Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 7)

Chapter 7

by the HN government. Military police partnering efforts with HN police organizations typically occur at

the company and platoon levels, based on guidance from military police battalions. Some partnering efforts

may be conducted by military police staff elements working with HN police support personnel to assist in

specific areas (supply and logistics, human resources management, communications, maintenance). These

military police company, platoon, and staff partners may be augmented or task-organized with military

police LE detachments as required.

7-38. Advising HN governments involves the use of individuals or teams to coach, teach, and mentor HN

police personnel at all levels. Advising and partnering are complementary, but inherently different

activities. Advisers must work to build relationships with HN police counterparts based on mutual personal

and professional respect, thus enabling candid and open dialogue to influence the decisions and

organizational development of HN police organizations. Advising efforts are typically conducted by senior

military police commanders and staffs. These military police advisers work with their HN police

counterparts. For example, military police company commanders and platoon leaders advise police station

level commanders, military police battalion commanders and staffs advise midlevel managers and staff, and

military police brigade commanders and staffs advise senior police officers or chiefs of police and staff.

Advisory activities continue to occur after the requirement for unit level partnership has diminished and is

no longer required.

PARTNERSHIP PLANNING FACTORS

7-39. There are many factors that military police commanders and staffs must consider when planning for

designating AO and partnership assignments. The police station is typically the center of gravity for

success in building HN police capability and capacity. Military police companies are assigned areas based

on the number of HN police stations in the area and associated coverage requirements. Platoons partner

with HN police stations to provide periodic reports to maintain continuous assessments. One of the most

critical decisions is determining the appropriate number of military police platoons required to safely and

effectively conduct police development and transition operations.

7-40. Appropriate military police platoon-to-HN police station ratios are determined based on multiple

factors, including the—

Threat environment.

Size of the station, specifically the number of police officers.

Distance and time between stations.

Reaction force response time.

Proficiency of the station.

Protection of the station.

Available essential equipment (weapons, body armor, ammunition, vehicles, radios, uniforms).

Life support sources (power, water, sewage services).

Facilities status.

7-41. For planning purposes, in a high-risk environment or when HN police capability at the station level is

seriously degraded or nonexistent, one military police platoon typically partners with each HN police

station individually. Providing an HN police station with a single military police platoon ensures that

military police can establish and maintain a 24-hour presence at the police station. As conditions permit and

the confidence and proficiency of HN police increase, one platoon may assume responsibility for multiple

HN police stations.

7-42. One platoon per station is a suggested planning factor when the initial HN police station coverage

plan is executed, but may be changed based on mission variables and station assessments. Typically, one

military police platoon assigned to four HN police stations is the maximum span of control for effective

partnership during relatively stable conditions.

(See figure

7-2.) Centrally locating the company

headquarters will help ease mission command and logistical support.

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Host Nation Police Capability and Capacity

Legend:

host nation

Figure 7-2. Military police span of control

POLICE STATION TRAINING

7-43. Military police conduct training at the station level while partnering with HN police. These training

programs should be synchronized to reinforce basic police training that should have been taught at a police

training and certification academy. The focus of training should initially be basic police procedures, to

include—

Patrolling.

Defending the police station.

Managing police operations.

Collecting and reporting police information.

Conducting communications.

Operating checkpoints.

7-44. In some cases, formal academy training may not exist; established police training academies by U.S.

and multinational forces may have yet to occur. In these cases, initial training can be completed and

documented by military police platoons supporting HN police stations. However, all HN police personnel

must attend a formal training and certification academy at the earliest opportunity.

7-45. Police training programs taught at the unit level should consist of individual tasks that build to

collective training tasks (police station operations, traffic enforcement, coordinated multinational police

operations). The end state of any police training program is to train a legitimate, trustworthy, and

professional HN police force. As proficiencies increase, HN police assume leading roles while military

police observe, monitor, and advise personnel during multinational operations. Over time, military police

continue to assume a more teaching, coaching, and mentoring role. The goal of unit-taught police training

is to produce trained police officers and to assist HN police in assuming increasingly greater

responsibilities in training police station operations and patrol supervision.

POLICE DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSITION TEAMS

7-46. When the security environment permits or the HN police competency level has been assessed at a

higher level, military police companies may be task-organized into PDTTs and assigned to HN police

stations based on mission and operational variables. This change marks the transition from a primarily

partnership role to a more advisory role.

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7-47. PDTTs are typically composed of organic military police squads that are augmented by additional

support specialties from military police LE detachments and other military and civilian police specialties.

Senior level PDTTs may be composed from staff elements within the military police brigade and battalion

structure. They serve in an advisory role to assist in the transition of responsibility for domestic security to

HN police to provide a safe and secure environment. PDTTs conduct a multitiered system of training and

development to complete the HN police structure (from the individual police at the station through the

senior HN LE official and staff). PDTTs follow and receive training and policy guidance through their

functional military police structure. Typical tasks required of PDTTs include—

Training, coaching, and mentoring HN police (from the patrol level, up to and including, the

senior HN LE official and staffs [developing leadership]).

Teaching and developing personnel accountability procedures

(administration, pay, leave,

weapons).

Training and developing security protection measures.

Establishing and developing police intelligence programs (collection, analysis, dissemination,

information controls).

Planning and executing collective training programs in criminal law, criminal investigations,

evidentiary procedures, and community policing.

Ensuring that all officers receive formal individual training and certification (police academy).

Planning, training, and coordinating effective police operations.

Establishing and training procedures for suspect and detainee handling.

Developing and training logistical support systems (maintenance, supply, accountability).

7-48. PDTTs must fully understand the significance of their task, the commander’s intent, and applicable

measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. Preparation is critical. During the initial transition

to PDTT support to HN police elements, the HN may not be fully prepared to maintain security and enforce

the laws; therefore, the HN government will be unable to assume full and autonomous control.

7-49. PDTTs can act as elements under operational control or tactical control of non-military police units

when required by mission and operational variables. In these cases, PM technical channels are required to

ensure that training, policy, and LE operational requirements are consistently applied across the AO. PM

technical channels are also required to ensure that LE and policing activities are conducted within the rule

of law and that PDTTs understand and comply with HN and international legal requirements.

ADVISORY ROLE

7-50. Building rapport is one of the most important tasks for PDTT advisers. Establishing rapport is the

desired method of gaining influences with a counterpart; rapport enables other activities to occur smoothly.

Genuine rapport is developed slowly over time, but can be ruined in an instant. Skills that contribute to

credibility include—

Leadership.

Courage.

Discipline.

Maturity.

Judgment.

Decisionmaking abilities.

7-51. Demonstrating proficiency as a trainer will make a good first impression. This requires a

combination of technical and tactical knowledge and experience of application. The ability to provide good

planning advice requires more than a sound understanding of the planning process. It requires practice and

analytical judgment to adjust and apply the process effectively during the normal confusion of actual

operations.

7-52. The ability to provide sound advice is critical. This advice must be consistent with the needs of the

HN. Advisers should observe, listen, and be open to solutions that are consistent with HN organizational,

cultural, and political needs. A solution that may work within a U.S. military or civilian organization

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society may not be the best solution for the HN police organization. The ability to provide valuable tactical

advice is critical. This requires an intimate understanding of the threat, the environment, and how to apply

tactics appropriately. PDTTs will often have to analyze the situation and make decisions with little to no

information.

KEY ENABLERS

7-53. The success of the team mission depends on how the team performs and how well it employs

enablers (civilian police advisers provided by the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of State

linguists). Civilian police advisers and linguists can spell success or failure for the PDTT. Combining and

embedding civilian police advisers with their respective military police counterparts can enhance the

overall capability of the team.

Civilian Police Advisers

7-54. Civilian police advisers are composed of veteran police officers from across the United States who

come with a wide range of experience and education. Their LE experiences can cover a large specialty

range, including—

Organized crime.

Gang units.

Patrol officers.

Special weapons and tactics units.

Hostage negotiations.

Criminal investigations.

Property crime.

Narcotics.

Homicide.

7-55. Each civilian police adviser brings a unique perspective to the field. It is that personal experience

from which civilian police advisers’ missions draw core strengths. When combined with military police

operating in the field, civilian police advisers form a strong training force with a shared goal to mentor

police and security forces as they progress to becoming self-sufficient, reliant, and capable of maintaining

and sustaining a viable civilian police force.

7-56. Senior level civilian police advisers are assigned to the command staff and coordinate directly with

corps and theater level military PM sections. They assist in facilitating communications throughout the

mission. The command staff members typically have a military counterpart with whom they interact on a

daily basis. As a result of this interaction, civilian police advisers are able to infuse the civilian LE

perspective on the PDTT mission at a level that can provide appropriate guidance and influence across the

entire AO.

7-57. Communication between civilian police advisers and their military counterparts is the fundamental

component for mission success. There may be differences in philosophies between military and civilian

police, which will require careful consideration while operating in a combat environment. This is why

PDTT members must recognize basic and, sometimes, opposing perspectives. It is important that major

differences between military police team members and civilian police advisers be invisible to HN police

personnel.

7-58. Key considerations when working with civilian police advisers include the following:

Civilian police advisers do not have the authority to arrest or detain a suspect. They can only use

force in self-defense and are not authorized to engage in combat operations.

Civilian police advisers are assigned to maximize the potential benefit of their specific

experience and skill sets according to PDTT mission goals and objectives.

The team chief and the platoon leader should sit down with the civilian police advisers and

develop a standardized training model for each station. Civilian police advisers should be used

liberally, allowing them to leverage their experience.

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Civilian police advisers should be kept fully informed on all aspects of the mission. They are an

integral part of the team.

All resources should be used. Failure to use resources will severely impact the mission and may

impact the working relationship between the civilian police advisers, the team chief, and the

PDTT. Integration and cooperation are the keys to success for the PDTT mission.

Civilian police advisers integrated into the team and mission should also be incorporated into the

functioning combat team. It is important for military police personnel to remember that civilian

police advisers—

Are not a force multiplier and should never be directed to take an offensive posture or

participate in an offensive action during a mission. Civilian police advisers are mandated by

policy to maintain a defensive posture and are to use their issued weapons only in self-

defense or in the defense of fellow teammates.

Must be familiar with the capabilities and limitations of the weapon systems within the

team.

Should be incorporated into the training and rehearsals of the PDTTs; this will also help

build camaraderie within the team and squad.

Interpreters and Linguists

7-59. The successful use of interpreters is essential to the mission. The use of local national interpreters is

typically restricted due to operations security concerns. As a general rule, local national interpreters are

used for direct communication with junior HN police officials and HN police patrols. They can also be

used for HN police training on unclassified and nonsensitive information and systems. Local national

interpreters are not typically informed of the destination, meetings, movement times

(beyond initial

movement), or movement routes. Upon arrival at a mission location, only enough information is provided

to local national interpreters to actively support interpreter requirements. Cell phone possession and use

may also be restricted.

7-60. U.S. contract linguists are preferred when available. These assets are typically extremely limited and

may only be available for missions with senior level personnel or when required due to sensitivity or

classification of material or conversations requiring interpretation. A U.S. contract linguist can be used

periodically to verify and validate the effectiveness of a local national interpreter’s translation skills or to

ensure that accurate translations are rendered. The following guidelines help facilitate the use of

interpreters and linguists:

Avoid overuse. Interpreters and linguists are there to help in all facets of translating; remember

to treat them with respect.

Use simple phrases and words. Simple, direct wording will help the interpreter and limit the

chance of mistranslation. Slang and jargon should be avoided. Following this procedure will

assist the linguist in understanding the meaning and will hasten the translation process. A lot of

time is lost in translating.

Speak directly to the person when trying to convey a message to them; do not speak to the

linguist. This helps establish a stronger bond with the HN individual.

Include the linguist in rehearsals.

Limit private conversations between the linguist and the local national.

Think operations security when working with local national interpreters. They should not be

present during convoy briefs or rehearsals. Linguists will travel with PDTTs, but should not be

given any mission-specific information (exact time of departure, routes to be traveled, scheduled

location visits, troop strength data). Although linguists are working for U.S. forces, they are still

local nationals with unknown backg2rounds; operations security is imperative for the safety of the

team.

If an interpreter is not available, consider the use of machine foreign language translation

systems.

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RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

7-61. Reconstituting HN police personnel requires successful police recruitment and a training program

that emphasizes basic police officer training. The more focused the training is to the officer’s level and

knowledge requirements, the more meaningful and insightful it will be to the person. Additional training

focusing on organizational leadership should be given to midlevel and senior leaders.

7-62. Police recruitment programs should be crafted with substantial input from local HN authorities, take

the local culture into account, and use themes that resonate with the local population. They should ensure

that all major demographic groups are properly represented. U.S. and multinational partners should

encourage and support HN efforts to recruit from minority populations. A clear set of appropriate mental,

physical, and moral standards must be established and enforced.

7-63. Ideally, recruits are centrally screened and inducted. Recruitment centers need to be in areas that are

secure and protected from attacks by threat elements that may oppose U.S. and HN efforts. Effective

security forces can help improve HN social and economic development through the benefits that each

member receives. Every recruit should be provided a basic level of literacy, job training, and morals and

values inculcation.

POLICE LEADERSHIP

7-64. Police leader candidate standards should be high. Candidates should be in good health and pass an

academic test that is set to a higher standard than tests for enlisted police recruits. Potential leadership level

candidates should be carefully vetted to ensure that they do not have close ties to any criminal or radical

organization. Lower-level police supervisors should be selected from the best police force members to

ensure that objective standards are established and enforced and that promotion is by merit and not through

unlawful influence, nepotism, or other illegal factors.

7-65. The careful vetting of candidates and the cooperation of community leaders are necessary if the local

police are to become an effective and legitimate force. Failure to properly vet potential police candidates

can result in significant long-term problems. Criminals, persons with psychological issues, insurgent

elements, and many other categories of undesirable personnel may attempt to gain employment within the

police force. The military police brigade and battalion intelligence officer and staff should be heavily

involved in the vetting process.

7-66. Potential recruits should undergo a basic security check and be vetted against lists of criminals and

persons suspected of participating in illegal activities against friendly forces. As much as possible, this

process should be conducted with substantial input from HN agencies and personnel. Membership in illegal

or corrupt organizations must be carefully monitored; past membership should not automatically exempt a

recruit from selection. Any ongoing relationship of a recruit with an illegal organization requires constant

monitoring; in some cases, the recruit may be dismissed from the vetting process. Care should be exercised

to ensure that no single police unit contains too many previous members of an illegal unit, tribal militia, or

other militant faction.

POLICE ACADEMIES

7-67. Training HN police requires that senior military police leaders and planners, in cooperation with

USAMPS, develop an exportable HN police basic training academy program. It should consist of a

comprehensive program of instruction and necessary resources to train the required amount of HN police

personnel. HN police academy programs require enormous resources and time and should be addressed as

early in the planning phase as possible. The length of the program will vary, depending on the stability of

the HN environment, the assessed effectiveness of current HN police forces, available resources, and the

required training on functional specialties.

7-68. In the case of a failed police system, academy programs may need to be tiered from basic-level

training to more advanced follow-on training due to the urgent need to train and field as many HN police as

quickly as possible. During the beginning phases, the use of U.S. and multinational instructors with training

experience can greatly enhance the overall quality of the instruction. These instructors can be military

police or civilian LE personnel. As early as possible, academy management and instruction should

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Chapter 7

transition to HN control, at first under U.S. and multinational supervision and then gradually to full HN

autonomy. As the environment matures, planners and trainers may lengthen police academy courses to

focus training on higher-level police training tasks.

ADDITIONAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

7-69. Police training programs need to be developed to provide instruction that is based on the level of the

officer being trained. Senior level training should address the issues necessary to manage effective police

operations. These issues can include leadership, management skills, logistics, human resource management,

and other requirements. At the same time, the training developed for basic police officer training should

concentrate on basic LE skills (understanding legal requirements; police interviews, apprehensions, and

traffic stops; police officer survival techniques).

Basic Training

7-70. If possible, basic police officer training should occur in established training academies with

standardized programs of instruction. The training should be conducted by experienced LE personnel on

basic police procedures, weapons proficiency, and survival skills. During initial training, LE trainers

observe and conduct training. More experienced HN police are selected as assistant instructors and

demonstrators. Over time, the instruction transitions and HN assistant trainers become the primary trainers.

Most of the training should be hands-on, practical-exercise training. Tasks required for basic police officer

training can include—

Use of force.

Police officer survival.

Weapon retention and suspect disarming.

Firearms training.

Handcuff application.

Suspect search and transportation procedures.

Patrol procedures.

Checkpoint operations.

Traffic stop procedures.

Communications.

Cordon establishment.

Building clearing and search procedures.

Crime scene securing and evidence collection and preservation.

First aid procedures.

Executive-Level and Midlevel Training

7-71. U.S. forces tasked with training HN personnel must ensure that HN police forces have capable

management, through and including the highest echelon police leaders. Military police leaders should

consider assigning experienced senior military police personnel to positions with their HN police force

counterparts to serve as executive trainers and advisers. Military police planners, working with police

experts for the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of State, should also develop formal

training programs for senior police personnel.

7-72. Initial, intermediate-level police supervisor training should focus on building effective leaders and

staffs for small units and then progressively move to higher echelons. Thus initial, intermediate-level

officer training should be focused at the police station level. A cadre of carefully selected midlevel police

leaders can be provided advanced-level education at formal strategic-level schools. This prepares qualified

cadre to assume leadership positions and become faculty for HN schools. These programs are, however,

expensive and time-consuming. Executive training should include more advanced- and strategic-level

considerations.

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7-73. Executive-level police leaders must be prepared to engage other governmental agencies to compete

for funding and other resources. They must also be competent at conducting long-range planning and

establishing a strategic vision for their organization. Executive-level and midlevel training considerations

include—

Supply and logistics. Senior personnel must be well versed in procedures to procure and protect

resources required to operate a police organization. They must be capable of identifying

requirements, prioritizing needs, and supervising the procurement and distribution of supplies

and equipment. Supply discipline and equipment accountability are also critical. Logistics

functions can include—

Conducting a supply (distribution and accountability of equipment) and logistics discipline

program.

Maintaining the vehicle fleet.

Budgeting. The ability to manage funds for an organization is vital. Senior personnel must

possess the skills required to forecast, document, and justify budget requirements projected for

the coming years.

Human resource management. Human resource skills are necessary to ensure that qualified LE

and support personnel are hired, trained, and retained to conduct the operations of the

organization. Human resource functions can include—

Recruiting and vetting police officers and staff.

Conducting and documenting in-service training.

Conducting midlevel and senior-level management training on planning, observing,

supervising, counseling, operating, recording, reporting, and budgeting.

