hierarchy. In a small

post with no security officer, the AO assumes the functions of the security officer. In this situation, the AO

would then have operational control (OPCON) of the Marine security guard (MSG) detachment, if one is

assigned to the Embassy. The AO is also responsible for the Embassy communications unit.

2-6. The general services officer (GSO) has many of the same functions as a logistics staff officer. The

GSO is normally responsible for all buildings, grounds, construction, vehicles, and maintenance.

2-7. The chief of the consular section is responsible for many functions relating to U.S. personnel and is

an appropriate point of contact (POC) for the intelligence and operations staff officers. Consular officers

are, in general, responsible for protecting the welfare of all U.S. citizens visiting and residing in their

country, knowing the whereabouts of U.S. citizens, and maintaining an estimated count of U.S. citizens in

the area.

2-8. The chief of the security assistance office (SAO) may act as the senior military person at the

Embassy. He maintains liaison with the HN’s military forces. The law authorizes him to perform specific

military functions with the HN that other Embassy staff members cannot. When an Embassy has no

military personnel assigned to the Defense Attaché Office, the SAO is responsible for the activities

associated with that office. Likewise, an Embassy may not have an SA assigned but has a staffed Defense

Attaché Office.

2-9. The United States defense representative (USDR) is normally the senior military official assigned to

the Embassy. The USDR is the representative of the SecDef, CJCS, and GCC. The USDR provides the

conduit for planning, coordinating, and executing support to USG officials for DOD activities that are not

the responsibility of another DOD agency or component. The USDR is responsible for coordinating

administrative and security activity for DOD elements assigned to the Embassy that are not under the

control of a combatant commander.

2-10. The DATT is a military DOD representative attached to the Embassy in diplomatic status. He has

access to the daily Embassy situation report (SITREP) and other written intelligence. The chief of station

and DATT are ideal points of contact for the intelligence staff officer. They can provide information about

HN civil and military capabilities, such as order of battle.

2-11. The public affairs officer (PAO) is responsible for media relations and approves all media contacts

during a NEO. He is the POC for the JSOTF PAO.

2-12. The regional security officer (RSO) is a diplomatic security officer responsible for the security

functions of U.S. Embassies and Consulates in a given country or group of adjacent countries. The RSO

oversees the special security force (SSF) and contract security force at the post.

2-13. Embassies without an RSO have a post security officer (PSO) who has general security duties at a

specific Embassy (or Consulate). The PSO is a special staff officer under the control of the AO. The PSO

exercises OPCON over the MSG detachment assigned to the station. The SSF are DOS employees who

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United States Organizations and Roles

respond to crises in foreign countries. They work for the RSO and provide additional bodyguard security

for the COM, the DCM, and others as directed by the RSO.

2-14. The political officer reports on political developments, negotiates with the host government, and

represents views and policies of the USG to his contacts. The political officer maintains regular contact

with HN government officials, political and labor leaders, and other influential citizens and third-country

diplomats. The political officer is a major contributor to the overall intelligence picture.

2-15. The economic officer analyzes, reports, and advises on economic matters in the HN. Economic

officers negotiate with the host government on trade and financial issues. They also work closely with

relief organizations.

2-16. The medical officer is the senior medical person. He responds to emergencies and sets up triage,

trauma, and mass casualty operations. The medical officer can also advise the JTF on medical threats and

preventive medicine measures necessary for in-country and incoming forces. However, this advice should

not take the place of good medical intelligence by the evacuating force before the operation.

2-17. The MSG detachment has, at a minimum, a commander and watch standers. The MSG detachment

missions and duties include—

Exercising access control and providing stationary guard coverage of the principal buildings

Conducting visual inspections of controlled access areas to detect possible physical or technical

penetrations

Performing other necessary duties that need immediate action and that the COM, chargé

d’affaires, RSO, or PSO directs.

Protecting the principal buildings as the EAP outlines or as the COM, chargé d’affaires, RSO, or

PSO directs.

2-18. The MSG detachment commander is normally a member of the emergency action committee (EAC).

The EAC is the interface between the Embassy and the DOS. The mission of the EAC is to brief,

coordinate, and plan for the evacuation and protection of U.S. noncombatants and certain designated

aliens. The EAC is a subset of the country team. It advises the Ambassador on security issues, emergency

preparedness, draw downs, and evacuations. The EAC prepares the EAP.

COUNTRY TEAM

2-19. The country team is a council of senior officers, normally section heads, working under the direction

of the COM to pool their skills and resources in the national interest of the United States. The country team

system makes rapid interagency consultation, action, or recommendation possible from the field and

effective execution of U.S. missions, programs, and policies. The organization of each country team varies,

depending on the COM’s desires, the specific country situation, the number and size of U.S. programs, and

the qualifications of the senior officers representing the agencies. The country team normally consists of

the following members:

COM.

DCM.

Consular officer.

Chief of station.

RSO.

Political counselor.

Commercial attaché.

Agricultural attaché.

Legal attaché.

Science officer.

PAO.

AO.

Economics officer.

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Chapter 2

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) attaché.

Director of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Director of the Peace Corps.

DATT.

Chief of the SAO.

OTHER AGENCIES

2-20. During NEOs, the JSOTF may need to coordinate with agencies outside the DOS. The following

paragraphs discuss other agencies that may have important responsibilities during NEOs.

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

2-21. The USAID is a quasi-independent agency that funds developmental projects representing the

nationwide efforts of the country team. Administratively, it functions within the DOS and operates under

an administrator who also serves as the Director of the International Development Cooperation Agency.

USAID—

Carries out economic assistance programs designed to help people of developing countries

advance their productive capacities, improve their quality of life, promote economic and

political stability, and assist other missions in providing the HN with supplies and equipment to

construct needed projects.

Maintains liaison with all charitable organizations capable of conducting humanitarian

assistance.

Responds to virtually any disaster abroad, with emphasis on humanitarian relief in the form of

equipment and funds.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

2-22. By law (Title 42, United States Code [USC], Section 1313, Assistance for U.S. Citizens Returned

From Foreign Countries) and Executive Order 12656, the Department of Health and Human Services

(DHHS) is the lead federal agency for the reception of all evacuees in the United States. DHHS personnel

meet and assist evacuees at the U.S. port of entry. The Embassy and DOS coordinate DHHS assistance for

evacuees.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL

2-23. The Department of the Army (DA), Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, is responsible for the

reception and repatriation of all DOD family members, nonessential employees, and DOD contractors. The

Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3025.14, Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and

Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad, provides guidelines for reception and repatriation.

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICES

2-24. If the safe haven is in the United States, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

(USCIS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) may meet evacuees at the port of entry.

