Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 5)

Procedure for Excavations

Page 31 of 32

Revision/Review Log

Revision Date

Authority

Custodian

Revision Details

22 October 2004

CHSSE Manager

CHSSE Team

Initial Issue as controlled document

Leader

07 Sept 2007

Alan McNulty

Esmira

General:

(CHSSE Manager)

Akhundova

Throughout the procedure the document

(CHSSE Team

numbering for referred procedures has been

Leader)

changed from UNIF to AzSPU.

Section 1. Introduction:

1.2 Scope; Wording changes. Following

inclusion to Section 1 are; 1.3 Legislation &

Standards, 1.4 Ground Disturbance Golden

Rules of Safety, 1.5 Company Requirements,

1.6 Stopping Unsafe Work, 1.7 Deviations, 1.8

Document Review, 1.9 SSOW Specific Cross

References (new doc control numbers). 1.10

Language Facilitation, 1.11 Procedure

Summary.

Section 2. Responsibilities:

Is now “Definitions & Abbreviations”. New

section.

Section 3. Access Routes:

Is now “Roles and Responsibilities”. Changes

made to the responsibilities of SM, SC, Area

Authority, Machinery Operator.

Section 4. Route Identification and

Preparation:

Is now “Trenches and Excavations”. New

section.

Section 5. Site Safety:

Is now “Access Routes”.

Section 6. Pre-excavation Requirements and

Procedure:

Is now “Route Identification and Preparation”.

Section 7. Excavation Procedures:

Is now “Site Safety”. Under 7.3 Excavator

Operators; Word „certified‟ included into line.

Section 8. Backfilling Procedures:

Is now “Pre-excavation Requirements and

Procedure”. Under 8.4 Excavation Boundaries;

Additional paragraph added. Under 8.7 Risk

Assessment, PTW and Supplementary

Certificates; Bullet point - Cold Work Special

Task Permit changed to - Permit to Work

Certificate.

Section 9. Site Reinstatement:

Is now “Excavation Procedures”. Under 9.1

Excavation Inspections; Second bullet point

changed from - „after rainstorms‟ to „After

severe weather conditions or seismic activity.

Section 10. Documentation:

Is now “Backfilling Procedure”.

Section 11. Is now “Site Reinstatement”.

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: 14 Sept 2007

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00050-2>>

Print Date: 7/24/2010

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE CONTROLLED VERSION OF

THIS DOCUMENT CAN BE FOUND AT http://docs.bpweb.bp.com/dkazspu/component/hssesms

Procedure for Fire Protection

Page 3 of 15

INTRODUCTION

1.1 DOCUMENT PURPOSE

This Safe System of Work provides the information necessary for ensuring the safety

of personnel, buildings, installations, and plant with regard to fire prevention,

detection and protection.

1.2 DOCUMENT SCOPE

The contents of this Safe System of Work apply to all BP owned or managed sites in

Azerbaijan and Georgia and all personnel employed on those sites.

This Safe System of Work does not remove the responsibility for compliance with

local legislation and statutory requirements, which shall be complied with at all times.

2 RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1 SITE MANAGER / OFFSHORE INSTALLATION MANAGER

Site Managers and Offshore Installation Managers shall develop appropriate

instructions for fire protection and prevention and associated emergency procedures

using the contents of this document as a guideline and where necessary by

consulting with relevant expert authorities.

In particular, Site Managers and Offshore Installation Managers are responsible for:

 on-site compliance with this safe System of Work

 the formulation, implementation and continual review of fire protection,

prevention and emergency procedures on their site or installation

 the development of a contingency plan to fight fires in the event of the non-

availability of fire protection or fire fighting personnel

 ensuring all personnel undergo regular training and drills in fire protection and

that all personnel employed on the site are in possession of relevant and up-

to-date fire fighting training certificates

Note: In some cases, the requirement for individual certification may be

waived at the Site Manager’s or Offshore Installation Manager’s

discretion (for example, for manufacturer’s representatives or

service hands who may be on site on a one-off basis and for only a

short period of time)

 ensuring an inspection and maintenance schedule is in place for:

o fixed and portable fire fighting systems and equipment

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<05 October 2004>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00051-2>>

Print Date: 7/24/2010

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE

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Procedure for Fire Protection

Page 4 of 15

o fire detection systems.

2.2 AREA AUTHORITY

Within their particular areas, Area Authorities are responsible for ensuring:

 compliance with this safe System of Work

 that fire prevention and housekeeping standards are maintained at all times

 that all fire fighting equipment is in date and fully functional

 that all activities are carried out in a safe and responsible manner with regard

to fire risks, and that Risk Assessments are carried out wherever necessary.

2.3 ALL PERSONNEL

All personnel, including contractors, are responsible for the prevention and detection

of fire. In particular, all personnel are responsible for:

 immediately informing their supervisor of any situation that they consider to

be a potential fire risk

 conducting themselves and their work in a fire-safe manner

 ensuring that they are aware of and fully understand the actions they must

take in the event of a fire alarm

 ensuring that they are fully aware of the actions they must take on

discovering a fire.

3 FIRE PREVENTION

Prevention is the first line of defence against fire. All reasonably practicable

measures shall be taken to reduce the fire risks to as low as reasonably practicable.

3.1 HOUSEKEEPING AND PROCEDURES

Properly established and applied housekeeping procedures are required in order to

reduce both the risk of fire and the ultimate consequences should a fire occur.

3.1.1 Work Areas and Walkways

No materials, flammable or otherwise, should be allowed to accumulate in the

workplace or in walkways, where they can present direct fire hazards or obstruct

attempts to deal with a fire.

 Work areas and walkways should be kept free of any unnecessary flammable

materials, including:

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<05 October 2004>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00051-2>>

Print Date: 7/24/2010

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE

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Procedure for Fire Protection

Page 5 of 15

o flammable materials or agents no longer required for the activity

o combustible waste (for example, wood shavings, flammable dust)

o packaging materials, particularly plastics and polyester foam waste

which, when ignited, can give off large amounts of dense, black

smoke and toxic fumes.



All spills involving flammable liquids shall be cleaned up immediately. Where

necessary, suitable cleaning materials should be provided and used.



Flammable liquids should be dispensed over a drip tray, the contents of which

should be disposed of at frequent regular intervals

(for example, on

completion of dispensing activities)



Where necessary, working areas should be kept free of flammable dust

accumulation by regular cleaning, and vacuuming spillages as they occur.

3.1.2

Waste Materials



Suitable containers must be provided for waste materials. These containers

must be clearly labelled with regard to their use and contents.



Oily or paint soaked rags, waste, or clothing shall be placed in closed, metal

containers that shall be emptied frequently, ensuring safe disposal of their

contents.



Contaminated waste materials should be disposed of safely in accordance

with the Environmental Management System. If necessary, waste disposal

experts should be used.

3.1.3

Working Practices



Keep containers closed when not in use. If possible, use safety containers

with self-closing lids.



Only dispense flammable liquids in a safe place where there is good

ventilation and no source of ignition.



Take extra care when dealing with, or working close to, engine fuels, solvents

and thinners. Nearly all refined liquid petroleum products will emit a flammable

vapour and may convert naturally to a gaseous state at or below

temperatures found in a normal working environment



Do not use flammable liquids for cleaning machinery or machine parts.



Suitable signs should be posted in areas where ignition sources or flammable

materials are likely to be in use



Identified fire risks should be dealt with immediately

Note: In accordance with BP’s Golden Rules, all personnel are obliged to

stop work if they consider that work to be unsafe. This includes the

risk of fire.

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<05 October 2004>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00051-2>>

Print Date: 7/24/2010

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE

CONTROLLED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CAN BE FOUND AT

http://docs.bpweb.bp.com/dkazspu/component/hssesms

Procedure for Fire Protection

Page 6 of 15

3.2 RISK ASSESSMENTS

3.2.1 All Activities

Risk Assessments shall assess the potential for a fire and its possible

consequences. In particular, Risk Assessments should address the:

 existence of planned and accidental ignition sources

 proximity of combustible materials to the work area or storage area

 possible consequences of fire and the possibility of the fire spreading to

adjacent areas

 provision of suitable and adequate fire fighting equipment and personnel

 requirement for contingency plans in the event of a fire or spillage

 competency of personnel involved in the work and of those who may be

required to deal with the initial outbreak of a fire.

