Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 7)

FM 3-19.40

DIAMOND FORMATION

B-87. The diamond formation (Figure B-5) can be used as an offensive

formation or a defensive formation. It is used by riot control forces when they

enter a crowd to apprehend ringleaders. The diamond formation is also useful

when 360-degree security is needed.

Figure B-5. Diamond Formation

CIRCLE FORMATION

B-88. The circle formation (Figure B-6) is used for the same purposes as a

diamond formation. It is used for dispersed and nonviolent crowds, where the

diamond formation is used when the formation must break into or out of a

crowd.

Figure B-6. Circle Formation

VARIATIONS

B-89. Many suitable variations of riot control formations can be employed.

Ensure that appropriate commands and signals are devised to execute the

formations. Due to their complicated nature and the coordination required,

practice the formations extensively before actually using them in a riot.

FORMATION ENHANCEMENTS

B-90. Riot control formations may require enhancement. They can be very

tiring and stressful for troops on line, especially when faced with a hostile

crowd. The crowd may try to break through the control force to reach a

protected facility or to disrupt the efforts of the control force. Likewise, a

Use of Force and Riot Control Measures B-21

FM 3-19.40

determined crowd may refuse to give way to an advancing control force if they

believe the line is not solid. Other elements of the control force can be

positioned in general, lateral, or close support of the main line as needed.

When all the troops in the unit are not required on line at the same time, the

remaining elements can be kept in general support. Elements in general

support are immediately available to provide lateral or close support as the

situation changes.

Platoon Formation With General Support

B-91. The command for forming a platoon formation with a squad in general

support (Figure B-7) is PLATOON AS SKIRMISHERS (ECHELON LEFT,

ECHELON RIGHT, WEDGE), SECOND SQUAD IN SUPPORT, MOVE. The

first and third squads execute the formation, and the second squad remains in

column formation. The number two man of the third squad is the baseman for

the formation.

1st squad

3d squad

2d squad

Figure B-7. Platoon Line, 2d Squad in General Support

B-92. The command for forming a platoon formation with one squad in

general support in a column of twos is PLATOON AS SKIRMISHERS

(ECHELON LEFT, ECHELON RIGHT, WEDGE), SECOND SQUAD IN

SUPPORT IN COLUMN OF TWOS, MOVE. The first and third squads

execute the formation. The second squad, at the command of its squad leader,

executes a column of twos to the right.

B-22 Use of Force and Riot Control Measures

FM 3-19.40

B-93. To assemble a platoon with a squad in general support, the procedure is

the same as for a formation without support, except the second squad does a

countercolumn. The third squad then dresses on the right of the second squad,

and the first squad dresses on the left of the second squad.

Platoon Formation With Lateral Support

B-94. Troops deployed in lateral support (Figure B-8) extend the sides of a

formation and prevent access to the rear of the formation. The command for

forming a platoon formation with lateral support is PLATOON AS

SKIRMISHERS (ECHELON LEFT, ECHELON RIGHT, WEDGE), SECOND

SQUAD IN LATERAL SUPPORT, MOVE. The first and third squads execute

the formation, while the second squad stands fast. When the formation is

formed, the odd-numbered members of the second squad form in column

formation behind the last man of the first squad and the even-numbered

members form in column formation behind the last man of the third squad.

2d squad

(odd numbers)

2d squad

(even numbers)

Figure B-8. Platoon Echelon Right, 2d Squad in Lateral Support

B-95. To move the second squad from general support to lateral support, the

platoon leader commands SECOND SQUAD, LATERAL SUPPORT, MOVE.

To have the second squad join the formation from general or lateral support,

the platoon leader commands SECOND SQUAD, EXTEND THE LINE

(WEDGE), MOVE. The second squad moves out—odd-numbered members to

the left and even-numbered members to the right—to extend the formation of

the first and third squads.

Use of Force and Riot Control Measures B-23

FM 3-19.40

B-96. To assemble the platoon from a platoon formation with lateral support

is nearly the same as for the platoon line. However, the number two men of

the second and third squads do a right face and a left face, respectively, toward

their squad leaders. On the execution command, the first and third squads

move to the point designated by the platoon leader. As the first and third

squads clear the formation, the second squad moves.

Platoon Formation With Close Support

B-97. Troops in close support (Figure B-9) reinforce the line to prevent the

crowd from breaking through the control force. This is done by putting a

second line of soldiers at a close interval behind the lead element, covering the

interval between the soldiers in the lead formation.

2d squad

Figure B-9. Platoon Wedge, 2nd Squad in Close Support

B-98. The command for forming a platoon formation with a squad in close

support is PLATOON AS SKIRMISHERS (ECHELON LEFT, ECHELON

RIGHT, WEDGE), SECOND SQUAD IN CLOSE SUPPORT, MOVE. The first

and third squads execute the primary formation. After the first and third

squads are in position, the second squad executes the same formation to the

rear of the first formation and closes in on it. The soldiers in the supporting

formation shift to cover the intervals between soldiers in the first formation.

B-24 Use of Force and Riot Control Measures

FM 3-19.40

Vehicles

B-99. When a control force encounters large riot groups, they can employ

vehicles and troops on foot in riot control formations. Employ armored

vehicles when practical because they have a strong psychological effect and

offer protection for occupants. Consider the following when using vehicles in

riot control formations:

• A windshield with safety glass offers some protection in the upright

position and minimizes the danger of injury from glass fragments.

However, if paint or other obscurants strike the glass, the operator

may be unable to see well enough to operate the vehicle safely.

• A wooden or metal frame strung with razor wire and mounted across

the front of a vehicle enhances the vehicle’s usefulness as a mobile

barrier and increases its psychological impact.

• A dismounted formation walking alongside the vehicle may be needed

to keep rioters from reaching the sides and rear of the vehicle.

Formation Variations

B-100. During riot control operations, the platoon leader may rotate squads in

the lead elements of the formation to give them a rest. He is not limited to

using only the squads specified in the preceding examples as the lead

elements. By changing the preparatory command, he can choose other squads

to lead the unit. For example, if he wants the first and second squads to lead a

platoon wedge, he issues the command PLATOON WEDGE, THIRD SQUAD

IN SUPPORT, MOVE. By designating the support squad in the preparatory

command, the platoon leader tells the remaining squads that they will lead

the formation.

B-101. The platoon leader may also relieve squads in the lead element by

forming the same formation with support squads. The support element then

passes through the lead element. This procedure is often necessary when

soldiers don protective masks to employ riot control agents.

COMMANDS

B-102. Commands can be given to riot control units in formation orally or

with hand signals. Normally, both verbal and nonverbal commands are given.

All formation commands are given in two counts—a preparatory command

followed by an execution command. All movements into or recovering from riot

control formations are performed at the halt.

B-103. The formation commander faces the troops and gives the preparatory

oral command, accompanied by the appropriate visual command. On the

execution command, the leader drops both arms and points to the position

where he wants the element to form. The formation commander gives the

following visual commands:

• Echelon left. Extends left arm upward at a 45-degree angle and right

arm downward at a 45-degree angle, simulating the intended

formation.

Use of Force and Riot Control Measures B-25

FM 3-19.40

• Echelon right. Extends right arm upward at a 45-degree angle and

left arm downward at a 45-degree angle, simulating the intended

formation.

• Line formation. Extends both arms parallel to the ground.

• Wedge formation. Extends both arms downward at a 45-degree

angle, forming a wedge.

• Diamond formation. Extends both arms above his head, bending

elbows slightly and touching fingertips together.

• Circle formation. Extends both arms above his head, bending

elbows slightly and touching fingertips together, then makes a circular

motion with his right hand.

• Assemble from a riot control formation. Extends right arm

upward and makes a circular motion.

B-104. The oral rifle commands for safe port, safeguard, and on guard and the

baton commands for parade rest, port, and on guard are given in one count. Do

not rely on oral commands completely, especially with the added noise from

vehicles, helicopters, and crowds. Plan to use alternate methods for relaying

commands.

B-105. While in the assembly area, each squad leader has his squad count off.

The squad leader is always number 1, and the baseman for the formation is

number 2. The number each soldier is assigned during the count off

determines his position in his unit’s control formation. The unit marches in

column formation from the assembly area to the disturbance site. It halts a

reasonably safe distance from the crowd, within plain view of it. The on-site

commander decides the riot control formation to use and the size of the

element to commit.

B-106. On the preparatory command, troops assume the safe-port position.

On the execution command, troops form the formation with the baseman

posting himself at the location pointed to by the element leader. As troops

reach their proper positions, they face the direction of the unit’s intended

advance and come to a halt. They remain halted in the safe-port position and

await further orders. Once the troops are in the riot control formation, the

commander commands SAFEGUARD and issues the proclamation. Following

the proclamation, the commander informs disturbance participants that they

have a specific time in which to comply with the order to disperse. If

participants fail to disperse within the given time, the commander employs

measures needed to disperse the crowd.

B-107. When a rifle-equipped formation is commanded to safeguard or on

guard, the commands are for the lead element only and the support elements

come to port arms. Similarly, when a baton-equipped formation is commanded

to port or on guard, the general or lateral support elements assume the port

position. Members of support elements give a resounding stomp with their left

feet when the lead element goes to on guard. On the command FORWARD,

MARCH, the support element maintains the same half step as the lead

element.

B-26 Use of Force and Riot Control Measures

FM 3-19.40

CADENCE

B-108. The usual cadence for moving troops is as follows:

• Into and out of a riot control formation. Double time (180 steps

per minute). Troops are at safe port with a rifle or at port with a baton

when performing these maneuvers.

• Safeguard position. Quick time (120 steps per minute).

• On-guard position. Cadence is

steps per minute. For

psychological effect, troops usually accentuate each left step with a

stomp.

B-109. The commander may increase or decrease cadence depending on the

situation. For example, he may order quick time to keep pressure on a crowd

that is withdrawing. He halts a formation moving in the on-guard position by

commanding PLATOON (SQUAD/COMPANY), HALT. The command of

execution is given on the left foot. On the command HALT, each soldier in the

formation brings his right foot forward, even with his left foot, then takes one

more half step with his left foot. He stomps his left foot as he comes to a halt

and remains in the on-guard position.

INTERVAL DISTANCE

B-110. The usual interval distance between soldiers in riot control formations

is one pace or 30 inches but it can be adjusted for particular situations. A

30-inch interval may not be sufficient in some situations and may have to be

lengthened. Some police forces have found that a greater interval makes

formation members less vulnerable to thrown objects.

COMMANDER AND LEADER POSITIONS

B-111. When a unit is in a column formation, each echelon commander

usually takes a position at the head of the column. In riot control formations,

the element leader takes a position where he can best direct and control the

unit. The senior formation commander normally centers himself and his staff

behind the formation. Subordinate leaders position themselves where they

can best control their soldiers within the formation. For diamond and circle

formations, the squad leader and the assistant squad leader place themselves

in the center of the formation. These are only guidelines, and leaders can

adjust positions with respect to their units as they see fit.

B-112. In column formations, messengers, radio operators, marksmen,

disperser operators, and other platoon headquarters members usually take

positions at the front of the column. In riot control formations, headquarters

personnel can be positioned near the commander at his discretion. If the

situation does not allow this, headquarters personnel can be positioned behind

the control element.

Use of Force and Riot Control Measures B-27

Appendix C

Equipment Guide

Table C-1 lists equipment that may be issued to EPWs when their clothing

becomes unserviceable. (See CTA 50-900 when determining what clothing

to issue EPWs.) Sundry packs and recreation equipment are also needed,

and the facility commander arranges for them through supply or local

purchase.

Table C-1. Individual Equipment

Line

Allowances by Zone

Item

Item, Basis of Issue, and Remarks

Unit

No.

II²

III³

IV⁴

V⁵

VI⁶

VII⁷

B60252

Belt, trousers, cotton webbing, 1 1/4”,

per EPW

C06886

Boot, combat, men’s, leather, black, 8

1/2” high, per EPW

C32182

Buckle, belt, trousers, brass,

lacquered finish, per EPW

C03750

Cap, hot weather, polyester/rayon, OG

106, per EPW

Cap, wool, knit, per EPW

G48939

Drawers, men’s, cotton, thigh length,

white, with elastic waistband, per EPW

G49213

Drawers, men’s, wool knit, ankle

length, silver gray, per EPW

J62858

Glove inserts, wool and nylon knit, OG

108, per EPW

J63269

Glove shells, leather, black, per EPW

K35007

Helmet, sun, adjustment chin strap,

adjustment head size, per EPW

L70789

Liner, wet weather, poncho,

camouflage color, per EPW

P17415

Poncho, coated, nylon, OG 207, per

EPW

T03520

Shirt, men’s, cotton sateen, OG 107,

per EPW

T04205

Shirt, men’s, wool, nylon flannel, OG

108, per EPW

T93335

Sock, men’s, wool, cushion sole, OG

408, stretch type, per EPW

Equipment Guide C-1

Appendix D

Military Police Internment/Resettlement Units

Table D-1 provides a synopsis of the various MP I/R units that may be

assigned to the TO.

Table D-1. MP I/R Units

Unit

TOE

Assigned To

Duties

HHC, MP

19641L000

FORSCOM in

Provides C², staff planning, and supervision of I/R

command (I/R)

CONUS and

operations performed by assigned and attached

TSC OCONUS

MP elements.

HHC, MP brigade

19762L000

TSC

Provides command, staff planning, and supervision

(I/R)

of I/R operations performed by assigned and

attached I/R MP elements.

MP detachment,

19543LH

I/R brigade

Provides C², staff planning, and supervision of two

I/R team (C²)

or three I/R battalions that process and intern

12,000 or fewer people.

MP detachment,

19543LD

MP brigade

Provides the following when the brigade’s span of

I/R team (I/R

(I/R)

control is exceeded:

brigade liaison

•

Extends the capability of the MP brigade

team)

(I/R) to plan and supervise collection,

internment, and evacuation operations of

EPWs, CIs, DCs, and US military prisoners.

•

Acts as a coordination link to allied and

indigenous organizations to ensure that they

are complying with the Geneva Conventions

concerning EPWs and CIs.

•

Ensures that EPW operations in the TO

international agreements, and US policies

implementing international law.

•

Is an essential link with HN forces securing

EPWs, CIs, and DCs. Ensures that policies

favorably consider the intent of the US to

comply with international treaties pertaining

to the care and handling of EPWs, CIs, and

DCs.

MP detachment,

19643L000

I/R command,

Receives, processes, maintains, disseminates, and

I/R information

I/R brigade, or

transmits required information and data relating to

center

MP brigade

EPWs, American PWs, CIs, and DCs within the TO.

Military Police Internment/Resettlement Units D-1

FM 3-19.40

Table D-1. MP I/R Units (continued)

Unit

TOE

Assigned To

Duties

MP detachment,

19543LE

One per camp

Provides a coordination link to allied and

I/R team (EPW/CI

(northeast

indigenous I/R facilities.

branch camp

Asia only)

Helps maintain proper custody and control of

liaison)

internees.

Ensures that the provisions of US policies,

publications, and directives; international

agreements; US policies implementing international

law; and the Geneva Conventions are fulfilled.

MP detachment,

19543LG

Provides a coordination link to allied and

I/R team (EPW/CI

detachment,

indigenous forces.

processing liaison

I/R team (I/R

Establishes, organizes, and operates an I/R

team)

brigade liaison

processing element within an I/R facility or, with an

team)

I/R battalion support team, at a location other than

an I/R facility.

MP detachment I/R

19543LC

Provides processing capabilities for 8 internees per

team (I/R

detachment,

hour. One squad is assigned for every 200

processing squad)

I/R team (I/R

internees requiring processing per day within a

brigade liaison

separate/independent corps, division, or brigade

team) (for C²)

force as required.

HHC, MP battalion

19646L400 or

I/R brigade in

Provides C², administrative, and logistics support to

(I/R) (EPW/CI/DC)

19546A and

an AO

operate an I/R facility.

19547AB(4)

Provides OPCON of attached units.

Is capable of interning and supporting 4,000 EPWs

and CIs or 8,000 DCs.

HHC, MP battalion

19546A000

MP brigade

Provides command, staff planning, administration,

(I/R)

and logistical support to operate an I/R facility for

EPWs, CIs, or US military prisoners.

Provides OPCON of assigned and attached units.

Supervises battalion functions (personnel, medical,

supply, and food services).

HHC, MP battalion

19656L000

MP brigade

Provides command, staff planning, administration,

(confinement)

and logistical support for a confinement facility for

US military prisoners.

MP detachment

19547AA00

HHC, MP

Provides supervision, administration, health

(I/R) (confinement)

battalion (I/R)

services, and logistical support for US military

prisoners.