Embassy staff may include representatives from the Department of Homeland Security and ICE who can

help identify the foreign nationals the United States will evacuate. Responsibilities of the USCIS include

the following:

Facilitate the entry of legally admissible persons as visitors or as immigrants to the United

States.

Grant benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act, including those seeking permanent

resident status or naturalization.

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United States Organizations and Roles

Prevent unlawful entry into the United States.

Apprehend and remove persons whose entry is illegal or not in the best interest of the

United States.

2-25. In addition to the USCIS and ICE, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection may also be necessary to

meet and process non-USG evacuees. The WLG is responsible for coordinating USCIS, ICE, and

U.S. Customs and Border Protection support to the NEO.

Washington Liaison Group

2-26. A representative of the DOS chairs the WLG. Representatives from the Office of the Secretary of

Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the military departments are members of the WLG.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent

Capabilities is the NEO coordinator for the DOD. The DOS invites other USG departments and agencies to

participate as appropriate.

2-27. The WLG is responsible for coordinating, planning, and implementing DOS and DOD plans for the

protection and evacuation of noncombatants abroad. The representatives of the WLG are the points of

contact for their departments on all matters pertaining to evacuation planning and implementation. The

WLG arranges transportation beyond what is routinely available to the Embassy. It designates the ISB, safe

haven, and repatriation site. (Unless otherwise designated by the OSD, the ultimate safe haven for DOD

employees and dependents is the United States.)

2-28. The WLG coordinates with the DHHS, INS, and the U.S. Customs Bureau. The WLG ensures the

appropriate agencies meet all non-USG evacuees at the initial port of entry in the United States, process

them into the country, and assist them in making onward travel arrangements.

2-29. The DHHS meets and assists evacuees at the U.S. port of entry. The DHHS provides assistance only

if evacuees are without adequate resources to resettle on their own, the Embassy and the DOS recommend

assistance, and the individual desires assistance.

Regional Liaison Groups

2-30. RLGs are joint-monitoring and -coordinating bodies established by the DOS. Political advisors chair

the RLGs to their GCC, with representation from the DOD.

2-31. RLGs ensure coordination exists between the various Embassies and military commands. RLGs

ensure that Embassies (or posts) and GCCs coordinate NEO planning. They provide advice and guidance

to diplomatic and Consulate posts and military commands in their areas by—

Helping Embassies and commands plan evacuation and protection of U.S. citizens and certain

designated aliens in case of emergency.

Providing liaison between the WLG and the Embassy.

Reviewing EAPs and forwarding them to DOS with comments and recommendations.

Ensuring coordination exists between the various Embassies and military commands.

GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDERS

2-32. The DOS may task GCCs to assist in the event of imminent or actual hostilities, significant civil

disturbances, or natural and manmade disasters. Geographic combatant commanders prepare and maintain

contingency NEO plans to help the DOS protect and evacuate U.S. noncombatants and designated aliens.

2-33. The GCCs develop general contingency plans to support the DOS in case the SecDef orders such

assistance. These plans include support for the evacuation of noncombatants. When a situation develops in

which U.S. military assistance is necessary during a NEO, the CJCS designates the supported and

supporting combatant commanders for planning purposes.

2-34. The CJCS warning order (WARNORD) provides guidance to the GCCs. This guidance normally

covers areas of key concern to the President or SecDef and provides the GCC with an overview of the

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Chapter 2

political context within which the higher authority is considering the NEO. The scope and objective of U.S.

involvement in a developing situation requiring a military response is often in general terms to allow

maximum flexibility in the preparation of appropriate COAs. The CJCS warning order—

Defines command relationships, the anticipated mission, and any planning constraints.

Identifies available forces and strategic mobility resources and establishes tentative timing for

execution. The CJCS may state that the GCC specify the forces, mobility resources, and timing

as part of COA development.

2-35. Upon request by the Embassy, the GCC supporting the Embassy’s area of responsibility (AOR) will

dispatch a small advanced echelon (ADVON) team. The ADVON team will maintain contact with the

Embassy and coordinate the initial military effort. The ADVON team has the communications equipment

necessary to maintain effective contact between the GCC, subordinate JFC, and the Embassy.

2-36. Although each Embassy has an EAP, the information may not be accurate or current. Prior

coordination and a site survey may not be possible. The GCC must deal with the situation as it exists at the

time of evacuation. He may have to depend on information that Embassy personnel or other assets provide.

2-37. Evacuations may be politically sensitive. The highest levels of leadership monitor NEOs. The DOS

determines the evacuation sites and timing of the operation. As a situation develops, the evacuation force

secures assembly areas and an evacuation site, establishes defensive perimeters, and locates and escorts

evacuees. Protecting the force and its charges may include establishing physical barriers to protect

assembly areas and evacuation sites.

ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND

2-38. Higher authorities may task commanders of Army Service component commands (ASCCs) of

geographic combatant commands to provide conventional army units in support of ARSOF-conducted

NEOs. Coordination between the Army Service component command staff and the JSOTF or ARSOF

should occur during preparation and planning (FM 4-93.4, Theater Support Command). Conventional

Army, military police (MP), infantry, aviation, signal, and logistical units may be necessary augmentations

to an ARSOF conducting a NEO.

SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES

2-39. In nonemergency evacuations, the Commander, United States Joint Forces Command

(CDRUSJFCOM), and the Commander, United States Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM), are the safe

haven commanders for DOD repatriation in their respective areas of responsibility. In addition,

CDRUSPACOM is responsible for repatriation operations in Hawaii, Alaska, and U.S. territories in the

Pacific. CDRUSJFCOM has delegated the responsibility for repatriation to the Army component

commander, who is the Commander, United States Forces Command (CDRUSFORSCOM).

2-40. Because of its reputation as a humanitarian Service, the Coast Guard may play a vital role in certain

emergency evacuation situations. The relatively nonbelligerent nature of Coast Guard cutters and aircraft

makes them an option in cases where a DOD presence may exacerbate a potentially hostile situation.

2-41. As a member of the WLG, the SOF representative coordinates with the DOS, the GCCs, and the

Services to ensure the adequacy and timeliness of special operations planning and coordination in support

of NEOs. The Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM), prepares and

provides SOF in support of NEOs conducted by GCCs.

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Chapter 3

Contingency and Predeployment Planning

Evacuation operations differ from most other military operations. The direction of the

operations may remain with the U.S. Ambassador at the time of evacuation. Further,

the order to evacuate is a political, rather than a military, decision with extensive

ramifications. It indicates to the local population and other governments that the

situation has deteriorated to such a point that the U.S. has lost faith in the ability of

the HN to maintain control. Therefore, the Ambassador may delay the evacuation

order longer than would normally be considered militarily sound. As a result, the

evacuation, when it is ordered, is more urgent and dangerous.