3.2.2 Hot Work

Hot Work, spark potential or naked flame, shall only take place under the control of a

Permit to Work that is supported by a formal Risk Assessment.

See also 3.4 Hazardous Areas.

3.3 HAZARDOUS AREAS

3.3.1 Area Classification

Areas are classified as hazardous or non-hazardous using recognised standards.

The process of identification of hazardous areas is a multi-discipline task performed

by Process and Safety Engineers in the development of a hazardous area

classification.

The areas may be classified as:

Zone 0: in which a flammable atmosphere is continuously present or present for long

periods.

Zone 1: in which a flammable atmosphere is likely to occur in normal operation.

Zone 2: in which a flammable atmosphere is not likely to occur in normal operation,

and if it does it will exist for only a short time.

Non-Hazardous: in which an area is not one of Zone 0, 1 and 2.

3.3.2 Plant and Equipment in Hazardous Areas

Equipment and plant used in Zones 0, 1, and 2 must be explosion proof and

electrical devices must be intrinsically safe.

Any source of unplanned ignition, including mobile phones, matches and cigarette

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<05 October 2004>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00051-2>>

Print Date: 7/24/2010

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE

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Procedure for Fire Protection

Page 7 of 15

lighters shall not be taken into these areas.

3.3.3 Motor Vehicles and Internal Combustion Engines

Special precautions are required for the use of motor vehicles and internal

combustion engines. In particular:

 motor vehicles and internal combustion engines shall not be allowed in Zones

0 and 1

 motor vehicles and internal combustion engines shall only be allowed into

Zone 2 under a Hot Work (Spark Potential) Permit.

3.3.4 Hot Work in Hazardous Areas

All hot work, in a hazardous area or otherwise, shall only be carried out under the

control of a Hot Work permit, either spark potential or naked flame. The issue of a

Hot Work permit is dependent upon the results of a formal Risk Assessment that

shall fully address the fire risks involved and the Hazardous Zone classification.

Note: It is BP policy to avoid hot work in hazardous areas wherever practicable. It

is the role of engineers planning the work to minimise the need for hot work

and provide cost effective alternatives by careful consideration during the

design and planning phase.

3.4 HANDLING AND STORAGE OF FLAMMABLE SUBSTANCES

3.4.1 Handling

 Site Managers and Area Supervisors shall be aware of hazardous and

flammable materials that are used or stored within their areas of responsibility

and shall have contingency plans in place for dealing with spills and fires

involving these materials

 Personnel handling flammable materials shall be suitably qualified and trained

in the use and properties associated with those materials

 Personnel handling or dealing with flammable substances shall be equipped

with suitable personal protective equipment, including but not necessarily

limited to face protection, hand protection and fire-proof overalls

 Suitable fire fighting equipment shall be made available in areas where

flammable substances are handled.

3.4.2 Storage

 Site Managers and Area Authorities shall be aware of all flammable materials

stored within their areas of authority

 Flammable substances shall not be stored near to sources (potential or real)

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<05 October 2004>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00051-2>>

Print Date: 7/24/2010

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE

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Procedure for Fire Protection

Page 8 of 15

of flame, high heat or near other combustible materials

 Flammable substances shall be stored in secure storage areas or facilities

 Storage areas for flammable liquids and gases shall be well ventilated in

order to promote rapid dispersal of vapours given off from leaks, spills or

unplanned releases

 Storage areas for flammable substances shall have signs and notices clearly

posted warning personnel that flammable substances are present

 Where necessary, storage areas shall be equipped with adequate

containment facilities, for example trays or bunding, to prevent spills from

spreading to other areas

 Containers used for flammable materials shall be clearly and accurately

labelled with regard to their contents

 Glass containers shall not be used for storing flammable liquids.

3.5 FIRE PROTECTION OF BUILDINGS AND PLANT

As a minimum, building work shall comply with local authority requirements.

New and altered buildings / installations and work sites shall be formally assessed

and adequate provision made for:

 fire detection

 fire fighting equipment (fixed and portable)

 personnel escape routes.

Note: Any buildings, installations, or sites undergoing structural alterations or a

change of use must be reassessed for the above points.

4 FIRE DETECTION

4.1 FIXED FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMS

4.1.1 Description and Types

The most types of fire detection system used on BP sites and installations in

Azerbaijan and Georgia are:

Heat detectors (electro-pneumatic; electronic; heat sensing wire; quartzoid bulbs)

Smoke detectors (photo-electric cell, ionisation detectors, continuous air sampling)

Flame detectors (infra-red detectors, ultra violet detectors)

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<05 October 2004>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00051-2>>

Print Date: 7/24/2010

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE

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Procedure for Fire Protection

Page 9 of 15

4.1.2 Location and Use

As a minimum, fixed fire detection systems shall be located and used in accordance

with the manufacturer’s recommendations and in accordance with local legislation.

Detection systems shall not be modified in any way without undergoing a thorough

Risk Assessment. Any modification must only be carried out in accordance with

UNIF-HSE-PRO-312 Management of Change.

All modifications shall be recorded and held on site.

4.1.3 Operation

Fire detection systems shall include an automatic alarm system that:

 alerts personnel to an outbreak of fire

 provides indication of where the fire is.

 activates a fire suppression system (for example, sprinkler system).

If for any reason these facilities must be overridden:

 personnel must be informed (for example by public announcement)

 smoking shall not take place in the affected area

 any hot work in the affected area shall only be allowed under the control of a

Permit to Work and only when alternative arrangements for fire detection and

protection have been arranged (for example, the use of fire watchers).

4.1.4 Inspection and Maintenance

Fire detection systems should be inspected and maintained by a competent person

and in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and recommendations. The

Site Manager / Offshore Installation Manager shall ensure that a suitable inspection

and maintenance programme is in place for fixed detection systems.

Inspection results and any repairs carried out to a fixed fire detection system must be

recorded and held on site for future reference.

4.2 MANUAL FIRE DETECTION

4.2.1 Site Specific Procedures

Note: The procedures to be adopted upon discovering a fire, or hearing the fire

alarm, are site specific and will vary between locations. For example, on an

offshore installation, some personnel might not evacuate immediately but

are required to remain at their place of work in order to make plant and

equipment safe or to form part of the fire fighting team. For this reason the

information given here is of a generic nature only.

Personnel shall be made aware of site-specific fire and emergency procedures

during their initial safety induction. The induction should cover:

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<05 October 2004>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00051-2>>

Print Date: 7/24/2010

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE

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Procedure for Fire Protection

Page 10 of 15

 action to take in the event of a fire

 escape routes and muster points

 manual alarm point locations

 extinguisher locations

In addition, fire and muster instructions shall be posted at strategic locations around

the site.

Note: At all times, personnel are responsible for making themselves aware of the

fire and emergency procedures relevant to their location.

4.2.2 Person Discovering Fire

Personnel discovering a fire should:

1. Raise the alarm the alarm by shouting “FIRE FIRE FIRE”.

2. If the fire is small and easily extinguishable and a suitable extinguisher is

available, attempt to put out the fire without endangering themselves or

others

or…

if the fire is not easily extinguishable or the initial attempt to extinguish the fire

fails, evacuate the area closing any doors en route.

3. Follow the fire and emergency procedures specific to the site / installation.

4.3 PERSONNEL RESPONSE TO FIRE ALARM

Note: The procedures to be adopted upon discovering a fire, or hearing the fire

alarm, are site specific and will vary between locations. For example, on an

offshore installation, some personnel might not evacuate immediately but

are required to remain at their place of work in order to make plant and

equipment safe or to form part of the fire fighting team. For this reason the

information given here is of a generic nature only.

Upon hearing the fire alarm, personnel should:

1. Switch off / make safe the equipment they are using and leave the area /

building by the nearest safe exit, closing doors and windows behind them

2. Proceed in accordance with local fire and emergency procedures.

Note: Personnel should not delay from evacuating to collect their personal belongings.