D-2 Military Police Internment/Resettlement Units

FM 3-19.40

Five Ss and T

search, segregate, silence, speed, safeguard, and tag

field manual

FMFM

Fleet Marine Force manual

FMFRP

Fleet Marine Force reference publication

foreign nation

FORSCOM

United States Army Forces Command

FSB

forward support battalion

foot, feet

Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 (Intelligence)

Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 (Operations and Plans)

Assistant Chief of Staff, G4 (Logistics)

Assistant Chief of Staff, G5 (Civil Affairs)

gal

gallon(s)

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in

Time of War, 12 August 1949

guard

general officer

general purpose

GPW

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,

12 August 1949

GWS

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the

Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949

GWS (SEA)

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of

Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,

12 August 1949

H&RA

Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs

H/CA

humanitarian and civic assistance

humanitarian assistance

HHC

headquarters and headquarters company

HIV

human immunodeficiency virus

hazardous material

host nation

Glossary-4

FM 3-19.40

STP

soldier training publication

STRESS

search, tag, report, evacuate, segregate, and safeguard

tuberculosis

TCMS

Theater Construction Management System

THP

temporary home patrol

theater of operations

TOC

tactical operations center

TOE

table(s) of organization and equipment

TRADOC

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command

TSC

Theater Support Command

TTP

tactics, techniques, and procedures

UCMJ

Uniform Code of Military Justice

UIC

unit identification code

United Nations

UNDP

United Nations Development Program

UNDRC

United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF

United Nations Children’s Fund

UNOCHA

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

United States

USACIC

United States Army Criminal Investigation Command

USAFEP

United States Air Forces Europe pamphlet

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

USAR

United States Army Reserve

USCG

Unites States Coast Guard

USD

Under Secretary of Defense

USDA

United States Department of Agriculture

USDB

United States Disciplinary Barracks

USIA

United States Information Agency

WFP

World Food Program

Glossary-9

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FM 100-19. Domestic Support Operations {FMFM 7-10}. 1 July 1993.

FM 100-23-1. Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations {FMFRP 7-16;

NDC TACNOTE 3-07.6; ACCP 50-56; PACAFP 50-56; USAFEP 50-56}. 31 October 1994.

FM 101-5. Staff Organization and Operations. 31 May 1997.

Foreign Assistance Act, US Code (1994).

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed

Forces in the Field (GWS), 12 August 1949.

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked

Members of Armed Forces at Sea (GWS [SEA]), 12 August 1949.

Geneva Convention Protocol Relative to the Status of Refugees. 1967.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC),

12 August 1949.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Status of Refugees. 1951.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW), 12 August 1949.

Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, 12 August 1949.

Misc Pub 27-7. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 2000 Edition.

Posse Comitatus Act, US Code (1994).

STANAG 2033. Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW) (Edition 6). 6 December 1994.

STANAG 2044. Procedures for Dealing With Prisoners of War (PW) (Edition 5). 28 June 1994.

STANAG 2084. Handling and Reporting of Captured Equipment and Documents (Edition 6).

6 April 1999.

STP 19-95B1-SM. Soldier’s Manual, MOS 95B, Military Police, Skill Level 1. 21 February 1997.

STP 19-95C14-SM-TG. Soldier’s Manual and Trainer’s Guide for MOS 95C Internment/

Resettlement Specialist, Skill Levels 1/2/3/4. 26 March 1999.

Bibliography-4

Index

categories of civilians, 9-2

CIs, 5-12

central CP, 3-12

US military prisoners, 7-1

ACS. See Army Corrections

CHA. See corps holding area

confiscated items, 3-5

System (ACS).

(CHA).

constitutional rights, US military

adjudged prisoner, 7-4

chapels, 6-7

prisoners, 7-3

adjutant general (AG), 2-9

chaplain, 2-10

constructing I/R facilities, 6-1

administration

chaplain captive, 4-14

control

CI facility, 5-2

chemical irritants, B-13

CIs, 5-10, 5-17

DC facility, 9-15

CI. See civilian internee (CI).

civilians, 10-10

FCF, 8-11

circle formation, B-21

DCs, 9-2, 9-14

HA facility, 10-11

civil rights, 1-13

EPWs, 4-12

administrative segregation, 7-5

civilian interference, 9-2

US military prisoners, 7-5,

AG. See adjutant general (AG).

civilian internee (CI), 1-3, 5-1

8-10

agencies involved in I/R

civilian lead agency, 1-9

control force, B-6

operations, 1-6

civilian organizations, 1-8

controlled flow, 4-1

agitators, 4-10

civil-military operations (CMO), 9-1

corps holding area (CHA), 3-1,

agriculture program

clandestine activities, 4-23

3-15

CIs, 5-16

classification

correctional facilities, 7-3

EPWs, 4-20

captives, 3-7

correctional staff, 7-12

air assault operations, 3-19

DCs, 9-11

correctional system, 7-1

airborne operations, 3-18

EPWs, 4-9

correctional treatment programs,

aircraft transport, 8-19

US military prisoners, 8-7

7-8

amphibious operations, 3-18

classification reduction, 8-9

correctional treatment, US military

apprehension of escaped

clear zones, 6-2

prisoners, 7-1

prisoners, 8-16

clemency, 7-11

correspondence

approved-adjudged prisoner, 7-4

close confinement, 7-6

CIs, 5-13

armored operations, 3-18

close support, B-24

EPWs, 4-17

Army Corrections System (ACS),

clothing

US military prisoners, 7-19,

7-1

CIs, 5-5

8-14

assembly area, DC, 9-4

civilians, 10-9

counseling, 7-8

assignment to internment facility

DCs, 9-12

CP. See collecting point (CP).

CIs, 5-4

EPWs, 4-15

crowd

EPWs, 4-9

US military prisoners, 8-7

behavior, B-6

CMO officer, 2-9

control, B-6

backhaul system, 3-10

CMO. See civil-military operations

tactics, B-8

barracks rules, 9-15

(CMO).

currency, 3-5

baton positions, B-14

coercion, 3-7

custody grade, US military

battlefield confinement, US military

collecting point (CP), 3-1, 3-10

prisoners, 7-5, 8-9

prisoners, 8-1

collection point, DCs, 9-4

custody, US military prisoners, 7-5,

briefing DCs, 9-6

combat zone (CZ), 1-2

8-10

commander responsibilities, 2-1

CZ. See combat zone (CZ).

commands, B-25

cadence, B-27

communications, 6-3

canteens, 4-18

DART. See disaster assistance

compensation

captives, 1-11

reponse team (DART).

CIs, 5-16

capture tag, 3-2

database, 4-5

EPWs, 4-20

captured supplies and equipment,

DC facility, 9-7

US military prisoners, 7-11

6-5

DC operations, 9-1, 9-2

complaints, 5-13

capturing power, 1-6

DC. See dislocated civilian (DC).

confinement

casual prisoner, 7-4

deadly force, 9-17, B-1

Index-1

FM 3-19.40

definitions, 1-2

CIs, 5-14

guards, 7-13, 8-11

dependent children of CIs, 5-4

EPWs, 4-24

deprivation, 8-9

US military prisoners, 7-7

HA. See humanitarian assistance

detained prisoner, 7-4

escapes, preventing, 8-18

(HA).

detainees, 1-11

escort guard company, 4-11

halt, B-2

detaining power, 5-12

evacuation

hostile

diamond formation, B-21

captives, 3-7

act, 9-17

disaster assistance response team

DCs, 9-5

environment, 10-2

(DART), 10-19

EPWs, 4-1

intent, 9-17

disciplinary

evacuee, 1-5

housed personnel, care and

action, 8-9

evacuees, return of, 9-6

control, 2-13

measures, 7-6

evaluation board, 7-8

housekeeping supplies, 6-7

punishment, 5-3

expellee, 1-5

humanitarian assistance (HA),

disciplinary-and-adjustment board,

extra duty, 8-9

10-1

8-16

extra good-conduct time (EGCT),

discipline

7-11

CIs, 5-11

ID band

civilians, 10-10

CIs, 5-4

facility guard force, 2-6

DCs, 9-14

EPWs, 4-6

FCF. See field confinement facility

EPWs, 4-15

identifying

(FCF).

US military prisoners, 8-9

CIs, 5-5

FDF. See field detention facility

dislocated civilian (DC), 1-4

DCs, 9-11, 10-8

(FDF).

disorder, 2-8, B-7

US military prisoners, 8-7

Federal Response Plan, 1-7

displaced person (DP), 1-4

IDP. See internally displaced

female

disposition of DCs, 9-18

person (IDP).

CIs, 5-11

dissident actions, 4-21, 5-17

IG. See inspector general (IG).

EPWs, 4-9

disturbance, 2-8, 5-17, 5-18

IHO. See international

field confinement facility (FCF),

documentation, DCs, 9-6

humanitarian organization

7-1, 8-3

DP. See displaced person (DP).

(IHO).

field detention facility (FDF), 7-1,

impounded items, 3-5

8-3

information flow, 4-7

echelon formation, B-19

field processing captives, 3-2

initial processing, 4-7

education program

finance officer, 2-9

inspections, 2-8

CIs, 5-15

Five S and T procedure (search,

inspector general (IG), 2-12

EPWs, 4-18

segregate, silence, speed,

intelligence gathering, 4-22, B-11

US military prisoners, 7-10

safeguard, and tag), 3-4

intermediate processing, 4-8

EGCT. See extra good-conduct

forfeiture, US military prisoners,

internally displaced person (IDP),

time (EGCT).

8-9

1-5

emergency action plan, 2-2, 7-7

formation enhancement, B-21

international humanitarian

emergency services (ES), 10-14

formations, B-16

organization (IHO), 1-9

CONUS, 10-14

forms

international organization (IO), 1-8

OCONUS, 10-17

ACS, 7-17

internee committee, 5-12

employment

FCF, 8-13

internment

CIs, 5-16

forward CP, 3-10

dependent children, 5-2

EPWs, 4-19

fraternization

protected civilians, 5-2

US military prisoners, 7-10

CIs, 5-11

internment serial number (ISN),

enemy plants, 4-10

EPWs, 4-15

4-6

enemy prisoner of war (EPW), 1-2,

frisking US military prisoners, 7-7

interpreters, 4-2, 5-6

4-1

full processing, 4-8

interrogation, 3-17

engineer officer, 2-10

interservice transfer, 4-11

EPW leaders, 4-10

general orders, 2-6

IO. See international organization

EPW. See enemy prisoner of war

general support, B-22

(IO).

(EPW).

Geneva Conventions, 1-12, 1-13

ISN. See internment serial number

equipment guide, C-1

good-conduct time, 7-18, 8-9

(ISN).

ES. See emergency services (ES).

guard towers, 6-2

isolation, 4-9

escapes

Index-2

FM 3-19.40

MP support

PRC. See populace and resource

DC operations, 9-7

control (PRC).

L&O. See law and order (L&O).

ES operations, 10-20

pretrial confinement, 7-3

lateral support, B-23

MWD. See military working dog

principles

law and order (L&O), 9-16, 10-12

(MWD).

CI facilities, 5-3

layout

I/R facilities, 2-2

central CP, 3-13

I/R operations, 1-5

CHA, 3-15

NGO. See nongovernmental

priorities of force, 8-17, B-1

DC facility, 9-10

organization (NGO).

prisoner status, 7-4

DC overlay, 9-5

NLW. See nonlethal weapon

privileged mail, 7-20

FCF, 8-5

(NLW).

privileges, US military prisoners,

forward CP, 3-11

nongovernmental organization

8-9

HA facility, 10-7

(NGO), 1-8

proactive programs, 10-1

I/R facility, 6-3

nonlethal measures, 9-18

procedures

processing center, 6-5

nonlethal weapon (NLW), B-3

DC operations, 9-3

legal considerations, 10-3

nonmandated organization, 1-9

I/R facility operations, 2-1

legal obligations, 9-2

nonviolent tactics, B-7

processing

lethal force, B-4

notice of protection, 2-3, 5-11

captives, 3-2

lights, 6-3

CIs, 5-6

line formation, B-18

civilians, 10-6, 10-8

location of I/R facilities, 6-1

objectives, I/R operations, 1-5

DCs, 9-9

OD. See other detainee (OD).

officer prisoner, 7-4

EPWs, 4-1

mandated organization, 1-9

US military prisoners, 8-5

operational environment, 10-2

marking CI facilities, 5-18

processing centers, 6-5

other detainee (OD), 1-4, 5-1

marking outer garments

processing stations

CIs, 5-5

CIs, 5-7

EPWs, 4-16

PAO. See public affairs officer

DCs, 9-11

marksman, B-5

(PAO).

EPWs, 4-2

MCO. See movement control

parole, 7-12

US military prisoners, 8-6

officer (MCO).

patrol roads, 6-3

property accountability, 3-5

medical captive, 4-14

perimeter security, 2-7

protected CI status, 5-4

medical care

permanent transfer, 4-11

protected civilian, 5-2

captives, 2-4

permissive environment, 10-2

protecting power, 1-11, 4-14, 5-12

CIs, 5-13

personal property

protection

civilians, 10-9

CIs, 5-14

captives and detainees, 1-11

DCs, 9-6, 9-12

EPWs, 4-11

EPWs and CIs, 1-12

EPWs, 4-17

US military prisoners, 7-18

refugees, 1-13

internees, 6-7

personnel file

psychological operations

US military prisoners, 7-23,

CIs, 5-4

(PSYOP), 2-12

8-8

EPWs, 4-5

PSYOP. See psychological

medical evacuation, 3-8

US military prisoners, 7-8

operations (PSYOP).

medical officer, 4-17, 5-9

petty-cash fund, 7-19

public affairs officer (PAO), 2-10

medical operations, 2-11

photographs

punishment, 8-9, 8-10

medical support, 3-10, 3-12

CIs, 5-8

punitive measures, prohibited, 7-6

metric conversions, A-1

EPWs, 4-4

MI interrogation team, 3-2, 3-17

US military prisoners, 8-7

rail transport, 8-19

migrant, 1-5

planning considerations, central

rations

military working dog (MWD), 2-7,

CP, 3-14

DCs, 9-6

4-23, 5-18

platoon echelon left, B-20

EPWs, 4-17

misconduct, 8-16

platoon echelon right, B-20

reactionary force, 8-16

mitigation, 7-11

policies, DCs, 9-3

reactive programs, 10-1

motor vehicle transport, 8-18

populace and resource control

reassignment, EPWs, 4-10

movement control officer (MCO),

(PRC), 9-1

receipts, 3-6

2-12

positions, B-27

receiving

movement of captives, 3-9

CIs, 5-6

Index-3

FM 3-19.40

EPWs, 4-1

sanitation, 2-4, 4-17, 5-13, 6-7, 8-8,

tower guards, 2-7

receiving centers, 6-5

9-12, 10-9

training

reclassification

schedule of calls, 2-2

ACS, 7-15

DCs, 9-11

screening, 3-17, 9-11, 10-8

I/R personnel, 2-13

EPWs, 4-10

searches, 3-4, 5-11, 9-9, 10-8

NLWs, B-5

record of events, B-9

security, 2-5, 3-9, 4-7, 4-15, 4-21,

riot control, B-10

records

5-11, 5-17, 9-5, 9-13, 10-2,

transfer

CI facility, 5-4

B-11

CIs, 5-14

I/R facility, 2-4

security measures, prohibited,

EPWs, 4-10

recreation program

8-10

US military prisoners, 7-21,

captives, 2-5

security requirements, I/R facilities,

8-19

CIs, 5-16

6-2

transporting

I/R facility, 6-7

segregation

civilians, 10-13

US military prisoners, 7-10

at CPs and CHAs, 3-7

DCs, 9-5, 9-6, 9-18

refugee, 1-5, 1-13

EPWs, 4-9

US military prisoners, 7-7,

regulations

US military prisoners, 7-4, 8-9

8-18

ACS, 7-17

self-government

treatment

FCF, 8-13

civilians, 10-10

CIs, 5-1

releasing CIs, 5-15

DCs, 9-13

detainees, 1-12

relief agencies, 1-10

sentence computation, 7-18, 8-14

EPWs, 4-13

religious materials, I/R facilities,

signal officer, 2-10

tribunal, 4-10

6-7

SJA. See staff judge advocate

remission, 7-11

(SJA).

uncertain environment, 10-2

repatriating EPWs, 4-11

social programs, 2-4

units in a TO, D-1

reports

CIs, 5-15

US military prisoner, 1-5

captives, 3-6

EPWs, 4-18

US policy, 1-12

CI facility, 5-4

special orders, 2-6

use of force, 2-8, 8-17, 9-17, 10-2

EPWs, 4-11

staff judge advocate (SJA), 2-10

I/R facility, 2-4

staff responsibilities, 2-9

representatives, EPW, 4-13

standby guards, 2-7

violations of the UCMJ, 8-16

reprimand, 8-9

standing orders, 2-2, 5-3

visits, 5-16

requests, 5-13

stateless person, 1-5

responsibilities

stay-put policy, 9-4

commander, 2-1

strength report, 4-7

walking patrols, 2-7

staff officers, 2-9

STRESS (search, tag, report,

war victim, 1-5

restraining devices, 7-6

evacuate, segregate, and

warning, 8-9

restrictions, employing EPWs, 4-19

safeguard), 3-2

weapon positions, B-16

retained items, 3-4

subsistence

wedge formation, B-19

retained person (RP), 1-3

at I/R facilities, 6-5

work detail guards, 4-23

riot, 2-8, 5-17, B-8

CIs, 5-5

worship

riot control agents, B-11

civilians, 10-9

captives, 2-5

riot control measures, B-9

DCs, 9-12

CIs, 5-16

river-crossing operations, 3-18

EPWs, 4-17

EPWs, 4-18

ROE. See rules of engagement

US military prisoners, 8-8

US military prisoners, 7-20

(ROE).

