Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8)

Chapter 5

5-36. Each evacuee must have documentation that provides positive identification. Normally,

documentation includes any of the following:

Passport.

Consular report of birth.

DOD dependent identification card.

Seaman’s papers.

5-37. Unless the Embassy specifies otherwise, the search team should not delay operations because of a

lack of documentation. The search team should identify, segregate, and transport questionable individuals

to the processing center with other evacuees. Processing center personnel may delay individuals or separate

families if they cannot provide positive identification.

5-38. Evacuees wishing to go with the search team must act quickly. While evacuees are preparing their

belongings for departure, the search team leader records their names so that the team has a record of

evacuees returning to the assembly area.

5-39. U.S. citizens wishing to evacuate may travel without escort to the ECC. U.S. citizens that drive

personal vehicles to the ECC will turn the keys over to an Embassy official. However, for security reasons,

the search team leader should discourage evacuees from using personal vehicles. If an evacuee drives a

personal vehicle, the search team leader notes the individual’s name and indicates the evacuee’s intent to

report directly to the ECC. The search team commander reports this information to the processing center

officer in charge (OIC) when the marshalling team returns to the ECC.

5-40. The search team leader asks each evacuee if he knows of other U.S. citizens in the area. If evacuees

identify citizens who are not on the list the Embassy provides, the team leader notes the names and

addresses and reports them to the marshalling team commander, who reports them to the operations center.

5-41. Evacuees may ask the search team leader or marshalling team commander to evacuate alien or HN

personnel, such as servants or close friends. These requests may come from U.S. citizens speaking on their

behalf or directly from the individuals seeking evacuation. Regardless of the source of the request, the

marshalling team commander only has the authority to evacuate U.S. citizens or those on the Embassy list.

The marshalling team commander must refer any questionable individuals to an Embassy official.

5-42. U.S. policy is that no one may grant asylum within the territorial jurisdiction of another power. The

on-site commander, regardless of grade, may grant temporary refuge under conditions of urgency to save a

person from imminent danger. Because such an action may result in retribution against U.S. forces or

citizens, he must weigh his decision to grant refuge against the potential danger the action may cause. U.S.

Embassy representatives must assume responsibility for these individuals as soon as possible.

5-43. The search team proceeds, in turn, to each assigned location and then returns to the assembly area.

To preclude infiltration at the assembly area, the search team leader vouches for each evacuee. He then

turns the evacuee over to the marshalling team command group for in-processing. The commander may

send the search team on another search mission or incorporate it into the perimeter security force.

Processing Evacuees

5-44. While the security force prepares positions and search teams deploy, the marshalling team command

group prepares to take in evacuees. Members of the marshalling team command group must not spend

significant amounts of time compiling administrative data. However, they must identify each individual

entering the area and document and address evacuee medical problems (for example, administer first aid or

arrange for medical evacuation [MEDEVAC]). Personnel conducting in-processing must provide evacuees

arriving at the assembly area unaccompanied with the same information that the search teams provided

their groups.

5-45. The marshalling team command group conducts the processing at the assembly area. A senior

noncommissioned officer (NCO) and several assistants can easily accomplish this while the remainder of

the marshalling team secures the area.

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5-46. The security team must positively identify each individual from a passport or other official

document. The security team should not allow anyone into the assembly area that does not have positive

identification. The marshalling team commander resolves any discrepancies by having the individual

provide reasonable proof that he is a U.S. citizen. U.S. Embassy personnel make the final decisions in

disputes. Personnel must segregate individuals in question and return them to the ECC where the

marshalling team commander turns them over to Embassy personnel.

5-47. Embassy-designated wardens can provide immense aid to the marshalling team commander.

Wardens are personnel who have knowledge of the individuals in the area and can verify their status. To

accelerate processing, the wardens may have already prepared processing packets for each evacuee.

Unfortunately, the warden system is not foolproof. Wardens may arrive at the assembly area too late to be

of help.

5-48. Personnel can avoid some problems with identifying U.S. citizens if each marshalling team has a

complete list of the names of evacuees. The marshalling team commander can then check to see if an

evacuee from another area reported to his location. The marshalling team commander must remember,

however, that Embassy personnel must make the final decision to deny evacuation to anyone who is not on

the list. The only exception will be someone posing a direct threat. Figure 5-2 shows a marshalling area.

Figure 5-2. Marshalling area

5-49. Evacuees must submit to individual inspections before entering the assembly area. This inspection

ensures the safety of the evacuees and marshalling team. Personnel may provide amnesty boxes for

evacuees. The marshalling team commander should avoid strip-searching or other physically intrusive

forms of search unless he determines that such procedures are necessary for security and safety. He may

want to use metal detectors (for personnel and baggage) and dogs (for baggage only) to speed up the

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inspection, but the process should not demean the evacuees. All personnel should treat evacuees with the

utmost courtesy.

5-50. Conflicts may occur between individual evacuees and members of the marshalling team. Disputes

may arise over the amount of baggage, speed of the operation, confiscation of contraband, or deportment of

specific individuals. Marshalling team members must remember they have no legal jurisdiction or control

over U.S. citizens. They cannot force any civilian to do anything against his or her will unless the civilian

is threatening them with bodily harm.

5-51. The relationship between the military escort and the civilian evacuees is one of voluntary

cooperation. If a citizen becomes disruptive, the team commander gives him the choice of conforming to

the rules or departing to fend for himself. The marshalling team commander should make allowances for

the despair felt by the evacuees, but he cannot endanger the welfare of the other evacuees or his command.

He should document all incidents and obtain written statements from witnesses.

5-52. The marshalling team command group should inform evacuees arriving with more than the allowed

baggage of the baggage restrictions and that, depending upon the available transportation, the evacuees

may have to leave some baggage behind. As long as enough transportation is available, the search team

should allow evacuees to carry baggage with them to the processing center. At the processing center, the

Embassy can arrange for the disposition of excess baggage. This would be an ideal time for the marshalling

team command group to mark or tag all baggage for future identification. If personnel must separate

evacuees from their baggage during transport, the marshalling team commander may want to inventory

pieces and provide receipts to evacuees. One method to accomplish this is the simple two-piece tag system

used by airlines. Unless an evacuee declares a high-value item in his baggage, the marshalling team

commander should not be concerned about contents beyond inspections already discussed. Personnel

should warn evacuees with high-value items that under no circumstances will the government assume

responsibility for the items. The marshalling team commander may obtain a written statement to this effect.

5-53. The next step for inprocessing evacuees is to record the requisite information on each evacuee. A

detailed history is not necessary, but the information personnel record must be scrupulously accurate. The

marshalling team command group enters the individual’s name, age, sex, citizenship, identification type

and document number, and next of kin or permanent home address in an alphabetically tabbed logbook.

Figure 5-3, page 5-9, shows a sample logbook. The marshalling team command group handwrites all

entries accurately and legibly. The laptop or notebook computer is an alternative for inputting evacuee

information into a database for quick retrieval upon return to the ECC. Computer users must back up

information to ensure they can retrieve it later.

5-54. Once the marshalling team command group makes the proper entries in the logbook, the marshalling

team commander briefs the evacuees by—

Giving the evacuees an updated SITREP, the anticipated schedule for the remainder of the

evacuation, and any other useful information.

Cautioning the evacuees against distracting the security personnel by engaging them in

conversation.

Asking the evacuees to remain in the most protected portion of the assembly area.

Portraying the team’s intent to make the evacuees feel as comfortable as possible.

5-55. The marshalling team attends to evacuees with special needs first. Medical personnel determine if

medical problems require immediate evacuation or special transportation. If so, the commander reports the

emergency and acts to move the ill or injured evacuee to the ECC.

5-56. Once the marshalling team accounts for the evacuees on its list, its commander requests permission

from the marshalling element commander to close out the assembly area and return to the ECC. When

returning to the ECC, the marshalling team usually follows the same procedures that it followed when it

conducted its earlier movement. Helicopter or vehicular transportation is more desirable than foot

marches—especially with a large number of civilians with varying physical capabilities.

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Evacuation Force Operations

Name

Age/Sex

Citizenship

Permanent Home

Tab

Last, First, MI

Address

City, State

Figure 5-3. Sample evacuee logbook

5-57. When the marshalling team arrives at the ECC, it moves directly to the processing center. The

commander turns the evacuees and logbook over to the reception station OIC for final processing and

embarkation. If JTF assigns the commander another assembly area, he obtains another logbook.

SECURITY ELEMENT

5-58. The security element has two missions. First, it secures the ECC perimeter, evacuation sites, LZs,

staging or parking areas, and landing sites for naval craft. Second, it may serve as a reaction force in the

event the marshalling element or other units require assistance. The following factors determine the size of

the security element necessary to support the evacuation:

The enemy threat to evacuation operations.

The anticipated response of HN police, military forces, and other friendly forces in and around

the evacuation objective area.

The crowd-control requirements at each site.

The number of evacuees.

The number of marshalling and search teams necessary to search for evacuees.

The number of evacuation sites.

The size of the ECC.

The transportation available to cover the assigned areas.

The personal security of the Ambassador.

The type of resources personnel will use to evacuate individuals.

LOGISTICS ELEMENT

5-59. The logistics element should limit its support to the minimum essential support necessary for the

evacuation. The logistics element commander should consider the following factors in determining

requirements for logistical support to the JTF:

Characteristics. The characteristics of the evacuation area.

Resources available. What are the existing and potential facilities for support to the JTF, such as

facilities for the storage and distribution of supplies, transportation means, airfields, fuel points,

medical facilities, medical supplies, and other facilities? What food, water, fuel, and

consumables are available?

Environment. What are the weather and terrain like?

Magnitude. How many evacuees are there? What are their needs?

Threat identification. What are the potential threats to the evacuation?

Threat level. What is the adversary’s or potential adversary’s level of strength and activity?

Threat area. What is the disposition and location of the threat?

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Task force. What is the strength and composition of the JTF?

Troops. What is the total troop strength?

Task force composition. What is the composition of the JTF in terms of ground, air, and naval

combat forces, combat support, and combat service support units?

Logistical capability. What are the logistical support capabilities of each component and

separate unit?

Time. What are the time constraints and duration of operation?

Logistical support. What logistical support will the Embassy and evacuees need?

Host-nation support (HNS). What is the availability and suitability of HNS as an alternative to

deploying U.S. military logistical support?

HNS experience. What experience does the HN have in conducting NEOs?

Support agreements. What prearranged HNS or inter-Service support agreements, as

appropriate, are in place?

Transportation. What are the capabilities and dependability of the HN transportation system to

provide rapid evacuation of combat and noncombat casualties?

WITHDRAWAL OF THE EVACUATION FORCE

5-60. Once all marshalling teams return to the ECC and the ECC processes and departs all evacuees, the

evacuation force commander notifies the tasking headquarters that the evacuation phase is complete. The

evacuation force commander asks the senior DOS representative remaining in the HN if he may conclude

the evacuation. Once the DOS representative grants permission, evacuation force commander conducts his

withdrawal.

5-61. The situation in the HN may rapidly deteriorate. In addition, locals may know that U.S. citizens are

withdrawing. These two factors, along with the possibility of looters, may heighten the possibility of an

armed attack on the remaining U.S. forces. Once the civilians leave, the evacuation force adopts a

defensive position until the last unit departs.

5-62. In a hostile or uncertain environment, support elements should depart first with all equipment not

essential to the withdrawal. Once this is accomplished, the evacuation force commander moves his force to

the least exposed portion of the airfield or port. He deploys a mobile security team to protect aircraft on

final approach from any attempts by hostile forces to destroy the aircraft. Pilots should be aware of the

danger and use deception tactics as long as possible before landing and as soon as possible after taking off.

5-63. The last security element to withdraw should be of a size that a single lift using available aircraft or

ships could extract it. With this method, no unit remains on the ground without the capacity to temporarily

withstand hostile action. Leaving a smaller force might tempt some unfriendly element to inflict casualties

on the last group to leave.

5-64. If the situation deteriorates, the evacuation force commander can decide to leave nonessential items

of equipment on the ground and evacuate the force. He must recognize the propaganda value this

precipitous action has for forces that can accuse the United States of withdrawing in disorder. Because

such an action might have awkward repercussions, the evacuation force commander takes this action only

in dire circumstances.

5-65. In a permissive environment, the commander may reverse the withdrawal sequence for units.

Initially, combat elements may withdraw while the support elements, along with a small security element,

may remain in the HN and redeploy last.

5-66. Once the entire evacuation force departs, the JTF or JSOTF commander notifies the GCC that the

evacuation is complete. He gives similar notification when the last aircraft or ship leaves the airspace or

territorial waters of the HN.

5-67. During the initial planning process, the tasking headquarters determined the destination of the

evacuation force. If there is no reason for the evacuation force to go to a safe haven, it returns to its home

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base as soon as possible. If another mission exists for the evacuation force, the commander adjusts

accordingly.

EVACUATION CONTROL CENTER ORGANIZATION

5-68. The ECC staff, supporting the DOS, conducts processing and screening associated with NEOs. It

also performs selected NEO logistical functions. However, the JTF or JSOTF should be prepared to

perform or augment these functions, if necessary. The number of evacuees, environment of the evacuation,

and location of the evacuation area will determine size and composition of the ECC.

5-69. The three guiding principles for any ECC are as follows:

Accuracy. Every individual that evacuation personnel should account for are accounted for.

Security. Personnel are safeguarding evacuees and the JTF from all threats.

Speed. Personnel are processing evacuees quickly and efficiently.

5-70. As the marshalling teams bring the evacuees to the ECC, the processing center assumes control of

the evacuees. The ECC’s purpose is to prepare the evacuees for eventual overseas movement to a

temporary safe haven in another country or the United States. The ECC screens all evacuees to certify

identification, ensure that documentation is accurate, and verify all information provided is current.

Representatives from the consular affairs section should be in the ECC to help determine the eligibility of

questionable evacuees. If an evacuee arrives without an escort, processing personnel should verify the

identity and evacuation eligibility of the individual before allowing him to enter the ECC. The processing

center performs the necessary screening, registration, medical, and transportation functions to ensure an

orderly evacuation. The processing center consists of the following:

Headquarters section. Personnel in the headquarters section perform the following:

Plan, organize, and supervise the operation of the ECC.

Maintain liaison with local representatives of the DOS and other agencies involved in the

evacuation.

Advise the JTF on the progress of the evacuation.