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<05 October 2004>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00051-2>>

Print Date: 7/24/2010

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE

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Procedure for Fire Protection

Page 11 of 15

5 FIRE PROTECTION

5.1 FIXED FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT

5.1.1 Description and Types

The most common types of fixed fire fighting systems are:

 Sprinklers

 High Velocity Water Spray (Automatic and Manual)

 Medium Velocity Water Spray (Automatic and Manual)

 High Expansion Foam Flooding Systems (Fixed and Portable)

 CO₂ Fire Suppression Systems (may be used in unmanned areas).

5.1.2 Location and Operation

As a minimum, fixed fire fighting systems shall be located and used in accordance

with the manufacturer’s recommendations and in accordance with local legislation.

Fixed fire fighting systems shall not be modified in any way without undergoing a

thorough Risk Assessment. Any modification must only be carried out in accordance

with UNIF-HSE-PRO-312 Management of Change.

All modifications shall be recorded and held on site.

5.1.3 Inspection and Maintenance

As a minimum, fixed fire fighting systems should be inspected and maintained by a

competent person and in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and

recommendations and local legislation. The Site Manager / Offshore Installation

Manager shall ensure that a suitable inspection and maintenance programme is in

place for fixed fire fighting systems.

Inspection results and any repairs carried out to a fixed fire fighting system must be

recorded and held on site for future reference.

5.2 PORTABLE FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT

5.2.1 Description and Types

 Water: Water filled extinguishes are suitable for use on fires involving paper,

wood, and rubbish.

Warning: Water extinguishers must not be used on electrical fires where

there is a possibility of the water coming into contact with

electrical sources.

 Foam: Foam filed fire extinguishers may be used successfully on fires

involving paper, wood and general rubbish. However, foam fire extinguishers

are primarily designed for use on oil fires.

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<05 October 2004>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00051-2>>

Print Date: 7/24/2010

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Procedure for Fire Protection

Page 12 of 15

Warning: Foam extinguishers must not be used on electrical fires where

there is a possibility of the foam coming into contact with electrical

sources.

 Dry Powder: Dry powder filled extinguishers may be used on fires involving

rubbish and oil and may also be used on electrical fires. However, the use of

dry powder on electrical equipment usually makes that equipment unusable.

 Carbon Dioxide (CO2): CO2 extinguishers are intended for use on electrical

fires only. If used on fires involving rubbish and debris, the pressure from the

extinguisher is likely to disturb the seat of the fire and spread burning material.

For the same reason they are not suitable for oil based fires.

5.2.2 Location

Portable fire fighting equipment must be placed in accordance with local fire

regulations, national fire protection guidelines and any other requirements.

The location of all portable fire fighting equipment should be shown on safety plans

placed at strategic locations around the site / installation.

5.2.3 Operation and Use - Recharging

All extinguishers must be recharged immediately after each use. Chemicals must

never be mixed, as the resulting chemical reactions may damage the extinguisher.

Recharging must only be done by trained personnel.

5.2.4 Inspection and Maintenance

All maintenance of portable fire fighting equipment must be carried out by a

competent person and in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations and

local legislation.

The following inspections represent the minimum requirements of any inspection

programme:

 All extinguisher units must be in the designated location and clearly visible.

Signs or painted red backg2rounds may be used to identify extinguisher

locations.

 All extinguishers must be visually checked every month to ensure operational

reliability (for example, seals are in place, nozzles and hoses are free from

damage and the units can be accessed easily).

 Annual inspections must be performed as per manufacturer’s specifications

and applicable regulations.

 Inspection results shall be documented for each extinguisher unit and

retained on file at the local site.

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<05 October 2004>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00051-2>>

Print Date: 7/24/2010

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Procedure for Fire Protection

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6 TRAINING AND DRILLS

6.1 TRAINING PROGRAMME

All personnel are required to be knowledgeable on the common causes and types of

fire and must be familiar with the use of fire fighting equipment. This is achieved by

the use of a comprehensive training programme that includes:

 established training courses for all personnel joining a BP installation,

including a schedule of planned and regular refresher courses

 regular on-site drills and practices.

6.2 TRAINING RECORDS

Training records for all personnel shall be held on site. In particular, for offshore

installations, all personnel shall have completed their training before being allowed

offshore unless the Offshore Installation Manager grants dispensation (for example,

for contractor personnel who shall only be offshore on a one-off basis and only for a

limited period).

6.3 PRACTICE DRILLS

Practice drills shall be held at regular intervals according to an established

programme. The drills shall be used to practice and improve personnel skills and

knowledge in fire fighting techniques and also to highlight any shortcomings in

established fire fighting procedures.

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<05 October 2004>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00051-2>>

Print Date: 7/24/2010

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE

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Procedure for Fire Protection

Page 14 of 15

APPENDIX A - DEFINITIONS

Fire Protection:

All measures used to minimise injury and loss through fire,

including procedures, design, selection, installation and

maintenance.

Fire Prevention:

Procedures used to minimise or prevent fire.

Fire Detection

Equipment designed to detect fire and raise the alarm.

Systems:

Fire

Systems designed to suppress or extinguish fires through

Suppression

automatic or manual activation.

Systems:

Emergency

Planned measures designed to minimise the risk of injury in an

Procedures:

emergency situation.

Combustible:

The property of any material or substance that will readily burn.

Flammable:

The property of a substance that ignites easily, burns intensely

and has a rapid flame-spread.

Flash Point:

The lowest temperature at which a flammable or combustible

liquid gives off vapours to form an ignitable mixture with air.

Ignition

The lowest temperature at which a mixture of vapour and air will

Temperature:

ignite without a spark or flame. The term also applies to the

temperature of a hot surface that can ignite flammable vapours.

Flammable or

The range between the smallest and largest amounts of vapour

Explosive

in a given quantity of air that will explode or burn. The amount is

Range:

usually given in percentages and are based on normal

atmospheric temperatures and pressures.

Water

The capability of a flammable or combustible liquid to be soluble

Solubility:

in water.

Spontaneous

Ignition due to the rapid oxidation of a substance that generates

Combustion:

enough heat for ignition to occur.

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<05 October 2004>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00051-2>>

Print Date: 7/24/2010

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Procedure for Fire Protection

Page 15 of 15

APPENDIX B - CHECKLIST FOR FIRE SAFETY MANAGEMENT

Note: This checklist in this appendix is provided as an aide memoir only, and is not

intended for use as an approved test certificate or an official document:

CHECKLIST FOR FIRE SAFETY MANAGEMENT



Ensure that written fire safety and emergency evacuation instructions are

provided, properly displayed and regularly updated.



Ensure that all means of escape from buildings, installations and work areas

are properly indicated and readily accessible.



Ensure that adequate fire fighting equipment is provided, correctly located

and indicated.



Make all personnel aware of the location of escape routes, fire alarms and fire

fighting equipment.



Arrange training in the use of fire fighting equipment.



Keep readily combustible materials and flammable liquids to a minimum

consistent with reasonable requirements and ensure that relevant statutory

requirements, codes and client standards are observed, particularly during

cutting and welding operations.



Ensure that good housekeeping is practised, for example, the removal of

unwanted rubbish and packing materials from the work area.



Ensure that an annual fire safety audit of all premises is carried out.



Refer to the HSE Adviser in the event of queries.

Revision/Review Log

Revision Date

Authority

Custodian

Revision Details

<<05 october

<< Alan McNulty

<<Esmira

<< Initial Issue>>

2004>>

Akhundova >>

Control Tier:

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Revision Date: <<05 October 2004>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00051-2>>

Print Date: 7/24/2010

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE

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Procedure for Gas Detection Equipment

Page 2 of 11

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

1.1

DOCUMENT PURPOSE

1.2

DOCUMENT SCOPE

RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1

SITE MANAGER

2.2

AREA AUTHORITY

2.3

GAS TESTERS

GAS DETECTORS (TYPE AND USE)

3.1

ALL GAS DETECTORS

3.2

FIXED GAS DETECTORS

3.3

PORTABLE GAS DETECTORS

FIXED GAS DETECTION SYSTEMS

4.1

LOCATION AND USE

4.2

SYSTEM FAILURE

4.3

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMITS (ALARM AND SHUTDOWN LEVELS)

4.4

CALIBRATION

4.4.1

Frequency

4.4.2

Calibration Records

PORTABLE GAS DETECTORS

5.1

ISSUE AND USE

5.1.1

Issue

5.1.2

Use

5.2

GAS TESTERS

5.2.1

Gas Tester Level 1

5.2.2

Gas Tester Level 2

5.3

OPERATION

5.3.1

Personal Protective Equipment

5.3.2

Test Criteria

5.3.3

Test Location

5.3.4

Reading Interpretation

5.3.5

Handling Portable Gas Detectors

5.4

CALIBRATION

5.4.1

Before Use

5.4.2

Additional Calibration

5.4.3

Calibration Method

5.4.4

Calibration Records

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Procedure for Gas Detection Equipment

Page 3 of 11

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 DOCUMENT PURPOSE

This Safe System of Work provides the guidelines and procedures necessary to

ensure a safe working environment through the:

 controlled and systematic monitoring for combustible gas using:

- fixed gas detection systems

- portable gas detection equipment

 regular maintenance of gas monitoring equipment

 use of suitably trained and authorised Gas Testers.