EARLY ACTION PLANS

3-1. U.S. Embassies and Consulates are required to have early action plans for the area under their

cognizance. The COM is responsible for the preparation of an EAP. The EAP should address, among other

things, the evacuation of U.S. citizens and designated foreign nationals from a foreign country with

military assistance. The supporting military commander is solely responsible for the conduct of military

operations to assist in the implementation of EAPs. EAPs (to include photographs) give details on—

Evacuation sites.

Number of evacuees (total and by area).

Assembly areas.

Command posts.

Key personnel (names, location, and means of contact).

3-2. Geospatial intelligence base for contingency operations (GIBCO) products, formerly known as

noncombatant evacuation operation packages

(NEOPACKS), are electronic, tailored, geospatial and

written products designed to support a NEO. These products can contain highly accurate terrain

visualization, route analysis, site selection, weather effects, and other products to assist the NEO planner.

Planners should include geospatial-intelligence contingency packages in the EAP.

3-3. The 12 FAH-1, Emergency Planning Handbook, by the DOS is a consolidated source of guidance

for foreign-Service posts. The handbook provides information on planning for and dealing with certain

emergencies. The handbook is the principal reference for posts preparing and revising the EAPs.

Appendix D of this manual contains sample EAP checklists from the 12 FAH-1.

NOTIFICATION METHODS

3-4. Evacuation notification methods (Figure 3-1, page 3-2) involve various ways of communicating

with potential evacuees. These methods include wardens, radios or telephones, and runners.

3-5. Wardens are usually volunteers who have agreed to notify a certain number of U.S. citizens when

evacuation is possible. As a rule, the wardens prepare, update, and maintain a list of phone numbers and

addresses of U.S. citizens residing in their area. During an evacuation, each warden distributes messages,

keeping individuals informed about the evacuation and other relevant information.

3-6. U.S. citizens and foreign nationals living outside of large population centers may require an alternate

means of notification. Alerting personnel can use shortwave radio and commercial telephone to contact

personnel living at great distances from the Embassy. However, because of the insecure nature of these

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Chapter 3

means, personnel can only transmit unclassified information through them. In some instances,

communications outages may require runners to disseminate information to personnel outside the Embassy

area.

Figure 3-1. Evacuation notification methods

MILITARY PLANNING AND PLANNING ASSISTANCE

3-7. Particular HN and DOS events create a probability of a NEO occurring. NEOs progress through five

stages that require prior planning.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION TRIPWIRES

3-8. Possible events that may lead to a NEO are as follows:

The issuance of DOS travel advisories (Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] Watch Condition

[WATCHCON] III).

The existence of threats against U.S. citizens or U.S. facilities.

The DOS implementation of voluntary departure.

The demonstration of mass protests directed at U.S. citizens, facilities, or policies.

The implementation of DOS-authorized departure (DIA WATCHCON II).

The deterioration of security conditions.

The existence of rioting or general lawlessness.

The presence of violence directed at U.S. citizens or facilities.

The emplacement of limitation by the local government on the free movement of U.S. citizens.

The closing of international airports or borders.

The existence of an insurgency that may threaten U.S. citizens.

The invasion by a third nation that may threaten U.S. citizens.

The implementation of a DOS-ordered departure (DIA WATCHCON I).

The evacuation of other country’s citizens.

The request by the COM for assistance.

3-9. As more events on the list occur, the probability of a NEO occurring increases. This list is not

all-inclusive. It is not in sequential or chronological order. In addition, the list does not represent an

escalating scale of probabilities culminating in the immediate necessity to execute a NEO.

PHASES OF A NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION

3-10. A NEO assisted by the military usually consists of the following NEO phases:

Phase I. Predeployment begins upon receipt of the CJCS WARNORD. It extends through the

commencement of the deployment.

Phase II. Deployment commences with the departure from home station. Deployment is

complete upon linkup with the supported JTF, JSOTF, or Army special operations task force

(SOTF).

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Contingency and Predeployment Planning

Phase III. Lodgment includes the establishment of assembly areas, departure airfield or port

facilities, landing zones (LZs), and, if necessary, safe havens.

Phase IV. Evacuation involves the collection, processing, preparation, and evacuation of desired

personnel.

Phase V. Redeployment includes the return of all forces to the home station after the evacuation

is complete.

PREDEPLOYMENT PLANNING

3-11. Predeployment planning begins when the subordinate JTF or JSOTF receives the WARNORD from

the GCC. Predeployment planning continues until the evacuation force reaches the ISB or the evacuation

site. Prior coordination between the GCC and the Embassy staff can greatly improve planning. The GCC

can provide the JTF or JSOTF with information to begin the planning, such as the general contingency

plans developed by the combatant command. During this period, the advance party may deploy. The GCC

must request diplomatic support from the DOS. The GCC’s request will result in the DOS requesting the

necessary overflight agreements.

3-12. Time is often critical in planning. The JTF or JSOTF commander obtains necessary planning

information from the combatant command. As a minimum, he must determine the following:

The need for and the location of an ISB (if the WLG has not designated one).

The number and general location of evacuation sites. The ports of embarkation

(POEs),

approximate number of evacuees, and the manner in which evacuees will leave the country.

The location of the safe haven and any intermediate safe havens and the person responsible for

establishing and operating these sites.

3-13. One of the first pieces of information that the combatant command provides the JTF or JSOTF

commander is the operation plan (OPLAN) or concept plan (CONPLAN) for the emergency evacuation of

citizens from the country or region in question. This is the GCC’s baseline guidance for the operation. In

most cases, this document contains an analysis of the AOR and valuable background intelligence about the

geography and demography of the HN. In addition, it identifies the headquarters with responsibility for the

operation. The combatant command develops the CONPLAN for each country in its AOR based on

priority and resources. The combatant command reviews and updates the CONPLAN often to allow for

expeditious planning should a NEO be necessary.

3-14. The Embassy provides the combatant command with a copy of its EAP, which the command

provides to the JTF or JSOTF after analyzing it for mission direction. The plan contains much of the

intelligence the task force and evacuation force commanders will need to plan the operation. The EAP

includes a checklist for evacuations assisted by the U.S. military and intelligence on routes, assembly areas,

and helicopter LZs. It also contains airfield and seaport survey data. (Appendix D contains samples of EAP

checklists.) Other critical sources of intelligence available include the following:

Geospatial-intelligence contingency packs.

Regional survey team reports.

Joint expeditionary support products—noncombatant evacuation operations.

Contingency support packages (CSPs).