supplies, 7-22

ROI. See rules of interaction (ROI).

supply services, 8-15

RP. See retained person (RP).

support personnel

rules of engagement (ROE), 2-8,

ACS, 7-16, 7-20

4-15, 5-18, 9-17, 10-3, B-2

MP unit, 8-15

rules of interaction (ROI), 4-14,

suspension, 7-11

8-16, 9-17, 10-13

tactics, B-5

safeguard, 3-8

tagging captives, 3-6

safety, 2-5, 5-2

temporary custody, 8-1

sally ports, 6-3

temporary transfer, 4-11

Index-4

TC 7-100.3

Training Circular

Headquarters

Department of the Army

No. 7-100.3

Washington, DC, 17 January 2014

Irregular Opposing Forces

Contents

Page

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

Irregular Forces

Irregular OPFOR and Hybrid Threat for Training

Tailoring the OPFOR

vii

Chapter 1

IRREGULAR OPPOSING FORCE FUNDAMENTALS

1-1

Hybrid Threat

1-1

Capabilities and Intent

1-1

Tactics

1-4

Interactions of Operational Variables

1-4

Principles

1-7

Motivations

1-10

Support

1-12

Blurring of Categories

1-14

Comparison and Contrast

1-15

Chapter 2

INSURGENTS

2-1

General Characteristics

2-1

Insurgent Organizations

2-3

Chapter 3

GUERRILLAS

3-1

General Characteristics

3-1

Guerrilla Organizations

3-7

Guerrilla Brigade

3-8

Guerrilla Battalion

3-16

Guerrilla Company

3-23

Guerrilla Platoon

3-25

Guerrilla Hunter-Killer Company

3-25

Hunter-Killer Group

3-27

Tactics and Techniques

3-28

Chapter 4

CRIMINALS

4-1

Characteristics

4-1

Motivations

4-3

Criminal Organizations

4-4

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Contents

Command and Control

4-6

Criminal Activities

4-8

Chapter 5

NONCOMBATANTS

5-1

General Characteristics

5-1

Armed Noncombatants

5-3

Unarmed Noncombatants

5-7

Unarmed Combatants

5-16

Chapter 6

TERRORISM

6-1

Terrorism in Complex Operational Environments

6-1

Motivations

6-2

Terrorism Planning and Action Cycle

6-3

Terrorism Actions

6-7

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

6-9

Terrorism Trends and Emergent Vectors

6-21

The Specter of Terrorism

6-26

Chapter 7

FUNCTIONAL TACTICS

7-1

Functional Organization of Forces and Elements

7-1

Types of Offensive Action

7-3

Types of Defensive Action

7-24

Irregular OPFOR in Hybrid Threat Tactics

7-36

Appendix A

INFORMATION WARFARE

A-1

General Characteristics

A-1

INFOWAR Organizations

A-4

INFOWAR Support to Irregular OPFOR

A-6

Figures

Figure I-1. Irregular force actors

Figure 1-1. Relation of irregular OPFOR principles to achieving the objective

1-8

Figure 2-1. Network types

2-5

Figure 2-2. Typical levels of leadership, action, and support

2-6

Figure 2-3. Higher insurgent organization

2-10

Figure 2-4. Local insurgent organization

2-13

Figure 2-5. Local and higher insurgent organizations network (example)

2-14

Figure 2-6. Insurgent direct action cell and team graphic symbols

2-15

Figure 2-7. Insurgent supporting cell graphic symbols

2-20

Figure 3-1. Guerrilla organization symbols: brigade to team level

3-7

Figure 3-2. Guerrilla brigade (example)

3-8

Figure 3-3. Guerrilla battalion (example)

3-17

Figure 3-4. Guerrilla company (example)

3-24

Figure 3-5. Guerrilla platoon (example)

3-25

Figure 3-6. Guerrilla hunter-killer company (example)

3-26

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Contents

Figure

5-1. Armed and unarmed noncombatants (examples)

5-1

Figure

5-2. Noncombatant support to the irregular OPFOR (examples)

5-3

Figure

5-3. PSC organization by functions (example)

5-6

Figure

5-4. Media team organization (example)

5-9

Figure

5-5. NGO field office functions (example)

5-12

Figure

6-1. Terrorism actors in complex operational environments

6-1

Figure

6-2. Terrorism planning and action cycle

6-4

Figure

6-3. Bombing: insurgent affiliate (example)

6-11

Figure

6-4. Kidnapping: insurgent-criminal affiliation (example)

6-13

Figure

6-5. Hostage-taking: guerrilla unit (example)

6-14

Figure

6-6. Raid: multiple insurgent suicide cell assaults (example)

6-15

Figure

6-7. Anthrax-laced letters: death-mayhem in targeted population (example)

6-21

Figure

7-1. Insurgent ambush (example)

7-4

Figure

7-2. Guerrilla ambush (example)

7-5

Figure

7-3. Insurgent assault (example)

7-10

Figure

7-4. Guerrilla assault (example)

7-11

Figure

7-5. Insurgent raid (example)

7-11

Figure

7-6. Guerrilla raid (example)

7-11

Figure

7-7. Guerrilla reconnaissance attack (example)

7-11

Figure

7-8. Simple and complex battle positions

7-25

Figure

7-9. Insurgent defense of a simple battle position (example)

7-28

Figure

7-10. Guerrilla defense of a simple battle position (example)

7-29

Figure

7-11. Insurgent defense of a complex battle position (example)

7-33

Figure

7-12. Guerrilla defense of a complex battle position (example)

7-34

Tables

Table 1-1. Comparison and contrast of insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals

1-16

Table A-1. INFOWAR elements, objectives and targets

A-3

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

iii

Preface

This training circular (TC) is one of a series that describes an opposing force (OPFOR) for training U.S. Army

commanders, staffs, and units. See the References section for a list of other TCs in this series. (Other

publications in the former Field Manual [FM] 7-100 series will be converted to TCs as well.) Together, these

TCs outline OPFOR that can cover the entire spectrum capabilities of regular and/or irregular forces against

which the Army must train to ensure success in any future conflict.

Applications for this series of TCs include field training, training simulations, and classroom instruction

throughout the Army. All Army training and red team venues should use an OPFOR based on these TCs, except

when mission rehearsal or contingency training requires maximum fidelity to a specific country-based threat or

enemy. Even in the latter case, trainers should use appropriate parts of the OPFOR TCs to fill information gaps

in a manner consistent with what they do know about a specific threat or enemy.

This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG) /Army National Guard of the

United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.

Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is the proponent for this

publication. The preparing agency is the Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate

(CTID), TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity

(TRISA)-Threats. Send comments and suggested

improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to CTID

at the following address: Director, CTID, TRISA-Threats, ATTN: ATIN-T (Bldg 467, Rm 15), 803 Harrison Blvd,

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1323.

This publication is available at on the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library (RDL) at

http://www.adtdl.army.mil. Also, see Army Training Network

(ATN) https://atn.army.mil with Army

Knowledge Online (AKO) access. Two locations on the ATN front-page access TRADOC G-2 products. Click

the “Training for Operations” button and then click the “CTID Operational Environment Page” link. Click the

“DA Training Environment” button and click the “OPFOR & Threat Doctrine” link. Both of these sites provide

threat and opposing forces (OPFOR) resources and references for training, professional education, and leader

development. Updates subject to the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) approval process will occur as

required, and as a result of a normal review production cycle for an Army training circular. The date on the

cover and title page of the electronic version will reflect the latest change update.

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Introduction

This training circular (TC), as part of the TC 7-100 series, addresses the irregular

opposing force (OPFOR), which in Army training exercises represents a composite of

actual threats and enemies that comprise irregular forces. The three primary

categories of irregular forces portrayed by the OPFOR are insurgents, guerrillas, and

criminals. These actors may operate separately or in conjunction with one another

and/or combined with regular military forces as the Hybrid Threat (HT) for training.

This TC also addresses other actors present in an operational environment (OE), who

may be affiliated with the irregular OPFOR through willing support or coercion,

and/or may be passive or unknowing supporters of the irregular OPFOR.

IRREGULAR FORCES

Irregular forces are armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police,

or other internal security forces (JP 3-24). The distinction of being armed as an individual or group can

include a wide range of people who can be categorized correctly or incorrectly as irregular forces.

Excluding members of regular armed forces, police, or internal security forces from being considered

irregular forces may appear to add some clarity. However, such exclusion is inappropriate when a soldier of

a regular armed force, policeman, or internal security force member is concurrently operating in support of

insurgent, guerrilla, or criminal activities.

Irregular forces can be insurgent, guerrilla, or criminal organizations or any combination thereof. Any of

those forces can be affiliated with mercenaries, corrupt governing authority officials, compromised

commercial and public entities, active or covert supporters, and willing or coerced members of a populace.

Independent actors can also act on agendas separate from those of irregular forces. Figure I-1 depicts

various actors that may be part of or associated with irregular forces.

DRUG

IED

Insurgents

Passive

Terrorists

Criminals

Guerrillas

Supporters

Active Supporters

Independent Actors

Figure I-1. Irregular force actors

Closely related to the subject of irregular forces is irregular warfare. JP 1 defines irregular warfare as “a

violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant

population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full

range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” The

definition spotlights a dilemma of conflict in and among a population. It also indicates that the non-state

actors characterized as irregular forces may operate in other than military or even military-like

(paramilitary) capacities.

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

Introduction

IRREGULAR OPFOR AND HYBRID THREAT FOR TRAINING

The function of the OPFOR is to portray a threat or enemy in training exercises. Army Regulation (AR)

350-2 establishes policies and procedures for the Army’s Opposing Force Program. Since 2004, that AR

has defined opposing force as “a plausible and flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a

composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces used in lieu of a specific threat force, for

training or developing U.S. forces.” AR 350-2 has defined threat as “any specific foreign nation or

organization with intentions and military capabilities that suggest it could become an adversary or

challenge the national security interests of the United States or its allies.” However, that definition of threat

was much narrower than the way ADRP 3-0 now defines it.

“A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm

U.S. forces, U.S. national interests, or the homeland. Threats may include individuals, groups of

individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliances.

When threats execute their capability to do harm to the United States, they become enemies.” (ADRP 3-0)

A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist

forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects (ADRP 3-0). A hybrid

threat can consist of any combination of two or more of those components.

The preface of TC 7-100 says that TC outlines “the Hybrid Threat that represents a composite of actual

threat forces as an opposing force (OPFOR) for training exercises.” After focusing on real-world hybrid

threats in its first part, TC 7-100 states: “Part two of this TC focuses on the Hybrid Threat (HT) for U.S.

Army training. The HT is a realistic and relevant composite of actual hybrid threats. This composite

constitutes the enemy, adversary, or threat...represented as an opposing force

(OPFOR) in training

exercises.” That means that, in the context of the HT for training, the OPFOR can also include nonmilitary

actors (such as criminal elements), which are part of the threat faced by the training unit. Since the

definition of hybrid threat includes other than military and paramilitary actors, it has broadened the

application of the term OPFOR.

The AR 350-2 definition of OPFOR used the term paramilitary forces, defined in JP 3-24 as “forces or

groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization,

equipment, training, or mission.” However, the ADRP 3-0 (and TC 7-100) definition of hybrid threat uses

the broader term irregular forces, defined in JP 3-24 as “armed individuals or groups who are not

members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces.” Thus, irregular forces would

include paramilitary forces, but also other armed individuals or groups that do not resemble regular armed

forces. Although the ADRP 3-0 definition of hybrid threat includes “terrorist forces, and/or criminal

elements,” both criminals and actors who use terrorism as a tactic would actually fit under the JP 3-24

definition of irregular forces.

FM 7-100.4 lists criminal organizations under non-state paramilitary actors, but only because “Criminal

organizations at the higher end of the scale can take on the characteristics of a paramilitary organization.”

However, it notes that “individual drug dealers and criminals or small-scale criminal organizations (gangs)”

do not have that type of capability. FM 7-100.4 also refers to “other armed combatants” as “nonmilitary

personnel who are armed but not part of an organized paramilitary or military structure. Nevertheless, they

may be disgruntled and hostile.” ARDP 3-0 defines “a party identified as hostile against which the use of

force is authorized” as an enemy. In a training exercise, such an enemy would be portrayed as part of the

OPFOR.

FM 7-100.4 also recognizes the category of “unarmed combatants.” It says: “The local populace contains

various types of unarmed nonmilitary personnel who, given the right conditions, may decide to purposely

and materially support hostilities against the United States

Individual criminals or small gangs might be

affiliated with a paramilitary organization and perform support functions that do not involve weapons

Even unarmed individuals who are coerced into performing or supporting hostile actions and those who do

so unwittingly can in some cases be categorized as combatants. Thus, various types of unarmed combatants

can be part of the OPFOR.”

Thus, a threat or enemy can be any individual or group—not necessarily military and/or paramilitary, or

even armed. The same is true of the OPFOR that represents the threat or enemy in a training exercise.

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Introduction

TAILORING THE OPFOR

The OPFOR must be a challenging, uncooperative adversary or enemy. It must be capable of stressing any

or all warfighting functions and mission-essential tasks of the U.S. armed force being trained. This TC

addresses the irregular OPFOR with a tactical focus on insurgents, guerrillas, and/or criminals. In exercise

design (see TC 7-101), the type(s) of forces making up the OPFOR will depend upon the conditions

determined to be appropriate for accomplishing training objectives. In some cases, the OPFOR may only

need to reflect the nature and capabilities of a regular military force, an irregular force, or a criminal

organization. However, in order to be representative of the types of threats the Army is likely to encounter

in actual OEs, the OPFOR will often need to represent the capabilities of a hybrid threat. In that context,

the force that constitutes the enemy, adversary, or threat for an exercise is called the Hybrid Threat, with

the acronym HT. Whenever the acronym is used, readers should understand that as referring to the Hybrid

Threat. The HT is a realistic and representative composite of actual hybrid threats.

Regular military forces of the OPFOR may have irregular forces and/or criminal elements acting in loose

affiliation with them, or acting separately from them within the same training environment. These

relationships depend on the scenario, which is crafted based on the training requirements and conditions of

the Army unit being trained. The OPFOR tactics described in TC 7-100.2 are appropriate for use by an

OPFOR that consists either entirely or partly of regular military forces. Some of those tactics, particularly

those carried out by smaller organizations, can also be used by insurgents, guerrillas, or even criminals.

Even those tactics carried out primarily by regular military forces may involve other components of the HT

acting in some capacity. When either acting alone or in concert with other components of the HT, irregular

forces and/or criminal elements can also use other tactics which are outlined in TC 7-100.3.

Note. After this introduction, the chapters and appendixes of this TC address their topics from

the OPFOR point of view. So, friendly refers to the irregular OPFOR and other parts of the

Hybrid Threat. Likewise, enemy refers to the enemy of the irregular OPFOR, which may be an

opponent within its own country or region or an extraregional opponent (normally the United

States or a U.S.-led coalition).

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

vii

Chapter 1

Irregular Opposing Force Fundamentals

This chapter describes the fundamental characteristics of the irregular opposing force

(OPFOR). This TC portrays three main categories of irregular OPFOR: insurgents

(chapter 2); guerrillas (chapter 3); and criminals (chapter 4). Other actors present in

an operational environment

(OE) can be willing, coerced, and/or unknowing

participants in irregular OPFOR activities (chapter 5). The irregular OPFOR interacts

with the eight operational variables that make up an OE. This interaction among

variables adds to the complexity of an OE and creates multiple opportunities for the

irregular OPFOR to optimize its capabilities against an enemy. The irregular OPFOR

can use terrorism as a tactic

(chapter

6) in addition to military-like functional

techniques (chapter 7). A table in this chapter compares and contrasts the capabilities

and limitations characteristic of a guerrilla force, an insurgent organization, and a

criminal organization. The particular capabilities and limitations of the various types

of irregular OPFOR are described in subsequent chapters of this TC.

HYBRID THREAT

1-1. The irregular OPFOR can be part of the Hybrid Threat (HT). (For more information of the HT, see

TC 7-100.) The HT can be any combination of two or more of the following components: regular military

forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements. The irregular OPFOR component of the HT can be

insurgents, guerrillas, or criminals or any combination thereof. The irregular OPFOR can also include other

armed individuals or groups who are not members of a governing authority’s domestic law enforcement

organizations or other internal security forces. On occasion, situations may occur where unarmed

individuals or groups may be part of the irregular OPFOR and the HT. An example of unarmed individuals

aligned with the HT in an active support role is when segments of the population participate in public

demonstrations against an enemy of the HT. Possible HT combinations include parts of the irregular

OPFOR operating openly with regular military forces, being sponsored directly or indirectly by a state’s

government, or being supported by non-state organizations.

