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Chapter 4
BOAT AND WATERCRAFT PATROLS
4-29. Many AOs are bordered by, or have within its boundaries, large bodies of water, including lakes,
rivers, bays, and other shorelines. A body of water can be of great concern when it lies on a boundary with
an element that is not under U.S. military control or when it bisects the AO. These bodies of water create
natural obstacles and avenues for ingress and egress into the AO.
4-30. Bodies of water may be used for recreational purposes by the local population. They can also be used
as ingress or egress points by criminal or other threat elements attempting to access the AO. Regardless,
military police may be required to use boats or watercraft to maintain a patrol capability and presence on
these bodies of water to deter threats, respond to threats, and respond to accidents or other incidents
requiring emergency response.
4-31. The use of boats and watercraft for patrol purposes requires special training and certification to
ensure that Army LE personnel can operate the platform safely and effectively. Military police
commanders and PMs must ensure that Army LE personnel required to use boats or other watercraft
receive adequate training.
OTHER SPECIALIZED PATROL METHODS
4-32. Military police operate in a variety of conditions and environments. While not common across the
Army, other patrol means are sometimes required based on the local conditions, terrain, and other factors.
Military police commanders and PMs must be flexible and consider these patrol methods when they prove
feasible and can meet the requirements of the specific AO. They must also understand that any nonstandard
patrol method has its own set of training, licensing, and resource requirements. These requirements must be
researched, understood, and implemented appropriately to ensure that Army LE personnel and the
community are safe and secure. These nonstandard methods can include—
z
Aviation patrols.
z
Motorcycle patrols.
z
All-terrain vehicle patrols.
z
Horse patrols.
z
Snowmobile, snowshoe, or ski patrols.
LAW ENFORCEMENT PATROL STRATEGIES
4-33. There are numerous techniques or strategies commonly used to organize and employ basic LE
patrols. These techniques can be employed using any of the methods discussed in the previous paragraphs.
The patrol strategy (or strategies) used is based on mission variables specific to the AO and the effects
desired. While a single patrol strategy may be used across the entire AO, a combination of techniques is
more commonly employed to achieve the desired effect. The PM, commander, and staff must conduct
mission analysis to determine the patrol strategies that will be most effective in addressing specific
problems within their AO. There are several common patrolling strategies used by Army LE and civilian
police agencies. These strategies include—
z
Random (routine).
z
Directed.
z
Split-force.
z
Saturation.
z
Differential-response.
RANDOM
4-34. Random patrolling (also known as routine or preventive patrolling) is conducted by assigning a
specific patrol AO and allowing the LE patrol to move randomly throughout the AO at the discretion of the
patrol leader, supervisor, or LE officer. This strategy is typically considered reactive in nature. The
assigned AO may be a designated route between two points (a heavily traveled street [line patrol], an area
with boundaries established by identifiable terrain [area patrol]). While moving randomly within the AO,
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the patrol can respond to incidents or calls for service, conduct field interviews, or address other situations
as they occur. The patrol should be constantly observing the environment and looking for variances,
indicators of criminal activity or public dangers, and specific information fulfilling identified police or
other intelligence requirements.
4-35. Moving a patrol throughout an AO without setting a pattern is critical to the success of random
patrols. This type of patrolling can give the community a perception that the police are omnipresent, always
showing up without warning or predictability. This lack of predictability can serve as a deterrent to criminal
activity and allow the alert patrol to locate ongoing criminal activity.
4-36. Over time, it is very difficult for patrols not to create identifiable patterns, especially when the
personnel are consistently assigned to the same AO. Personal preferences and habits will tend to produce
predictable patterns. One way to mitigate the patrol pattern tendency is to rotate personnel so that they do
not consistently operate within the same AO. While this technique mitigates the impact of patrol
predictability, it also has negative impacts. Failure to place LE personnel in a consistent AO can inhibit the
effectiveness of community-oriented policing activities requiring the development of relationships and trust
between the community and the patrol. It also makes it difficult for LE patrols to become intimately
familiar with the area, the individuals within the community (to include habitual criminals or mischievous
juveniles), ongoing problems in the area, and changes to the environment
(new criminal threats or
activities, changes in social habits of the community, changes in the level of fear or intimidation within the
community). Consistent patrol assignments can reap huge benefits by allowing LE personnel to develop
rapport with the community and learn the terrain, the individuals, and the unique idiosyncrasies of a
specific AO. When personnel are consistently assigned the same patrol AO, they must constantly evaluate
their actions to identify and avoid patterns and routines that can enable criminal or threat element
exploitation.
DIRECTED
4-37. Unlike random patrolling, directed patrols are given specific tasks and instructions, which focus
patrol efforts. Directed patrolling is considered a proactive strategy. This strategy reduces patrol downtime
and addresses concerns over patrol productivity and effectiveness. It also focuses LE patrols on identifying
crime-conducive conditions and gathering critical police information, thus allowing the implementation of
crime prevention and interdiction efforts. Patrols are provided specific guidance based on—
z
Information collection and police intelligence requirements.
z
Police intelligence analysis results.
z
Specific concern or focus areas.
z
Command or PM LE initiatives.
z
Police engagement strategies.
z
Complaints or reports of crime from the community.
4-38. Directed patrols can be especially useful when employing inexperienced military police Soldiers.
Directed patrols provide structure and direction to their patrol activities when their level of experience does
not allow for the initiative and situational understanding inherent with more experienced military police
Soldiers. For more experienced military police Soldiers, directed policing may limit the ability of the patrol
to take the initiative and fully capitalize on police engagement opportunities with the community or
develop leads that may result in the prevention or interdiction of criminal activity. Directed patrolling can
also result in an added workload for the desk crew and patrol leaders or supervisors, especially during
police operations with large numbers of active patrols. Directed patrolling requires that the desk section and
patrol leaders or supervisors continuously prioritize and manage tasks for the patrols; this can adversely
impact other duties. The military police commander, PM, and operations staff must balance the advantages
and disadvantages of direct patrols.
SPLIT-FORCE
4-39. Split-force patrolling involves identifying one portion of the patrol force to perform routine patrols.
A routine patrol responds to calls assigned by the desk section. The remaining elements are employed as
directed patrols.
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4-40. Typically, directed patrols are not required to respond to incoming service calls unless routine patrols
are not available and the call is considered time-sensitive. This strategy allows the military police
commander or PM to conduct reactive and proactive measures simultaneously. Split-force patrolling can
result in significant disparities in workloads. The routine patrols can quickly become overwhelmed with
calls, required patrol responses, and associated casework while directed patrols will typically not be
assigned missions and tasks that are time-sensitive in nature. Military police commanders, PMs, and staffs
must carefully monitor split-force patrols to ensure that personnel rotate between directed- and routine-
patrol missions to prevent patrol burnout.
SATURATION
4-41. Typically, saturation patrols are used within the split-force construct. This strategy places a higher
number of patrols into AOs that are characterized by higher crime activity, traffic offenses, or other
incidents to increase LE presence. Saturation patrols are placed in an area during peak criminal or
disruptive activity. They may be instructed to enforce zero tolerance for specific activities (speeding, loud
music, curfew violations, prostitution). These patrols will perform increased vehicle and pedestrian stops
and conduct more field interviews than normal.
4-42. Saturation patrols can be significant deterrents to criminal or other disruptive behavior. They can also
result in large amounts of police information that can be used by police intelligence analysts supporting
policing efforts. Care must be exercised when using saturation patrols as they can be perceived as heavy-
handed if employed too frequently in the same AO. The key to a successful saturation patrol strategy is an
aggressive police engagement effort to inform the community of the purpose and intent of the mission and
to receive community feedback. It is important to coordinate with the SJA for legal advice and opinions
before conducting saturation patrols.
DIFFERENTIAL-RESPONSE
4-43. A differential-response strategy focuses on maximizing the use of LE patrol assets through the
prioritization of calls and associated LE patrol responses. This technique is regularly employed when LE
patrol resources are inadequate due to—
z
Unavailable personnel or resources (a high deployment operational tempo of supporting military
police companies, a significant flu outbreak that reduces the available force).
z
Environmental conditions that limit the ability of patrols to respond or that make response for
nonemergency situations too hazardous to justify (such as severe ice storms that make road
conditions treacherous).
z
An incident that creates a large number of high-priority calls (a terrorist event, an industrial
accident, a natural disaster).
4-44. Within a differential response construct, the military police commander, PM, and staff must prioritize
incidents that require an LE response by severity. Incidents of significant severity (reports of injuries,
crimes or emergencies in progress, reports or discoveries of serious incidents [deaths, sexual assaults])
would continue to require an LE patrol response. Other less serious incidents (larcenies, minor traffic
accidents, simple assaults with no or minimal injuries) would be placed on low priority for a response or be
handled by an alternative method. Many incidents (lost or stolen property, noninjury traffic accidents) can
be documented over the phone for follow-up and processing at a later date, or the victim or reporting party
can be asked to come to the military police station to make a report at their convenience.
TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATIONS
4-45. An effective traffic enforcement program begins with highly trained TMCIs. These specially trained
personnel are subject matter experts in the laws and methods encompassed in executing traffic programs
and conducting traffic collision investigations.
(See chapter
6 for additional information on traffic
enforcement.)
4-46. The capabilities of TMCIs and other military police conducting traffic management and enforcement
can be especially critical in support of contingency operations in an effort to establish civil control. Many
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operational environments are marked by the lack of order and structure. The roadways can be chaotic and
hazardous due to congested and inadequate road networks and the lack of traffic control and enforcement.
Military police with experience and training in traffic management and enforcement can be a critical
element within a multifunctional team of engineer, transportation, and other specialties to develop plans
and implement solutions to these issues.
4-47. TMCIs can also provide training and mentorship to HN police to develop their traffic enforcement
capabilities. Regardless of the environment, TMCIs possess the knowledge and capability necessary to—
z
Investigate major and minor traffic collisions (to include those with fatalities or serious injuries).
z
Plan traffic control and flow for special events.
z
Determine selective enforcement measures required for problematic traffic areas.
z
Provide traffic safety education, training, and reports.
z
Develop traffic volume and distribution studies.
z
Enforce speed and parking limits.
z
Provide motorist assistance.
z
Provide roadway hazard reports.
z
Suppress the frequency of incidents that involve driving under the influence and while
intoxicated.
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
4-48. Regardless of the operational environment, offenses committed against U.S. forces and property
degrades military discipline, morale, and operational capabilities. In coordination with federal, state, local,
and foreign LE agencies, LE personnel investigate crimes and offenses in support of the commander’s
effort to protect personnel, resources, and critical assets. Criminal investigations are conducted primarily by
military police Soldiers
(MPIs and TMCIs) and USACIDC SAs. (See ATP 3-39.12 for additional
information on LE investigations.)
4-49. In support of HN populations, police development, and transition activities, Army LE may be
required to conduct criminal investigations pertaining to crimes committed by and against HN personnel.
Army LE may also be required to train and mentor HN police investigators in an effort to build HN
criminal investigations capability and capacity. (See chapter 7 for additional information on building HN
police capability and capacity.) Regardless of the operational environment, criminal investigations
conducted by Army LE personnel include—
z
Criminal investigations of major incidents involving death, serious bodily injury, and war
crimes.
z
Investigations concerning customs violations, illegal traffic of controlled substances and other
contraband, and black market activity.
z
Fraud and economic crime investigations.
z
War crimes, human trafficking, and other crimes against humanity.
z
Investigations of minor offenses (low-value personal property thefts, simple assaults).
z
Juvenile investigations.
z
Traffic accidents.
4-50. Even though MPI and USACIDC SAs are typically responsible for criminal investigations of serious
crimes, military police LE patrols are, in most cases, the first to respond to a crime scene or incident site.
An LE patrol must be prepared to conduct a preliminary investigation to ensure that perishable information
and evidence is captured and reported. This initial information can be critical to successful follow-up
investigations conducted by MPI or USACIDC SAs. In relatively minor cases, follow-up investigations
may be performed by military police LE patrols to obtain additional information or conduct additional
interviews or interviews that could not be performed concurrent with the initial response or other LE
requirements.
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PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS
4-51. Preliminary or initial investigations begin when the first patrol arrives at the scene of an incident.
The preliminary investigation should include—
z
Observing and documenting—
The general condition of the scene.
Activities occurring upon approach and after arrival.
Spontaneous statements or comments made by victims, witnesses, or potential subjects.
z
Maintaining and protecting the crime or incident scene by establishing—
A protective perimeter around the crime scene.
An access point and briefing area to control and document entry into the controlled area.
z
Conducting evidence collection, as required.
z
Locating and identifying victims, witnesses, or potential subjects.
z
Conducting initial interviews with victims, witnesses, or potential subjects and ensuring that
witness statements are properly documented.
z
Apprehending subjects, as required.
z
Completing all required documentation.
Patrol reports.
Witness statements.
Chain-of-custody and evidence documentation.
z
Backbriefing MPI and USACIDC SAs on all aspects of the preliminary investigation and
providing copies of reports, statements, and evidence documentation.
FOLLOW-UP INVESTIGATIONS
4-52. Follow-up investigations are common to obtain additional investigative information for cases,
perform checks on victims, conduct additional interviews, or complete other LE requirements. A follow-up
investigation can be conducted by LE patrols for relatively minor cases. The use of LE patrols for follow-
up investigations can free MPI and USACIDC SAs to concentrate on more serious investigations. It can
also provide a positive image of the organization to the community by demonstrating an involved patrol
force. When possible, the same patrol that conducted the preliminary investigation should be used to
conduct the follow-up. If this is not possible, the LE patrol conducting the follow-up investigation should
thoroughly review previous documentation to ensure familiarity with the case.
4-53. Follow-up investigations by LE patrols may be directed by the desk sergeant, the patrol supervisor,
or the operations section. They can also be initiated by the original responding patrol, when required.
Follow-up investigations may include additional searches or interviews, subject apprehension, and victim
or witness assistance.
INTERVIEWS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERROGATIONS
4-54. Interviews and LE interrogations are critical tools for Army LE to obtain information from victims,
witnesses, and suspects concerning their actions and observations during a crime or incident. Interviews
and LE interrogations are a means of obtaining testimonial evidence to help determine what occurred at an
incident. Within the context of LE investigations, testimonial evidence is a statement based on personal
knowledge or belief that serves as evidence or proof concerning a crime or incident under investigation. To
obtain this information, LE personnel ask appropriate questions designed to illicit required information and
determine the truthfulness of the information by observing and interpreting the actions and words of the
person being interviewed. Effective interviewing and interrogation require an understanding of human
nature, good interpersonal communications abilities, and sharp observation skills. This section will provide
a description of interviews and interrogations, focusing primarily on interviews conducted by LE patrols.
(Interviews and interrogations are covered in detail in ATP 3-39.12.)
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INTERVIEWS
4-55. Interviews conducted during LE activities and investigations are less structured than LE
interrogations. Interviews are conducted by LE personnel to gather information and determine facts about a
crime or incident. An interview is a nonstructured discussion, where open-ended questions are asked to
determine facts about an incident or crime. Interviews are characterized by the questioning of a person who
is cooperative and freely provides information; interviews are used for fact finding and are probative in
nature. During interviews of potential suspects, reasonable suspicion of guilt may not be established;
persons being interviewed are typically not under apprehension and may depart the area at any time. During
an interview of a victim, witness, or potential suspect, and if a statement is made that raises a reasonable
suspicion of guilt that the individual committed a crime, questioning must cease until the subject is advised
of their UCMJ Article 31 and Miranda Rights (see Miranda versus Arizona, 1966). Interview questions
may only continue if the subject waives their right against self-incrimination and legal counsel. This should
be documented on DA Form 3881 (Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate).
4-56. During LE operations, LE patrols conduct interviews to determine as many facts as possible about
the crime or incident in question to support the preliminary and follow-up investigations. The LE personnel
must know the elements of proof for any crimes that may have been committed to ensure that appropriate
questions are asked and relevant information is obtained. Military police with less experience or knowledge
of the elements of proof should seek assistance and guidance from patrol supervisors, squad or team
leaders, military police desk personnel, LE investigators, or operations personnel. At a minimum,
interviews conducted by LE patrols and investigators should be conducted to answer—
z
Who. Ascertain the people involved in the incident. This includes victims, witnesses, and
potential subjects.
z
What. Determine what happened during the incident. This includes major events or actions
relevant to the crime or incident.
z
When. Identify when the incident occurred. Establish the time that the crime or incident
occurred, to include a chronology of events leading up to and following the crime or incident in
question.
z
Where. Determine the exact location where the incident occurred. This may include multiple
locations.
z
Why. Identify the cause or motivations for the crime or incident to occur. This is very important
during a suspect interview to help determine the motivation and state of mind of the individual.
z
How. Determine how the crime or incident occurred. Identify events leading up to and during
the event; obtain details of specific actions.
4-57. There are several types of interviews conducted by Army LE personnel during police operations.
These interview types include—
z
Canvas interviews. Canvas interviews are conducted in the immediate areas surrounding a
crime scene or incident site. Canvas interviews are used to obtain information and identify
witnesses who may not come forward on their own. These witnesses may be able to provide
relevant information to aid in the investigative effort. LE patrols may be required to conduct
canvas interviews to determine the facts about an incident subsequent to the initial response, as
part of a preliminary investigation, or in support of LE investigators while they are processing
the crime scene or incident site. Canvas interviews do not target specific persons; they target all
persons within a specific area around a crime scene or incident site.
z
Field interviews. Field interviews, unlike canvas interviews, target a particular person seen in an
area. Field interviews are conducted to find out what a person is doing in an area and to
determine their activities. Field interviews are typically initiated upon observation of suspicious
activity or due to potential association with a crime or incident. Any information collected
during a field interview should be documented and forwarded through operational channels to
the operations section for processing. Locally produced field interview cards can be useful to
assist LE patrols in obtaining relevant information. Persons identified during field interviews
may be contacted later if crimes are reported later in the area where they were stopped. Patterns
of activity can also be identified if the same person is habitually stopped in an area where
criminal activity is identified.
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Chapter 4
z
Victim interviews. Victim interviews are conducted to obtain specific information concerning
the crime or incident that has occurred and resulted in harm to the individual or their property.
Victim interviews are conducted to obtain specific details of the incident and determine what
crimes may have been committed. Victims are often traumatized and emotionally upset
following a crime or incident; care must be taken when talking to victims of physical violence,
emotional abuse, or major incidents. Their state of mind may be very fragile. For violent crimes
or traumatic incidents, responding LE patrols will typically conduct only a brief initial interview
and defer in-depth interviews to LE investigators or other personnel trained to conduct a more
formal interview.
z
Witness interviews. A witness is anyone having knowledge of an incident. Witnesses can
include—
Eyewitnesses. Eyewitnesses are persons who observe the actual event and have direct
knowledge of the crime or incident. Eyewitness interviews are critical to verify accounts of
victims and suspects. LE personnel must understand that eyewitness recollections of
specific events may differ from person to person, depending on their state of mind and
experiences.
Significant parties. Significant parties are people having other than direct knowledge or
observation of an incident; however, they may have relevant information that can prove or
disprove aspects of the crime or incident being investigated. Significant parties may be able
to verify or refute an alibi, confirm or refute historical facts about a crime scene or incident
site, or may have been witness to and be able to document statements made by an individual
involved in a crime or incident (even though they were not present when the crime was
committed).
z
Suspect or subject interviews. A suspect or subject is anyone suspected of committing a crime.
Before the interview of a subject, a DA Form 3881 must be completed. The subject and their
demeanor at the time will determine how the interview is structured.
LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERROGATION
4-58. A LE interrogation is conducted by trained LE personnel, typically MPI or USACIDC SAs. A law
enforcement interrogation is the systematic effort by law enforcement investigators to prove,
disprove, or corroborate information relevant to a criminal investigation using direct questioning in
a controlled environment. An LE investigator conducting an LE interrogation uses an understanding of
human nature and natural human responses to obtain information from individuals during questioning in
support of an LE investigation. LE interrogations are employed when a reasonable suspicion of guilt is
known.
4-59. During an LE interrogation, the subject of the questioning is not free to leave. The interrogation is
conducted in a controlled and structured environment using direct, close-ended questions designed to
obtain an admission of guilt or a confession. An admission is a self-incriminating statement that falls short
of a complete acknowledgement of guilt; a confession results when the whole truth has been disclosed by
the subject, including the acceptance of responsibility for their actions. LE interrogations include polygraph
examinations by trained and certified USACIDC polygraph examiners. Polygraph examinations can result
in LE investigators obtaining confirmation of a reasonable suspicion of a subject’s guilt or may result in the
investigator eliminating the individual as a viable subject.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
4-60. For Army LE personnel to effect legal searches and seizures, it is critical that the following
definitions are understood:
z
Search. A search is an examination, authorized by law, of a specific person, property, or area for
specified evidence or property or of a specific person for the purposes of seizing such property,
evidence, or person. A search without probable cause will not be considered by the courts unless
it was conducted incident to a lawful exception.
z
Seizure. A seizure is the taking of property from the possessor by an authorized person or the
restriction of freedom of movement of an individual against their will by an agent of the
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government. Any item that is reasonably believed to be an unlawful weapon, contraband, or
evidence of a crime or that might be used to resist apprehension or to escape may be seized.
z
Probable cause. Probable cause is a reasonable belief that the person, property, or evidence
sought is located in the place or on the person to be searched. (See Rule 315f[2], Manual for
Courts-Martial.) Probable cause to conduct a search or seizure exists when there is a reasonable
belief that a crime has been committed and that the person, property, or evidence sought in
connection with the crime is located in the place (a room, barracks, privately owned vehicle,
quarters) or on the person to be searched. To determine if probable cause exists, the authorizing
authority must determine that there is a reasonable belief that the person, property, or evidence
sought is located in the place or on the person to be searched. The probable cause determination
is based on the totality of the circumstances at the search time.
z
Search authorization. In the military, a search authorization (based on probable cause) may be
issued by a competent military authority. A competent military authority includes a military
judge, a military magistrate, or a commander who has control over the place where the property
or person to be searched is situated or found. (See Rule 315d, Manual for Courts-Martial.)
4TH AMENDMENT RESTRICTIONS
4-61. When there is a reasonable expectation of privacy
(person, home, papers, effects), the
4th Amendment will not be violated. The 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution establishes the right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
4-62. The following key criteria need to be considered to determine if there is a violation of the
4th Amendment:
z
Whether there is an intrusion into an area where a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy. When determining whether the area intruded upon is an area where one has a
reasonable expectation of privacy, courts review the subjective. Did the person have an
expectation of privacy in the home, car, footlocker, desk, or other area? The objective is if
society is willing to recognize that it is reasonable to expect privacy in that area. Both inquiries
need to be answered in the affirmative for the courts to find a reasonable expectation of privacy.
z
Whether the intrusion was effected by a U.S. government official or agent. The
4th Amendment does not apply unless there is U.S. government intrusion. Private searches and
foreign searches are not covered by the 4th Amendment as long as the private individual or
foreign officials are not acting as agents of the U.S. government. A search may not be
unreasonable if it is in an area where a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
or the search is conducted by someone who is not a government agent.
Reasonable Search
4-63. A search is not unreasonable when conducted pursuant to a search warrant or authorization that was
issued upon a showing of probable cause. Probable cause is a reasonable belief that the person, property, or
evidence sought is located in the place or on the person to be searched. (See Rule 315f, Manual for Courts-
Martial.) LE personnel can conduct a lawful apprehension or seizure of a person based on probable cause.
Once a subject is lawfully seized based on probable cause, the subject’s reasonable expectation of privacy,
in their person, is diminished and they are able to be searched because of the probable cause supporting the
apprehension. Many exceptions exist which allow for searches and seizures and do not violate the 4th
Amendment, consent being one of them. A person’s consent to search an area means that the search is not
unreasonable because that person has authority over the area and is inviting LE personnel into the area.