3-15. The combatant command staff and the Embassy must coordinate regularly to ensure the OPLAN and

the EAP are consistent. Failure to coordinate and update either plan can cost precious planning time or,

even worse, cause disaster. One such example is the evacuation of Mogadishu, Somalia, in January 1991.

Although the Embassy in Mogadishu moved in 1989, the evacuation plan contained a map from 1969.

Helicopters carrying the evacuation force spent an additional 20 minutes above hostile forces looking for

the Embassy. In this case, the failure to update plans could have resulted in the loss of aircraft, personnel,

and evacuees.

3-16. Other agencies may provide key intelligence for planning NEOs. When geospatial-intelligence

contingency packages are not included as part of or as a supplement to an EAP, the unit conducting the

NEO should request a package from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). The NGA is a

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Department of Defense combat support agency and a member of the national intelligence community. The

DIA provides the DOS, selected Embassy DATT officers, appropriate military commands, and the

Services with contingency support packages or U.S. diplomatic facility graphics for use in evacuation

planning. Other intelligence products that may be available and applicable to the NEO include the gridded

reference graphic and the contingency support study. In addition, the DIA is responsible for national-level

evasion and recovery intelligence production.

JOINT TASK FORCE OR JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE

3-17. If a NEO involves military forces, they are usually comprised of units from more than one Service or

country. Upon receiving orders, the GCC designates a CDRJTF to exercise overall control of the NEO

operations. The CDRJTF is responsible for all activities, from initial planning and deployment to

establishing an ISB, conducting the evacuation, and if necessary, operating the safe haven.

3-18. The GCC may elect to form a JSOTF. The organization of a JSOTF is similar to a conventional JTF.

A higher or senior JFC normally establishes a JSOTF to plan and conduct special operations. The

establishment of the JSOTF may be subordinate to another JTF or directly subordinate to a GCC or

subunified command. Likewise, a TSOC commander may establish a JSOTF to focus on a specific mission

or region within the operational area assigned by the GCC. In addition, the JSOTF could operate as a

JSOTF afloat—at sea in a forward area. This option may be necessary when protection and security risks

are a concern or the government will not allow a land-based JSOTF on its territory.

3-19. The JSOTF is a temporary, joint SOF headquarters. This SOF headquarters controls a JTF made up

of SOF of more than one Service in a specific theater of operations. The GCC forms a JSOTF to carry out a

specific operation or to execute special operations in support of the theater campaign or other operations.

The JSOTF may have conventional units under its OPCON or tactical control to conduct assigned

missions. Figure 3-2 depicts a typical JSOTF.

Figure 3-2. Typical joint special operations task force

SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE

3-20. If there is only one group, regiment, or battalion in charge of Army special operations, the Army

calls it a SOTF. The commander, joint special operations task force (CDRJSOTF), may establish multiple

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Contingency and Predeployment Planning

subordinate SOTFs. The commander organizes each SOTF around the nucleus of an SF or a Ranger unit

and includes a mix of ARSOF units and their support elements. The CDRJSOTF assigns each SOTF an

area within the joint special operations area or functional mission under the SOTF’s OPCON.

3-21. The SOTF is a mission-dependent organization. The command may construct the SOTF of theater

SOF assets and forces based in the continental United States

(CONUS). Because of possible time

constraints, ARSOF elements stationed in-theater may provide the nucleus that CONUS-based forces

arriving in-theater build upon.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION

3-22. NEOs involve managing large groups of people with little to no military training across a collapsing

infrastructure with an ever-changing threat. The military forces have ultimate responsibility but little

authority over the personnel that they are protecting. Because conventional intelligence preparation of the

operational environment

(IPOE) focuses on combat between two conventional military forces, the

intelligence staff section must draw techniques from other sources to complement his analysis for NEOs.

The methods of IPOE for urban operations are one supplemental source (FM 3-06, Urban Operations).

3-23. Accurate and timely intelligence is the key to a successful NEO. To provide useful intelligence, the

intelligence staff officer must ensure full engagement of the intelligence effort at all times. Current military

intelligence doctrine emphasizes the following five main considerations:

Consideration 1. Initially, the commander drives the intelligence effort. He focuses on the

intelligence system by clearly designating his priority intelligence requirements

(PIR) and

mission requirements. He ensures that personnel fully employ and synchronize the intelligence

effort. He demands that the intelligence effort provide the information he needs in the time

frame and form in which he needs it.

Consideration 2. The intelligence officer synchronizes intelligence collection, analysis, and

dissemination with operations. By synchronizing intelligence, the intelligence officer ensures the

executing commander receives the information he needs for his decision-making process.

Intelligence synchronization is a continuous process that keeps intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance (ISR) operations tied to the commander’s critical decisions and concept of

operations.

Consideration 3. Broadcast dissemination of intelligence is the simultaneous broadcast of

near-real-time intelligence from collectors and processors at all echelons. It permits commanders

and operational elements at different echelons to receive the same intelligence at the same time.

This provides the commander, evacuation control center

(ECC), Embassy intelligence

personnel, evacuation teams, ISB personnel, and home-base or safe-haven personnel with a

common picture of the mission area.

Consideration 4. Split-based intelligence operations enable the commander to have top-driven,

high-resolution intelligence, regardless of which organic intelligence-collection and production

assets are currently in use and in-country. Split-based intelligence operations employ collection

and analysis elements from all echelons, from national to tactical, in HNs, sanctuaries, or the

CONUS. Collection elements typically operate in the HN while analysis occurs in a sanctuary or

HN.

Consideration 5. The intelligence staff officer tactically tailors ISR support for each phase of

the operation based on the mission requirements and the availability of resources. He must

decide which key intelligence personnel and equipment to deploy immediately to the mission

area and when and if to phase in his remaining military intelligence (MI) assets. (FMI 2-01.301,

Specific Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Applications for Intelligence Preparation of

the Battlefield, provides more information.)

3-24. Uncertain and hostile NEO environments presuppose regime resistance to the operation or regime

incapacity because of partial or full breakdown of law and order and partial or full breakup of the regime’s

defense and security establishments. With regime resistance, the threat profile consists of regime military

and paramilitary (police) forces and auxiliaries. In this situation, order-of-battle analysis can derive unit

strengths, types and amounts of weaponry and mobility assets, garrison locations, and so forth. With

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Chapter 3

regime incapacity, the threat-force profile may be even more diverse. The threat-force profile may consist

of—

Military or police mutineers.

Political party or factional militias.

Mobilized trade- or student-union groups.

Street gangs.

Enraged mobs.

3-25. Soldiers cannot consider civilian groups unarmed because they may loot arsenals or receive weapons

from local power brokers, which makes it more difficult for Soldiers to obtain intelligence concerning the

number of hostile forces.