1.2 DOCUMENT SCOPE

The contents of this Safe System of Work are applicable on all BP owned and

managed sites and installations in Azerbaijan and Georgia and to all personnel

employed on those sites and installations.

2 RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1 SITE MANAGER

The Site Manager / OIM is responsible for:

 formally appointing suitably qualified and experienced persons to carry out:

 gas testing

 gas testing instrument calibration and testing

 ensuring that fixed gas detection systems on the site

/ installation are

maintained in an operational state

 ensuring that procedures are in place that ensure gas testing is carried out

wherever necessary.

2.2 AREA AUTHORITY

Area Authorities are responsible for ensuring that gas tests are carried out within their

area of responsibility wherever there is any possibility that combustible gas might be

present.

2.3 GAS TESTERS

Authorised Gas Testers are responsible for carrying out gas tests to the level to

which they are authorised.

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Procedure for Gas Detection Equipment

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3 GAS DETECTORS (TYPE AND USE)

3.1 ALL GAS DETECTORS

Gas detectors shall:

 be used wherever there may be a risk to people or property caused by the

presence of flammable gas

 be designed to issue suitable audible or visual warnings that alert personnel

to the presence of flammable gas.

3.2 FIXED GAS DETECTORS

Fixed gas detectors are detectors that are permanently placed at strategic locations,

and where deemed appropriate by local management, to monitor conditions on a

continuous basis. In particular they are placed wherever it is thought that combustible

gas could collect following an uncontrolled and unplanned release.

Note: Fixed gas detection systems may initiate specific safety actions automatically.

3.3 PORTABLE GAS DETECTORS

Portable gas detectors are often used during activities that take place where

flammable gas could exist, for example, in confined spaces. In most cases, the use

of portable gas detection equipment will be called for by the work procedure /

instruction.

4 FIXED GAS DETECTION SYSTEMS

4.1 LOCATION AND USE

Fixed or automatic combustible gas detectors/systems may be used to initiate a

number of automatic safety actions, including:

 visual and audible warnings

 plant / equipment shutdown

 operation of fire extinguishing systems

 installation evacuation alarm.

4.2 SYSTEM FAILURE

Any malfunction, abnormal condition, or failure of the fixed gas detection system that

prevents the safe operation of plant and machinery, shall initiate an automatic shut

down of that facility.

Note: When the facility operates on purchased electrical power, shutdown features

must incorporate adjustable time delays to prevent plant shutdown from short

duration power outages. Automatic restart systems shall be overridden by the

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Procedure for Gas Detection Equipment

Page 5 of 11

shutdown system.

Partially attended sites / facilities (those which are not manned 24 hours a day)

must have suitable provisions incorporated so that affected plant / equipment can be

automatically shutdown for 24 hours without causing damage to the facility.

In partially attended facilities, any malfunction, abnormal condition, or failure of the

fixed gas detection system that actuates a plant or machinery shutdown must also

actuate a visual enunciator. A remote signalling device must be actuated during

unattended periods.

In fully attended facilities, each any malfunction, abnormal condition, or failure of

the fixed gas detection system that actuates a plant or machinery shutdown must

actuate a visual and audible alarm prior to the shutdown. These alarms must actuate

sufficiently ahead of each shutdown point to give time for corrective measures to

prevent a shutdown.

4.3 LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMITS (ALARM AND SHUTDOWN LEVELS)

Concentrations of combustible gases that will trigger alarms and shutdowns shall be

as follows. These are maximum set values. Set points may be lower.



10% Lower Explosive Limit - Low alarm, actuate alarms/enunciator



50% Lower Explosive Limit - High alarm, may or may not actuate

shutdowns, depending upon the capability of the facility.

4.4 CALIBRATION

4.4.1 Frequency

Combustible gas detection systems shall be calibrated in accordance with the

manufacturer’s recommended procedures or at least every 3 months, whichever is

more frequent.

Calibration Gas Tanks

Gas detectors are usually calibrated using gas from a calibration gas tank. It is a

good safety practice to install a tube from floor level to detectors placed at high levels

and ceilings. This permits introduction of the calibration gas through the tubes at

ground level.

The contents of the calibration gas tank are under pressure. Therefore the following

precautions should be observed at all times:

 Do not allow oil, grease or flammable solvents to contact the flow control of

the calibration gas tank.

 Do not store calibration gas tanks near heat or fire, or in room used for

habitation.

 When the tank is exhausted, discard in a safe place such as burial in the

earth or in sanitary landfill.

 Do not throw in fire or incinerate.

 Do not puncture.

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Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00052-2>>

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Procedure for Gas Detection Equipment

Page 6 of 11

 Keep out of the reach of children.

 It is not permitted and it is hazardous to refill these gas tanks.

 Do not attach the calibration gas tank to any other apparatus other than

described above.

4.4.2 Calibration Records

Records must be maintained on the calibration of these instruments at the site /

installation. Records should include the:

 detector location

 detector make/mode

 detector type

 date of calibration

 calibration results

 name of the person who completed the calibration.

5 PORTABLE GAS DETECTORS

5.1 ISSUE AND USE

5.1.1 Issue

Portable gas detectors must only be used:

 in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions for determining the lower

explosive limit of combustible gas in the air

 by personnel trained in their use.

Note: On BP sites and installations in Azerbaijan and Georgia this means that

portable gas detectors may only be used by authorised Gas Testers.

5.1.2 Use

Portable gas detectors, or explosimeters, use a set of batteries to measure the

oxidation rate of the combustible gas. This measurement is then read from a meter

showing the gas combustibility.

Portable combustible gas detectors shall be used when:

 introducing flame into an area which may contain a flammable atmosphere.

 lighting fired heater vessels.

 issuing hot work permits.

 doing all confined space entry work

 leak seeking

 verifying gas-free conditions.

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Procedure for Gas Detection Equipment

Page 7 of 11

5.2 GAS TESTERS

Personnel required to operate portable gas detectors shall have completed the

training programme for Authorised Gas Tester Level 1 or Level 2 and shall be

formally appointed by the Site Manager for carrying out gas test (see Safe System of

Work UNIF-HSE-PRO-104 Authorisation).

All training will be conducted by qualified personnel only and will be documented and

kept on file.

5.2.1 Gas Tester Level 1

An Authorised Gas Tester Level 1 is authorised to test for the presence of flammable

gas or vapour, toxic gas and oxygen, and in particular to test atmospheres in

‘Confined Spaces’ as defined in UNIF-HSE-PRO-108 - Confined Space Entry

5.2.2 Gas Tester Level 2

An Authorised Gas Tester Level 2 is authorised to test for the presence of flammable

gas or vapour.

5.3 OPERATION

5.3.1 Personal Protective Equipment

Warning: It must be understood that testing an area because there is a possibility of

a hazardous condition, the person conducting the test must be protected

from the potential hazard and be properly equipped with the necessary

safety equipment.

Fire resistant clothing is advisable where it is available.

5.3.2 Test Criteria

Testing procedures must conform to the following criteria.

 The test must be valid and accurate which means that the correct instrument

of known accuracy was used in such a manner as to give the true picture.

 The person using the instrument must make sure that the instrument is giving

reliable information and that it is interpreted correctly.