Exclusionary Rule
4-64. Army LE personnel must know and understand the law surrounding the 4th Amendment and lawful
searches and seizures to be effective in their positions. Failure to understand and act according to the 4th
Amendment and subsequent judicial holdings can result in the exclusion of evidence.
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4-65. The exclusionary rule (the court’s response to constitutional violations) allows the court to exclude—
z
Evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search or seizure (evidence which violated the 4th
Amendment rights of the accused).
z
Any derivative evidence from the original 4th Amendment violation. Derivative evidence is
evidence obtained as a result of the original 4th Amendment violation, as a product of the
violation or as evidence which flowed from the violation (often referred to as fruit of the
poisonous tree).
Contacts and Stops
4-66. A contact occurs when Army LE personnel engage a member of the community. Often, Army LE
personnel make citizen contacts to gain further information before determining whether an apprehension is
warranted. This begins with simple communication with a person. Army LE personnel can make contact
with a person anyplace where Army LE personnel are lawfully present. Under the context of a police
contact, the individual contacted is not under any form of detention or apprehension and can terminate the
contact and leave anytime. Examples of lawful contacts include questioning witnesses of a crime or
warning an individual of hazards within the AO. These types of contacts are reasonable, permissible, and
within the normal activities of Army LE personnel and commanders.
4-67. A stop usually occurs after Army LE personnel witness a disturbance, traffic violation, or other
incident that violates laws or threatens public safety and order. The communication is similar to the citizen
contact communication in that the questioning is administrative in nature. The citizen contact and the stop
are not apprehensions. Within the context of a contact, the individual is under no requirement to stay and
may depart at will. A stop, while less restrictive than an apprehension, does limit the individual’s ability to
break contact and leave at will; a stop can be described as a temporary detention for an investigative
purpose. Apprehension and detention involve government control over the freedom of movement of a
person, although apprehension is based on probable cause and is more permanent in nature.
4-68. At any point in which Army LE personnel make contact with the public, items that are in open view
can be seized if identified as contraband. This is known as plain-view doctrine. Plain-view doctrine has
several key elements.
4-69. Army LE may seize an item of evidence in plain view if the following elements are met:
z
The officer is lawfully in the place from which he observes the item—the officer did not violate
the 4th Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence can be plainly viewed.
z
The item is immediately recognizable as contraband (no manipulation of that item occurred to
determine its contraband nature).
z
The item may lawfully be reached from the officer’s location. Therefore, an officer must
distinguish between situations in which contraband is observed and may be immediately seized
and times when the contraband is observable but an authorization or warrant must be obtained or
an exigency exception is present. For example, seeing contraband through the window of a
residence would require, in the absence of an exigent circumstance, a search authorization before
that residence could be entered and the contraband seized. However, contraband observed on a
table in a residence and room that the officer was invited into could be seized immediately.
Investigative Stops (Terry Stops and Frisks)
4-70. A Terry Stop (Terry versus Ohio, 1968) (also known as an investigative stop) is the brief detention of
a person when Army LE personnel have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion is
a lesser belief than probable cause but, like probable cause, is based on the totality of the circumstances.
The experience of Army LE personnel; the crime conditions (such as a high-crime area); the mannerisms,
dress, and activities of the detainee; and the time of day are factors when considering the totality of the
circumstances for a Terry Stop.
4-71. The Terry Stop allows for a frisk of the detainee for the safety of Army LE personnel. However, the
frisk is not automatic and should only be performed when there is a reasonable belief that the person is
armed and presently dangerous. The frisk does not rise to the level of a body search. A frisk consists of a
pat down of the outer clothing; the inner clothing is not touched and personnel should not conduct a pocket
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Military Police Law Enforcement Patrol
search unless a weapon is found. Within the context of LE officer safety and frisks associated with Terry
Stops, weapons are defined very broadly. Many objects can be used as and considered a potential weapon,
(a screwdriver; scissors; other sharp, heavy, or dense objects). If other contraband is discovered during the
conduct of a lawful frisk, Army LE personnel may seize that contraband. The Terry Stop can turn from a
detention to an apprehension if probable cause develops that a crime has occurred or will be committed by
the detained person.
4-72. If, in the course of a lawfully conducted frisk of an individual’s outer clothing, an Army LE officer
feels an object with a contour and mass making its identity immediately apparent as contraband, the officer
may seize the object. In this instance, there is no unauthorized invasion of privacy; LE personnel were
already acting within established constraints to search for weapons. The contraband may be seized without
a formal search authorization and would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the
plain-view context (see Minnesota versus Dickerson, 1993). This action is also known as plain-feel
doctrine.
4-73. Army LE personnel cannot arbitrarily conduct a search based on a hunch or without proper authority.
The following paragraphs describe the requirements to conduct a search, whether granted by an
authorization or by consent of the individual having control over the area or property to be searched.
AUTHORITY TO GRANT A SEARCH
4-74. To conduct a legal search, a search authorization must be provided. A search authorization is an
expression of permission, written or oral, issued by a competent military authority. The military authority
must be an impartial individual who is a commander, a part-time military magistrate, or a military judge.
The commander must be an officer in charge or hold a position of command over the place where the
property or person is to be searched or seized. A part-time military magistrate is a neutral and detached
impartial judge advocate who received appointment from a senior military judge. The military judge is also
authorized to grant a search authorization but will typically be used as an authority of last resort. After a
proper search authorization is granted, Army LE has the authority to conduct the search, within the
parameters or scope of the authorization, and to seize any evidence found as a result of the search.
Scope
4-75. A search authorization is limited to the scope of the person, place, or things to be searched. This
means that the person conducting the search must carefully comply with the limitations imposed by the
authorization. Only those locations described in the authorization may be searched, and the search may be
conducted only in areas where it is likely that the object of the search will be found. For example, if
personnel have the authority to search the quarters of a suspect, a parked car near the quarters may not be
searched. Likewise, if the authorization states that a computer is being sought, areas unlikely to contain the
computer may not be searched (such as a jewelry box). The limits of the search authorization do not
prohibit the seizure of evidence consistent with plain-view doctrine.
Searches Not Requiring a Search Authorization
4-76. Although the general rule is to obtain a search authorization, there are instances when a search
authorization is not required. The following searches are exceptions to the search authorization
requirement:
z
Consent search. A search may be conducted of any person or property as long as lawful consent
is given. A person can always consent to a search of their own person or property, unless that
person no longer has control of the property. A person in control of property, but who might not
own it, can also give consent to a search of that property. Consent can be withdrawn anytime;
Army LE personnel must then stop the search and get proper authorization if the search is to
continue. Ideally, the consent to search should be obtained in writing.
z
Search incident to apprehension. When a person is lawfully apprehended, that person and the
surrounding area can be searched. The search may be conducted for weapons or destructible
evidence. The surrounding area of the person consists of the area within immediate control and
the area in which the person being apprehended could reasonably reach with a sudden movement
26 January 2015
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Chapter 4
to obtain a weapon or evidence. This immediate control area can be anywhere, to include a
vehicle. To search a vehicle incident to apprehension, the apprehended person must be in
reaching distance of the passenger compartment or it must be reasonable to believe that the
passenger compartment of the vehicle contains evidence related to the offense of the
apprehension. This search does not include the trunk or the engine compartment.
z
Operable vehicle search. An operable vehicle may be searched if there is probable cause that
the vehicle contains evidence of a crime. The key to this exception is that it would be impractical
to obtain a search authorization under the circumstances. The elements of probable cause and
exigent circumstances that make obtaining a search authorization impractical must be present.
The scope of the search is not limited to the interior of the vehicle and may include the entire
vehicle. The vehicle must be one that a reasonable person would believe to be operable. Clear
indications of an inoperable car would be if there was no motor or the car was on blocks. This
search exception is different from the search incident to apprehension in that Army LE personnel
must have probable cause of a crime above and beyond that of the probable cause to apprehend.
z
Hot pursuit. Under exigent circumstances, Army LE personnel may enter an area normally
requiring a search authorization (residence, barracks room, office) to detain or apprehend a
subject. A subject committing a crime (or located by Army LE personnel in a public area) that is
wanted for a previous offense can be pursued into a private area if he flees to avoid detention or
apprehension.
z
Medical emergencies. When there is a valid medical emergency, Army LE may take necessary
actions to preserve the health of personnel. For example, if an LE patrol finds an unconscious
person, that person may be searched in an attempt to find some identification and determine the
cause of their condition.
z
Crimes in progress and destruction of evidence. An observation of a crime in progress
warrants immediate action. Army LE personnel may enter a home or vehicle without a formal
search authorization. For example, an Army LE patrol moving through a neighborhood hears
screams for help emanating from a residence. Taking time to obtain a search authorization to
enter the home could result in serious injury or death to the victim; no formal search
authorization is required. During these incidents, LE personnel with requisite probable cause
may take immediate action to secure evidence in the immediate area that is in danger of being
destroyed.
INSPECTIONS
4-77. An inspection never requires probable cause and, at times, can be more intrusive than a search. A
commander may not use a health and welfare inspection as subterfuge to avoid the requirements of a
probable cause search. Although suspected criminal activity (such as suspected drug use) may form part of
the basis for a health and welfare inspection, the primary purpose must remain the military fitness and
discipline of the unit.
4-78. One key aspect of an inspection is that all inspected individuals are subject to the same level of
scrutiny during an inspection. Evidence that is obtained lawfully during a health and welfare inspection
may be used for criminal prosecution.
4-79. An inspection is an examination of the whole or part of a unit, organization, or installation. This
includes an examination at the entrances and exits of an installation. The primary purpose of the inspection
is to determine and ensure the security, military fitness, and good order and discipline of the unit,
organization, or installation to be inspected. The inspection is also a lawful procedure to determine the
fitness of an individual Soldier and is often conducted in the way of a urinalysis exam.
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Military Police Law Enforcement Patrol
4-80. Other examinations include—
z
Inspections upon entry to or exit from an installation. A commander of a U.S. military
installation may authorize appropriate personnel to search persons or the property of those
persons as a prerequisite for entry or exit to any base or base camp. Any individual that refuses
the search can be denied entry. This inspection or search can include the entire vehicle
(including the trunk and engine compartment) or any containers in the subject’s possession. The
inspection or search cannot be conducted for the primary purpose of obtaining evidence of
crimes to be used in courts-martial or other disciplinary proceedings. If evidence is found during
an inspection where the purpose was for the security of the unit, that evidence can be used
against the person.
z
Health and welfare inspections. A health and welfare inspection is an inspection of an area in
the commander’s control. The primary purpose of health and welfare inspections is to ensure the
security, military fitness, or good order and discipline of the unit. A health and welfare
inspection cannot be used to find specific evidence that can later be used in a court-martial
proceeding. If the commander is aware of possible criminal activity, then a search based on
probable cause must be authorized by that commander or other competent authority.
z
Urinalysis inspections. A random or 100 percent urinalysis inspection is permissible, if it is for
the military fitness of the unit. If the sole purpose of the inspection is to obtain evidence of a
crime, that evidence cannot be used against the person. If evidence of a crime (the use of an
illegal substance) is found during the urinalysis inspection, that evidence can be used against the
person. Urinalysis inspections must be conducted according to Army regulations and unit
policies.
INVENTORIES
4-81. Inventories are conducted according to the appropriate regulations that mandate them. The purpose
of an inventory is administrative. The purpose is not to determine whether there is evidence of a crime, but
to maintain accountability of government property, place monetary liability on those responsible for loss of
government property, or account for the personal property of an individual placed in custody. If weapons,
evidence, or contraband are discovered during a lawful inventory, that evidence may be seized and used as
evidence in a subsequent court-martial proceeding. As with an inspection, an inventory cannot be
conducted as a ruse for a search.
CONSIDERATIONS DURING POLICE OPERATIONS SUPPORT TO HOST NATION POLICE
4-82. Army LE personnel must learn the specific legal requirements and constraints associated with the
HN legal system when conducting police operations that support HN police and establish a criminal justice
system operating under the rule of law. The laws of governing international bodies may take precedence in
countries experiencing civil unrest or without an existing governing body. As HN capability and capacity
are established, the control of LE and policing responsibilities transition to HN control, and the HN legal
system then becomes the standard for conducting LE activities. Other nations will likely have different
legal authorities and restrictions based on their system of government, political ideology, and culture. HN
police must be contacted immediately in the event that a local national is under suspicion of committing a
crime or is found in possession of an illegal item on a U.S. base; laws of the HN may apply. It is critical
that procedures for dealing with HN personnel are understood and enforced. Military police and USACIDC
commanders must coordinate with the geographic combatant commander staff and consult with their
supporting SJA to ensure that they—
z
Understand the specific authorities and constraints of the HN legal system.
z
Understand the timelines for transition to the HN system.
z
Train their Soldiers and USACIDC SAs adequately to ensure that they fully understand HN
authorities and constraints.
z
Can advise non-LE U.S. military elements, as required.
z
Can train, mentor, and monitor HN police forces to ensure compliance with legal constraints
within their systems.
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Chapter 4
APPREHENSION BY ARMY LAW ENFORCEMENT
4-83. Apprehension is the taking into custody of a person. It occurs when a government official causes a
person to lose the freedom of movement. A lawful apprehension must be based on probable cause.
Probable cause to apprehend is a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed and that the person to
be apprehended committed the offense. Military LE personnel (military police Soldiers; Army civilian LE
personnel; USACIDC SAs; and all commissioned officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned
officers) are authorized to apprehend persons.
GENERAL GUIDELINES
4-84. An apprehension may be made on an installation, without an authorization, as long as there is
probable cause; the exception for apprehension is in the private dwelling of the person to be apprehended.
If an apprehension is required in a private dwelling, proper authorization must be obtained from a
competent legal authority (an installation or garrison commander, a military magistrate, or a military
judge). Apprehensions within a private dwelling not on a military base or base camp require authorization
by civilian authority (civilian judge) and are typically executed by civilian LE. A private dwelling is a
single-family home, duplex, or apartment—this does not include the barracks. Exceptions to the
requirement for search authorizations are discussed within the searches and seizures section in this chapter.
4-85. Army LE personnel must be prepared to take immediate coordinated action at the scene of a crime or
during an investigation. This action often involves making an apprehension. An apprehension is the taking
of a person into custody and is the equivalent of arrest in civilian terminology. The need to apprehend an
offender can occur with little warning. Army LE personnel must be familiar with apprehension policies,
regulatory directives, the use of force, handling and custody of evidence, and crime scene protection
procedures. Apprehension policies and procedures must be clear and described in written guidance. These
procedures must be trained and rehearsed on a recurring basis and given the same degree of training as
other LE skills. (See ATP 3-39.12 for information on the custody of evidence and crime scene procedures.)
JUVENILE APPREHENSIONS
4-86. Juvenile offenders may be apprehended on U.S. military bases and base camps by Army LE
personnel. The authority of Army LE personnel regarding juveniles not subject to the UCMJ is derived
from the installation commander’s inherent authority to maintain order on the installation. Upon
apprehension, Army LE personnel will follow normal apprehension procedures and will notify juveniles of
their legal rights and the offense for which they are apprehended. This procedure typically occurs in the
presence of a parent or legal guardian. Parents or guardians must be advised of the juvenile’s rights and the
offense for which they are apprehended. Parents or guardians must be notified of the apprehension
immediately upon arrival at the police operations center.
4-87. After the military police duty officer or duty investigator has conducted an initial interview, the
juvenile will typically be released to the parents or guardian. If a major offense is involved (rape, armed
robbery), the initial interview is deferred to USACIDC SAs or other appropriate authorities maintaining
jurisdiction. In cases where the offense or condition of the offender is serious enough to warrant detention,
the juvenile will be released to civil authorities. (See ATP 3-39.12 for a more detailed discussion on
interviewing juveniles.)
4-88. The military police desk blotter will not contain any identifying information for juvenile offenders.
This includes names of juvenile subjects, their parents or sponsors, or addresses. Protected identity also
applies to the juvenile victims of such offenses as rape or child molestation. (See AR 190-45 for detailed
procedures.) The desk blotter must indicate that the person is a minor with protected identity.
REPORT WRITING
4-89. An important tool in support of enforcement measures is the written reports of the military police
Soldiers and USACIDC SAs. It is essential that these reports are well written and accurately reflect the
facts of an incident. Military police reports provide police information critical to police intelligence
activities and are an important contributing factor in the successful prosecution of criminals. Poorly
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26 January 2015
Military Police Law Enforcement Patrol
reported incidents may result in inaccurate or insufficient information that does not support LE and police
activities. Poorly reported incidents can severely jeopardize criminal investigations.
4-90. A report of the investigation is an official record of pertinent information disclosed through the
conduct of an LE response and subsequent criminal investigation. It is prepared by the responding unit and
forwarded through the appropriate channels. Reports are written and submitted to—
z
Provide an official record of relevant information.
z
Provide the commander and the SJA or trial counsel with the facts surrounding the alleged
offense.
z
Identify the alleged perpetrators, witnesses, and victims or complainants.
z
Pinpoint event times.
z
Identify the location of the incident.
z
Identify offenses and activities relevant to the incident.
z
Identify evidence and the location where the evidence was found.
z
Provide data for statistical purposes, analysis, and development of enforcement measures.
z
Use for future court testimony.
4-91. A report of an incident is an objective statement of responding LE personnel. The report can be
completed by military police Soldiers, Army civilian police, or USACIDC SAs. When writing a report,
personnel should—
z
Organize notes. Categorize and evaluate items of evidence and backg2round information. Once
this takes place, the report is ready to be written.
z
Write the report to present a word picture in a chronological manner.
z
Write the report clearly, concisely, and with grammatically correct language, proper spelling,
and accurate punctuation. Avoid the use of slang and informal language unless they are direct
quotes from a person associated with the incident or report.
z
Include all facts relevant to the investigation. This includes details that will prove or disprove
facts surrounding the alleged offense. Do not dismiss information that is felt to be inadmissible
as evidence at a trial. Include mitigating circumstances related to the case.
z
Identify each person related to the investigation, to include the responding patrol and
investigator.
(See DA Form
3975
[Military Police Report] for the required fields of
information.) Remember to protect entries concerning juveniles.
z
Verify the report information to the fullest extent possible by conducting interviews of those
associated with the incident, including witnesses and bystanders.
z
Ensure that the report is complete and answers the questions: who, what, where, when, why, and
how? While brevity is desirable in report writing, do not sacrifice accuracy and completeness.
z
Review the report for the above information before submitting it through appropriate channels
(desk sergeant, operations).
COURT TESTIMONY
4-92. LE personnel frequently engage in activities that may require them to testify before a court, board, or
administrative hearing. While LE investigators are routinely required to provide court testimony regarding
criminal cases, LE patrol personnel may also be required to testify regarding their responses to an incident,
observations, actions, and support to the investigative process.
(ATP 3-39.12 provides additional
information regarding testimony before courts, boards, and administrative hearings during judicial and
nonjudicial procedures.)
4-93. LE patrol personnel should approach every call with an understanding that they may be required to
appear before a court, board, or administrative hearing to describe their observations and actions at the
crime scene or incident site. The best way to ensure preparedness is to take detailed notes and produce
complete and thorough patrol reports that clearly and concisely capture as many relevant details of the LE
response as possible. These notes and reports should be recorded as soon as it is safe and practical to do so,
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Chapter 4
given the environment and specific characteristics of the LE response in question. Detailed notes and
reports can effectively assist in the recollection of specific facts about an incident or event.
4-94. LE personnel should take notes in a timely manner to ensure that their observations and
understanding of the incident, their actions, and the actions of others are accurate and verifiable before
being entered into a record or report. Although accurate and timely fact finding is essential to sound police
practices, LE personnel should never jeopardize the safety of personnel or the success of an ongoing police
activity simply to record data.
4-95. If required to testify before a court, board, or administrative hearing, LE patrol personnel should
address the following requirements and general guidelines:
z
Preparation. Ensure that—
Military police report (including associated statements and evidence) documentation is
reviewed before providing testimony to ensure an accurate recollection of the incident.
Inexperienced LE personnel seek advice from experienced personnel, including trial
counsel, if appropriate, to ensure an adequate understanding of the procedure, the layout of
the specific court or hearing room, and any advice regarding what to expect. This allows
adequate mental preparation before the court, board, or administrative hearing appearance.
Practice with SJA representatives is conducted, when possible, in a mock court training
scenario that seeks to create the conditions of a courtroom or official hearing.
z
Professionalism. LE personnel should—
Look like professionals. Uniforms or civilian clothes should be pressed and clean. Any LE
gear worn should be clean and free of debris. Personal hygiene should be of the highest
standards.
Avoid appearing with anything in their mouths when testifying. This includes chewing gum,
candy, tobacco, snuff, or toothpicks.
Avoid sunglasses or exceptionally trendy glasses.
Be courteous and respectful to the parties involved in the proceeding.
z
Confidence. LE personnel should—
Be confident and look confident. LE personnel should project the appearance that they have
been in a courtroom before; if this is not the case, a visit to the court or hearing room should
be coordinated before the proceeding to familiarize them with the surroundings. A
reconnaissance of the courtroom or hearing room before their testimony can help build
confidence by eliminating surprises associated with unfamiliar surroundings. LE personnel
should understand who will be participating in the proceedings during their testimony and
where they will be seated. These actions can help LE personnel feel at ease as they enter the
room. This is especially important for personnel with minimal courtroom experience.
Stick to the facts. LE personnel should avoid providing opinions, speculation, or unqualified
testimony. This can damage the case and the credibility of the individual LE officer as a
witness. If asked a question that is unclear or not understood, they should request
clarification. If the answer to the question is not known by the LE officer providing
testimony, they should simply state, “I don’t know.”
Make eye contact and speak clearly in a volume that allows everyone in the room to clearly
understand. This will help LE personnel communicate effectively and create a favorable
impression with the panel or judge regarding their candor and honesty. Mumbling gives an
appearance that the individual providing testimony is unsure and unconfident.
z
Technical language. Avoid the use of jargon or technical language. If jargon or technical
language is used, the term should be explained. Army LE personnel should never assume
persons within the proceeding will understand LE-related terms or jargon.
z
Technical procedure. Army LE personnel often use techniques or equipment requiring specific
procedural responses or methodology in application. If LE personnel use or employ a police
procedure of a technical nature in any part of their testimony, they should be prepared to
articulate the rudiments of that process or procedure in basic terms to the level of expertise
required for the safe and effective use of the technique or equipment.
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Chapter 5
Police Engagement
Police engagement is a cornerstone to successful long-term police operations.
Successful police organizations interact with, and gain support from, most of the
population they serve. This holds true for civilian and military forces. Military police
and USACIDC elements conduct police engagement in all environments (supporting
bases and base camps and contingency operations). Police engagement occurs
(formally or informally) when military police and USACIDC personnel interact with
area residents, HN police and security forces, media personnel, and other
organizations that allow military police to gain and share information about threat
and criminal activity within an AO. Information obtained through police engagement
must be collected, analyzed, and distributed in a timely fashion to be of maximum
value to commanders, Soldiers, and the mission.
MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS
5-1. Army commanders are responsible for informing and influencing audiences inside and outside their
organizations. They do so to achieve local effects while ensuring that their activities and plans support and
complement their higher headquarters, available strategic communication guidance, and applicable U.S.
policy. Commanders are supported by several capabilities, including public affairs, military information
support operations, military deception, and Soldier and leader engagement.
5-2. Police engagement is a type of Soldier and leader engagement specific to police operations. Police
engagement is conducted by military police and USACIDC personnel to engage local, HN, and
multinational police partners; police agencies; civil leaders; and local populations. Police engagement also
passes and obtains critical information relevant to police operations to influence internal and external
audiences. Police engagement enables successful police operations and can influence broader military
operations or affect an AO.