3-26. Threat-force location is a critical factor. The nonconventional threat types noted above will not

necessarily assemble at or near military installations. Therefore, personnel conducting intelligence analysis

must note the presence of these threats at stadiums, parks, or other mass-assembly areas near the NEO site.

As with the location of the nonconventional threat types, their tactics also merit special consideration. One

key concern for task forces is the inclination of foreign threats to take U.S. citizens hostage. Another

consideration is the inclination of foreign threats to resort to arson or infrastructure sabotage. In either case,

such actions could jeopardize the NEO. A final key consideration is the identification of the key motivators

of hostile action. If the government opposes the NEO, this task is easier than if antigovernment or

nongovernment elements oppose it. Government leaders and spokespersons are much more likely than

factional or mob leaders to function as known entities. In any case, it is essential for intelligence sources to

identify those individuals who are most likely to incite opposition to the NEO.

3-27. ARSOF units use three techniques to collect intelligence—the bull’s-eye technique, the threat model,

and the criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability

(CARVER)

targeting matrix factors. Used in sequence, they allow the intelligence staff officer to focus the collection

effort, characterize the threat, and predict possible COAs by analyzing friendly operations through an

enemy perspective.

Bull’s-Eye

3-28. In the original bull’s-eye concept, the commander tailors his level of intelligence support to the

geographic proximity an area has to a mission. The outermost ring consists of the country and region in

which the operation is taking place. The middle ring represents the mission area analysis the intelligence

staff section conducts, which provides area-specific intelligence for the team. The innermost circle covers

the specific operational or target areas and provides mission-specific analysis.

3-29. Unlike an SF direct-action or special-reconnaissance mission, a NEO may include several locations

at which key events will occur simultaneously, such as multiple concentrations of U.S. nationals and other

potential evacuees. These places will shift as the operation progresses, for example, from the Embassy to

the POE. Therefore, the intelligence staff section can have several bull’s-eyes to focus collection and

analysis effort on, reallocating resources to provide predictive analysis during progressive phases of the

operation.

Threat Model

3-30. In a NEO environment, the intelligence staff section faces a larger variety of threats than in a

conventional scenario. In addition, these threats can change quickly as the physical and governing

infrastructures continue to deteriorate. Personnel can use some aspects of conventional IPOE to analyze

military forces and well-organized resistance groups. To accomplish this, however, the threat must possess

a relatively stable organization and institutionalized tactics, which may not be the case in a NEO

environment. To complement established IPOE techniques, the intelligence staff section can use the threat

model, which allows it to look at a wider array of factors in the operational environment in terms of

functional effects on the operation, rather than just those identified in terms of conventional warfare.

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Contingency and Predeployment Planning

3-31. The threat model is a color-coding system that allows the analyst to categorize aspects of the threat

environment, which allows him to evaluate features normally not considered in conventional IPOE. White,

red, blue, black, and green correspond to the operational environment, threat, friendly forces, physical

objects, and local civilian population.

Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerabiliy, Effect, and Recognizability

Targeting Matrix

3-32. Originally, SF used the CARVER targeting matrix to determine the most effective and expedient

means of identifying, selecting, and attacking targets. In a NEO, the military force commander can use this

matrix as a method for evaluating key installations and critical points in the operation to reduce their

desirability as red force targets. Within an installation, he could evaluate a critical subsystem, such as the

electrical system, and within the operation, a key element, such as the egress route from the Embassy to the

POE. The factors in the CARVER targeting matrix are as follows:

Criticality. The importance of a system, subsystem, complex, or component. A target is critical

when its destruction or damage has a significant impact on the output of the targeted system,

subsystem, or complex.

Accessibility. The ease with which a threat can reach a target, either physically or by fire. A

target is accessible when an enemy action element can physically infiltrate or hit the target by

direct or indirect fires.

Recuperability. A measure of the time necessary to replace, repair, or bypass the destruction of

or damage inflicted on the target. Recuperability varies with the sources and ages of targeted

components and the availability of spare parts.

Vulnerability. A measure of the ability of the action element to damage the target using

available assets (both men and materials). A target is vulnerable if the enemy has the manpower

and expertise to successfully attack it.

Effect. The negative or positive influence on the population because of the action taken. The

impact on the evacuee’s comfort and safety because of electrical system failure is key.

Recognizability. The degree to which individuals can recognize a target under varying weather,

light, and seasonal conditions without confusion with other targets or components.

Note: FM 2-0, Intelligence, and current SF intelligence doctrine provide more detail on the

intelligence process.

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Chapter 4

Deployment

The commander should form and request permission to dispatch an advance party to

the HN early in the planning process. The advance party may consist of two

elements: the forward command element (FCE) and the evacuation site party. The

advance party should be small and inconspicuous to avoid drawing attention to it.

Personnel must deploy with the necessary specialized equipment to accomplish the

mission. Once the advance party deploys and sets up the ECC, the commander inserts

the main body. Appendix E provides guidance for NEO planning.

PREPARATION AND PLANNING

4-1. Deployment of the advance party depends on the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and support

available—time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). The least conspicuous method is for the

advance party to arrive in the HN in civilian clothes and on civilian aircraft. This is possible only in a

permissive environment and if the proper authorities can arrange the necessary passports and visas.

4-2. An uncertain or hostile environment may require forcible entry. Use of military aircraft allows the

advance party to carry additional equipment that they may need to set up the evacuation site and establish

communications and liaison. The advance party should accomplish the following tasks before deployment:

Forward the number of members in the advance party to the Embassy for approval.

Develop and brief a communications plan.

Acquire and review appropriate maps.

Review the Embassy EAP and the EAP checklists.

Assemble and inspect necessary equipment.

Develop and brief an advance party evasion and recovery plan.

Obtain visas for the advance party.

Determine whether the advance party should deploy in civilian clothes.

Consider weapon and ammunition requirements.

Examine the need for specialized equipment.

Determine the medical requirements.

Identify translator and linguistic requirements.

Review all available intelligence on the proposed NEO.

Assess media interest in the situation, JTF or JSOTF activities, and JTF or JSTOF involvement

in the evacuation.

FORWARD COMMAND ELEMENT

4-3. Upon arrival in the HN, the FCE initiates liaison with the diplomatic mission as follows:

Briefs DOS representatives on the capabilities and missions of the advance party and the JTF or

JSOTF.

Establishes a forward command post that can expand to incorporate the JTF or JSOTF

headquarters staff.

Provides a continuing presence for planning and ensures a complementary role with DOS

personnel.

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Chapter 4

Determines whether the operational environment is permissive, uncertain, or hostile.

Advises the CDRJTF regarding the size and composition of forces necessary. If specified in the

initiating directive, determines whether the JTF or JSOTF is appropriate for the mission.