Maintain communications with all elements of the evacuation force, to include ships,

control aircraft, remote sites, evacuation vehicles, DOS personnel, and HN security.

Reception station. Reception station personnel collect all available information from the

marshalling teams that escort the evacuees. Information from the marshalling team’s logbook is

valuable because it may reduce the processing time.

Security screening station. Personnel assigned to the security screening station will search all

evacuees and their baggage for restricted items. Personnel will separate and individually screen

evacuees suspected of possible criminal or enemy agent activity.

Registration station. Registration station personnel should complete all administrative

paperwork before evacuees leave the country.

Debriefing station (optional, depending on the situation and the time available to conduct the

evacuation). Human intelligence and counterintelligence personnel should staff the debriefing

station. Personnel debrief each evacuee to obtain information that may affect the evacuation

force, its mission, the evacuees, or other USG activities in the country.

Medical station. Medical station personnel provide emergency medical treatment and

immunizations required by the safe haven country. As necessary, injured or ill evacuees may

proceed through the medical station to receive first aid and to identify medical conditions that

may affect the evacuation process. Serious medical cases receive top priority for evacuation.

However, the medical officer ensures that any seriously ill, injured, or wounded individuals

complete processing.

Transportation station. Transportation station personnel prepare each group of evacuees for

embarkation aboard aircraft, ships, or surface vehicles.

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Comfort station. Comfort station personnel provide a temporary waiting area for evacuees until

they board evacuation aircraft.

Temporary refugee holding area. While the OIC of the ECC cannot grant requests for asylum,

he can provide temporary refuge for persons in imminent physical danger, if such measures do

not compromise the security of the ECC, in a temporary refugee holding area. DOS

representatives must handle all requests for asylum.

EVACUATION CONTROL CENTER PROCEDURES

5-71. ECC personnel process evacuees through the stations discussed above. The following paragraphs

discuss each station’s processing procedures.

RECEPTION STATION

5-72. Upon arrival at the reception station, personnel move the evacuees into a holding area. In the holding

area, personnel receive and brief the evacuees. Senior officials should give the initial briefing. The briefing

should provide enough information to ease fears about the evacuation process. The briefing should include

the following:

A summary of the reasons for the evacuation.

The stations through which the evacuees will process.

An explanation of the need for an inspection of personnel and baggage.

The support evacuees can expect at the temporary safe haven.

The general process evacuees will experience upon arrival in the United States.

The support the repatriation center will provide the evacuees.

5-73. Reception station personnel will perform the following:

Organize evacuees into groups (maintain family integrity whenever possible).

Maintain a roster of each evacuee. Roster information should include nationality; date of birth;

evacuation classification; profession; destination; and name, address, or phone number of a POC

in the United States for notification.

Collect evacuee information from marshalling and search teams.

Ensure each evacuee proves his identify through, dependent identification cards, seaman’s

papers, or anything that unquestionably establishes U.S. citizenship. Check evacuee’s

identification against the list of potential evacuees provided by the Consulate.

Provide an escort for groups of personnel going through the processing center. The reception

station should provide very important persons (VIPs) and emergency medical cases individual

guides, if available.

SECURITY SCREENING STATION

5-74. Security screening station personnel search evacuees and their baggage for restricted items.

Personnel separately screen evacuees suspected of being enemy agents or criminals. Personnel should

escort foreign diplomats, VIPs, and emergency medical cases and their families through the security

station. Security station personnel will perform the following:

Inspect for restricted items. Personnel should inspect each evacuee and bag at the conclusion of

the briefing. They must also screen areas they are using for individual inspections. Handheld

metal detectors can expedite the inspections. Security personnel must confiscate all restricted

items. They must remember that many foreign countries sell drugs over the counter that the

Unites States requires a prescription to obtain. Medical personnel on the inspection team can aid

in identifying these drugs.

Impound all weapons, excluding those of USG personnel, and issue receipts to the owners.

Personnel should consult Embassy or customs officials about the disposition of these weapons.

Unless the weapons are illegal in the United States, the USG will return the weapons to the

owners at the repatriation center.

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Refrain from searching the persons, property, papers, and families of foreign ambassadors or

diplomats without specific direction from the DOS.

Refrain from searching diplomatic pouches.

Prohibit searched evacuees from returning to the reception holding area and vice versa.

Separate evacuees suspected of being enemy agents or criminals and escort them to the

screening and interrogation station. Personnel should ensure these individuals understand that

the screening is voluntary and is a prerequisite to evacuation. At the conclusion of the

interrogation, these evacuees will be allowed to continue the processing, set free, or placed in a

detainee area.

Note: Security personnel can deny passage of personal baggage that they suspect of containing

restricted items. Based on reasonable belief, the ECC OIC may refuse to evacuate any baggage

suspected of containing weapons, explosives, or restricted items.

REGISTRATION STATION

5-75. At the registration station, foreign nationals must either be on the Embassy or post list of potential

evacuees or be approved by the U.S. Embassy staff before they can continue processing. The Ambassador

or designated representative is the final authority on the acceptability of evacuee identification. Personnel

maintain a roster of each evacuee, with nationality; date of birth; evacuation classification; profession;

destination; and name, address, or phone number of a POC in the United States for notification. Personnel

complete this roster in duplicate. The Ambassador or designated representative is the final authority on

acceptability of evacuee identification. If there are doubts about a person’s identity, registration station

personnel should turn the matter over to the DOS and evacuate the person.

5-76. Registration station personnel should ensure that there is supervision of all foreign nationals until

they receive a clearance for evacuation or an escort outside the ECC. Security personnel should be

available to react to any hostile incidents.

5-77. Each evacuee should do the following:

Prove identity by using passports, dependent identification cards, seaman’s papers, or anything

that unquestionably establishes U.S. citizenship.

Sign a Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity when refusing evacuation assistance.

Provide information concerning background and personal history to the registration clerks. The

DOS’s Emergency Planning Handbook (EPH) provides for Optional Form (OF) 28, (Evacuation

Documentation). The OF 28 is a standard one-page form that has three carbon copies. The form

contains critical information, such as personal data, citizenship status, a privacy warning, and a

promissory note. The original of the form remains at the ECC while the evacuees can use the

copies as boarding passes for evacuation transportation and for in-processing at the temporary

safe haven.

Receive a copy of Department of Defense (DD) Form 2585, (Repatriation Processing Center

Processing Sheet). Evacuees should complete the DD Form 2585 before they arrive at the

repatriation center.

DEBRIEFING STATION

5-78. The debriefing station is optional, depending on the situation and the time available to conduct the

evacuation. Human intelligence and counterintelligence personnel should staff the debriefing station.

Debriefing station personnel interview each evacuee to obtain information that may affect the evacuation

force, the evacuation force mission, the evacuees, or other USG activities in the country. Information that

might be of interest to the debriefing station personnel includes the following:

Locations of other potential evacuees.

Changes in the political situation.

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Movements and activities of indigenous groups, entities, and parties that might oppose the

evacuation.

Intent of a threatening third party, to include considering the following:

What is the capability and likelihood of the third party carrying out a threat?

Can the third party be influenced?

Can the potential threat be stopped or countered?

MEDICAL STATION.

5-79. As necessary, injured or ill evacuees may proceed through the medical station for first aid

(Figure 5-4) and identification of medical conditions that affect the evacuation process. Serious medical

cases receive top priority for evacuation. However, the medical officer ensures that any seriously ill,

injured, or wounded persons complete processing. Medical personnel should—

Determine if any evacuee requires emergency medical treatment or evacuation.

Verify inoculations necessary for the safe haven country, if necessary.

Prepare to treat trauma injuries should the situation deteriorate.

Perform emergency treatment, as necessary.

Isolate evacuees with infectious diseases.

Figure 5-4. Evacuee screening at a medical station

TRANSPORTATION STATION

5-80. Personnel assigned to the transportation station should—

Prepare each group of evacuees for embarkation aboard aircraft, ships, or surface vehicles.

Coordinate surface or air transportation

(Figure

5-5, page

5-15) to include movement of

personnel to the evacuation area, transportation of evacuees to designated aircraft or landing

craft, and internal evacuation site requirements.

Provide loading control personnel to supervise loading of personnel aboard vehicles, aircraft, or

landing craft.

Maintain a roster of all embarked personnel, showing destination and identification information.

Organize evacuees into transportation groups (chalks), issue boarding passes for aircraft, and

verify baggage tags.

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Verify that information on the passenger manifest agrees with information on the evacuee

Ensure there are enough transportation assets to transport evacuees and their baggage to the

POE.

Figure 5-5. Evacuation by air transport

COMFORT STATION

5-81. The comfort station is a temporary waiting area for evacuees until they board evacuation aircraft.

Comfort station personnel should make the evacuees’ stay as untroubled as possible and provide some

degree of privacy.

5-82. If possible, comfort stations should provide evacuees with the following:

Sufficient shelter, cots, blankets, food, water, and infant supplies.

Senior personnel, medical personnel, unit ministry teams, and assistants available to counsel

evacuees, especially families with young children.

Male and female personal items.

Restroom or latrine facilities.

TEMPORARY REFUGEE HOLDING AREA

5-83. The USG can provide a temporary refugee holding area for personnel who are ineligible for

evacuation but are in imminent physical danger. The ECC can choose not to provide this area if resources

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Chapter 5

are not available or if it might compromise the security of the operation. The temporary refugee holding

area personnel will perform the following:

Ensure the refugees are kept secure and separate from actual evacuees.

Search all refugees for restricted items, especially weapons.

Brief the refugees on the following items:

The temporary refugee holding area is only for individuals in immediate physical danger.

The qualifications for admission to this station do not constitute asylum.

The only agency that can consider and grant requests for asylum is the DOS.

The DOS handles requests for asylum on an individual basis.

The DOS will brief evacuees on the criteria for asylum.

Release, retain, or evacuate the refugees in accordance with instructions given by the COM.

CLASSIFICATION, PRIORITIES, AND CONSIDERATION

FOR EVACUEES

5-84. For organizational purposes, all evacuees receive a number priority and classification designator.

These categorizations are critical to the smooth execution and success of the operation. ECC personnel use

them when identifying, moving, and locating evacuees. The staff should keep abreast of changes in the

total numbers of potential evacuees through updates from the Embassy staff. These updates include the

total number for all evacuees and a number for each evacuee category.

CLASSIFICATION

5-85. The evacuee classification system shown in Figure 5-6 governs priorities of evacuations. A priority

designator includes a combination of a Roman numeral and a capital letter, indicating major and minor

priorities of each individual. If the USG accepts responsibility for an alien, personnel afford him the same

major and minor category consideration as other U.S.-sponsored evacuees.

Major Categories

I—American citizens.

II—Alien immediate family members of American citizens.

III—Foreign-service national and TCN employees of the USG.

IV—Eligible non-U.S. citizens who are seriously ill or injured or whose lives are in imminent peril (but who do not qualify for a

higher priority.

V—Others eligible (as directed by the Ambassador of JFC).

Minor Categories

A—Pregnant women.

B—Unaccompanied children under 18.

C—Aged and infirm.

D—Adults with children.

E—Adults 18 or older.

Figure 5-6. Classification of evacuees

FIRST PRIORITY

5-86. In NEOs, the first priority is U.S. citizens. The USG evacuates individuals in the following order:

Those with current identification, such as passports, birth certificates, DOD identification cards,

seaman’s papers, and aircrew cards, and individuals the Ambassador designates as first priority,

regardless of national affiliation. The Ambassador is the final authority.

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Those with expired U.S. passports that have been expired for less than 10 years.

Those with expired U.S. passports that have been expired for over 10 years.

GUIDELINES

5-87. Some guidelines for interaction with evacuees are as follows:

Evacuees are not enemy prisoners of war (EPWs).

Personnel should use the minimum force.

Evacuation can be an unsettling experience—especially for separated children and families. As a

rule, a patient, courteous, and professional attitude will calm both the situation and the evacuees.

Personnel should exercise limitations on baggage dependent upon the situation.

Personnel must ensure evacuees remain with their baggage.

Personnel must search baggage for firearms, explosives, ammunition, or restricted items. ECC

personnel should be considerate but firm; safety of personnel is paramount.

JTF or JSOTF leaders should establish a policy concerning pets. Whenever possible, ECC

personnel should allow pets to accompany evacuees unless doing so jeopardizes health or

security conditions. If pets arrive for evacuation, ECC personnel should establish a pet-control

facility.

ECC personnel should not accept gifts, tips, or bribes. All personnel must be aware of this

prohibition.

Personnel should refer all questions pertaining to evacuees to the DOS representative in the

ECC.

Personnel should allow higher-priority evacuees elect lower-priority evacuation to avoid

separating families. If it is necessary to MEDEVAC a member of a family, the USG will

medically evacuate the entire family.

Personnel must have well-established liaison with local airport security and ambulance services.

Medical personnel should consider wearing distinctive clothing or markings to aid in

identification.

Medical personnel should provide patients with written instructions for medical care, when

possible—especially for children.

REQUEST FOR ASYLUM OR TEMPORARY REFUGE

5-88. International law and custom have long recognized the humanitarian practice of providing temporary

refuge to any person, regardless of nationality, in imminent physical danger. It is U.S. policy to grant

temporary refuge in a foreign country to nationals of that country or to TCNs solely for humanitarian

reasons when exceptional circumstances place their lives and safety in imminent danger. The OIC of an

aircraft, ship, station, or activity decides what measures are prudent to take when providing temporary

refuge.

5-89. ECC personnel will not release information to the media concerning requests for asylum until the

DOS clears the information for release. ECC personnel must report any requests by foreign governments

for the return of an individual to the DOS representative.

5-90. The ECC safeguards evacuees seeking refuge or asylum until the Ambassador makes a determination

of status. ECC personnel should not release personnel against their will to a third-party force. ECC

personnel must consider the safety of JTF personnel and the security of the unit. In addition, ECC

personnel must—

Grant temporary refuge to individuals in imminent danger, regardless of whether they ask for

asylum or temporary refuge.

Allow DOS representatives handle asylum requests through the appropriate channels.

Establish procedures to notify the GCC of all actions relating to requests for asylum.

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Chapter 6

Temporary Safe Haven Operations

The DOS designates safe havens. A temporary safe haven is a location in an area or

country that the USG can move evacuees to quickly and easily. Ideally, the safe

haven is in the United States; however, circumstances may exist that require an

intermediate or temporary safe haven.