5-3. The goal of police engagement is to develop routine and reliable networks and relationships through
which police information and police intelligence can flow to military police and USACIDC personnel and
into the operations process. Police engagement is conducted—
z
Between LE agencies.
z
With non-LE organizations.
z
With the general population.
5-4. Police engagement is an activity with two distinct purposes. It is used to inform the populace or other
agencies and organizations of specific data points and themes in an effort to persuade the population;
mitigate potential or occurring discontent or animosity; provide advanced notification of program, policy,
or procedural changes to mitigate potential problems; or gain support and develop a sense of community
involvement.
5-5. Police engagement is also a means to interact with, and gain valuable information from, the
population or other agencies and organizations. It is enhanced by regular contact and the subsequent
development of trust.
26 January 2015
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5-1
Chapter 5
5-6. Based on the tactical situation and other requirements, police engagement can be formal or informal:
z
Formal. Formal police engagement is generally conducted as part of a deliberate military police
or USACIDC Soldier and leader engagement strategy to gain support or information or to
convey a message. This activity requires preparation, coordination, and proper reporting after a
police engagement activity. Through formal police engagement, military police and USACIDC
personnel interact with and influence a wide range of personnel and organizations (HN or
multinational police, civil leadership, other governmental agencies, nongovernmental agencies).
In any situation, it is essential that exchanged information and data are accurate and consistent
with the informational themes and operations they represent.
z
Informal. Informal police engagement is more widespread and less directive in nature; however,
it is no less important to the overall success of the mission. This level of engagement can occur
many times during a single mission or shift. It is not constrained by location, prior coordination,
or resources. Every time military police Soldiers and USACIDC SAs interact with personnel
outside their organization, they conduct an informal police engagement. By building a rapport
with the community, military police Soldiers establish avenues to obtain police information.
5-7. During military police operations, military police conduct police engagement in support of bases,
base camps, and contingency operations across the range of military operations. It is important for military
police Soldiers to establish avenues to obtain police information and rapport with the HN community
during deployments. It is equally important to establish open communications with populations around
bases and base camps, to include civilian communities and local LE organizations. Based on current
geopolitical and ideological factors, operations within a foreign operational environment typically add
layers of difficulty to police engagement due to language and cultural differences, possible animosity by
HN police, and potential dislike for the United States.
5-8. Commanders set priorities and goals and resource for police engagement activities. Individual
military police Soldiers and teams interacting with the population conduct the bulk of police engagement.
During formal and informal police engagements, military police leaders and Soldiers maintain a deliberate
focus and commitment to identifying criminal actors, crime-conducive conditions, and other criminal or
policing factors that could affect an area or threaten the short- or long-term success of operations.
5-9. Information and interaction resulting from police engagements should be reported to the staff
through the chain of command at the conclusion of the mission. This can be done through verbal
backbriefs, written patrol reports, automated databases, or other reporting mediums. The information can
then be evaluated for further dissemination, analysis, and action, as required. If valuable information is
identified, an informal police engagement can quickly transition to a deliberate collection effort.
PLANNING AND COORDINATION
5-10. Planning, information collection, analysis, and decisionmaking are key elements of police
engagement. The protection of LE-sensitive information and dissemination of actionable information are
central tenets that are maintained throughout police engagement operations. Effective police engagement
relies on the balance between making information available and the ability to protect information that may
be sensitive or proprietary or that may compromise ongoing LE, intelligence, or military operations and
methods if disclosed.
5-11. Military police and USACIDC personnel employ multiple engagement considerations before and
during police engagements. The preparation for collection efforts is subject to reviews and revisions as new
situations emerge and additional knowledge is obtained. The ability to redirect the focus of police
engagement and develop new avenues for information flow is a key strength, trained and honed by military
police and USACIDC personnel during the conduct of LE missions supporting operations on bases and
base camps. This action provides the commander with a valuable trained asset for use during deployments.
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Police Engagement
5-12. Military police Soldiers are trained to incorporate the following:
z
Background. As part of an initial mission analysis (whether the mission is preparing for routine
patrol in support of police operations on a base or base camp or to conduct a series of province-
wide cordon and search operations), military police and USACIDC personnel consider previous
experiences (missions in the area or similar missions in other areas) the authority for the mission
and the intent of the mission. Although these preparation operations normally involve
predetermined objectives (crime prevention, traffic control, security reinforcement), military
police and USACIDC personnel are flexible in their dealings with the populace, transitioning
immediately from one mission set to another as situations develop.
z
People. During meetings and discussions, military police identify and reference designated
sources using a variety of means (names, positions, organizations, biometrics). The results of
previous engagements and the agendas of individuals or groups in similar positions could prove
beneficial to future operations.
z
Meeting preparation. A primary source of information before a formal police engagement may
include police information and intelligence, intelligence summaries, updates, and reviews of
current command information themes and messages. Military police and USACIDC personnel
conducting police engagement should also review the current collection plan for existing
information and intelligence requirements. These sources may provide the latest information
from political or cultural advisers. When dealing with HN or multinational officials, the protocol
office and SJA can provide information regarding proper gift exchanges or similar situations.
z
Adjacent unit coordination. Military police and USACIDC personnel frequently have
boundaries that encompass two or more unit AOs. When military police elements cross these
boundaries, care must be taken to ensure that the owning unit is aware of their presence and
mission. This coordination is important to address safety and security concerns; military police
must ensure that the police engagement is nested with the maneuver commander’s information
plan and operations. Coordination in support of bases and base camps includes coordinating with
civilian LE in the event that military police or USACIDC personnel need to conduct operations
outside the installation.
z
Interpreter support. One key to successful operations is experience and rehearsal with assigned
interpreters. Interpreter support will be required in most operations outside the United States and
may be required in some DSCA. Care is required to ensure that interpreters translate verbiage as
close to verbatim as the language and culture allow. Most interpreters are contracted HN or third
world country nationals. There is generally a limited number of U.S. Soldiers and contracted
U.S. citizens available who have the appropriate language skills required to serve as interpreters.
z
Uniform and equipment requirements. Although basic uniform, protection, and equipment
requirements are often in place
(especially during operational deployments), it may be
productive to review these requirements before police engagement missions. A risk assessment
may indicate that lowering individual uniform requirements (body armor, protective gear) during
meetings with HN police or civic and religious leaders will maintain adequate protection while
allowing a better flow of information and connection between the parties present. At other times,
recording devices may be used, overtly or covertly, to ensure that all conversations are
accurately captured. Care is required to ensure that these operations comply with U.S. and HN
laws.
z
Post engagement follow-up operations. Timely summaries to stakeholders are critical to
ensure that information collected is appropriately disseminated, proper analysis is conducted,
information gaps are identified, and collection plans are updated for future engagements. Care
must be taken to ensure that information dissemination restrictions are followed. When
conducting police operations involving U.S. persons, military and other intelligence
organizations must operate under significant constraints. LE agencies may make information
LE-sensitive, effectively restricting it to LE personnel. Military police and USACIDC personnel
must be familiar with legal and regulatory constraints on LE information. (See ATTP 3-39.20.)
26 January 2015
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Chapter 5
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
5-13. Formal and informal police engagement are critical to effective military police operations. They
provide means to gain support within the community, develop positive relationships and a sense of trust
with the population and other organizations (LE and non-LE), and relay important safety and protection
information relevant to police operations. Information obtained through police engagements can be critical
to effective police operations and, within a contingency environment, support Army operations by
providing timely and relevant information to the operations process and integrating processes (intelligence
preparation of the battlefield, targeting, and risk management).
5-14. When planning for police engagements, commanders, PMs, and staffs must ensure that relevant
information and intelligence requirements are provided to military police and USACIDC Soldiers. These
Soldiers must understand the requirements and the intent. This includes elements on deliberate collection
missions and other missions. Many times, chance encounters with the public or other officials can provide
police engagement opportunities, thus resulting in the spontaneous presentation of information relevant to
intelligence requirements. These informal contacts can also result in the collection of information that can
affect operations.
5-15. Many times, imparting information regarding police operations (LE and policing initiatives, public
safety information, public service communications) is necessary. The PM or military police commander
may want to conduct a police engagement to educate and calm the public following a specific event or
series of events; gain public support for specific investigations or general LE initiatives; or provide advance
notice of upcoming events, initiatives, or other potential changes to the AO that affect the community.
PMs, military police commanders, and staffs must deliberately shape the message they want to portray to
the population.
5-16. Specific talking points developed in advance of a police engagement can help military police and
USACIDC personnel deliver a consistent message to the public. Talking points regarding policing topics
and other military operations may be issued by a military higher headquarters or other Army LE
organization. Civilian agencies, including LE organizations working with the U.S. military, may also issue
talking points. Military police and USACIDC elements ensure that information is coordinated and
synchronized with higher and supporting elements so that there is no conflict in the message or
compromise of protected information.
Individual Motivations
5-17. Military police should be aware of underlying motivations that may drive persons to interact with,
and provide information to, military police and USACIDC Soldiers. While conducting police operations in
support of bases and base camps, persons may be motivated to pass information to military police due to a
sense of duty or justice. The military culture is based on values that encourage a sense of duty, honor, and
doing what is right. This is beneficial when policing military communities. Others may come forward
because they may be complicit in criminal activity and are cooperating in hopes of receiving leniency.
Some may seek to obtain revenge against an individual that has done something (real or perceived) to
slight, hurt, or anger them. These are just a few possible factors that may motivate members of a population
to come forward with information.
5-18. Some of the same motivations discussed in the previous paragraph may be relevant within
contingency operations overseas. However, HN personnel may have different motivating factors for
interacting and cooperating with military police and USACIDC Soldiers specifically and with U.S. forces
in general. When military police interact with the HN population, individual sources may be influenced
by—
z
Feelings of support for overall U.S. goals. This support may stem from a desire to help their
country by assisting U.S. forces or a desire for justice, fear, desperation, or revenge. Individuals
may provide false information to extract revenge or gain an advantage. Victims may see the
United States as a liberating force and protector.
z
A hope for money or support. Motivations of self-interest (such as a fear of criminal, terrorist,
or insurgent elements) may cause victims to seek out U.S. or other multinational forces.
5-4
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26 January 2015
Police Engagement
5-19. In all environments and circumstances, military police (commanders, staffs, and police intelligence
analysts) must be cognizant of the potential motivations behind individuals providing information and their
track record of reliability in reporting information on the enemy or criminal threat. The corroboration of
information is required, especially if it may lead to detention, the use of force, or other targeting.
Public Affairs and the Media
5-20. The command or installation public affairs office can be extremely important. They assist in
scheduling and preparing for media interactions and will usually accompany military police and USACIDC
leaders and Soldiers to interviews. Soldiers should understand that the media will publish articles about
events when Soldiers are involved. Although the coverage may not always be complimentary, a leader’s
job is to ensure an accurate and fair presentation. Public affairs personnel monitor local media outlets for
stories and citizen concerns. In overseas environments, public affairs personnel may employ HN citizens or
other personnel with knowledge of the language and culture who cannot only translate articles, but can also
explain the significance of terms, slang, and political displays.
5-21. The operational environment can change rapidly. Singular events may cause sudden or violent shifts
in public sentiment. These events may occur within or outside the affected AO. Civilian media outlets can
be key sources of information for identifying and assessing changes in public sentiment, the geopolitical
climate, or ideological trends. Monitoring these venues can help commanders and staffs develop police
engagement strategies. Individual Soldiers may become spokesmen or media symbols based on single
events, photographs, or statements. This can occur during LE activities that support bases, base camps, or
contingency operations.
Cultural and Religious Considerations
5-22. In some instances, cultural and religious differences, convictions, and traditions will heavily
influence how individuals within some cultures interact with military police or other Soldiers. Cross-
cultural communication can require significant time to build relationships and trust. Soldiers may have to
engage in conversations to build rapport before engaging in critical discussions and decisionmaking. Many
cultures see our desire to get straight to the point of business and will not build relationships. In some
cultures, only the eldest male can speak for the group and women may not be allowed to speak to men
outside their immediate family. These situations can be significant barriers to effective communication.
Military police and USACIDC Soldiers must understand and shape their police engagement methods to
overcome cultural and religious barriers. The use of female military police or USACIDC personnel may
facilitate reaching female civilians in certain cultures.
5-23. Chaplains, although not normally a part of specific military police operations or investigations, can
often provide insight into the religious customs that may discourage an individual from cooperating with
military police. Typically, there is no requirement for an in-depth understanding of all facets of a religion or
culture, but simple rules of behavior and how to interact and ask questions may be extremely helpful.
COORDINATION ACTIVITIES
5-24. Coordination with other agencies, units, and organizations
(other governmental agencies and
nongovernmental organizations) operating in the area is critical to successful police engagement strategies.
Deliberate police engagement strategies should be coordinated and synchronized with associated
stakeholders, units, and organizations operating within the AO. In many formal venues, these stakeholders
may participate with military police and USACIDC personnel. For example, town hall meetings scheduled
to discuss problems within a community may include representation from other LE agencies, local
government officials, unit commanders, and community leaders. Coordination with other stakeholders and
elements in the AO also ensures that supporting interests are not damaged by information disseminated by
military police or USACIDC personnel. The public affairs office will typically work to ensure that talking
points and strategic communication themes are published and synchronized. They can also assist in
modifying or framing a specific message or talking point to mitigate conflict with other friendly efforts.
5-25. Training events with HN security forces can be used to instill esprit de corps, which often results in
an increased capability, function, and desire to work with U.S. forces. Common equipment, uniforms,
26 January 2015
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5-5
Chapter 5
weapons, and tactics can contribute to a more consistent interaction between forces. Early in Operation
Iraqi Freedom, planners decided to design Iraqi police uniforms with brassards. To match these uniforms
closely with the U.S. military police Soldiers and for easy identification by U.S. Soldiers, Iraqi Police were
provided with Iraqi Police brassards to signify their country. While considered a logistical function at face
value, the action was also a deliberate police engagement strategy designed to build camaraderie and
develop a sense of cooperation and teamwork between military police units and the supported HN
personnel and Iraqi police.
5-26. Visitors to theater detention facilities provide opportunities for military police Soldiers to conduct
police engagement operations at the individual level. Themes and agendas should be carefully vetted with
the higher headquarters information operations officer and element to ensure that they are consistent with
facility SOPs and command guidance. All visitors to theater detention facilities are considered potential
voices to the local community reference the level of care and security provided by U.S. forces. Visitors are
also potential sources of information for U.S. forces. Family members that visit theater detention facilities
generally avoid contact with U.S. forces due to fear and social pressure. When possible, certain aspects of
visits should be designed to lower those preconceptions and afford opportunities for information flow. (See
FM 3-63.)
COLLABORATION AND FUSION
5-27. Effective collaboration and fusion are designed to communicate actionable information on threats,
incidents, and information pertaining to the operational environment; to enhance situational understanding;
and to maximize the ability to assess the level of risks and execute plans to mitigate emerging threats.
Networks are developed to enhance the exchange and collaboration of police information. The effective
implementation of a network is based on active participation by military, government, and private sector
security partners in robust multidirectional information sharing. When organizations are provided with a
comprehensive picture of threats or hazards in the operational environment and participate in ongoing
multidirectional information flow, their ability to assess risks, make prudent security decisions, and take
protective actions is substantially enhanced. Similarly, when military police and USACIDC personnel are
equipped with an understanding of the information needs of other military and civilian organizations, they
can adjust information collection, analysis, synthesis, and dissemination activities accordingly.
5-28. An information-sharing approach constitutes a shift from strictly hierarchical to a networked model,
allowing distribution and access to information (vertically and horizontally) and the ability to enable
decentralized decisionmaking and actions. The objectives of the network approach are to—
z
Enable secure multidirectional information sharing that focuses, streamlines, and reduces
redundant reporting.
z
Implement a common set of communications, coordination, and information-sharing capabilities.
z
Provide a robust communications framework tailored to specific requirements.
z
Provide a comprehensive common operational picture that includes timely and accurate
information.
z
Provide timely incident reporting and verification.
z
Provide a means for the integration of state, local, tribal, and private sector security partners in
the intelligence process, as appropriate.
z
Protect the integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information.
5-29. Regardless of the operational environment, subtle influences will create variations in network
membership. The availability of agencies within the local operational environment, the varied personalities
of organizational leaders, and cultural or operational differences between agencies are factors that may
influence membership participation and team dynamics.
5-30. Military police and USACIDC personnel may develop networks that support bases, base camps, or
specific AOs during contingency operations. Standardization provides a platform for tailoring staff,
providing institutional training, and selecting the most appropriate resources (automation, other emerging
technologies). The successful development of networks can increase cooperation between local agencies
and provide a mechanism for developing local, regional, national, or international networks to enable
information sharing.
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26 January 2015
Police Engagement
NETWORK PARTICIPANTS
5-31. A network should be tailored to meet the realities of the operational environment. The network is
influenced by threat assessment, information and intelligence requirements, and the specific needs of
participating agencies. A network will generally consist of agencies located within the immediate
operational environment. Internet connectivity and functional networks have expanded the number of
agencies that can participate in local networks. This is particularly important when specialized capabilities
are required to fill capability gaps supporting operations within the AO. If particular agencies are not
represented in the local environment (Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration
field offices, military intelligence, HN LE), military police and USACIDC personnel can add them to their
network by leveraging another LE network or making direct contact with the agency using Internet services
and functional networks.
5-32. A network will typically have a core of regular participants. Relationships beyond the core
participants can fluctuate based on numerous factors
(specific circumstances, operations, incidents).
Relationships will continue to develop, and the number of core participants may increase as bonds are
strengthened through joint ventures and as agencies expand their own operating networks. The missions
and priorities of individual organizations will greatly affect personnel participation and the level of sharing.
5-33. A comprehensive communications system to support the network will ensure uninterrupted contact
between elements, when necessary. Contact lists for agencies should be disseminated throughout the
network and routinely checked to validate less frequent contacts and maintain personal working
relationships. Agencies should have compatible communication systems for routine support.
(See
ATTP 3-39.20 for additional information on establishing networks.) There are significant restrictions
regarding information sharing, especially regarding U.S. persons. The supporting SJA should be consulted
to ensure that information sharing and fusion activities are within the legal parameters established by U.S.
law and DOD policy.
FUSION CELLS
5-34. Fusion cells provide a structured mechanism through which government agencies, civil and military
LE, public safety, and private sector stakeholders can come together with a common purpose and
framework to improve criminal activity prevention, security measures, and contingency planning.
5-35. A fusion cell is a collaborative effort in which participating agencies coordinate and synchronize
their efforts to facilitate analytical collaboration. It can include LE and intelligence agencies (depending on
the environment and mission) that provide resources, information, and expertise to support the combined
effort. The combined efforts of an effective fusion cell enhance the ability to detect, prevent, investigate,
and respond to criminal and terrorist activity within a specific AO. The primary purpose of a fusion cell is
the analysis of disparate or unrelated data sources. For example, a police agency that is a member of a
police intelligence fusion cell may have information within its files that complements or completes
information in another police, state, or government agency database referencing potential threats. (See
ATTP 3-39.20 for additional information on fusion cells.)
MEETINGS, WORKING GROUPS, AND BOARDS
5-36. Commanders establish meetings, working groups, and boards to integrate staff, enhance planning and
decisionmaking, and ensure the synchronization of activities. They also designate staff elements to
participate in meetings, working groups, and boards. (See FM 6-0 for additional information on meetings,
working groups, and boards.) These forums are important venues for police engagement activities. The PM,
military police, USACIDC commander, and staff should ensure that police engagement strategies and
opportunities are maximized appropriately during these opportunities.
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Chapter 5
5-37. Meetings, working groups, and boards serve as forums for information exchange and integration, but
are slightly different in their purpose and intent. These forums are described as—
z
Meetings. A meeting is scheduled to present and exchange information. Depending on the
meeting purpose, attendees may involve the commander, chief of staff, staff principals, subject
matter experts, and subordinate echelon commanders and staffs.
z
Working groups. A working group is a group of predetermined staff representatives who meet
to provide analysis, coordinate information, and provide recommendations for a particular
purpose or function.
z
Boards. A board is a temporary group of selected staff representatives with delegated decision
authority for a particular purpose or function.
5-38. The military police staff participates in numerous meetings, working groups, and boards to ensure the
integration and synchronization of military police missions and requirements. Military police and
USACIDC staffs participate to ensure that specific police-related information and other military police-
related information and intelligence requirements are integrated, relevant, fed, and fused into the operations
process.
5-39. Typically, military police staff elements will participate in—
z
Meetings.
Operations synchronization (led by the current operations cell).
Operations update and assessment (led by the current operations cell).
Movement synchronization (led by the sustainment cell).
z
Working groups.
Antiterrorism.
Threat.
Operations and intelligence.
Plans or future operations.
Assessment.
Targeting.
Information operations.
Civil affairs operations.
Personnel recovery.
5-8
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Chapter 6
Traffic Management and Enforcement
Traffic management and enforcement are integral parts of police operations.
Maintenance and the orderly movement of personnel, equipment, supplies, and other
resources are critical to military operations and a functioning civilian infrastructure.
Traffic management and enforcement are important parts of the overall effort to
establish and maintain traffic control to protect personnel and resources. Effective
traffic control and traffic management require elements from many disciplines
(military police, engineer, transportation, safety). Each element provides specific
technical capabilities to develop and implement traffic management plans that enable
the freedom of movement for military commanders and the communities in the AO.
This chapter focuses primarily on traffic management and enforcement associated
with the police operations discipline; however, a framework is provided which
illustrates the relationship between police operations-related traffic management and
enforcement and the related policing tasks conducted within the security and mobility
support discipline.
SUPPORT
6-1. Military police conduct traffic management and enforcement support across the range of military
operations. Traffic management and enforcement are critical to maintain freedom of movement for military
and civilian traffic on bases and base camps, within AOs, and within HNs in support of civil control efforts
to maintain freedom of movement for military personnel and resources supporting the maneuver
commander during combat operations. Military police conduct traffic management and enforcement as
parts of an overarching and multifunctional traffic management effort. Traffic management is the direction,
control, supervision, and execution of all activities required to enable freedom of movement for persons,
vehicles, and resources. Traffic management holistically involves transportation, military police, engineer,
and other technical capabilities.
6-2. Traffic management and enforcement by military police are manifest within three mission sets.
Military police—
z
Conduct traffic control.
z
Conduct traffic enforcement.
z
Investigate traffic collisions.
6-3. During police operations, these operations are conducted within stable environments. They are
characterized by support to general order and LE efforts to maintain order and the rule of law. Traffic
management and enforcement within this context can also be critical during a transitional period; a nation
may experience instability due to certain situations (major conflicts, natural or man-made disasters).
Military police units may be required to assist the HN in establishing civil control and supporting
governance under the rule of law.
6-4. Traffic management and enforcement also manifest in the policing activities typically associated with
the military police discipline of security and mobility support. These activities are not tied to an LE effort
and the rule of law, but focus on enabling orderly movement and preventing disruptions to lines of
communications critical to military operations. It is important to understand that during transitional periods
associated with contingency operations, there may be no clear delineation between LE-related traffic
management and enforcement and security and mobility support.
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Chapter 6
Note. Within the United States or its territories, any traffic operations or another LE operation
conducted off a military installation must be conducted within the constraints of the Posse
Comitatus Act and other U.S. law and DOD policy. The local SJA should be consulted before
any activities are conducted off an installation to ensure that operations are conducted within
these legal restrictions.