1-2. The irregular OPFOR can be part of the HT, but can also operate independently without any

allegiance to or collaboration with other types of forces associated with the HT. Various state and non-state

organizations, regular military forces, paramilitary forces, and/or criminal organizations might be operating

in the same space and time as the irregular OPFOR but not be part of the irregular OPFOR or the HT. To be

a hybrid threat, all these components would have to be “unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects”

(ADRP 3-0 and TC 7-100).

CAPABILITIES AND INTENT

1-3. The irregular OPFOR is adaptive, flexible, and agile. It can quickly change its composition to

optimize organizational capabilities and use those capabilities against known or perceived vulnerabilities of

an enemy. The irregular OPFOR takes prudent risks when an expectation exists for successful attack on an

enemy. However, it may also make significant practical sacrifices in individuals and materiel in order to

achieve a major psychological impact on an enemy. An example of such deliberate sacrifice is a number of

nearly simultaneous, small unit or direct action cell assaults on targets that result in the deaths of all

attackers, but receive sensational media coverage to a global audience.

1-4. The intent of the irregular OPFOR is to acquire a range of capabilities and use them at selected times

and locations in order to achieve desired effects. It can use those capabilities against an enemy. However,

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

1-1

Chapter 1

the irregular OPFOR can also use functional tactics and/or terrorism to manipulate a population and

dissuade support to an enemy’s military forces and/or other institutions. When necessary, it will use acts of

violence to gain influence and develop willing or coerced cooperation. Concurrently, it will use indirect

means to progressively degrade an enemy’s physical power and infrastructure, and to psychologically

influence the political, social, economic, military, and information variables of an OE. The irregular

OPFOR will attempt to exploit its familiarity with the physical environment and its ability to blend into the

local populace. The time variable normally favors the irregular OPFOR. The activities of the irregular

OPFOR are constant over a long period of time, but may change in pace, tempo, and speed. The timing of

actions will sometimes appear random when the actual mode of the irregular OPFOR and its activities are

deliberate decisions as part of a long-term campaign or strategy.

1-5. One of the most significant capabilities of the irregular OPFOR is the ability to manipulate and/or

ignore the restrictions and sanctions that apply to regulated military forces, law enforcement agencies, and

internal security forces belonging to a sovereign state. International protocols and conventions, national

statutes and law, and moral codes that guide behavioral norms and social interactions can limit the enemy’s

use of weapon systems and other capabilities that overmatch irregular OPFOR capabilities. The irregular

OPFOR can make exceptions by complying with these codes of conduct when that is advantageous for its

information warfare campaign. However, it can easily abandon those standards when they no longer

provide operational value. When regular military forces of a state incorporate clandestine use of the

irregular OPFOR, the state can often plausibly deny responsibility for actions conducted by

irregular forces.

1-6. Although violent actions by any individual organization or combination intend to receive immediate

notoriety, the irregular OPFOR complements violent actions with methodical, long-term psychological

warfare. The overarching agenda of the irregular OPFOR can include but is not limited to the

following issues:

Expand support and/or control within an area or region.

Deter opposition to its objectives within a relevant population.

Obtain popular recognition and support of its objectives by designated segments of a population.

Marginalize the governance and/or extraregional influence of an adversary.

Attract an international or global audience and/or external sources of influence to support irregular

OPFOR aims.

1-7. The irregular OPFOR seeks to gain the approval and support of at least certain elements of a relevant

population in order to obtain active or passive assistance. The methods by which it acquires such influence

are complex in any OE. Normally, it must communicate a compelling narrative of legitimacy that is

accepted by the population. This credential of legitimacy may require a gradual process of convincing the

relevant population that the irregular OPFOR is an acceptable means to achieve desired social, religious, or

political effects. However, the irregular OPFOR may confer authority on itself without regard to the

population’s goals.

1-8. An enemy of the irregular OPFOR may maintain that the OPFOR concept of legitimacy is corrupt

and illicit. The irregular OPFOR may declare that its actions are justifiable under existing conditions, and

attempt to degrade the legitimacy of a governing authority. Over time, the irregular OPFOR seeks to obtain

recognition of its legitimacy by a willing populace and official recognition from external states and/or

organizations in order to accomplish its long-term goals. Once its authority is recognized, the irregular

OPFOR seeks to maintain the legitimacy of its cause, its leadership role, and its actions.

1-9. Sometimes external recognition and support is not as important to the irregular OPFOR as is

establishing a geographic enclave from which to plan, prepare, and conduct its activities and influence. The

irregular OPFOR conducts direct and indirect actions that are adaptive and persistent. This form of conflict

incorporates irregular forces typically categorized as insurgents or guerrillas, and includes selective actions

coordinated with criminal organizations. Particular actions can be purposely conducted as acts of terrorism,

or can employ more military-like tactics. All of these actions are described in terms of the common

functional framework described in the 7-100 series of FMs and TCs.

1-2

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Irregular OPFOR Fundamentals

COMPLEXITY AND COLLABORATION

1-10. The irregular OPFOR may be part of a complex array of irregular and regular OPFOR organizations,

units, or individuals with various coordinated and/or disparate single-agenda aims. A particular geographic,

political, cyberspace, or ideological environment may lead to alliances or affiliations that are dynamic and

constantly changing. Discrete incidents may not seem to be part of an overall plan. However, detailed

analysis of the irregular OPFOR actions and associated political, social, economic, information, and other

events normally reveals a vision supporting a long-range aim.

1-11. In particular conditions and circumstances, irregular OPFOR actions can include support from

regular military forces and/or special-purpose forces (SPF) from a state or states. Internal security forces

and/or law enforcement organizations that have been infiltrated by the irregular OPFOR can also support

irregular OPFOR actions within an area or region. The collaboration among organizations, units, and/or

individuals of a relevant population may be based on coercion, contractual agreement, and/or temporary or

long-term common goals and objectives.

1-12. Possible rationales for irregular OPFOR collaboration with other organizations or individuals in an

OE can include—

Spotlight grievances for resolution.

Establish influence over a relevant segment of a population.

Develop acceptance and legitimacy of irregular OPFOR programs and actions.

Achieve OPFOR objectives without alienating critical segments of indigenous and/or

extraregional populations.

Cultivate active or passive supporters.

1-13. Irregular OPFOR objectives may promote solutions to grievances in the context of a particular

population. The irregular OPFOR may prefer to use indirect approaches such as subterfuge, deception, and

nonlethal action to achieve its objectives. However, it is committed to violent action, when necessary, in

order to compel an enemy and/or an opposing form of governance to submit to its intentions. Some

irregular OPFOR organizations such as affiliated criminal gangs exist for their own commercial profit and

power, and are not interested in the quality of life and/or civil security of a relevant population that they

influence or coerce. Other forms of the irregular OPFOR can be rogue individuals with single-issue

agendas who are willing to use criminal activity and/or terrorism in order to achieve their objective.

ADAPTABILITY

1-14. The irregular OPFOR is constantly adapting its capabilities in an agile and flexible manner to

achieve its objectives. These capabilities include improvements in organization, equipment, and tactics.

The irregular OPFOR can readily task-organize for a particular action. It tailors actions to support a

compelling agenda that resonates with a relevant population for active and/or passive support. It makes

adjustments when it gains or loses affiliated support or experiences degradation due to recent actions.

1-15. Irregular OPFOR actions are conducted as a continuum. Any pause in its operations is part of a

coherent campaign of persistent conflict. A long-term perspective guides near- and mid-term actions to

marshal capabilities for future actions. While one form of action may appear stalled, another form of action

is likely underway against an enemy weakness. Protracted actions can change quickly if the irregular

OPFOR observes unexpected enemy vulnerabilities.

1-16. The irregular OPFOR’s ability to quickly transition also gives it the agility and flexibility to—

Command, control, and/or influence various activities.

Task-organize its forces.

Deceive and surprise.

Disperse and concentrate.

Retain freedom of movement.

Apply physical and psychological techniques in order to create anxiety in an enemy.

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

1-3

Chapter 1

This agility and flexibility is critical to how effectively the irregular OPFOR adapts its patterns of

operations to maintain the initiative over an enemy. The irregular OPFOR perseveres in adversity by its

ability to adapt.

1-17. FM 7-100.4 (to be converted to a TC) outlines the baseline organizations and equipment of

insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals and provides general guidance on how these forces may task-organize

for particular missions. This process of task-organizing and/or tailoring of forces is flexible to

accommodate the particular mission and conditions in the OE.

Note. In order to achieve a desired level of capabilities, the irregular OPFOR order of battle or

task-organized structure may require adjustments in types and numbers of weapons systems, other

equipment, and personnel. If a particular piece of equipment in the organizational directories of

the OPFOR administrative force structure in FM 7-100.4 is not appropriate for a specific OE,

possible substitutions are identified in the Worldwide Equipment Guide.

TACTICS

1-18. Insurgents and guerrillas, as part of the irregular OPFOR, may employ variants of the functional

tactics outlined for smaller tactical units of the regular OPFOR in TC 7-100.2 (see chapter 7 of this TC).

Criminal elements do not normally have the ability to execute these functional tactics.

1-19. All three types of forces that make up the irregular OPFOR can employ terrorism as a tactic in order

to achieve their aims. (For actions typical of criminals, see chapter 4. For more detail on terrorism, see

chapter 6.)

INTERACTIONS OF OPERATIONAL VARIABLES

1-20. The irregular OPFOR is part of the military variable, which explores the military and/or paramilitary

capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given OE. However, irregular OPFOR

actions can affect or be affected by all the operational variables: political, military, economic, social,

information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time

(PMESII-PT) and their subvariables. The

impacts may be robust, moderate, or relatively insignificant. The interaction of the operational variables

and subvariables establishes conditions for various levels of irregular OPFOR capabilities and limitations.

The dynamic interaction and effects by the irregular OPFOR on operational variables are a physical and

psychological combat multiplier for the OPFOR. The following paragraphs discuss the impacts of the

irregular OPFOR on each of the operational variables. They also provide examples of how the actions of

one variable can directly or indirectly impact on other variables and affect the capabilities and influence of

the irregular OPFOR.

POLITICAL

1-21. The centers of responsibility and power at various levels of governance can be an objective for

irregular OPFOR subversion or violent action. The irregular OPFOR may target for willing or coerced

support of its aims—

Constituted authorities at local, provincial, and/or state levels.

Tribal leaders and/or clan chiefs.

Religious leaders and councils.

Influential political organizations.

The irregular OPFOR may want to institute its own political goals for the perceived benefit of a relevant

population, or to create chaos within a governing authority in order create a protected geographic enclave

within a sovereign state. In either case, influence over a relevant population is essential. Given enough

electoral support in a relevant population, the irregular OPFOR may be able to win formal political

recognition at varied levels of a governing authority that it opposes.

1-22. Conditions of the political variable would very likely interact with social and economic conditions of

an OE. The political aim of the irregular OPFOR could have a genuine intent to provide a voice in politics

1-4

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Irregular OPFOR Fundamentals

to an under-represented relevant population, or be self-serving in order to obtain control of political

institutions for its own commercial profit. It may start as the former and transition into the latter. An

example of this transition could be if the irregular OPFOR emerged from an indigenous population of rural

farmers and tenants with grievances against absentee landowners and corporate businesses. However, over

time, the irregular OPFOR might shift its focus to commercial profit in racketeering and the production,

and distribution of illegal drugs to a transnational market.

MILITARY

1-23. The irregular OPFOR can infiltrate regular military and/or paramilitary forces of an enemy

governing authority. It can collect intelligence on military unit strengths and weaknesses, unit leader

preferences and biases, and/or readiness of weapons, support, and materiel. Covert actions by irregular

OPFOR members can undermine the effectiveness of enemy units by—

Raising doubts about the validity of enemy unit missions.

Subverting leader and subordinate allegiances.

Questioning the general treatment of military and/or paramilitary members by the governing

authority.

1-24. With military training, weapons and equipment stolen or purchased by the irregular OPFOR can be

used more effectively to improve its armed capabilities. In some cases, the irregular OPFOR may attempt

to transition highly trained irregular forces into a more formalized paramilitary or security force in order to

demonstrate its ability.

1-25. An example of interaction of military and information variables could be a media campaign directed

at a local, regional, and transnational audience, in which the irregular OPFOR uses the symbols and

appearance commonly associated with military power and influence. The irregular OPFOR could use

progressive success in establishing and protecting a geographic safe haven with a declaration of

sovereignty. Announcements to a global information network could display senior irregular OPFOR leaders

in military uniform and attire, speaking publicly with official banners or flags, and maps or images of

territory declared as independent. A focused defense of the safe haven, assisted by an extensive and

supportive diaspora could achieve irregular OPFOR objectives unless challenged by an enemy

governing authority.

ECONOMIC

1-26. The economic effectiveness and prosperity of a governing authority can be marginalized with black

market activities coordinated by the irregular OPFOR. Criminal activities can include smuggling, theft,

and/or piracy of marketable goods. Insurgent or guerrilla actions can include disrupting the flow of

commerce throughout the economic chain of production, distribution, and consumption by the general

populace. The irregular OPFOR, in some instances, can become the illicit commercial broker for what

transactions occur in an economic sector. Front companies and/or organizations can launder resources and

money into legitimate enterprises in support of irregular OPFOR objectives.

1-27. An example of interaction between economic, infrastructure, and information variables could be

when the irregular OPFOR can deliver a satisfactory level of livelihood, health care, and commercial

advancement for a relevant population. The population may have been denied access to such expectations

by transnational corporations and a governing authority that extract natural resources from the region for

their own profit and exclusive use. The grievance of this economic poverty can result in irregular OPFOR

actions such as sabotage of pipelines, disruption of refining facilities, kidnapping of corporate officials,

and/or random acts of murder. The irregular OPFOR can use a media campaign aligned with the economic

grievances of the relevant population to emphasize the validity of OPFOR offensive actions. For example,

it could call attention to the presence of significant private security contractors of transnational corporations

and regular military forces of a governing authority conducting business security actions and military

operations for their own financial gain.

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

1-5

Chapter 1

SOCIAL

1-28. Cultural, religious, and ethnic differences can be stress points within a population that the irregular

OPFOR can incite with real or false claims to further fracture a society and its social institutions. Unsettled

grievances based on traditional values and customs can range from dissatisfaction to violent demonstrations

against issues such as human rights, educational opportunities, and/or social mobility. The irregular

OPFOR can nurture the support of particular social and religious leaders of a community that align

themselves with OPFOR initiatives. Civic improvement associations and social welfare projects

administered by the irregular OPFOR focused on a relevant population can be part of a comprehensive

social unity program.

1-29. An example of interaction of the social and information variables could be the compelling influence

that a cleric or advisory council of clerics can have on a relevant population. Religious leaders may have

traditional authority in a culture that recognizes such an overarching authority, Based on that perceived

authority, the directives and prohibitions of that cleric or council can direct popular support of the irregular

OPFOR or civil disobedience to a governing political authority.

INFORMATION

1-30. Public communications by the irregular OPFOR can promote its own message with perception

management and also discredit programs of the enemy governing authority. Open source and human

intelligence collection operations can improve the irregular OPFOR awareness of enemy weaknesses.

Information warfare (INFOWAR) by the irregular OPFOR can deceive, destroy, or sabotage enemy

communication infrastructure. Examples of irregular OPFOR INFOWAR activities include blogs on the

Internet, publicizing incidents of alleged abuse by a governing authority in global news media, and/or

recurring presentations by charismatic individuals in social, political, educational, and religious institutions.

1-31. Another example of how the interaction of variables can cause significant impacts on irregular

OPFOR operations is the way the physical environment can influence the transmission and flow of

irregular OPFOR information and intelligence. In a rural setting, the irregular OPFOR may use normal

commercial transportation means of porters and mule trains. In an urban setting, it may use vendors and

daily routes of commercial goods. Thus, in either setting, sophisticated electronic monitoring capabilities

by an enemy of the irregular OPFOR may become insignificant. The irregular OPFOR can manipulate the

global information environment by using the Internet to encrypt and/or hide messages in innocent

appearing electronic communications. Verbal or electronic communications of a relevant population can be

stifled by irregular OPFOR threats and/or coercion when such information negatively affects its operations

in an area. Public claims of responsibility for acts of terror by the irregular OPFOR can further reduce overt

support of a relevant population to an enemy of the irregular OPFOR.

Note. The information variable is discussed in more detail in appendix A, which describes the

elements of the irregular OPFOR’s INFOWAR.

INFRASTRUCTURE

1-32. The irregular OPFOR can cause immediate, progressive, and long-term effects on of basic facilities,

services, and operational installations that provide the infrastructure for a community or society. Immediate

impacts can be the disruption of a sole-source oil pipeline and/or the destruction of a main electrical power

generation facility. Progressive acts to disrupt and cause long-term impacts can be the mining of regional

motor transportation routes with improvised explosive devices and recurring ambushes of commercial and

military convoys. From a more positive perspective, the irregular OPFOR could provide basic civil services

not being provided by a governing authority such as potable water and/or basic medical care.