TEMPORARY SAFE HAVEN SITE

6-1. Adequate transportation may not be available to move all evacuees directly from the evacuation sites

to the United States. An intermediate safe haven may be a U.S. Navy ship; however, personnel should

move the evacuees from the ship to land-based safe havens (in the United States or a third country) as

quickly as possible. If a temporary safe haven is necessary, the DOS coordinates with the government

where it will be located. Coordination for the use of facilities, customs requirements, security,

transportation, and billeting is necessary.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR SAFE HAVEN SITES

6-2.

The DOS considers the following factors when selecting a site:

Presence of OPSEC before and during the evacuation operation to ensure mission success and

prevent undue pressure against the temporary safe haven government.

Capability to communicate with the ECC, JSOTF headquarters, and local Embassy.

Suitability of airfield or port capacity for the aircraft or ships the USG will use for both the

evacuation and later the onward movement for the evacuees. The DOS considers the following

suitability factors:

Capability of port or airfield for 24-hour operations.

Availability of HN controllers to staff the airfield and the requirement for JTF controllers.

Balance of airflow restrictions against anticipated dates and timing of anticipated airflow.

Numbers and types of aircraft involved in the operation and the total number of aircraft.

Condition of aircraft parking areas.

Dimension and condition of runways and taxiway.

Availability of logistical airfield search and rescue, security, fire fighting, and logistic

support.

Availability of airfield maintenance support.

Capabilities of airfield facilities.

Channel and harbor depth.

Berthing space, pier information, and location of anchorages.

Capabilities and types and of tugs.

Availability of equipment to load or offload ships, if necessary.

Climatological, meteorological, and oceanographic conditions.

Proximity of major transportation hubs.

Availability of adequate billeting, rations, and potable water for evacuees and the temporary

safe haven force.

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Chapter 6

6-3. Although temporary safe haven personnel operate under the authority of the host government, the

local population may not extend their goodwill. The temporary safe haven may be a prime target for

terrorism and riots. The JSOTF should plan for such situations to protect both evacuees and JSOTF

personnel.

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

6-4. The temporary safe haven force, organized similarly to the ECC’s processing section, operates under

the control of the JSOTF. It should deploy no later than the evacuation force; however, logistic

requirements to support a large number of evacuees may require that it deploy earlier. A limited security

force can provide necessary internal and perimeter security. The force may consist of the following

elements:

Command group.

Reception team.

Processing team.

Comfort team.

Scheduling team.

Security team.

COMMAND GROUP

6-5. The command group coordinates the overall operation. The command group consists of the

commander, executive officer, staff noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC), communications officer,

family center staff, chaplain, liaison officers, and interpreters. The family center staff provides and

coordinates human and social service support for evacuees. The chaplain ministers to the spiritual needs of

the safe haven force and evacuees and helps them deal with the stress and hardship created by the

evacuation. The liaison officers and interpreters maintain contact with the U.S. Embassy and the host

government. The command group is responsible for the following:

Planning, organizing, and supervising the operation of the temporary safe haven.

Maintaining liaison with local representatives of the DOS and other agencies involved with the

operation.

Advising the CDRJTF on the progress of the temporary safe haven operations.

Establishing procedures for government officials and TCNs, if not previously established by the

JTF.

Establishing provisions for searching women, children, disabled persons, and injured persons.

RECEPTION TEAM

6-6. This team consists of a briefing section and a PA section. The briefing section should brief the

evacuees upon their arrival concerning the following:

The current political situation in the HN.

The description and operation of the temporary safe haven.

The travel options and arrangements.

The customs requirements in the temporary safe haven.

The projected departure times for flights to the United States.

6-7. The PAO, working with HN personnel, releases accurate and timely information to the media.

However, release of information on the NEO or temporary safe haven operations within each country is the

responsibility of the Ambassador. Temporary safe haven PAO responsibilities are as follows:

Advise the temporary safe haven commander on all aspects of PA.

Coordinate and supervise all PA and command information functions to include planning and

production of bulletins, newsletters, and other information media.

Keep the JTF PAO advised on all aspects of PA.

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Temporary Safe Haven Operations

Distribute information pertaining to the temporary safe haven and its operations to the news

media according to JTF policies.

Escort civilian and military news media representatives.

Prohibit the news media from entering evacuee billeting areas.

Ensure that both the CDRJTF and the individual both give permission before the media

conducts an interview.

Determine and disseminate JTF guidance on the release of information to the public.

PROCESSING TEAM

6-8. The processing team should not duplicate the ECC processing, but the team should verify that all

information from the ECC is complete and correct. The administration, transportation, intelligence, and

medical sections are part of the processing team.

Administrative Section

6-9. The administrative section registers and tracks all evacuees and ensures that the appropriate sections

collect all DOS- or JTF-required information. The administrative section should have legal personnel

advise evacuees on claims procedures and assist in relations between evacuees, safe haven personnel, and

host-country nationals. Appendix H provides legal considerations in the event of a NEO. The

administrative section should—

Receive and register incoming evacuees in conjunction with DOS representatives.

Maintain a roster of each evacuee who passes through the temporary safe haven. The roster

should list the following:

Nationality.

Date of birth.

Evacuation classification.

Profession.

Destination.

Name, address, or phone number of a POC in the United States for notification.

Provide escorts for groups of personnel. Very important personnel and emergency medical cases

should receive individual guides, if available.

Provide for the safekeeping and security of valuables while evacuees wait for onward

transportation to the United States.

Provide assistance in locating separated family members.

Transportation Section

6-10. The transportation section is responsible for assisting in the onward movement of evacuees to their

final destination. The USG does not provide for the movement of persons other than U.S. employees and

family members. Nongovernmental employees evacuated by U.S.-funded charter, whether commercial or

military, sign promissory notes to cover the cost of transportation. To ensure an orderly movement, the

transportation section should—

Coordinate surface or air transportation for the movement of evacuees to the United States.

Coordinate movement flow of evacuees with the joint reception coordination center.

Provide loading-control personnel to supervise the loading of personnel aboard aircraft, ships, or

vehicles.

Maintain a roster of all embarked personnel. The roster should include destination and

identification information.

Expedite the departure of all evacuees who are sick, injured, or wounded.

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Chapter 6

Intelligence Section

6-11. The intelligence section may debrief each evacuee if the evacuees did not receive a debriefing at the

JTF ECC. If the temporary safe haven is also acting as a temporary ISB, intelligence section personnel

should arrange to pass information gained from evacuees to those forces that are returning to a threat area

for follow-on operations. Intelligence section personnel should also report information to the joint

intelligence center.

Medical Section

6-12. The medical section provides support to the temporary safe haven force. In addition, if the ECC did

not conduct medical screening, the medication section will need to conduct evacuee medical screening.

Medical section services may include any or all of the following:

Determining if an evacuee requires emergency medical treatment.

Performing emergency treatment or coordinating with a local hospital to perform the treatment.

Advising the temporary safe haven OIC on hygiene and preventive medicine.

Inspecting food and water obtained from local sources.

Evaluating the general health of the evacuees, particularly in regard to pregnancies and the

possibility of communicable diseases.

COMFORT TEAM

6-13. The comfort team provides logistical support for the operation. It is responsible for supplies,

billeting, sanitation facilities, food, and local transportation. The comfort team’s contracting or purchasing

officer coordinates services with the HN. Some considerations are as follows:

Shelter. Ideally, billeting is accomplished through facilities or hotels provided by or contracted

from the temporary safe haven country. However, the JTF may need to establish a tent city. In

this event, the temporary safe haven force arrives early enough to accomplish this before

evacuees begin arriving. The CDRJTF may consider contracting locally for the labor and

sanitation facilities.

Food. Because evacuees will normally leave the HN with little or no food supplies, the comfort

team may use meals, ready to eat as a temporary solution to the evacuees’ lack of food.

However, the temporary safe haven OIC should be prepared to establish a food service section

to provide special diets to foreign nationals or TCNs involved in the evacuation.

Climate. If the climate of the country is substantially different from the evacuee’s former area or

residence, the team may need to provide adequate clothing.

Hygiene. Evacuees may not have been able to pack personal, comfort, or hygiene items before

arriving at the evacuation site. The following is a partial list of items the evacuees may need:

Baby formula.

Trash bags.

Baby food or juice.

Diapers.

Toilet paper.

Feminine hygiene supplies.

Toothpaste and toothbrush.

Soap.

Shampoo.

Razors.

Washing powder.

Sheets.

Towels.

Blankets.

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Temporary Safe Haven Operations

Candy.

Wash bucket.

Note: Logistical support for NEOs has historically been the most prevalent challenge.

Thousands of civilians, personnel, pets, babies, and elderly or ill evacuees complicate the

logistical requirements for food and support. In addition, the military supply system does not

provide for many of the types of necessary items that evacuees need.

SCHEDULING TEAM

6-14. The scheduling team coordinates and plans the departure of evacuees from the temporary safe haven.

The scheduling team should do the following:

Coordinate with the transportation section for the turnover of the temporary safe haven upon

embarkation of the final chalk.

Coordinate with the comfort team to transport evacuees to the POEs.

Create a manifest for authorized passengers aboard military or commercial charter flights.

SECURITY TEAM

6-15. This team provides or arranges for adequate security at the temporary safe haven site. The security

team should provide the following:

Personnel to safeguard any aircraft located at the site.

A processing team and related facilities.

A perimeter security element to prevent unauthorized entry into the safe haven.

A reaction force to respond to possible emergencies within the safe haven.

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6-5

Appendix A

Historical Noncombatant Evacuee Operations

The DOD has conducted NEOs to assist the DOS in evacuating civilian

noncombatants and nonessential military personnel many times over the years.

ARSOF or another Service’s SOF participated in most of these operations in some

manner. The study of past operations allows planners and operators to gain

knowledge from lessons learned. This appendix provides a general composition of

past NEO forces (Table A-1) and a summary of specific operations.

Table A-1. Past noncombatant evacuation operations

Operation

Forces

1990

JTF: 22nd MEU

Operation SHARP EDGE

Supporting Forces: USMC

Liberia

JSOTF: None

1991

JTF: 13th USAF

Operation FIERY VIGIL

Supporting Forces: Navy

Philippines

JSOTF: None

1991

JTF: MAGTF*

Supporting Forces: SOF

Operation EASTERN EXIT

Somalia

JSOTF: None

and USMC

1994

JTF: USAF

Operation TIGER RESCUE

Supporting Forces: USAF

Yemen

JSOTF: None

1996

Operation ASSURED

JTF: SOCEUR

Supporting Forces: SOF,

Liberia

RESPONSE

JSOTF: SOCEUR

SETAF**, USMC

1996

JTF: 22nd MEU

Operation QUICK RESPONSE

Supporting Forces: USMC

Central African Republic

JSOTF: None

1997

JTF: MEU (SOC)

Operation NOBLE OBELISK

Supporting Forces: USMC

Sierra Leone

JSOTF: None

1997

JTF: Unknown

Supporting Forces:

Operation FIRM RESPONSE

Congo-Brazzaville

JSOTF: Unknown

Unknown

1997

Operation GUARDIAN

JTF: SETAF

Supporting Forces: SOF &

Congo & Zaire

RETRIEVAL

JSOTF: SOCEUR

SETAF

1997

JTF: MEU (SOC)

Operation SILVER WAKE

Supporting Forces: USMC

Albania

JSOTF: None

1998

JTF: MEU (SOC)

Supporting Forces: Navy

Operation SAFE DEPARTURE

Eritea

JSOTF: None

and USMC

1998

Operation SHEPHERD

JTF: SOCEUR

Supporting Forces: SOF

Guinea-Bissau

VENTURE

JSOTF: SOCEUR

2002

JTF: USEUCOM

Supporting Forces:

Operation SHEPHERD SENTRY

Central African Republic

JSOTF: None

SOCEUR

2002

JTF: USEUCOM

Supporting Forces: SOF

Operation AUTUMN RETURN

Cote d’Ivoire

JSOTF: SOCEUR

and USAF

* Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)

** Southern European Task Force (SETAF)

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A-1

Appendix A

NAMED OPERATIONS AND COMPOSITION

OF EXECUTING FORCES

A-1. Operation FIERY VIGIL (Figure A-1) became the largest peacetime evacuation of active duty

military personnel and family members in history. The USG diverted a strike group led by the USS

Abraham Lincoln en route to the Indian Ocean in response to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT

STORM to assist the humanitarian effort. The 23-ship armada sealifted nearly 45,000 people from the

Subic Bay Naval Station to the Visayas Province port of Cebu.

Figure A-1. Children aboard the United States Ship Merrill during Operation FIERY VIGIL

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE

A-2. In early April 1996, the fighting between two warring factions—the Patriotic Front of Liberia and

the ethnic Krahn elements—tore Liberia apart. United Nations observers and the Economic Community of

West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) were unable to stop the fighting. Over a

4-day period,

10,000 Liberians engaged in intense fighting and surrounded the U.S. Embassy. The

Ambassador requested additional security and evacuation assistance. In this appendix, the History and

Research Office of the United States Special Operations Command describes this particular NEO.

Figure A-2, page A-3, shows the timeline of this NEO, and Figure A-3, page A-4, shows the organization

of this NEO.

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Timeline

June-September 1990

Liberian

rebels

lay

siege

Monrovia

oust

President

Samuel K. Doe.

ECOMOG peacekeeping force enters Liberia to end the siege. Rebels break into ethnic warlord militias. Seven

years of civil war begin.

August 1995

Leaders sign the 13th peace plan since 1989. This plan establishes a ruling council and mandates that the

presidency rotate among council members until elections determine the president.

6 April 1996

Fighting erupts between warlord factions in and around Monrovia after the ruling council attempts to oust

Roosevelt Johnson.

9 April 1996

Special Operations Component, European Command (SOCEUR) security elements secure the U.S. Embassy.

United States Air Force (USAF) SOF helicopters begin evacuating the first of 2,200 personnel to Freetown,

Sierra Leone.

11 April 1996

Elements of an Army airborne company based in Italy augment SOCEUR forces.

12 April 1996

CONUS-based ARSOF and Army special operation aviation begin air evacuation operations from Monrovia.

Personnel are conducting air-refueling operations.

19 April 1996

Factions declare a cease-fire, but sporadic fighting continues.

ECOMOG leaders meet to refocus the peace process.