Staffing various departments (patrol, investigations, SRT, traffic).

Establishing and managing procedures for pay and benefits.

Police administration. The new HN police department will eventually become responsible for

managing several internal functions and must receive training on how to manage them. These

functions can include—

Operating a secure records section to maintain police records and reports, statistical

databases, and other required records.

Conducting internal-affairs investigations concerning professional standards violations,

internal-security issues, and preemployment investigations.

Scheduling patrols.

Planning events and contingency operations.

Managing police intelligence activities.

Supervising and monitoring desk and communications operations, to include dispatch and

electronic communications (radio) maintenance.

Accounting for evidence collection, processing, and control.

Operating a field training officer program.

Issuing police credentials and maintaining the data in a secure database.

Operating a permit section.

Operating a temporary detention facility on the premises.

Operating a court liaison section for prisoner pretrial release functions, the transfer of

prisoners to permanent detention facilities, and case preparation.

Prescribing standardized uniforms, weapons, duty equipment, and radio protocols.

In-Service Training

7-74. The purpose of in-service training is to ensure continued proficiency in necessary skills; familiarize

officers with new developments and techniques; and achieve a revitalized sense of compassion,

professionalism, and career interest. In-service training is intended to promote continued instruction and

study in the attitudes, knowledge, skills, and procedures involved in the duties and responsibilities of LE,

above and beyond the fundamentals covered in basic police training and mandated weapons training.

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7-75. In-service training is a mandatory training program. It can include required cyclic recertification

tasks or professional development training intended to sustain and improve knowledge and proficiency

while preparing personnel for possible future positions in specialized units. In-service training can also be

mandated by organizational leadership to address identified problems or to impart critical information. The

length and location of in-service training may range from 15 minutes during shift changes or guard mounts

to days on specialized training sites. Subject areas range from weapons proficiency, to ethical conduct, to

officer survival, and to the identification of improvised explosive devices. The training is limited only to

the needs of the police organization.

KEY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

7-76. The successful management of police stations depends on administrative specialists, human resource

specialists, record keepers, budget personnel, and facilities and custodial staffs. Police operations also

require armorers, supply and logistics personnel, communications and automations specialists, and vehicle

mechanics. These critical staff positions are not LE personnel; therefore, their numbers should not be

included when identifying the number of police officers required for a police organization. These positions

do not require individuals to be LE officers or specific police training. However, they may require some

level of security clearance and backg2round investigation.

7-77. Military police brigade and battalion staff elements and military police LE detachments have the

capability to conduct or coordinate training for HN police station support personnel. In some cases, civilian

support personnel may be required to augment military police capabilities.

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

7-78. The recruitment, training, and retention of qualified and quality police officers depend on an

effective human resource management system. Once trained and assigned, personnel must be paid,

accounted for, promoted, and recognized for exemplary performance. This also applies to the support staff.

Clear organizational administration systems must be instituted, and a national standard for pay and

promotion that is fair and equitable should be established.

Pay and Benefits

7-79. Appropriate compensation levels help prevent a culture of corruption in HN police forces. It is

cheaper to spend the money for adequate wages and produce effective police forces than to pay less and

end up with corrupt and abusive police personnel who alienate the population. This is especially a

challenge in cultures where corruption and graft are accepted ways of life. Military police must be

constantly aware that HN police who are left unchecked (when in contact with the local community) have

substantial opportunity to become corrupt in their duties.

7-80. Some important considerations concerning the pay status of HN forces include the following:

Pay for commissioned officers, noncommissioned officers, and technical specialists should be

competitive with other professions of the HN. Police officers need to be paid a sufficient wage

so that they do not have to supplement their income with part-time jobs or resort to illegal

methods.

Pay should be disbursed through HN government channels, not U.S. channels.

Pay for police forces should come from central government budgets, not from kickbacks or

locally procured revenue. If this happens, the loyalty of the HN police will always be in question

and corruption is likely.

Cultural norms should be addressed to ensure that questionable practices

(such as taxing

subordinates) are minimized.

Good pay and attractive benefits must be combined with a strict code of conduct that allows for

the immediate dismissal of corrupt personnel.

Pensions should be available to compensate the families of police force members in the event of

a service-related death.

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Personnel Accountability

7-81. Military police must be fully engaged in monitoring the accountability of personnel in HN police

force units. Proper personnel accountability reduces corruption, particularly in manual banking systems

where pay is provided in cash. Additionally, the number of personnel failing to report for duty can be an

indicator of a possible attack, breakdown in unit morale, or criminal influence upon police security forces.

Promotion Screening and Selection

7-82. Military police leaders and planners may be required to provide mentorship and influence HN

promotion systems. Processes for making promotion selections should be based on proven performance and

demonstrated aptitude for increased responsibility. Objective evaluations ensure that promotion is by merit

and not through illegal or improper influence; promotion due to social or cultural status should always be

avoided. Two methods may be worth considering when selecting leaders. First, identify the most competent

performers, train them, and recommend them for promotion. Second, identify those with social or

professional status within the training group and then train and recommend them for promotion. The first

method may lead to more competent police leaders, but may be resisted for cultural reasons. The second

method ensures that new leaders will be accepted culturally, but competence may be sacrificed. The most

effective solution is often a combination of the two methods.

Human Resource Personnel Training

7-83. To maintain effective human resource staffs and programs, personnel must be thoroughly trained.

Refresher and professional development training is also required to maintain proficiency and training on

systems and procedural updates. Military police brigade and battalion personnel staffs can conduct or

coordinate training for human resource personnel. Human resource personnel should be trained on a variety

of tasks, which includes—

Maintaining personnel manning rosters.

Conducting recruiting and hiring processes.

Maintaining personnel records.

Overseeing badge and credential issuance and standards.

Managing pay and benefits.

Managing personnel accountability systems

(records on leave of absences, sick leaves,

hospitalizations, annual vacations).

Managing promotions.

Managing award submissions.

Executing casualty management.

Managing the evaluation process.

Preparing, submitting, and maintaining administrative forms.

Tracking administrative actions.

POLICE OPERATIONS

7-84. The HN police operations section provides critical oversight and control of LE operations (desk

operations, LE patrols, criminal investigations, traffic management and enforcement, police administration,

logistics). The police operations section is responsible for planning for the organization and coordinating

with other police and governmental agencies.

7-85. Military police brigade and battalion S-3 sections augmented with military police LE detachment

personnel can conduct and coordinate training for the HN police operations section. Police operations

personnel should be trained on a variety of tasks, to include—

Operating a 24-hour police operations center or desk.

Managing work shifts.

Preparing and executing patrol plans.

Developing redundant coverage and overlapping patrol area boundaries.

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Chapter 7

Securing police stations.

Maintaining station training plans.

Monitoring and documenting training requirements (staff training, police officer certifications,

and in-service training requirements).

Conducting detention cell operations (headcount, feeding, showering).

Transporting detainees.

Conducting shift change briefs and guard mount operations.

Conducting liaison with emergency services and other agencies (including other LE stations and

headquarters).

Executing crisis management operations.

Managing academy attendance.

Scheduling firearms and other qualification ranges.

Managing evidence custodian requirements.

POLICE ADMINISTRATION (RECORDS AND REPORTS)

7-86. A police administration section is required to ensure that police-related records and reports are

properly stored and disseminated within legal and policy guidelines for LE-related information. The police

administration section will typically manage automation systems and access requirements for the

organization.

7-87. Military police should assist in establishing administrative functions, to include managing databases,

developing forms and processing procedures, providing guidance, and setting standards for daily

operations. Personnel must be familiar with the scope of police powers, authority, and jurisdiction.

Reference materials should be on hand for quick reference and to establish offense codes for use in record

keeping and administrative actions. Patrol reports and security checklists must be developed and used to

record pertinent information and activities. Military police should not force the use of U.S. forms; the

development of local forms can give ownership to HN police. After an assessment determines that there is

no existing form that meets the requirement, a U.S. form may be used.

7-88. Military police LE detachments have the capability to provide limited training for police

administration sections. This section requires training to achieve and maintain proficiency in activities,

which include—

Managing and allocating case file numbers.

Monitoring police reports for administrative completeness and accuracy.

Conducting, processing, storing, and backing up police reports.

Distributing police reports, as appropriate, and ensuring that distribution is controlled and

conducted within legal and regulatory constraints.

Maintaining liaison with the court system and legal personnel.

Producing police-related correspondence, as required.

Maintaining court appearance records and facilitating court appearances.

SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS

7-89. Other personnel essential in sustaining police operations include mechanics, facilities maintenance

personnel, and supply specialists. HN police stations require a maintenance facility and a motor pool within

the vicinity of the police station compound to ensure that vehicles are available for LE patrol activities.

7-90. Police operations are resource-intensive and require significant supply operations to provide LE-

specific equipment and expendable supplies. An organizational supply system is a key part of police

operations. Military police can assist in the development of property management and logistics

accountability systems, supply acquisition, and record-keeping requirements.

7-26

ATP 3-39.10

26 January 2015

Host Nation Police Capability and Capacity

7-91. Military police brigade or battalion logistics officers and staff and military police company supply

personnel can provide and coordinate training for supply and logistics personnel. Supply and logistics

personnel must be trained and proficient in a number of activities, to include—

Requisitioning all classes of supplies (food, water, individual equipment, fuel, barrier materials,

ammunition, sundry items, vehicles, medical items, repair and maintenance parts).

Requisitioning automation equipment requirements.

Preparing and submitting contract requirement packages for sustainment items (food, facilities,

protection requirements) and providing assistance in managing contracted support through unit

contracting officer representatives and receiving officials.

Publishing supply and logistics policy letters and SOPs.

Developing procedures and service agreements for maintaining fleet operations and equipment.

Maintaining a maintenance program at the operator level for all issued equipment (weapons,

communications equipment, vehicles).

Executing a maintenance program at the regional and district levels (above the operator level).

Maintaining infrastructure for stations, water, power, and sewage.

Managing supply discipline and accountability.

Distributing equipment and supplies to the user level.

Conducting equipment inventories.

Maintaining individual officer equipment records.

Maintaining required station equipment levels.

Maintaining stock levels of police forms.

Managing equipment accountability.

Cross-leveling equipment and supplies, as necessary.

Maintaining ammunition accountability.

AUTOMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

7-92. Automation and communications specialists are required to procure and maintain critical automation

and communications equipment, secure local area networks, and maintain connectivity with other databases

and forums. HN police operations depend on the ability of personnel to maintain communications with LE

elements as they perform their duties. Military police can help establish communication protocols by

creating call signs and radio procedures for daily communications, maintaining operations security,

implementing information systems and security procedures, and maintaining communication security

operations.

7-93. Automation systems, to include crime and police record databases, are critical to managing police

operations. The establishment of an automation system is an extremely important part of setting up a

modern policing capability. Military police can assist HN police in developing a centralized data storage

system that is accessible to all police and security agencies. When designing and implementing these

systems, military police personnel should—

Ensure that a security program is incorporated into the system.

Provide an information management system that will provide support, administrative functions,

logistics, training, operation reporting, vehicle registration, police reporting, and penal

information.

Determine additional LE reports needed (daily activity logs, other automated entries).

Provide LE access to automated police records from a centralized database.

Conduct queries expeditiously and with the appropriate permission from a centralized database

for real-time information and the quick compilation of crime statistics.

Train by developing guidelines for maintaining readiness, benchmarks to gauge progress, and

reasonable standards for police operations (from basic to advanced tactics and procedures).

7-94. Dispatchers and other communications personnel within the operations control center or desk

dispatch respond to patrols with guidance from shift and desk supervisors. They also track and record

26 January 2015

ATP 3-39.10

7-27

Chapter 7

police operations as they occur. They must be trained to professionally handle members of the public who

enter the police station to report situations.

7-95. Training for automation and communications personnel can be conducted or coordinated by the

military police brigade or battalion signal officer and staff. Military police LE detachment desk teams can

provide training for dispatch personnel. Automations and communications personnel require training to

achieve and maintain proficiency in activities, which include—

Performing dispatch procedures and administrative functions.

Maintaining emergency response system connectivity.

Managing a communications equipment maintenance program (including handheld, vehicle-

mounted, and base station equipment and repeaters).

Maintaining communications architecture and connectivity with outside agencies, other police

stations, and headquarters elements.

Ensuring the compatibility of communications systems.

Preparing and submitting contract requirement packages for the requisition of communications

equipment and services and providing assistance in managing contracted support through unit

contracting officer representatives and receiving officials.

Maintaining repair parts for communications equipment.

Maintaining the operation of crime record and police intelligence data systems.

Maintaining computer hardware and updating software as necessary.

Maintaining automation connectivity with the World Wide Web.

Maintaining repeaters.

Providing emergency first aid.

Coordinating evacuation missions for injured persons and aiding disabled motorists.

Investigating criminal and traffic complaints and violations along the highways and major

roadways.

7-28

ATP 3-39.10

26 January 2015

Appendix A

Metric Conversion Chart

This appendix complies with AR

25-30 which states that weights, distances,

quantities, and measurements contained in Army publications will be expressed in

both U.S. standard and metric units. Table A-1 is a metric conversion chart for the

measurements used in this manual. For a complete listing of preferred metric units

for general use, see Fed-Std-376B.

Table A-1. Metric conversion chart

U.S. Units

Multiplied By

Equals Metric Units

Feet

0.30480

Meters

Fluid ounces

29.57300

Milliliters

Gallons

3.78540

Liters

Inches

0.02540

Meters

Inches

2.54000

Centimeters

Inches

25.40010

Millimeters

Miles

1.60930

Kilometers

Ounces

28.34900

Grams

Pounds

453.59000

Grams

Metric Units

Multiplied By

Equals U.S. Units

Centimeters

0.39370

Inches

Grams

0.03527

Ounces

Kilograms

2.20460

Pounds

Kilometers

0.62137

Miles

Liters

0.26420

Gallons

Meters

39.37000

Inches

Meters

3.28080

Feet

Milliliters

0.03380

Fluid ounces

Millimeters

0.03937

Inches

Legend:

U.S.

United States

26 January 2015

ATP 3-39.10

A-1

Appendix B

Maintenance of Good Order and Discipline

Commanders are inherently responsible for the maintenance of good order and

discipline within the units and areas under their control. This includes the authority to

conduct investigations of offenses and other incidents and to have offenders

apprehended. In some instances, this responsibility also extends to civilians in the

commander’s AO that threaten or impede the normal functioning of the command by

conduct that is criminal or prohibited by laws or regulations.

AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION

B-1. Authority refers to the right of LE personnel to exercise power and exact obedience. Whether subject

to the UCMJ or not, Article 7, UCMJ, gives Army LE personnel (security police, military police, and

persons designated by proper authorities to perform military criminal investigative, guard, or police duties)

the authority to apprehend military personnel for any violation of the code. This authority applies

worldwide and is subject to the restrictions of Rule 302, Manual for Courts-Martial.

B-2. The UCMJ does not typically grant Army LE arrest authority over civilians during routine police

operations within the United States; however, the installation commander’s inherent authority to protect the

installation permits Army LE, as agents of the installation commander, the authority to apprehend civilians

for offenses occurring on the installation. This arrest authority is limited in that Army LE personnel can

detain civilians for a reasonable period of time sufficient to investigate the incident before turning them

over to an appropriate civilian LE authority. (See AR 195-2 and DODI 5200.08.) In 2006, the U.S.

Congress expanded UCMJ jurisdiction to include civilian persons serving with or accompanying the armed

forces in the field during contingency operations. The authority of contractor personnel to apprehend or

detain individuals can be ascertained only by examining the contract under which they are performing.

B-3. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 authorizes the prosecution of certain criminal

offenses committed by certain members of the armed forces and by persons employed by or accompanying

the armed forces outside the United States. Under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, offenses

committed in the United States that are punishable by confinement of more than 1 year are punishable to

personnel who engage in the same conduct outside the United States. These individuals are subject to trial

by the federal government if the crime is a felony, the HN fails to prosecute, and the U.S. attorney believes

prosecution is warranted.

Notes.

See 18 USC 3261, 3262, 3263, 3264, 3265, 3266, and 3267.

DODI

5525.11 provides implementing procedures for the Military Extraterritorial

Jurisdiction Act.

B-4. Jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear a case and render a legally competent decision. Generally,

there are three parties concerned with jurisdiction:

Judge.

Prosecutor.

Police.

26 January 2015

ATP 3-39.10

B-1

Appendix B

B-5. Depending on where the offense occurs, the type of offense, and the status of the offender, the matter

could be sent to one of three court systems:

State court (or foreign court if outside the United States, based on status-of-forces agreements).

Federal court (consisting of U.S. district courts for felonies and U.S. magistrate court for

misdemeanors).

Court-martial or military tribunal.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE COURT

B-6. The U.S. magistrate court system enables the enforcement of misdemeanor laws on Army

installations. The U.S. magistrates have jurisdiction to try persons Soldiers and civilians accused of, and

sentence persons convicted of, misdemeanors committed on federal property. (See 18 USC 3401.) The U.S.

Magistrate Court also has jurisdiction over juveniles who commit on-post misdemeanors.

(See

18 USC 3401.) Cases most frequently tried include larceny, assault, and traffic offenses. Since the

jurisdiction of the court is limited to the trial of misdemeanor cases, it may not impose a sentence of

imprisonment in excess of 1 year.

B-7. Offenders are cited to appear in U.S. magistrate court by the issuance of a U.S. district court

violation notice. Some offenses allow payments by mail, while others require a court appearance. The trial

of a juvenile may necessitate a certification by the U.S. attorney that the state juvenile court lacks

jurisdiction, refuses to assume jurisdiction, or does not have adequate programs and services available. (See

AR 190-45.) This certification will require coordination between the SJA and the appropriate civilian

authorities.

B-8. The prosecution of a criminal charge is determined by the court or courts with jurisdiction over the

case. Types of prosecutors include—

Military (trial counsel).

State (district, state, prosecuting, and circuit attorneys).

Federal (U.S. attorney, special assistant U.S. attorney).

HN (HN attorney, based on the system and court structure of the HN).

B-9. The three types of LE include—

State (city, county, and state).

Federal (Federal Bureau of Investigation; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; and U.S.

marshals, DA police, and all other federal LE activities and agencies, to include military

criminal investigative organizations [USACIDC, Air Force Office of Special Investigations,

Naval Criminal Investigative Service]).

Military

(military police

[master-at-arms, security forces]) and criminal investigators

[USACIDC, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Naval Criminal Investigative Service

SAs]).

HN (LE organizations within the HN criminal justice system).