1-33. Irregular OPFOR actions can include calculated disruption or destruction activities to limit enemy

capabilities and/or convince a relevant population that the enemy is incapable of protecting them and

providing adequate public or private services. The irregular OPFOR may choose to—

Attack public utilities or the civil servants who service such utilities.

Prevent delivery of commodities that sustain performance of public services.

1-6

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Irregular OPFOR Fundamentals

Interdict services such as motor transportation, urban construction and repair.

Disrupt implementation of farming initiatives hosted by an enemy governing authority.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

1-34. The irregular OPFOR can optimize the geography and/or manmade structures of a physical

environment by using restrictive rural terrain or dense urban communities to mask complex battle positions

and safe havens. Terrain, weather, climate, and vegetation can support the concealment and/or cover of

irregular OPFOR staging and conduct of operations. The growth of poor and underemployed populations in

many large metropolitan areas, and the increase of some cities to a status of megalopolis are prime

conditions to create grievances that can be manipulated by the irregular OPFOR.

1-35. An example of interaction among variables could be the impact of a governing authority’s land

reforms that adversely affect the immediate prosperity of a local or regional population. This could include

a directed destruction of one type of farming crop on limited usable terrain, and a replacement crop that

does not provide the same economic value to the farmer or local distributor. This situation can be part of

INFOWAR, with the irregular OPFOR promoting a story of how the governing authority it to blame for

these negative impacts.

TIME

1-36. Time can be a combat multiplier for the irregular OPFOR when the cultural perception of time

accepts a protracted conflict. During such a protracted conflict, the irregular OPFOR can use violent

actions, INFOWAR, diplomatic discussions, economic pressures, and progressive representations of value-

added for a relevant population. Timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions, as well as how the

timing and duration are perceived by various actors in the OE, can prevent or delay governing authority

activities in favor of irregular OPFOR aims.

1-37. The irregular OPFOR seeks to chose the time and place for engaging the enemy. Timing can be the

most significant aspect of determining when to tactically execute a decision to delay, deceive, fix, and/or

block. Timeliness of information and intelligence is another key aspect that the irregular OPFOR uses to its

own advantage. In order to affect enemy pace, tempo, and/or speed of action and reaction, the irregular

OPFOR may plant false information at a particular time and ensure that an enemy obtains it. The prudent

use of time is often combined with characteristics of a physical environment to create opportunities in

support of near-, mid-, and/or long-term objectives.

PRINCIPLES

1-38. The fundamental principles of the irregular OPFOR guide organizational and individual actions.

Regardless of whether the organization is military-like in appearance and operations, or includes elements

that are loosely affiliated with the irregular OPFOR in a political, social, or economic sector of a society,

these principles provide a common framework of how the irregular OPFOR plans and conducts actions.

Since the irregular OPFOR often resembles military forces in many ways, some of these principles are very

similar to fundamental military principles in the regular OPFOR. In some cases, however, the principles are

tailored in consideration of irregular OPFOR capabilities or limitations. Depending on the type of irregular

OPFOR organization and its goals and motivations, the irregular OPFOR adapts the following principles to

address particular situations. Figure 1-1 on page 1-8 shows how each of the principles interrelate and

contribute toward achieving an irregular OPFOR objective. That objective typically relates to a particular

grievance on the part of the irregular OPFOR or of a relevant population it seeks to influence.

INITIATIVE

1-39. Initiative is the ability of the irregular OPFOR to retain a freedom of action in its plans and

operations. Initiative enables the irregular OPFOR to force an enemy to react to its actions. Success often

goes to the side that conducts itself more actively and resolutely. Irregular OPFOR leaders encourage

initiative to make and implement bold decisions in order to establish or change the terms of the irregular

conflict in favor of the irregular OPFOR. Subordinates are expected to take advantage of new

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developments immediately. They seek to overcome a position of relative inferiority while operating within

a senior OPFOR leader’s intentions. Initiative exploits an enemy’s restrictive rules of engagement or

political restrictions.

Objective

Ends

in order

to achieve

Results

Perseverance

with resolute

Adaptability

Concentration

Mobility

Means

Actions

Surprise

Deception

Protection

that applies

Initiative

focuses

leader

Ways

Concept

Grievance

Figure 1-1. Relation of irregular OPFOR principles to achieving the objective

DECEPTION

1-40. Deception is the ability to deliberately convey a false and/or distorted picture of the situation to an

enemy leader that is targeted for deception. Deceptive information causes an enemy leader to believe he has

accurate situational awareness and understanding. Irregular OPFOR leaders plan and direct deception that

helps them accomplish their objective, but does not hamper other concurrent OPFOR actions. Feints and

demonstrations are examples of deception. Other elements of INFOWAR attempt to optimize the effects of

deception in tactics and techniques. Various irregular OPFOR capabilities and actions can lead to a

compelling yet inaccurate analysis by the enemy leader. These means of deception, not limited by domestic

or international law and conventions, can include the following:

Physical activity or lack of activity.

Technical resources and employment techniques indicative of a particular tactic.

Administrative indicators such as visual, oral, or documentary evidence in order to manipulate and

distort reality.

SURPRISE

1-41. Surprise is the ability of the irregular OPFOR to take advantage of an enemy vulnerability in a

manner for which an enemy is unprepared or unable to effectively counter. Irregular OPFOR action is

normally swift and fleeting and may employ unexpected means. The irregular OPFOR attempts to shape a

setting so that an enemy is not expecting the action or create conditions that an enemy is not prepared to

confront. The irregular OPFOR achieves surprise through deception activities in conjunction with

protection and security measures and/or other elements of INFOWAR. Surprise can be achieved by means

such as the following:

Changing tactics, techniques, or the intensity of actions against an enemy.

Employing commercial or industrial materiel as a weapon in unexpected ways.

Presenting public indications of compromise or cessation of armed conflict. For example, the

irregular OPFOR may agree to a truce and series of negotiations with an enemy, but use the time

to prepare and stage for nearly simultaneous surprise attacks on military and civil government

facilities.

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PROTECTION

1-42. Protection is the ability to preserve irregular OPFOR effectiveness of its organizational assets and

capabilities. These assets and capabilities include OPFOR personnel, equipment, weapon systems,

operations, information, facilities, and/or infrastructure. Protection involves a continuous, integrated series

and/or group of measures that sustain the ability for the irregular OPFOR to plan, prepare, and conduct

successful actions. Protection and security measures are a key element in INFOWAR (see appendix A).

The irregular OPFOR normally operates with a minimal or unidentifiable signature within a relevant

population in order to avoid being a lucrative target. Protection complements the use of a safe haven, when

required, to refit or reconstitute irregular OPFOR combat power. An example of protection is an irregular

OPFOR guerrilla unit exfiltrating from a raid in hostile territory to a secure location in a neighboring state.

This unofficial support by a state near the area of OPFOR actions provides security and protection to the

guerrilla unit while it recruits and trains replacements due to casualties incurred in the raid.

MOBILITY

1-43. Mobility is the ability to sustain irregular OPFOR freedom of movement within areas controlled or

occupied by the enemy. The irregular OPFOR seeks to create an advantage over the enemy regarding

knowledge and use of geographic terrain and populations in order to position, reposition, and/or prepare for

and conduct effective actions. A high degree of mobility enables the irregular OPFOR to use available

combat power with maximum effect at a decisive time and place. For example, the irregular OPFOR can

blend into a population with similar clothing and daily habits in order to maintain anonymity while

transiting an area or region. This type of mobility can allow the timely supply of weapons and materiel,

fiscal resources, and/or manpower for designated actions in an area or region.

ADAPTABILITY

1-44. Adaptability is the ability of the irregular OPFOR to use initiative and creative thinking in order to

set particular conditions and take advantage of the resulting opportunities. Irregular OPFOR leaders

recognize emergent developments that change existing conditions, and apply initiative that causes the

enemy to react at a disadvantage to the actions of the irregular OPFOR. Simple tactics and techniques can

be adapted for use against an enemy’s sophisticated technology and weapon systems. For example, a

system of couriers can negate the intrusive ability of electronic monitoring devices to detect and locate the

financial transaction networks of a local insurgent organization that were formerly conducted with cellular

telephones. Conversely, the irregular OPFOR can adapt to sophisticated techniques such as encrypting and

hiding information within harmless appearing communiqués such as electronic files, images, and

documents transiting the Internet.

CONCENTRATION

1-45. Concentration is the ability of the irregular OPFOR to mass the capabilities of combat power in time

and space, in order to achieve a desired effect. Concentration of effort allows the irregular OPFOR to create

and dominate a condition for a specific amount of time. When the irregular OPFOR concentrates rapidly or

gradually from dispersed locations to conduct a particular action, a normal subsequent action is to quickly

disperse in order to avoid an effective enemy response against the massed OPFOR. An example of

concentration is the coordination to quickly mass irregular OPFOR insurgent cells, and use a swarming

technique in a raid to overwhelm a designated target at an isolated combat outpost. Once insurgents have

seized the objective and secured or destroyed designated weapons, equipment, and documents, the cells

quickly disperse into the countryside or urban areas in order to avoid capture or death.

PERSEVERANCE

1-46. Perseverance demonstrates the will of the irregular OPFOR to persist in long-term commitment to

fight an enemy until it accomplishes its goals and objective. Protracted and persistent operations are the

norm of the irregular OPFOR. Actions may be subtle and can be part of a gradual series of actions toward

achieving a task. Dramatic individual actions are often used to establish or sustain notoriety for the

irregular OPFOR, but rarely achieve a decisive effect. Periodic setbacks in irregular OPFOR missions are

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anticipated and rationalized with effective INFOWAR announcements to sustain a moral dominance of the

irregular OPFOR over an enemy. INFOWAR techniques can also convince a relevant population to sustain

support of the irregular OPFOR even though its actions may require an extended period of time before the

population eventually benefits. The irregular OPFOR may attempt to achieve its objectives within a

specified timetable and announced milestones; however, the objectives may take decades or generations to

achieve.

MOTIVATIONS

1-47. Insurgents and guerrillas are normally motivated by social, religious, or political issues or some

combination of those. In most cases, criminals—whether they are part of the irregular OPFOR or not—

have other motivations. Although individual actors who conduct criminal activity may not be part of the

irregular OPFOR, the individual’s personal motivation and/or ideology may be the deciding perspective of

why he or she acts.

Note. The local populace may provide active or passive support out of a different motivation

than the insurgents or guerrillas they support. For example, the motivation of the populace might

be financial (payment or beneficial effects on business profits) or security provided them. The

populace might provide support, based on ethnic or religious issues, to an insurgent or guerrilla

organization even if they do not share that organization’s political agenda.

INSURGENTS OR GUERRILLAS

1-48. Certain types of motivation are common to insurgents and guerrillas, the two most likely components

of the irregular OPFOR. However, insurgents and guerrillas that agree to collaborate against a common

enemy may or may not share the same motivations or ideology.

Note. If multiple insurgent and/or guerrilla organizations exist in a particular OE, they may share

some motivations but differ in others. In order to form an affiliated relationship, the

organizations just need to have one or more motivations that coincide with or complement each

other. An example of a coinciding motivation could be that both organizations resent the

presence of an extraregional force in their country. An example of a complementary relationship

would be if one organization has financial resources, while the other needs financial support

1-49. The motivation that incites violent as well as nonviolent actions by the irregular OPFOR is often

framed in the context of ideology. The irregular OPFOR acts in a particular way based on underlying

grievances, which are often linked to the ideals of an ideology. These unresolved grievances—perceived or

factual—create conditions where armed and unarmed individuals believe they must act to obtain what they

believe is a just solution. The rationale and the resulting actions may be perceived in a positive and

negative light by a relevant population. The motivation and rationale typically are one or more of

the following:

Personal or group social identity.

Devotion to a particular religious belief.

Commitment to a form of political governance.

Combinations among these factors can further complicate how to describe the motivation and ideology of a

particular person or group. Other motivations exist and may become a primary prompt for action, though

only loosely associated with a social, religious, or political agenda. Aspects of ethnicity, geography, and

history affect personal and group relationships as witnessed in social status and networks, religion, and

politics. Combinations can occur among these factors to further complicate how to describe the motivation

of a particular person or group.

Social Identity

1-50. Social identity, as an individual and/or as a member of a social group, is often a fundamental aspect

of why people may be aligned with or alienated from the irregular OPFOR. They may be attracted by an

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ability to satisfy a perceived critical want or need in their lifestyle. Allegiance to a clan, tribe, or familial

grouping is an example of social identity and accountability. These forms of social allegiance can indicate

why change is desired or required in a social order. The same rationales can support why a set of ideals or

practices must be sustained or expanded within a relevant population. Several common categories of social

identity that can overlap with religious or political agendas are as follows:

Ethnocentric groups who understand race or ethnicity as the defining characteristic of a society

and basis of cohesion.

Nationalistic groups who promote cultural-national consciousness and perhaps establishment of

a separate nation-state.

Revolutionary groups who are dedicated to the overthrow of a governing authority and

establishment of a new social order.

Separatist groups who demand independence from an existing governance that appears socially,

theologically, or politically unjust to a relevant population.

1-51. A variation on these identity categories is an independent actor who conceives, plans, and conducts

violent or nonviolent actions without any direction from another person or irregular force. This type of

individual may be sympathetic to the aims of a particular group, but have no contact with the group or

affiliated members of the group.

Religion

1-52. Religion can be a compelling motivation. As a personal belief, religion can be interpreted as divine

edict and infallible. Practice of a faith system is a personal interpretation and decision. However,

fundamentalist clerics and/or religious mentors in some instances can interpret passages of religious

doctrine in a particular way that supports the irregular OPFOR agenda. Some interpretations may be a

purposeful misrepresentation never intended by an original religious author. Other clerics or radical splinter

groups may honestly believe in a religious duty to pursue a fundamentalist approach to worship and

lifestyle. In either case, religion can be used as a catalyst to instigate rivalry between and among ethnic

and/or religious denominational groups. Confrontations can be provoked by faith system practices that are

completely unacceptable to another faith group and/or can create an irreconcilable theological wedge

between cultural-faith groups in a relevant population.

1-53. The irregular OPFOR may attempt to link religion with declarations that governing political

authorities who do not accept a particular understanding of a faith doctrine are a wicked secular presence

that must be destroyed and replaced with a fundamentalist theocracy form of governance. Cults, although

not a religion by normal definition, can adopt similar forms of violence, mass murder, and mayhem as part

of a self-proclaimed apocalyptic vision and purpose.

Politics

1-54. The irregular OPFOR, especially the insurgent part, can have a political agenda. Prevalent political

systems that can be promoted by the irregular OPFOR include forms of governance such as—

Single-party totalitarian state.

Nationalist-fascist authority.

Leadership appointed or democratically elected by popular vote.

Social self-management and equality aimed at reducing or eliminating political and economic

hierarchies.

Social-political process that evolves toward a classless-stateless society with common ownership

on means of production, communal access to commodities for livelihood, and general social

programs for the benefit of community and human wellness.

Pseudo-social and political authority that protects a geographic sanctuary and/or safe haven for

conduct of an illicit commercial enterprise.

1-55. The irregular OPFOR can use motivations of a political ideology to attract the attention of a relevant

population in order to develop influence with a particular community. This can lead to support and/or

collaboration or actually joining the irregular OPFOR. Since politics are integral to the overarching

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conditions that affect daily life, commerce, vocation, freedoms, and family, the irregular OPFOR can use

political influence—along with social and/or religious appeal—to enhance its legitimacy. Visible actions,

often localized in perspective, focus on demonstrating power and authority.

CRIMINALS

1-56. Although actors who conduct criminal activities may not be insurgents or guerrillas, personal

motivation and/or ideology may be a deciding factor in their decision to join the irregular OPFOR

voluntarily or be coerced to participate. Criminals who become part of the irregular OPFOR may or may

not share some of the same motivations as other parts of the OPFOR. Regardless of their social identity and

religious or political preferences, criminals are motivated primarily by money. (See chapter 4 for more

detail on the motivations of criminals and criminal organizations.)

SUPPORT

1-57. Support for irregular OPFOR activities includes capabilities provided by individuals and

organizations internal and external to the geographic area. Multiple forms of support can be voluntary

and/or coerced from individuals, selected segments of a population, or activities and organizations with

particular capabilities. Affiliation with and/or among organizations indicates a common goal. However,

affiliation is not a formal association and subordination among participants. Support relationships are

often temporary and remain in effect only as long as the benefits of cooperation are mutual to the

involved organizations.

INTERNAL

1-58. Internal support includes the ideological and practical means to improve and/or sustain irregular

OPFOR operations. Insurgents or guerrillas seek to ally and affiliate with activities and people that range

from specific commodities and/or functional skills to networks of political, commercial, religious, and/or

social groups with required capabilities. Internal support indicates the commitment of leaders, active

supporters, and passive supporters to further the progress of the irregular OPFOR. As conditions change in

geographic, political, cultural, cyberspace, and/or ideological environments, the coordination of internal

support adjusts to accommodate emergent opportunities.

EXTERNAL

1-59. External support is not always necessary for the irregular OPFOR to succeed. However, some form

of external support is usually critical to sustain long-term operations. Activities and organizations often

provide external support for ideological reasons, but other motivations can include political power,

commercial enterprise, financial wealth, and/or some common grievance affecting a relevant population.