POLICE OPERATIONS
6-5. Traffic management and enforcement conducted in support of police operations are LE or policing
tasks that directly support the maintenance of good order and discipline as part of a broader police mission
set conducted by military police. LE tasks related to traffic management and enforcement include those
associated with traffic enforcement and collisions. Additional traffic control tasks are conducted as a means
to enable freedom of movement and maximize traffic flow through the―
z
Employment of police engagement and public awareness activities.
z
Use of traffic control posts (TCPs), when required, during peak traffic times, special events,
collisions, disasters, or other incidents.
z
Analysis and assessment of traffic conditions to develop recommendations and solutions to
traffic problems.
6-6. TMCIs receive specific training to conduct traffic management and enforcement. They possess
specific capabilities in traffic collision investigations and enforcement of traffic-related laws, including
suppression of driving under the influence violations. TMCIs provide expertise and assist the PM and
military police staff in developing traffic control and enforcement plans. These plans combine all elements
of traffic management and enforcement (enforcement, investigation, and control) into a holistic traffic plan.
6-7. In some environments and circumstances, extensive analysis may be required to address systemic
traffic problems. These problems can be the result of―
z
Traffic throughput volume increase.
z
Significant construction causing restrictions in road capacity.
z
Natural or man-made disasters or conditions that damage or restrict trafficability (including
combat operations, industrial accidents, or weather and geologic incidents).
z
Traffic control device and measure loss. This causes chaotic and dangerous conditions for
persons and vehicles due to natural or man-made disasters or conditions (combat operations,
industrial accidents, or weather and geologic incidents).
6-8. TMCIs are trained to conduct baseline traffic studies required for gathering traffic-related data to
conduct analysis and assessment on traffic flow. Traffic studies and subsequent analyses and assessments
are critical components to establishing successful traffic control measures. These technical capabilities are
enhanced when combined with multifunctional teams (engineer, transportation, other key capabilities).
These multifunctional teams may be required to conduct large-scale traffic assessments, address problems
that may require road or highway construction, or assist with implementing major changes to traffic control
device implementation and placement.
SECURITY AND MOBILITY SUPPORT
6-9. Security and mobility support is a military police discipline conducted to protect the force and
noncombatants and preserve the commander’s freedom of action. Military police units expedite the secure
movement of theater resources to ensure that commanders receive the forces, supplies, and equipment
needed to support the operational plan and changing tactical situations. Security and mobility support
include many traffic-related tasks required for effective traffic control. These tasks include―
z
Developing traffic regulation and enforcement plans.
z
Conducting enforcement of main and alternate supply route regulations.
z
Providing straggler movement control.
z
Controlling movement of displaced civilians.
z
Conducting populace and resource control.
6-2
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26 January 2015
Traffic Management and Enforcement
6-10. The same skills and capabilities required for traffic management and enforcement during LE
missions are equally relevant to security and mobility support and efforts to maintain freedom of action for
U.S. forces. These skills and capabilities make military police Soldiers the optimum choice for traffic
control tasks, regardless of the environment. Military police—
z
Integrate movement control and highway regulation plans into military police traffic control
plans.
z
Provide traffic control on main supply routes and enforce highway regulation plans.
z
Reroute and divert traffic as required by the tactical situation or directed by movement control
personnel.
z
Provide traffic and route reports on the status of main supply routes to movement control
centers.
6-11. Military police conduct security and mobility support to expedite military traffic flow by operating
TCPs at critical locations. They control traffic flow through the employment of holding areas and defiles to
control movement through restricted terrain. Military police apply traffic control measures to enable
freedom of movement by emplacing and monitoring route signs on main supply routes and alternate supply
routes and patrolling those routes to ensure compliance with traffic regulation directives. They may conduct
security and mobility support as a functional element or as part of a combined arms effort. Military police
routinely work with engineer route clearance teams, EOD teams, sustainment (logistics and movement
control) elements, and aviation support to open and maintain the security and viability of lines of
communications to ensure that commanders can deploy and employ forces during critical times and at
critical places in the operation. Security and mobility support are discussed in detail in FM 3-39.
PLANNING
6-12. Traffic management and enforcement are planned within the context of broader police operations.
Traffic management and enforcement are critical elements to any policing plan; they enable freedom of
movement and facilitate rapid and efficient response times. This enables military police and other traffic
control elements to initiate appropriate actions to mitigate disruptions. The goal of effective traffic
management and enforcement is to enable the use of existing and future road networks (with applicable
traffic control measures) to enable the unencumbered movement of personnel and resources in the most
efficient manner possible. Traffic control includes all active and passive measures used to mitigate traffic
congestion, and it enables the safe movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Traffic enforcement
activities are employed to compel compliance with traffic control measures when voluntary compliance
fails.
6-13. There are many considerations that PMs, military police commanders, and staffs must address when
planning traffic management and enforcement. Traffic management and enforcement at bases and base
camps are characteristically stable; traffic patterns and traffic management are typically well established.
Consistent with LE planning in general, the planning and execution of traffic management and enforcement
within these AOs involves incremental changes to address specific incidents, emerging traffic problems, or
changes that affect traffic flow. This may also be the case in some expeditionary environments, depending
on specific mission sets and environmental factors. However, many expeditionary AOs require extensive
traffic planning to overcome the lack of planning and significant degradation of the AO and associated
infrastructure due to natural or man-made factors (combat operations, natural disasters, lack of capability
within HN police and security forces).
6-14. Whether planning incremental changes to existing operations or significant and comprehensive
changes to traffic management and enforcement, PMs, military police commanders, and staffs consider a
myriad of factors. Failure to consider these factors can have a detrimental effect on traffic flow and the
ability of military and civilian populations to move personnel and resources through the AO. Many
considerations have likely been addressed on mature bases and base camps. However, it is important to
understand the importance of these elements so that future recommendations for incremental traffic control
adjustments (to address existing issues, emerging problems, or major construction) can be made with an
understanding of the existing traffic control configurations.
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Chapter 6
FUNCTIONAL AREA IDENTIFICATION
6-15. The areas of functional specialization or purpose should be identified. On bases and base camps,
these areas can include—
z
Headquarters locations.
z
Residential neighborhoods.
z
Barracks locations.
z
Motor pool concentrations.
z
Warehouse elements.
z
School zones.
6-16. Within HN areas near military bases or base camps, areas of functional concentration can include—
z
Government centers.
z
Industrial elements.
z
Airports and seaports.
z
Residential neighborhoods.
z
Commercial districts.
6-17. When establishing traffic routes and patterns, main thoroughfares should be routed around the
periphery of these functional areas. Through traffic should be concentrated on a minimum number of well-
defined, easily controlled routes. This action allows traffic to proceed without the delay caused by vehicles
entering or exiting a facility.
TRAFFIC CONTROL MEASURES
6-18. The military police staff should identify and establish (when required) a primary traffic control plan
to address high-volume conditions and to mitigate or prevent excessive traffic on side and residential
streets. The traffic control plan should establish major routes to bear most of the traffic load. Primary routes
should pass around the periphery of functional areas to preserve area integrity. Interconnecting routes
(arterial routes and collector streets) should also skirt the boundaries of major areas. Every effort should be
made to discourage the unnecessary use of roads in residential areas, troop housing areas, or other areas
where significant pedestrian traffic and congestion due to high-population densities make excessive vehicle
traffic hazardous; through traffic should be discouraged in these areas.
6-19. One-way roads may be implemented to improve traffic flow and safety. When throughput capacity is
a problem, narrow roads can carry a greater volume when designated for one-way traffic. One-way traffic
can help reduce congestion at intersections and decrease traffic collisions, especially where a high traffic
collision rate is caused by vehicles that are turning across the flow of traffic. Temporary, one-way roads
may reduce congestion and increase traffic flow (for example, during morning and evening rush hours).
Reversing the flow can mitigate traffic congestion and delays (for example, one way in during morning
hours and one way out during afternoon hours). Eliminating or restricting curb parking can increase safety
and traffic flow on the road and eliminate the need to convert two-way roads to one-way roads.
6-20. Speed zones should be determined in relation to the roadway and its relative separation from the
areas the road passes through. Elevated or otherwise separated highways designed for through travel can be
posted for higher maximum speeds. Minimum speeds should also be considered for these roadways to
prevent unnecessary traffic backups and unsafe conditions. Lower speeds are required for side and
residential streets.
6-21. The established speed limit should safely handle traffic, allowing for a sufficient stopping distance
between likely hazards. Reasonable speed limits encourage driver compliance. Historically, a speed in the
85th percentile (as surveyed in a particular road or condition) has been used as the rule of thumb for
establishing maximum speed limits. Although, recent studies have shown that actual posted speed limits
tend to be a few percentage points lower than 85 percent. By establishing a speed consistent with what the
majority of the population would choose to drive with no outside interference (the 85th percentile), the
speed limit will be enforceable and more likely to achieve compliance. Unnecessarily restrictive speeds
may be ignored by drivers, requiring greater and unnecessary enforcement efforts.
6-4
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Traffic Management and Enforcement
VEHICLE AND PEDESTRIAN VOLUME AND ROAD CAPACITY
6-22. The volume or throughput of vehicles and pedestrians within an AO is an important data element for
traffic management. The identification of high-volume routes and, conversely, low-volume routes can be
helpful when determining routing options. Traffic studies may be required to obtain accurate data,
especially if historic data is not available. Special attention should be given to cyclic and predictable peaks
in traffic flow (morning and evening commutes, shift changes within major industrial areas, civic or
sporting events).
6-23. All roadways have maximum traffic capacities based on their construction (reinforced concrete,
asphalt, gravel, dirt), which determines vehicle weight, width, and length restrictions. The thickness,
quality of the materials used, slope, grade, and other factors are critical in these determinations. The
physical size of the roadway (width and number of lanes) and characteristics (the number of feeder roads,
cross streets, intersections, roundabouts) can also affect the capacity of the roadway. These characteristics
can be determined by military police conducting hasty route reconnaissance or traffic studies. While
military police are capable of conducting basic route reconnaissance, deliberate route reconnaissance and
highly technical traffic studies require engineer support. Engineers can provide the technical knowledge
and capabilities to assess and classify roads and determine maximum capacities. Engineer technical
expertise is also required when construction or reconstruction of roads and highway networks is needed.
(See FM 3-34.170 for information on route reconnaissance and route classification.)
TRAFFIC COLLISION AND INCIDENT HISTORY
6-24. Traffic collision and incident history is an important part of any traffic analysis and planning effort.
The identification of traffic collision history and traffic-related incidents (driving under the influence, road
rage, speeding) can enable the staff to determine trends, patterns, and associations that can be useful in
pinpointing problem areas. This information can lead to further investigations to determine causal
relationships that require mitigating efforts. Traffic collisions should be organized by type, severity, time,
date, and other relevant criteria to aid analysts in identifying relevant trends, patterns, and associations.
6-25. Collision data for bases and base camps can be queried from COPS. The data can then be organized
by criteria and the results manipulated to an appropriate format to meet the purpose and intent of the
assessment. In contingency environments, there may be no database available for query. The AO may have
been disrupted to a point that records were destroyed; record keeping ceased, thus causing breaks in the
historical record; or records relating to traffic collisions or other incidents were not kept by the HN.
6-26. When HN records are available, coordination with HN police personnel may produce the desired
collision information. Many times, especially following a major disruption due to combat operations or
natural or man-made disasters, traffic patterns and population movement are altered to a point that
historical data may not provide a relevant picture of current problem areas. This can be especially true
when a large U.S. and multinational presence
(military and civilian) has drastically increased the
thoroughfare on HN roads. In these cases, military police and other staff elements may be required to begin
tracking collisions from a given point in time. Trends, patterns, and associations will begin to emerge as
time passes and the data builds.
SPECIAL EVENTS
6-27. Special events often generate heavy traffic volume. These events range from large concerts and
sporting events to major holiday celebrations and political events. Regardless of the specific event, these
activities can create major disruptions to routine traffic flow and typically require significant planning,
preparation, resources, and manpower to mitigate disruptions and control traffic ingress and egress event
parking. Traffic control planning for special events is typically conducted as part of a holistic special event
plan that includes other LE activities, coordination of additional emergency response requirements
(medical, fire, EOD, SRT), engineering assets, public affairs assets, and associate government or private
sector sponsors and coordinators.
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
6-5
Chapter 6
6-28. Traffic control considerations include―
z
Ingress and egress routes.
Direct routes to and from the immediate event area.
Ingress routes that terminate at designated and identified event parking areas.
Routes that do not allow event traffic to spill over into residential and other nonevent areas.
Detour routes that allow normal traffic (not event-related) to avoid the event area.
z
Emergency vehicle access. Personnel should designate, mark, and protect routes for emergency
vehicles and ensure that emergency vehicle operators are briefed on these routes.
z
Barriers, traffic cones, temporary signing, and other associate traffic control equipment.
z
Public awareness.
Specific routes and parking plans publicized through media outlets, flyers, and other venues
before the event.
Directional and guide sign use.
z
Event operations centers for LE and other emergency response personnel.
z
Traffic control personnel requirements.
Critical intersections and choke points that require manned TCP requirements identified.
Personnel requirements identified, to include enough personnel for breaks or rotations.
TCPs in place before the event start and end times. Failure to place TCPs early may result in
traffic control personnel being unable to get through traffic and reach their assigned
location.
TCP personnel able to answer questions from the public regarding directions, parking, and
other general event information.
z
Communications.
Dedicated event radio frequency for event support personnel (apart from the standard LE
net) to avoid interference with normal (nonevent) police operations.
Additional batteries and charging capacity.
Dedicated call signs.
z
Logistics.
Water points or delivery plans for event support personnel.
Meal delivery or rotation plans.
Latrine requirements.
CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE AND INCREASED THREAT CONDITIONS
6-29. PMs, military police commanders, and staffs must ensure that traffic planning and traffic control
requirements are included in local crisis incident response planning. Crisis incidents, regardless of their
nature, will significantly impact normal traffic patterns. Planners must consider the potential impacts and
the actions and resources that are required to mitigate those effects.
6-30. Some incidents are relatively localized. Traffic control considerations in these cases may be
relatively easy to employ and may be within the capabilities of the force that is on duty at the time of the
incident. However, other incidents may impact a larger area, creating significant traffic control challenges.
These incidents are inherently chaotic and involve many elements, each with their own personnel,
equipment, and other requirements. These assets must be able to move into the incident area. They must be
resupplied and sustained. Civilians and military personnel not directly involved with the incident and relief
effort must be evacuated, housed, and sustained. All of these moving pieces disrupt the normal flow of
traffic; traffic control efforts must be emplaced to enable appropriate movements to occur.
6-31. Typically, military police staffs will be involved with establishing critical-incident response plans for
bases or base camps within contingency environments. These plans will typically address a wide variety of
incidents deemed most likely to be faced by elements within the affected AO. These critical-incident
response plans are based on the environmental conditions specific to the AO, threats within the area, and
potential man-made disasters due to industrial or other facilities within the AO or area of interest. For each
6-6
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
Traffic Management and Enforcement
individual incident response plan, military police planners responsible for LE and traffic control planning
must assess the likely impact area for each specific incident and develop traffic control recommendations
accordingly. These recommendations must be coordinated and synchronized with all other elements of the
crisis response plan. Military police planners must understand the requirements of other response and relief
elements to be prepared to support those requirements.
6-32. Increases in the force protection condition can also significantly impact traffic flow and traffic
control requirements. Military police staff must be heavily involved with the antiterrorism personnel
responsible for developing antiterrorism plans for bases and base camps to ensure that they understand the
increased requirements inherent with an elevated force protection condition and plan accordingly. Increased
force protection condition requirements can impact traffic control planning and execution in areas that
have―
z
Manpower and equipment requirements increased due to―
Checkpoint operations.
Random antiterrorism measure requirements.
LE patrol requirements.
Parking constraints.
z
Movement or the addition of traffic control devices (barriers, lighting).
z
Route changes.
Ingress and egress routes.
Road closures (due to increased standoff requirements).
z
Traffic implications emanating from parking constraints
(due to increased standoff
requirements).
TRAFFIC CONTROL
6-33. Traffic control includes the actions and measures employed to facilitate the movement of personnel
and resources and to mitigate disruption to the flow of traffic. These traffic control activities and measures
range from those requiring extensive manpower expenditures to those requiring considerable initial-cost
equipment and automated technologies expenditures (thus requiring relatively low maintenance and having
little to no manpower requirements).
6-34. Traffic control activities are an integral part of military police traffic management. Traffic control
measures and activities can include―
z
TCPs.
z
Traffic control devices.
z
Police engagement and public education campaigns.
z
Traffic studies and assessments.
TRAFFIC CONTROL POSTS
6-35. A traffic control post is a manned post that is used to preclude the interruption of traffic flow or
movement along a designated route (FM 3-39). A TCP is used to support police operations or security and
mobility support operations when required to facilitate movement. TCPs are established to provide traffic
control on a specific point of terrain where freedom of movement is degraded. The primary purpose of
TCPs is to ensure the orderly traffic movement according to the traffic control plan, prevent unnecessary
delay, and meet command safety requirements.
6-36. TCPs are employed in all environments, from bases and base camps to contingency operations. They
can be deliberate traffic control measures conducted based on traffic control plans, traffic assessments, or
specific contingency plans. TCPs can also be conducted as hasty traffic control measures in response to
traffic collisions, threat incidents, or other unforeseen circumstances that impact traffic flow. For example,
TCPs may be employed—
z
When a road network is inadequate to accommodate traffic.
z
To ensure that designated traffic or convoys receive priority and uninterrupted movement.
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
6-7
Chapter 6
z
When serious delays or congestion occur or are anticipated due to a temporary condition.
z
To facilitate detours around―
Traffic collision sites.
Threat incident sites.
Temporary roadway degradations (downed bridges, damaged roadways, flooded streets).
z
To support special control and security requirements for designated persons.
z
To facilitate traffic control supporting special events.
z
In response to reported interruptions of traffic.
6-37. The configuration and exact positioning of a TCP depends on several factors. The safety of military
police Soldiers conducting traffic control operations is the foremost concern. It is critical to ensure that
traffic control personnel are able to see all approaching vehicles and that the drivers are able to see traffic
control personnel. The following factors affect military police positioning:
z
Degree of control required.
z
Amount of time available to plan and prepare for execution.
z
Design and characteristics of the intersection or roadway.
z
Traffic volume and types.
z
Light and weather conditions.
z
Threat conditions.
TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICES
6-38. Traffic control devices are used to facilitate traffic movement by providing information, direction,
and instructions to vehicle operators and pedestrians. They are used as an economy of force measure that
reduces the requirements for military police or other personnel to physically conduct traffic control
functions, facilitate the safety of personnel and equipment, and transmit information to vehicle operators
and pedestrians. Traffic control devices include―
z
Signs. These can include permanent, temporary, or automated message boards or other
information delivery means.
z
Traffic signals.
z
Pavement markings.
z
Railroad crossing control signals and mechanisms.
z
Drop gates.
z
Barriers used to change traffic direction, stop traffic, or segregate traffic elements.
z
Speed reduction devices (speed humps, serpentines).
z
Road reflectors.
z
Roadway grooving.
z
Traffic cones and portable bollards.
6-39. Permanent and semipermanent traffic control devices are generally emplaced by engineer personnel,
and their placement is based on extensive traffic control studies and accepted design standards. This
placement typically achieves the desired effect within the capacity of the roadway in relation to traffic
volume. However, in some instances, the placement and number of devices may not be adequate. Military
police can provide recommendations, based on traffic studies and subsequent analyses, for additional traffic
control devices or the modification of timing, phasing, or positioning of individual devices.
6-40. Temporary traffic control devices are used extensively by military police conducting traffic activities.
These devices function similarly to their more permanent counterparts, but they are easily transported,
emplaced, and moved, thus facilitating traffic control operations. Temporary traffic control devices are
used for―
z
Traffic collisions sites.
z
Temporary revisions to traffic flow (detours, channelization, redirection).
z
TCPs.
6-8
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
Traffic Management and Enforcement
z
Entry control points.
z
Checkpoint operations.
z
Parking control.
z
Public information.
z
Hazard identification.
z
Restricted or exclusion area marking.
POLICE ENGAGEMENT AND PUBLIC INFORMATION EFFORTS
6-41. Effective traffic control requires communication with all persons affected by traffic control measures.
This is particularly important when there are significant or long-term changes to normal traffic patterns.
Police engagement and public information campaigns can reduce frustration and increase community
cooperation. The methods used to provide for public information and police engagement strategies depend
largely on the amount of time between the knowledge of a change or disruption and the actual traffic event.
6-42. Changes to traffic flow and routes may be planned with significant lead time. Construction projects,
planned special events, or deliberate changes to traffic control devices and measures are examples where
extensive police engagement and public information campaigns are typically conducted. In these cases,
military police can inform the public of planned disruptions during normal contact operations, including at
routine LE patrols, community meetings, and interagency forums. Military police also coordinate with
public affairs to develop and distribute community service announcements well in advance of the specific
event. Key to these efforts is community awareness and expectation management. If the community knows
well in advance of a special event or change to traffic flow, they can prepare and compensate for associated
delays or the increased distances associated with alternate routes. The public, to include businesses and
other employers, are encouraged to make adjustments to their normal operations and routines to reduce
traffic impact. These methods may include―
z
Carpooling.
z
Driving alternate routes.
z
Using public transportation.
z
Adjusting or staggering work hours.
z
Telecommuting.
z
Teleconferencing.
6-43. Many times, incidents occur unexpectedly with little or no warning. In these instances, the timelines
for developing police engagement strategies and public information campaigns are significantly
compressed. In these instances, police engagement opportunities may be limited to immediate notifications
and contact with the community while concurrently conducting hasty traffic control measures. In short- or
no-notice situations, the public affairs office has the capability to rapidly get information to the community
through a variety of methods.
TRAFFIC CONTROL STUDIES AND ASSESSMENTS
6-44. Traffic control studies are designed to obtain information on various traffic problems and usage
patterns in an AO. They can be complex and require multifunctional teams that include engineer, LE,
safety, transportation, and other specialties. The PM or military police commander uses traffic control
studies to identify current conditions and problem areas. These studies can also be critical to identifying
future requirements and strategies concerning traffic control and associated traffic enforcement efforts. The
results of traffic control studies are used by the PM, military police commanders, and staffs (including
police intelligence analysts) to conduct analysis and assessment of the AO specific to traffic-related
concerns and incidents.
6-45. GIS software can greatly enhance the analysis, assessment, and subsequent production of police
information and associated police intelligence specific to traffic flow and associated impacts. This
information and police intelligence are critical to military police planning and significantly enhance
situational understanding when integrated into the planning and decision cycles of other functional,
multifunctional, and maneuver commanders through the Army operations process. (See ATTP 3-39.20 for
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
6-9
Chapter 6
additional information on police intelligence production, dissemination, and integration into the operations
process.)
6-46. A traffic study is an investigation of the current operating conditions and physical characteristics of
an AO regarding traffic movement and pedestrians. The information obtained through a traffic study can be
analyzed to produce assessments of current and potential future traffic-related problem areas. This enables
PMs, commanders, and staffs to develop solutions and remedial measures to mitigate identified problem
areas. Mitigation solutions can include―
z
Traffic movement control devices.
Emplacing or upgrading signs.
Emplacing or upgrading traffic signals.
Emplacing or upgrading road markings.
z
Traffic control measures.
Adjusting traffic flow directions (one-way streets, alternate flow changes based on peak
hours, traffic directions).
Widening or constricting specific traffic flow areas.
Emplacing traffic control personnel at critical intersections and choke points.
z
Traffic enforcement measures.
Setting up speed zones.
Increasing LE presence.
z
Public information and police engagement activities to:
Educating the public.
Notifying the public of changes affecting traffic flow.
Encouraging other mitigation measures (car pools, public transportation, alternate work
schedules).
z
Increased visibility, safety, and driver confidence.
Lighting critical areas.