B-10. There are general criteria that must be satisfied before a court can exercise criminal jurisdiction in a

case. Jurisdiction can generally be described as the power of a court. These criteria include—

Subject matter jurisdiction. This is the jurisdiction of the court over the offense. For example,

a magistrate court would not have subject matter jurisdiction over an offense of insubordination

because it is not an offense prohibited by the federal criminal code or any state or local code that

can be assimilated. A court-martial, by contrast, would have subject matter jurisdiction over this

offense because this conduct is prohibited by the UCMJ.

Personal jurisdiction. This is the jurisdiction of the court over the offender or the accused. The

personal jurisdiction of a court-martial is status-based. If a person is subject to the UCMJ at the

time of the offense and at the time of trial, a court-martial would have personal jurisdiction over

the accused.

Territorial jurisdiction. Territorial jurisdiction determines the limits of the power of the court

with regard to the physical location of a crime or event. In some criminal cases, there may be a

question concerning what level of government or sovereign (state, federal [including military],

B-2

ATP 3-39.10

26 January 2015

Maintenance of Good Order and Discipline

or HN) has authority over specific personnel or violations. At times, concurrent jurisdiction may

be in effect, meaning that multiple governmental authorities may have jurisdiction or exclusive

jurisdiction by one governmental authority. The UCMJ is extra-territorial, which means that it is

applicable worldwide to those subject to the UCMJ, Article 2. LE personnel should consult their

servicing SJA concerning jurisdictional manners.

B-11. When a crime occurs that is punishable by military and civilian courts, the supporting SJA must

coordinate to determine where the accused will be tried. In many situations, memorandums of

understanding with state or local authorities or status-of-forces agreements with HNs will outline who has

primary jurisdiction in specific cases or circumstances. The U.S. magistrate will generally have jurisdiction

over on-post misdemeanors.

CIVILIAN POLICE AND GUARD PERSONNEL

B-12. The authority for federal civilian employees assigned to security, police, and guard duties is derived

from Article 7, UCMJ. Federally employed civilian police, security guards, and contract guards can

perform LE and security duties authorized by the installation commander and are subject to any limitations

imposed. The installation commander is also the source of authority for other personnel assigned to security

force duties. These security force personnel may apprehend persons on an installation for committing

felonies and breaches of peace or threatening the property or welfare of others. However, this apprehension

authority is limited to issuing citations and turning the subject over to the appropriate civilian or military

authorities. (See the restrictions in the Posse Comitatus Act on the use of these personnel in providing aid

to civilian LE.)

B-13. The PM or military police commander, in cooperation with the SJA, develops an SOP for Army

civilian police and security guards. The SOP must describe the procedures and limitations for detention,

apprehension, and the use of force. The SOP must also address the restrictions placed on personnel when

responding as a reaction force or to a hostage situation.

JUDGE ADVOCATES

B-14. The UCMJ is federal law and the basis of the military justice system; it dictates what conduct is

criminal, establishes the various types of courts-martial, and sets forth the procedures to follow in the

administration of military justice. The purpose of military justice is to assist in maintaining good order and

discipline in the armed forces, promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and

strengthen the national security of the United States. (See FM 1-04.)

B-15. The mission of judge advocates and supporting legal personnel is to provide professional legal

services at all echelons of command. The Judge Advocate General is responsible for the overall supervision

and administration of military justice within the Army. The commander is responsible for the

administration of military justice in the unit and must communicate directly with the SJA about military

justice matters.

B-16. There are three components of military justice, each with the following distinct functions:

SJA. The SJA is responsible for military justice advice and services to the command. The SJA

advises commanders concerning the administration of justice, the disposition of alleged offenses,

appeals of nonjudicial punishment, and actions on courts-martial findings and sentences. The

SJA supervises the administration and prosecution of courts-martial, prepares records of trial,

manages the victim-witness assistance program, and performs military justice training.

Chief, U.S. Army Trial Defense Service. The Chief, U.S. Army Trial Defense Service,

exercises the supervision, control, and direction of defense counsel services in the Army. The

judge advocates assigned to the U.S. Army Trial Defense Service advise Soldiers and represent

them before courts-martial. These judge advocates also represent Soldiers in adverse

administrative hearings.

Chief Trial Judge, U.S. Army Judiciary. The Chief Trial Judge, U.S. Army Trial Judiciary,

provides military judges for general and special courts-martial, supervises military judges,

promulgates rules of court, and supervises the military magistrate program. Military judges

assigned to the U.S. Army Trial Judiciary preside over courts-martial, exercise judicial

26 January 2015

ATP 3-39.10

B-3

Appendix B

independence in the conduct of courts-martial, conduct training sessions for trial and defense

counsel, and perform or supervise military magistrate functions. Military magistrate functions

include the review of pretrial confinements; the examination of confinements pending the

outcome of foreign criminal charges; and the issuance of search, seizure, or apprehension

authorizations.

OTHER POLICE AGENCIES

B-17. The PM often relies on outside police agencies for assistance and to share police information and

intelligence. The PM develops memorandums of agreement and understanding with local police agencies in

support of various emergency and public safety issues. Local and state police representatives should be

invited to installation planning meetings, working groups, and forums to exchange ideas, solicit input, and

participate in appropriate exercises. Antiterrorism efforts should always include local, state, and federal

police and intelligence agencies as required by AR

525-13 and DODI 2000.12. Any HN LE and

intelligence personnel should be included when overseas and within the limits of operational security.

These agencies are valuable sources of information and support to installation commanders and special

staff.

B-18. Advances in database technology, combined with an explosion in information sharing and

networking among police agencies, have resulted in the development and expansion of robust information

repositories. Army LE personnel continue to access the National Crime Information Center database, but

increasingly turn to databases from corrections systems for fugitive information and to Department of

Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation systems for terrorist threat information. DOD

proprietary automation systems (COPS and ACI2) greatly improve interoperability and eliminate seams

that criminal and other threats might otherwise exploit.

B-19. The authority for Army LE to collect and store LE information is covered by numerous laws,

regulations, and policies. ATTP 3-39.20 contains an extensive list of documents and sources that outline

the authorities and constraints related to information storage and sharing.

B-4

ATP 3-39.10

26 January 2015

Appendix C

Evidence and Forensics Support

The capability to properly secure and collect physical evidence in support of LE

activities and other mission requirements is critical to successful criminal prosecution

and mission success. Evidence collection is a capability routinely employed by

military police across the full range of military operations. Some operational

environments may dictate abbreviated procedures; but when security allows and time

and resources are available, it is ideally performed to full evidentiary standard.

Advances in the forensic analysis of physical evidence collected at crime scenes and

incident sites have expanded the awareness of forensic capabilities and the

requirement for properly handling evidence to avoid contamination and maintain the

chain of custody. This appendix provides a brief description of the key activities

involved in evidence collection and forensic analysis. It focuses on tactics,

techniques, and procedures for use in evidence collection by military police,

USACIDC, or others involved in the collection and preservation of evidence. The

processing and analysis of collected evidence is covered in other publications,

including ATP 3-39.12 and ATTP 3-39.20.

ANALYSIS AND CAPABILITIES

C-1. The capabilities to collect, analyze, and exploit latent prints, DNA, firearm signatures, toolmarks,

trace evidence, documents, and media have been employed with great success in traditional LE applications

and in efforts to target, apprehend, and prosecute terrorists or enemy combatants. Deployable, forensic

laboratory capabilities have enabled significant expansion, timeliness, and relevant evidence collection and

forensic analytical capabilities that support expeditionary commanders beyond the singular role of criminal

investigations.

C-2. The collection of physical evidence and follow-on forensic analysis enables LE investigators to

connect individuals to specific crimes or other incidents; link persons, material, and equipment (including

weapons); and identify trends, patterns, and associations pertinent to crimes and criminal activity. The

collection of physical evidence and follow-on forensic analysis can also enable operating forces to identify

enemies and add depth and scope to the intelligence picture. Items such as fingerprints and DNA enable

U.S. forces to identify who handled an item (such as an improvised explosive device) and to connect a

particular person with a certain place or event. The resulting information can provide information and

intelligence supporting―

Criminal investigation and prosecution. Evidence collected, analyzed, and exploited by LE

investigators, forensics laboratory examiners, police intelligence analysts, and staff can match

individuals to particular locations, events, or devices and establish trends, patterns and

associations. These results can be used to further criminal investigations and be compiled to

build a criminal prosecutorial package for use in conjunction with the testimony of experts to

further detain or charge individuals suspected or proven to be involved in criminal acts against

U.S. forces, family members, and resources.

Protection efforts. Information and police intelligence derived from collected evidence and

subsequent analysis can enhance preventive protection measures by identifying threats and

enabling commanders to implement measures to mitigate hostile actions against U.S. personnel

(to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information.

Targeting actions. These actions can be LE targeting in conjunction with ongoing LE

investigations or targeting

(lethal and nonlethal) against threat elements in contingency

operations.

26 January 2015

ATP 3-39.10

C-1

Appendix C

Sourcing actions. The collection of evidence and subsequent forensic analysis can be fused with

other information obtained through LE or intelligence channels (in contingency environments

and in support of bases and base camps) to increase the situational awareness and understanding

of movement and the origin of components used by threat and criminal elements, involved

regional groups, and transnational sponsorship.

Medical processes. Medical examiners conduct processes to identify individuals and determine

the cause and manner of death. The recovery of forensic materials can enable the Armed Forces

Joint Pathology Center to perform research and analysis, increase knowledge regarding Army

deaths, and identify trends and preventive risk factors.

KEY ACTIVITIES

C-3. Physical evidence collection and forensic analysis as an overall capability is divided into the

following collection activities:

On-site. On-site collection activities include the recognition, preservation, and collection of

evidence. These activities can be conducted by Army LE patrols, LE investigators, emergency

response teams, and other Soldiers at an incident site or crime scene.

Off-site. Off-site activities include the storage of collected evidence, the analysis of evidence,

and the production and dissemination of forensic reports and police intelligence analysis.

C-4. Depending on the mission and the environment, these activities can be conducted by evidence

custodians within LE organizations and forensic laboratories, LE investigators, forensic analysts, police

intelligence analysts, and military intelligence analysts. Figure C-1 depicts evidence collection and forensic

analysis activities.

Figure C-1. Key evidence collection and forensic analysis activities

C-2

ATP 3-39.10

26 January 2015

Evidence and Forensics Support

ON-SITE ACTIVITIES

C-5. Processing a crime scene or conducting site exploitation requires specific activities. The senior

person at the site is responsible for—

Overseeing the operations, security, and site assessment.

Specifying a detainee holding area or screening area for persons discovered at the site (if

required).

Ensuring that a chronology of events is documented (a chronological timeline from arrival to

departure from the site).

Ensuring that the site is cleared of threat personnel and rendered safe from booby traps,

explosives, or other hazards to friendly forces.

Prioritizing the site search.

Ensuring that the site documentation is complete.

Preparing required reports.

C-6. While each situation is different, there are some key activities that are common when processing

most crime scenes or incident sites.

Initial Walk-Through Activites

C-7. Initial walk-through activities are typically conducted by an experienced military police Soldier or

USACIDC SA when the crime scene is processed during policing support to bases and base camps. During

contingency operations, this task may be conducted by an experienced Soldier or support personnel

assigned to the site exploitation element. The initial walk-through is conducted before the start of the

deliberate search and collection effort. When conducting a walk-through, the safety of on-site personnel is

of primary importance. Special attention should be placed on identifying potential hazards. Secondly, the

individual conducting the walk-through should focus on identifying the evidence and prioritizing the

collection. Additional considerations during the initial walk-through include―

Establishing an entry control point.

Verifying the number of rooms (if searching a building).

Establishing the location for an evidence collection point.

Determining whether the initial cordon requires expansion to protect evidence or provide hazard

mitigation.

Identifying equipment or special skills

(outside the capabilities of the team) required to

adequately process the site.

Determining the best search method for the site.

Identifying fragile evidence that should be collected during the initial walk-through or be

immediately protected from environmental conditions or inadvertent destruction by team

members.

Determining which items are safe enough to collect and those that require on-site processing

before collection (latent prints, trace).

Considering the use of evidence markers (large numbers on tent-shaped markers that can be

placed adjacent to evidence).

Considering the use of still or video photography (digital) to brief the team and document the

condition of the site as it was initially found.

Annotating initial observations to use in briefing the team.

Recognition of Potential Evidence

C-8. Military police, USACIDC, weapons intelligence teams, task-organized battalion site exploitation

teams, emergency response teams, and other Soldiers must be trained and capable of identifying materials

and data that have potential evidentiary or forensic value.

26 January 2015

ATP 3-39.10

C-3

Appendix C

Preservation of Evidence

C-9. The preservation of evidence involves protecting materials and data from the moment the items are

recognized as evidence or protecting incident sites or crime scenes where latent or other evidence not

readily identifiable is likely to be found. Evidence must be protected and preserved by available, reasonable

measures (marking, packaging, tracking) to prevent contamination, loss, or alteration. These measures may

include establishing cordons and entry control measures and providing physical protection to incident or

crime scene areas.

Collection of Evidence

C-10. Collection of evidence is the recovery of materials from incident sites or crime scenes. The incident

site or crime scene is documented, contextual information is recorded (within environmental and threat

constraints), and materials are inventoried. The presumptive testing of materials may also be involved. It is

critical to establish and maintain an unbroken and documented chain of custody. The collection of evidence

inherently includes its transfer to an adequate storage area or location where a more complete analysis can

be performed. Ensure that evidence is correctly processed by—

Attaching a DA Form 4002 (Evidence/Property Tag) directly to the item of evidence, the

evidence container, or the blank shoe tag that is attached to the item. Merely attaching a

completed DA Form 4002 to an item of evidence does not meet the requirements of AR 195-5.

Each item of evidence or sealed evidence container must also be individually marked for future

identification. If evidence is placed in a heat-seal bag, the tag on the bag may replace the

adhesive label. Initiate a chain-of-custody documentation (DA Form 4137 [Evidence/Property

Custody Document]). This documentation includes a list of the seized items (when, where, and

by whom) and a description of the items (including serial numbers).

Conducting quality control to ensure that evidence is properly packaged, marked, and

documented. All items of evidence should be marked (on the container, not on the evidence)

with the initials of the collector and the time, date, and location of collection.

Evidence for Transfer

C-11. The original and three copies of DA Form 4137 must be completed and updated each time custody

changes for any piece of evidence. The original and the first two copies are submitted to the evidence

custodian. The third copy is placed in the official case file.

Laboratory Request

C-12. DD Form 2922 (Forensic Laboratory Examination Request) is used to begin a laboratory request if

one is required.

OFF-SITE ACTIVITIES

C-13. Off-site activities include the processing, storage, and analysis of collected items and the production

and dissemination of site exploitation reports to inform and support follow-on activities. Off-site collection

and forensic analysis activities support technical exploitation. Activities include the appropriate storage of

collected materials; the analysis of collected materials based on the availability and location of supporting

forensic capabilities; the production of forensic reports that document facts; information and intelligence

that result from the analysis and dissemination of the reports to submitting organizations and other

consumers of forensic information, as appropriate.

Storage of Collected Evidence

C-14. Materials and associated information must be maintained until associated LE investigations or

tactical operations are fully adjudicated or resolved. Storage mediums must be adequate to preserve

perishable evidence and prevent the degradation of evidence, to the maximum extent possible. Policies and

procedures relevant to specific missions or activities will dictate proper disposition.

C-4

ATP 3-39.10

26 January 2015

Evidence and Forensics Support

Analysis of Evidence

C-15. This activity includes analysis by investigators and trained analysts and technical examinations at

forensic laboratories. Even though analysis predominantly occurs away from the incident site or crime

scene, initial analysis may begin at an on-site location through the recognition of materials and contextual

information.

Notes.

See ATTP 3-39.20 for additional information on the analysis of police information.

See ATTP 3-90.15 for information on site exploitation.

Production and Dissemination of Forensic Reports and Intelligence

C-16. After analysis is complete, the results are catalogued and the appropriate reports and products are

produced. These reports and products are shared according to policies and procedures relevant to the

specific mission and the operational environment. The dissemination of forensic reports and associated

police intelligence enables the effective exploitation of collected evidence and resultant data. Exploitation

can be conducted by LE and legal personnel (in criminal cases) and by U.S. military commanders (in

contingency operations) when information and police intelligence is fed into the operations process.

Exploiting the results of forensic analysis can lead to targeting actions, apprehensions, and prosecutions of

suspects. (See ATTP 3-39.20 for additional information on the production and dissemination of police

intelligence and police information.)

C-17. Evidence collection and forensic analysis are integral activities to criminal investigations and broader

police intelligence activities. Within contingency operations, police information and police intelligence

resulting from a forensic analysis of collected evidence provides critical information to the operations

process and feeds the intelligence process. (See ATTP 3-39.20.)

IDENTIFICATION, PRESERVATION, AND COLLECTION OF

EVIDENCE

C-18. Evidence collection and subsequent forensic analysis are conducted across all environments, ranging

from stable environments and associated LE activities to unstable environments associated with

contingency operations. Military police support collection efforts across the entire range of environments.

Military police can function solely as part of a U.S. military LE effort, a multinational LE effort, or general

military operations supporting site exploitation efforts. Site exploitation is systematically searching for and

collecting information, material, and persons from a designated location and analyzing them to answer

information requirements, facilitate subsequent operations, or support criminal prosecutions.

(See

ATTP 3-90.15 for additional information.)

C-19. During LE operations

(including stable contingency environments that support U.S. and HN

populations), the collection of evidence by military police LE patrols responding to a crime scene is limited

to items directly resulting from a search incident to apprehension or that may pose a danger to LE patrols

and others in the area (weapons, drugs). Military police LE should initially focus on—

Assessing and prioritizing immediate or potential dangers and taking action to ensure that

persons at the crime scene or incident site (to include LE personnel) are safe.

Requesting additional resources (when required) and establishing and maintaining control of the

situation.

Identifying and segregating victims, possible subjects, and witnesses to the crime or incident.

Securing the crime scene or incident site.

Conducting initial investigations and initial interviews of victims, possible subjects, and

witnesses.

C-20. Potential evidence should be identified as early as possible by responding LE patrols. However,

many times the priority of work for first-responder LE elements does not allow an extensive search of the

26 January 2015

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C-5

Appendix C

area until additional patrols and LE investigators arrive at the scene. Once additional patrols or LE

investigators arrive, the division of labor can be established by the senior military police or LE investigator

at the scene. Any evidence identified by patrols should be protected by collection and preservation or by

establishing cordons to limit access to the evidence site and enable a deliberate search for additional

evidence.