The motivations that incite the irregular OPFOR affect how and why support is obtained. Whether support

is voluntary or coerced, the rationale of why support is necessary reflects how discrete aspects of assistance

improve a cumulative capability.

1-60. Prominent categories of support are moral, money, and materiel. The morality of supporting the

irregular OPFOR links an ideology to an outcome of desired conditions by a relevant population. Money

enables the irregular OPFOR to acquire capabilities required in order to enhance its influence not only in a

paramilitary sense, but also across a full spectrum of operational variables in an OE. Materiel support

indicates the provision of equipment, supplies, and operating systems used by the irregular OPFOR and/or

its supporters. Materiel requires training, maintenance, and recurring systems improvement. These

capabilities suggest the need for trainers, advisors, and/or liaison personnel to support the irregular OPFOR.

To accomplish these actions, a safe haven or sanctuary allows a freedom of action in planning, preparing,

and staging for overt and covert operations. Three main types of external support are diaspora support, state

support, and non-state support.

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Diaspora

1-61. A diaspora is a relevant population that has voluntarily moved or migrated, and/or been forcefully

displaced from an established or ancestral homeland. However, they still have racial, national, tribal,

religious, linguistic, and/or cultural affinities with inhabitants of that homeland. Motives for support from a

diaspora can include ethnocentric, separatist, and/or nationalistic. A fundamental objective is to correct

proven or perceived injustices to a group of people in a larger community and relevant population. This

type of support is often linked to a common social, religious, and/or political identity.

1-62. Voluntary support from a diaspora is a preferred method for assistance to the irregular OPFOR.

However, compelling the support from segments of a diaspora may be required at times to ensure the

amount of general or specialized support required to sustain operations. Compelling support from a

diaspora is a calculated risk that is closely monitored by irregular OPFOR senior leaders in order to not

alienate a significant portion of the relevant population.

1-63. Beyond aspects such as financial and materiel contributions, the expansion of support through

INFOWAR with and for a diaspora can sway public opinion and obtain continuing extraregional and

international support for the struggle of the irregular OPFOR. In the spotlight of globalized media, a

diaspora usually accents the moral correctness of resolving proven or perceived injustices to a group of

people in a relevant population of the particular geographic region or state.

External State

1-64. Support from an external state for the irregular OPFOR can be covert and/or overt. A state acts

primarily based on its political objectives. Political, economic, social, fiscal, moral, and/or logistics support

can be provided while disavowing any direct connection to the irregular OPFOR. For example, a state may

condemn an adversary state for repressing a relevant population while covertly providing arms,

ammunition, sanctuary, training bases, and/or advise and other forms of assistance.

1-65. A state might employ SPF and/or covert agents of the state to conduct direct actions in support of the

irregular OPFOR. The state officially denies responsibility or state sponsorship for such activities, but can

engage in unofficial INFOWAR releases that indicate support for specified actions within the insurgency.

In other situations, a state may openly declare a legal or moral right to intervene in the affairs of another

state and support designated insurgent organizations and their affiliates. States may form a coalition to

condemn the acts of a governing authority and announce support for irregular OPFOR actions.

1-66. A state can act overtly by providing supplies, training, and other forms of support to the irregular

OPFOR. This support can be coordinated and provided without any specified control over an insurgent or

guerrilla organization by the state. Other options can exist where stipulations are mutually agreed upon

between representatives of the state and irregular OPFOR leaders in exchange for materiel and/or a safe

haven or protected staging area for operations. Other means of support can include—

Access to training facilities and expertise not otherwise readily available to the irregular

OPFOR.

Extension of diplomatic protections and services such as immunity from extradition.

Use of embassies and other protected grounds.

Use of diplomatic pouches to transport weapons or explosives.

False documentation for personal identification and movements throughout geographic regions

and states.

1-67. States in a coalition or as members of an international organization may decide to intervene directly

in an insurgency with diplomatic envoys, observation teams, and/or military forces. A coalition may form

to condemn the acts of a governing authority and announce support for irregular OPFOR actions. The

irregular OPFOR insurgent organization leaders and coalition authorities can mutually agree to—

Seek conditions for justice and respect arising from international treaties and other sources of

international law.

Promote social progress, economic advancement of indigenous people.

Maintain international stability and security.

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Non-State

1-68. Forms of non-state support can range from non-state transnational networks with global reach

capability to individuals with a special or unique capability. These forms of support can be overt and/or

covert. Networks can be regional or international in their aims, and/or individuals committed to a single-

issue agenda. Whether support involves a type of network, hierarchical organization, or loosely coordinated

individuals, non-state support to an insurgency or independent guerrilla operations often includes

sophisticated criminal activities in foreign and/or indigenous environments.

1-69. Insurgencies may turn to transnational criminal organizations for funding. Other globalized

capabilities can provide advanced knowledge and technology exchanges, mobile international

transportation, and near-instantaneous cyber communication. Non-state support exchanges in capabilities

can occur directly and indirectly.

1-70. Transnational economic entities such as international business corporations may provide support to

irregular OPFOR operations in order to further their corporate business interests. Other supervisory or

workforce individuals in non-profit or private organizations may assist the irregular OPFOR based on

personal beliefs and/or as the result of coercion or extortion. Individual financiers may provide support in

order to advance personal agendas or cultural, ethnic, political, and/or religious causes.

1-71. External support from other parts of the irregular OPFOR and/or in conjunction with regular military

forces can include an exchange of personnel and equipment, as well as intelligence, training, recruitment,

logistics, and finances. In addition to individual and contracted mercenaries, a significant body of other

independent or loosely collaborative individuals may be available for hire to an irregular OPFOR

organization. These personnel may have served previously in guerrilla units or regular military units.

BLURRING OF CATEGORIES

1-72. Although three basic types of forces can be part of the irregular OPFOR, the distinctions among

insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals are sometimes blurred. That is because they may have more in

common than they have that is different. From the viewpoint of the existing government authority, for

instance, the activities of all three types are illegal, that is, criminal. Not just criminals but also insurgents

and guerrillas can engage in criminal activities. Some insurgent organizations can include guerrilla units

(developed from within or affiliated) and some guerrilla units may be part of an insurgency. In advanced

phases of an insurgency, guerrilla units may begin to look and act more like regular military units.

1-73. There are three general tactics available to the irregular OPFOR—

Military-like functional tactics.

Criminal activity.

Terrorism.

1-74. At any given time, the irregular OPFOR could use any of these means. The differences among these

three can become blurred, especially within an urban environment or where the governing authority exerts

strong control.

INSURGENTS AND GUERRILLAS

1-75. As an insurgent organization grows, its cellular structure or parts thereof may develop into a more

hierarchical military-like structure. Within an insurgent organization, direct action cells may combine to

form guerrilla squads and platoons. In some cases, a platoon or company may retain some direct action

cells (possibly for terror tactics). Other specialized cells of an insurgent organization can evolve into

parts of—

Supporting units of a guerrilla company, battalion, or brigade.

Staff elements of a guerrilla battalion or brigade.

1-76. Guerrillas may engage in more military-like operations after an insurgency develops extensive

popular and logistics support. When they feel the conditions are set, insurgents may generate a

conventional military force that can directly confront regular forces of the existing governing authority.

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INSURGENTS AND CRIMINALS

1-77. There is often a nexus between insurgency and crime. Sustainment requirements, especially funding,

often drive insurgents into relationships with organized crime or into criminal activity themselves.

Insurgents may turn to local, regional, or transnational criminal elements for funding. Cooperating with

criminals may not be ideologically consistent with the movement’s core beliefs, although that does not

necessarily prevent such cooperation.

1-78. An insurgent organization itself may engage in criminal activities as a source of funding. Income is

essential not only for insurgents to purchase weapons but also to pay recruits and bribe corrupt officials.

Reaping windfall profits and avoiding the costs and difficulties involved in securing external support makes

illegal activity attractive to insurgents. Kidnapping, extortion, robbery, and trafficking (drug, human, black

market goods, and so on)—four favorite insurgent activities—are very lucrative, although they can also

alienate the population.

1-79. Insurgents may use coercive force to gain power over the population. Examples of organizations

providing such force are insurgent direct action cells, guerrilla units, gangs, and organized crime elements.

Such groups may use their coercive means for a variety of purposes unrelated to the insurgency. Protecting

their community members, carrying out vendettas, and engaging in criminal activities are examples.

Insurgent organizations may also attract followers through criminal activities that provide income.

1-80. Insurgencies attract criminals and mercenaries. Fighters who joined for money will probably become

bandits once the fighting ends and may engage in criminal activity during the fighting. This category

includes opportunists who exploit the absence of governing authority security and law enforcement to

engage in economically lucrative criminal activity, such as kidnapping, smuggling, or theft.

1-81. Some insurgencies can compartmentalize criminal activity, keeping it ancillary to the main effort and

preventing it from affecting the organization and its unity. However, some insurgencies can become

focused on criminal activity that once only served as a funding mechanism. Some insurgent cell leaders

may become crime bosses. The insurgency as a whole may degenerate into criminality, particularly if the

primary movement disintegrates and the remaining elements are cast adrift. Such disintegration replaces an

ideologically inspired body of individuals with a more diverse body, normally of very uneven character.

1-82. Even when criminal networks are not a part of an insurgency, their activities—for example, banditry,

hijackings, kidnappings, and smuggling—can further undermine the governing authority. Insurgent

organizations often link themselves to criminal networks to obtain funding and logistics support. In some

cases, insurgent networks and criminal networks become indistinguishable. Most insurgent groups are more

similar to organized crime in their organizational structure and relations with the populace than they are to

military units.

REGULAR AND IRREGULAR OPFOR

1-83. There can also be some blurring between the irregular OPFOR and regular OPFOR military units.

Both types of forces can use many of the same functional tactics (such as assault, ambush, and raid).

1-84. The regular OPFOR, especially SPF, may use terror tactics similar to those of the irregular OPFOR.

Since SPF may or may not be in uniform, they may be hard to distinguish from irregular OPFOR insurgents

or guerrillas, for which they often serve as trainers or advisors and alongside which they may fight.

COMPARISON AND CONTRAST

1-85. Within the irregular OPFOR, guerrilla units, insurgent organizations, and criminal organizations have

various capabilities and limitations. Table 1-1 on pages 1-16 through 1-18 compares and contrasts the basic

characteristics of the three types of forces in order to highlight their similarities and their differences.

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Table 1-1. Comparison and contrast of insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals

Characteristic

Insurgent Organization

Guerrilla Unit

Criminal Organization

Leadership

Network is typical, but can

Hierarchical with military-like

Hierarchical structure or

include hierarchical sub-

chain of command and control

network dependent on origin

organizations; leaders may be

or support systems; leaders

of organization; even in small

located distant from the

predominantly indigenous;

criminal organizations,

geographic area of conflict;

political advisors may

leaders may be located

political or ideological mentors

accompany guerrilla units in

distant from the geographic

or council advisors and/or

actions. Leader titles are

area of conflict; political or

counsel senior leaders. Title

military in nature such as

ideological mentors or council

for personnel in command is

battalion and/or company

advise and/or counsel senior

usually “leader.” Some

commander, platoon leader,

leaders. Leader titles can be

leaders may use a religious,

section leader, team leader,

traditional or historical terms,

historical, or honorific title.

hunter-killer group leader.

or simple authority terms.

Motivation

Insurgency movement with a

Social identity, religion, or

Intention to profit fiscally

political and/or ideological

politics. Can be military

through control of a process,

agenda. Can also be social

component to an insurgency;

commodity, and/or area;

identity or religion.

or can be independent of an

social identity as a power

insurgency with a specified

broker in a designated

agenda.

geographic, economic, or

social environment.

Organization

Cellular-network model; can

Military unit model with

Hierarchical structure or

be hierarchical for designated

echelons of command and

network dependent on origin

capabilities or functions; can

control; can include land, sea,

of organization; general

include paramilitary capability

and air capabilities; can be

categories of gangs, large-

for a primarily political-

affiliated with other irregular

scale syndicates, and

oriented organization; can be

OPFOR and/or regular

transnational organizations;

affiliated with other irregular

military forces; more likely

organizations can be based

OPFOR and/or regular

that other irregular OPFOR

on family, ethnic, commodity,

military forces.

components to be closely

or specialized purpose. Can

integrated with regular military

infiltrate or become affiliated

forces.

with insurgent, guerrilla, or

regular military forces.

Objectives

Concessions from and/or

Military mission success

Profit from activities and

defeat of a political opponent;

within a campaign in support

coercion; expand

ultimately, overthrow an

of unit goals and desired end

organizational influence within

enemy governing authority

state; can be an independent

an area, regional, or

and replace governance with

and specified guerrilla unit

transnational scope; preserve

insurgent movement

agenda; can be the military

control of specified

leadership; seek legitimacy as

capability in insurgent

commodities, geographic

movement.

organization.

areas, and/or services; avoid

contact with governing

authority.

Internal

Active and passive support in

Active and passive support by

Active and passive support in

Support

local and larger area

segments of a local area

local and larger area

population; can have

population for military-type

population; can use coercion

legitimate social-economic-

capabilities; can expand

to influence legitimate social-

political activities to mobilize

support to regional area

economic-political activities or

civil support.

population.

individual support.

External

Regional safe havens;

Regional safe havens; can

Cooperative affiliations

Support

Diaspora systems to promote

receive cooperation or

among gangs, large-scale

insurgent movement in

assistance from regular

syndicates, and/or

regional and/or international

military, SPF, or state

transnational organizations

communities; can receive

activities opposing the

can provide designated

cooperation or assistance

governing authority in the

support and services; co-

from regular forces, SPF, or

area of guerrilla operations.

opted governing authority

state activities opposing the

offices may also assist.

governing authority.

Activity

Local, regional, provincial,

Military-like functional tactics

Local, regional, and/or

Patterns

and/or district activities with

as norm; can expand tactical

transnational activities;

intention of obtaining support

actions into a military

random or systematic activity

of relevant population; can be

campaign focused in a

to sustain influence;

social, economic, diplomatic,

geographic area.

specialized expertise can be

political, and military activities.

part of functional business

model of larger commercial

enterprises.

1-16

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Irregular OPFOR Fundamentals

Table 1-1. Comparison and contrast of insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals (continued)

Characteristic

Insurgent Organization

Guerrilla Unit

Criminal Organization

Composition

Higher insurgent organization

Brigade to squad-team

Transnational organization,

and local insurgent

guerrilla units; can be tailored

large-scale syndicates, and/or

organization; functional

for specialized missions; can

gangs; can be groups

structure with cellular base;

be supported by SPF advisors

affiliated in temporary or long-

can receive assistance or

and/or regular forces advisors

term specific business

support from SPF and/or

or liaison.

arrangements.

regular military forces.

Personnel

Indigenous and/or

Predominantly indigenous

transnational core; ideological

core; can include members

core, but can include

mentor support network; rank

outside of indigenous

members outside of

and file members can be in a

population; rank and file

indigenous population as

period of active service in the

members typically remain in

organization expands in

insurgent organization, or be

the same military unit with a

business connections; status

authorized inactive status and

long-term commitment of

may indicate familial or social

return to familial-social

duty.

lineage within organization;

responsibilities with their local

rank and file members may

population.

be specialized operators.

Recruitment

Local, regional, or

Local or regional population

Familial or social affiliations

extraregional population

recruiting base; informal

may be membership

recruiting; often relates to an

induction process with

requirement; rank and file

ideological or faith system

expectation of long-term or

members may be contracted

commitment to serve; can be

open-ended term of service;

for skill sets; initiation rites

contract support; can use

can use conscription from

and tests may precede

conscription for limited

local population; require

acceptance; code of conduct

lengths of time or seasonal

compliance with strict

may demand absolute

standards and discipline.

allegiance to the organization.

Weapons and

Tier 1-4 capabilities (see

Other Equipment

Worldwide Equipment Guide)

dependent on support from

dependent on access to local

dependent on ability to

insurgent region and

resources, or a higher and/or

purchase or procure weapons

diaspora; can receive

local insurgent organization if

and/or materiel.

clandestine support from

part of an insurgency; if

states, private organizations,

independent, obtains

and/or criminal activities that

weapons from raids,

oppose the governing

ambushes, and black market

authority in conflict with the

purchases; can include

insurgent organization.

sophisticated systems and

heavy weapon capabilities

similar to regular military

forces.

Uniforms

Local attire of populace as

Varied military-like clothing or

Attire of local populace as

norm; can wear military-like

pieces of clothing, load-

norm; can use civilian or law

pieces of clothing and load-

bearing equipment, and

enforcement or paramilitary

bearing equipment for

insignia as norm; can wear

pieces of clothing and

designated direct actions.

local attire of populace to

equipment in order to

facilitate mission.

deceive.