Applying or replacing reflective material on signs, barriers, and roadways.
Emplacing safety barriers and guardrails.
z
Major construction.
Performing new road construction.
Widening roadways.
Repairing damaged roadways.
Note. Although PMs, military police commanders, and staffs may identify traffic control device
requirements, military police do not emplace, change, or remove permanent or semipermanent
traffic control devices. These efforts must be coordinated with engineers, safety and
transportation personnel, and other stakeholders. Within bases, base camps, or in urban areas in a
contingency environment, appropriate commanders, staffs, and HN agency personnel
(as
appropriate) are the decisionmakers for permanent or semipermanent traffic control device
emplacement or removal.
6-47. Military police have the capability to conduct basic traffic studies. Complex studies and analysis
require a multifunctional team that includes engineers, safety and transportation personnel, and other
specialties, based on the AO and conditions. Traffic control studies are used to ensure that the traffic
control plan is adequate and provides for safe and efficient traffic movement. Continuing traffic control
studies improve the flow of information for planning and action between military police, engineers, and
safety and transportation personnel.
6-48. Traffic studies are required when changes occur in traffic conditions. These changes could be major
issues (such as the disruption of primary ingress or egress routes) or relatively minor issues (such as the
addition of a new secondary road or a new building with increased parking problems). Traffic studies may
be required in contingency operations to assess traffic patterns and make recommendations to commanders
6-10
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26 January 2015
Traffic Management and Enforcement
about improving traffic flow, routing military or civilian traffic, and employing traffic control measures.
These studies may require the formation of a traffic study team of military police, engineers, safety and
transportation personnel, or other specialties (as required). The type of change will determine the nature
and depth of each study. Studies may be required in day and night environments to obtain relevant results.
6-49. The traffic study team should be familiar with the traffic control devices in place. The manuals for
specific traffic control devices may be required to ensure that the team understands the standardized criteria
and operational capabilities for the automated devices. The team must have the administrative equipment
required for their study, including—
z
Timing devices (stopwatches, radar).
z
Measuring equipment (tape measures, laser range finders, study equipment).
z
Flashlights, reflective vests, or other safety equipment.
z
Sufficient administrative supplies (pencils, pens, paper, drawing templates, standardized data
collection forms).
6-50. Some studies may be focused on a single intersection or area; others may be conducted across an
entire AO. The intent and breadth of a specific study will determine the study personnel and resources
needed and the requirements for capabilities beyond military police operations (engineers, safety and
transportation personnel, other specialties). Typically, TMCIs are best suited to participate in military
police traffic studies. If TMCIs are unavailable or not available in sufficient quantities, experienced
military police Soldiers are capable of conducting traffic studies.
6-51. A traffic study team should be composed of at least two study personnel per location. More
personnel may be required based on the characteristics of the site and the threat conditions in the area. For
large-scale studies, especially within a contingency environment, command and control are critical. Studies
are best conducted as a mission assigned to a single headquarters to ensure that an adequate span of control,
communications, protection, and other support considerations are coordinated and synchronized.
6-52. Additional planning operations should be considered when selecting and implementing traffic study
teams. These operations include ensuring that—
z
Specific guidance and intent are provided to the team members. This is critical to ensure that the
collected data is valid.
z
Study teams have redundant communications to notify their chain of command of problems or
emergencies.
z
Uniformed Army LE personnel do not cause invalid study results (depending on the specifics of
the study). Study teams may need to be dressed in civilian clothes or, at a minimum, be absent of
uniform items or equipment that clearly indicate an LE presence.
z
Deliberate traffic enforcement measures in the areas of the studies are curtailed for a few weeks
before and during the study. Recent LE presence at the study sites can cause invalid results.
z
Adequate quantity and quality data is collected. Typically, the more samples or incidents
recorded, the more reliable the results will prove. For example, a study at each stop sign should
span 1 hour or more and include at least 50 vehicles for each approach to the intersection. For
studies on sites with high accident frequencies, personnel should study other locations with
similar characteristics for comparison purposes. The greater the number of comparable sites
studied, the greater the probability of obtaining relevant data and accurate assessments.
Maps and Diagrams
6-53. It is important that personnel have a detailed map or diagram of the AO to study its current condition.
The map should include existing traffic control devices (signs, signals, markings, speed zones). If current
traffic control devices are known and mapped, this information must be available to the traffic study team.
GIS products may need to be created to provide quality map information.
6-54. Many times, especially within deployed environments, detailed knowledge of an AO is limited or
nonexistent. It is likely that traffic studies may be required to cover an entire city or AO. Data must be
collected and documented so that valid analyses and realistic assessments of existing traffic control
measures and requirements can be conducted.
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
6-11
Chapter 6
6-55. Known problem areas should be marked, including—
z
Choke points.
z
Key problem areas or intersections (areas of significant congestion, delay, or accidents).
z
Route designations. (See ATP 4-16.)
Open.
Supervised.
Dispatched.
Reserved.
Prohibited.
z
Identified danger areas or zones.
z
Restricted or exclusion areas.
Photographs and Geographic Information System Tools
6-56. Photographs of key locations or problem areas can be helpful in the analysis and assessment of traffic
study data. The personnel participating in the analysis and assessment may not be able to personally see the
sites. This can be due to transportation or scheduling limitations. The number of personnel physically on
the study team may also be limited due to increased threat, especially in a contingency environment. Aerial
or satellite photographs of the AO can be extremely helpful to the traffic study team.
6-57. GIS tools can be helpful in producing incident maps with overlay data. GIS software can enhance
traffic analysis through layered graphics; blended geographic data; and descriptive information to map
places, events, and incidents to identify patterns and associations relevant to traffic management. (See
ATP 3-34.80 and ATTP 3-39.20 for additional information on GIS.)
TRAFFIC STUDY METHODS
6-58. There are several methods that can be used to study traffic flow and traffic control measures. The
methods used depend on the specific study being conducted. Multiple methods can be used simultaneously.
These methods typically involve vehicle and driver surveys (used to capture information [driving habits,
trip purposes]), vehicle counts, and movement characteristics (number of passes, average speed, weight
specifications). Traffic studies are most constrained by the ability to gain cooperation and willing
participants. Typical traffic study methods include—
z
Mailed or distributed questionnaires. On bases and base camps, questionnaires can be the
most effective survey means based on cost versus benefit. Vehicle registration records can be
used to obtain mailing lists for the questionnaires, or the questionnaires can be distributed at
access control points. Developing mailing lists in support of contingency operations within
urban areas overseas may be problematic. Further, HN mail systems may be inadequate or
nonexistent. Checkpoints can provide a means for distribution within HN environments,
although obtaining survey returns may be problematic. A large sample population must be
included to compensate for historically low response rates.
z
Roadside interviews. While manpower-intensive, roadside interviews may be the most
productive method, especially within HN populations, although language barriers and interpreter
support must be considered. The greatest challenge is determining a location that will minimally
affect traffic flow while allowing access to the appropriate target population. This method is not
generally effective for high-volume highway studies due to traffic flow and safety
considerations. Roadside interviews are typically conducted where traffic can be channelized
into a checkpoint area. In general, military police should—
Interview 50 percent of drivers during nonpeak hours and 25 percent of drivers during peak
hours.
Ensure that interview stations are visible and safe.
Maximize contacts by arranging several interviewing stations on a lane; there should not be
more than five interviewers in a single lane.
Mitigate delays by ensuring that each interview takes no more than 30 to 40 seconds.
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ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
Traffic Management and Enforcement
z
Travel diaries. This is a technique where the public is requested to keep a detailed account of
their travel habits
(times, purposes, types of transportation, frequency) and other pertinent
information. Travel diaries are largely constrained by the willingness of the public to participate.
z
Home interviews. Home interviews are very resource-intensive and time-consuming operations.
Because they are conducted in person, home interviews can provide explanations of intent and
survey clarity. They can also provide a means for military police personnel to interact with the
public and foster community support.
6-59. Typical traffic counting methods include—
z
Installing hardware on or into the roadway. With the exception of pneumatic tubes, these devices
are installed by engineers and are not typically employed by military police. Military police may
coordinate with traffic engineers to obtain data from these devices.
Electronic or magnetic sensors. These devices are typically installed within the grooves in
the road. Depending on the capability of the sensors used, they can detect vehicle movement
(numbers), weight, and speed.
Pneumatic road tubes. This method consists of a rubber tube placed across the lanes of the
road. Pressure exerted on the tube activates an attached counting mechanism. It can count
the number of axle movements over the roadway. The tubes are temporary mechanisms that
are relatively easy to emplace and remove.
Plate sensors. These devises are installed within the roadway and have the capability of
measuring vehicle weight and speed.
z
Conducting assessments from areas adjacent to the roadway.
Manual observation. This is the most common method. Manual observation involves
placing personnel at specific locations to record vehicle and pedestrian movements. These
counts can be done manually and totaled on standardized logs for compilation and analysis.
In some cases, mechanical or electronic counting mechanisms may be employed. Manual
observation allows observers to document traffic numbers, types, and directions of travel.
This observation method presents a higher level of risk for the study team in areas with
heavy traffic or where the threat level is high.
Sensors. A variety of sensors are available that can be placed above the roadway (from
bridges, overpasses, or other structures) or along the side of the roadway. The types of
sensors vary; they include passive infrared, acoustic, and microwave. These sensors can
detect the presence, speed, and type of vehicle. Depending on the type of sensor employed,
the weather, backg2round noise, or other environmental conditions can limit its capabilities.
Video image detection. This technology uses video cameras and associated software
applications to record vehicle numbers, types, and speed.
TRAFFIC STUDY TYPES
6-60. Traffic studies are conducted to gather specific data relevant to traffic flow and traffic control. Many
of these studies will be conducted simultaneously; the data collected from a single study will generally be
considered along with data from other studies. The studies discussed in this section include—
z
Traffic control device.
Signs.
Signals.
Pavement markings.
Camera, radar, and other detection devices.
z
Origin destination.
z
Vehicle occupancy.
z
Pedestrian.
z
Speed.
z
Speed delay.
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
6-13
Chapter 6
z
Vehicle volume.
z
Traffic collision.
Traffic Control Device Studies
6-61. Traffic control device studies are conducted to determine if devices are adequate (in numbers or
types) and if they are placed in a manner that safely and effectively achieves the desired effect. Typically,
traffic control device studies are conducted to determine the initial requirements and placement of traffic
control devices. In mature areas, this will generally be in conjunction with new roadway construction or
major revisions to a road or road network. These studies will typically be conducted by traffic engineers
with input from, and coordination with, other technical specialists (military police, safety personnel). In
contingency environments where the road infrastructure has been destroyed or is primitive, large-scale
traffic control device studies are required as a precursor to major construction. Traffic engineers will lead
the study, and other specialists support the effort.
6-62. Following the initial study and subsequent emplacement of traffic control devices, personnel should
periodically conduct follow-up studies to ensure that the device remains effective. Scheduled cyclic studies
are typically conducted by the supporting city or other supporting civil engineer assets. Changes in the
environment (new roads, building infrastructure, degradation of roadways), especially those that alter
traffic patterns, may render existing traffic control devices ineffective or even dangerous. These changes
result in the requirement for a traffic control device study. These cyclic studies may occur annually,
monthly, or at other intervals based on the operational environment and conditions specific to the locations.
Military police conduct cyclic traffic device studies on a limited basis when appropriate engineer assets are
unavailable.
6-63. Traffic control device studies can also be initiated based on problem areas identified through
community complaints, traffic collision data, or traffic disruptions documented by LE patrols on daily
patrol reports. Military police, due to their patrol presence across the AO and visibility over traffic
collisions and disruptions, are uniquely positioned to identify these disruptions and the requirements for
conducting device studies. Areas and conditions identified by military police as traffic problem areas
represent the primary instances where military police assets will conduct traffic control device studies.
6-64. The following types of traffic control devices may be studied separately or in combination:
z
Signs. Signs are used to regulate, warn, or guide traffic. These devices include automated signs
used to pass important hazards or threat warnings to the public.
Evaluating conditions.
Indicating inventory.
Validating placement locations.
Confirming adequacy of an intended message.
z
Signals. Signals are used to regulate, warn, or guide traffic. The purpose of these powered or
automated devices is the same as for signs.
z
Pavement markings. Pavement markings are used to regulate, warn, or guide. This includes
lines, patterns, words, and other markings set into pavement or curbing. These markings are all
studied for the same reasons.
z
Camera, radar, and other detection devices. These devices are used to monitor traffic flow,
capture the speed of vehicles violating traffic regulations, or capture and display vehicle speed
for driver awareness and deterrent effect.
Sign Studies
6-65. Sign studies can be conducted to determine the need for keeping, replacing, or adding signs. Study
teams can collect data for the analysis of the relationship between driver obedience to posted signs and
collision frequencies. Sign studies can enable military police to make recommendations on how to improve
driver obedience; this may include selective enforcement, education, sign relocation, fresh paint, reflective
material, or a combination of these measures.
6-14
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
Traffic Management and Enforcement
6-66. Sign studies include the determination of sign—
z
Type. The study team may determine that a change to current signage is required; for example, a
stop sign may no longer be needed and should be replaced by a yield sign.
z
Size and shape. Sign size and shape are typically standardized. In foreign countries, military
police must use the standard established and understood by the HN.
z
Color. Sign color is also standardized. The team should examine existing signs for fading or
alteration due to vandalism. Signs may require replacement if excessive degradation of the sign
is identified.
z
Reflectivity. The reflective property on signs must allow visibility at night to allow for sufficient
reaction time. Maintenance is required if additional reflective material or sign replacement is
deemed necessary to correct degraded reflectivity.
z
Location (including sign visibility). The team determines sign placement, including distances
from pavements or curbs, distances from intersections, heights, and other key characteristics
unique to specific locations. Signs should be placed in locations where the target population can
observe the device and have adequate time to react. Sign movement or additional signage may
be recommended. Trees, shrubs, walls, or other objects may obstruct views.
z
Driver compliance. Key to the overall intent of sign studies is the determination of driver
compliance. The level of driver compliance can be attributed to many possible factors, to include
those previously listed. However, driver noncompliance may not be a result of failure to observe
or understand traffic control signs or other devices. In these instances, targeted enforcement by
LE at identified problem areas may be required.
6-67. The data from sign studies is organized for analysis and assessment by military police and staffs from
other study teams represented. The results of subsequent analyses and assessments can be used to
determine a need for—
z
Improved sign compliance through targeted enforcement and traffic control measures. (Facts
from this study can be used to justify the need to the public.)
z
Removed or modified sign types at intersections where a combination of the following factors
exist:
Intersection views are unobstructed and allow a clear view and adequate reaction time for
motorists, typically in areas where speed is low. Care should be taken when recommending
a reduction in control measures at any intersection where posted speed limits are high.
Vehicular conflicts at the intersection are not a problem.
Traffic collision rates at the location are extremely low.
6-68. A lack of visibility may often be a reason for noncompliance. Obstructions affecting visibility may
include—
z
Hourly or seasonal variations (weather, leaves, branches on trees, parked cars).
z
Man-made obstructions (buildings, fences).
z
Separations between the driver and the sign. On wide, multilane streets, drivers on interior lanes
may not observe signs placed on the shoulder of the road. This can be corrected by putting
another sign in a center median (if available) or emplacing overhead traffic control devices.
6-69. Reflective markings on the pavement may be used to complement existing traffic control devices and
help alert motorists of traffic control requirements.
Signal Studies
6-70. Signal studies are performed to check driver compliance of traffic control signals, typically at
intersections. They can be used to determine a need for targeted enforcement, education, signal retiming, or
other physical changes.
6-71. Traffic control signals at intersections permit conflicting traffic movements to occur in an orderly
and safe manner through a common space. The various traffic movements, whether pedestrian or vehicular,
are signaled to move for specified periods or phases.
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Chapter 6
6-72. Traffic control signals are studied to identify and document—
z
Signal type. The signal may be a fixed-time, flashing, traffic-actuated, or another type.
z
Location and position. Signals may be centered over the intersection, over each lane direction,
mounted on poles on the side of the roadway, or in other configurations.
z
Physical information. This information includes the size of the signal, number of lights,
presence of shields or other devices to control visibility, and other characteristics.
z
Phasing
(the time the light is applicable to each direction at an intersection). The
movements at an intersection are grouped; these groups of movements make up a separate phase.
Each phase of a signal is devoted to only one set of movements. The movements within a phase
are those that can proceed concurrently without major conflict. Movements are sometimes
allowed to occur simultaneously, even though minor conflicts are possible. Pedestrians can
typically cross intersections while turning movements are occurring; these actions are known as
permitted movements. A movement that occurs without any simultaneous permitted movement
is known as a protected movement. A traffic control signal allowing only one movement to
occur while all others are halted (such as a left turn across the roadway) is an example of a
protected movement.
z
Phase timing (green, amber, and red time). Timing refers to the length or duration of elements
within a given phase (such as the respective duration of each light interval [green, amber, and
red or the interval between green lights]). Important timing intervals for traffic control signals
include the—
Green interval. Green interval is the period of the phase during which the green signal is
illuminated.
Amber interval. Amber interval is the period of the phase during which the amber light is
illuminated.
Red interval. Red interval is the period of the phase during which the red light is
illuminated.
Effective green time. Effective green time is the total time spanning the green and amber
intervals. This is the actual time that movement through an intersection (with respect to that
light phase) is allowed.
All-red interval. All-red interval is any period or interval when all of the intersection
signals are red.
Intergreen interval. Intergreen interval is the time between the end of a green light for one
phase and the beginning of a green light for the subsequent phase.
Pedestrian walk interval. Pedestrian walk interval is the time during which the pedestrian
is signaled to cross the roadway. Typically, a pedestrian signal interval is 4 to 7 seconds.
(The pedestrian crossing time should be based on the average time required for a pedestrian
to cross the intersection.) The pedestrian crossing time must be totally within the green
interval for vehicular traffic traveling the same direction as the pedestrian right-of-way. In
some instances, especially for extremely wide roadways and heavy traffic areas, pedestrian
movements may be isolated phases (no other movements allowed) and timing may be
increased.
z
Cycle times. A cycle is one complete iterative sequence of all phases of the signal.
6-73. Typically, a signal study is conducted with observers on opposite, diagonal corners of the
intersection. In this manner, each team element can check traffic in two lanes, alternating to the left and
right. This requirement is due to the traffic flow and increased fluidity associated with signaled
intersections. If a specific trigger initiated the study (high vehicle collision rates, extreme congestion),
personnel should ensure that the study is conducted during the same time of the day and days of the week
associated with the trigger event.
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Traffic Management and Enforcement
6-74. Additional team members for specific sites may be required in some circumstances. Factors that may
increase team size requirements include studies conducted—
z
On multilane intersections.
z
In higher-threat environments.
z
Where high pedestrian traffic is involved concurrently with associated vehicular traffic.
6-75. Data from traffic signal studies is organized for analysis and assessment by military police and staffs
from other study teams represented. The results of subsequent analyses and assessments can be used to
determine the need—
z
For a special enforcement program to improve signal compliance. (Facts of this study can be
used to justify this need to the public.)
z
To make physical changes to traffic signals.
Faulty timing. Faulty timing may be responsible for some compliance problems,
particularly if the phases are too short.
Lights placed at improper angles. Improper placement may allow both approaches to see
lights at the same time, thus creating confusion. This can be corrected by using hoods or
louvers.
Physical locations. Signals at complex intersections may be confusing. An assessment of
repositioning options may be warranted.
Stop lines or other pavement markings. Adding pavement markings can increase reaction
time and driver awareness. Directional lights may be necessary at intersections with a high
number of left turns.
z
To improve the visibility of signals.
Hourly or seasonal changes. These changes may include foliage or the position of the sun
in the morning or late afternoon.
Hoods and louvers. These devices may be used to shade the signal and help reduce glare if
the sun is causing visibility problems.
Illuminated advertising signs. These types of signs may interfere with signal observation.
Pavement Marking Studies
6-76. Pavement markings are the lines, patterns, words, and other markings set into the pavement or
curbing. They can be used to mark areas restricted from vehicular traffic (fire lanes, no parking zones).
They can also be used to identify the roadway (such as in highway confidence markings). Pavement
markings can provide advanced warning of turn lanes or exit ramps. They are used extensively to identify
stop lines and pedestrian crosswalks. Pavement markings are typically used to augment or enhance existing
traffic control measures to increase awareness and compliance. When studying pavement markings,
personnel should check the marking—
z
Type. The marking types include solid lines, double lines, or left-turn lines.
z
Visibility. The marking visibility is determined by condition and reflectivity.
z
Material. The material used on the marking includes paint or other material.
z
Measurement. The marking measurement includes line length and width.
6-77. Data from pavement marking studies is organized for analysis and assessment by military police and
staffs from other study team capabilities represented. The results of subsequent analyses and assessments
can be used to determine the need to—
z
Improve pavement marking compliance observance through targeted enforcement and traffic
control measures. Facts from this study can be used to justify the need to the public.
z
Make markings more visible. The lack of visibility may be caused by the fading or degradation
of reflective material and may often be the reason for noncompliance.
z
Add pavement markings where none currently exist to augment existing traffic control measures.
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Chapter 6
Camera, Radar, and Other Detection Device Studies
6-78. Camera, radar, and other detection device studies are typically focused on obtaining data that
assesses the effectiveness of the device or increased compliance. These devices are used to monitor traffic
flow, capture the speed of vehicles violating traffic regulations, or capture and display vehicle speed for
driver awareness and a deterrent effect. These devices are typically employed in problem areas as an
additional traffic control measure to existing signs, signals, or markings. Their employment is typically
based on staff recommendations to provide additional control measures in problem areas as an economy of
force measure. When assessments of the effectiveness of these devices result in further noncompliance,
targeted enforcement by LE patrols is typically warranted.
Origin Destination Studies
6-79. An origin destination study is used to determine travel patterns for traffic in an AO during a typical
day. It is useful in assisting long-range traffic planning, especially when there are substantial changes
anticipated in the AO or mission. An origin destination study is conducted to determine the amount of
traffic and the impact of movement on an AO. The study focuses on three categories of movement or trips,
defined as one-way movement, from start point (origin) to end point (destination).
6-80. Trips are further classified as—
z
Internal. Internal is defined as one point to another point within a given area (assigned AO, city
boundary).
z
External. External is defined as a given area (assigned AO, city boundary) to a destination
outside the area or vice versa.
z
Through. Through is defined as trips traveling through the AO, with a start point and an end
point outside the area (assigned AO, city boundary).
6-81. Typically, origin destination studies are conducted using questionnaires, roadside interviews, or
home interviews. The exact method must be determined ahead of time, based on the characteristics of the
AO, time constraints, and other factors. The number of personnel needed to conduct this study depends on
the method of study used. A sampling of the typical traffic is taken. Based on the extrapolation of the data
collected, an estimate of the percentages for each type of movement (internal, external, or through) can be
determined. The greater the number of samples, the greater the accuracy of the study. To encourage
cooperation, the community should be made aware in advance of the reasons for the study. Information
concerning the study should be disseminated to the public.
6-82. Questions directed to the public in an origin destination study may include the following:
z
How do you normally travel to and from your place of duty?
Do you drive a car?
Are you a passenger in a car?
Do you take public transportation?
Do you walk?
z
Please answer the following if you drive a car:
How many people are typically in the car (include self)?
Where does your trip originate (street address, city)?
What is your normal route?
Where do you park your car upon arrival at your destination (parking lot location or
identification, nearby building number or landmark, or nearest intersection)?
Where do you work?
What is your destination and the destination of other members in your car pool?
What is the normal time for your commute?
What are your normal alternate routes in the event of delays?
6-83. Information from these studies can be used to anticipate present and future traffic patterns, especially
the future demand on the road network, when data from consecutive studies is compared and analyzed.