C-21. All personnel who are not essential to processing a scene, to include unit and LE leadership, should

stay outside the established cordon area to prevent the contamination or destruction of evidence. Leadership

should be briefed outside the crime scene or incident site by the senior military police or LE investigator.

During contingency operations, the senior leader in charge of the site may be non-military police or

USACIDC personnel. Incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives

(CBRNE), regardless of the environment, may require specially trained hazmat, CBRN, or EOD personnel

to control the inner cordon until the area is rendered safe.

C-22. At major or complex incident sites or crimes scenes, a deliberate systematic search of the site to

collect and document identified evidence should be conducted under the supervision of MPI or USACIDC

SAs with military police patrols supporting the effort.

C-23. Upon arrival of MPI or USACIDC SAs, military police LE patrols should thoroughly brief the LE

investigators regarding—

Response to, and observations of, the incident.

Physical characteristics and the layout of the crime scene or incident site.

Behavior and the general demeanor of victims, subjects, and witnesses.

Observed physical characteristics of the crime scene and the actions or behaviors of victims,

subjects, or witnesses that seem odd or out of place. These observations can be helpful to

LE investigators as they conduct the investigation.

Victims, witnesses, and potential subjects.

Initial interview and investigation results that were conducted by responding military police

patrols.

Identified evidence (including evidence physically collected and protected, but still in place).

Physical locations and established boundaries of secured crime scenes.

C-24. In unstable environments, especially those consistent with contingency operations, evidence

collection may be conducted in conjunction with hasty or deliberate site exploitation operations. Hasty site

exploitation, including the collection of valuable evidence, is typically conducted in time-constrained

environments, especially when the threat is too high to risk extended presence on an objective, incident site,

or crime scene. This type of exploitation is conducted on an objective or site that can provide military

forces an immediate and timely opportunity to exploit threat information gained through collected evidence

and statements from personnel. It may be conducted by functional military police elements or as part of a

combined arms team. Hasty site exploitation procedures should be included as a contingency operation in

most operational plans. Hasty site exploitation is warranted in many instances, to include following—

An immediate incident response (as with the explosion of an improvised explosive device or

other attack).

The discovery of a weapons cache.

A raid mission or an assault where information, personnel, or material require collection.

A tip from an informant regarding threat activity, personnel, or material.

A deliberate site exploitation where evidence of a previously unknown site is discovered.

C-25. Deliberate site exploitation is conducted when there is sufficient time available and the conditions are

conducive to secure the site, conduct deliberate planning and rehearsals, and move dedicated site

exploitation assets to the site. This will typically be a combined arms operation employing technical

specialties from numerous branches. When specific information or material relevant to a commander’s

critical information requirements is identified, hasty site exploitation can evolve into deliberate site

exploitation. Deliberate site exploitation teams should include technical and functional experts that can

enhance the team’s ability. The specific technical capabilities required should be based on the type of site

being exploited and the material expected at the site. The ability to include specialized assets as part of the

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Evidence and Forensics Support

site exploitation team can expedite the collection effort and the subsequent analysis of evidence collected

for exploitation.

CRIME SCENE OR INCIDENT SITE PROCESSING

C-26. In any criminal investigation, the validity of information obtained from physical evidence and

subsequent analysis may be challenged if the evidence has not been protected from contamination and an

uncompromised chain of custody has not been maintained. Evidence must be properly collected, handled,

and stored to ensure that the integrity of the evidence and the validity of a subsequent analysis are

maintained and can survive scrutiny. This can also be critical for evidence collected during non-LE-related

military operations. Many times, evidence collected and processed during military operations is required to

successfully prosecute war criminals, terrorists, or other threat elements conducting criminal activities

against U.S. forces and our multinational and HN partners.

C-27. No two crime scenes or incident sites are the same. Military police and USACIDC Soldiers and

leaders must evaluate each site individually and conduct evidence collection based on the specific crime or

the incident, threat, or hazard specific to the site; command and PM policies and directives; and other

considerations that affect the environment. Each crime scene or site must be evaluated by responding

military police and USACIDC personnel based on the type of incident; environmental conditions;

personnel involved; and the threat (or other hazards) to responding personnel, witnesses, victims, and the

general population. The senior, on-site military police or USACIDC SA should take charge and plan the

activities of other responding or supporting personnel. At bases and base camps (for crimes or incidents in

which USACIDC has purview as dictated by AR 195-2), the senior USACIDC SA will typically maintain

operational control of the crime scene, with military police elements in support. The senior military police

Soldier on-scene should coordinate directly with the senior USACIDC SA on-scene to determine required

support requirements.

C-28. The senior military police or USACIDC SA should take actions to ensure that the―

Site is protected.

Restrict foot or vehicle travel through the site to protect evidence.

Emplace ropes, tapes, signs, and guards to limit access.

Military police and investigators follow general guidelines for processing crime scenes. These

guidelines are applied in sequence, and they are relevant to most incident sites or crime scenes

(although the conditions of individual sites will vary).

Observe. Perform an initial walk-through and search for items, but do not disturb them.

Record. Document the site and the evidence using photographs, sketches, and notes.

Preserve. Use proper containers and chain-of-custody documents to protect items.

Process and collect. Dust for latent prints, and bag and tag items.

Transport. Safely move the items and paperwork to the appropriate analytical element as

soon as practical.

EVIDENCE COLLECTION

C-29. The array of possible evidence at any location is as varied as the incidents or crimes associated with

those locations. The collection of material at any crime scene or incident site must be prioritized and

conducted based on the type of incident, any threat or hazards associated with the site, and other

environmental conditions. Collectors should always wear gloves when gathering evidentiary material; this

is for their safety and the protection of evidence.

C-30. Some evidence cannot be easily identified or is not easily collected by simply picking the item up. It

should be noted that not all evidence is obvious or visible to the collector. For some types of evidence,

additional measures must be taken to identify, collect, and preserve the evidence for further evaluation and

use in criminal investigations and legal proceedings. Some evidence must be further developed (latent

prints, blood stains) to be visible, while other items are simply too small (trace evidence) to be readily seen

without the use of specific techniques and equipment. Other materials may be large enough to be observed

but may be hidden by other objects.

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C-7

Appendix C

C-31. Examples of potential evidence that dictate the need for further processing or the use of special

techniques to detect and collect them can include―

Latent prints (fingerprints, palm prints, and footprints).

Trace evidence.

Impressions (footwear, tire tracks, toolmarks).

Biological materials.

Latent Prints

C-32. Latent prints can be on nearly any surface. There is a chance that anything touched by an individual

could bear latent prints which may be collected as evidence. Latent prints are characterized as porous or

nonporous. Porous surfaces can include cardboard, paper, and unfinished wood. Latent prints are difficult

to extract from porous material. The best method is to collect and package the entire piece of material and

transport it to a laboratory for print development by chemical or other means.

C-33. Nonporous material is typically an easier medium from which latent prints can be developed and

collected. These materials can include glass, metal, finished wood, plastic, and other materials. Nonporous

surfaces can also include textured surfaces (vinyls, appliances, computers, vehicle interiors). Items where

latent prints are detected (handheld mirrors, drinking glasses) can be collected for analysis off-site. If the

entire object cannot be seized, the use of print powder and tape can be used to lift a latent print from a

nonporous surface. Army LE investigators have the equipment and materials necessary to apply powder

and lift latent prints from nonporous surfaces. (See ATP 3-39.12.)

C-34. Latent prints can be found by several means. A close examination of a surface may reveal the

presence of a print to the naked eye. Scanning a surface believed to have latent fingerprints with a flashlight

held obliquely (almost parallel) is effective for many surfaces. Perform cyanoacrylate (super glue) fuming

of all nonporous evidence whenever possible. Items that are believed to have been handled, but do not

show a visible print, should be seized for analysis off-site.

C-35. After a print is located and before processing it, make note of its location and condition. This data

should be included in any sketches produced of the scene. The latent print should be photographed as

found, using midrange, close-up, and close-up with scale identifier techniques. The use of an oblique light

may be necessary to obtain the photograph. The close-up photograph of the fingerprint should fill the

frame.

Trace Evidence

C-36. Trace evidence is minute quantities of material found on other material or evidence. It can be hairs,

fibers, powder, or other residue. These small quantities of material are sometimes difficult to locate and

extract. At times, large objects must be collected so that trace evidence can be extracted in a laboratory.

When trace evidence is located at a crime scene or incident site, the location of the material must be

documented and photographed before collection.

C-37. First, examine the area suspected of containing trace evidence to determine what is visible to the eye

without enhancement. The likelihood of finding trace evidence can be enhanced by using oblique lighting

(shining a light source [such as a flashlight] almost parallel to the surface being examined). Darkening the

room while using oblique lighting is a technique that may enhance the visibility of trace evidence. Trace

evidence may also be collected when packaging other evidence by placing clean paper beneath the

evidence. The process of packaging the original evidence may cause trace evidence to fall onto the clean

paper beneath where it can then be documented and collected.

C-38. Always wear gloves when collecting trace evidence. Rubber tip or plastic tweezers are best for

collecting hair and fiber material. Other residues may be collected using low-tack tape; the sticky portion of

adhesive notepads can be used as a field-expedient method. Trace evidence should be collected in clean

paper using a druggist fold. A druggist fold consists of folding one end of the paper over one third, and then

folding the other end one third over that. The process is then repeated from the other two sides. This creates

nine squares when unfolded. Place the evidence into the center square and refold. The outside two edges

can then be tucked into each other to make a closed container to protect evidence and keep it from falling

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Evidence and Forensics Support

out of the container. Once the evidence is folded into the paper, it can be sealed and marked appropriately.

It is best not to package hairs, fibers, or biological evidence in plastic bags; plastic does not allow moisture

within these materials to dissipate, thus increasing the chance of mold. (See ATP 3-39.12.)

Impressions

C-39. Impressions can be left behind as two-dimensional or three-dimensional imprints. Two-dimensional

impressions are typically left on flat, hard surfaces; three-dimensional impressions are left in material that

is softer and gives way under the weight or pressure of the object leaving the impression. Impressions can

result from many actions and can include footwear prints, tire tracks, or toolmarks.

C-40. After locating the impression, and before processing, document the location and the condition of the

found item. Include a location description in any sketches produced. Photograph the impression as found

using midrange, close-up, and close-up with scale identifier techniques.

C-41. Two-dimensional impressions can sometimes be lifted by powdering and using fingerprint tape. If

the impression is larger than the width of the tape, layer the tape (with a 1/4 inch or more overlap) so that it

fits over the impression. Place the lifted impression on a clean sheet of paper, and then package it for

transport.

C-42. For three-dimensional impressions, collect the entire item containing the impression if possible. For

example, a toolmark on a door frame can be collected by removing the damaged section of the door frame.

Sometimes, the only way to collect a three-dimensional impression is by casting or photographing it.

Photograph the toolmark from various angles so that all characteristics of the impression, including those

on the vertical sides, can be seen. A flash may be required to obtain adequate detail in darkness or when

shadows are a problem.

Biological Materials

C-43. All biological materials at crime scenes or incident sites should be treated as a biohazard and handled

with great caution. Latex, nitrile, or other nonporous polymer gloves must be worn when recovering and

packaging biological evidence. Additional personal protective equipment (eye protection, surgical masks,

full-body protective covering) is recommended. All items of evidence should be carefully documented

before collection, to include photographing the evidence at the original location. If sketches are produced,

include the location of the evidence on the sketch.

C-44. When packaging clothing or other evidentiary items that have blood, urine, or other biological

material on them, ensure that the items are dried and packaged separately. Each item must be packaged

separately in clean paper or cardboard packing material. Gloves should be changed after handling each item

of evidence to avoid cross contamination. Also, evidence collectors should avoid talking, coughing, or

sneezing around or over unsealed evidence to avoid cross contamination.

C-45. Clean, sterile swabs or swatches must be used to collect blood or other fluid samples. Dried blood or

other suspect stains can be moistened slightly with clean water and rubbed with a swab or swatch to gather

the sample. Allow samples to air-dry before storing them in dry, breathable containers

(paper or

cardboard).

EVIDENCE CONTAMINATION

C-46. Evidence can be contaminated through contact with people (fingerprints, hairs, saliva, or other

contaminants) or from cross contamination between items of evidence. Military police and USACIDC

Soldiers must exercise care to avoid evidence contamination to the greatest extent possible.

C-47. General measures to avoid contamination of evidence include―

Using personal protective equipment to reduce the risk of individuals causing contamination.

Collect and handle items gently with gloved hands (change gloves between handling different

items of evidence). Be cognizant of what is handled with gloved hands before handling

evidence.

Handling evidence where fingerprints are least likely to be (on corners, edges, rough surfaces).

26 January 2015

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C-9

Appendix C

Practicing extreme care when using instruments to collect evidence (such as tweezers) to prevent

possible destruction or alteration of the physical characteristics of the evidence. Ensure that any

instruments used to collect evidence are sterile.

Avoiding writing directly on evidence, when possible.

Packaging items separately. The integrity of evidence must be maintained from the site to the

laboratory; protect it from physical breakage, contamination, bacterial growth, and such. (See

table C-1 for detailed evidence collection guidelines.) When packaging items—

Use appropriate containers (clean bags, boxes, envelopes, cans).

Use clean, folded paper or paper bags instead of plastic bags for biological materials.

Ensure that improvised packaging is clean (so as not to contaminate the evidence). For

example, using ammunition cans for guns or spent shell casings may transfer residue to the

weapon. Using suitcases for clothing can cross contaminate DNA from hairs, fingernails,

skin cells, or other contaminants.

Use a druggist fold of clean paper for small or trace items of evidence.

Table C-1. Evidence collection guidelines

Item

Collection

Recommended Packaging

•

Wrap items in paper or another

•

Use tweezers to handle objects.

Sharp glass,

cushioning material to protect sharp

metal objects,

•

Be aware of possible fingerprints.

edges.

and metal

•

Collect glass on top of shoes or clothing or on

•

Place wrapped items in paper bags,

fragments

the hair of a subject or victim.

and place bags in a rigid container.

•

Photograph weapons in place. Note the

position of the safety, selector lever, and

hammer (when possible); and add items to any

sketches made.

•

Render weapons safe by removing all

ammunition. Do not remove ammunition from

•

Place firearms in a cardboard box or

loaded magazines. Ammunition may have

wrap them in paper.

Firearms

latent prints. Save the ammunition as evidence

•

Package ammunition similarly, but

(it may be useful for comparison analysis and

wrap it separately from the weapon.

may contain latent prints).

•

Handle firearms only on rough surfaces (to

prevent damage to other latent evidence).

•

Record the manufacturer, model, and any

serial numbers or other markings found.

•

Photograph items in place (when possible),

and add them to any sketches made.

•

Examine items for information on activity

•

Place items in a paper envelope or

plans, personal contacts, handwriting samples,

plastic bag and then in a cardboard

Documents

and other exploitable information.

box.

and drawings

•

Examine documents for fingerprints. Use care

•

Use any available dry, clean bag or box

when handling (pick up by the edges to lessen

for field expediency.

the chance of disturbing latent evidence).

•

Seize paper pads that may contain indented

writings.

•

Photograph in place (when possible), and add

Computers,

•

Package items in butcher paper.

to any sketches made.

laptops, digital

•

Do not tape items directly to the

cameras, and

•

Disconnect power cords from the back of

computer tower or laptop; only attach

other

computers, but do not turn them off.

tape to the butcher paper.

electronic

•

Remove the battery if a laptop does not power

•

Place items in a cardboard box.

devices

down.

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Evidence and Forensics Support

Table C-1. Evidence collection guidelines (continued)

Item

Collection

Recommended Packaging

• Ensure that personal digital assistant

devices and cell phones remain

charged, when possible.

Computers,

• Collect software (CDs, DVDs, memory

laptops, digital

cards) and other peripheral items.

cameras, and

Note. Digital electronic items may have

other electronic

tracking capability that can allow them to be

devices

tracked by criminal or threat elements. These

(continued)

items should be transported to personnel

trained in digital analysis as quickly as possible

to expedite exploitation and to mitigate tracking

threats.

•

Place items in an envelope, paper CD

envelope, or butcher paper; and place them in

•

Photograph in place (when possible)

a cardboard box.

and add them to any sketches made.

DVDs and CDs

•

Do not allow the tape to touch the DVDs or

•

Pick up items on the edges to avoid

CDs.

disturbing latent evidence.

•

Prop up the evidence so that only the edges

are touching the sides of the box.

•

Do not collect CBRN hazards unless

•

Never mix chemicals.

absolutely necessary. Obtain safety

•

Place less than 5 mL (2-3 mL) of chemical

guidance from trained CBRN or

sample into a sealed glass container,

Chemicals

hazmat personnel.

preferably with a polytetrafluoroethylene-lined

•

Photograph items in place (when

cap.

possible), and add them to any

•

Use trained personnel to retrieve and package

sketches made.

chemical evidence.

•

Examine items for DNA, saliva, latent

•

Place items in a clean envelope or a druggist

Tobacco

prints, lip gloss, or lipstick.

fold, seal it, and place it in a metal container.

products and

•

Examine matches for fingerprints and

•

Use a clean glass jar or metal container for

matches

other evidence that is recoverable in a

field expediency.

laboratory.

•

Collect a dry sample by moistening a cotton

swab.

Biological

•

Prepare a moist or liquid sample by absorbing

•

Photograph items in place (when

material

the substance onto a cotton swab. Allow to air

possible), and add them to any

(saliva, semen,

dry.

sketches made.

urine)

•

Dry samples in place inside a paper bag; or

use clean paper, wrapped in another layer of

clean paper.

•

Dig soil and mineral samples from an

outside area. Collect at least 4 ounces

per sample.

•

Place the sample in a small vial, jar, or clean

Soils and

•

Examine carpet or other flooring,

metal can.

minerals

shovels and other tools, and various

•

Use any clean glass jar or metal container for

locations within a vehicle (accelerator,

field expediency.

clutch, trunk, vehicle carpet) for soil

samples.

•

Place the evidence in a cardboard box,

•

Photograph in place (when possible),

Tools

ensuring that the working surface of the tool is

and add them to any sketches made.

protected

26 January 2015

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C-11

Appendix C

Table C-1. Evidence collection guidelines (continued)

Item

Collection

Recommended Packaging

•

Photograph (when possible), and add

them to any sketches made.

•

Photograph in place (when possible),

•

Cushion items with paper towels or cotton;

and add them to any sketches made.

place them in a cardboard box.

Toolmarks

•

Collect the item, when possible.

•

Use any clean cardboard box for field

•

Remove the toolmark if the toolmark is

expediency.

part of a larger item (door, window

frame, fence, other marked object).

Mark the edges cut by investigators.