Disposition

Within political boundary of

Within enemy-held, hostile, or

Within geographic area under

governing authority as norm;

denied territory; can be safe

organization control; can be

can be safe haven in or near

haven in or near geographic

safe haven in or near area

contested territory; size and

area of contested territory;

involved in business

location of cells based on

unit size, location, and

transactions; size and location

local conditions.

command integrity based on

of organizational groupings

Rural and/or urban areas on

local conditions.

based on local conditions.

mission basis; often occupy

Rural and/or urban areas on

Rural and/or urban on mission

safe havens in populace, can

mission basis; often occupy

basis; often use protected

locate as dispersed cells,

safe haven and complex

locations in populace, can

and/or in CBP; can use social,

battle position (CBP) away

locate as dispersed groups;

economic, or political

from populace; can locate

co-opted social, economic, or

organizations as public and

units in proximity to other

political organizations can

visible presence in populace.

guerrilla units for mutual

prevent interference by law

support.

enforcement or internal

security organizations.

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

1-17

Chapter 1

Table 1-1. Comparison and contrast of insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals (continued)

Characteristic

Insurgent Organization

Guerrilla Unit

Criminal Organization

Training

Functional skills in local or

Basic and advanced military

Basic and advanced skills

regional safe havens, or

skills instructed in safe haven

learned in practice; special

contract support for niche

or CBP in or near geographic

skills and support can be

expertise; skills and services

area of conflict. If part of

contracted; training can

can include administrative,

insurgency, coordinates for

include administrative,

intelligence, direct actions,

special skills and support; can

intelligence, internal security,

supply, transportation,

be augmented by SPF and/or

operational franchise

communications, and/or

regular military advisors.

management, supply and

special skill sets; can be

services, transportation,

augmented by SPF and/or

communications, and/or

regular military advisors.

special skill sets.

Internal Security

Counterintelligence and

Counterintelligence elements

Internal security maintained

internal security cells monitor

monitor guerrilla loyalty.

through codes of conduct and

insurgent loyalty.

monitoring activities and

outside contacts; specialized

groups monitor member

loyalty.

Logistics

Self-sustaining with populace

Self-sustaining with supply,

support; support from regional

support; can receive mission-

services, and materiel

safe havens and diaspora;

based support from regular

purchased, stolen, or coerced

can receive regular military

military forces and SPF; can

from a local populace, or

and SPF materiel support;

barter and/or commandeer

provided by a regional or

can commandeer materiel

materiel from local area; can

transnational network; can be

from local area.

capture supplies and materiel

supported from regional safe

from enemy forces.

havens.

Communications

Local, regional, and/or global;

Local and regional; tactical

Local, regional, and/or global;

easy access to media; access

communications norm; secure

easy access to media; access

to Internet and INFOWAR

and encryption capable;

to Internet and INFOWAR

technologies; secure and

access to Internet and

technologies; secure and

encryption capable; common

INFOWAR technologies;

encryption capable; common

use of messenger or courier.

common use of messenger or

use of messenger or courier.

courier.

Finances

Periodic reward in goods and

Semiformal or formal pay

Payment to designated

services; may include

system in local script and/or

members based on

contract-for-hire payment

barter materiel; can be

performance and profit;

systems; can be obligation

conscription with no pay.

payments may be cash,

with no pay.

services, and or in-kind

barter; investments and

payments are often laundered

to mask origin.

Terrorism

Use or restriction of terrorism

can be due to insurgent

based on guerrilla

can be due to senior or

proclamation; psychological

commander directive;

intermediate leader decision;

weapon; actions are

psychological weapon;

field operators may use

integrated as part of

actions are integrated as part

terrorism within the domain

INFOWAR campaign;

of INFOWAR campaign; can

they control; psychological

purpose ultimately supports a

be deliberate or random for

weapon; actions can be

political objective can be

intended effects.

focused or random for effects.

1-18

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Chapter 2

Insurgents

This chapter presents an overview of insurgent organizations and actions as part of

the irregular OPFOR for U.S. Army training. The insurgent irregular OPFOR is

representative of threats in a resistence movement and/or insurgency that can exist in

various operational environments (OEs). Insurgents can be armed or unarmed. In

addition to functional tactics (see chapter 7), insurgents can use acts of terrorism (see

chapter 6) to intimidate or influence a governing authority or a relevant population.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

2-1. Insurgents are armed and/or unarmed individuals or groups who promote an agenda of subversion and

violence that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. They can transition between

subversion and violence dependent on specific conditions. Both types of action intend to disrupt a

governing authority. They gradually undermine the confidence of a relevant population in a governing

authority’s ability to provide and justly administer civil law, order, and stability. Insurgents can achieve

their aims without violence, but this is not the norm.

RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTORS

2-2. During an insurgency, the distinctions among insurgents, guerrillas, criminals, and other actors in an

OE are often unclear. Insurgents may use deception to add to this confusion and sometimes deny

responsibility for direct actions or acts of terrorism. Insurgent organizations can act separately from other

groups, organizations, and/or activities in conflict with an enemy or in conjunction with them to achieve

common goals.

2-3. Insurgents may conduct operations in combination with regular military forces of a state in conflict

with the governing authority that insurgents oppose. Advisors, liaison teams, and military forces—

especially from special-purpose forces (SPF)—can provide overt and covert support for insurgent actions.

2-4. When present in the irregular OPFOR, guerrillas are normally incorporated into and subordinate to a

higher insurgent organization. However, guerrilla forces can also be aligned with local insurgent

organizations. In some cases, lower-level guerrilla units may be subordinate to a local insurgent

organization. Guerrilla forces can also exist as an independent capability, completely independent of higher

and local insurgent organizations. Evolving conditions may cause affiliations or task organizations that are

particular to that context. The relationships between insurgents and guerrillas operating in an area may be

temporary and remain in effect only as long as the both organizations mutually benefit. Guerrillas are

described in detail in chapter 3.

2-5. Insurgents may also act in conjunction with criminal elements. Criminals may exploit the instability

caused by insurgency to further their own profit. Insurgents may consort with criminals or resort to criminal

activities themselves, in order to finance and sustain their operations.

Note. The Hybrid Threat (HT) used in training of U.S. Army forces can include all these types of

actors and capabilities. The HT can be any combination of two or more of the following

components: regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements. Possible HT

combinations include insurgents and other parts of the irregular OPFOR operating openly with

regular military forces, being sponsored directly or indirectly by another state’s governmental

ministries and/or departments, or supported by non-state organizations. (See TC 7-100 for

detailed discussion of the HT.)

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

2-1

Chapter 2

2-6. Insurgent organizations can form temporary affiliations with other commercial, social, or political

entities. They can also solicit or coerce the active and/or passive support of civilians in and outside of the

area of conflict. Such supporters can include—

Those merely sympathetic to the goals of the insurgents.

Those providing monetary support.

Those actively supporting and engaging in direct actions alongside the insurgents and/or

guerrillas.

Insurgents may have the overt and/or covert support of a government-in-exile when both organizations

view a governing authority as a common enemy.

SCOPE

2-7. Insurgent organizations normally conduct irregular conflict within or near the sovereign territory of a

state in order to overthrow or force change in that state’s governing authority. Some insurgent activities—

such as influencing public opinion and acquiring resources—can occur outside of the geographic area that

is the focus of the insurgency.

2-8. An insurgent organization may begin or remain at the local level. A local insurgent organization may

exist at small city, town, village, parish, community, or neighborhood level. It may expand and/or combine

with other local organizations. Cities with a large population or covering a large area may be considered

regions and may include several low-level insurgent organizations. A higher insurgent organization may

exist at regional, provincial, district, national, or transnational level. Higher insurgent organizations usually

contain a mix of local insurgent and guerrilla organizations. The higher insurgent organization can apply

both types of forces with a wider scope of impact. The OE and the specific goals determine the size and

composition of each insurgent organization and the scope of its activities.

(See sections on Higher

Insurgent Organizations and Lower Insurgent Organizations, below, for more detail.)

LINES OF EFFORT

2-9. An insurgency is fundamentally a political movement. The expectation of a long-term conflict requires

plans for and use of physical and psychological force. Civic actions develop, expand, and marshal the

support of a relevant population for the insurgency’s agenda. A comprehensive plan of action typically

incorporates three main lines of effort:

Political influence.

Direct action violence and terrorism.

Civic interaction and support.

Political Influence

2-10. The political element provides the overarching command and control

(C2) of the insurgent

organization. The political leadership plans and directs the strategy and actions to divide or weaken the

governing authority they oppose. Information warfare (INFOWAR) activities foster dissatisfaction of the

relevant population with the governing authority and show the insurgency as an opportunity for change.

The insurgency degrades the confidence of the population in the governing authority. At the same time, the

political element is preparing and/or implementing its own administrative and governance capabilities that

provide solutions to the population’s grievances.

Direct Action Violence and Terrorism

2-11. Insurgent cellular organization provides an adaptable function-based capability. Direct action cells

reside primarily in local insurgent organizations and usually conduct small-scale and focused violent acts at

the tactical level of conflict. (Direct action cells are described in detail later in this chapter.) Actions can

range from one-person tasks to multiple cells tailored temporarily for specific operations. Subversion and

selective or random violence are planned acts to incite frustration and overreaction by a governing

authority. The government reaction can anger the relevant population and further undermine its allegiance

or passive support to the governing authority. If an insurgency advances to the use of guerilla units, the

2-2

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Insurgents

guerrillas conduct operations against elements of the governing authority with functional tactics. (See

chapter 3 for detail on guerrillas and chapter 7 on functional tactics.) Terrorism can be applied throughout

these direct and supporting actions. (See chapter 6 on terrorism.)

2-12. Targets are often the activities and organizations that provide civil law and order such as—

Police.

Civil administrators.

Internal security forces.

Regular military forces of the governing authority.

2-13. Insurgent actions can range from simple threats and hoaxes to use of sophisticated technology and

weapon systems. Insurgent organizations generally do not possess much of the heavier and more

sophisticated equipment the guerrilla organizations possess. If the insurgents require these weapons or

capabilities, they may either obtain them from guerrillas, or the guerrilla organization may provide its

services depending on the relationship between the two organizations at the time. Some insurgent

organizations profess the desire to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Civic Interaction and Support

2-14. Civic interaction by insurgents with a relevant population establishes and maintains influence over

the population. It allows the insurgency to successfully organize clandestine actions. Activities can—

Incite open demonstrations against the governing authority.

Improve recruitment efforts for the insurgency within the population.

Demonize the governing authority as a threat to the population rather than protector.

2-15. If a relevant population believes that a governing authority is incapable of effective governance,

insurgents can usually obtain increasing active and passive support from the population. Insurgents degrade

the operational effectiveness of a governing authority in selected functions. They use a full range of

INFOWAR capabilities to exhaust the resolve of a governing authority and increase the population’s will to

support the overthrow of such governance.

2-16. Insurgents conduct some civic initiatives in a manner that does not overtly link the services to it.

Other actions often assist in providing basic social services that mitigate suffering of the population and

provide support. The insurgents will want to take credit for these. Such support can be humanitarian

programs for—

Food.

Potable water.

Basic medical services and preventive medicine.

Basic safe guarding of personal and commercial property.

Arbitrating civil and social disputes ignored by a governing authority.

2-17. The insurgent organization can sometimes obtain enough public support its representatives can be

legally elected to political positions within a governing authority. Ultimately, the insurgency must convince

an increasing number of uncommitted citizens and passive supporters within the relevant population to

accept its agenda for change or replacement of the current governing authority.

INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS

2-18. Insurgent organizations do not have a fixed structure. The mission, environment, geography, goal,

and many other factors determine the configuration and composition of each insurgent organization. Their

composition varies from—

Organization to organization.

Mission to mission.

OE to OE.

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

2-3

Chapter 2

The structure, personnel, equipment, and weapons mix all depend on specific mission requirements. The

size, specialty, number, and type of subordinates also depend on the size, number, and specialties required

for specific missions in an OE.

Note. Additional details of insurgent direct action and supporting cells are in FM 7-100.4. To find

these details, use Army Knowledge Online (AKO) access to the Hybrid T h r e a t D o c t r i n e

folder at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/30837459. Then, go to the “FM 7-

100.4 Org Guide” folder and click, in sequence, as follows: Administration Force Structure; Vol

III Paramil Nonmil Orgs; 01 Combatants; 01 Armed Combatants; 01 Insurgent Orgs; 01 Local

Insurgent Org. This FM will transition to a TC 7-100.4.

The insurgent organization diagrams of FM 7-100.4 and the personnel and equipment lists that

accompany them represent a composite of actual insurgent forces. They are a baseline that U.S.

Army trainers can modify to provide the appropriate conditions required for a particular training

exercise and/or training task. FM 7-100.4 provides detailed step-by-step instructions on how to

construct a task organization based on the training requirements. FM 7-100.4 also describes how

to select equipment options. See also TC 7-101 for guidance on creating the appropriate OPFOR

order of battle during exercise design.

CAPABILITIES

2-19. Insurgent organizations are flexible, agile, and adaptable. They can quickly change their composition

to optimize capabilities and use these capabilities against known or perceived vulnerabilities of an enemy.

These dynamic organizations are able to—

Adjust continually to changing conditions.

Shift organizational structures and alliances.

Influence and blend within a relevant population.

Simultaneously conduct covert and overt actions.

Use subversion and violence in innovative ways.

Shift between functional tactics and terrorism.

Employ a wide spectrum of lethality—from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to possible

WMD.

2-20. The irregular OPFOR can include insurgent organizations in two levels of capabilities:

Higher insurgent organization.

Local insurgent organization.

2-21. A higher insurgent organization includes at least one local insurgent organization and can include

guerrilla forces. The higher and local insurgent organizations include direct action cells and supporting

cells. The direct action cells are primarily within local insurgent organizations. The differences in

supporting cells of higher and local insurgent organizations relates to the scope of mission and

responsibilities usually associated with the size of geographic areas within which they operate. Some direct

action and supporting cells break down into teams.

2-22. A higher insurgent organization can have subordinate guerilla units. In some cases lower-level

guerrilla organizations may be subordinate to or affiliated with a local insurgent organization. In either

case, guerilla units operate in conjunction with the activities of direct action cells and/or supporting cells.

NETWORKS

2-23. The interactions between and/or among organizations, units, cells, and teams vary in complexity.

They can be hierarchical but most often take the form of a network. Communication and coordination in a

network can be linear and visualized as links in a chain, with each node connected to the next node in

sequence. Another option is a hub, in which one node (a director or decisionmaker) is central to a number

of other nodes that are not directly in contact with each other. A wheel is a variation on the hub in which

each of the nodes is in contact with neighboring nodes, with the central node providing common source of

2-4

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Insurgents

information and/or guidance. An all-channel array provides contact among all nodes of a particular

network. The network of an insurgent organization can include a combination of all these types (as shown

in figure 2-1). (See figure 2-5 on page 2-14 for another example of such combinations.)

Networked

Organization

Chain

All-Channel

Hub

Wheel

Figure 2-1. Network types

2-24. A network C2 structure adapts configurations to best use the capabilities of available organizations,

units, cells, and teams. Adaptability and innovation are hallmarks of the insurgent organization.

LEADERSHIP, ACTION, AND SUPPORT

2-25. Insurgents are flexible in how to organize C2. However, figure

2-2 shows six categories of

leadership, action, and support that normally exist in an organizational structure in either a hierarchy or

network:

Senior leaders.

Subordinate leaders.

Cadres.

Active supporters.

Passive supporters.

2-26. The pyramid illustration in figure 2-2 indicates a relative number of people in each category.

Underlying this pyramid is the relevant population that is critical to how these levels function for C2 and/or

influence. Insurgents can use the population in various ways, such as a mass human shield or to assist in

insurgent organization security.

2-27. The insurgents can also solicit and/or coerce support from the population. Another consideration is

the amount of support that is or is not provided by state and non-state sponsors for the insurgency.

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

2-5

Chapter 2

Senior Leaders

Subordinate Leaders

Cadres

Active Supporters

Passive Supporters

Population

Figure 2-2. Typical levels of leadership, action, and support

Senior Leaders

2-28. Senior leaders are the recognized authority of the insurgency. They conceive and state a

philosophical or practical justification for actions by subordinate operational leaders and followers. These

senior leaders—

Announce strategic direction and policy.

Approve goals and objectives.

Provide overarching guidance for operations and protracted conflict.

2-29. The leadership of an insurgent organization may be one individual or a group of leaders, who may or

may not consult formally with advisors. Leadership may informally use advisors or a council comprised of

tribal, religious, political, secular, radical sectarian, other associations, and/or any combination thereof. A

formal council of advisors is more common in a higher insurgent organization (see discussion of advisors

under that heading, below). The insurgent leader may also be a tribal, cultural, political, or religious leader.

The leader of a guerrilla unit may join the leader of a political element in an insurgency and form a

collective leadership for the insurgent organization.

2-30. Although leadership may be shared or apportioned among several individuals, one senior leader is

often identified as the recognized authority and primary spokesperson for the objectives of the insurgent

organization. The leader focuses on the strategic perspective and understands how to communicate the

ideology and/or objectives that motivate the insurgents. A leader may have risen from the tactical ranks of

the organization with calculated actions and political savvy, and/or may have achieved notoriety and/or

demonstrated his influence through acts of terror. The leader usually is knowledgeable of world politics and

complex socio-political environments. Individual leadership skills are often supplemented by personal

charisma.