 The goal of the test is not to show vapours within certain limits but to show the

actual picture of the entire contents of the space. If the presence of a vapour

is indicated, the space or area must be re-evaluated to determine why, and

corrective measures must be taken before work proceeds.

 Field calibration records must be documented by the tester. This

documentation should include the serial number of the unit, the date and

results of the calibration and the name of the person performing the

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Procedure for Gas Detection Equipment

Page 9 of 11

5.3.3 Test Location

Location is important because the hazard may be restricted to a small portion of the

entire volume. Therefore, it is important to test the whole volume. If the vapour or

gas has a specific gravity which is different from that of air, there may be lighter

gases collecting at the top of the space while the heavier ones will hug the floor and

collect in pits and sumps.

Note: Most flammable gases are heavier than air and will settle in low-lying areas.

5.3.4 Reading Interpretation

The operator must always watch the meter while testing. The needle can quickly rise

and fall in a high concentration and come to rest on that part of the scale that would

indicate a safe reading, yet in actual fact, an extremely dangerous concentration

could exist. This is particularly evident when strong concentrations of explosive

vapour are in an oxygen deficient atmosphere.

Some instruments cannot be used in oxygen deficient atmospheres. In these cases

detector tubes will be used to give accurate readings.

5.3.5 Handling Portable Gas Detectors

Sampling Hoses:

Select the correct sampling hose for the specific application and always use the

shortest length of sampling hose

(this will minimize the possibility of vapours

condensing in the hose).

Before Use:

Before use, check the:

 calibration of the instrument to be sure it is reading accurately.

 battery voltage and/or zero adjustment periodically.

 instruments for tightness.

Purging:

Whenever a reading is obtained, purge the instrument in fresh air, and take a second

test to be certain of an accurate reading.

Purge the indicator by drawing in fresh air, even if another sample is not to be taken

right away, as this removes any possibility of contamination by corrosive gases in the

combustion chamber.

Restrictions in Use:

Warning: Do not remove the flashback arrestors from the instrument. They

prevent the explosion that occurs in the combustion chamber from

passing back to the mixture being sampled.

 Do not sample high temperatures with a cold instrument. Condensation may

occur and give a false reading. Whenever possible, the instrument must be at

the same temperature as the vapour being sampled.

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Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00052-2>>

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Procedure for Gas Detection Equipment

Page 10 of 11

 Do not use the indicator for sampling gasoline vapours containing TEL

(tetrathylead, liquefied lead additive) unless the indicator has been approved

for this specific application.

 Do not let the sampling hose or probe reach into a liquid.

 Do not adjust the voltage when a sample is in combustion chamber.

5.4 CALIBRATION

5.4.1 Before Use

Portable combustible gas indicators shall be inspected and field calibrated, in

accordance with the manufacturers instruction, prior to use.

All field calibration tests will be done upwind, in a clean fresh air environment, away

from the area to be tested. The reasons for testing in this area are to ensure:

 the instrument is not contaminated and therefore may give false readings.

 that personnel are in a safe working environment.

5.4.2 Additional Calibration

If the instrument is to be used numerous times during a shift, it may only be

necessary to calibrate prior to the initial use unless the instrument:

 has been dropped

 used in a highly contaminated environment

 has been subjected to fluid entry

 has been subjected to extreme temperature change.

5.4.3 Calibration Method

There are two steps to thorough calibration:

 Set the Zero in air and the span using a certified known gas /air calibration

gas.

 Perform a function test in the field (a solvent marker will be enough to activate

the alarm on a combustible gas sensor).

Note: Function tests do not replace calibration. Function tests are only used to

confirm operation of the sensor and alarms.

Warning: Using a butane lighter to activate the alarm during function testing is

dangerous

5.4.4 Calibration Records

Field calibration and maintenance records must be documented by operating

personnel and maintained on file at the local field office.

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Hot Work Policy

Page 3 of 17

INTRODUCTION

1.1.

Purpose

This document sets out the precautions and conditions considered necessary for the

safety of all Hot Works carried out on BP owned or managed sites in Azerbaijan and

Georgia. It has been produced so that all involved parties can make a uniform

approach hot work activities.

1.2.

Scope

The contents of this procedure are applicable to all BP owned and managed sites /

installations in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Contractors working on BP owned or

managed sites / installations are also responsible for alignment with this procedure.

This document does not replace the procedures prepared and adopted by specialist

contractors. Neither does it supersede any national and local regulatory

requirements. However contractors will not be permitted to perform works on BP

AzSPU sites without proper work control certification.

This procedure contributes to compliance with the “HSE expectations” contained in

“getting HSE right”, the „Golden Rules of Safety‟ and the Control of Work (CoW)

standard that the Hazards associated with BP activities are identified and that the

risks are assessed and managed.

All guidelines contained shall be regarded as the minimum requirements for BP

owned or managed sites / installations in Azerbaijan and Georgia.

The scope covers defined activities of BP and Contractors at all BP AzSPU sites and

installations.

1.3.

Legislation & Standards

The aim of this Safe System of Work is to achieve “no accidents”, “no harm to

people” and “no damage to the environment”. To achieve this aim, this SSOW

complies with National Legislation, the terms of the Production Sharing Agreement

(PSA) and mandatory BP Standards.

The best International Oil Industry practice has been adopted to reduce the level of

risk to ALARP.

In the absence of local regulations, BP Group Standards will apply. In addition,

appropriate UK and US regulations and industry best practice have been considered

in setting suitable goals and targets.

1.4.

Company Requirements

It is a company requirement that all tasks are subjected to an assessment of risk to

demonstrate that risks have been reduced to as low a level as reasonably practicable

(ALARP). This can be achieved by complying with the Company‟s existing standards.

Where compliance with Company standards cannot reasonably be achieved, a

formal level 2 Risk Assessment will be undertaken to identify any additional controls

and demonstrate that risks remain as low as reasonably practicable. Whether by

compliance with Company Standards or through level 2 Risk Assessment, the

Company‟s Golden Rules of Safety must be complied with. Golden Rules are non-

negotiable.

Control Tier:

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Revision Date: 15 March 2008

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00053-2>>

Print Date: 7/24/2010

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Hot Work Policy

Page 4 of 17

1.5.

Stopping Unsafe Work

To stop the continuation of potentially unsafe work at the earliest possible stage, the

Control of Work (CoW) Policy and this procedure for Hot Work make it very clear that

all personnel are obliged and have the authority to

“STOP” the work that they

consider to be unsafe.

1.6.

Deviations

This procedure is written in sufficient detail that it should be able to be applied

consistently at all sites / installations. There may still be the requirement for some

local rules covering site / installation specific logistical/administrative arrangements

and local variations in responsibilities to reflect differences in organisational

arrangements. These local rules should not deviate from the core processes within

this document. Any form of deviation from this procedure, including but not limited to

local rules, shall be requested and authorised in accordance with SSOW, Deviations

from Regulations and Procedures (Doc. No: AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00011-2).

1.7.

Document Review

This document will be reviewed on an annual basis when users from the sites /

installations will have an opportunity to propose changes to the existing processes

and procedures. The document Technical Authority will be responsible for

coordinating this review.

1.8.

SSOW Cross References

In carrying out any such Hot Work Naked Flame activity, compliance to AZSPU

SSOW management system shall apply. As a minimum, reference shall be made to

the following:

SSOW

Document Number

Title of Procedure

AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00060-2

Permit to Work

AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00063-2

Task Risk Assessment

AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00048-2

Energy Isolations-Electrical

AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00049-2

Energy Isolations-Process

AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00013-2

Confined Space Entry

AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00002-2

BP Control of Work Standards

1.9.

Language Facilitation

Due to the various languages spoken at sites / installations, there is a necessity to

assist all with “an ease of understanding”. Therefore, the development and use of

information tools are available.

1.10. Procedure Summary

A Procedure Summary has been developed in a form of a leaflet, which can be

carried by the Line Supervisors while conducting their day-to-day work tasks. The

Leaflet summarizes the contents of this Procedure for Hot Work. The Procedure

Summary can also be used as a guideline for Line Supervisors to deliver their daily

toolbox talk. (See Appendix C)

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Hot Work Policy

Page 5 of 17

DEFINITIONS

Hazardous Area

Plant areas processing highly flammable

materials, e.g. gas and condensate

ALARP

As Low As is Reasonably Practical

Hot Work

Covers the use of any device, tool or

equipment that produces flame, sparks,

arcs, heat or hot particles having enough

energy to ignite flammable or

combustible materials

A combustible material

Any material that will burn, while a

flammable material is a gas or liquid that

is easily ignited by most low-energy heat

sources.