•

Package small trace evidence by putting it in

Building

a padded container or a druggist fold.

materials

•

Collect samples of other material

(insulation,

•

Use clean toilet paper or paper towels (when

containing residue; gather as much of

wood, roofing

necessary) as field-expedient packaging

the damaged area or residue as

materials,

materials.

possible.

ceiling

•

Wrap larger samples in clean paper, and

particles)

place them in a clean cardboard box.

•

Ensure that wet paint is dry before

collection; scrape or cut it from the

surface.

•

Collect small chips by placing them in a

druggist fold and then place the paper in a

•

Collect paint chips (about the size of a

larger envelope.

nickel) from the top layer of the original

Paint

surface of the object painted. This may

•

Collect dried paint by scraping it into a

require cutting out the sample from the

druggist fold or seizing the entire substrate.

top all the way to the surface.

•

Document the label with the color of the

•

Collect a full layer (to include the top

sample and layers of liquid within the sample.

layer) through the surface if there is

damage to a wall.

•

Photograph and sketch items in place.

•

Do not try to process clandestine drug

•

Ensure that pills are counted and placed in

laboratories as they may have

plastic or glass jars or pill boxes. Keep pill

extremely dangerous chemicals and

types separated.

Drugs and

booby traps.

•

Ensure that plant material (biological

narcotics

Note. A site that contains large amounts of

substances) is not placed in plastic bags.

drugs or narcotics is likely to have additional

Moisture within the material can cause mold if

items related to that activity, including currency,

weapons, business logs and other written

not packaged in breathable containers.

records, and computers containing associated

digital records.

• Photograph in place (when possible),

and add them to any sketches made.

•

Collect small pieces by placing them in a

• Ensure that smooth (plastic) material is

druggist fold and then double-wrapping it in a

examined for possible latent prints.

larger envelope.

• Examine woven materials (rough

Wires, ropes,

•

Collect large sections by rolling them into

surfaces) for evidence (skin cells [do

and cords

wrapped paper and then placing them in an

not touch with bare hands]).

appropriately sized paper bag.

• Consider the possibility of biological

•

Use any clean paper bag or cardboard box for

material on ropes, cords, or wires.

field expediency.

• Do not untie knots. Cut away a section

as far as possible from the knot.

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Evidence and Forensics Support

Table C-1. Evidence collection guidelines (continued)

Item

Collection

Recommended Packaging

• Photograph in place (when possible),

and add them to any sketches made.

• Place balls of tape on glass or hard

• Place tape in a clean cardboard box to

Tape

plastic surfaces.

preserve the nonstick side.

• Place unraveled tape with the sticky

side on glass or a hard plastic surface

to prevent smudging and smearing.

• Examine whether evidence needs to

be hand-carried to a laboratory or

• Place a piece of paper under the burnt paper.

storage site.

Burnt paper

• Place paper in a box padded with toilet paper

Note. Burnt paper is difficult to collect without

or paper towels.

destroying it; sometimes burnt paper simply

turns black instead of disintegrating.

• Do not touch UXO or hazmat.

Postblast, and

• Contact EOD or other specialized units

UXO sites

that service such sites immediately.

Legend:

CBRN

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

DNA

deoxyribonucleic acid

EOD

explosive ordnance disposal

milliliter(s)

not applicable

UXO

unexploded ordnance

Note. Areas containing, or suspected of containing CBRNE material or explosives should be

secured and left for technical CBRN, EOD, or other experts to process. This includes

unexploded ordnance or stockpiles of ammunition and explosives. Postblast sites also require

specialized training and expertise to safely and effectively process. In contingency

environments, command guidance, policy, and established procedures must be followed when

determining the appropriate actions for these types of sites.

SEARCH METHODS

C-48. A variety of search methods can be employed at crime scenes and incident sites. The specific method

used to process a particular site is based on the individual characteristics of the site, the time available to

safely process the site, the skill level of the team, the tools and equipment available, and the importance of

the evidence itself. The search method should be determined by the senior military police or USACIDC SA

on-site or the appropriate unit commander as appropriate. Search methods include―

Zone search. A zone search is conducted by dividing the site or area to be searched into smaller

manageable areas or zones. Searchers are then assigned specific zones in which to concentrate

their search efforts. This method works well for searching buildings and individual rooms.

Within each zone, a separate search method may be employed (such as a strip or quadrant

method).

Circle or spiral search. This method requires the searcher to start at the outside of the area or

room and move in a slow circle search, gradually closing the radius to spiral the pattern inward.

Care must be exercised to avoid the tendency to speed the search as the spiral tightens toward

the center. To ensure thoroughness, the pattern should then be reversed to cover the same area

from the opposite direction. This can be done by the same searcher, or another searcher can be

employed.

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Appendix C

Strip and line search. This method is typically used for large areas (including outside sites).

The area is divided into lanes or strips that can be searched by one person (1 to 2 meters in

width). The search begins on an outer strip. After moving completely through each strip, the

searcher moves to the adjacent strip and searches in the opposite direction. The pattern continues

until the entire area is searched.

Line search. This method is a variation of the strip and line search and is used when multiple

searchers are available. The lanes or strips are set, and multiple searchers move down individual

lanes simultaneously.

Grid search. In this method, two sets of lanes (similar to the strip and line method) are set at 90°

angles to form a grid. The lanes are searched first in one direction; then the area is searched

again by going over the same terrain at a 90° angle to the first search. The grid search is more

time-consuming, but provides a greater degree of thoroughness and a higher likelihood that all

available evidence will be found.

C-49. When searching rooms and buildings, searchers should not neglect wall hangings. Remember to

search under and behind pictures or other items on the wall. Be watchful for false ceilings, false walls, false

floorboards, storage areas, attic doors, and hidden compartments. Search under and behind furniture and

appliances.

C-50. For vehicle searches, the zone method works well. The vehicle is divided into segments or zones and

methodically searched. All areas of the passenger interior and storage compartments should be searched, to

include pulling up corners of carpeted areas. Thoroughly search the trunk and engine compartment, looking

under spare tires, behind padding, and inside storage compartments. On vehicles without molded bumpers,

check behind bumper assemblies. The trunk, dash assembly, door panels, bumpers, fuel doors, and other

areas should be checked for hidden compartments.

DOCUMENTATION

C-51. Proper documentation of the crime scene or incident site and all associated evidence can be critical to

the value of the evidence during subsequent analysis and criminal prosecution. Documentation of the site

helps provide context to the evidence, spatial references between evidence and other objects or features of

the site, and the identification of specific physical aspects of the site itself. Following general

documentation of the crime scene or incident site, more detailed documentation of specific evidence or

other subelements of the site (individual rooms, courtyards, detached buildings, or other items) should be

conducted.

C-52. The crime scene or incident site is typically documented through―

Notes.

Photographs.

Sketches.

Notes

C-53. Detailed notes should be taken while the site or crime scene is being documented to complement

photographs and sketches and to document observations of the crime scene, the incident site, and associated

personnel. Describe the general layout of the room or area and anything that is important to help recall

details later. Provide descriptions of individual items and their relation to each other and their environment.

The note taker should also document behaviors, spontaneous statements by personnel at the crime scene, or

other observations that may help investigators during follow-up investigations.

C-54. Notes taken will be used to support sketches and follow-on reports. The notes taken at the scene

should complement or add clarifying detail to the content of sketches and photographs. Details from notes

taken at the scene can also provide LE investigators and police intelligence analysts with details that help

build an understanding of the specific incident or case.

C-14

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26 January 2015

Evidence and Forensics Support

Photographs

C-55. Photographs to document crime scenes and incident sites are generally broken down into general or

overall site photographs, midrange photographs, and close-up photographs. Ensure that the flash feature is

turned off before taking any incident site photographs until the site has been deemed clear of potential

improvised explosive device hazards, especially inside structures. Video documentation can also be used to

document crime scenes.

C-56. An overall photograph of the area shows the general site condition. It is taken to portray a wide

general view of the area being documented. It can also show the original position of large objects, bodies,

or other evidence. Site photographs can be used to document efforts to hide evidence. Evidence markers

can be useful for documenting specific items of evidence and can be used to cross-reference the photograph

to other documentary evidence. Interior and exterior views of rooms, courtyards, or other areas should be

taken.

C-57. Midrange photographs are taken to show the spatial relationship between an item and a fixed feature.

Typically, the fixed feature used to show a spatial relationship with an item of evidence should be captured

in an overall photograph taken previously. Several photographs from multiple vantage points may be

required to fully document the spatial relationship of a target item to a fixed item. Multiple fixed items can

also be referenced to establish spatial documentation.

C-58. A close-up photograph is typically taken as a follow-up to a midrange photograph. Multiple close-up

photographs may be required to document the evidence―

With the use of a tripod for clear photographs, when possible.

As it is found at the site. Photograph the evidence as it is found before movement; attempt to fill

the frame when taking the photograph.

With a fully labeled scale (ruler, coin, or other item of known and consistent size) on the same

plane as the item. This provides a reference to establish a sense of the size of evidence.

To show various views of the evidence.

To show serial numbers, unique markings, alterations, and damage.

To provide a clean backg2round with contrasting color. This provides a clearer image of the

evidence without the backg2round clutter associated with the environment in which it was found.

C-59. Video documentation can also be useful in documenting incident sites and evidence. The

videographer should begin on the outside of an indoor site, with an overall pan of the outside area of the

site. The videographer can then move inside (if interior scenes are being documented) or methodically

around the site (for outside scenes). When approaching specific pieces of evidence, the videographer can

zoom in to capture midrange and close-up images consistent with the photographic descriptions above. As

with still close-ups, an item to provide scale should be added to the close-up video documentation. If audio

is recorded, the videographer can narrate the film as it is recorded to provide additional context. If the video

is narrated, keep others from talking and minimize other distracting noises. If external noises cannot be

minimized, consider muting the recording and not providing a narration.

Sketches

C-60. The sketch is typically drawn as an overhead view of the crime scene or incident site, depicting items

of evidence, their orientation, and their position in relation to other items of evidence or fixed objects. The

sketch is an accurate representation of the scene, which is not done to a scale. Templates can be helpful

when making sketches of crime scenes or incident sites; however, freehand sketches are required when

templates are unavailable. Sketches are useful in portraying distances and spatial relationships between

evidence and other features of the crime scene or incident site.

C-61. Sketches should include legends (depicting symbols used, primary direction, or other required points

of clarification) and include the statement not to scale on the sketch. The sketch should also include the

name of the sketcher, the date, and a description of the area or building depicted.

26 January 2015

ATP 3-39.10

C-15

Appendix C

C-62. The general sketch guidelines should include―

Overall site sketches.

Document the site.

Portray the entire site (buildings, outdoor areas, other features).

Record only necessary measurements.

Individual areas or rooms where evidence is found.

Provide detailed sketches of the entire site or crime scene.

Include measurements to show the spatial relationship between each item of evidence and

important fixed features of the room or area.

Provide separate sketches for each room, area, or subelement of the crime scene or incident

site.

C-63. The depictions of measurements on sketches are important in documenting sites and accurately

portraying the spatial relationships between objects. There are several methods that can be used to

accurately document a crime scene or incident site on a sketch. These methods include the―

Triangulation method.

Find two fixed reference points in the site close to the evidence.

Measure from each fixed point to the center of the evidence.

Measure both ends of the evidence when dealing with long objects (baseball bats, rifles).

Baseline method.

Use a reference line (a wall or a line fixed with stakes with a known distance from

landmarks if outside).

Use two measurements. Make one measurement from the end of the baseline to the center of

the evidence; make one perpendicular measurement from the baseline to the center of the

evidence.

Rectangular method. This method is used in rectangular, enclosed areas (such as rooms).

Measure

90° from the adjoining walls to the center of the evidence to get two

measurements.

Ensure that the measuring device stays level (not angled vertically or horizontally) to ensure

an accurate measurement.

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS

C-64. Crime scenes and incident sites can include significant hazards for LE personnel, Soldiers, and the

general public. Military police and USACIDC personnel must be aware of, and take appropriate action to

mitigate, the risks associated with crime scenes and incident sites. Some of the more common hazards

include―

Biological hazards. Using personal protective equipment can significantly reduce the hazards

associated with biological contaminants (chances of infection, exposure to harmful biological

contaminants, and cross contamination of evidence). Assume biological specimens (including

blood, semen, urine, saliva, or other bodily fluids) are contaminated. Care should be taken with

any specimen until it is identified and appropriate safety measures are determined. There are

several precautions that can be taken to ensure that personnel working in the vicinity of a crime

scene or incident site are safe. Precautions against infection by contact with biological material

can include―

Clean nitrile or other nonporous polymer gloves for protection of the individual and

evidence. Leather, cotton, or other natural or synthetic work gloves typically used for

normal operations should not be used as a substitute for latex gloves unless there is

absolutely no alternative. If these gloves are used out of necessity, they should be discarded

appropriately to avoid any further contamination. Change gloves often, particularly when

moving from one type of evidence collection to another and to another area or room.

Double-gloving can offer an additional layer of protection.

Surgical face masks to help protect from airborne biological materials.

C-16

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26 January 2015

Evidence and Forensics Support

Disposable shoe coverings where blood and other biological substances exist to lessen the

potential of tracking these materials to clean areas and to prevent the introduction of

contaminants into the site.

Full body overgarments with hoods may be used to provide protection.

Self-sealing envelopes should be used to store biological material.

CAUTION

Never lick an envelope to seal it; this can be a safety hazard and a

contamination hazard.

Note. Remove personal protective equipment and conduct decontamination, if necessary, when

leaving the immediate site. Put on new personal protective equipment when reentering. All

personal protective equipment should be discarded according to local policy. Consult the

medical staff for disposal advice.

Chemical hazards. Chemical hazards can cause immediate incapacitation or death if

appropriate safety precautions are not taken. Unless absolutely necessary, the area should be

controlled so that no one enters the contaminated area until CBRN or other qualified hazmat

personnel can determine the appropriate measures to be taken. Always take maximum

precautions until the chemical hazard can be identified and appropriate safety measures can be

employed. If dangerous chemicals are present, personnel entering the contaminated area should

be limited to those absolutely required to enter; typically, this will be CBRN or hazmat

personnel. Common routes of exposure are inhalation; ingestion; and skin, eye, and mucous

membrane contact. Precautions should be taken to protect all body parts. Precautions against

contamination by chemical materials can include the use of―

Protective masks. Military-issued protective masks will protect against inhalation hazards

from most chemicals. CBRN or hazmat personnel can advise if additional protective

equipment is necessary.

Chemical suits. LE personnel should have access to chemical protective suits (military

issue or commercial) that can provide some minimal protection against chemical hazards.

These suits are not typically sufficient for direct contact or in areas of high concentrations of

dangerous chemicals.

Perimeters. Military police and USACIDC personnel should establish an immediate

protective perimeter around areas of suspected chemical contamination. The minimum safe

distance is based on the type of material and other environmental considerations, but should

initially be established at a minimum of 50 meters from the source. Personnel should be

kept outside the 50-meter perimeter and upwind of the source of the contaminant to the

greatest extent possible. The perimeter may require expansion based on direction from

hazmat personnel.

Sharp items. Be especially careful handling and packaging syringes, knives, razor blades, or

other sharp objects. Use specialized sharps containers if possible. Otherwise, wrap sharp items in

a paper product or other porous material to protect sharp edges.

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C-17

Appendix C

Booby traps and unexploded ordnance. The presence of booby traps and unexploded ordnance

is a viable threat and hazard when performing police operations at bases and base camps in

contingency environments. Military police and USACIDC personnel should always incorporate

the technical capabilities of engineers, EOD, and other technical support when available.

Unexploded ordnance is a common hazard on military installations, in training areas, and in AOs

where contingency operations are conducted. Booby traps are employed routinely by threat

elements overseas, but are also used by criminal elements at home to protect assets (drug

operations, caches).

Always follow SOPs when working in locations where the site or items may be

booby-trapped. This includes buildings, caches, bodies, valuables, equipment, and other

items left in the open.

Be mindful of the potential presence of unexploded devices while working the site.

Do not touch or move the device (unexploded ordnance); contact EOD immediately.

Firearms. Always clear confiscated firearms upon seizure. Never ship or transport a loaded

firearm that has been collected as evidence.

Other dangerous conditions. Military police and USACIDC Soldiers should be aware of other

potential challenges to troop and public safety and should act accordingly. These challenges can

include foul weather, chemical hazards, structural defects, unsafe air, and other hazards.

C-18

ATP 3-39.10

26 January 2015

Appendix D

Customs and Border Control

Military police conduct customs support in support of deployment and redeployment

requirements for entry into an HN and reentry into the United States, respectively.

U.S. forces must meet the specific customs requirements of the country to which they

will deploy before entry and, consequently, must meet the requirements established

by U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Department of Agriculture for

reentry into the United States. Military police elements also conduct support to

customs and border control during contingency operations through customs

enforcement, physical security, and LE capabilities at border access points.

OPERATIONS

D-1. Meeting U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Department of Agriculture standards is the

obligation of each individual and commander. Historically, military police conduct and authenticate

customs preclearances under the supervision of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S.

Department of Agriculture. Military police customs personnel are trained to conduct customs inspections

and to clean and disinfect vehicles, equipment, and personal baggage.

D-2. There are two types of military customs inspectors that support military operations:

Military customs inspector-excepted. These customs inspectors conduct routine customs

inspections under the supervision and training of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and

U.S. Department of Agriculture. They may be civilians who are trained in that capacity. Training

may occur within the United States or in foreign locations, depending on the immediate need and

the availability of resources to support the training location.

Customs/border clearance agent. These customs inspectors are the most prevalent customs

capacity filled by Army military police. They provide customs support to redeploying units who

request preclearance operations. DTR 4500.9-R addresses these inspectors in detail.

D-3. Customs inspectors are the first line of defense against the introduction of foreign plant and animal

pests and diseases into the United States, and they help prevent contraband from entering the country. Their

mission involves eliminating restricted and prohibited items (agricultural pests, environmental hazards,

controlled substances, contraband) from traveling into the United States while under DOD control or

contract.

D-4. Military police customs personnel are trained to inspect for prohibited items and enforce the

requirements. They inspect and examine DOD cargo, equipment, aircraft, vehicles, and personal baggage

leaving from locations outside the United States en route to U.S. points of entry. The customs inspectors

ensure that returning military equipment conforms to U.S. Department of Agriculture standards and that

gear returning with personnel serving abroad complies with U.S. Customs and Border Protection laws for

reentry into the United States. The U.S. Army customs inspectors have jurisdiction over all customs and

operational washdown sites in their AO. During the increased deployment of U.S. forces, additional forces

may be required to perform the customs mission in support of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and

U.S. Department of Agriculture. Military police can provide training for non-LE Soldiers to perform duties

as customs inspectors to support the combatant commander’s rotation of forces in and out of theater when

authorized by U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Department of Agriculture.