Advises the CDRJTF regarding the time, place, and method for the arrival of the evacuation

force.

Determines existing political and sociological considerations.

Determines attitude of and support available from the local population and authorities.

Establishes communications between the FCE and the CDRJTF as follows:

Makes the communications link to NEO commander available to the senior DOS

representative.

Maintains continuous communication for exchange of planning data and intelligence.

4-4. The FCE establishes communications between the evacuation site and the Embassy and provides a

link with the evacuation force commander. The FCE provides the commander with updated SITREPs. The

FCE may include the following personnel:

Officer in charge.

Intelligence representative.

Operations representative.

Logistics representative.

Communications team.

Medical representative.

Air or naval representative.

PAO representative.

CA representative.

PSYOP representative.

Legal advisor.

EVACUATION SITE PARTY

4-5. The evacuation site party, the second functional group in the advance party, secures and establishes

the ECC site. In some cases, it may be impossible for the evacuation site party to secure the ECC site

without a supporting security force. In this case, the commander may consider augmenting the party or

having the evacuation site party reconnoiter the ECC site and developing plans for occupying it when

security forces arrive.

4-6. The evacuation site party may consist of the following personnel:

Officer in charge.

Operations representative.

Intelligence representative.

Communications representative.

Personnel representative.

Logistics representative.

Security representative.

CA representative.

PSYOP representative.

Legal advisor.

4-7. Upon arrival in the HN, the evacuation site party must accomplish the following:

Plan, organize, and establish the ECC in preparation for the main body.

Provide direct liaison with the chief, Embassy consular office.

Maintain liaison with civilian or local host-government agencies involved in the evacuation.

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Deployment

Conduct ground reconnaissance of proposed assembly areas, evacuation sites, beaches,

helicopter LZs or drop zones, airports, and ports. Consider probable meteorological and

oceanographic impacts on site selection.

Conduct initial preparation of assembly areas and evacuation sites, to include the following:

Collect essential planning intelligence.

Assist DOS personnel with news media.

Establish and maintain communications with the FCE and Embassy.

Coordinate additional security requirements that the HN police may provide.

During permissive NEOs, coordinate for overflight rights.

4-8. The desired advance party members listed previously for the FCE and the evacuation site party are

unconstrained. Mission requirements or guidance from DOS may preclude the deployment of such robust

elements. Consequently, commanders must be prepared to prioritize and to accomplish advance party

requirements with smaller elements.

INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE

4-9. Use of an ISB during deployment provides many advantages over deploying directly from the home

station. The ISB becomes more important as the distance from the home station and the likelihood of

hostilities increase. The ISB may be in another country close to where the evacuation is taking place or

may be any ship under U.S. control. Ideally, the ISB will also function as a temporary safe haven, if one is

necessary. The ISB may also serve as an airfield for support forces when forced entry is necessary. Support

forces may include additional aircraft and personnel for unforeseen movement requirements or combat

forces (such as air units capable of offensive attacks and airborne infantry units).

4-10. The advantages of an ISB are as follows:

The commander can finalize evacuation plans.

The staff can gather additional intelligence.

The joint force can conduct rehearsals and briefings.

The units can redistribute and finalize loads.

The personnel can recuperate following the deployment from their home station.

The reaction force or additional security personnel can stage for contingency operations.

The ISB can function as the temporary safe haven for the operation.

COORDINATION

4-11. When an ISB is located in a country other than the United States, the DOS is responsible for

coordinating with the foreign government. If the ISB is an established U.S. base in a foreign country, using

the ISB as a staging point for launching forces into another country can pose significant political issues.

The CDRJTF should advise the DOS of the requirements for the ISB. The ISB should meet the following

criteria:

Be able to handle the aircraft or ships the GCC will use in the evacuation.

Possess effective communication with JTF or JSOTF and combatant command headquarters,

advance party, ECC, temporary safe haven, and the ISB Embassy.

Have adequate facilities for shelter, food, and sanitation if the GCC will use the ISB as the

temporary safe haven. Facilities should accommodate the evacuation force and evacuees.

Possess repair and refuel capability for aircraft or ships in use.

Have storage facilities for perishables; petroleum, oils, and lubricants; medical supplies; and

ammunition.

Be close to major medical facilities, if possible.

Be located to provide maximum possible operations security (OPSEC).

Have overflight rights.

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Chapter 4

Have a public affairs (PA) contingency plan for any planned or unplanned media presence.

Appendix F shows a PA plan for a NEO (HN).

Be close enough to the evacuation site that aircraft or ships used in the evacuation can transit

without refueling.

Have adequate local and area security forces to protect U.S. personnel and equipment. HN or

security forces from the deployed ISB support element can provide this protection.

INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE COMPOSITION

4-12. The composition of the ISB force depends on what support is necessary and what is already onsite at

the ISB. An ISB at an established, modern facility requires substantially less support than at a

lesser-developed location. Some considerations for the ISB force are as follows:

Maintenance and service requirements for aircraft.

Liaison with the Embassy and civilian agencies (police, military, customs, and others, as

necessary).

Interpreters.

Facilities for maintenance, refueling, billeting, messing, and sanitation.

Contracts for local services and supplies.

Local security.

Air traffic and movement control and weather impacts on air movements.

HN medical infrastructure.

Overflight rights.

DEPLOYMENT OF THE EVACUATION FORCE

4-13. After the advance party contacts the Embassy and establishes the ECC, the GCC can insert the

evacuation force. There are three options to accomplish the deployment, and each option must consider

potential weather impacts on the evacuation plan (for example, poor ceiling or visibility at an airfield can

disrupt a carefully planned airflow). They are as follows:

The evacuation force may land at the ECC and then deploy marshalling teams to the assembly

areas.

The evacuation force may deploy to the Embassy while the marshalling forces deploy directly to

the assembly areas.

The evacuation force may simply land at the ECC and wait for the evacuees to come to the

location.

4-14. With the first option (Figure 4-1, page 4-5), the entire force lands at the ECC. The commander issues

final instructions and dispatches the marshalling force to collect the evacuees. This is the best option when

the situation is vague and the advance party is unable to provide the commander with adequate intelligence

to disseminate to subordinate units. The commander and staff plan in detail after they arrive and receive the

advance party or Embassy staff briefing.

4-15. The second option (Figure 4-2, page 4-5) allows the marshalling teams to deploy directly to their

respective assembly areas. The evacuation force deploys to the Embassy. This option is more complicated

than the first. The GCC implements this option when there is not enough time to plan for detailed

execution or when the time available is so short that marshalling forces cannot be delayed at the ECC.