20 April 1996

Approximately 250 Marines relieve SOF security, air evacuation elements, and Army security forces at the

Embassy.

The Marines begin evacuating the remaining 750 civilians.

The Marine commander assumes command of the Operation ASSURED RESPONSE task force.

Figure A-2. Monrovia and Liberia timeline

A-3. On 7 April 1996, U.S. Ambassador William B. Milam requested additional security forces. Because

of this request, the National Command Authorities officially notified the Commander, United States

European Command (CDRUSEUCOM) to prepare for a NEO. The CDRUSEUCOM assigned this mission

to the SOCEUR. The commander gave the mission the code name Operation ASSURED RESPONSE.

A-4. When the CDRUSEUCOM notified the SOCEUR of the NEO, the command was supporting

ongoing operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the recovery mission for personnel killed in the crash of a

USAF CT-43. Fortunately, the SOCEUR staff and its components had previously developed NEO plans.

A-5. Limited options were available for the insertion of the evacuation force and for the removal of

evacuees. Warring factions had surrounded the two existing airports in Monrovia. These airports were also

in poor condition. The lack of airfields and time available affected the possible COAs. One possible COA

involved an MC-130 flying off the coast of Monrovia US Navy SEALs (sea-air-land) and parachuting into

the ocean. The aircrew would also drop two combat, rubber, raiding crafts into the ocean. The other COA

involved deployed SOF helicopters reassembling at Freetown, Sierra Leone, and then inserting security

forces at the Embassy (a 90-minute insertion flight). Both COAs involved the use of helicopters for the

exfiltration of evacuees.

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A-3

Appendix A

Figure A-3. Organization of Operation ASSURED RESPONSE

A-6. The USEUCOM operations director authorized the deployment of an ESAT to Monrovia. The ESAT

would review the security situation and provide SOCEUR an evaluation of the situation. On 7 April 1996,

NAVSOF and the initial forward command element departed on two MC-130 aircraft for the ISB

(Freetown). The SOCEUR FCE established the Operation ASSURED RESPONSE JTF headquarters while

the NAVSOF prepared to reinforce the Embassy.

A-7. The JTF headquarters element ran the ISB operation at Freetown. The ISB was responsible for the

following:

Conducting helicopter operations to and from the Embassy.

Resupplying the Embassy with food, water, and medical provisions.

Handling the aircraft bringing supplies, equipment, and personnel.

Managing the transfer of evacuees to aircraft for the flight to the safe haven.

A-8. MH-53J helicopters deployed from Brindisi, Italy, and Mildenhall, England, by C-5 transport to the

ISB. They arrived on 8 April. Personnel reassembled one of the helicopters on 9 April. The ESAT and 12

NAVSOF departed for the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia. They were to provide the JTF with a situational

update and the Embassy with increased security.

A-9. On

9 April

1996, a portion of the JTF staff, additional NAVSOF, and an element from

1-10th SFG(A) arrived in Monrovia

(Figure A-4, page A-5). The JTF staff established the JTF

headquarters in the Embassy while the 1-10th SFG(A) assumed responsibility for the ECC and Embassy

security. Over the next two days, additional SF personnel arrived. On 10 April 1996, the ECC became

operational.

A-10. Members of the

1-10th SFG(A) established and maintained reception, registration, medical

screening, and transportation stations (Figure A-5, page A-5). From 10 to 14 April, the ECC processed

around 1,800 evacuees. On 15 April 1996, elements of the 3-325th Infantry relieved the SEALs and SF,

who returned to the ISB. The MH-53Js and MH-47s continued to support evacuation flights through

19 April 1996, completing 98 sorties and evacuating over 2,126 individuals (436 U.S. citizens) from 76

different countries.

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Historical Noncombatant Evacuee Operations

Figure A-4. A helicopter landing at the Embassy in Monrovia

Figure A-5. Special Forces Soldiers escort evacuees from a transportation station

A-11. On 20 April 1996, the Commander, Task Force 62, (USS GUAM Amphibious Ready Group relieved

the Commander, Special Operations Command, United States European Command (CDRSOCEUR) as the

commander of the Operation ASSURED RESPONSE JTF. In only a few days, SOF successfully

accomplished a complex mission using a variety of in-theater and CONUS units. Task Force 62 continued

Operation ASSURED RESPONSE until it was relieved in late June. A Special Purpose Marine A-ground

task force relieved the ARG and completed the mission in August 2006. A USSOCOM History and

Research Office document contains more information on the operation including detailed tactical

information, such as placement of security positions within the Embassy, lessons learned, and TTP for

coordination of airframe flow into the evacuation area.

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A-5

Appendix A

OPERATION AUTUMN RETURN

A-12. In the late 1990s, Cote d’Ivoire, a prosperous West African nation, began to unravel politically

(Figure A-6, pages A-6 and A-7). In December 1999, the military overthrew the government for the first

time in Cote d’Ivoire’s history. In late 2000, Junta leader Robert Guei overtly rigged elections and

proclaimed victory. Popular protest forced him to step down and placed Laurent Gbagbo in power. Ivorian

dissidents and disaffected members of the military launched a failed coup attempt in September 2002. The

political and military crisis led to fighting, which threatened hundreds of TCNs and a significant number of

U.S. citizens, most notably students at the International Christian Academy located in Bouake. In response

to the crisis, the U.S. Ambassador to Cote d’Ivoire requested an evacuation of U.S. citizens. From

24 September to 4 October 2002, USEUCOM directed the evacuation of over 300 U.S. citizens and TCNs.

Timeline

1993

Henri Konan Bedie becomes president following the death of Houphouet-Boigny.

October 1995

A disputed election puts Bedie back in power.

July 1999

Alassane Ouattara leaves his job at the International Monetary Fund and returns to run for president. His plan

to face Bedie divides the country along ethnic and religious lines.

1999

The military overthrows Bedie in a coup led by Robert Guei. Bedie flees to France.

October 2000

Guei declares that he won the elections and claims the presidency. Guei flees in the wake of a popular revolt

against the alleged rigging of the election.

January 2001

The attempted coup fails.

March 2001

After Alassane Ouattara’s party gains the majority at local polls, the public calls for new presidential and

legislative elections.

June 2001

Amnesty International criticizes the government’s human rights record over the alleged killings of 57 civilians

during the 2000 election campaign. However, in August, investigations clear eight gendarmes accused of the

killings.

October 2001

President Gbagbo sets up a national reconciliation forum. General Guei refuses to attend in protest against his

aide’s arrest.

November 2001

Opposition leader Alassane Ouattara returns to the country, ending his yearlong exile in France and Gabon.

1993

Henri Konan Bedie becomes president following the death of Houphouet-Boigny.

October 1995

A disputed election puts Bedie back in power.

July 1999

Alassane Ouattara leaves his job at the International Monetary Fund and returns to run for president. His plan

to face Bedie divides the country along ethnic and religious lines.

Figure A-6. Cote d’Ivoire timeline of events

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Timeline (continued)

1999

The military overthrows Bedie in a coup led by Robert Guei. Bedie flees to France.

October 2000

Guei declares that he won the elections and claims the presidency. Guei flees in the wake of a popular revolt

against the alleged rigging of the election.

January 2001

The attempted coup fails.

March 2001

After Alassane Ouattara’s party gains the majority at local polls, the public calls for new presidential and

legislative elections.

June 2001

Amnesty International criticizes the government’s human rights record over the alleged killings of 57 civilians

during the 2000 election campaign. However, in August, investigations clear eight gendarmes accused of the

killings.

October 2001

President Gbagbo sets up a national reconciliation forum. General Guei refuses to attend in protest against his

aide’s arrest.

November 2001

Opposition leader Alassane Ouattara returns to the country, ending his yearlong exile in France and Gabon.

August 2002

The forum grants Ouattara’s party four ministerial posts in new government.

September 2002

A mutiny in Abidjan by demobilizing soldiers grows into a full-scale rebellion, with rebels from the Ivory Coast

Patriotic Movement seizing control of the north.

October-December 2002

A short-lived cease-fire in October gives way to further clashes and a battle for the key cocoa-industry town of

Daloa. Previously unknown rebel groups seize towns in the west.

January 2003

President Gbagbo accepts an invitation to peace talks in Paris. A peace proposal is made

involving power-sharing.

Figure A-6. Cote d’Ivoire timeline of events (continued)

OTHER OPERATIONS

A-13. Operation AUTUMN RETURN is not the most well-known or well-documented operation.

Operation NOBLE OBELISK is well-known in the ARSOF community and is often used as an example or

case study in institutional training. After action reports at the JTF and operational detachment level, unit

histories, and monographs written for these cover many of the operations listed in this appendix. Each of

these operations can provide important operational lessons that aid in the successful execution of the next

NEO that ARSOF supports.

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A-7

Appendix B

Guidelines for Rules of Engagement

NEOs are not strictly under the control of either the GCC or the CDRJTF. These

commanders are responsible for the conduct of military operations in support of the

NEO. The chief of mission is responsible for the NEO and the final ROE.

OVERVIEW

B-1. The ROE for NEOs should reflect the limited military objective that the USG wants to accomplish.

The ROE are positive restrictions on the use of military force to prevent a commander and his Soldiers

from violating the national policy of the USG or the law of land warfare. The ROE for NEOs limit the use

of military force to the level necessary to complete the mission successfully, to provide for self-defense of

the military force, and to defend evacuees. Figure B-1 shows a sample ROE card.

Rules of Engagement for Soldiers

ROE Before Hostilities

1. If you are operating as a unit, squad, or other formation, follow the orders of your leaders.

2. As a sentry, follow challenge procedures and the orders of the officer or sergeant of the guard and these

ROE.

3. If you are not operating as a unit or other formation, you may use deadly force when necessary to—

a. Defend yourself from serious injury or death. Do not use deadly force to protect yourself from the

threat of mere harassment, such as someone throwing rocks at you, or minor injury.

b. Defend other U.S. and multinational Soldiers and U.S. citizens from life-threatening attack.

c. Defend critical buildings, supplies, and equipment. Your leaders will point out critical areas and

outline challenging procedures.

Note: Leaders refer to complete ROE in the OPLAN or operation order (OPORD).

ROE During Hostilities

4. If you are operating as a unit, squad, or other formation, follow the orders of your leaders.

5. As a sentry, follow challenge procedures and the orders of the officer or sergeant of the guard and these

ROE.

6. If you are not operating as a unit or other formation, you may use deadly force when necessary to—

a. Defend yourself from serious injury or death.

b. Defend other U.S., allied, and coalition Soldiers and U.S. citizens from life-threatening attack.

c. Defend critical buildings, supplies, and equipment.

d. Use indirect fire only when the task force commander approves the use of such fire.

7. Avoid injuring innocent civilians or their property, medical personnel, and chaplains; they are protected

targets. An individual attacking you is not a protected target. You should—

8. Avoid firing into a crowd of apparent noncombatants because you may start a riot or injure innocent

people.

9. Refrain from firing automatic weapons into a crowd unless ordered to do so or unless doing so is

absolutely necessary to save your life or the lives of other U.S., allied, and coalition Soldiers and U.S.

citizens.

10. Your leaders may change these ROE; follow their orders.

Note: Leaders refer to complete ROE in OPLAN or OPORD.

Figure B-1. Sample rule of engagement card for Soldiers

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B-1

Appendix B

B-2. The commander may coordinate these ROE with HN authorities and disseminate them to the

indigenous population as part of the CA and PSYOP programs. This will inform the population of the

reasons for U.S. actions and help minimize civilian interference with the operation. Commanders and

Soldiers have an inherent right to protect the force from attack. The ROE do not diminish this

responsibility. However, the ROE do enable the commander to determine the line between aggressive or

offensive actions and defensive actions.

B-3. Soldiers conduct defensive actions only as aggressively as necessary to protect U.S. lives, property,

and equipment. Defensive actions may include pursuit only until the attacker is no longer in a position to

inflict casualties upon U.S. personnel, property, or equipment. Subordinate commanders will thoroughly

indoctrinate all personnel in the need for minimum force, humane treatment of evacuees, and good order

and discipline when conducting NEOs. Commanders at all echelons will use the minimum force necessary

for each situation and will take no action that the local population might interpret as initiating hostilities.

B-4. Ideally, the ROE should allow for centralized control at the JTF level and decentralized execution of

fire support, close air support, and employment of riot control agents. If possible, the evacuation force

commander should have the authority to employ supporting arms to ensure the safety of the force and the

accomplishment of the mission. However, national strategic policy and political considerations are the

usual basis for the ROE, not tactical considerations. If directed by the commander, the ROE may include

prohibitions from The Hague and Geneva Conventions. The following are prohibitions from the Hague and

Geneva conventions:

Personnel cannot declare that they will give no quarter.

Personnel cannot kill or wound an enemy who lays down his weapon or surrenders. If an enemy

cannot defend himself, personnel cannot kill or wound him.

Personnel will not shoot small arms, crew-served weapons, or artillery into undefended

populated areas or buildings.

Personnel will not fire on religious, social, civic, and historic monuments or facilities. Personnel

will not fire on hospitals or places where the sick or wounded are, unless the enemy is using

them for military purposes. In this instance, the definition of military purpose is a threat to the

accomplishment of the NEO. Attack on any of the aforementioned facilities is only warranted if

the enemy is using the facility to initiate hostile, aggressive acts; endanger the lives of evacuees

or members of the task force; or prevent mission accomplishment.

Personnel cannot loot.

Personnel will not destroy or seize any property unless such destruction or seizure is

operationally necessary within the above parameters. Personnel will not destroy medical

supplies and equipment.

In addition to the above, personnel will ensure that—

All money, effects, and articles of personal property, except arms, military equipment, and

military documents, remain in the possession of the prisoners and detainees.

All captured or detained individuals are afforded humane treatment.

SUGGESTED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

B-5. In permissive and uncertain environments, unarmed hostile forces may attack or threaten

U.S. personnel. The on-site commander may reduce or overcome the threat with the following:

Verbal. The commander may issue warnings to the demonstrators.

Show of force. The commander may demonstrate a show of force, including the use of crowd or

riot control formations.

Force. The commander may order additional force, as necessary, to meet and overcome the

threat. Commanders may authorize additional force to prevent the loss of life or major damage

to property and equipment. Firing on unarmed personnel is a last resort. The commander will

discontinue the use of force when it is no longer necessary to accomplish its immediate purpose.