D-5. Concurrent with customs jurisdiction is the responsibility of military police elements to advise and

provide training to units identified for movement. Advice includes broad, general customs information to

specific information (such as washdown operational suggestions and requirements). Military customs

inspectors establish administrative procedures for the review and final inspection of vehicles by

26 January 2015

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D-1

Appendix D

U.S. Department of Agriculture at the point of entry. They appropriately mark each vehicle cleaned and

inspected and maintain a log to track the number, owning units, and disposition of the vehicles.

D-6. Military police have the capability of providing trained and certified military customs team support

when required to enforce U.S. Customs and Border Protection laws and regulations. A military police

customs element is composed of a five-person team of military police. The team is organized to train and

supervise members of other non-military police units (multinational forces, contractors) to perform customs

inspections at a seaport of debarkation or aerial port of debarkation. Military police customs elements,

along with these trained personnel, conduct customs operations. A military police customs element consists

of a—

Senior military customs inspection supervisor. The senior military customs inspection

supervisor coordinates logistical support, operational integration, staff planning, and

coordination for customs team operations. The senior military customs inspection supervisor

provides technical supervision for customs team operations.

Senior military customs inspection team. The team is composed of four trained military police

customs personnel. They augment U.S. Customs and Border Protection or U.S. Department of

Agriculture personnel in conducting customs training and performing customs operations in

support of units and personnel redeploying to the United States or its territories. Customs teams

may also provide technical expertise and support for border operations to enforce restrictions on

contraband or other regulated items.

MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT

D-7. Military police may be required to support border entry control points or to patrol specified

international border areas in support of U.S. military border control operations. This operation can be

conducted in support of efforts to control the borders by U.S. military forces during contingency

operations, in support of HN border control organizations as border operations transition to HN control, or

in support of a stable HN government and associated border control organizations. Border control

operations are conducted for many reasons, to include—

Maintaining security at border crossing sites and along national boundaries.

Controlling movement of the local population (on both sides of the border).

Limiting the smuggling of contraband.

Controlling the spread of disease vectors through applicable quarantine measures.

Enforcing tariff requirements to protect the economy.

D-8. Military police provide relevant capabilities to enhance border operations. Military police units are

trained in access control and physical security measures that can enhance border checkpoint operations.

Military police, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, or U.S. Department of Agriculture personnel can use

their experience supporting HN customs requirements at entry points and other checkpoints, as required.

An MWD team provides the capability to detect contraband being smuggled across state boundaries.

Military police units can provide LE expertise and work closely with HN border personnel to provide

training and assistance until the HN is capable of assuming full authority.

D-9. Military police border control operations include the—

Integration of border control and customs efforts.

Enforcement of regulations and restrictions on the movement of personnel, vehicles, material,

and goods.

Cooperative efforts with adjacent border agencies.

Detection and apprehension of—

Illegal trafficking across borders.

Criminals, including localized and organized criminal activities.

Movement of irregular forces, including terrorist activities and movements.

Enemy infiltrators.

Other threats to the HN and persons of intelligence interest.

D-2

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26 January 2015

Customs and Border Control

UNSTABLE ENVIRONMENTS AND TRANSITIONING HOST NATION CUSTOMS AND BORDER

CONTROL OPERATIONS

D-10. Effective border control is a central component of civil security. Generally, border and naval or coast

guard forces secure national boundaries while customs officials regulate the movement of people, animals,

goods, and other resources flowing across national borders at border crossing sites (including illegal

crossing sites used to bypass border control enforcement measures). Most countries take significant efforts

to control the movement of personnel and resources at their borders.

D-11. In contingency environments following a significant conflict or major man-made or natural disaster,

the U.S. military and its multinational partners may be required to establish border control operations until

an HN capability and capacity can be developed. As border capabilities are increased within the HN, the

U.S. military will assume a training and mentorship role as the HN transitions to full control of their

national borders.

D-12. Control is maintained through the establishment of authorized road or rail crossing points, patrols of

designated border areas and entry control points, and liaison agreements with authorities of neighboring

countries. Prohibited or restricted zones are often used to help control movement at borders. While military

police can perform border patrol operations on a limited basis, the mission is typically conducted by

maneuver units in contingency operations and by specially trained HN border patrol assets when the HN is

capable of patrolling its own borders. Military police elements are typically employed in support of border

control operations at established border crossing sites and entry control points.

D-13. Border control operations are paramount during contingency operations to prevent adversaries from

moving weapons, supplies, and personnel across borders to attack or disrupt friendly forces. When

conducting border control, military police should coordinate with HN police, counterintelligence units, and

civil affairs units concerning the populace and resources control aspects of the mission. They should watch

for individuals or items that may be involved in criminal and customs offenses. Military police can also

establish the identity and purpose of U.S. military members crossing borders and can examine their

vehicles and travel documents when directed.

STABLE HOST NATION CUSTOMS AND BORDER CONTROL OPERATIONS

D-14. Military police in HNs may be tasked to enforce customs laws and regulations in support of local

government officials. The U.S. military enforcement of customs laws in countries where U.S. forces are

stationed is often part of agreements like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization status-of-forces agreement

between the United States and an HN. Under such agreements, military police enforce the customs laws of

the host country with respect to U.S. forces personnel and their dependents. Military police assist the HN

and—

Prevent the illegal sale or transfer into the local economy of U.S. forces’ goods entering the

country free of customs duties and taxes.

Authenticate and issue customs import documents to members of the U.S. forces for importation

of personal property (except hold baggage or household goods entering as official consignments

of U.S. forces).

Issue permits to transfer customs or duty-free personal property to nonmembers of U.S. forces.

Verify the status of retired U.S. forces personnel residing in the country so that these personnel

(who are not members of the U.S. forces as defined in the status-of-forces agreement) may apply

to the HN customs authority for customs certificates. These certificates entitle them to purchase

items in commissaries and post exchanges without payment of import duties or taxes.

Work with HN border police and customs agents to prevent import and export violations by

members of U.S. forces.

D-15. At overseas airports, military police customs personnel may be tasked to provide customs control.

They can perform antihijack inspections for all outbound military and civilian personnel, family members,

and accompanying baggage pending departure on air mobility command charter aircraft. They may also be

tasked to prevent contraband, unauthorized weapons, and illegal narcotics from being introduced into the

United States or the HN.

26 January 2015

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D-3

Appendix E

Law Enforcement Patrol and Manpower Requirements

When conducting police operations, military police and PM staffs must analyze their

AO, considering many factors to determine requirements for conducting police

operations. In some environments, staffs may have a large amount of historical data

that can be used to determine LE patrol and manpower requirements. Some

environments may be such that little to no historical data relevant to crime and police

operations is available for staff planning. The relative amount of data available is a

primary factor in determining what methods are used to determine LE patrol and

manpower requirements. This appendix provides methods for calculating LE patrol

and manpower requirements. The methods provided can be accomplished manually

or by incorporating the formulas into most spreadsheet or database programs.

PATROL ALLOCATION PLANNING

E-1. There are numerous computer-based software applications that can be used to aid LE agencies in

determining the appropriate allocation of LE assets within a given AO or jurisdiction. GIS software can be

extremely useful to the military police or PM staff to overlay crime or incident data on a digital map of the

AO. The software can also allow a wide range of other applicable data to be overlaid, including

demographic data, industrial hazard areas, sensitive assets, key traffic routes and congestion points, and

existing patrol and police station operational boundaries. Commercial software applications can be

purchased that employ algorithms to historical police data, resulting in statistical outputs that include peak

activity times, LE patrol workload and activity, response times, and response delay factors. These programs

can also provide recommendations regarding LE asset allocation.

HISTORICAL REQUIREMENTS

E-2. The following method for determining patrol and manpower requirements was developed by the staff

at USAMPS. It is a simplified method for determining LE patrol allocation requirements that can be done

by hand or input into basic spreadsheet or database software. It can also be used in coordination with other

database and GIS applications used by PM or military police staffs. It is relatively straightforward and can

be manipulated by the staff to fit the specific operational environment. This method requires at least a year

of historical data for the AO considered.

E-3. The following planning factors and variables typically affect LE patrol requirements unique to each

LE organization and the AO. Planners should consider—

The AO covered by LE elements.

The patrol employment related to time (shift configuration).

The number of hours that patrol is required.

The base patrol requirements, using variables that are specific to the AO and the organization

and that are based on historical data.

The number of hours that personnel are available for patrol duties.

The configurations of individual LE patrols.

E-4. Before patrol and manpower requirements can be calculated, the AO in which police operations will

be conducted must be identified. In many cases, the AO is defined as the base, base camp, or

forward-deployed base of operation where police operations are required. In some cases (such as support of

civil control efforts or support to HN police), the AO may be a subset of a larger area (such as the area

covered by a single police station within a larger police jurisdiction). Chapter

2 outlined staff

26 January 2015

ATP 3-39.10

E-1

Appendix E

considerations for determining patrol areas that are relevant to identifying boundaries for AOs as subsets of

larger coverage areas.

EMPLOYMENT CONFIGURATION AND PATROL HOURS

E-5. Once the AO is identified, the staff and military police commander or PM must determine what shift

configuration will be employed. Police operations are, by nature, required to be conducted 24 hours per

day, 7 days per week. The LE organization must determine what shift configuration is to be implemented

(per 24-hour period) and what times during the day that each shift will be on duty. There are many options

for shift configurations, including—

Two 12-hour shifts.

Three 8-hour shifts.

Three 8-hour shifts, plus one overlap shift (four total shifts per 24 hours).

E-6. When the shift configuration is established, the military police or PM staff can calculate the total

number of hours for each shift per year. This can be calculated by multiplying the number of hours per shift

times the number of days per year. For example, for an 8-hour shift—

365 × 8 = 2,920 total hours per year

where—

365

= days per year

= hours per shift

Base Patrol Requirement

E-7. The military police or PM staff must calculate the base patrol requirement based on historical data.

The base patrol requirement is the number of LE patrol elements required per shift. The patrol is a singular

LE element that can respond or react to an incident; this does not necessarily equate directly to personnel.

The base patrol requirement can be calculated by using workload related variables, to include the—

Number of incidents in the target area. This refers to the number of calls for service or other

incidents requiring an LE patrol to be dispatched to the scene. This variable is based on the

historical average for the shift being analyzed. Care must be taken to ensure that data is only

counted for locations within the designated AO for the shift in question. The data should depict

the type of incident or offense, the time and day of the incident or offense (or time of report),

and the exact location of the incident or offense. This allows staff and police intelligence

analysts to accurately map the data within the target area. Data for at least 1 year should be used;

a longer period will provide greater statistical validity.

Average time required per call. The average duration from the time of dispatch to the time the

LE patrol departs the scene should be computed. Data for at least 1 year should be used; a longer

period will provide greater statistical validity.

Buffer time factor. The buffer time refers to the average time spent on activities per shift,

making patrols unavailable for dispatch to incoming calls for service or incidents. These

activities can include officer-initiated contacts

(a traffic stop or response to an observed

suspicious activity, inspection, public service or police engagement activity). For example, if the

average LE patrol spends an equal amount of duty time on buffer time activities compared to

responses to calls or incidents, the buffer time factor would be 2. If LE patrols spend half the

amount of duty time on buffer time activities compared to responses to calls or incidents, the

buffer time factor would be 1.5. The buffer time will typically be larger for LE elements that are

conducting community policing or other patrol strategies that require a higher degree of direct

police engagement by LE patrol elements and the community.

E-2

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26 January 2015

Law Enforcement Patrol and Manpower Requirements

E-8. The base patrol requirement for a shift can be calculated by multiplying the number of incidents in

the target area times the average time required per call for a service or incident, multiplying the result times

the buffer time factor, and then dividing that result by the number of hours required per year to obtain the

base patrol requirement per shift. For example—

9,125 × 0.75 × 2 = 13,687.5, rounded up to 13,688 patrol hours (base requirement)

where—

9,125

average number of incidents or patrol requirements per year for a given shift

0.75

average time (hours) required per call

buffer time factor (hours)

13,688 ÷ 2,920 = 4.69 rounded up to 5 patrols

where—

13,688

patrol hours

2,920

hours per shift

E-9. Five patrols (according to the equation above) is the minimum number of base patrols required per

shift. The requirements for different shifts will be different based on call volume, traffic patterns, and other

factors. For example, shifts spanning the evening and early morning hours historically have a much higher

call volume than other shifts. In these cases, the requirements for each shift should be calculated separately.

E-10. These calculations do not include supervisory patrol requirements. To calculate supervisory patrol

requirements, multiply the span of control ratio times the minimum base patrol requirement for each shift.

See the following examples:

Example 1

If the desired span of control is one supervisory patrol for every five base patrols

(1:5)—

5 ÷ 5 = 1 (minimum) supervisory patrol per shift

where—

base patrol requirements

desired span of control for one supervisory patrol

Example 2

If the base patrol requirement is eight and the desired span of control is one

supervisory patrol for every three base patrols—

8 ÷ 3 = 2.7 rounded up to 3 (minimum) supervisory patrols

where—

base control requirements

desired span of control for one supervisory patrol

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E-3

Appendix E

Personnel Availability

E-11. The staff must also determine an estimate of available time for LE personnel by identifying variables

that reduce personnel availability. (See table E-1.) Variables may be added or removed from the list based

on the characteristics of the individual organization and mission. Variables may include—

Vacation or leave.

Days off.

Time off for medical reasons.

Training.

Case or report preparation.

Court appearance.

Counseling time.

Table E-1. Planning factors to determine time unavailable

for patrol duties

Planning Variable

Planning Factor

Constant

Hours

14 days

Vacation or leave

(average days of vacation or

8 hours per day

112

leave per Army LE personnel)

104 days

(based on 5 days on, 2 days off)

Days off

8 hours per day

832

(52 weeks per year x 2 days off

per week)

7 days

Time off for medical

(average days off per person for

8 hours per day

reasons

medical reasons)

5 days

Training

(average required annual or

8 hours per day

recertification training)

9 days

Case or report

(average cumulative time for

8 hours per day

preparation

case and report preparation)

2 days

Court appearance

(average cumulative time

8 hours per day

required for court appearances)

Counseling time

2.25 days

12 months

(1.5 hours per month)

Total hours unavailable for patrol duties per year

1,146

Legend:

law enforcement

E-4

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Law Enforcement Patrol and Manpower Requirements

E-12. By adding the results of these variable calculations, an estimate of the total hours unavailable (1,146

hours per year) can be determined for each individual LE officer. With this factor and the total number of

hours per year for the identified shift, the following calculations can be made:

Hours available for patrol duties. The following formula is used to calculate the hours

available for patrol duties:

hours required per shift per year − hours unavailable per year = hours available for patrol duty

Example

2,920 − 1,146 = 1,774 hours available for patrol duty

where—

2,920

hours required per shift per year

1,146

hours unavailable per year

Relief factor. The relief factor is the number of personnel required to meet

1 man-year

requirement. The relief factor is used to determine the number of LE personnel required to meet

base patrol requirements factoring in variables for personnel unavailability. The following

formula is used to calculate the relief factor:

number of hours required per year ÷ number of hours available per year = the relief factor

Example

2,920 ÷ 1,774 = 1.7 personnel

where—

2,920

hours per year

1,774

hours available per year

E-13. The preceding calculations are applied to each shift, using historical data for the specific time periods

associated with each respective shift. The shift requirements are then compiled to determine the daily patrol

requirements.

Individual Law Enforcement Patrols

E-14. The staff and military police commander or PM must determine the configuration of individual patrol

elements to facilitate the calculation of manpower requirements. The LE patrol may be configured as a

single- or multiple-person patrol. The determination is made based on the operational environment, existing

and potential threat, and relative experience of the individual LE personnel. In support of bases and base

camps, more experienced LE personnel may be assigned to single-person patrols. Single-person patrols

may also be employed for less experienced LE personnel in relatively benign environments, especially

when sufficient supervisory leadership is available to assist and mentor less experienced personnel. During

shifts where the probability of calls that are volatile in nature are high or in areas where the threat may be

higher, two-person patrols may be appropriate. In expeditionary environments supporting stability

operations, the threat level may be such that full, three-person military police teams and military police

squads may be required to serve as a patrol element.

E-15. The military police or PM staff determines the optimum configuration for all shifts based on the

considerations discussed. This allows the staff to determine the overall daily manpower requirement.

Table E-2, page E-6, shows an example of an LE patrol configuration plan.

26 January 2015

ATP 3-39.10

E-5

Appendix E

Table E-2. LE patrol configurations and associated personnel requirements

Base LE Patrol

Supervisory LE Patrol

Shift

Configuration

Personnel Per Day

A (0800-1600)

Five patrols; one person

Base LE patrol

per patrol element

A (0800-1600)

One supervisory patrol; one

Supervisory LE patrol

person per patrol element

B (1600-1200)

Five patrols; two personnel

Base LE patrol

per patrol element

B (1600-1200)

One supervisory patrol; one

Supervisory LE patrol

person per patrol element

C (1200-0800)

Five patrols; one person

Base LE patrol

per patrol element

C (1200-0800)

One supervisory patrol; one

Supervisory LE patrol

person per patrol element

Three patrols; two

D (2000-0300)

personnel per patrol

Base LE patrol

element

D (2000-0300)

One supervisory patrol; one

Supervisory LE patrol

person per patrol element

Subtotals

Total daily personnel requirement for LE patrols

30 personnel

Legend:

law enforcement

not applicable

E-16. As discussed earlier, there are many variables that may make personnel unavailable for LE patrol

duties. The relief factor calculated in paragraph E-12 is applied to the daily personnel requirement for base

LE patrols to determine the number of personnel required for sustained operations. Multiply the required

base patrol personnel times the relief factor of 1.6 to get the base patrol personnel requirement necessary

for sustained operations. The same relief factor must be applied to the requirement for supervisory LE

patrols. (See table E-3.)

Table E-3. Relief factor to determine personnel requirements

for sustained operations

Daily Personnel

Total Requirement Per Day by

Element

Relief Factor

Requirement

Patrol Type

Base LE patrol

26 x 1.6

41.6, rounded up to 42 personnel

personnel

Supervisory LE

4 x 1.6

6.4, rounded up to 7 personnel

patrol personnel

Total daily personnel requirement necessary for

49 personnel

sustained operations

Legend:

law enforcement

E-6

ATP 3-39.10

26 January 2015

Law Enforcement Patrol and Manpower Requirements

COMPARATIVE DATA

E-17. Running estimates for police requirements based on comparative data between the target AO (AO

requiring police support) and similar AOs where LE operations are established can be useful when

historical data is inadequate or unavailable. A lack of crime statistics, historical police activity data, and

other factors make the use of many allocation metrics impossible. Expeditionary environments where

police infrastructure and records are nonexistent or have been destroyed are examples of when comparative

data analysis may be necessary. In these cases, initial running estimates based on comparisons between the

target AO and similar AOs may be the only realistic method available to produce planning estimates for LE

patrol and manpower requirements.