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Chapter 4

4-16. The third option (Figure 4-3) is to deploy the force to the ECC where it evacuates only those citizens

that make their way there. With this option, citizens who miss the notification also miss the evacuation and

the deploying force only partially completes its mission.

Figure 4-3. Option three, single-point evacuation

4-17. Aircraft remaining on the ground with the military force are subject to sabotage or outright attack

from hostile units or individuals. A large evacuation force increases the unit’s security problems because

the unit must guard more aircraft. If the aircraft do not remain with the evacuation force, the air component

and evacuation force commanders coordinate to ensure enough aircraft return at the right time. Ideally, as

soon as there are an appropriate number of passengers, one aircraft lands, picks up the passengers, and

departs. Precise timing reduces waiting time for evacuees and ground time for aircraft. The evacuation

force commander must find a suitable location for the aircraft to wait.

4-18. Naval evacuation is a likely alternative to aircraft evacuation. Naval operations could include any of

the following:

Loading ships at a seaport pier.

Ferrying evacuees from seaports to amphibious ships.

Transporting evacuees aboard helicopters to ships.

Using landing craft and beach operations.

4-19. Beach operations (Figure 4-4, page 4-7) are ideal for moving large numbers of evacuees at one time.

The use of Navy ships as intermediate safe havens allows a faster turnaround for tactical evacuation assets.

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Chapter 5

MAIN BODY HEADQUARTERS

5-1. The main body headquarters directs and coordinates the evacuation operation. The headquarters

consists of the FCE and the administrative team. The FCE, which is from the advance party, joins the

headquarters and maintains effective liaison with the Embassy staff. The administrative team combines

with the evacuation-site party from the advance party to ensure the smooth operation of the ECC.

MARSHALLING ELEMENT

5-2. The marshalling element moves to the designated assembly areas and secures them. It brings

evacuees to the assembly areas and then escorts them to the ECC. The GCC bases the size of the

marshalling element on the number of sites and evacuees supported.

5-3. A marshalling element may consist of multiple subordinate marshalling teams. The commander

organizes the marshalling team to secure and support evacuations through a single assembly area as well as

surrounding area. The marshalling team must be large enough to organize several search and security

teams. Search teams may be unnecessary if the Embassy’s notification plan successfully alerts evacuees to

report to predetermined assembly areas. If the Embassy informs all evacuees, then search teams should not

leave the assembly area except in emergency cases.

5-4. The search teams locate evacuees and escort them to the assembly area. Each search team should

have an interpreter or a SOF soldier capable of speaking the HN language and, if possible, a guide. A lost

team in a potentially hostile environment can create significant problems for the evacuation force.

Language-qualified personnel may be necessary to help the search teams move from the assembly areas

and locate evacuees who are not at home or whose addresses are incorrect.

5-5. A security team provides security to the search team during movement and in the assembly area. In

addition, the commander may attach a tactical Psychological Operations team (TPT) to the marshalling

teams. The TPT can use its organic loudspeakers to communicate with the local populace and

noncombatant evacuees.

MARSHALLING ELEMENT OPERATIONS

5-6. The marshalling element locates evacuees at or near their homes and moves them to the ECC. In its

most complete form, the operation has several marshalling teams under the control and direction of a

marshalling element headquarters. Leaving the ECC, the teams—

Proceed by designated routes to their respective assembly areas.

Secure assembly areas to use as bases of operation.

Dispatch elements to contact, identify, inform, and return the evacuees to the assembly areas.

Escort the evacuees back to the ECC.

Turn evacuees over to ECC personnel for transportation out of the country.

Verify that there is enough transportation for the search or security teams and evacuees. Teams

should prepare all evacuees to evacuate by helicopter, small boat or craft, and tracked or

wheeled vehicles. The marshalling elements should also consider the following:

Use local drivers, if available, because of their experience and familiarity with the local

road network.

Ensure there are enough mechanics available for emergency repairs.

Brief military drivers on the HN traffic laws and customs.

5-7. Movement control requires the marshalling element to do the following:

Issue local road maps to each driver.

Plan for convoy control and security.

Identify safe houses or areas in case vehicles breakdown or drivers become separated or lost.

Ensure that adequate communications equipment is available for convoys.

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Evacuation Force Operations

5-8. Assembly area operations require the marshalling element to do the following:

Establish perimeter security, even in a permissive environment.

Ensure there is enough transportation to move evacuees to the ECC.

Use, as needed, vehicles belonging to the evacuees to transport personnel to the ECC.

5-9. Search team operations require the marshalling element to do the following:

Have a list of potential evacuees from the consular officer.

Obtain copies of the instructions given to each potential evacuee.

Have copies of the “Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity” (Appendix C) readily available for

evacuees who refuse to leave.

Brief each evacuee on the baggage limitations set by the Embassy, identification requirements at

the ECC, and items that the commander or the law restricts or prohibits from transport.

Record the name, sex, age, potential medical problems, and citizenship of each evacuee.

Escort evacuees from the vehicle parking area to the ECC. Evacuees may drive their privately

owned vehicles directly to the ECC, although U.S. personnel should discourage this for security

reasons. Search personnel should note the individual’s name and intent.

Identify evacuees not on the list provided by the Embassy.

ROUTE SELECTION

5-10. The marshalling element commander first obtains the information collected by the advance party.

Significant information may include the following:

Updated lists of names and addresses of evacuees.

Specific medical conditions that will affect the evacuation effort.

Current maps.

Current developments in the political situation.

Specific sources of help should a confrontation develop.

Marshalling teams then use the bulleted information to determine their routes and ensure transportation is

available.

5-11. The evacuation force commander and his staff confirm the suitability of routes to and from each

assembly area. They may have had insufficient intelligence available at the home station to plan routes in

detail, and current, on-the-ground intelligence make some of the commander’s planned routes unusable.

5-12. The evacuation force commander considers several factors when selecting routes. Air movement of

marshalling teams and U.S. citizens is best because it involves minimal confrontation and requires less

time. However, the evacuation force commander must also plan an overland route to use should air

operations be unsuitable.

5-13. Conducting the evacuation during darkness helps avoid unnecessary publicity and reduces the

likelihood of confrontation. The HN government may have a curfew in effect during which the local

citizenry are less active. With less vehicular traffic, marshalling force vehicles will likely avoid traffic

congestion. The disadvantages to using darkness as a cover is that marshalling teams may get lost and they

may have difficulty locating evacuees.

5-14. If the unit moves in daylight by vehicle, the unit should avoid routes through densely populated

areas, on main traffic arteries, and through potential roadblocks (such as construction sites, railroad

crossings, and narrow bridges). The operations center coordinates the routes so that vehicles from separate

assembly areas do not intermingle. Again, the use of multiple routes enhances security and reduces

signature.