Riot control agents. The commander may authorize riot control agents. The commander only

utilizes these after authorization by the President and the GCC. Use of riot control agents is

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Guidelines for Rules of Engagement

subject to the effective ROE. Personnel may only use riot control agents defensively to protect

U.S. personnel and installations. If the GCC has not previously granted use of these agents, the

CDRJTF should request approval for use during the NEO planning phase.

B-6. If an armed, hostile force attacks U.S. personnel in a hostile environment, the following rules govern

the on-site commander:

Use adequate force to control the situation.

Respond to hostile fire directly threatening U.S. personnel or equipment with timely fire

directed only at the source of the hostile fire. Exercise restraint to avoid escalation. If possible,

use sniper or marksman fire to reduce the threat.

Use air attack only when it is the only means of protecting U.S. personnel.

Return fire across the boundaries or territorial waters of a third country only if a hostile force

continues to commit hostile acts after crossing that boundary.

Discontinue the use of force when it is no longer necessary to accomplish its purpose. After

hostilities cease, institute necessary measures to control the situation and assist the injured.

B-7. For aircraft operations, suggested ROE in permissive and uncertain environments are to report any

threatening actions to the higher authority by the fastest means available. Threatening actions include—

Small arms aimed at or following the aircraft.

Medium-caliber or antiaircraft weapons aimed at or following the flight path of the aircraft.

Electronic indications that fire-control radar is tracking aircraft.

Low passes or simulated gun runs by fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft.

B-8. In a hostile environment, suggested ROE for aircraft operations are as follows:

Limit actions to those necessary to reduce the threat to an acceptable level.

Report any fire to the next-higher authority. Personnel may return fire to reduce the threat to

acceptable levels and to protect the aircraft and aircrew.

Return fire immediately to protect the aircraft and aircrew if fired upon by radar-controlled guns

or missiles.

Report threatening action by fixed-wing aircraft against helicopters immediately.

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

B-9. The current instructions from the CJCS apply to all U.S. forces responding to all military attacks

within the United States and to all military operations outside the United States, with limited exceptions,

the most prominent being for multinational force operations.

ORGANIZATION OF STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

B-10. The standing rules of engagement (SROE) are organized as follows:

Enclosure A (SROE). This unclassified enclosure includes classified appendixes and details the

general purpose, intent, and scope of the SROE, which emphasize a commander’s right and

obligation to use force in self-defense. Enclosure A also addresses critical principles, such as

unit, individual, national, and collective self-defense; hostile act and intent; and the

determination to declare forces hostile, as foundational elements of all ROE.

Enclosures B through H and M through O. These classified enclosures provide general

guidance on specific types of operations, such as maritime, air, land, and space operations;

information operations; NEOs; counterdrug support operations; and operations conducted in US

territories.

Enclosure I

(supplemental measures). Classified supplemental measures found in this

enclosure enable a commander to obtain or grant those additional authorities necessary to

accomplish an assigned mission. Supplemental measures are divided into actions requiring

SecDef approval, actions requiring GCC approval, and actions delegated to subordinate

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Appendix B

commanders (though the delegation may be withheld by higher authority). Supplemental ROE

relate to mission accomplishment, not self-defense, and never limit a commander’s inherent

right and obligation of self-defense.

Enclosure J (ROE process). This unclassified enclosure provides guidelines for incorporating

ROE development into military planning processes.

Enclosure K. This unclassified enclosure contains ROE references.

Enclosure L (Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. forces). This unclassified enclosure

covers standing rules for the use of force for U.S. forces and includes classified appendixes. The

unclassified portion covers purpose and scope and provides content that cancels previous CJCS

instructions and the DOD Civil Disturbance Plan (Garden Plot), and supersedes DODI 5210.56.

It requires unit commanders at all levels to teach and train personnel how and when to use

nondeadly and deadly force in self-defense.

Enclosure P. This unclassified enclosure describes the rules for the use of force message

process.

Enclosure Q. This unclassified enclosure lists rules for the use of force references.

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Appendix C

Notification Forms

This appendix contains NEO notification forms. Figures C-1 through C-5, pages C-1

through C-3, provide samples of NEO notification forms.

Stand Fast Notice

NAME OF POST:_____________________________________ DATE:__________________

Because of the current local situation, this office recommends that U.S. citizens remain in their homes. U.S.

citizens should only conduct essential outside activities, and they should avoid public areas until the situation

improves. Since there is always the possibility that the situation will deteriorate and U.S. citizens will need to

relocate, this office recommends that U.S. citizens take the following precautions:

1. Without hoarding, try to keep on hand a reasonable supply (7 to 10 days) of food, water, and fuel.

If you have a personal automobile, ensure it is ready for immediate use. Fill the gas tank, and check the

oil, water, tires, and battery.

If your passport, exit visa, or registration with this office is not current, contact us immediately at

telephone________.

Collect all important papers and documents, such as passports; birth, marriage, divorce, and

naturalization certificates; inoculation cards; insurance policies; bankbooks; and U.S. and local currency.

Make or update a complete inventory of your household effects in duplicate.

Prepare one suitcase (66 pounds or less) for each family member. The suitcase should contain, as

applicable, warm clothing (regardless of season), eyeglasses, supplies for babies and children, and

special medications.

Listen to the local media, Voice of America, U.S. Armed Forces Radio, or the British Broadcasting

Company closely for announcements from the local government or this office.

Your warden is ________________. You can reach your warden at_______________.

This office is monitoring the situation. It will provide further guidance when necessary. Please pass the

contents of this notice to other U.S. citizens, and keep it handy for reference.

Figure C-1. Example stand fast notice

Leave Commercial Notice

NAME OF POST:_____________________________________ DATE:__________________

In view of the gravity of the current local situation, this office recommends that nonessential U.S. citizens

depart by commercial transportation as soon as possible. If adult U.S. citizens have compelling reasons for

remaining in the area, this office suggests that their dependents depart with their pets while commercial

facilities are available.

1. U.S. citizens with valid passports and foreign dependents with valid passports or visas should not come

to this office for travel arrangements. Rather, they should make their own arrangements directly with

transportation companies or travel agents.

2. Departing individuals should inform this office by telephone (___________) or mail of their departure

plans, providing their name, date, and place of passport issuance; probable date and mode of

transportation; and names and addresses of next of kin; other POC in the United States; and travel

agents.

Figure C-2. Example leave commercial notice

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Appendix C

Leave Commercial Notice (continued)

3. This office cannot accept personal or real property for protection. This office will accept copies of

inventories of property left in the country and attempt to arrange for protection of such property through

the local authorities.

4. U.S. citizens without valid passports or those unable to arrange transport for themselves or their

dependents because of financial or other reasons should report to this office as soon as possible. They

should bring the following items with them:

5. U.S. passports or other proof of U.S. citizenship.

6. Passports or identification cards for non-U.S. spouses and dependents and proof of relationship (birth or

marriage certificates).

Please pass the contents of this notice to other U.S. citizens, and keep it handy for reference.

Figure C-2. Example leave commercial notice (continued)

Evacuation Notice

NAME OF POST:_____________________________________ DATE:__________________

Because of the situation in this country, the Ambassador is recommending the evacuation of all U.S. citizens.

This office may terminate operations with little or no advance warning. U.S. citizens wishing USG assistance

should immediately contact their wardens or this office telephone (_________). The Embassy or Consulate is

arranging chartered transportation to the United States or another safe haven. The issuance of tickets is not

feasible. All evacuees will sign promissory notes to cover the cost of their transportation. The DOS will bill

evacuees later for the costs evacuees incur. (USG personnel and their dependents travel on official orders;

therefore, the DOS will bill their respective agencies.) To provide proper protection and to help citizens leave

safely, this office asks evacuees to note the following:

1. Your warden is _______________. You can reach your warden at_____________.

2. Your assigned assembly area is at______________________. The following apply:

_____ Arrive at the assembly area at _____.

_____ Remain alert because this office will inform you when to report to the assembly area.

_____ Refrain from bringing your vehicle to the assembly point.

_____ Bring enough food for each family member to have meals.

_____ Bring ready-to-eat food (canned items, sandwiches, and so on) because the assembly area does

not have cooking facilities.

_____ Bring an unbreakable container with _____ quarts of water per person.

_____ Bring pets to the assembly area for transport. The DOS is allowing pets the transport of pets

during this NEO.

10.

_____ Refrain from bringing pets to the assembly area. The DOS is not authorizing the transport of pets

during this NEO. Make arrangements for the care of your pets during your absence.

Note: Only checked items apply.

11. Bring important personal papers (passports, inoculation cards, cash, credit cards, and checkbooks) and

one suitcase (66 pounds or less) per person containing clothing suitable for the local climate and a

change of climate. Remember eyeglasses, special medicines, and any supplies for infants or children

needed. Do not bring firearms or liquor. If authorized by the DOS, bring your pets.

12. Family members should consider the possibility of temporary separation. Adults can avoid problems by

exchanging data concerning bank accounts, addresses, and telephone numbers of relatives in the

United States, and powers of attorney.

Figure C-3. Example evacuation notice

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Notification Forms

Embassy or Post Closing Notice

NAME OF POST:___________________________________________ DATE:_______________________

The situation in this country is such that the USG is closing its offices here effective___________________.

The Embassy located at _________________will protect U.S. interests until further notice. This office

recommends that U.S. citizens leave the country immediately. Until this office ceases operations, it will make

every effort to assist U.S. citizens wishing to depart. Citizens planning to remain should provide their names,

addresses, and next of kin to this office so that it can pass the information to the DOS and to the Embassy.

Please pass the contents of this notice to other U.S. citizens, and keep it handy for reference.

Figure C-4. Example Embassy or post closing notice

Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity

Agreement made, this________________day of______________, 20__, between _____________________

and the military forces of the United States.

Whereas the military forces of the United States agree to evacuate_________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

Said offer of evacuation is declined by the above-named individual(s) with the understanding that the offer will

not be repeated.

Evacuee Signature:________________________________________________

Evacuee Signature: ________________________________________________

Figure C-5. Example waiver of evacuation opportunity

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C-3

Appendix D

Emergency Action Plan Checklists

This appendix contains sample checklists (Figures D-1 through D-5, pages D-1

through D-5) from 12 FAH-1 EPH. Embassy EAPs normally contain checklists

similar to these. The U.S. Department of State Bureau of Administration Web site

contains additional information on this topic.

Checklist for Evacuation Assisted by the United States Military

What is the name and title of the U.S. official in charge of the evacuation?

What are the names of U.S. officials remaining behind? (Attach a list with names and means of contact.)

What are the names of post officials available to assist in the processing and evacuation? (Attach list of

officials. See DOS Emergency Planning Handbook, Exhibit 120. Update the list to show name, probable

location, means of identification, and contact information of officer performing each relevant function).

What are the locations of the number of military screening stations for evacuees? How many are there?

What groups will assist the military?

Is the environment permissive, uncertain, or hostile?

What are the security need for the perimeter, assembly areas, and embarkation points?

What security will the host government or controlling authority provide?

Are alternate evacuation, assembly, or reception sites available? Are alternate evacuation, assembly, or

reception sites available? Where are the GIBCO products located, and who has custody of them?

Could unauthorized individuals forcibly join the evacuation? If so, what action does the post OIC

recommend?

10. What action does the post OIC propose if someone asks for political asylum?

11. Will the post OIC of the post vouch for the baggage and personal property of all or some evacuees or

should the evacuation force search for weapons and explosives?

12. Does the post OIC want the military to conduct a physical search of the evacuees that the post cannot

vouch for?

13. Which personnel can conduct physical searches of female evacuees if such a search is necessary?

14. What is the modified priority if the evacuation priority is different than the one stated in the post plan?

15. Will food be necessary? If yes, what is the total number of meals?

16. Is potable water available? What quantity of bottled water is necessary?

17. Does the post anticipate any U.S. citizens refusing evacuation?

18. What is the policy on evacuees taking pets? If the DOS authorizes evacuees to transport pets, has the

evacuation force commander considered the requirements, such as customs and quarantine

restrictions, to ensure the pets can enter the safe haven? If pets the DOS disallows the transport of

pets, what will happen to the pets evacuees bring with them to the evacuation processing centers?

19. Does the post OIC anticipate that military personnel will need to search for missing evacuees? If so, where

will evacuees be likely to be located? (Personnel should give radio call sign frequencies, if known.)

20. What is the likelihood that search operations will meet armed resistance?

21. Will post personnel need assistance destroying sensitive materials or equipment?

22. Will portable radios be available to assist in the assembly, movement, and control of evacuees? How

many sets? What frequencies? Additional needs?

23. Who will prepare manifests of evacuees, post personnel, and military personnel?

Figure D-1. Example checklist for evacuation assisted by the United States military

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Appendix D

Checklist for Evacuation Assisted by the United States Military (continued)

24. What are other items that may affect the NEO?

25. What are local travel restrictions, curfews, and roadblocks?

26. What are local military activities?

27. How will local political or security factors affect the evacuation?

28. Public affairs considerations?

29. Can the Embassy provide interpreters if necessary?

30. Can the post OIC provide updated copies of the post’s—

31. Emergency Planning Handbook, Section 1540, with exhibits?

32. Communications annex?

33. Logistics annex?

34. Transportation annex?

35. F-77 Potential Evacuees Report?

36. GIBCO products?

37. What is the number of—

• Litterbound wounded, injured, or ill evacuees?

• Ambulatory wounded, injured, or ill evacuees?

• Pregnant evacuees?

38. What medical assistance (to include special equipment) will evacuees need?

39. What is the breakdown of evacuees?

_____ 0-7 years

_____ 8-16 years

_____ 17-20 years

_____ 21 years and older

40. Will there be doctors and nurses among the evacuees?

41. Will any influential religious or community leaders be among the evacuees?

42. What is the weight and volume of any sensitive materials or equipment requiring evacuation by pounds

and cubic feet?

Note: Personnel must attach an intelligence estimate of the local situation and HN military status.