E-18. For planning purposes, a target police-to-population ratio can be calculated based on analyses of

similar policing systems. Population ratios should be based on individual urban areas within the larger AO.

Each of these urban centers may require different police officer densities based on the overall population,

population density, and other factors (including threat and area geography). Typically, the more dense the

population, the greater the police-to-population ratio requirement. Table E-4 provides examples of police

densities for five major U.S. cities.

Table E-4. Population and police densities for major U.S. cities

Total

Ratio of Police

Population

City

Population

Police

Officers to Square

Officers to

Density

Officers

Miles of Patrol Area

Population

New York

25,925 persons

127 officers per

1 officer per 205

8,008,278

39,110

City

per square mile

square mile

residents

12,746 persons

59 officers per square

1 officer per 218

Chicago

2,896,016

13,423

per square mile

mile

residents

11,232 persons

50 officers per square

1 officer per 218

Philadelphia

1,517,510

6,728

per square mile

mile

residents

12,172 persons

42 officers per square

1 officer per 297

Boston

589,141

2,044

per square mile

mile

residents

Los

7,915 persons

20 officers per square

1 officer per 431

3,600,000

9,195

Angeles

per square mile

mile

residents

Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper

16, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

E-19. After major urban areas are calculated and requirements are established, rural areas can be

determined. Typically, police density in rural areas is more closely tied to communication capabilities and

response times. Once individual police-to-population densities are calculated, actual police requirements

can be determined and overall averages for the AO can be determined.

E-20. The police-to-population ratio template enables the staff to determine the total number of required

police officers for each policing area (city, county, or other jurisdiction) based on the estimated population.

For example, if the target police-to-population ratio is 5 police officers per 1,000 people, a policing area

with 700,000 residents would require approximately 3,500 policing personnel. The 3,500 personnel police

force can then be divided into individual police stations. The span of control must be considered when

dividing individual police station areas and manpower allocations. For planning purposes, 200 police

officers per station represent a medium-size police force.

E-21. The number of required police stations will determine the police hierarchy required to exercise

command and control over the individual stations and police elements. Police organizations will typically

be organized with an overall headquarters element. The size of the organization will determine if interim

management levels are required or if individual police station commanders report directly to the

headquarters element. In extremely large organizations, the district headquarters may be assigned a share of

the police stations and act as a midlevel management element. These midlevel elements provide command

and control for their assigned police stations and report to the police headquarters element, thus

establishing the organizational span of control at a more manageable level. Extremely small organizations

26 January 2015

ATP 3-39.10

E-7

Appendix E

(such as those organized to provide LE and policing support to rural or small towns) may integrate the

headquarters element into a single police station that supports the entire AO.

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIFIC MISSIONS

E-22. A formula can be used to calculate the number of personnel required to fulfill a given mission

requirement, while allowing for a specific work schedule. This manpower requirement calculation allows

military police staffs, commanders, and PMs to identify the required amount of personnel needed to meet a

specific mission requirement. This formula is best used for very specific missions; it is not a good

application for determining long-term sustained mission requirements. The formula can be used as a

stand-alone calculation or, when properly input into most standard computer spreadsheet applications,

calculated automatically. This formula is used when—

A daily manpower or mission requirement is known.

The desired work schedule is known (for example, 5 days on and 2 days off).

The total number of personnel required to meet the given mission is unknown.

Note. In the case of a fractional number, the results are always rounded up. This provides the

minimum number of personnel required for the stated commitment.

E-23. The formula is—

daily commitment × number of days scheduled ÷ actual number of days worked

= personnel requirement

Example 1

5 days on, 2 days off

100 × 7 ÷ 5 = 140 personnel requirement

where—

100

positions (for 140 personnel)

total number of days on the schedule

actual days worked

Example 2

6 days on, 3 days off

100 × 9 ÷ 6 = 150 personnel requirement

where—

100

positions (for 140 personnel)

total number of days on the schedule

actual days worked

E-24. For long-term planning and to account for emergencies, training, leave, injury, unexpected illness, or

other personnel absences, a 10 percent increase is typically added to the personnel requirement.

E-8

ATP 3-39.10

26 January 2015

Law Enforcement Patrol and Manpower Requirements

Example

150 × 0.1 = 15

150 + 15 = 165 personnel requirement

where—

150

initial personnel requirement

MANPOWER CAPABILITY AND CONSTRAINTS

E-25. Many times, the mission must be accomplished with the personnel available. In these instances, the

capability of the unit must be calculated to provide leaders and staffs with the actual manpower capability

of the unit. This provides the staff with available personnel resources to accomplish the stated mission and

enables informed planning, recommendations, and decisionmaking regarding the prioritization of tasks for

the available force. The manpower capability calculation allows military police staffs, commanders, and

PMs to identify the specific mission capabilities (or constraints) given a specified number of available

personnel. The manpower capability calculation is best applied to very specific missions; it is not a good

application for determining long-term sustained mission requirements or constraints.

E-26. Like the manpower requirements formula, the manpower capability formula can be used as a

stand-alone calculation or as input into a computer spreadsheet application to perform calculations

automatically. This formula is used when—

The total number of available personnel is known.

The desired work schedule is known (for example, 5 days on and 2 days off).

A daily manpower capability is unknown.

E-27. When calculating manpower capability, use the following formula:

available personnel × days worked ÷ total days on the schedule = total daily manpower capability

Note. For manpower capability calculations, the results must be rounded down.

Example 1

6 days on, 3 days off

100 × 6 ÷ 9 = 66.67 rounded down to 66 personnel available for a 24-hour period

where—

100

available personnel strength

days on

days in schedule

26 January 2015

ATP 3-39.10

E-9

Appendix F

Crime Prevention

Crime prevention is a critical element in an overall policing strategy. It includes LE,

physical security, and crime prevention measures. These measures are mutually

supporting. Military police support the commander’s crime prevention and protection

efforts through a wide range of activities. This appendix provides guidance on

planning and implementing crime prevention programs and measures that support

bases and base camps. It provides information on crime and criminal analysis to

identify crimes, crime prevention surveys, command and individual countermeasures,

and program evaluation procedures.

PROGRAMS

F-1. Crime prevention is one program that can have a major impact on reducing crime rates at bases and

base camps with a relatively minor cost in dollars and manpower. It takes less effort to discourage a

criminal from perpetrating a crime or to teach a Soldier to avoid becoming a victim than it does to

investigate a crime and identify, prosecute, and punish an offender. In addition, a proactive approach to LE

can help maintain the high quality of service life that can improve the retention of first-term Soldiers.

F-2. The Army is a large organization that performs a variety of activities in many different environments.

Crimes that are major problems in one AO may be totally absent from others. For example, bases and base

camps supporting contingency environments may have a significant number of larcenies, while most depots

have none. Because of this, any rigid, centrally controlled program—no matter how carefully thought out—

is bound to be inappropriate in some locations. Therefore, DA has elected to provide only the most general

guidance and to allow commanders to develop crime prevention programs that address their local problems

and enhance their overall protection posture.

F-3. While military police use crime prevention measures as an integral part of their policing activities,

crime prevention must always be recognized as a commander’s program rather than as a military police

program. Military police personnel have the expertise to analyze data, identify major problems, and

develop lists of possible countermeasures. They perform these functions in support of a crime prevention

council or working group, typically appointed by the base, base camp, or mission commander and

composed of representatives of all major organizations and activities. Military police can also provide

support to individual unit commanders when requested.

OFFICERS

F-4. The PM or military police commander responsible for police operations typically appoints a senior

noncommissioned officer or officer who has a solid backg2round in military police investigations or

physical security to serve as the crime prevention officer. This person supports the crime prevention

council by serving as the military police representative responsible for providing crime and criminal data

analysis to identify problem areas, recommending programs for council consideration, and coordinating the

efforts of unit crime prevention officers to support the implementation of the crime prevention program.

F-5. As a member of the PM staff, the crime prevention officer develops the LE section of the crime

prevention program, develops and maintains the written crime prevention plan, and coordinates crime

prevention programs with civilian police agencies and community groups.

F-6. Crime prevention officers are also appointed in each organization, down to the company level. At the

company level, written crime prevention plans are not required; however, SOPs are established. A crime

prevention officer serves as the organization focal point for coordinating crime prevention plans and

supervises the implementation of the crime prevention program within the organization.

26 January 2015

ATP 3-39.10

F-1

Appendix F

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

F-7. The starting point for developing a crime prevention program must be a thorough analysis of crime

and criminal activity. (See ATTP 3-39.20.) This analysis identifies significant crime and criminal problems

that are susceptible to crime prevention efforts. Crimes that are the most susceptible to crime prevention

measures are those that exhibit a high probability of recurrence. Crimes such as murder are typically not

repetitive and are poor candidates for inclusion in the crime prevention program.

F-8. Since it is seldom practical to attack all criminal problems simultaneously, crimes should be

prioritized based on their impact on the command’s ability to perform the mission and the impact on

personnel. Next, the whole range of countermeasures that can be used to combat each problem must be

identified. Once developed and prioritized, the list of criminal problems and possible countermeasures is

presented to the installation crime prevention council for action. The council should decide which crimes

will be addressed and which countermeasures will be used for each crime. A sample crime countermeasure

matrix is shown in table F-1. The council may then identify specific objectives for its crime prevention

campaigns.

Table F-1. Sample crime countermeasure matrix

Command/LE Countermeasures

Community Programs

Crime

Arson

Auto theft

Burglary or

housebreaking

SAMPL

Employee theft

Fraud

Larceny

Rape

Robbery

Juvenile

delinquency

Vandalism

Legend:

law enforcement

F-2

ATP 3-39.10

26 January 2015

Crime Prevention

CRIME AND CRIMINAL ANALYSIS

F-9. Crime and criminal analysis is a system for identifying trends, patterns, and associations that may

exist. This analysis is an integral component of integrated police intelligence activities, applicable across

the operational continuum. It is an ongoing function for the PM and military police brigade and battalion

staffs. Crime and criminal analysis is the foundation upon which a bases and base camps physical security

and antiterrorism program is based. ATTP 3-39.20 provides a detailed discussion of crime and criminal

analysis and other police intelligence activities. An effective crime and criminal analysis seeks to identify

the following:

Crimes having a significant impact on a bases and base camps.

Segments of the population being victimized.

Criminal or perpetrator identifications.

Common occurrence times.

Areas experiencing the highest number of incidents.

Offense information (weapon types, victim actions that may be enabling criminal activity).

Information critical to bases and base camps or mission commander threat and vulnerability

assessments.

Information essential to formulating successful patrol distribution plans.

CRIME PREVENTION SURVEYS

F-10. An important factor in understanding the crime prevention survey is that it must be considered as an

ongoing process. While a particular survey will result in specific recommendations, each survey will

provide a foundation for future actions. In combination, these surveys form an information database that

can be used in support of a community crime analysis and action guide to support the resolution or

reduction of problems on a community-wide basis.

F-11. Six steps are used to conduct surveys and assess the impact of implemented recommendations. These

steps include—

Analyzing the overall environment for threats, current protection and enforcement gaps and

measures, and crime-conducive conditions.

Assessing the general vulnerability of the premises.

Defining the specific points of vulnerability.

Recommending specific security and enforcement procedures.

Including specific remedial hardware recommendations.

Conducting a follow-up study to assess the implementation and success of recommendations,

including continuous crime and criminal analysis.

F-12. Based on crime and criminal analysis and crime prevention surveys, personnel can identify needed

objectives. Crime prevention objectives should clearly identify the—

Crime that should be reduced.

Target population that will be addressed.

Specific changes and behaviors on the part of the victims or perpetrators that will be encouraged.

Actions that the command must take to reduce the opportunities for the crimes to occur.

F-13. With the information from crime and criminal analysis and crime prevention surveys, milestones and

specific countermeasures can be developed to mitigate crime-conducive conditions, reduce the opportunity

for a crime to occur, or remove the incentives for perpetrators. Without an effective crime and criminal

analysis, the overall security effort is unfocused. Moreover, a base or base camp patrol distribution plan

may be ineffective.

F-14. Crime prevention countermeasures can include—

Physical security measures

(lighting, barriers, alarms).

(See ATP 3-39.32 for an in-depth

discussion of physical security measures and applications.)

Police engagements.

26 January 2015

ATP 3-39.10

F-3

Appendix F

Command and public information and education campaigns.

Targeted LE patrols.

Command emphasis and enforcement on existing physical security and crime prevention

measures.

Proactive environmental designs to enhance crime prevention and physical security.

Juvenile crime prevention and awareness programs.

Neighborhood watch and other community programs.

CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM EVALUATIONS

F-15. Crime prevention programs must be continuously evaluated and assessed for effectiveness. This

analysis requires the PM, commander, and staff to—

Develop program objectives.

Identify measures of effectiveness.

Identify data requirements.

Develop baseline data for comparisons and collect new data.

Identify changes.

Describe results and make recommendations for change. (See figure F-1.)

Figure F-1. Crime prevention program evaluation

F-16. Several inherent difficulties in data collection on crime prevention programs make it difficult for

personnel to determine, with 100 percent accuracy, that a particular reduction in a crime rate is the result of

a particular crime prevention measure. These difficulties include the control of variables, the displacement

effect, and unreported crimes.

Control of Variables

F-17. In its simplest form, the type of evaluation most commonly used in academic or scientific settings

will determine the relationship between two variables. By varying the independent variable (for example,

the dosage of a drug), the effect on the dependent variable (for example, a pulse rate) is determined while

all other variables (such as food intake) are held constant.

F-18. These considerations also apply in the evaluation of crime prevention programs. However, since

crime prevention programs deal with human subjects in environments that cannot be readily controlled,

certain complications arise. The degree of success may have nothing to do with the effectiveness of the

program, but only with the way it was introduced or with the personal predispositions of the groups

F-4

ATP 3-39.10

26 January 2015

Crime Prevention

involved. There is no standard population; human beings are not standardized as mice are for laboratory

purposes. A program found successful at one base or base camp may be a failure at another.

F-19. This evaluation is further complicated by the behavior of the offenders. The offenders cannot be

treated directly or separated into experimental and control groups; they will not stand up and be counted.

The effectiveness of these programs is normally determined by looking at statistics of reported crimes and

arrests, which are more indirect indicators.

F-20. In a crime control program, it may be impossible to classify variables as dependent and independent;

they may all affect and be affected by each other. Furthermore, because of the difficulty in determining

why people behave the way they do, a number of variables may go unnoticed. Police programs designed to

reduce crime may have their most direct effect on the behavior of the general public toward the police,

which in turn affects the crime rate.

F-21. Evaluations are not necessarily restricted to the analysis of objective crime data; they can also

include subjective considerations and perceptions. These subjective evaluations can be of significant

benefit in augmenting the statistical analysis of the program results. They are especially helpful in assessing

why and how a program worked and whether a statistical outcome is actually evidence that the program

was successful. Interviews of participating agency personnel and residents of the program area are usually

used to supply this information. They can give the evaluator new insight into the actual program operation.

Displacement Effect

F-22. In many cases, where crime reductions have been measured and attributed to programs, it is unclear

whether there has been an actual reduction in crime or whether the crime has been displaced. The amount

of displacement depends, to an extent, on the offender’s characteristics. An opportunistic offender can be

pictured as having a relatively elastic demand—if the risk level is too high, he will forgo the crime. A drug

addict is typically described as having a relatively inelastic demand for the product because of the inelastic

demand (need) for drugs (despite the risks, they need the product).

F-23. The displacement effect manifests itself in multiple ways, including displacement to other—

Crimes.

Tactics and targets.

Areas.

Unreported Crimes

F-24. Crime statistics are based on crimes reported to the police; however, many crimes go unreported.

Victimization studies can estimate the extent of unreported crime, its change from year to year, and by

areas of the country. They can also help determine reasons that victims fail to report crimes. These

victimization studies are best suited to determine long-term effects. They are not suited for most crime

prevention evaluations in which short-term changes must be assessed.

ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN

F-25. An effective crime prevention effort recognizes the importance of considering design and physical

planning in crime reduction. Military police must understand a number of concepts about the relationship

between the physical design of buildings, landscaping, lighting and barrier placement, and crime

occurrences. Military police can advise engineers and other planners during the initial design stages of any

project. Military police can also recommend changes to existing structures and provide educational

programs to increase public awareness.

F-26. The model for crime prevention through environmental design is based on the theory that action must

be taken to counter crime before it occurs. The critical element in this model is the environmental

engineering component. It provides direct and indirect controls against criminal activity by reducing the

opportunity for crime through science and technology and the use of various urban planning and design

techniques. While some environmental design elements must be addressed in the preconstruction phase or

involve major reconstruction efforts, some can be addressed quite easily to reduce the existence of

26 January 2015

ATP 3-39.10

F-5

Appendix F

crime-conducive conditions (lighting, fences, shrubs, signage, public awareness of environmental risks that

are not readily changed). Environmental design considerations include—

Building setbacks (front, side, and rear).

Wall construction, interior and exterior (industrial, commercial, and residential).

Door construction, setbacks and security (industrial, commercial, and residential) (including

carports, garages, and sliding glass doors).

Windows and skylights, setbacks, heights (from ground), show-window displays, and types of

frames or panes.

Stairs (stairwells and staircases).

Balconies.

Utility boxes.

Fences, walls, hedges, screens, setbacks, heights, and louvers.

Parking (public and private).

Lighting (industrial, commercial, and residential).

Streets, sidewalks, and walkways (locations, slopes, curvatures, grades, and block lengths).

Alleys (blind and through).

Valuables visibility (people, safes, cash registers, and personal property).

Signs (street signs and signals, traffic signs and signals, and advertising signs).

Accessibility—approaches, entrances, and exits

(pedestrian, vehicular, services, residential,

commercial, and industrial).

Public utilities and easements (gas, water, telephone, electrical).

Public areas and facilities (public restrooms, parks, bus stops, shelters, playgrounds, recreation

halls).

Street trees and shrubbery (types, heights, and locations).