HWNF

Hot Work Naked Flame

HWSP

Hot Work Spark Potential

SSOW

Safe System of Work

Site Manager

Site Controller

OIM

Offshore Installation Manager

Area Authority

Performing authority

PTW

Permit to Work

TRA

Task Risk Assessment

ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES

3.1.

Site Manager (SM) / Site Controller (SC) / Offshore Installation Manager

(OIM)

The Site Manager

/ Site Controller

/ Offshore Installation Manager shall be

responsible and accountable for the application of this procedure in his area of

responsibility, He shall ensure:

 That adequate numbers of Competent responsible persons are appointed to

manage and maintain the requirements of this procedure

 That this procedure is strictly adhered to for all occasions when it is identified

that hot work is to take place.

 That formal records of all SimOps risk assessments are maintained in

accordance with this procedure

3.2.

Area Authority (AA)

The Area Authority shall be responsible for ensuring that the requirements of this

procedure are adhered to within his area of responsibility. He shall be responsible for

ensuring:

 That hot work activities have been risk assessed and planned

 That all persons involved in hot work activities are instructed on the

requirements of risk assessment, permit to work conditions, and any risks or

hazards associated with the work activity

 That regular inspection is performed on all hot work activities to confirm that

conditions are suitable and sufficient and, that all personnel are in compliance

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Hot Work Policy

Page 6 of 17

with this procedure, and that good housekeeping practices are being

implemented to limit or eliminate the potential for fire.

 That the Performing Authority performs Risk Assessments, and conducts

Toolbox Talks associated with hot work activities.

3.3.

Performing Authority (PA)

The Performing authority shall ensure;

 The compliance of all personnel under their supervision with this procedure

when involved in hot work activities

 That a risk assessment has been performed and a toolbox talk conducted

 That all personnel are informed of, and understand, the risks associated with

the task they are performing, and any associated works that may affect their

work activity

 That the activity is executed in accordance with this procedure

 That hot work activities are halted if an unsafe situation occurs.

 That good housekeeping practices are implemented at all work areas

 That work activities have been reviewed and pertinent information exchanged

with all other affected parties.

3.4.

Employees

All employees shall be responsible for:

 Compliance with this procedure when involved in hot work activities

 Implementing good housekeeping practices

 Informing their immediate Supervisor should any unsafe situation occurs

 Awareness of other personnel and ongoing works in their area

POLICY & CLARITY

4.1.

Policy

The Azerbaijan Strategic Performance Unit (AZSPU) policy relating to hot work

naked flame activities in hazardous areas is that:

 Engineering shall minimize the need for hot work and provide cost effective

alternatives by careful consideration during the design phase.

 It is not permitted unless all other alternatives have been totally exhausted.

 Appropriate level of authorization has been obtained - PUL & EA (ref. 5.1)

When such work is unavoidable it is necessary to ensure that the activity is planned

and activities recorded and approved demonstrating that ALARP requirements have

been met. In meeting ALARP the following shall be considered:

 Record Management justification for considering naked flame work, including

consideration of alternatives.

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Hot Work Policy

Page 7 of 17

 Identify and classify the potential sources of release.

 Determine the extent of the probable risk areas.

 Carry out a formal risk assessment.

Only when these steps have been completed and with the approval of the Asset

Manager may the Area Authority consider the issue of a Hot Work (Naked Flame)

Permit.

If Naked Flame work is considered to be justifiable under these requirements, the

guidance in this document provides a logical and safe application methodology.

4.2.

Clarity

Permit for Hot Work could involve any of the following activities:

 Naked flames (welding, flame cutting)

 Electrical welding

 Electrical induction pre-heating, stress relieving or use of high temperature

thermal calibrators (above 200°C), except in authorised workshops

 Use of portable grinders (air or electrically powered)

 Abrasive wheels

 Use of flare guns

 Use of heat shrink blowers in hazardous zones

 Use of equipment or work on pipe work or vessels contaminated or

potentially contaminated with pyrophoric scale

Note 1: A Hot Work (Naked Flame) Permit is not required for operations and/or

maintenance activities involving ignited gas flares or permanently mounted plant

using an enclosed flame (boilers, inert gas generators, etc).

RISK ASSESSMENT

5.1.

Key Risk Issues

It is BP policy that hot work (naked flame) should not be carried out in hazardous

areas (Zones 0, 1 and 2) whilst the plant is online and/or under the pressure.

Alternative engineering solutions should always be sought for activities that require

hot work.

Normally work of this nature should be carried out during planned turnarounds when

the plant can be depressurized, drained and made hydrocarbon free.

In circumstances where the OIM/Site Controller/Asset Manager consider that hot

work could be safely carried out in a hazardous area and where there is no other

practicable alternative, the following precautions are required:

 A level 2 Risk Assessment outlining rigorous control measures must be

conducted

 Before the work commences approval must be obtained from the PUL and

Engineering Authority

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Hot Work Policy

Page 8 of 17

The Key Risk Issues associated with hot work in hazardous areas are the ignition

potential to any local hydrocarbon residues or a leak, which could lead to a localised

fire impact on personnel and potential escalation. Hot work would also require that

local fire detection systems would need to be inhibited.

Any hot work within a zone which is not designated a hazardous shall be carried out

under Hot Work PTW system following appropriate RA and approval process.

5.2.

Background

These requirements are loosely based on hazardous area classification for selection

of electrical equipment. They are not identical and care should be taken not to

confuse the results, which may differ significantly

(The electrical techniques

examines plant in normal operation while these guidelines are concerned with

abnormal operation)

The requirements are based on the:

 Identification of any item from which flammable material may be released and

then,

 The assessment of the extent of the risk area likely to be affected if

flammable material is released

Hot work sites must be prepared in such a manner that fires or explosions cannot

result from the work. To do this, it is essential to take all of the steps necessary to

keep flammable and combustible materials away from hot work ignition sources.

However, a combustible liquid that is confined at a temperature near its flash point

becomes highly flammable when it escapes from confinement.

Preparing for safe hot work requires knowing sources of flammable and combustible

materials and operating conditions, which could adversely affect conditions at the

work site. The people who prepare the hot work sites also have an obligation to help

protect the people who do the work against other hazards. Such hazards include hot,

corrosive or toxic materials, hot atmospheres, harmful chemicals and unsafe access.

For extent of Designated Zones and their detailed use in different kind of plants (on-

shore / off-shore) refer to API RP 505 and ETP 44-60.

WORKPLACE PRECAUTIONS

Standard precautions are detailed in SSOW.

Additional measures may be taken to reduce risks where this is considered to be

reasonably practicable. Such measures may include the provision of barriers, (such

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Hot Work Policy

Page 10 of 17

Appendix A: Checklists

These checklists are to assist the Area Authority of the precautions, which may be

required in completing a Hot Work permit for naked flame work in a hazardous area.

A completed copy of the appropriate checklist is to be attached to the top (performing

authority) copy of the permit and filed with the permit on completion. A new checklist

is required for each permit; it is not permitted to use the same checklist for

continuation permits when the work lasts more than one day.

In view of the importance of monitoring flammable materials when performing naked

flame hot works in hazardous areas the Area Authority may require to specify the

location of any portable gas detectors. It may even be necessary to mark the

required position of the detectors on site to prevent inadvertent misplacement.