Figure D-1. Example checklist for evacuation assisted by the United States Military (continued)

Checklist for Assembly Area

Location:

Date:

Assembly Area:

Primary:

Alternate:

Embarkation Point:

1. Grid coordinates:

2. Reference points:

3. Size:

4. Estimated capacity:

5. Shelter:

6. Water:

7. Cooking facilities:

8. Food stocks:

Figure D-2. Example checklist for assembly area

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Emergency Action Plan Checklists

Checklist for Assembly Area (continued)

9. Estimated people and days on hand:

10. Latrine and shower:

11. Control point:

12. Telephone:

13. Radio call sign:

14. Access and choke points:

15. Alternates:

16. Nearest police station:

17. Nearest medical facility:

18. Distances to embarkation points:

19. Identify helicopter LZ (if applicable):

This report prepared by:

Sketch attached:

Video attached:

Photo attached:

Figure D-2. Example checklist for assembly area (continued)

Helicopter Landing Zone

Location:

Date:

1. Designator:

2. Locations:

3. Grid and latitude and longitude:

4. Reference point(s):

*Dimensions:

6. Surface:

7. Obstacles:

8. Recommended air approach(es):

9. Recommended ground approach(es):

10. Distance(s) to assembly area(s):

11. Comments:

Sketch attached:

Video attached:

Photo attached:

*The minimum size for an MH-47 LZ and MH-60 is 100 feet by 100 feet.

Figure D-3. Example checklist for helicopter landing zone

Airfield Survey

Location:

Date:

1. Name of airfield:

2. Location (map coordinates):

3. Fuel (type and availability):

4. Materiels-handling equipment:

5. Elevation:

6. Runway length:

Figure D-4. Example checklist for airfield survey

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Appendix D

Airfield Survey (continued)

7. Runway width:

8. Surface composition and estimated single-wheel loading factor:

9. Available parking area:

10. Largest aircraft accommodated:

11. Instrument approach facilities and navigation aids:

12. Aircraft obstacles:

13. Runway and taxiway lighting:

14. Communications (frequencies and call signs used):

15. Physical security:

16. Airfield control:

Civilian

Military

17. Status of commercial air traffic into and out of the airfield during the period in issue:

18. Airfields status according to International Civil Aviation Organization standards for signs, markings, and

other applicable requirements:

19. Availability of FAA-certified air traffic controllers:

20. Key contacts:

21. Distance from assembly area to airport:

Primary:

Secondary:

22. Conditions of roads leading to airport:

23. Conditions and weight limits of bridges leading to airports:

24. On-site assembly areas and capacity:

25. Latrine and shower facilities:

26. Feeding facilities and capacities:

27. Text or copy of description in Airfield and Seaplane Stations of the World.

Report prepared by:

Sketch attached:

Video attached:

Photo attached:

Note: Complete a separate form for each airfield considered feasible for use during an evacuation.

Figure D-4. Example checklist for airfield survey (continued)

Seaport Survey

Location:

Date:

1. Name of seaport:

2. Location (map coordinates):

3. Entrance restrictions and minimum anchorage:

4. Channel depth, depending on season:

5. Tide, depending on season:

6. Pilots necessary or available:

7. Navigational aids:

8. Port or beach obstacles:

9. Wharf (description and capabilities):

10. Materials-handling equipment:

Figure D-5. Example checklist for seaport survey

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Appendix E

Noncombatant Evacuation Operation

Staff-Planning Considerations for Noncombatant

Evacuation Operation Guidance

This appendix provides questions that personnel may use for evacuation planning and

operations. These questions may serve as focus for the detailed planning and

operational dialog between diplomats and military forces that must precede any

successful evacuation operation.

PERSONNEL STAFF QUESTIONS

E-1. The personnel staff section should consider the following questions:

Who will screen the evacuees?

Will the Embassy assign its personnel to screen?

Are there any evacuees (for example, wardens) who can help process and screen evacuees?

What are the JTF requirements for screening?

Has the appropriate authority verified the screening and processing areas?

Do personnel know what actions to take if an evacuee seeks political asylum?

Will personnel need to search the baggage and personal property of all evacuees for weapons or

explosives?

Who will physically search female evacuees?

What proof of U.S. citizenship is acceptable?

Are there any changes in the standard priorities for evacuation?

Will the U.S. Embassy be able to assign evacuation priorities before it schedules the evacuation?

What animals (pets) are prohibited from traveling on the designated transportation? Has the

appropriate authority identified restrictions concerning animals at the safe haven location?

INTELLIGENCE STAFF QUESTIONS

E-2. The intelligence staff section should consider the following questions:

What is the current situation in the country, in the Embassy, and near the U.S. citizens?

Are there any members of the JTF, or anyone reasonably available, who have been in the HN

recently?

Is there any immediate intelligence that the JTF needs from the evacuees?

What discipline problems can the JTF expect from the evacuees? Who are the potential

troublemakers?

Is there any sensitive equipment or material the JTF will need to evacuate or destroy? Will

personnel with requisite clearances need to help evacuate or destroy sensitive equipment or

material?

Who are the key HN personnel, and what are their attitudes toward the evacuation?

Where are the HN police forces located? Are they available and capable? Are they loyal to the

host government? Are they hostile to the United States? Is there factional infighting?

What is the location of HN fire services? Are they available and capable?

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Appendix E

What is the location of HN military forces? Are they available and capable? Are they loyal to

the host government? Are they hostile to the United States? Is factional infighting present?

Will the host government provide any security for the assembly areas of evacuation sites? What

are the locations of the assembly areas? Which unit will provide security? What will be the size

of the security force?

What is the potential threat? What are the strength, composition, disposition, weapons

capability, and probable tactics of the potential threat?

Will the Embassy or HN provide interpreter support?

What organization will provide the JTF with country studies that contain requisite evacuation

information, such as landing zones, concentration of U.S. citizens, port facilities, and landing

beaches? By what method will that organization transmit this information to the JTF?

Who will provide the JTF with climatological, meteorological, and oceanographic information?

Are map products of the joint operations area and the Embassy compound available? What are

the sources?

Who is in control of and ensures familiarity with GIBCO products and other geographic

information?

OPERATIONS AND PLANS STAFF QUESTIONS

E-3.

The operations and plans staff section(s) should consider the following questions:

Will this be a permissive, uncertain, or hostile NEO? If the evacuation is permissive, should the

JTF expect unarmed hostilities? If the evacuation is uncertain or hostile, will the JTF need

pursuit forces? What is the likelihood of terrorist activities?

What multinational forces will be operating in the area? Will the CDRJTF integrate

multinational forces into the JTF plan? If the JTF is not incorporating multinational forces, how

are the separate forces deconflicting separate plans?

Who is the senior U.S. official in charge of the evacuation operation?

Who will give the JTF permission to complete the evacuation and to leave the evacuation site?

What is the chain of command for U.S. military forces?

What is the relationship between the CDRJTF and the Ambassador?

Will all U.S. mission or Embassy officials be leaving? If not, who will remain? What action

should the CDRJTF take when an Embassy official refuses evacuation?

Who makes the final determination of evacuee accounting before final evacuation departure?

Is the Embassy’s EAP available? Is it current?

Who is the CDRJTF’s primary POC at the Embassy for details of the operation?

What steps are being taken by the Embassy to get the evacuees ready for evacuation?

Has the JTF verified and surveyed the primary and alternate assembly areas, evacuation sites,

and routes?

What is the total number of U.S. personnel the JTF will evacuate?

What actions should personnel take with individuals not on the list of evacuees (for example,

TCNs)? What is the total number of TCNs the JTF will evacuate, and what is their total number

per priority category? What identification is necessary for TCNs?

What is the composition of the evacuees? Will there be a cross section of those listed in the

EAP?

What action should the JTF take if there is an outbreak of violence among evacuees?

Will the CDRJTF send search teams after missing evacuees?

What are the ROE for the JTF?

What is the guidance on the use of PSYOP?

What is the role of CA in NEO?

Does the JTF have permission to drop sensors?

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Noncombatant Evacuation Operation

Staff-Planning Considerations for Noncombatant

Evacuation Operation Guidance

Has the appropriate party sent all requirements for the strategic transportation system to the

United States Transportation Command center or crisis action team?

What is the best means of transportation to evacuate personnel? Can commercial airlift provide

more timely evacuation than deploying U.S. military assets? Has the JTF commander identified

air requirements for units and equipment in the Joint Operation Planning Execution System? Are

U.S. naval assets readily available to stage off the coast?

What are the appropriate command and control arrangements if the JTF conducts the NEO as a

combined operation?

What support is available from other U.S. sources?

What support is necessary by other U.S. agencies?

What support is available from other participating nations?

What support is necessary by other participating nations?

Are trained explosive ordnance disposal personnel available through the HN?

Is an ISB available? Where? How extensive are its facilities and support capabilities?

Will the Ambassador allow an FCE to deploy?

LOGISTICS STAFF QUESTIONS

E-4. The logistics staff section should consider the following questions:

What are the arrangements for evacuee housing, security, and transfer? Where should the JTF

locate evacuee housing? How much housing will the evacuees need? If necessary, what type and

quantity of clothing will evacuees need? What type and quantity of food evacuees need? Will

evacuees be in the area long enough to need food? Will evacuees need protective clothing?

Are there procedures to handle claims against U.S. civilians?

Who will provide an emergency resupply of ammunition for the advance party, if necessary?

Will the Embassy or HN be available to provide transportation support? Where is transportation

located, and what condition is it in? What type of transportation will the JTF need, and what

type is available? How many people can the available transportation carry? Are operators

needed?

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS STAFF QUESTIONS

E-5. The civil-military operations staff section should answer the following questions:

What is the attitude of the local population toward U.S. personnel? Will the local population

help or hinder U.S. operations?

What support is available from HN civil authorities?

What support is available from international organizations represented in the area?

What cultural nuances and customs should the JTF evacuation force know to avoid

confrontation?

COMMUNICATIONS STAFF QUESTIONS

E-6. The communications staff section should consider the following questions:

What communications support will the Embassy provide, and how will the communication

architecture be constructed to support the operations (that is, networks, frequencies, secure

equipment, or relays)?

Can the JTF send portable communications equipment to the Embassy in advance to create

higher quality, secure communication?

How will outstations (safe haven site, marshalling elements, and security elements) talk to

headquarters JSOTF?

16 November 2009

FM 3-05.131

E-3

Appendix E

MEDICAL QUESTIONS

E-7. The medical officer should consider the following questions:

Will the Embassy and HN provide medical support? Has the Embassy or JTF coordinated

MEDEVAC procedures with the HN? Where are HN health services? What are the capabilities

of the HN and Embassy health services?

What is the policy concerning seriously wounded evacuees? Should the JTF give them

precedence over all other evacuees? What is the physical condition of all evacuees? Are

aeromedical evacuation assets necessary? If so, does the CDRJTF need to pre-stage those assets

nearby? What are the MEDEVAC procedures?

Which evacuees have special medical needs, such as pregnancy, infectious disease, exceptional

family member, or pediatric health care problems?

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE QUESTIONS

E-8. The PAO should consider the following questions:

Who will prepare the PA plan? How often will the responsible party update it? Who is the lead

PA director? Will the PAO evacuate media representatives?

Are there that the PAO will restrict media access to? Is there a media support plan?

What coordination has PAO made with the HN media to support the NEO or the NEO PSYOP

plan?

Will the HN media provide support for the NEO or the NEO PSYOP plan?

POSSIBLE DILEMMAS

E-9. Because each NEO is unique, situations may arise that require special considerations. The CDRJTF

should brief personnel and prepare them to deal with the following:

Questions concerning use of deadly force or a given weapon system in a given situation.

Use of deadly force.

Interpretation of the ROE.

Hostile detainees who present themselves to the JTF or who the JTF capture.

Civil disturbance, from passive resistance or civil disobedience to violence.

Terrorism.

Bomb threats.

Snipers.

Nonambulatory evacuees.

Language problems.

Religious problems.

Evacuees that do not appear on the Embassy list but appear to be bona fide evacuees.

Deaths of evacuees and the evacuation of their remains.

Evacuees (listed or unlisted) with unknown IDs.

Evacuees carrying contraband and the disposition of the contraband.

Civilians in overwhelming numbers coming to assembly areas or evacuation sites to request

evacuation.

Evacuees on the Embassy list refusing evacuation.

Evacuees trying to give bribes to gain favor.

Inaccurate evacuation lists.

International journalists converging on the area in large numbers.

E-4

FM 3-05.131

16 November 2009

Appendix F

Notional Combatant Command Public Affairs Plan for a

Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (Host Nation)

This appendix includes a sample notional combatant command PA plan for a NEO

(HN) that provides PA guidance. Figure F-1, pages F-1 through F-8, shows a sample

plan.

Section I. Situation, Mission, Execution, and Security

Situation.

1. General. This plan provides specific PA guidance, PA tasking, and overall concept of operations for

in-theater U.S. military PA activities conducted in support of the evacuation of U.S. citizens, TCNs,

and selected host-country nationals from a foreign nation. The COM has authority over media

coverage of the NEO in the HN. He may authorize coverage contrary to the desires of the

commander.

Policy. Leaders should pursue a vigorous PA program to keep U.S. and international audiences

informed of NEOs to the maximum level possible that is also consistent with OPSEC and personnel

safety. The mission of PA is to allow the CDRJTF to conduct the mission in a manner that safeguards

personnel and OPSEC while using the media to keep the U.S. public informed.

Assumptions.

a. News media pools will not deploy for this operation.

b. Media coverage and PA notification is authorized.

Open media coverage in HN is possible.

Mission.

1. To contribute to public confidence in U.S. procedures for the operation by providing the media access

to unclassified, timely, and accurate accounts of the operation.

2. To describe the operations accurately as the effective use of flexible U.S. military force for an

evacuation of noncombatants endangered by a hostile environment.

3. To characterize U.S. military involvement in the operation as nonconfrontational and humanitarian.

4. To illustrate the capabilities, readiness, and professionalism of U.S. forces.

5. To promote accurate media coverage of NEOs.

Execution.

1. Concept of operations. This plan outlines PA support for any COA. Because the situation can rapidly

deteriorate from a permissive to a hostile environment, the command must prepare to support each

COA separately, sequentially, and concurrently.

a. General. A PAO deploys with theater military forces and serves as the CDRJTF’s spokesperson

when there is on-scene media coverage of the operation.

b. Media coverage and opportunities. Commanders can anticipate that initial media coverage will

focus on evacuees and their reaction to departing individuals. The media will eventually shift its

focus to the effectiveness of a military NEO to the treatment of evacuees. The senior on-scene

DOS PA representative will authorize all access to and interviews of evacuees. The JTF PAO

and commanders will authorize any interviews with U.S. military personnel. The following media

opportunity list is not exhaustive. The list should not limit additional coverage in any way.