F-6

ATP 3-39.10

26 January 2015

Appendix G

Police Station Construction Considerations

The police station is the hub of all LE activity. This is true whether the LE agency is

civilian or military police. Police stations supporting bases, base camps, or

metropolitan areas can be large operations with significant capabilities beyond basic

LE requirements, while small stations can be austere with only the most basic

equipment and facilities. Regardless of size, military police stations have basic

requirements common to all functional military police operations. An understanding

of the basic requirements can help military police elements when assisting HN police

agencies in building their police station capability and capacity.

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

G-1. The public must have access to military police station activities to conduct legitimate business. These

areas must be easily accessible and clearly marked. However, controls must be established to prevent

visitors and unauthorized personnel from wandering through the station. Such controls must not interfere

with personnel who are conducting business with the various PM sections. Electronically operated visitor

control doors can be used to gain access to the information desk. Military police station criteria for

permanent stations in support of bases and base camps are outlined within the Unified Facilities Criteria

(UFC). The UFC provides standardized planning guidelines for small and large military police stations.

Minimum standards for detention cells are prescribed in AR 190-45 and AR 190-47.

G-2. Mission requirements determine the need for specific station features. To support the basic military

police mission, space is required for—

The PM, the deputy PM, and administrative support personnel (office space).

A station desk.

LE sections.

Operations.

Traffic.

Investigations.

Physical security and access control.

Police administration (records and reports).

Game warden.

An offender-processing area.

Conference and interrogation or interview rooms.

Patrol work areas, with automations support.

Arms, evidence, and property storage.

Briefing and debriefing patrol and reserve areas.

Detention facilities.

Public waiting rooms.

Latrine facilities.

Parking for employees, visitors, and military police vehicles.

Impounded-vehicle parking.

Communications and automations equipment (including a National Crime Information Center

terminal).

26 January 2015

ATP 3-39.10

G-1

Appendix G

Storage for riot control and other special equipment.

Shower facilities.

G-3.

Specific station features should include—

Outside lighting 360° around the station, with a 50-foot standoff area free of private vehicle

parking.

Controlled or monitored access to the station on all doors.

Special entrances provided for military police personnel.

Interior and exterior doors with shatterproof windows for maximum observation, with the

exception of the door leading from the public waiting area to the detention area, which must not

permit observation. This door is electrically operated.

A minimum of exterior windows. Where required, shatterproof windows may be substituted for

plate glass.

Emergency lighting and power.

Separate latrine facilities for public and station personnel.

A field safe for storing property and evidence during nonduty hours when the evidence custodian

is not readily available.

Interview rooms with one-way mirrors (where possible) for identification purposes.

A private work area for the duty officer. This area can also serve as an interview room.

A break area, out of public sight, for military police personnel. Break areas may contain vending

machines.

A communications room with intrusion detection alarms for the post exchange, the finance

office, and the bank.

Furniture (in public areas) inconspicuously secured to the floor to prevent its use in a scuffle.

Access to detention facilities that are free of items that can cause prisoner injury.

Offices that require frequent coordination (such as operations and administration) located close

to one another.

G-4.

Efficient design can enhance the security of the station, reduce personnel requirements, and ensure

that station facilities are used effectively. The general planning guidance in each sample design is based on

programming factors (staff composition, organizational structure, physical development requirements

consistent with a hypothetical set of functional and operational objectives). Space organization principles

are based on established organizational and functional needs and on requirements for the design and

construction of military police facilities. (For more information on designing military police facilities, see

the UFC. Figure G-1 and figure G-2, page G-4, provide examples of small and large military police

stations.)

RECONSTITITION OF HOST NATION POLICE STATIONS

G-5. During the conduct of stability tasks, the U.S. military may be required to reconstitute HN police

organizations and infrastructure. Military police (in conjunction with civil affairs, other multinational

forces, governmental agencies, and HN forces) must assess the existing police structures to coordinate for

construction support. They must coordinate reconstruction and funding efforts with contracting personnel

to ensure compliance with procedures for expending funds in direct support of HN organizations. Military

police must be prepared to write a statement of work and properly staff it through higher headquarters. Any

project statement of work for an HN police station should address construction, protection, and other

requirements identified in an assessment (as necessary) for the functionality of the police station. Project

plans should be staffed with interagency and HN partners.

G-2

ATP 3-39.10

26 January 2015

Police Station Construction Considerations

G-6. Police personnel and facilities are often targeted by criminals, terrorists, and insurgents; therefore,

police personnel, equipment, and facilities require robust security and protection. Regardless of the

physical structure or layout of the various police stations, basic protection measures need to be in place

before police operations begin. Many of these measures may take weeks or months to construct. Protection

measures include—

Protection in-depth.

Standoff distance.

Access control.

Barriers and blast mitigation.

PROTECTION IN-DEPTH

G-7. There is no single security system, method, or design that protects against all threats. The central

mechanism in the Army to protect against threats is through the layering of security, better known as

protection in-depth. Commanders must apply protection in-depth to any protected facility to render an

attack ineffective. Figure G-3 illustrates the general, layered protection approach to the implementation of a

physical security system. The protected facility is located within an innermost ring of security. Additional

layers of security are provided at increasing distances from the asset to be protected. The number of layers,

the components that comprise the layers, and their resistance to penetration depend on the threat and the

importance of the asset to be protected.

Figure G-3. Example of layered protection

G-8. The objective of providing in-depth protection is to manage risks with redundant security or multiple

protective measures between the threat and the target. Subsequently, these measures help a commander

achieve a more complete security posture. Each measure must present unique obstacles to the threat, while

also affording detection and protection capabilities. This action will increase the risk of detection to the

adversary and reduce their chances of a successful intrusion or attack. Theoretically, if one layer of security

proves inadequate protection, another layer will prevent the threat from conducting a full breach.

STANDOFF DISTANCE

G-9. The best protection from the effects of blasts is standoff distance. The standoff distance is the

distance maintained between where a threat may be and the target. The initial goal should be to make that

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G-5

Appendix G

distance as far from the target as practical. In most countries, police stations are built from conventional

construction (common unhardened construction). These buildings will not withstand common blast effects.

To mitigate blast threats to police stations, standoff distances and exclusion areas must be established and

enforced. (See ATP 3-39.32 for data on minimum standoff distances to mitigate blast effects.)

ACCESS CONTROL

G-10. Local citizens should have access to police stations to report crimes, seek assistance, or receive

public safety information. However, access must be controlled and monitored to prevent adversaries from

causing injury, death, or destruction to the police station and personnel. Personnel trained specifically in

access control may be required in high-threat environments.

G-11. Initially, HN personnel may require military police Soldiers or other U.S. and multinational elements

as partners to provide security or access control. This can be especially critical when HN loyalties or the

infiltration of HN elements is a concern. HN security personnel must be monitored and supervised.

Combining security forces enhances capabilities and provides different styles and levels of control. Using

different methods to apply control measures confuses would-be adversaries. Access control procedures are

described in TC 19-210.

G-12. Planning facility access control includes developing procedures for inspecting all incoming

personnel, hand-carried items, and vehicles. Specific areas to be considered during access control

operations include—

Identification methods to be used (photograph identification, badges).

Authority for access and identification confirmation.

Criteria for access to the police facility for—

Assigned personnel.

Visitors.

Media.

Maintenance personnel.

Contractors.

Delivery personnel.

Other emergency personnel.

Material control procedures (consider inspecting all hand-carried items and deliveries).

MWD team employment.

Vehicle control (vehicle inspections, parking, emergency vehicle procedures, and other vehicle-

related activities).

Security overwatch and fighting position locations.

Additional security measure locations.

Protective barriers.

Lighting (to include emergency backup lighting).

Communications.

Response force operations (military police employ response force operations as described in

FM 3-19.4 and TC 19-210).

Contingency planning (responding to fire alarms, bomb threats, hostage situations, natural

disasters, and other emergencies).

BARRIERS AND BLAST MITIGATION

G-13. The most important protection measures used to protect personnel and facilities are barriers and blast

mitigation. The detonation of vehicle bombs generates four primary hazards to personnel in fixed structures

and shelters and in the open. These hazards include—

Primary fragments.

Secondary fragments from barriers and structures.

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ATP 3-39.10

26 January 2015

Police Station Construction Considerations

Secondary debris in fixed structures.

Blasts.

G-14. Barriers capable of stopping moving vehicles include chain link fences reinforced with cable,

reinforced concrete barriers, ditches, and berms. Barrier materials may not be available in large quantities.

Concrete barriers will need to be constructed locally and delivered to the site using large trucks and

equipment. Engineers should be employed to ensure that the concrete is reinforced and that it meets

minimum standards to prevent spalling, fracturing, and other forms of degradation caused by substandard

production. Other types of barriers used to protect against blast threats include—

Earth-filled barriers.

Portable, water- or sand-filled barriers.

G-15. Reinforced concrete barriers used for countermobility should not be used to mitigate blast damage.

Concrete barriers at the detonation point can help (when properly constructed and placed) to mitigate

fragments, but do little to mitigate the blast. Reinforced concrete barriers should be linked with cabling to

ensure that the integrity of the barrier is maintained. Earth-filled barriers work well for fragment protection,

but do little to reduce structural damage. Water-filled barriers are ideal for quick deployment. Water-filled

barriers are lightweight when they are empty, but they can weigh several thousand pounds when full.

Therefore, water-filled barriers should be chained together for effectiveness.

G-16. Maximum protection can be achieved when different types of barriers are integrated into a system of

protection. Personnel should consider using a combination of concrete and earth-filled barriers for

countermobility protection and to reduce the effects of a blast. TC 19-210 describes each barrier and its

protection capabilities. (See ATP 3-39.32 for the planning and implementation of barriers, blast mitigation,

and the other aspects of hardening measures related to protection.)

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G-7

Appendix H

Equipment Requirements

LE activities have equipment requirements specific to the unique tasks conducted by

Army LE personnel. This appendix provides a list of general equipment requirements

for use in planning and resourcing LE personnel by military police staffs, PMs, and

military police commanders.

BASIC LAW ENFORCEMENT PATROL EQUIPMENT

REQUIREMENTS

H-1. LE activities require specific minimum equipment requirements to ensure that individual LE

personnel and the community are safe. This equipment provides personal protection for the individual

conducting LE activities, keeps the equipment stable on the person, and ensures that the tools necessary for

graduated response to threats are readily available. LE patrol personnel conducting police operations under

relatively stable conditions are typically equipped with the following individual equipment:

Handgun. Army LE personnel carry their issued 9-millimeter sidearm.

Weapon holster. The holster should be rated at a retention or security Level II. This is important

for safety and weapon retention. The holster should be fabricated of a durable material

(typically, nylon or leather), especially at the points where the holster is connected to the belt.

Note. Holsters are typically categorized as Level I, Level II, or Level III based on the number of

weapon retention devices designed into the holster. A Level I holster has one retention device,

Level II has two, and Level III has three.

Ammunition carrier or pouch. The ammunition carrier or pouch should be fabricated of a

durable material (typically, nylon or leather).

Concealed body armor. The minimum level of body armor recommended for use by police is

Level IIA (this level will defeat 85 percent of all handgun ammunition); Level IIIA is optimum.

Body armor provides protection against many ballistic threats from standard firearms; it may not

provide protection against puncture threats from pointed weapons (knives, arrows, ice picks).

Body armor considerations include—

Fit. The body armor should fit the individual according to the manufacturer

recommendation.

Hygiene. Body armor should be cleaned regularly according to the manufacturer

recommendations. In hot environments, sweat from LE personnel can cause the body armor

carrier to become unsanitary and create a health hazard.

Physical limitations. Physical capacity may be reduced due to aerobic limitations

associated with the additional weight of the body armor and the constriction of the rib cage

while wearing the body armor. Personnel should train while wearing body armor to increase

strength and stamina.

Note. The National Institute of Justice established certification standards for rating body armor

based on armor performance against various ballistic threats. Body armor is rated across six

levels, from Level I through IV, including Levels I, II, IIA, III, IIIA, and IV.

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H-1

Appendix H

Equipment duty belt. The belt should be made of durable material (nylon, leather) that is fairly

rigid. It should be at least 2 1/4 inches wide to provide support for the equipment needed and to

distribute the weight along the waist. The belt should have a safety mechanism that prevents it

from being easily unbuckled from the front.

Handcuffs and case. There are generally two types of handcuffs available: chained and hinged.

Chained handcuffs have a link of chain between the two locking devices. Hinged handcuffs have

a pivoting hinge between the two devices. Hinged cuffs allow for less maneuverability for the

subject.

Flashlight and carrier. A durable, reliable flashlight is essential. Rechargeable flashlights can

be cost-effective over time by reducing battery replacement costs. The flashlight should produce

at least 65 lumens of light. The carrier should be made to fit the flashlight to prevent it from

falling out of the carrier during movement under routine and extraordinary conditions.

Radio case. The radio case should be made of durable material (nylon, leather). The radio

should fit the case correctly to prevent it from falling out during LE activities.

Belt keepers. Belt keepers on the duty belt are important to prevent slippage along the torso and

to keep items worn on the belt in position.

Wet-weather gear. Police operations must be sustained in extreme conditions. Durable, highly

visible, wet-weather gear should be on hand for LE personnel at all times. The wet-weather gear

should provide protection from the elements and not interfere with the LE officer’s movement

and ability to access weapons and equipment. It should also provide a high level of visibility

during conditions where visibility is reduced due to weather conditions.

Personal first aid kit. The kit should include—

Nitrile gloves.

Cardiopulmonary resuscitation face shield.

Decontamination or disinfectant wipes.

Trauma bandages.

H-2.

least one of the following pieces of equipment should be provided to LE personnel as an

additional less-than-lethal force option when the application of force is required:

Impact weapon and keeper. Impact weapons, typically batons designed for LE use, are a useful

tool for LE. The type of baton depends on local policy and training. Batons come in different

sizes ranging from 18 to 36 inches. Military police staffs, PMs, and commanders should

understand that there are training and certification requirements specific to each type of baton.

Baton types include—

Straight, expandable baton.

PR-24®, side handle baton (expandable and rigid versions).

Straight (rigid) baton.

OC spray and case. OC spray should be rated at least 5.5 percent. There are several sizes of OC

canisters and several types of spray nozzles. The specific size and type of spray should be

uniform within the organization. Training and certification is required for LE personnel to carry

OC spray for LE duties. The use of OC spray in some operational environments may be

prohibited. Ensure that the use of OC spray outside the United States is staffed through the

supporting SJA before employment.

Electroshock weapon with case. An electroshock weapon designed for LE use comes in

multiple configurations. Training and certification are required for LE personnel to carry

electroshock weapons for LE duties. Applicable DOD, Army, and local policies must be

considered when resourcing LE personnel with electroshock weapons.

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26 January 2015

Equipment Requirements

H-3. LE patrols should also have the following items readily available, typically carried within or on their

patrol vehicle or other mode of transportation:

Forms.

DA Form 2823 (Sworn Statement).

DA Form 3946.

DA Form 3975.

DA Form 4002.

DA Form 4137.

DD Form 1408 (Armed Forces Traffic Ticket).

Field interview cards (locally produced).

United States District Court Violation Notice.

Basic evidence collection materials (paper bags, plastic or glass containers).

Digital cameras.

Flex cuffs.

Portable warning and traffic control equipment.

Flashlights with cones.

Reflective vests.

Traffic warning flares.

Warning triangles.

Police whistles.

Basic first aid kits with nitrile gloves.

Water (5-gallon container is preferable), clean rags, and mild liquid soap.

Personal protective equipment, consistent with standards established by the Occupational Safety

and Health Administration, to include (at a minimum)—

Full-face or half-mask, air-purifying respirators (National Institute for Occupational Safety

and Health-approved).

Hooded, chemical-resistant clothing

(overalls; two-piece, chemical-splash suits; and

disposable, chemical-resistant overalls).

Chemical-resistant gloves.

Emergency Response Guidebook (for hazmat response).

Chemical lights. Colors may be designated for use for specified applications or signals.

SPECIAL-RESPONSE SCENARIOS

H-4. Some items of equipment may not be necessary for routine LE patrol activities. However some

incidents occur that are beyond the normal LE patrols capabilities. These incidents may require special

equipment that needs to be accessed in a timely manner when the incident occurs. (See ATP 3-39.11 and

ATP 3-39.35 for equipment specific to SRTs or protective service missions.) These incidents can range

from major accidents to active-shooter or other volatile situations. The use of the equipment within this

section may require specific training or qualification for use. Authorization for use may likewise be

elevated to levels well above the LE patrol, patrol supervisor, or military police operations staff. Local

policy will dictate authorization levels for the use of specific weapons and equipment.

H-5. Special-response equipment should be readily available to LE personnel (maintained at the military

police station or within select LE patrol vehicles) where it can be distributed to authorized personnel in a

timely manner. The type of equipment, regulations, and local policy dictate exact storage requirements.

Up-to-date training and qualification rosters must be maintained at the police desk to ensure that equipment

is only issued to authorized personnel.

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H-3

Appendix I

Special-Response Considerations

Police operations include responses to many incidents that are outside the boundaries

of normal LE and police responses or that, due to the sensitivity of the incident, may

require specific actions or considerations. This appendix addresses select special-

response considerations.

RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS

I-1. Ensuring that personnel respond quickly and appropriately when incidents occur is an essential part

of the police mission. Special-response situations may include domestic disturbances, active shooters,

hostage situations, and natural or man-made disasters. Typically, these events involve one or more of the

following factors (although the presence of one factor by itself does not automatically mean that an incident

is critical):

Threat or act of violence.

Loss of life, significant injury, or significant damage to property.

Substantial resource demands.

Close public scrutiny through the media.

Coordination among federal LE agencies, state or local LE agencies, public affairs, emergency

relief services, or emergency response services.

I-2. Regardless of the type of incident, all LE responses require some general actions to protect the

public, protect evidence, and gather information. Personnel may be apprehended, if required, based on the

incident and the available information. In most cases, the initial report of an incident will be communicated

to the police operations center or military police desk.

I-3. The police operations center or desk section should attempt to obtain the following information from

the caller and any accessible LE databases:

The nature of the alleged incident.

The address or specific location of the alleged incident.

The nature of injuries, if any.

A telephone number where the caller can be reached and a determination as to whether the caller

is the victim or a witness.

The involvement or presence of firearms or other weapons, if any.

The need for fire department, ambulance, or other emergency response.

INITIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE

I-4. An LE patrol will typically be dispatched to the scene of an incident. Upon arrival at the scene, LE

patrol responsibilities can include—

Maintaining radio communications with the military police desk.

Assessing immediate or potential dangers and taking actions, as appropriate, to mitigate risk to

the public and emergency response personnel.

Hazmat, fire, or explosive hazards.

Active shooters, violent persons, or other threats.

Environmental conditions (traffic, weather, smoke).

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Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 7) - page 39