2-31. Insurgent leaders can be located within or outside of the insurgent organization’s geographic area.

These leaders provide strategic guidance that is implemented by subordinate leaders conducting operations

within the geographic area. Leaders use the media to convince or coerce targeted segments of a population

to act in a particular way. These leaders may solicit clandestine financing and other support for operations

to attack high-priority targets.

2-32. A situation may arise where the senior insurgent leadership is coordinating closely with a

government-in-exile in order to reestablish authority over a state that has had its legitimate government

ousted. Insurgent leaders can use multiple means to support a government-in-exile such as gradually

providing civil and social services the existing governing authority is not providing to a relevant

population. Another means is to gradually use political processes to obtain legitimate representation in

local, regional, and national political parties and institutions. Leaders use these informal and formal

processes to gain and sustain support of designated segments of a population and continually expand the

positive influence of the insurgent organization’s agenda.

2-6

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Insurgents

Subordinate Leaders

2-33. Subordinate leaders of the insurgent organization command or control organizational activities

within geographic areas or functions. These leaders provide direction and guidance, approve goals and

objectives, and provide overarching coordination in support of senior leader guidance. They may be leaders

of cells and/or teams of specialized expertise or leaders of local insurgent organizations comprising several

cells. The subordinate leaders may have responsibilities as special advisors to the senior leadership, media

spokespersons, political leaders, or functional experts. If decentralized in structure, these leaders plan and

act within general senior leader mission guidance. Other leaders, if structured in a more hierarchical

military-type organization, plan and act within specified planning directives or guidance from senior

leaders.

2-34. For security and a division of labor, subordinate leaders may sometimes use intermediate leaders to

communicate directives and guidance to subordinate cells and supporting activities. Clandestine

communications can use sophisticated techniques such as electronic steganography to hide information

within a message or email, or simple techniques such as human couriers and intermediaries to relay oral

information and/or directives.

2-35. Leaders can have varied effects on an organization’s effectiveness if they are eliminated. The

insurgent organization develops redundancy among leaders and subordinate leaders in order to minimize

significant disruption when a leader is killed or captured.

Cadres

2-36. In a general sense, a cadre is a nucleus of trained personnel capable of assuming control and of

training others. In an insurgent organization, cadres include both the political or ideological cadre of an

insurgency and the cadre of operators who direct and conduct direct action and supporting functions.

2-37. One type of cadre is the political or ideological core of an insurgent organization. Movements based

on religious extremism include religious and spiritual advisors among the cadre. Political advisors may

have a special role in some organizations. The cadre can be openly active or mask their activities within a

relevant population. Some cadre activities are violent enforcement of political and ideological discipline,

subversion of opponents, and/or manipulation of social power to support an insurgent program. Cadre may

perform key shadow-government or government-in-exile functions that are physically distant from a

relevant population.

2-38. Another type of cadre is the nucleus of experts in direct action or supporting cells of the insurgent

organization that carry out specific functions and/or instruct other insurgents in functional capabilities.

Some mid-level cadres are trainers and technicians such as bomb makers, financiers, and surveillance

experts. Low-level cadres can be direct action operators but usually supervise and coordinate other

insurgents rather than actually conducting direct action tasks. These actors can have functional, specialized,

multifunctional, and/or supporting purposes based on knowledge and skill sets.

2-39. Examples of activities conducted, coordinated, and led by cadre can include but are not limited to—

Intelligence and counterintelligence networks.

Political affiliations and alliances.

Recruiting programs.

Training programs.

Ideology education programs.

Weapon system and communications acquisition and maintenance.

Logistics sustainment.

Finances and fiscal resourcing programs.

Social and medical welfare support.

INFOWAR capabilities against the opposition government and adversaries in the relevant

population and international community.

Operational missions.

Acts of selective and/or random terrorism.

17 January 2014

TC 7-100.3

2-7

Chapter 2

2-40. Some cadres use coercion and leverage to gain limited, periodic, or one-time cooperation from

individuals in the relevant population. This forced cooperation can range from gaining specific information

on a proposed target to supporting or conducting a suicide bombing attack.

Active Supporters

2-41. Active supporters are fully aware of their relationship to the insurgent organization but do not

normally commit violent acts. They can continue normal positions in society while providing functional

expertise or general support to the insurgents. Depending on the type of organization, they may operate in

functional capacities, such as politics, fund-raising, and/or INFOWAR activities of the insurgency. Acting

as visible or tacit partners, active supporters may also—

Conduct or augment intelligence, surveillance, and counterintelligence activities.

Provide and administer safe houses and safe havens.

Promote dissatisfaction with the status quo in recurring media affairs information releases.

Support recruiting efforts for new members and affiliates.

Solicit and collect financial or other types of donation support.

Provide civilian transportation.

Conduct courier and communications services.

Produce forged documents.

Acquire commodities to assist insurgent direct action and supporting cells.

Store caches of supplies, weapons, ammunition, explosives, and other materiel.

Assist in the manufacture of weapons and IEDs.

Assist in subversive activities.

Assist in sabotage, assassination, or other direct and violent actions.

Provide medical treatment and related support.

2-42. Supporters can improve insurgent initiatives to obtain the representation of legitimately elected

political officials. Other supporters may assist the actions of a direct action cell or a guerrilla hunter-killer

(HK) team. Active supporters may or may not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement in an

insurgent agenda. They can conduct covert and overt operations. They can infiltrate organizations of the

governing authority and conduct subversive activities against civil, social, and/or military programs.

2-43. Insurgent leaders often broker associations for active support with civil, political, or other

paramilitary organizations for selected purposes. Such associations may arise from specific mutual interests

when cooperative efforts might not normally be expected. Public statements and/or secretive agreements

that promote mutual support for a specific agenda of an insurgent organization can include the following

themes:

Historical and recent perspectives to remedy grievances.

Familial, tribal, or clan allegiance.

Business and social productivity.

Faith system dogma.

Personal beliefs, motivations, and ideology.

Civil and political opposition to programs of a governing authority in a state or region.

Interference of an extraregional state in the domestic affairs of a state or region.

Potential future roles in society.

Passive Supporters

2-44. Passive supporters are typically individuals or groups that are sympathetic to the announced goals

and intentions of an overarching insurgent agenda. However, they are not committed enough to take an

active role in insurgent direct actions or acts of terrorism. Sometimes fear of reprisal by opponents of the

insurgency leads to passive yet sympathetic support.

2-8

TC 7-100.3

17 January 2014

Insurgents

2-45. Passive supporters may not be aware of their tacit relationship to the insurgent organization. They

may intermingle with active supporters and be unaware of their actual relationship to the organization.

Individuals may develop suspicions of activities that might be supporting insurgent actions, but decide to

ignore indications and continue their daily lifestyle actions.

2-46. The insurgent organization recognizes that a sympathetic base of passive support in a population is

an ever-changing factor with multiple social, economic, religious, or political motives. The insurgency

depends on a sympathetic segment of the population remaining passive. Nonetheless, passive supporters

can be useful for political activities, fund raising, and/or unwitting assistance in intelligence gathering and

other nonviolent activities. A primary value of passive support is minimal interference by the citizenry in

ongoing overt actions of the insurgent organization.

2-47. Passive support can undermine civil and social programs, and political and/or theological institutions,

of the governing authority. Many functions of such programs and institutions must rely on voluntary

cooperation by large segments of the population.

HIGHER INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS

2-48. The term higher insurgent organization includes any insurgent organization at regional, provincial,

district, or national level, or at the transnational level. Cities with a large population or covering a large

geographic area are considered regions. Higher insurgent organizations may control several local insurgent

and/or guerrilla organizations. They can have transnational affiliations or other overt and/or covert support.

2-49. The main capabilities of a higher insurgent organization that are not usually present in a local

insurgent organization are as follows:

Subordinate local insurgent organizations in their network.

(Local insurgent organizations

usually do not have echeloned subordinate local insurgent organizations.)

Guerrilla units within their network and operating in the same geographic area. (Local insurgent

organizations may have temporary affiliations with guerrilla units or may occasionally command

and control them.)

Personal protection and security cell(s) for the organization’s senior leaders and designated

advisors or special members. (A local insurgent organization does not normally have a personal

protection and security cell.)

Associations and/or affiliations with criminal organizations directly and without coordination

with subordinate local insurgent organizations. (The long-term vision in a higher insurgent

organization may include cooperation with regional or transnational criminal organizations for

specific capabilities or materiel available through criminal networks.)

2-50. Higher insurgent organizations have no standard organizational structure. They are not necessarily

subordinate to a regional, national, or transnational insurgent organization. However, higher and local

insurgent organizations can be subordinate to and/or loosely affiliated with regional and national insurgent

organizations. Any relationship of independent insurgent organizations to regional or national structures

may be one of affiliation or dependent upon only a single shared or similar goal.

2-51. Local insurgent organizations, guerrilla units, and other organizations (such as criminal gangs and

networks) often operate in the same geographic area as a higher insurgent organization and can be

subordinate, loosely affiliated, or independent of a higher insurgent organization. Any relationship of

organizations and units to one another may be allegiance, affiliation, or temporary association based on

shared aims and/or mutual support.

2-52. A higher insurgent organization is normally cellular and comprises a network of functional

capabilities. Figure 2-3 shows the types of organizations and cells that can comprise a higher insurgent

organization.

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2-9

Chapter 2

HIGHER

INSURGENT

ORGANIZATION

(Regional, National,

or Transnational)

LOCAL

GUERRILLA

PLANNING

INSURGENT

BDE/BN/CO/

ADVISORS

CELL

ORGANIZATION

PLT/HK Teams

CI & INTERNAL

PERSONAL

INFORMATION

INTELLIGENCE

SECURITY

PROTECTION

WARFARE

CELL

& SEC CELL

CELL

COMMS &

TECHNICAL

LOGISTICS

FINANCE

TRADECRAFT

SUPPORT

CELL

CIVIL

TRAINING

RECRUITING

TRANSPORT

AFFAIRS

CELL

SHELTER

MEDICAL

CELL

Note. While this organization chart appears in a hierarchical format, that is only for convenience.

In actuality, a network structure is most likely in an insurgent organization. Also, the numbers of

each type of subordinate organization or cell can vary, and some may not be present at all in a

particular organization.

Figure 2-3. Higher insurgent organization

2-53. Some insurgent organizations may not have separate cells for all of the required functions. However,

someone in the organization must be designated to perform all basic and critical functions. For example,

the intelligence cell may also incorporate the counterintelligence and security functions, or the logistics cell

may also perform the functions of the shelter and/or transportation cells.

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Insurgents

2-54. Subordinates and supporting cells of a higher insurgent organization may or may not be colocated

with each other or with the leadership of the higher insurgent organization. They may be located in separate

villages, towns, cities, regions, or countries, as long as they can adequately and securely provide the

required support in a timely fashion. The numbers and types of each, and their locations, may change

frequently.

2-55. A higher insurgent organization can have all the same types of supporting cells found in a local

insurgent organization. (These types are described under Local Insurgent Organization.) Compared to their

local counterparts, these cells may be larger and have expanded capabilities. However, the higher

organization may also have advisors and one or more personal protection and security cells.

Advisors

2-56. The senior leader (or leaders) may or may not have a council of advisors. He can receive advice from

others inside and outside the organization. However, he may rely heavily on his council of advisors to

provide counsel, guidance, and/or expertise on a wide variety of areas. If present, advisors can include—

Political (international relations; shadow government).

Military (advice and liaison with affiliated nations or guerrillas; acquisition of military weapons

and equipment, advisors, or fighters).

Religious (religious leaders or liaison with them).

Cultural (ethnic, tribal, minority populations).

Financial (international and money-raising).

Mass media (perception management).

2-57. The number and types of advisors is situation dependent. Some insurgent leaders may have an

advisor for every issue requiring specialized expertise, while other leaders may have advisors that can

provide counsel on several functions. An example of a multifunctional advisor would be one that could

provide counsel on political, religious, and tribal issues. Some functions may require specialized expertise.

For example, in order to manipulate the media to achieve a specific goal in perception management, the

leader of the INFOWAR cell may require expertise and/or advice from several advisors such as a cleric, a

politician, and a tribal and/or ethic leader.

2-58. The number of permanent advisors can be many but is often limited to a few individuals. One of

these advisors generally rises to the position of primary advisor to the leader. In some insurgent

organizations, in addition to providing counsel, the primary advisor also serves in a position comparable to

that of a second-in-command, a deputy, or a chief of staff. The position of primary advisor is an extremely

prestigious, influential, and powerful position in the insurgency. The primary advisor is usually the

religious, political, or the military advisor. The choice of primary advisor typically reflects the insurgency’s

goals and agenda.

2-59. Advisors may consult with the leader on policies, tactics, and weapons to be used. They may use

simple or information-age technology to exchange experience, practical observations, and lessons learned.

Such advisors may coordinate activities among various supporting cells while also coordinating selective

activities of direct action cells.

2-60. Even if not part of a formal council of advisors, leaders of supporting cells directly assist a senior

leader in planning and supervising the actions of the insurgent organization. For instance, the leaders of the

INFOWAR, logistics, and finance cells may advise the leader on matters pertaining to their functional

specialties.

2-61. Advisors may or may not be armed. In most cases, advisors will possess firearms but may not choose

to carry them on all occasions. There are typically security specialists (personal bodyguards) and drivers

assigned to the advisors. The advisors’ association with the insurgency may be covert, with very few

people aware of their connection. Most insurgent organizations have a mixture of overt and covert

counselors.

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2-11

Chapter 2

Personal Protection and Security Cells

2-62. A personal protection and security cell is responsible for the personal security and welfare of the

senior leader(s) and other important persons. The cell’s armed security specialists provide around-the-clock

protection for these personnel and vehicles for transporting them. The vehicle may or may not be armored.

Even if armored, it is built to appear just like any other vehicle commonly used in the environment. Some

weapons and/or equipment may be left in the vehicle until required or not carried on the mission at all. All

cell members are cross-trained in the use of all weapons, equipment, and vehicles assigned to the cell.

2-63. This cell works closely with both the counterintelligence and security cell(s) and the intelligence

cell(s). When needed, it receives augmentation of trained personnel from direct action teams.

LOCAL INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS

2-64. The term local insurgent organization applies to any insurgent organization below regional,

provincial, or district level. This includes small cities, towns, villages, parishes, communities,

neighborhoods, and/or rural environments. (Large cities are equivalent to regions and may contain several

local insurgent organizations.) Activities remain focused on a local relevant population.

2-65. Differences between a local insurgent organization and a higher insurgent organization are as follows:

Direct actions cells are present within a local insurgent organization. Their multifunctional

and/or specific functional capabilities may be enhanced or limited based on availability of

resources and technical expertise in or transiting the local OE. These direct actions are planned for

immediate and/or near-term effects related to the local insurgent organization’s area of influence.

Guerrilla units might not be subordinate to the local insurgent organization. However,

temporary affiliations between local insurgents and guerrillas are possible for specified missions

coordinated by a higher insurgent organization. Direct action personnel may use, fight alongside

of, or assist affiliated forces, and guerrillas to achieve their common goals or for any other

agenda. Guerrilla units may operate in a local insurgent organization’s area of influence and

have no connection to the local insurgent organization or a higher insurgent organization.

2-66. Criminals can affiliate with a local insurgent organization or a higher insurgent organization as a

matter of convenience and remain cooperative only as long as criminal organization aims are being

achieved. The local insurgent organization retains a long-term vision of its political agenda, whereas

cooperation by a criminal organization is usually related to localized commercial profit and/or

organizational influence in a local environment. This usually equates to criminals controlling or facilitating

materiel and commodity exchanges. The criminal is not motivated by a political agenda.

2-67. The local insurgent organization uses functional tactics (see chapter 7) and terrorism (see chapter 6)

as the primary means to achieve its goals. Terrorism instills fear and anxiety that coerces and degrades the

resolve of an enemy governing authority and selected people in a relevant population.

Relation to Other Insurgent Organizations

2-68. The local insurgent organization is the basic level of insurgent organization. Local insurgent

organizations are not always subordinate to a regional, national, or transnational insurgent organization.

They may be completely autonomous and independent of a larger insurgent movement and not be

associated with it in any way. In other cases, they can be either subordinate to or loosely affiliated with

such a larger organization. They may operate under the guidance of a larger insurgent organization even is

no command relationship exists. In some cases a local insurgent organization may provide only financial

support and general guidance to its direct action and supporting cells (see figure 2-4).

2-69. Cells of a local insurgent organization may be forced to provide for themselves in several areas. A

typical example of this is a smaller direct action cell separated from the parent insurgent organization by

distance, population, or ability to communicate securely. They may not have access to the expertise or

products such as IEDs provided by the technical support cell and must improvise IEDs by themselves.

2-70. Any relationship to a higher organization or among independent local insurgent organizations may be

dependent upon only a single shared or similar goal. These relationships are generally fluctuating and may

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Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 7) - page 24