5-15. Once the evacuation force commander selects the routes, the operations center staff informs the

marshalling element commander. He, in turn, passes the routes to the marshalling teams on strip or

topographical maps that exhibit enough detail to be useful. If possible, marshalling team commanders

reconnoiter the routes by helicopter before movement.

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5-3

Chapter 5

5-16. If the evacuation force commander decides not to send out search teams, the marshalling teams

remain in their respective assembly areas and the evacuees come to them. After waiting a suitable amount

of time, the marshalling team escorts the evacuees to the ECC or sends out search teams to contact

unaccounted for U.S. citizens.

TRANSPORTATION

5-17. Key planning for the marshalling force includes choosing the best method to transport the

marshalling teams and the evacuees. Options for moving marshalling teams include helicopter, airborne

insertion, vehicle, and foot. If volunteered, the force may use vehicles belonging to the evacuees to move

the marshalling teams and evacuees to the ECC.

5-18. Marshalling teams moving on foot must reduce their vulnerability. A close tactical formation reduces

the chance of separation and enhances the commander’s control of his unit if someone tries to disrupt the

march.

5-19. Vehicular movement requires more coordination but is preferable to foot movement. Drivers must

become familiar with primary and alternate routes and accurate area maps. Commanders may use local

drivers. In some situations, the experience of local drivers with the road network may aid timely

evacuation. Movement by convoy requires security and sufficient radios to maintain control. A traffic

circulation plan is necessary to identify main and alternate evacuation routes, critical points, and

checkpoints. The traffic circulation plan will simplify reporting. The Embassy staff and evacuation force

commander’s staff identify safe houses or areas for drivers and passengers in case of vehicle breakdown.

5-20. Each team should have an attached mechanic with enough equipment to make emergency repairs. If

a vehicle breaks down, the marshalling team commander decides whether to repair or abandon the vehicle.

The mechanic can expedite repairs and provide the marshalling team commander with an expert opinion.

The marshalling team commander must not allow anyone to remain with the vehicle without adequate

security.

MOVEMENT CONTROL

5-21. The marshalling element monitors the progress of the teams and reports their locations to the

operations center. Teams report their status to the marshalling element as they arrive at and pass through

each checkpoint. Teams submit additional reports when they secure their assembly areas, when they are

prepared to return with the evacuees to the ECC, and at any other time that the commander considers

appropriate.

5-22. Team commanders use a similar reporting system to control the movement of their search teams.

Such a system, properly prepared and coded, can add to the mission’s OPSEC by reducing radio

transmission time.

5-23. Using specially prepared, coded execution checklists is ideal. Doing so allows the team commander

to pinpoint immediately the exact location of each team.

ASSEMBLY AREA OPERATIONS

5-24. The marshalling team has two basic functions once it arrives at the assembly area. It secures the area,

assembles all evacuees inside the secured location, and begins processing them for evacuation.

Securing the Assembly Area

5-25. The marshalling team occupies the assembly area just as any tactical unit clearing and occupying any

assembly area would. The marshalling team operates within the constraints of the tactical environment and

according to the ROE. Once security is in place, they should allow no one inside the perimeter without an

escort. Security personnel maintain contact with the command group by using short-range radios or

telephones.

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FM 3-05.131

16 November 2009

Evacuation Force Operations

5-26. NEOs are tactical operations, even in a permissive environment. The team commander must

remember that the population, or elements within it, may turn hostile, and he must be able to defend the

assembly area if hostile elements attack. Consequently, the area must be defensible and security team and

search squads must maintain defensible positions.

5-27. A member of the Embassy staff (PSO or RSO) generally chooses the assembly area. If the

evacuation force cannot defend the assembly area, the team commander should direct evacuees to an

appropriate place nearby. The team commander should attempt to get approval of the new location from an

Embassy representative. If doing so proves impossible, the team commander is still responsible for

protecting his force and its charges. As a minimum, the team commander should inform the marshalling

element commander of his decision.

Dispatching Search Teams

5-28. Immediately after arriving in the assembly area, the marshalling team commander dispatches his

search squads, assigning search responsibilities according to the Embassy’s most current evacuee list. If the

Ambassador and his staff implemented the evacuation plan successfully, most U.S. citizens know that the

evacuation is necessary and they act accordingly. Inevitably, some people will not have heard of the

evacuation, and search teams must locate and accommodate them. PSYOP assets may provide the

capability to assist in locating personnel by communicating the search team’s intent to the local populace.

The marshalling team commander must weigh OPSEC and protection requirements against notification

capabilities.

5-29. If the information reached all evacuees, the team commander may not need to dispatch search teams.

If conditions allow for their free movement, evacuees may come to the assembly area on their own.

5-30. The search team proceeds to the addresses of potential evacuees. If the individual or family is not

present, the team leader tries to determine their location by asking the neighbors. He may leave instructions

in a visible place, but he must consider the effect these instructions will have if they fall into unfriendly

hands. If the individual or family is present, the team leader follows the procedures described in the

following paragraphs.

5-31. Each search team leader gives each individual a complete list of instructions. If possible, the

Embassy advance party obtains enough copies of the instructions to supplement the team leader’s oral

briefing and gives a written copy to each potential evacuee.

5-32. Once he makes contact, the search team leader gets one of two responses. The individual decides to

either evacuate or stay. If the individual decides to remain in the HN, the search team leader repeats the

Ambassador’s warning. The situation is extremely dangerous, and a closed Embassy cannot assist

evacuees.

5-33. If the warning has no effect, the search team leader leaves the address of a POC (if available) and

asks the individual to sign a waiver certificate (Appendix C). The waiver certificate shows that the USG

provided the individual with the opportunity to depart under its protection and that the individual chose to

remain. If the individual will not sign, the search team leader makes a note of the time, date, and

circumstances surrounding the offer. He should also remind USG employees and their dependents that they

must obey an evacuation order. (The evacuation force may locally produce certificates of waiver.)

5-34. If the individual chooses to accompany the search team, the search team leader explains the

conditions of the evacuation. Again, if possible, he gives them a written document expressing these

conditions.

5-35. Usually, the Embassy evacuation notice lists baggage limitations (usually one 66-pound bag per

person). The marshalling team must use common sense in making allowances for evacuees with infants and

for other special circumstances. The commander must thoroughly brief the search team leader on what to

do with pets. If time and space allow, the evacuation force commander may authorize the evacuation of

pets. If he does not, evacuees should leave pets with friends. The evacuation force commander may arrange

for euthanasia as an alternative. If the task force is evacuating pets, owners should bring immunization

records to speed processing.

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FM 3-05.131

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Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8) - page 11