Title: Checklist prior to and During Hot Work

Prior to work starting (by area authority)

When Noted on Permit

Required

Precaution

(Delete as necessary)

If not required

Consult HSE Advisor over Emergency

Yes

Response Plan

Habitat for Hot Work (complete

Yes

additional checklist)

Yes

Provide Forced Ventilation

Yes

Provide fire blankets

Mandatory

Barrier off area

Mandatory

Warning notices around worksite

Yes

Check calibration of fixed gas heads

Work squad familiarisation with fire

Yes

equipment

Yes

Test deluge prior to start

Yes

Inform CCR

Mandatory

PA prior to start of work

During Work (by performing authority)

When Noted on Permit

Required

Precaution

(Delete as necessary)

If not required

Specified location for portable gas

Yes

monitors

Mandatory

Permanent Firewatcher

Yes

Radio contact with control room

Production operator to monitor plant

Yes

pressure

Yes

Ground monitor linked to fire hydrant

All fire doors to/from area to be kept

Yes

shut

Control Tier:

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Hot Work Policy

Page 11 of 17

Appendix B: Habitats

A temporary habitat is a temporary construction used to protect personnel and/or a

work site from weather and interference from surrounding processes. Temporary

habitats are made from scaffold and tarpaulins, purpose made rigid boarding or

similar materials and shall be of the following types:

Type 1 Personnel/Equipment Habitat

This type of habitat is solely for the use of protecting personnel or equipment from

the weather. These can be further defined as equipment storage areas or weather

shelters where no work activities are being performed.

Type 2 Work Habitat

This type of habitat is sheeted out to protect a worksite from surrounding plant

conditions and weather to allow cold work activities to be carried out in a hazardous

area. Hot work (naked flame) may be carried out in these habitats during full area

shutdowns (turnarounds) providing that the area ahs been proved to be hydrocarbon

free and deemed unclassified under the hazardous area zone classification.

Type 3 Positive Pressure Habitat

This type of habitat allows hot (naked flame) to be carried out in, or within 15 m of

hazardous area.

Habitats shall:

 Be built so that an Entry Attendant can be posted outside and ensure

communication with personnel inside the habitat

 Have the exit clearly marked, both inside and out. The exit shall be capable of

being opened from either side. If the habitat obstructs a walkway, then

suitable barriers shall be erected together with warning signs

 Have radio communication made available to the Entry Attendant whilst the

habitat is in use to raise the alarm in the event of a gas detector activating or

emergency situations

 The minimum number of personnel allowed in the habitat is two with one of

the inhabitants acting as Firewatcher

 Have all gas cylinders located outside the habitat, and any hoses and torches

used removed from the habitat at work breaks and at completion of the task

 Have a foam fire extinguisher available inside the habitat and a dry powder

extinguisher externally

 Have a pressure set firewater hose with spraying nozzle laid out to the habitat

from the nearest hydrant or drum and placed so that it can easily be operated

by the Firewatcher from outside the habitat

 Only fire retardant material shall be used in the construction

Positive Pressure Habitats used for hot work (naked flame) shall:

 Have an entrance that maintains positive pressure

 Have the exit clearly marked, both inside and out. The exit shall be capable of

being opened from either side. If the habitat obstructs a walkway, then

suitable barriers shall be erected together with warning signs

 Have radio communication made available to the Entry Attendant whilst the

habitat is in use to raise the alarm in the event of a gas detector activating or

emergency situations

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Page 12 of 17

 Have an overpressure of 5 to 20mm water gauge (can be monitored by the

aid of slanting pipe fluid manometer)

 Have an exterior manometer for read-off of overpressure in the habitat

 Be built so as to minimise possible hydrocarbon leakage points in the habitat

 Pressurisation shall be by air circulation drawn from a safe zone well away

from any noxious fumes taking account of wind direction and release sources.

The source of air for the inlet duct shall be at least 2m inside a designated

safe zone that has been declared gas free. The exhaust vent shall be ducted,

from a point opposite to the inlet, to a safe, open air zone. Inlet and outlet

ducts shall be protected and either marked with signs or guarded so that

obstruction is prevented. The ducts shall be clearly marked at both ends „For

Habitat Use - Do Not Remove‟

 Radio communication shall be made available to the Entry Attendant whilst

the habitat is in use to raise the alarm in the event of a gas detector activating

or emergency situations

Precautions

Habitats that are constructed for hot work require special precautions to be

considered to mitigate against risk of fire to the habitat itself. Habitats in this case will

be constructed from fire retardant sheeting and additional protection will be required

in the form of fire blankets in the direct vicinity of the hot work area to include floor,

and in some cases walls and ceilings.

Note: It must be remembered that although fire retardant material should be used

throughout, this material in certain circumstances can still support a fire.

It is difficult to specify exactly what specific precaution should be taken as each job

will be different. The following checksheet must be used to identify what precautions

have been put in place; this must be completed for each habitat.

Checklist Prior To Habitat for Hot Work

FACILITY:

APPROVAL TO PROCEED WITH THE WORKSCOPE

Area Authorities Signature:

Date:

To be completed /signed/approved prior to the commencement of Naked Flame Work

Yes

Is the housing secure, safe, made of fire retardant material and sturdy enough to hold

men and equipment?

Are the entrance and exit satisfactory and are they identified?

Is the inside of habitat and any combustible fabric lined with fire blankets and is the fire

blanket secured to ensure that it stays in place within the habitat.

Will any welding debris etc. be contained within the habitat and neither come into

contact with the habitat structure nor fall out of the habitat into the external

environment?

Is the habitat of sufficient size for at least 2 men to carry out the job within minimum

restriction?

Is the inside of the habitat free from combustible material?

Is the pressurising air supplied from at least 2 meters within a safe area and is the

ducting properly secured?

Is the duct marked „FOR HABITAT USE - DO NOT REMOVE‟?

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Is the air supply to air movers marked „FOR HABITAT USE - DO NOT REMOVE‟?

Is the exhaust ducting vented out of the module

Can the pressure within the habitat be maintained at a pressure above atmospheric

pressure? State test pressure achieved:

_______________________

Is the exit from the habitat of sufficient size to allow easy escape in an emergency and

is there a suitable viewing port?

Is the area at the pressurising duct inlet, gas free?

Have all open ended pipes, not subject to work scope been blanked?

(Not applicable means yes)

NOTE:

The answers to all the above questions must be „YES‟ . Any conditions which do not meet the

procedure requirements must be rectified before the habitat can be put into service.

APPROVAL OF THE HABITAT

Habitat Build Responsible Person

Signature:…………………………….…………………………… Date: …………………………………………….

Area Authority

Signature: ………………………………………………………… Date: ……………………………………………..

2^nd Auditor

Signature: …………………………………………………………. Date: ……………………………………………

APPROVAL TO PROCEED WITH THE WORKSCOPE

OIM Signature: ……………………………………………….

Date: …………………………………………..

Control Tier:

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Page 14 of 17

APPENDIX C: Procedure Summary

HOT WORK

The Area Authority shall be responsible for ensuring:

hydrocarbon residues or a leak, which could lead to a localised

¾ That Hot Work activities have been risk assessed

fire impact on personnel and potential escalation. Hot work

Policy

and planned

would also require that local fire detection systems would need

The AzSPU policy relating to hot work naked flame activities in

¾ That all persons involved in Hot Work activities are

to be inhibited.

hazardous areas is that, It shall not be permitted unless all other

instructed on the requirements of Risk assessment,

alternatives have been totally exhausted. When such work is

PTW conditions and any hazards associated with the

These requirements are loosely based on hazardous area

unavoidable it is necessary to ensure that the following is

work activity

classification for selection of electrical equipment. They are not

considered:

¾ That regular inspection is performed on all Hot Work

identical and care should be taken not to confuse the results,

¾ Record management justification for considering naked flame

activities to confirm that conditions are suitable and

which may differ significantly

(The electrical techniques

work, including consideration of alternatives

sufficient and, that all personnel are in compliance

examines plant in normal operation while these guidelines are

¾ Identify and classify the potential sources of release

with this procedure, and that good housekeeping

concerned with abnormal operation)

¾ Determine the extent of the probable risk areas

practices are being implemented

¾ Carry out formal Risk assessment

¾ That the Performing Authority performs Risk

The requirements are based on the:

assessments and conducts Toolbox Talks associated

¾ Identification of any item from which flammable material

Only when these steps have been completed and with the approval

with Hot Works

may be released (the "source of release"), and then,

of the Asset Manager may the Area Authority consider the issue of

¾ The assessment of the extent of the area (the "risk area")

a Hot work (naked flame) Permit.