Leaders should anticipate additional opportunities under each COA.

Figure F-1. Example notional combatant command Public Affairs

plan for noncombatant evacuation operation

16 November 2009

FM 3-05.131

F-1

Appendix F

Section I. Situation, Mission, Execution, and Security (continued)

(1)

Media opportunities for permissive and uncertain evacuation include—

• Interviews, as appropriate, and photo opportunities of evacuees awaiting transport from

assembly areas to the ECC and POE.

• Interviews and photo opportunities with military personnel at ECC and POE.

• Photo opportunities of evacuees departing assembly areas en route to and arriving at

the ECC, preparing to depart and departing, and arriving at the safe haven.

• Photo opportunities of aircrews conducting NEOs and interviews with aircrews about the

operation and their preparations for the operation.

• Photo opportunities of military personnel as they prepare to secure and secure the

assembly areas or the ECC and POE.

• Photo opportunities of U.S. Embassy evacuees preparing to depart and departing the

Embassy and interviews with senior Embassy spokespersons or officials.

(2)

Media opportunities for hostile evacuation include—

• Interviews and photo opportunities with the military personnel that secured assembly

areas and the POE.

• Interviews and photo opportunities with evacuees at assembly areas, awaiting transport

to the ECC and POE while en route to, arriving at, and departing the POE, and en route

to and arriving at the safe haven.

• Photo opportunities of Embassy evacuees preparing to depart and departing the

Embassy and interviews with senior Embassy spokespersons or officials.

(3)

The commander will provide the media with the opportunity to cover all aspects of the NEO.

The commander will not exclude the media from areas of ongoing operations for reasons of

their personal safety. The commander’s goal, as far as possible, is to treat reporters as

members of the units, allowing them to move with the units without recklessly exposing them

to hostile fire. Security at source applies. Personal safety and OPSEC for U.S. forces and

evacuees are paramount.

(4)

All forces participating in the operation will cooperate with media representatives on a not-to-

interfere basis to keep the U.S. public informed of the activities of the U.S. Armed Forces.

This will include reasonable access to key command and staff personnel for briefings and

interviews.

(5)

If feasible, the CDRJTF will give media representatives needed military support to facilitate

reporting on the operation. He will help media representatives file their stories and products,

including granting access to military communications facilities, where feasible, when

commercial facilities are not available.

SITREP requirement. JTF PAO will provide daily PA input, as appropriate, to the JTF SITREP

and ensure combatant command PA, Secretary of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Public Affairs (OASD-PA), Joint Staff, and component PAs are in the message plain

language address dictionary (PLAD). SITREP should include assessment of media coverage,

number of news media representatives present, text of communiqués, and any other significant

issues or events.

After-action report. The combatant command PA submits a written after-action report with

lessons learned to the OASD-PA within 60 days of completion of the operation. This report

outlines successful, defines problem areas, and provides proposed solutions.

Figure F-1. Example notional combatant command Public Affairs

plan for noncombatant evacuation operation (continued)

F-2

FM 3-05.131

16 November 2009

Notional Combatant Command Public Affairs Plan for a

Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (Host Nation)

Section I. Situation, Mission, Execution, and Security (continued)

Tasks. The commands and agencies indicated will complete the following tasks:

a. OASD-PA will do the following:

(1) Confirm that information and combat camera visual documentation release authority resides

with combatant command PA.

(2) Provide ongoing changes to approved PA guidance to combatant command PA.

b. Combatant command PA will do the following:

(1) Retain theater PA responsibility for NEOs.

(2) Carry out an active PA program, in collaboration with the HN Embassy and DOS

representatives, consistent with personnel safety and OPSEC.

(3) Coordinate initial announcement, questions, and answers with appropriate the U.S.

Embassy representatives and the OASD-PA.

(4) Provide the JTF PAO.

(5) Provide the combatant command PA representative to direct and coordinate PA operations

at the POE.

c. Component commands will implement the internal information program in support of this

operation.

d. Component PA will provide PA and VIDOC support to combatant command PA representatives,

as necessary, to facilitate media coverage of evacuees arriving at the POE.

e. The HN Embassy will provide coordination and assistance to the JTF PAO, as feasible and

appropriate.

JTF PA will do the following:

(1) Provide comprehensive, unclassified operational briefings for media representatives in the

HN if operationally feasible.

(2) Direct local JTF PA activities in coordination with the HN Embassy press officer.

(3) Provide copies or text of unclassified PA news releases or operational summaries to the

combatant command PA.

Coordinating instructions for release of information.

a. The HN Embassy, combatant command PA, and at their discretion, appropriate national

authorities in Washington, D.C., will make the initial public release of information.

b. Until the appropriate offices make the initial release, no military command is to release

information about the operation. Unless the GCC or combatant command PA directs otherwise,

all supporting commands involved in the NEO forward all queries and proposed responses to the

combatant command PA or the JTF PAO for clearance before public release. The combatant

command PA or the JTF PAO may delegate release authority to subordinate commands, if

requested.

c. Security classification of information will be in accordance with current DOD and DOS security

directives. All interviews are on the record.

d. If the GCC delegates release authority, component commanders may issue statements and

news releases within the context of approved PA guidance and information previously released.

The GCC may delegate original release authority to the JTF. The JTF PA maintains records of

releases, press conferences, and responses to queries and provides significant information to

the GCC by the fastest available means. Personnel will record news conferences and interviews

on tape.

e. Personnel will protect the right and privacy of individuals according to applicable directives. The

media will not interview or photograph any evacuee without the evacuee’s consent.

The media will coordinate all requests for interviews with military personnel through the

combatant command PA, its representatives, or the JTF PAO.

g. Personnel will forward transcripts or accurate accounts of news conferences and interviews to

the combatant command PA and the OASD-PA by the fastest available means.

Figure F-1. Example Notional Combatant Command Public Affairs

plan for noncombatant evacuation operation (continued)

16 November 2009

FM 3-05.131

F-3

Appendix F

Section I. Situation, Mission, Execution, and Security (continued)

Security of Operations and Personnel.

1. Hostile evacuation. In a hostile evacuation, implementing the PA plan may present a variety of

problems. It may be difficult for personnel to maintain a balance between security and release of

information to the public. This does not preclude providing all possible assistance to the media to

support their coverage of the operation.

2. Guidelines to follow in the presence of correspondents.

a. Personnel must not allow media access to intelligence centers or other classified areas or

information.

b. Personnel must not make off the record statements in briefings or discussions with members of

the media. Public or media knowledge of any classified activity associated with an operation

does not imply that the information is unclassified. It also does not imply that personnel may

release or confirm it.

c. Personnel must apply security at the source.

3. OPSEC. All PA activities will comply with OPSEC.

Combat Documentation (COMDOC) or VIDOC. COMDOC and VIDOC are operations functions.

1. During an operation, COMDOC or VIDOC is necessary for use in official briefings, for service to visual

and audio media that are not in the area, for internal information programs, and for later PA use, such

as stock footage. The following guidelines apply to providing coverage of the operation:

• Combatant command operations arrange to deploy a combat camera team before executing

NEOs.

• The JTF PAO provides the VIDOC team guidance on PA VIDOC requirements.

• The VIDOC team dispatches its material in a timely manner to the combat camera center (CCC)

at the POE.

2. The deploying teams ensure all personnel adhere to the following dispatch procedures:

• Personnel must address shipments containing videotape, unprocessed film, and audiotapes with

captions to the CCC. Personnel must ship VIDOC products to and from the POE via military

transport. Initial VIDOC products must be on the first and fastest transport.

• The CCC will quickly process, edit, and reproduce VIDOC products and then forward them to the

combatant command PA representative. The combatant command PA representative releases the

VIDOC products locally and forwards copies to the OASD-PA, as appropriate. The JTF PAO

ensures that an aircrew member, by name, is responsible for the material en route for delivery to

the combatant command PA representative. The shipment must be marked “EXPOSED FILM—

DO NOT X-RAY.” Complete caption data is included.

Internal Information. Commanders and PA officers make maximum use of command information

resources to explain the NEO within the bounds of what is releasable to the external public.

Section II. General Ground Rules for the Media

General.

1. PAO personnel are to follow the principle of maximum information flow to the public, consistent with

OPSEC and personnel safety. However, situations may arise where correspondents gain possession

of information not yet officially released under the rules of this section. Personnel must not allow

members of the media to transmit or publicly release such information until the JTF PAO officially

coordinates and clears the information for release.

2. At certain times and in certain areas, personnel will restrict the movements of correspondents. While

the JTF or PAO will keep these restrictions to a minimum, he will apply them when the security of the

operation warrants. The JTF PAO will advise correspondents of restrictions.

3. The JTF or PAO will regard any violation of the conditions or ground rules by a correspondent as a

basis for withdrawal of support.

Figure F-1. Example notional combatant command Public Affairs

plan for noncombatant evacuation operation (continued)

F-4

FM 3-05.131

16 November 2009

Notional Combatant Command Public Affairs Plan for a

Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (Host Nation)

Section II. General Ground Rules for the Media (continued)

Ground Rules.

Releasing authority. The GCC’s PA or JTF PAO will make available information concerning the

protection and evacuation of noncombatants cleared for official release to the media through one of

the following means:

a. Press releases.

b. Press briefings or conferences.

c. Special press handouts.

d. Interviews.

Categories of releasable information following initial official release.

a. Confirmation that U.S. forces are participating in the emergency protection and evacuation of

U.S. citizens, TCNs, and selected HN nationals.

b. Confirmation of evacuation vehicles, ships, or aircraft plainly visible to the media.

c. Nonsensitive, unclassified details of the operation.

d. Approximate number of noncombatant evacuees.

e. Approximate friendly force strength figures.

Casualty figures, if any. Personnel will not release the names of casualties or fatalities until

confirmation of next of kin notification.

Categories of unreleasable information.

a. Information regarding classified aspects of the NEO plan or the operation.

b. Information on the vulnerabilities, weaknesses, or shortfalls of operational command, control,

personnel, or support.

c. Details of ROE for military and civilian security personnel assigned to the operation.

d. Information on intelligence-collection activities, methods, targets, and results.

e. Information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while the command is planning or conducting

search-and-rescue operations during hostile action.

Listings of all U.S. elements involved in the operations.

Section III. Media Statements for COAs

Proposed Statements, Questions, and Answers. Proposed statements, questions, and answers for

each COA are outlined below. The USG declassifies statements, questions, and answers upon public

release.

COA 1 PA Guidance. PA guidance for COA 1 includes the statement for release in paragraph A

concurrent with initiation of the COA and OASD-PA approval.

“In view of the military coup and continued unrest in this country and the potential danger to U.S.

citizens, the USG has authorized evacuation of U.S. and other third-country personnel desiring to

leave the country. To assist with the evacuation, the combatant command has dispatched military

aircraft and personnel at risk. As a result of the unrest, voluntary evacuation at this time is prudent.”

2. Questions and answers for overall use are as follows:

Q1. How many people is the United States evacuating?

A1. Because it is a voluntary evacuation, assessing exactly how many people may desire to leave is

difficult. There are approximately (to be determined [TBD]) private U.S. citizens, TBD USG

employees, and TBD USG dependents living and working in the country. There are also TBD

Peace Corps volunteers. The Unites States plans to evacuate other people as well, including

personnel from other countries.

Q2. Are there any indications of threats of violence specifically directed against U.S. citizens in the

country?

Figure F-1. Example Notional Combatant Command Public Affairs

plan for noncombatant evacuation operation (continued)

16 November 2009

FM 3-05.131

F-5

Appendix F

Section III. Media Statements for COAs (continued)

A2.

No, there are not. The situation is strictly an internal matter that is not threatening any citizens

of other countries now living in the country.

Q3.

Are U.S. military personnel supporting the government forces?

A3.

No, U.S. military personnel are only supporting the evacuation of U.S. and third-country

personnel.

Q4.

Are U.S. military personnel armed?

A4.

U.S. forces are prepared to defend themselves. They carry arms to provide security to

evacuees and assembly and departure points, such as the airport.

Q5.

How are U.S. forces evacuating U.S. citizens?

A5.

U.S. forces are flying evacuees out on military aircraft from the TBD airport near TBD.

Q6.

Where are the evacuees going?

A6.

Evacuees flying on C-141 aircraft will relocate to airport TBD. Evacuees flying on C-130 aircraft

will first fly to the TBD airport in TBD and then to TBD.

Q7.

Was the action coordinated with the government of this country?

A7.

TBD by the DOS.

Q8.

Why has the USG issued a travel advisory for this country?

A8.

TBD.

Q9.

Is this an evacuation?

A9.

Yes.

Q10.

Is the local airport open?

A10.

The airport is closed to regular traffic.

Q11.

Are you taking private U.S. citizens out with the diplomats?

A11.

Yes. The staff at the U.S. Embassy in this country will assist private U.S. citizens in this

country who wish to leave. We are urging U.S. citizens in this country to contact the Embassy.

We are using our warden system to advise all U.S. citizens in the country to consider leaving

and to apprise them of all developments.

Q12.

What about TCNs?

A12.

Obviously, our first obligation is to U.S. citizens and their immediate family members. We have

asked other embassies to coordinate efforts on behalf of their own citizens.

Q13.

Have you received any requests from other countries to take their people out?

A13.

We have received a few requests.

Q14.

Is the United States coordinating with other countries?

A14.

Yes. The United States is in close contact with other embassies in this country.

Q15.

What happens to private U.S. citizens once they get to TBD?

A15.

We will help evacuees make onward travel plans to their final destination.

Q16.

Are they on their own from there on?

A16.

Yes.

Q17.

Who pays for the departure of private U.S. citizens and TCNs?

A17.

As in all such evacuations, evacuees will need to sign promissory notes to cover the cost of

their transportation.

Q18.

What about Peace Corps members? Is the United States ordering them out, too? Would they

leave with our diplomats and dependents?

A18.

Yes. The Peace Corps volunteers will depart with other U.S. citizens.

Q19.

Is this a one-time effort or are there contingency plans if further needs arise?

A19.

We are planning to evacuate all U.S. citizens who desire to depart the country. The United

States has no plans at this time for future contingencies. We urge all U.S. citizens to depart

now.

Figure F-1. Example Notional Combatant Command Public Affairs

plan for noncombatant evacuation operation (continued)

F-6

FM 3-05.131

16 November 2009

Notional Combatant Command Public Affairs Plan for a

Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (Host Nation)

Section III. Media Statements for COAs (continued)

Q20. How many Embassy employees will remain in the country?