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Traffic Management and Enforcement
When compiling data, samples should be collected to provide representative percentages for a 24-hour
period. Origin destination studies can provide information concerning the—
z
Number of trips into, within, and through an AO.
z
Time of day, mode of travel, and number of occupants in a vehicle during a trip.
z
Current travel patterns, areas that generate the most traffic, and efficiency of traffic lanes
concerning flow and safety.
z
Evaluations of the general road plan and current or foreseeable problems.
z
Need for revised flow patterns, alternate routes, new streets, and parking areas.
z
Parking patterns in major functional areas of the AO.
Vehicle Occupancy Studies
6-84. Vehicle occupancy studies are used to determine the number of occupants in each vehicle passing a
given location or entering or exiting a particular road. These studies can be used in conjunction with
volume studies and are generally used to determine vehicle occupancy during peak traffic times. Vehicle
occupancy studies are typically manual counts that require study teams to position themselves where they
can observe the target traffic flow and personnel inside the vehicles. Data is tabulated to reflect the number
of persons within a vehicle and the direction of travel. To ensure that enough data is collected to be
statistically relevant, at least 500 vehicles should be counted at each location.
6-85. A vehicle occupancy study is typically conducted within a time period before significant increases in
traffic flow begins (during shift changes, morning or evening rush hours) and after significant traffic flow
has ended. The exact window should be determined by staff, based on local traffic patterns and other
requirements. Separate counts can be made for morning peak, evening peak, and other peak traffic periods.
Comparison data can also be collected during nonpeak times. Counts of passenger cars, trucks, and military
vehicles should be in separate categories. Counts of buses or other mass transit can typically be obtained
from transit system records. The results of the study can be used to determine the current use of—
z
Car pools. The need for encouraging carpooling or the evaluation of requirements to establish a
car pool program to mitigate traffic congestion.
z
Public transportation. Available public transportation and the need for future public transit
systems or capacity.
z
Parking facilities. Current parking facilities and requirements for the construction of additional
facilities.
z
Networks. Networks and potential requirements for additional road capacity.
Pedestrian Studies
6-86. Pedestrian studies are used to determine if any pedestrian-vehicle conflicts exist at certain locations.
They are also used to establish the need for special precautions at high accident locations or other
congested areas (schools, hospitals, troop areas). The resulting data is typically a manual count, obtained by
a study team using mechanical counters. Counts should be tabulated at 15- or 30-minute intervals. This
enables analysts to isolate and compare pedestrian traffic at specific time frames and with corresponding
vehicle traffic volumes.
6-87. Counts should be made during peak pedestrian hours; the hours should be tailored to meet the
characteristics of the specific AO. If service facilities (shopping, other commercial areas) are studied,
counts should be made on days of heavy use. The results of pedestrian studies can be used to determine
the—
z
Need for pedestrian protection measures (sidewalks, fences, crosswalks).
z
Pedestrian traffic interference with vehicle turning. These determinations can result in
recommendations to adjust traffic signals.
z
Need for school crossing guards.
z
Extent and impact of jaywalking. Where jaywalking is deemed hazardous, remedial action may
be necessary. This is typically focused on public education campaigns as a first effort, followed
by further traffic control or enforcement measures (if necessary).
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Chapter 6
Speed Studies
6-88. Speed studies measure vehicle speeds at specific locations. The intent is to measure vehicle speeds to
determine what the maximum and minimum safe speeds are for the given roadway. To be reflective of
normal driving behavior, the study should be made in good weather and without military police presence.
Military police observers, who are not in military police uniform, should be inconspicuously located while
collecting data. The speed detection equipment used should not be mounted on an LE vehicle. Speeds
should be checked on a controlled basis (such as every second or third vehicle). The study should not be
conducted at a location that has recently been subjected to a speed enforcement program.
6-89. Speed study data is typically collected over a 24-hour period, and it is spread across three time
periods (morning, afternoon, and evening) at each location to capture an accurate representation of vehicle
speeds across the entire period (peak traffic times should be excluded). Each location should be studied for
at least 1 hour, with a minimum of 50 vehicle speeds collected (the more samples collected, the more
accurate the study). Data is tabulated and grouped by speed and type of vehicle (passenger or commercial).
6-90. Only free-floating vehicles should be checked. Free-floating vehicles are driven by persons who are
free to choose their own speed
(not restricted by traffic congestion, groups of vehicles, or other
environmental conditions that would artificially slow their travel). Study personnel should only check the
lead vehicle in a line or group of vehicles. They should not measure the speed of vehicles changing lanes,
passing, or turning. Speed studies are typically conducted at—
z
Roadways that have recently had changes in the speed limit or where existing speed limits need
to be evaluated.
z
Locations where traffic control devices are proposed.
z
Major thoroughfares.
z
Locations with high collision frequencies.
6-91. Personnel analyzing data received in a speed study must consider the maximum and minimum speeds
in normal conditions. The average speed is not useful. The maximum safe speed is typically considered to
be in the 85th percentile; the minimum safe speed is in the 15th percentile. To obtain percentile averages,
use the following:
z
Find the total number of vehicles checked (cumulative total).
z
Find 15 percent of this total number (multiply the number by 0.15). Round the results to the
nearest whole number.
z
Subtract this 15 percent from the cumulative total. The result is the 85th percentile.
z
Find the total number of vehicles traveling in each speed classification. (For example, one
vehicle was traveling 66.6 miles per hour, three vehicles were traveling 60.0 miles per hour, and
two vehicles were traveling 54.5 miles per hour.) List groupings on a table from fastest to
slowest. In the cumulative total column, insert a running total.
z
Start at the top of the cumulative total column (the highest speed recorded), and add the numbers
downward until the number most equal to 15 percent of the total is found. This is the 85
percentile.
z
Subtract 85 percent from the cumulative total to get the 15th percentile.
6-92. Speed studies are conducted to determine the—
z
Proper speeds for new or improved roads. A speed study shows statistically the maximum and
minimum safe driving speeds. From this information, speed limits can be set (or readjusted).
z
Posted speeds that require revision. If the speed study reflects the 85th percentile (speeds grossly
inconsistent with posted speed limits), revision to the posted speed may warrant additional
assessment.
z
Traffic control devices that are needed. A study helps determine where traffic control devices are
needed to encourage safe approach speeds to intersections or dangerous locations.
z
Potential cause and effect relationships between speed and the number of accidents (requires
correlation to collision data).
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Traffic Management and Enforcement
6-93. Additionally, speed studies can help military police to—
z
Determine compliance with established speed limits, including the effectiveness of speed control
programs and the need for change in the enforcement program.
z
Determine the appropriate timing on traffic signals. For example, the timing of an amber traffic
signal depends on the speed of approaching traffic. Speed limits are never set to match the
timing of signals.
z
Prepare traffic speed maps showing areas where slow speeds cause congestion and fast speeds
create danger areas.
z
Determine if complaints about speeding are justified.
Speed Delay Studies
6-94. Speed delay studies are used to determine speed variations along particular routes at different times;
the number, location, cause, frequency, and duration of delays; and the overall speed and travel time along
a route. A speed delay study shows overall speed and moving speeds between specified locations. It shows
delay times and the cause, frequency, and location of delays. Although speed delay studies target peak
traffic times, nonpeak times can also be measured for comparison data.
6-95. The speed delay study requires a driver and a recorder. The study teams travel along predetermined
routes. The length of the routes and predetermined landmarks should be identified before the study. The
study should be conducted during peak hours, and multiple teams should conduct studies on the same day.
6-96. The study vehicle enters the mainstream of traffic at the starting point. If more than one car is used
on the same route, start times should be staggered. The recorder documents the start time, the odometer
reading at the beginning of the route, the elapsed time, the odometer reading when passing the
predetermined landmarks, and the time and odometer reading at the end of the route. The location, nature,
and time of delays are also recorded. A stopwatch is used to time delays. Delays are anytime the study car
is not moving (at stop signs or signals, while waiting to make left turns, because of congestion). Speed
delay studies can help military police—
z
Map travel speeds on different routes to determine the most efficient routes of travel.
z
Locate points of congestion and insufficient road capacity.
z
Evaluate traffic control devices and the adequacy of posted speed limits.
z
Determine priorities for traffic control and road construction programs.
z
Study emergency vehicle movement times at different times of the day.
Vehicle Volume Studies
6-97. Vehicle volume studies are conducted to obtain information on the number, direction, and variations
of vehicle traffic passing through an intersection or along a major route. Vehicle counts are typically
conducted over 12- or 24-hour periods and include peak traffic times. Vehicle volume studies should be
conducted on normal workdays and during good weather conditions to obtain normal volume counts. The
count should begin 30 minutes before peak traffic periods and end 30 minutes after each peak period.
Vehicle volume studies are typically conducted manually by the study team. Traffic counts should be
collected in tabular form and grouped in 15- or 30-minute intervals. Vehicle counts should also be tabulated
by vehicle actions at intersections (straight, right turn, or left turn).
6-98. Security personnel typically maintain traffic counts as part of their normal duties at access control
points supporting bases and base camps. This same requirement can be replicated for security personnel at
access control posts and checkpoints during contingency operations. Counting mechanisms (pneumatic
road tubes, sensors) can be employed along straight roadways or access points when vehicle turning
movements are not relevant to the study.
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Chapter 6
6-99. The information gathered in a vehicle volume study is typically used in conjunction with other study
data (such as traffic control device studies). The data can be used to—
z
Study traffic control devices and their effectiveness. The study may justify the existence or need
for—
Fixed-time or traffic-actuated signals.
Stop signs, speed zones, or pavement markings.
Manned TCPs at specified locations and times.
z
Analyze other studies and evaluate the number of collisions based on volume and directional
movement.
z
Assess the need for street lighting and signals by comparing day and night traffic volume to day
and night collision frequency.
z
Assess future requirements (through streets, secondary roads, roadway improvements).
Traffic Collision Studies
6-100. The purpose of studying traffic collisions is to identify problem areas and measures to increase
traffic safety and to reduce the frequency of collisions. Traffic collision prevention programs require the
continuous study of collisions, violations, and mitigation measures to reduce traffic collisions. Traffic
collision studies enable PMs, military police commanders, and staff to identify trends, patterns, and
associations, enabling the—
z
Identification of high collision rate locations.
z
Evaluation of roadway design factors.
z
Planning of traffic control and targeted enforcement measures to reduce traffic collisions.
z
Evaluation of traffic control and enforcement measure effectiveness.
6-101. The validity of an analysis depends on the accuracy of the raw information that is obtained. This
fact is particularly important when studying collision causes. Military police can extract a large amount of
collision data from the COPS database. When military police are supporting HN police activities, accident
analysis relevant to HN populations and locations is required. Also, other means of data retrieval may be
needed. HN LE organizations may or may not have detailed traffic collision information. The information
they do have may be in the form of hardcopy collision files or in relatively modern, automated databases.
Military police must work closely with the HN to obtain the data required to conduct relevant traffic
collision analysis.
6-102. Collisions occur because of a variety of factors and in complex combinations. Phrases (following
too closely, speed excessive for conditions) are often insufficient to provide for valid analysis. Military
police staff and analysts should be cautious when interpreting traffic collision cases using subjective
language that is not measurable. Traffic collision studies require military police to—
z
Obtain collision data. The following information should be obtained:
Location.
Date and time (hour, day, month, and year).
Cause.
Type.
Light and weather conditions.
Driver’s name, age, sex, and experience level.
Seat belt usage.
Command or unit involved.
Traffic controls.
Injuries or fatalities.
z
Identify high collision rate locations.
z
Review or prepare collision and condition diagrams.
z
Conduct field observations at the location during conditions similar to those present at the time
of the collision.
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Traffic Management and Enforcement
z
Summarize facts.
z
Analyze facts and field data and recommend corrective actions.
Mapping
6-103. The mapping of incidents is critical to the identification of high collision rate locations. Some
collisions may require unique representation on the map to differentiate them from other collisions.
Collisions should be plotted by type. For example, fatality collisions, injury collisions, and collisions
involving alcohol or other substance abuse will typically be represented differently than minor collisions
with relatively little damage and no injuries. Traffic collision maps can be created manually using pins,
stickers, or other physical mediums affixed on a map of the AO. GIS applications can also be used to plot
collisions and display detailed environmental features, equipment, and other terrain features relevant to
studying collisions and specific collision locations.
Collision Diagrams
6-104. A collision diagram is used for the study and analysis of particular intersections or curves where a
number of collisions have occurred. The diagram consists of an outline map of the location and symbols
that show the direction of vehicle and pedestrian movement that were involved in collisions. If stationary
objects are important in collisions, they should be included in the diagram. Each diagram should—
z
Include a drawing of the intersection.
z
Identify the diagram.
z
Identify the streets shown.
z
Plot collisions.
Direction of travel.
Date of collision.
Time.
Road conditions.
Weather conditions.
Contributing factors
(defective vehicle equipment, equipment failure
[including traffic
control devices], intoxication or other impairment, environmental considerations).
6-105. Care should be taken to ensure that the collision diagrams do not show different sets of
circumstances affecting the scene (such as diagrams showing an intersection before and after a stop sign
has been installed). Collision diagrams should be analyzed for points of similarity. These points may
include—
z
Collision patterns involving vehicles traveling in the same direction (a collision caused by a
vehicle traveling northbound and another vehicle traveling eastbound that causes a head-on
collision, a collision involving eastbound and southbound vehicles at the same intersection).
z
Collisions of one type (cars turning left).
z
Collisions occurring during one season of the year.
z
Collisions occurring at a certain time of day or during certain lighting conditions.
z
Collisions occurring under the same weather conditions.
Condition Diagrams
6-106. When conducting traffic collision studies at a specific site, personnel will use additional detailed
information during the analysis process. A condition diagram that provides an accurate picture of the
physical conditions present at the location being studied can provide insight into the causes or contributing
factors of other collisions at the location. This information can provide insight into the effects that
obstructions can have on a driver’s view and road conditions.
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Chapter 6
6-107. Condition diagrams may indicate that view obstructions are contributory causes of collisions. A
driver proceeding at normal speed on one street should be able to see another vehicle approaching at
normal speed from an intersecting street. Obstructions reduce this ability. A driver should have the time
and visibility to react and stop or slow a vehicle to avoid a collision. Obstructions increase stopping
distances. Elements that should be annotated on a condition diagram include—
z
Curbs.
z
Roadway limits.
z
Property lines.
z
Sidewalks.
z
Driveways.
z
View obstructions on corners.
z
Physical obstructions on roadway.
z
Ditches.
z
Bridges.
z
Traffic signals.
z
Signs.
z
Pavement markings.
z
Streetlights.
z
Grades.
z
Road surfaces.
z
Types of adjacent property.
z
Irregularities (potholes, dips).
6-108. Personnel can obtain some diagram information from traffic collision reports and associated
collision diagrams. If the collisions are relatively recent, a site visit can provide required detail. Personnel
can prepare a condition diagram in conjunction with a field observation of the collision location. Field
observations should be made under the same weather and light conditions present during most traffic
collisions.
6-109. After a traffic collision study is completed, recommendations for improvements should be made.
These recommendations may include—
z
Changes to traffic control devices and measures (repairs, modifications, or emplacements).
z
The removal of obstructions at high accident locations.
z
Safety and education programs.
z
Targeted enforcement measures.
TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT
6-110. The enforcement of traffic laws and regulations is an important public safety activity. The purpose
of traffic enforcement is to ensure that roads are safe for all traffic and to compel compliance with traffic
laws by motorists. Traffic enforcement is conducted when traffic control measures alone (traffic control
devices, public education campaigns) are ineffective in compelling compliance with traffic regulations,
restrictions, and other safety mechanisms required to protect persons, resources, and traffic flow. An
effective traffic enforcement program requires highly trained TMCIs. These specialized investigators are
subject matter experts in the laws and methods encompassed in executing traffic programs and conducting
traffic collision investigations.
6-111. Traffic enforcement is routinely employed in support of bases and base camps. In an effort to
reduce vehicle collisions and prevent injury or death to U.S. forces or local citizens, traffic enforcement can
also be employed during contingency operations as the AO matures to enforce command safety directives.
Typically, these traffic enforcement measures are conducted as a part of the overall police mission by
military police in support of base and other geographic commanders.
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6-112. Military police may also be required to enforce traffic regulations on an HN population (to
maintain an adequate level of civil control on the roadways and to conduct effective traffic management)
until HN capability and capacity can be generated. The enforcement of traffic laws on an HN population
should be done consistently with HN laws to the greatest extent possible. The unnecessary enforcement of
traffic control measures not consistent with HN laws and customs typically results in excessive
noncompliance, animosity toward U.S. forces, and the loss of credibility and legitimacy for U.S. forces in
the eyes of the local population. When traffic control measures must be enforced to protect personnel and
resources, extensive police engagement and other information strategies should be employed to educate the
HN population and ensure that traffic control requirements are understood.
TARGETED TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT
6-113. Targeted or selective enforcement is designed to compel compliance with traffic control
regulations and devices and to lessen the probability of traffic collisions at targeted high-risk locations or
areas. Noncompliant behavior is identified through citizen complaints, traffic studies, or other analysis of
police information. During targeted or selective enforcement operations, select traffic patrol assets are
assigned to areas or intersections with specific enforcement guidance targeting specific, identified behavior
problems (specific times, locations, violations to be targeted). Proper data collection and analysis are
necessary for effective, targeted traffic enforcement activities.
6-114. Continuous analysis and assessment of traffic flow, collision rates, compliance with traffic control
measures, and other applicable data are critical for accurate and informed targeting decisions. After a
targeted enforcement activity is initiated, data is gathered for analysis to assess the effectiveness of the
specific enforcement activity. Modifications to targeted traffic enforcement strategies may be necessary
based on the feedback and analysis of existing activities. Based on the analysis and assessment of traffic-
related data, targeted enforcement allows PMs, military police commanders, and staffs to better allocate
limited traffic enforcement resources. The dispersion of limited resources and the targeting of identified
problem areas facilitate the most effective use of LE assets to protect personnel and resources, while
mitigating traffic disruptions caused by traffic collisions.
6-115. When significant traffic problems are identified, saturation enforcement can be conducted.
Saturation enforcement measures are typically an option of last resort when other measures prove
ineffective. During saturation enforcement, LE patrols converge on the specified problem area in much
larger numbers than during typical targeted enforcement activities. While conducting saturation
enforcement, patrols are typically instructed to enforce a no-tolerance policy for traffic violations.
Saturation enforcement is extremely manpower- and resource-intensive; it diverts LE resources from other
areas to focus on problem areas. Saturation enforcement can also result in public backlash caused by a
perception that LE elements are being unfairly stringent on a particular segment of the community.
CHECKPOINT OPERATIONS
6-116. Checkpoint operations conducted by military police are command-authorized inspections. The
purpose of checkpoint operations, within the context of traffic enforcement, is to create a deterrent effect
(perception of increased risk of detection, citation, and possible apprehension for traffic-related violations).
Checkpoint operations on bases and base camps during contingency operations can be incorporated into
existing random antiterrorism measures directed by the command and implemented by Army LE. Public
information and education should be integral parts of vigorous enforcement program.
6-117. Military police checkpoint operations are conducted routinely to suppress violations of driving
under the influence; enforce vehicle inspections, registrations, and driver licensing requirements; and
address other public safety concerns. Effective checkpoint operations require extensive planning and
coordination.
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Chapter 6
6-118. Some factors to consider when implementing checkpoint operations include—
z
Policies and procedures. Checkpoint operations should be conducted consistent with
established command and LE policies. Military police must have specific procedures outlining
the conduct of checkpoint operations that address checkpoint requirements
(manpower,
equipment, logistical support, safety, communications, transportation). Advanced mission
planning and rehearsals are critical.
z
Safe locations for checkpoints. The primary concern in checkpoint sites is the safety of the
general public and LE personnel. Checkpoint sites should—
Be located in an area that can be controlled by LE personnel.
Be located in sufficient space to establish inspection areas out of the traffic lanes and allow
vehicles not selected for inspection to proceed with minimal delay and disruption. These
inspection areas should allow for easy exit from, and reentry into, the flow of traffic.
Afford adequate visibility for approaching drivers and sufficient lighting within the
checkpoint and inspection area.
Accommodate higher force protection conditions when located within contingency
environments where an elevated threat level is present. The site should include areas where
Soldiers can engage threats from a covered position. Overwatch elements should be
included in the site security plan.
z
Traffic control devices. Drivers should have clear warning and visibility access to checkpoints
well in advance of any required action on their part. Warning methods could include—
Warning signs, flares, safety cones, portable barriers, and other portable traffic control
devices for marking or closing lanes.
Portable lighting systems to illuminate an area. Care must be taken to ensure that lighting
does not blind approaching drivers.
Marked patrol vehicles with warning lights flashing to effectively warn approaching drivers.
When conducting operations with tactical vehicles, personnel should position vehicles with
headlights and flashers operating to provide adequate warning to approaching drivers.
z
Legal requirements. Coordination should be conducted with the supporting SJA to ensure that
planned checkpoint operations are legally sound. Checkpoint operations must not target specific
individuals or groups
(profiling). To withstand scrutiny allegations and legal challenges,
operations must be conducted in a manner that ensures that the persons inspected are chosen
randomly. The SJA can provide advice and recommendations to ensure that legal checkpoint
operations are conducted within legal constraints and that any citations or apprehensions can
withstand scrutiny and result in successful adjudication.
z
Training and certification. Sufficient LE personnel who are trained and certified in field
sobriety testing, breath alcohol content equipment, and other required capabilities should be on-
site to expeditiously process personnel.
z
MWD assets. MWDs can be used to search for illegal drugs and explosive contraband. The
MWDs also serve as a significant deterrent by their mere presence on-site, and they can result in
spontaneous confessions by subjects transporting contraband.
z
Other logistical considerations.
Personal safety equipment. Personal safety equipment (reflective vests, flashlights, other
standard LE gear) should be worn by LE personnel conducting checkpoint operations.
Camera and video capability. Cameras and video recording equipment should be on hand
to document evidence, as required.
Automation equipment and required administrative supplies. These items should be
available to LE personnel for required casework.
Spare radios, batteries, and other communications equipment. These items should be
readily available to ensure constant communication with the military police desk.
Mobile breath test equipment and drug test kits. These items should be readily available
at checkpoint sites.
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SPEED MEASUREMENT EQUIPMENT AND CONSIDERATIONS
6-119. While speeding does not cause all collisions, it is a major contributor to many collisions.
Additionally, excessive speed increases the severity of collisions, potentially causing serious injury or death
and increased damage to personal and government property. Speed measurement devices are used by
military police to measure the speed of moving vehicles in speed enforcement activities and traffic studies
(speed studies).
6-120. Speed measurement equipment available to military police includes—
z
Radar systems. Small Doppler radar devices can measure the speed of moving vehicles. These
devices can be handheld or vehicle-mounted systems. Handheld devices are typically used in
contingency environments. Military police must ensure that handheld systems requisitioned for
use in tactical vehicles are configured to the vehicle electrical system.
z
Light detection and ranging systems. These systems are similar to radar systems, except light
detection and ranging systems use laser light to measure the speed of objects. Light detection
and ranging systems can be handheld or vehicle-mounted.
z
Video image detection systems. This technology uses video cameras and associated software
applications to record vehicle numbers, types, and speeds. These systems are typically mounted
to a stationary object and oriented on the road or intersection.
6-121. Speed measurement equipment systems require significant initial resource investments to cover
equipment and installation costs. Some jurisdictions only recognize specific types of speed detection
equipment. PMs, military police commanders, and staffs must ensure that the speed equipment used is
recognized by the judicial authorities within their AO.