A20. Approximately TBD Embassy employees will remain.

Q21. What is the U.S. Ambassador’s name?

A21. The Ambassador’s name is TBD.

Q22. Does this operation have a nickname?

A22. Yes, it is operation TBD.

Q23. Do you anticipate any problems removing the U.S. citizens from this country?

A23. No.

Q24. Who is the commander of the JTF?

A24. The commander of the JTF is TBD.

Q25. What units are conducting the NEO?

A25. Elements from TBD.

COA 2 PA Guidance. PA guidance for COA 2 includes the following statement for release concurrent

with initiation of the operation.

“Seizure of the airfield is necessary to allow for evacuation of U.S. citizens and third-country

noncombatants from this country. Rebel and government forces in this country have not specifically

targeted U.S. citizens. However, fighting has prevented those desiring to leave from doing so. The

USG ordered this military action to save lives, protect endangered U.S. citizens, and ensure

evacuation to safe havens.”

2. Additional questions and answers to COA 2 are as follows:

Q26. Why is the USG using SOF in this country?

A26. These forces provide the combatant commander with the flexibility needed to provide security

for U.S. citizens during this unstable situation.

Q27. How long will the deployment of U.S. forces be?

A27. Only as long as necessary.

Q28. Were any additional combat forces brought from TBD?

A28. No.

Q29. Can the media accompany the SOF or interview individuals?

A29. The command will take requests on a case-by-case basis and, if possible, accommodate them.

General. This section outlines the responsibilities of the JIB during the employment of a U.S. JTF or other

major U.S. force to conduct contingency NEOs within the combatant command AOR.

Objectives. The objectives of the JIB are—

• To provide a balanced PA program that supports the policies and objectives of the USG.

• To coordinate PA activities at all levels under the guidance of the GCC.

• To keep the public informed of contingency NEOs by providing the media with timely, unclassified

information to the maximum extent possible consistent with OPSEC and personnel safety.

JIB Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the JIB are—

• To verify media correspondents’ credentials and operate a badging system.

• To support the on-scene commander’s briefings and press conferences, as necessary.

• To escort media to PA activities, such as photo opportunities, briefings, and press conferences.

• To request official still photo and video COMDOC coverage of evacuation operations for PA

purposes.

• To serve as a clearinghouse for news releases, photographs, and audiovisual and visual information

products.

Figure F-1. Example Notional Combatant Command Public Affairs

plan for noncombatant evacuation operation (continued)

16 November 2009

FM 3-05.131

F-7

Appendix F

Section IV. Joint Information Bureau (JIB)

• To produce news analyses and summaries and to issue consolidated reports to the OASD-PA,

combatant command, and appropriate COM, as necessary, and to produce transcripts of all media

briefings, interviews, press conferences.

• To quickly respond to media queries (the goal is within 2 hours) and maintain logs of media queries

and responses.

• To ensure all speakers or briefers are fully informed on PA policy and guidance.

• To provide guidance concerning PA requirements to assigned military audiovisual and combat

camera teams.

Service Component Tasks. The JIB provides public information personnel, as requested.

JTF PAO and JIB Director Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the JTF PAO and JIB director are—

• To review, update, and prepare appropriate plans for the employment phases, including the request

for PA augmentation, if necessary.

• To deploy with the CDRJTF or ADVON.

• To establish the JIB in the final staging or forward operating area and conduct an active information

program based on guidance from the DOD, DOS, and GCC.

• To serve as the principal PA advisor to the CDRJTF.

• To coordinate PA matters with the appropriate U.S. diplomatic or U.S. information service

representative in the HN.

• To supervise all military PA activities in the area of operations and schedule, as appropriate, press

briefings and news conferences. Support an active command or internal information program.

Section V. Principles of Information for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations

Coverage.

1. Open and independent reporting is the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.

2. Pools are not the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. However, they may provide

the only feasible means of early access to a military operation.

Pools should be as large as possible. Pools should disband at the earliest opportunity—within 24 to 35

hours, when possible. The arrival of early access pools will not cancel the principle of independent

coverage for journalists already in the area. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be

appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or in which space is limited.

Combat Zone. The U.S. military will provide journalists in a combat zone with credentials. Journalists

must abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations.

Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone

of the journalist involved. News organizations will make every effort to assign experienced journalists to

combat operations and to familiarize them with U.S. military operations.

Access. The commander will provide journalists with access to all major military units. Special operations

restrictions may limit access in some cases. Military PA officers should act as liaison but should not

interfere with the reporting process.

Transportation and Facilities.

1. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should permit journalists to ride on military

vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military is responsible for the transportation of pools.

2. Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure,

compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible

for filing independent coverage. When government facilities are unavailable, journalists will file by any

other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news media

organizations, but electromagnetic OPSEC in operational environments may require limited

restrictions on the use of such systems.

Note: The principles discussed in Section V also apply to the operations of the standing DOD National Media Pool system.

Figure F-1. Example notional combatant command Public Affairs

plan for noncombatant evacuation operation (continued)

F-8

FM 3-05.131

16 November 2009

Appendix G

Evacuee Processing Training and Evaluation Outline

This appendix contains evacuee processing training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs)

for ECC processing (Figures G-1 through G-4, pages G-2 through G-11). The

following T&EOs are a composite of NEO evacuee processing T&EOs that the

1-10th SFG(A),

2-3d SFG(A), and

75th Ranger Regiment produced. These

organizations produced the evacuee processing T&EOs to support critical collective

tasks of ECC operations. Evacuee processing T&EOs are the foundation of collective

training. Units tasked to conduct a NEO should also consult their unit METL,

training documents, and SOPs. The evacuee processing T&EOs in this appendix are

listed in Table G-1, page G-2.

STRUCTURE

G-1. Evacuee processing T&EOs include training objectives for collective tasks necessary to perform

evacuee processing. Each evacuee processing T&EO contains the following:

Element. This identifies the unit that performs the task.

Task. This is a description of the work or action the unit is to perform. The task number is in

parentheses following the task title. The number identifies the task throughout the mission

training plan.

References. The references for each task are in parentheses following the task number. The

primary reference is underlined. The underlined reference contains the most information

concerning the task. If there is only one reference, it is not underlined.

Iteration. This identifies how many times the unit performs the task and the trainer evaluates the

task during training.

Commander/leader assessment. The unit leadership uses this to assess the proficiency of the

unit in performing the task to standard. Leaders circle a rating each time they assess the task and

then use the ratings to establish future training strategies for that task. The ratings are as follows:

T—Trained. The unit’s training is sufficient. The unit proficiently accomplishes the task.

Sustainment training every 6 months is a sufficient training strategy for units at this rating.

P—Needs practice. The unit’s training is not yet sufficient. The unit achieves the standard

with some difficulty or fails to perform some of the task steps to standard. Practicing the

task is the training strategy for units at this rating.

U—Untrained. The unit’s training is not sufficient. The unit cannot demonstrate an ability

to achieve proficiency. The commander should include the task in the next quarter training

program and develop a comprehensive strategy to address the deficiency as a training

strategy for the unit.

Condition. This statement describes the contingency environment in which the unit performs the

task. It also lists the equipment, manuals, or supervision necessary to perform the task. The

condition begins with an initiating cue.

Training notes. This statement informs the unit that in some cases conditions can significantly

change the way the unit performs a task (night, day, or limited visibility).

Task standard. This statement prescribes the overall task criteria the unit must meet to receive

credit for successful task execution.

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FM 3-05.131

G-1

Appendix G

Task steps. Task steps are actions or events that the unit performs sequentially. Each task step

identifies the leader, individuals, unit, or element responsible for performing that step. An

asterisk identifies leader task steps.

Performance measures. Performance measures identify how well the unit must perform the task

for the desired outcome. Each task step lists detailed measures.

GO and NO-GO columns. The commander or evaluator uses these columns to record the results

of each task step.

USE

G-2. The unit commander can use an evacuee processing T&EO to train a single task. However, he can

use a single evacuee processing T&EO in sequence with other evacuee processing T&EOs to train and

evaluate a larger group of tasks, such as a field training exercise or situational training exercise.

Table G-1. Noncombatant evacuee processing training and evaluation outline

tasks and task numbers

Task Title

Task Number

NEO-001

Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center

Establish and Operate a Reception Station

NEO-002

Establish and Operate a Security Screening Station

NEO-003

Establish and Operate a Registration Station

NEO-004

Establish and Operate a Medical Screening/Treatment Station

NEO-005

Establish and Operate a Transportation Station

NEO-006

Establish and Operate a Debriefing Station (Optional)

NEO-007

Establish and Operate a Holding Area

NEO-008

Establish and Operate a Temporary Refugee Holding Area

NEO-009

Establish and Operate a Comfort Station

NEO-010

Conduct Security Element Activities in Support of a Processing Center

NEO-011

Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center

ELEMENT: Evacuation Control Center (ECC)

TASK: Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center (NEO-001) (FM 3-05.131)

ITERATION:

(Circle)

COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U

(Circle)

CONDITIONS: Given an order from higher headquarters requiring establishment of a processing center within

a specified time and provided a designated center location with or without permanent facilities.

TASK STANDARDS: The element establishes an operational reception station, registration station, medical

screening/EMT station, transportation station, and security element within a specified time of receipt of order

or upon arrival at the center location. The element establishes requisite outer security measures. The

operational environment is permissive to uncertain.

Figure G-1. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and

operating a noncombatant evacuation operation processing center

G-2

FM 3-05.131

16 November 2009

Evacuee Processing Training and Evaluation Outline

Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center (continued)

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES

NO-GO

*1. The processing team OIC develops the plan for the layout of the processing center.

The schematic below shows a generic processing center. Each processing station

is positioned to support an orderly and logical flow similar to the preboarding

procedures of a civilian airline. The plan includes the following:

a. Reception station (NEO-002).

b. Security screening station (NEO-003).

c. Registration station (NEO-004).

d. Medical station (NEO-005).

e. Transportation station (NEO-006).

Debriefing station (NEO-007).

Holding areas—hostile, unknown, and evacuees (NEO-008).

Temporary refugee holding area (NEO-009).

Comfort station (NEO-010).

Security element (NEO-011).

Processing Center Schematic

Figure G-1. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and

operating a noncombatant evacuation operation processing center (continued)

16 November 2009

FM 3-05.131

G-3

Appendix G

Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center (continued)

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES

NO-GO

*2.

The ECC OIC orders stations to establish a processing center. Personnel at the

stations perform the following tasks before processing:

Physically secure the ECC.

Erect physical barriers.

Implement crowd-control measures.

Establish linkup with the ECC tactical operations center

(TOC), security

element, and marshalling force.

Prepare signs to identify routes and stations.

Mark station boundaries (using engineer tape, for example).

Check and ready equipment for processing.

Brief processors and escorts on the responsibilities and responses to possible

dilemmas (see Possible Dilemmas below).

Establish amnesty boxes and sites.

Place control or guards at all access point to the center.

Ensure a female is available, if possible, for searches of female evacuees

(MPs or USAF security forces are recommended).

Assign guards or guides for evacuee latrine usage.

Locate an explosive ordnance pit near the inspection area.

Ensure an interpreter or language cards at are each station.

Ensure refreshments and food are available.

Ensure handcuffs and restraints are available.

Ensure the public address system is operational.

Ensure limited comfort items for evacuees (for example, supplies for women

and children (are available).

Ensure travel comfort items

(for example, motion sickness bags,

antinauseants, and hearing protection) are available.

Establish a special holding area for persons requiring thorough inspections,

special handling, detention, and so on.

Establish and monitor secure frequency modulation

(FM) voice

communications with the ECC and the TOC.

POSSIBLE DILEMMAS

When is deadly force authorized? Review the following situations:

• Use of weapon system (Mark-19 or mortar).

• Hostile detainee who presents himself or is captured by the evacuation force.

• Civil disturbance from passive resistance or civil disobedience through violence.

• Terrorism.

• Snipers.

How will the force handle the following:

• Nonambulatory evacuees.

• Evacuees with special medical needs, such as pregnancy, infectious disease, exceptional family

members as pediatric health care problems.

• Evacuees suffering from trauma resulting from the current situation.

• Language problems.

• Religious problems.

Figure G-1. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and

operating a noncombatant evacuation operation processing center (continued)

G-4

FM 3-05.131

16 November 2009

Evacuee Processing Training and Evaluation Outline

Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center (continued)

POSSIBLE DILEMMAS

How will the force handle the following:

• The absence of the names of what appear to be bona fide potential evacuees the Embassy list.

• The deaths of evacuees, and the removal of their remains.

• Evacuees carrying contraband, and the disposition of contraband.

• Pets.

• Overwhelming numbers of civilians arriving at the assembly areas or evacuation site to request

evacuation.

• Listed evacuees refusing evacuation.

• Listed non-U.S. Government evacuees refusing to sign waivers.

• Classified couriers requiring segregation.

• Treatment of VIPs versus other evacuees, both U.S. and HN.

• Disruptive evacuees.

• Evacuees attempting to give bribes to gain favor.

• Inaccurate evacuation lists.

Note: Dilemma response will be mission-specific.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES

NO-GO

*3. Processing team OIC orders stations to conduct processing. The following tasks are accomplished during

evacuee processing:

a. Establish and operate a reception station (NEO-001).

b Establish and operate a security screening station (NEO-003).

c. Establish and operate a registration station (NEO-004).

d. Establish and operate a medical station (NEO-005).

e. Establish and operate a transportation station (NEO-006).

Conduct security element activities in support of a processing center (NEO-011).

Protect force and evacuees from direct and indirect fire.

Complete prioritized roster of all evacuees.

Treat all evacuees with courtesy—maintain strict control, high military appearance, and a

nonaggressive attitude to evacuees but maintain a strict military bearing.

Note: The DOS representative or the representative from the Embassy’s consular affairs office must be prepared to decide

what to do with unauthorized evacuees (for example, turn custody of them over to HN police or paramilitary forces).

TASK PERFORMANCE/EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK

ITERATION

TOTAL

TOTAL TASK STEPS EVALUATED

TOTAL TASK STEPS “GO”

TRAINING STATUS GO/NO-GO

*Indicates a leader task step.

Figure G-1. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and

operating a noncombatant evacuation operation processing center (continued)

16 November 2009

FM 3-05.131

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Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8) - page 12