6-122. The use of speed measurement equipment requires training and periodic certification for LE
personnel. Operator training includes site selection, equipment positioning and handling, the use of an
internal calibration system or tuning fork, and environmental effects judgment
(terrain, structural
interference, weather conditions). Documentation of this training and certification may be required in
judicial proceedings. Speed detection systems also require cyclical maintenance, to include calibration. A
scheduled maintenance program must be established and records maintained of services performed by
qualified technicians according to manufacturer specifications. The proof of cyclical calibration may also
be required in judicial proceedings. The maintenance and calibration of speed detection equipment must be
considered when deployed into an austere environment where maintenance and calibration assets may be
unavailable.
VEHICLE CONSIDERATIONS
6-123. Typically, vehicles used during traffic enforcement operations in support of bases and base camps
are specially equipped sedans or light trucks. These vehicles will have, at a minimum, emergency light
systems, speed detection equipment, and LE communications equipment. Additionally, they may be
equipped with other police package details, to include special interiors designed for transporting
apprehended persons; safety cages; automation equipment; and high-performance engine, transmission, and
suspension systems. The level of specialization is largely dependent on command priorities and resources.
6-124. An LE vehicle may be marked or unmarked. Marked vehicles will display markings to make them
easily recognizable to the public, to include top-mounted light systems and vehicle graphics identifying
them as military police. Other vehicles may be unmarked. Unmarked vehicles will have no exterior
graphics, and light systems will be covertly mounted to limit public ability to readily recognize the vehicle
as a police vehicle. Unmarked vehicles are used extensively by MPI and USACIDC SAs; they are also a
choice for some traffic enforcement operations.
6-125. During the conduct of certain traffic tasks, unmarked vehicles are important to reduce the chance
of identification. During traffic studies, for example, LE personnel may use unmarked vehicles to avoid
artificially altering data due to public reaction to a police presence. Similarly, during some traffic
enforcement activities, TMCIs may use unmarked vehicles to avoid premature detection. There are
advantages and disadvantages to each strategy.
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Chapter 6
6-126. The advantages of using marked vehicles include—
z
High visibility. A marked car provides physical protection to personnel. Increased visibility can
provide added safety by alerting the public to an LE presence and the possibility that their
maneuvers or actions on the roadway may not be consistent with normal vehicle operations. In
addition, visibility conveys the appearance of an active LE program in support of the community
and fosters public support and good relations with the community.
z
Deterrent effects. The mere presence of a marked vehicle typically has a deterrent effect. For
example, having a marked military police vehicle in a reduced-speed zone (in highly populated
market areas, school zones) can have an immediate effect on traffic speed, reducing levels
without the need for issuing citations.
6-127. The disadvantages of using marked vehicles include—
z
Wind resistance. Light systems mounted atop LE vehicles increase drag, which decreases
acceleration and reduces fuel economy.
z
Habitual problem areas or flagrant violators. While marked vehicles can be a deterrent by
their mere presence in an area (sometimes referred to as the halo effect), this is a temporary
condition that stops immediately upon departure of the vehicle. Instances where there are
significant problems with traffic violations or other offenses may require the use of unmarked
vehicles to reduce the visibility and predictability of LE presence. The reduced detection ability
increases the probability of an offender being caught and reduces violations more effectively
over a longer period.
6-128. The advantages of using unmarked vehicles include—
z
Stealth and anonymity. Unmarked vehicles offer a greater degree of stealth and anonymity. In
cases where LE does not want to be detected until the time and point of their choosing, the use of
unmarked vehicles is the preferred choice.
z
Detection of flagrant violators. Flagrant violations will typically not occur at a high rate when
the violator knows that LE patrols are in the area. The use of unmarked vehicles can enable LE
to observe flagrant and habitual violators. The fact that unmarked vehicles may be in the area
can also increase any deterrent effect beyond periods where LE patrols (marked or unmarked)
are physically present. Therefore, the unmarked vehicle can be an effective traffic enforcement
tool.
6-129. The disadvantages of using unmarked vehicles include—
z
Low visibility. Unmarked vehicles are less visible, by design, than marked vehicles. This can
create an increased risk for LE patrols. Army LE using unmarked vehicles must be constantly
aware of their surroundings and anticipate the actions of others. Only experienced personnel
should be tasked with missions using unmarked vehicles. The use of unmarked vehicles also
reduces the appearance of an active LE program supporting the community. This can lead to the
perception that LE personnel are not doing enough to support the public need.
z
Officer misconduct. The very anonymity that can be a benefit to traffic control and enforcement
efforts can also provide an opportunity for increased officer misconduct. While rare, some
personnel may feel that they are not recognized as Army LE and engage in inappropriate
conduct. PMs, military police commanders, and operations officers must be cognizant of this
risk. As stated earlier, only experienced personnel should be tasked with missions using
unmarked vehicles.
TRAFFIC COLLISION INVESTIGATIONS
6-130. TMCIs are specially trained to conduct collision investigations. They receive training and
designation as TMCIs upon successful completion of the Traffic Management and Collision Investigation
Course, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. These investigators provide technical capabilities required for
conducting traffic collision investigations and augmenting military police capabilities in conducting traffic
enforcement and education. TMCIs reconstruct collisions involving fatalities or extensive property damage
and investigate collisions involving minor injuries or damage to government property. They are skilled in
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Traffic Management and Enforcement
identifying safety issues with roadways, operator training deficiencies, and systemic mechanical problems
with vehicles.
6-131. Traffic collisions are extremely confusing events. How they occur, who or what causes them, and
why they occur are factors that the military police must determine. All military police Soldiers should know
the fundamentals of traffic collision investigations and how to prepare traffic collision reports. TMCIs can
assist in minor traffic collisions, when required. Major traffic collisions involving death, serious bodily
injury, or significant property damage should always be investigated by trained TMCIs. ATP 3-39.12
contains in-depth information regarding traffic collision investigation techniques.
6-132. An MPI or USACIDC SA may assume investigative responsibility in collisions in which other
offenses contributed to, or resulted from, a collision. Military police should notify the supporting
USACIDC element when a traffic collision involves a fatality or when an offense occurs that is within the
USACIDC investigative purview according to AR 195-2. In all cases, military police will complete the
investigation of the actual traffic collision. A copy of the collision investigation will be provided to other
LE investigative elements involved.
6-133. DA Form 3946 (Military Police Traffic Accident Report) contains the essential investigative
elements required (who, what, when, where, why, and how) to complete a traffic accident report. The
report will include required supporting documents (scaled diagrams, photographs, statements, results of
breath analysis). This information can provide for the maximum effective use of military police resources
in investigating traffic collisions.
RESPONSE
6-134. When dispatched to a traffic collision, military police must quickly assess the situation and
determine priorities based on the severity of the collision, roadway blockage, injuries, environmental
conditions, and many other factors. The on-scene investigation is concerned primarily with data gathering
and recording.
6-135. Upon arrival at a collision scene, military police must conduct a number of actions that may
include—
z
Establishing traffic control. Military police should determine if traffic control is needed upon
arrival. Traffic control mitigates the risk of additional collisions caused by traffic flow
degradation resulting from the initial collision.
Minor collisions. Damage is minimal, and no injuries are reported. Collision vehicles may
be directed out of the roadway to eliminate traffic control requirements.
Major collisions. Vehicles are best left in place until an investigation of the collision site
can be completed. The intent is to prevent other collisions from occurring and to protect the
scene while gaining as much information as possible to accurately report the incident.
Note. Additional patrols may be required to assist in traffic control until the scene can be
cleared. For major collisions involving life-threatening injuries or fatalities, scene processing
may take several hours.
z
Assessing incidents for the presence of hazmat. Military police responding to a collision site
should always be aware that hazmat may be present. This is especially true in collisions
involving commercial vehicles. While not as likely, passenger vehicles may also have hazmat
onboard. Military police responders should—
Remaining observant when approaching a scene for any signs of a spill or odor that might
indicate the presence of hazmat. Placards on vehicles can alert military police of hazmat on
board that may or may not have been compromised.
Identify safety precautions to protect LE personnel and the public if hazmat is discovered.
The fire department or other hazmat response elements may be required. (See appendix I for
additional information on responding to hazmat situations.)
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Chapter 6
z
Identifying injured personnel. Military police should determine the extent of injuries to people
at the collision scene and administer first aid and emergency treatment, as needed, while waiting
for medical first responders to arrive. The fire department may be required to extract personnel
trapped within the wreckage. Military police should always recommend that persons with
injuries (even minor injuries) seek evaluation by medical personnel to ensure that more serious
medical problems are not present.
z
Requesting additional support. Military police must assess requirements for additional
emergency response capabilities. Support required can include—
Medical.
Fire.
Hazmat.
Civil engineers.
Towing services.
Portable lighting.
Temporary traffic control devices and personnel.
z
Obtaining vehicle and operator information. Military police should check the driver’s license,
military identification, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance of persons involved in the
collision.
z
Identifying damage. Military police should determine damage to vehicles and surrounding
facilities and infrastructure and document all identified information.
z
Locating and interviewing witnesses. Military police should identify and separate potential
witnesses. When possible, all witnesses should be separated until interviews are complete to
prevent discussion that may influence their perception of the events surrounding the collision.
Statements should be taken when potential witnesses are identified as having significant
information. All witness interviews that are not reflected on a witness statement should be
documented on the DA Form 3946.
z
Gathering required information. Military police should obtain the facts surrounding the
collision for inclusion in the accident report. Information should be verified by statements or
physical evidence. This may include measurements for diagrams of the collision scene.
z
Completing the accident report. Military police use all gathered data and observations to
complete the DA Form 3946 and supporting documentation.
REPORTS
6-136. A DA Form 3946 should be thorough and concise. The report may be used in civil or judicial
proceedings, and the report reflects the professionalism and capability of the military police Soldier or
TMCI who prepared the report. Readers of traffic accident reports seldom know the writer; therefore,
opinions are often formed on the basis of the report. The credibility of the report can be compromised based
on the initial impression of the audience. Poorly written reports can make the most professional military
police Soldier or TMCI appear incompetent and unprofessional.
6-137. Military police who prepare accident reports should strive for—
z
Accuracy, brevity, and clarity. Plan and write reports so that they clearly and accurately state
the essential elements of the case.
z
Objectivity and impartiality. Conduct a thorough investigation; the investigation must be
objective and impartial. Never take sides.
z
Completeness. Ensure that reports contain the essential information of the investigation. The
report should answer the following questions—
What took place? Include all known actions leading up to and including the collision.
Who was involved? Include all persons surrounding the incident
(drivers, victims,
pedestrians, and witnesses).
When did the collision occur? Include the date, day, and time (for example, 25 March 2011,
Friday, 1400).
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Where did the collision occur? Describe the exact location and include any diagrams.
How did the events occur? List the accident sequence of events in chronological order.
What elements were involved? Include all vehicles, persons, buildings, traffic control
devices, characteristics of the roadway, and other environmental factors.
Why did the collision occur? This is a statement that includes the military police Soldier’s
or TMCI’s conclusion, based on the operational and conditional factors of the incident.
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Chapter 7
Host Nation Police Capability and Capacity
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and other nations have found
themselves in an increasing number of operations requiring them to establish stability
and security in different geographic areas of the world. Most often, this requires
military police to police population centers and completely develop or retrain HN
security forces to perform LE functions. The efforts to provide an LE capability and
develop HN police and security forces to support that capability are typically needed
during periods of varying length. The end state is reached when HN police and
security forces are prepared to assume full responsibility for LE operations
(independent of extensive outside support or assistance) to provide adequate security
for the HN population.
CIVIL CONTROL
7-1. As operations transition primarily to stability, it involves multiple lines of effort for military forces to
establish HN autonomy, legitimacy, and governance under the rule of law, to include establishing civil
security and restoring civil control. The first responsibility of U.S. military forces in a stability operation is
to establish civil security. Establishing civil security is the natural precursor required to establish conditions
for restoring civil control. Civil control establishes the rule of law to build a functioning HN criminal
justice system. A functioning criminal justice system encompasses the following key institutions necessary
for a functioning justice system:
z
Police personnel.
z
Investigative services.
z
Prosecutorial arms.
z
Public defense.
z
Prisons.
7-2. The restoration of civil control by the HN is required before effective governance under the rule of
law can be established. Military forces may be required to initially restore and maintain civil order until
efforts to establish HN security forces and police organizations that are trained and capable in LE and
policing skills are available. U.S. and multinational military forces may be tasked to train or monitor the
training of HN police forces.
7-3. Building HN police capability and capacity are critical elements for establishing civil control and
sustained civil order. Police organizations operating under civil control are essential to success. The clear
delineation of civil police authority and military roles are essential. The primacy of civil police
organizations in dealing with crime and security concerns within a population is a clear indicator of success
in achieving stability and a return to normalcy. (See ADRP 3-07 for additional information on stability
operations, including civil security and civil control lines of effort.)
7-4. If required, military police provide required technical capabilities and skill sets to conduct LE
activities in support of HN populations to establish civil security and to set conditions necessary to
regenerate HN police capability and capacity. Military police play a central role in U.S. military efforts to
establish civil control by identifying gaps and capabilities in HN police capacity, including infrastructure
and organizational requirements. Military police can then recruit, train, partner with, and mentor HN police
organizations until the forces are capable of independent LE and police operations.
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Chapter 7
SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE
7-5. Security force assistance is the Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by
the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces
and their supporting institutions (JP 3-22). FM 3-22 provides the doctrinal framework for security force
assistance. Security forces are duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a
state (JP 3-22). Foreign security forces are forces, including but not limited to, military, paramilitary,
police, and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and
correctional personnel, that provide security for a host nation and its relevant population or support a
regional security organization mission (FM 3-22).
7-6. Military police, working with the HN to build HN police capability and capacity, work within the
security force assistance framework as part of a comprehensive effort that includes all instruments of
national power. Security force assistance emphasizes the development and empowerment of HN
organizations, institutions, systems, and capabilities to overcome impediments to HN success.
7-7. Military police and USACIDC Soldiers and leaders must understand that imposing solutions based
on U.S. organizations, systems, procedures, and equipment is inconsistent with security force assistance
intent. Military police Soldiers must be open to HN solutions. HN personnel possess the advantage of
understanding the local culture, traditions, and behavior that our personnel do not possess.
7-8. Below are six areas that should be considered during security force assistance activities. The
discussion below applies specifically to military police and their efforts to build HN police capability and
capacity. Security force assistance imperatives include—
z
Understanding the operational environment. Military police Soldiers and leadership must
fully comprehend the operational environment and be prepared for, engaged in, and supportive
of PDTT efforts to succeed. Military police leaders and Soldiers must be prepared to train HN
security forces in remote areas. Some of these areas may be without essential services
(electricity, transportation, healthcare, communication). It is especially important that senior
leadership empower subordinate leaders to make appropriate, timely decisions. While senior
leaders must maintain situational understanding, decentralized control usually provides greater
success and credibility with the HN police.
z
Providing effective leadership. Leadership is critical in the dynamic and complex environments
associated with reconstituting HN police organizations and building police capability and
capacity. Effective leadership at all levels, from the most junior noncommissioned officer to the
most senior officer, is critical. Competent and effective leadership will build trust, mutual
respect, and personal and professional rapport between military police and HN police
counterparts. This relationship helps shape the environment for success.
z
Building legitimacy. The ultimate goal of military police in this environment is to develop HN
police forces that contribute to the legitimate governance of the population. Legitimacy is
achieved when HN police are competent, capable, committed, and confident in the eyes of U.S.
and multinational forces, the HN government, and the HN population. While it is important to
assist HN police in developing professionally, it is also important to realize that a mirror image
of the U.S. police model may not be the optimum solution.
z
Managing information. Managing information encompasses the collection, analysis,
preparation, dissemination, and storage of information directly related to police development and
transition activities. It also encompasses military police and U.S. forces lessons learned and the
operational information required for successful transitions between rotating U.S. military
elements.
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Host Nation Police Capability and Capacity
z
Ensuring unity of effort. The unity of effort must include military police, multinational
civilians, and HN police operating within the AO. Command and control relationships may be
consistent with traditional command relationships (centralized within a single command), or they
may be very complex, including multiple administrative, operational, and tactical control
relationships. These relationships must be clearly delineated and understood by all elements.
Supporting and supported relationships will change over time, and they are instrumental in the
full transition to HN responsibility.
z
Sustaining the effort. The effort to build HN police capability and capacity and to transition to
HN control may take years to achieve. The professional skills that HN advisers possess will
increase over time. Changing tactics, techniques, procedures, and environmental conditions and
the incorporation of those changes into the training and preparation of each successive rotation
are important to maintain the continuity and momentum of the overall effort.
RECONSTITUTION OF HOST NATION POLICE FORCES
7-9. Reconstituting an HN police force requires enormous resources and may take months or years to
properly organize, recruit, train, and equip. The effort requires a significant knowledge of LE activities and
associated technical capabilities. Organizing an HN police organization requires resolving numerous issues
related to—
z
Recruitment.
z
Promotion screening and selection.
z
Pay and benefits.
z
Leader recruitment and selection.
z
Personnel accountability.
z
Security force personnel demobilization.
7-10. The primary responsibility for training HN police is resident within the U.S. Department of State;
however, in many cases, the U.S. military will be granted authority to assume the mission until conditions
are stable enough for the U.S. Department of State to assume the lead role. Military police will typically
remain engaged in the reconstitution of HN police capability and capacity in support of the U.S.
Department of State following the U.S. Department of State assumption of the mission as the lead agency.
HOST NATION POLICE TRAINING RESPONSIBILITY
7-11. During the initial planning phase for rebuilding a foreign police force, it is important to seek out and
understand the governmental agencies responsible for the reconstitution or establishment of an HN police
force. It is imperative to understand the roles of each and what resources they bring to the mission.
7-12. The lead role in providing police assistance to foreign governments is normally delegated to the U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The U.S.
Department of Justice may also have representation through the International Criminal Investigative
Training Assistance Program. Training and assistance programs are intended to develop professional,
civilian-based LE institutions. Their objective is to develop police forces in the context of international
peacekeeping operations and to enhance the capabilities of existing police forces in emerging democracies.
INTERAGENCY RESOURCES
7-13. Support to HN police and other government functions requires substantial resource allocation that
may receive strategic-level attention. For this reason, any U.S. funds dedicated to HN police reconstitution
efforts must receive authorization from higher headquarters. Interagency resources may be involved in
numerous ways to support training for HN security forces. The U.S. Department of Justice and U.S.
Department of State have the capability to send civilian police advisers overseas to train and advise HN
police forces. The quick-reaction capability of these agencies is limited, although they can attain necessary
levels when given adequate time.
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Chapter 7
7-14. It is critical that civilian assets are nested throughout all the military police organizational structure to
ensure that priorities of effort are coordinated and synchronized. The most effective method to accomplish
these missions is through the employment of functional military police brigades and subordinate military
police battalions and companies task-organized with modular LE detachments. During counterinsurgencies,
the effectiveness of civilian police advisers and trainers may be limited by the high-threat nature of the
environment. These forces are most effective when operating in a benign environment or when security is
provided separately. Civilian police advisers can be integrated into military police platoons and squads to
provide security and to enhance military police capabilities.
HOST NATION POLICE STATION STRUCTURE
7-15. The size and organizational structure of the newly formed police force should be determined by the
geographic combatant commander, in coordination with civil authorities (U.S., multinational, and HN)
before reconstitution efforts begin. Civilian and military police planners create a blueprint outlining the
overall design of the HN criminal justice system and associated HN police structure, to include police
station infrastructure, patrol area boundaries, mission command node locations, and linkages to HN courts
and correctional facilities. This process is known as templating. The process helps identify an acceptable
end state to a police organization.
7-16. To develop a police system template, strategic planners must conduct a thorough analysis of existing
police organizations, available personnel, infrastructure, vehicles, and equipment and apply a quantitative
reasoning process to determine the desired police system end state. The templates must take into account
the type of police system needed, the local geography, the population and cultural requirements, and
previous criminal data for the AO (if available).
7-17. Templating may not translate directly from one region of the world to another; what works in one
region may not work in another. Templating is a process that can be effective when all known conditions
are considered. Any templated police structure should be consistent with the HN culture and governmental
structure. In some AOs, significant historical data and existing infrastructure may exist to serve as the
initial template for planning. Some templating considerations and actions are as follows:
z
Assess existing police system capability and capacity using the POLICE assessment tool. (See
ATTP 3-39.20.)
z
Determine required policing areas (police station AOs), based on the—
Geography.
Population groups to be policed, taking into consideration political, cultural, ideological,
and tribal factors.
Major urban areas.
AO population and population centers.
Rural and urban areas.
7-18. There are formulas and software applications for calculating police patrol and manpower
requirements. Many of these calculations require extensive historical data related to criminal activity,
police activity, personnel policies, and other factors. Some environments do not readily provide data for
calculations to determine these requirements. In these cases, comparative analysis between similar AOs
may be the best method for an initial determination of police patrol and manpower requirements.
Appendix E provides discussion and methods for determining police patrol and manpower requirements.
MISSION COMMAND CONSIDERATIONS
7-19. In the event that U.S. forces are deployed to a joint operations area with a limited or failed policing
system, military police forces may be required to initially perform LE and policing activities to establish or
maintain a secure environment. Long term, it is critically important to establish HN police forces to assume
police duties as soon as possible. The United States, multinational partners, and the HN should institute a
comprehensive program of police force development. The U.S. military police units serve best when
operating as a support force for professional civilian and HN police trainers. However, there may be times
when military police are given the primary responsibility for police training. The military police must be
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Host Nation Police Capability and Capacity
prepared to assume that role if required. This can be important early in an operation as demonstrated during
Operation Iraqi Freedom in the aftermath of large-scale operations in the spring and early summer of 2003.
7-20. Police support to shape the environment and conduct operations to establish and maintain civil
control should be initiated as early as possible in any operation. Initially, these shaping operations will
typically be conducted by military police elements (brigades, battalions, and companies) operating in a
decentralized manner. These military police elements, (whether operating within a military police brigade
organizational structure or within a brigade combat team, multifunctional brigade, division, or corps)
conduct police operations in support of their higher headquarters mission and commander’s intent.
DECENTRALIZED AND CENTRALIZED CONTROL
7-21. Decentralized control allows the commander to direct police operations, as required and within their
AO, based on specific mission variables. During the decentralized control of police operations, echelon
PMs play a critical role in providing technical and policy guidance relevant to executing police operations.
Guidance and direction provided through PM technical channels (from the brigade combat team PM, up to
and including, the theater PM and the Office of the Provost Marshal General) is critical to ensure that
military police elements and other Army personnel are conducting operations in a lawful and consistent
manner. (See ADRP 6-0 for additional information on determining the appropriate degree of control.)
7-22. As the AO matures and stabilizes and operations transition to focus on establishing or reconstituting
HN police capability and capacity across the joint operations area, police operations are typically
centralized under the mission command of a military police brigade or battalion. The negative impact of the
unsynchronized and inconsistent application of police operations and efforts to build HN policing
capability across an AO can have significant strategic implications and cause major delays in the
operational benchmarks for success. When extensive and long-term military police technical capabilities
and uniform effects are required across an AO, a military police brigade ensures technical oversight,
synchronization, coordination, and consistent application of military police capabilities. This is especially
true when stability operations are dominant within the AO. In cases where operational and mission
variables prohibit the centralization of military police assets under a single military police organizational
structure, Army commanders and staffs at every level ensure that missions related to building HN police
capability and capacity are coordinated and synchronized across the joint operations area to ensure
consistent policies, training, and applications of police capabilities. PM technical channels play a
significant role in this effort.
7-23. The functional mission command of military police forces that perform police operations in support
of an HN population is provided by the following primary echelons of military police headquarters units:
z
Military police command.
z
Military police brigade.
z
Military police battalion.
7-24. Each force has a staff that allows the commander to perform mission command of military police
organizations conducting police operations and other military police disciplines. (For specific information
regarding capabilities of these headquarters units, see FM 3-39.)
MISSION COMMAND OF HOST NATION POLICE ORGANIZATIONS
7-25. HN police organizations will typically operate under the command and control of their organic
organizational hierarchy. In the early stages of police organizational and capability development, military
police and other U.S. and multinational military elements may be heavily involved in advising and guiding
HN police operations. These U.S. and multinational advisers must strive to intervene as little as necessary
in the efforts and directives of HN police leadership. The goal during stability operations must always be to
enable the HN to become independent and function on its own. Advisers must also be aware of the
perceptions of the community at large. HN police leadership must be perceived as being in charge of their
organizations. They must not be seen as mere puppets of U.S. and multinational forces.
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
7-5
Chapter 7
7-26. The requirement to advise and guide HN leaders, especially early in the reconstitution process, is
relevant at all levels. Advice and guidance provided to the police station commanders and patrols must be
consistent with that provided to midlevel and senior HN police leaders. This is one of the primary
justifications for the centralized control of police development and transition assets within a functional
military police command chain. Consistency is critical. Multiple command chains directing police
development and transition activities increase the risk of inconsistent guidance, policy, and training
decisions within HN organizations.
MILITARY POLICE ACTIONS IN HOST NATION POLICE
BUILDING
7-27. Efforts by military police to reconstitute HN police capability and capacity are conducted at all levels
of the organization. Military police commanders, staffs, and operational elements gather information from
the station level through the highest levels of executive police administration. Military police commanders,
staffs, and patrols gather information through deliberate police engagement with the HN population,
community leaders, remaining or former HN police personnel, and other governmental agencies. They
obtain information regarding existing or historical locations of HN police facilities, police organizational
structures and systems, current HN police capability and capacity, and capability gaps that require
resolution. Military police staffs and police intelligence analysts collate and analyze this information to
develop an understanding of the existing police capability and capacity. Military police staffs and police
intelligence analysts use the factors of POLICE to aid their analysis. (See ATTP 3-39.20.)
CAPABILITIES
7-28. An accurate assessment of the HN criminal justice system is critical to successful civil control lines
of effort. Before beginning the reform or rebuilding of the civil authority triad, planners must conduct a
thorough assessment of the police, judiciary, and corrections systems to enable the establishment of
attainable goals and objectives. Military police and USACIDC SAs performing HN police training and
development may be required to conduct initial and ongoing assessments of the police and corrections
elements of the criminal justice system. Although not a primary responsibility, military police and
USACIDC staff should also monitor judiciary assessments, as the judiciary element of the criminal justice
system is inextricably linked to LE and corrections.
7-29. Thorough and accurate assessments of HN police capability enable military police and USACIDC
staffs to develop training and advisement plans and goals based on identified capability gaps. Table 7-1
provides questions that can assist planners in assessing LE systems and capabilities. Because the
assessment element may be able to intuitively determine answers, not all questions need to be asked
directly.
7-30. Additional questions may be required based on the organization, the operational environment, and
other factors. Each area should be assessed by policing personnel who have the appropriate backg2round and
experience to make informed assessments. This assessment is used to allocate manpower and resources.
The accurate and complete reporting of data is critical for the military police and USACIDC staff to make
viable assessments of current police organizations and systems.
7-6
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
Host Nation Police Capability and Capacity
Table 7-1. HN police organization assessment considerations
Area of Focus
Information Requirements
Operational Environment
•
Who are the main security providers (state and nonstate)?
•
What is the division of responsibility between security providers?
•
What role, if any, does the military play in civil security matters?
•
What are the major problems of community safety?
•
What types of injustices do people experience regularly?
•
What is the LE approach (for example, community-based policing versus control
and enforcement)?
•
Are some communities underserved by HN police?
•
What are the sources of LE funding (formal and informal)?
•
What role did the HN police play under the previous government?
Limited to minor crimes and traffic patrols?
Full capability organization consistent with Western police standards?
Showpiece organization?
General
State security?
organizational data
•
Do the HN police have a history of following the rule of law and due process
steps, or are they known for heavy-handed or abusive policing tactics?
•
What is the demographic breakdown of the police?
•
Does the demographic breakdown match the breakdown of the country?
•
Do regional and local HN police forces match their local demographics?
•
What priorities directed the location of HN police stations?
•
Are police stations located for political reasons or crime deterrence reasons?
•
Are police assets equitably dispersed based on population and criminal analysis?
•
Can the public easily access the police stations? Is the public willing to make
complaints at the police station?
•
Does the public view the HN police as a professional organization? If not, how are
they viewed (cronyism, thugs, an enforcement arm of a tyrannical state, inept,
incompetent, corrupt)?
Police Training Functions
•
Is formal training required before initial employment?
•
Is transition training required?
•
Is refresher or sustainment training required?
•
Is patrol or crime prevention training provided?
Training
•
Is traffic management and accident investigation training provided?
•
Is daily institutionalized roll call training required?
•
Does a field training officer program exist?
•
Are distributed learning programs provided?
•
Does the training program fully prepare HN police officers to maintain the rule of
law and abide by judicial and prosecutorial directives?
•
Is training on human rights incorporated throughout the curriculum?
•
Are HN police trained to handle known threats?
•
Is regular human rights refresher training conducted during normal duties?
Training curriculum
•
Does the training curriculum use a skills-based environment and on-the-job
training?
•
Does the training curriculum promote human, individual, and constitutional rights?
•
Does the training prepare the HN police for dealing with crimes against women
and train them to interact with female victims?
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
7-7
Chapter 7
Table 7-1. HN police organization assessment considerations (continued)
Area of Focus
Information Requirements
Police Training Functions (continued)
•
Do formal HN police academies exist? At what command levels?
•
Are there national training requirements? Are they enforced at all police levels?
Academy or training
•
Does the academy have instructor and curriculum development guidelines?
management and
•
Does the academy or academies have sufficient resources?
infrastructure
•
Are training records maintained for all personnel attending police training
(including those who failed to complete entry level training)?
Police Station Operations
•
Does each HN police station maintain a functional police desk to—
Receive all incoming calls for police assistance?
Prioritize the employment of resources and assign tasks appropriately?
Initiate notifications regarding reported incidents of police activity?
Police desk
Review the initial casework of LE patrols?
operations
Maintain a police journal to document police activities and contacts?
•
Do police desk personnel have access to LE databases and reporting
systems?
•
Are procedures in place for maintaining police station security?
•
What happens when an allegation or complaint about a crime is made?
Is an allegation or complaint recorded immediately? By whom?
Is there a standard format for recording initial crime reports?
Is an allegation or complaint made on paper or on an automated system?
How is the immediate action identified and managed?
Case management
How does the person initially recording the crime report manage the issue?
practices
Who has to be notified about the crime?
•
Are procedures in place that accurately record information about arrested
suspects and their property? Are these records updated and forwarded as the
suspect moves through the system? Are file copies maintained at the originating
station?
•
Does a formal information-sharing mechanism exist within the criminal justice
system? How is it used?
•
Is there active and routine coordination among the police community, the
prosecutor’s office, corrections, and the border police? Does this include the
means for—
Court orders to be communicated to HN police?
Corrections to notify police of legitimate inmate releases and illegitimate
escapes?
Information sharing
•
Is there active coordination or formal information sharing between the police
community and agencies that deliver public services (social services, public
health, behavioral health)?
•
Is there a reliable liaison between the police community and nonstate providers of
security operating under an official assignment?
•
Is there a formal mechanism for oversight, coordination, and regulation with any
nonstate security providers?
•
Is there an operational liaison with international organizations contributing to the
country policing efforts?
•
Do the following functions exist?
Police records and
A booking station system.
statistics
A property- and evidence-tracking system.
7-8
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
Host Nation Police Capability and Capacity
Table 7-1. HN police organization assessment considerations (continued)
Area of Focus
Information Requirements
Police Station Operations (continued)
Effective criminal records management (of active cases).
Centralized historical criminal archives.
•
Are police incidents reported in a uniform manner?
•
Do the following systems exist?
Police records and
Case tracking.
statistics (continued)
Police services tracking.
Traffic and vehicle databases.
•
Are statistics maintained on police service requests, crime reports, and arrest and
conviction rates?
•
Does the LE program engage in community outreach activities, public relations
activities, or other routine public interaction activities?
Public relations and
interaction with the
•
Does the program organize public awareness meetings?
public
•
Do the HN police leaders regularly meet with local government officials (mayors,
councils) to discuss police operations or issues?
•
Are statistics compiled regarding the incidence of criminal offenses against a
variety of criteria? Are statistics compiled in relation to local, regional, and national
geographical areas? Are statistics available to the public? Are statistics available
to local, regional, and national police commanders?
•
Do laws govern the collection, storage, and dissemination of criminal intelligence
and personal information? Do the HN police adhere to these laws and policies?
•
Do the HN police have a means of confirming a person’s identity (photograph
records, fingerprints, iris scans)?
•
Do HN police develop identity records of suspects (photographs, fingerprints,
narrative descriptions) as allowed by law? At what command level are these
Police information
records maintained? Can stations cross-reference the data? Up to what level?
and intelligence
•
Can HN police at every level collect, evaluate, collate, analyze, and disseminate
police information and criminal intelligence up, down, and laterally across the
organization?
•
Is all information and intelligence recorded in some manner (hardcopy or
electronically) at the originating station and forwarded to higher headquarters?
•
Do the HN police have personnel dedicated to evaluating and analyzing
intelligence? Are they specially trained?
•
Do the HN police make operational decisions based on gathered intelligence?
•
Are HN police leaders held accountable for their effectiveness at responding to
criminal patterns identified through intelligence?
•
Are there policies in place that govern the treatment of detainees in police
custody? Are HN police personnel acting in compliance with those policies?
•
Are detainees housed separately from prisoners (pretrial versus posttrial
situations)?
•
Do the HN police have processes in place to move detainees to a HN police level
where they will appear before a judge, or does a judge travel to police stations?
•
Are detainees normally seen by a judge within the period prescribed by law?
Detention operations
•
Are juvenile and women detainees housed separately from men?
•
Do the HN police have policies for injured detainees and special-needs detainees
(mentally ill, a threat to self or others, or subject to threat from other detainees)?
•
Do the HN police maintain accurate records of all detainees, including—
Identification?
Reason for arrest?
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
7-9
Chapter 7
Table 7-1. HN police organization assessment considerations (continued)
Area of Focus
Information Requirements
Police Station Operations (continued)
Injury or illness?
Personal property?
Detention operations
Disposition?
(continued)
• Are these records maintained after the detainee is released or transferred?
Note. Considerations on corrections operations are found in ATTP 3-39.20 and FM 3-39.
•
Do HN police services have the capability to manage civil disturbances without
resorting to military support?
•
Do specialized unit capabilities exist, to include—
Special-reaction or weapons teams?
Specialized police
Explosive ordnance disposal?
units
Protection for dignitaries, high-profile individuals, or other important persons?
Police dogs with capabilities in narcotics detection, explosives detection, and
personnel search?
•
Is proper training and equipment provided? Is it employed properly?
•
Does a centralized criminal evidence database exist?
•
Who manages and maintains the database?
•
Who has access to the database?
Criminal database
•
Who enters the evidence and information into the database?
and collection of
•
Can the database cross-reference evidence to develop leads or connections?
crime statistics
•
Are crime statistics collected in a reliable and generally accessible (digital or
otherwise automated) criminal database?
•
Is the criminal database or collection of crime statistics used for strategic
analysis?
Patrol Operations
•
Do the HN police actively patrol their communities or assigned jurisdictions, or do
they remain in the stations and only respond to calls?
•
Do HN police patrols respond to calls for service and crime threats in a timely
manner?
•
Can HN police stations take complaints on location and telephonically? Can the
stations dispatch patrols via radio?
•
Are HN police patrol officers equipped with the transportation and tools necessary
to perform their responsibilities?
•
Are HN police trained for, and capable of, resolving calls for service on the scene?
Patrol activities
•
Are HN police patrol officers, not just investigators, trained in crime scene
preservation?
•
Are HN police patrol officers trained in what to look for and how to protect
evidence?
•
Are HN police patrol officers aware of potential cross-contamination issues?
•
Are HN police patrol officers supplied with latex or similar gloves?
•
Do HN police patrol officers know how to bag, label, and record evidence and
exhibits?
•
Is an HN police patrol officer designated in major cases to ensure the continuity
and preserve the integrity of evidence?
Community
•
Is there substantial use of community-integrated policing?
integrated policing
•
Are foot patrols and fixed posts used in community-integrated policing?
and patrols and
•
Does a centralized complaint call-in system (such as 911) exist?
community action
•
Is there a viable strategic plan to conduct community policing?
plans
7-10
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
Host Nation Police Capability and Capacity
Table 7-1. HN police organization assessment considerations (continued)
Area of Focus
Information Requirements
Investigative Capabilities
•
Do the HN police have the ability, training, and resources to secure and process a
crime scene?
Crime scene search
•
Do the HN police employ chain-of-custody and evidence protection techniques?
and collection
•
Do modern or contemporary fingerprint analysis and identification and
capabilities
photography capabilities exist?
•
Are forensics used in cases and the analysis of criminal investigations and
prosecutions?
•
Do the HN police have access to criminal forensic laboratories?
Laboratory and
•
At what police command level do they operate?
office management
•
Are HN police adequately resourced with equipment and trained personnel to
effectively conduct forensics investigations?
•
Do the HN police or courts serve as the principal investigative arm for the
government? If it is the courts, what investigative capacity do the HN police have
by law?
•
How are investigators selected? Are they experienced police or hired directly as
investigators? What required training do investigators attend? Does this training
include—
Laws and guidelines related to investigative powers?
Crime scene preservation?
Forensic techniques?
Searches?
Interviews?
Case file preparation?
Contact with vulnerable people (victims, witnesses, suspects)?
LE investigations
Diversity knowledge?
•
Does a code, law, or other regulation establish the way in which a criminal
investigation should be conducted? How are the powers of investigators
described in the law? Is there a specific statute or are they described in a criminal
procedure law or police act? By virtue of these laws or regulations, is an
investigator able to—
Arrest and detain a suspect?
Seize property as evidence?
Search for evidence (on the premises and on persons)?
Interview suspects (and, in doing so, question their honesty and character,
which in some countries may otherwise be considered an act of defamation
[a criminal offense])?
Require samples (fingerprints, DNA evidence) and take photographs?
•
Does forensic laboratory capability exist?
•
Does the laboratory have the capability to process and analyze—
Firearms and toolmarks?
Questioned documents examination?
Forensic laboratory
Drug analysis?
support
Toxicology?
Trace evidence?
Serology/DNA analysis?
Pathology and forensic medicine?
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
7-11
Chapter 7
Table 7-1. HN police organization assessment considerations (continued)
Area of Focus
Information Requirements
Supervision and Management
•
How are leaders selected in the police organization?
•
Are senior leaders experienced police officers or political appointees?
•
Are first-line supervisors capable of providing reliable LE guidance and direction
to junior police?
•
Are operational police leaders changed out when new political leaders are
Leadership selection
appointed or elected?
and training
•
Are management and supervisory structures considered robust and reliable?
•
Is the span of control of police leadership adequate to promote and sustain
effective command and control of the organization?
•
Do first-line supervisors and managers receive leadership training?
•
Do executive, command, and senior management receive development training?
•
Are there a wide-ranging written strategy and mission that address known crimes,
threats, and incursions?
•
Does the strategy establish appropriate time frames for addressing the known
Strategy and
threats?
mission
•
Does the strategy define specific outcome-oriented goals with achievable,
forward-leaning performance targets?
•
Does management have strong strategic and operational planning capabilities?
•
Are directives, SOPs, policies, and written guidance that govern all principal police
systems developed at the appropriate command level and disseminated
throughout the force?
Policy and
•
Do these procedures contain operational standards for coordination at central,
procedures
regional, and local levels, as appropriate, for the known security risk?
•
Do these procedures delegate sufficient authority to the HN police at all levels to
perform their duties without excessive reliance on clearing routine actions through
the chain of command?
•
Does the police organization have funding sufficient to sustain and nurture a
proficient agency?
•
What level of government funds the HN police?
Funding
•
Are HN police funds dedicated to the police organization and protected from use
for non-police-related requirements?
•
Is an audit system in place to provide oversight of expenditures?
•
Is the HN police budget publicly disclosed?
Personnel Administration
•
Does the program use a diverse recruitment policy (including, for example,
targeted advertising and regional testing)?
Recruitment and
•
Do all ethnicities or other groups, including women, have statistically equal
advertisements
representation at all levels?
•
Does the program use a proactive nondiscrimination policy in LE recruitment?
•
Does the program use a standardized application process?
•
Does the police organization use standardized and documented practices and
Minimum
criteria for employment?
qualifications,
•
Do applicants undergo general knowledge, physical fitness, health, and
standards, and
psychological testing?
testing
•
Is police backg2round screening required for all new recruits?
7-12
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
Host Nation Police Capability and Capacity
Table 7-1. HN police organization assessment considerations (continued)
Area of Focus
Information Requirements
Personnel Administration (continued)
•
Are national standards in place governing personnel activities (pay, personnel
allocations at stations by rank, hiring and firing policies, pay scales, death or
disability payments)?
•
Do police stations maintain accurate personnel files and send extracts, as
needed, to higher headquarters?
•
Does the staff comprehensively and effectively administer policies, procedures,
and training?
•
Is administrative training provided?
•
Are requirements for advancement to each rank clearly laid out and enforced?
Personnel practices
•
Is there an appropriate manpower allocation for mission expectations?
•
Are HN police paid a living wage competitive with the private sector?
•
Is career progression nondiscriminatory?
•
Is career progression competitively based on merit?
•
What is the morale of the HN police?
•
Do the HN police have an established discipline policy that clearly states
administrative offenses, punishments, and adjudication authority?
•
Are HN police who commit crimes prosecuted through the civil courts?
•
Does an HN police counseling and police record certification database exist?
Logistics
•
Are the infrastructure and equipment readily available for use when needed?
•
Is operational infrastructure policy based on strategic priorities, wear-out
projections, and known demands for consumable supplies and equipment?
•
How is equipment serviced or maintained? Are service and maintenance
capabilities adequate?
•
Can local jurisdictions establish service or supply contracts with local vendors?
•
Does the headquarters track on-hand equipment supply and resupply needs of
Infrastructure and
subordinate stations?
equipment
•
Does a system exist to track firearms and equipment issues?
•
Are there controls for infrastructure, inventory, and warehouses?
•
Do HN police support equipment and services exist (transportation or fleet
management, armory, communications)?
•
Do technology equipment and services exist (computers, electronic information
systems, forensic equipment)?
•
Are there practices or offices for budget, finance, and procurement functions?
Independent Oversight and Internal Affairs
•
Do the HN police have a professional code of conduct? Is it followed?
•
Do the HN police have functional internal affairs and inspector general systems?
Inspector general,
•
Are policies written that govern the activities of the inspector general or internal
appraisal, corruption
affairs sections (how and when they conduct investigations and to whom they
unit, and tracking of
report)?
abuses
•
Are human rights abuses identified, investigated, and tracked?
•
Is there documented evidence of internal review conducted by the inspector
general, internal affairs, or command reviews?
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
7-13
Chapter 7
Table 7-1. HN police organization assessment considerations (continued)
Area of Focus
Information Requirements
Independent Oversight and Internal Affairs (continued)
• Does a civilian review board exist?
• Is there a citizen complaint and information center? Is it used and generally
Civilian oversight
effective?
• Does civilian oversight of police activities exist?
• What is the degree of public support (opinion) of the HN LE program?
• Is there evidence that the public generally feels secure?
• Does the public believe that HN police are accountable for their actions?
Public perception
• Does the public believe that HN police departments are generally free from
systematic corruption?
• Is there a system for HN police consultation with local communities?
Legend:
ATTP
Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
DNA
deoxyribonucleic acid
FM
field manual
HN
host nation
LE
law enforcement
SOP
standard operating procedure
TRAINING STRATEGIES
7-31. Following an assessment of infrastructure, capabilities, and capacities of the existing HN police
organization, military police commanders and staffs must develop training strategies to effectively train and
develop effective police organizations. These training strategies must consider the current state of police
forces and the strategic goals established by military and civilian leaders. Figure 7-1 provides an illustration
of HN police capacity built over time. As HN police capacity increases, HN police organizations lessen
their dependency on external support and become more self-reliant.
7-32. In many cases, pressure to hire, train, and place HN police officers into the community is high. It
should be understood that effective police organizations require solid and consistent leadership and
management systems for police operations to be effective. An effective training strategy must
simultaneously address management levels
(executive, mid-, and station levels), the training and
employment of police enforcement capabilities
(from basic patrol to highly technical investigative
functions), and the training of police and support personnel on systems to manage police operations.
Expectation management is the key to maintaining focus and achieving stated goals. The development of
police leadership with effective organizational hierarchies and functioning systems to manage police
operations takes time, especially in cases where police organizations are nonexistent or rudimentary at best.
While developing police capacity may be a key metric used by senior military and political leaders to
determine success, commanders and military police staff must reinforce that building a police force,
especially one that is capable of a full range of traditional LE functions (community- and intelligence-
driven policing, criminal investigations, evidence collection to support prosecutions) takes a long time,
often longer than political considerations will find acceptable.
7-33. Training strategies should target identified gaps in capability and build upon existing capabilities.
Training must be standardized across the organization. HN personnel with inadequate or no previous LE
experience should be trained at a standardized police academy. This ensures a standard baseline of training
for all entry level police officers (HN police academies are addressed later in this chapter). For HN LE
personnel with previous LE experience, within the previous HN police structure or other police
organization, training must be tailored to the knowledge and skill level of police officers and their
respective responsibilities.
7-14
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
Host Nation Police Capability and Capacity
Legend:
HN
host nation
LE
law enforcement
Figure 7-1. Development of HN police capabilities over time
7-34. Police management training at all levels must reinforce and support what is being trained at the
police station and basic police officer levels. The HN police organization, as a whole, will typically become
more self-sufficient as the organization leadership becomes more effective, systems are emplaced to
support police operations, and greater police capabilities are mastered. This allows the HN police agency to
achieve increasing levels of independence, which initially results in the elimination of U.S. and
multinational partnership requirements and, eventually, a reduction and complete elimination of advisory
requirements.
PARTNERSHIP AND ADVISEMENT
7-35. The level of support required by U.S. forces (including military police) will depend on the level of
degradation to former HN police infrastructure and capability. In some instances, significant HN
infrastructure and capability may be present within an AO. In these instances, U.S. forces will typically
provide minimal support as required and requested by the HN government. However, in many instances,
significant degradation to HN police infrastructure, capability, and capacity renders the HN LE and
policing efforts ineffective or nonexistent. This condition will typically require significant security force
assistance and intervention. In some cases, initial civil security and civil control efforts may be conducted
by U.S. and multinational forces as HN police and security organizations are reconstituted.
7-36. There are three types of security force assistance activities (advising, partnering, and augmentation)
conducted by U.S. and multinational elements to assist HN governments in rebuilding their internal
capacity. Military police conducting HN police development and transition missions rely heavily on
partnering and advising to enable successful HN police reconstitution and transition efforts.
7-37. Partnering efforts assign units at various levels of the HN organization to leverage the strengths of
U.S. and HN elements. This partnering includes training and multinational operations to develop HN police
capability and capacity. The degree of partnering will decrease over time as HN police capabilities mature.
The final partnering stage occurs as HN police forces take full control of their operations. At this stage,
U.S. forces may continue to provide quick-reaction forces, overwatch, or other assistance when requested
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
7-15
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