The Performing Authority shall ensure:

likely to be affected if flammable material is released

¾ The compliance of all personnel under their

For Clarity

supervision when involved in Hot Work activities

Hot work sites must be prepared in such a manner that fires or

A Permit for Hot work could involve any of the following activities:

¾ That a risk assessment has been performed and a

explosions cannot result from the work. To do this, it is

¾ Naked flames (welding, flame cutting)

toolbox talk conducted

essential to take all of the steps necessary to keep flammable

¾ Electrical welding

¾ That all personnel are informed of, and understand,

and combustible materials away from hot work ignition sources.

¾ Electrical induction pre-heating, stress relieving or use of high

the risks associated with the task they are

However, a combustible liquid that is confined at a temperature

temperature thermal calibrators

(above200°C), except in

performing, and any associated works that may

near its flash point becomes highly flammable when it escapes

authorised workshops

affect their work activity

from confinement.

¾ Use of portable grinders (air or electrical powered)

¾ That the activity is executed in accordance with this

¾ Abrasive wheels

procedure

Preparing for safe hot work requires knowing sources of

¾ Use of flare guns

¾ That hot work activities are halted if an unsafe

flammable and combustible materials and operating conditions,

¾ Use of heat shrink blowers in hazardous zones

situation occurs.

which could adversely affect conditions at the work site. The

¾ Use of equipment or work on pipe work or vessels

¾ That good housekeeping practices are implemented

people who prepare the hot work sites also have an obligation

contaminated or potentially contaminated with pyrophoric scale

at all work areas

to help protect the people who do the work against other

¾ That work activities have been reviewed and

hazards. Such hazards include hot, corrosive or toxic materials,

NOTE: A Hot work (naked flame) Permit is not required for

pertinent information exchanged with all other

hot atmospheres, harmful chemicals and unsafe access.

operations and/or maintenance activities involving ignited gas flares

affected parties

or permanently mounted plant using an enclosed flame (boilers,

inert gas generators, etc)

All employees shall be responsible for:

Workplace Precautions

¾ Compliance with this procedure when involved in hot

Additional measures may be taken to reduce risks where

Responsibilities

work activities

this is considered to be reasonably practicable. Such

The SM/SC/OIM is responsible and accountable, he shall ensure:

¾ Implementing good housekeeping practices

measures may include the provision of barriers, (such as

¾ That adequate numbers of competent responsible persons are

¾ Informing their immediate Supervisor should any

fire-blankets or tarpaulins), a habitat around the

appointed to manage and maintain the requirements of this

unsafe situation occurs

workplace, or forced ventilation. These precautions may

procedure

¾ Awareness of other personnel and ongoing works in

reduce the extent of the risk area.

¾ That this procedure is strictly adhered to for all occasions when

their area

Insulated Flanges

it is identified that Hot Works are to take place

Where flanges are covered by insulation consideration

¾ That formal records of all SimOps risk assessments are

Risk Assessment

shall be given to removing the insulation to enable a

maintained in accordance with this procedure

The Key Risk Issues associated with hot work in

satisfactory gas test.

hazardous areas are the ignition potential to any local

Control Tier:

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Hot Work Policy

Page 15 of 17

Open Drains

Where it is possible for flammable materials to drain in to open

drains, the drains shall be considered to be high risk unless the

drain lines are isolated and the drains flushed though to

remove flammable materials. After a satisfactory gas test such

flushed drains may then be considered to be low risk.

Non-Process Flammable Materials

In general, liquid fuels commonly used offshore are not

considered to be volatile provided that hot work is carried out

so that such fuels are not heated. A level 2 risk assessment

shall be carried out to define the control measures required to

ensure that work is carried out to avoid heating of such fuels

and in particular the precautions to be taken around the vents

on aviation fuel systems.

Habitats

Habitats shall:

¾ Be built so that an Entry Attendant can be posted outside

and ensure communication with personnel inside the

habitat

¾ Have the exit clearly marked, both inside and out. The exit

shall be capable of being opened from either side. If the

habitat obstructs a walkway, then suitable barriers shall be

erected together with warning signs

¾ Have radio communication made available to the Entry

Attendant whilst the habitat is in use to raise the alarm in

the event of a gas detector activating or emergency

situations

¾ The minimum number of personnel allowed in the habitat

is two with one of the inhabitants acting as Firewatcher

¾ Have all gas cylinders located outside the habitat, and any

hoses and torches used removed from the habitat at work

breaks and at completion of the task

¾ Have a foam fire extinguisher available inside the habitat

and a dry powder extinguisher externally

¾ Have a pressure set firewater hose with spraying nozzle

laid out to the habitat from the nearest hydrant or drum

and placed so that it can easily be operated by the

Firewatcher from outside the habitat

¾ Only fire retardant material shall be used in the

construction

Control Tier:

<<2>>

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Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00053-2>>

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Page 17 of 17

Revision/Review Log

Revision Date

Authority

Custodian

Revision Details

09 September

Alan McNulty

Esmira

Initial Issue

2004

Akhundova

15 March 2008

Alan McNulty

Abbas Islamov

Table of Contents changed as follows:

(AzSPU CH&S

(Central Safety

Section 3 is now Responsibilities; Section 4 is

Manager)

TL)

now Policy and Clarity.

General.

Section 1. Introduction. The Section now

consists of 10 new paragraphs substituting 2

replaced ones - Policy and Clarity, they are:

1.1 - Purpose; 1.2 - Scope; 1.3 - Legislation;

1.4 - Company Requirements; 1.5 - Stopping

Unsafe Work; 1.6 - Deviations; 1.7 - Document

Review; 1.8 - SSOW Cross References; 1.9 -

Language Facilitation; 1.10 - Procedure

Summary.

Section 2. Definitions. The previous title

„Definitions and Abbreviations‟ was altered to

„Definitions‟. 10 new definitions were added.

Section 3. Responsibilities. New section

consisting of 4 paragraphs defining the roles

and responsibilities of key personnel.

Section 7. Non-Process Flammable

Meterials. It is deleted as making the

Procedure inconsistent with its toughening as to

permissibilities and deviations.

Appendix B Describes now the use of Habitats.

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Page 2 of 43

Incident Investigation and Reporting

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

1.1

PURPOSE

1.2

SCOPE

1.3

CONTRACTOR INVESTIGATIONS

RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1

ALL PERSONNEL

2.2

SPU LEADER (SPUL)

2.3

VICE PRESIDENT (VP) OR NOMINATED PERFORMANCE UNIT LEADER (PUL)

2.4

SITE MANAGER

2.5

INCIDENT OWNER

2.6

INVESTIGATOR / INVESTIGATION TEAM

2.7

APPROVER

2.8

INCIDENT REPORT ORIGINATOR

2.9

RESPONSIBLE PARTY

2.10

CENTRAL HS&ER MANAGER

CORPORATE REPORTING & NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

3.1

SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES

3.1.1

Site Manager/OIM

Error! Bookmark not defined.10

3.1.2

Operations/Asset Manager

Error! Bookmark not defined.10

3.1.3

Performance Unit Leader (PUL)

Error! Bookmark not defined.10

3.1.4

Vice President (VP)

Error! Bookmark not defined.10

3.1.5

Strategic Performance Unit Leader (SPUL)

Error! Bookmark not

defined.10

3.2

INFORMATION REQUIRED

3.3

INCIDENT NOTIFICATION FLOW

1110

THE INVESTIGATION PROCESS

4.1

DETERMINING INCIDENT SEVERITY

4.1.1

Major Incident (Definition)

4.1.2

High Potential Incident (HiPo) Determination

4.2

TRACTION

4.3

ESTABLISH INVESTIGATION TEAM

4.4

TERMS OF REFERENCE

4.5

TEAM SELECTION

4.6

TEAM MOBILISATION

4.7

CONDUCT INVESTIGATION

4.7.1

Scope and Objectives

4.8

FACT FINDING

4.9

ESTABLISH THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

4.10

ESTABLISH AND ANALYZE FINDINGS

4.10.1 Identify Critical Factors and Causes and Make Recommendations ... 17

4.10.2 System Cause Analysis

4.10.3 Antecedent Behaviour Consequence Analysis (ABC Analysis)

4.10.4 System Cause Analysis - Example

4.11

COMPILE REPORT

4.11.1 Records

4.11.2 Report Outline

4.12

NON-CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS

Control Tier:

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Incident Investigation and Reporting

4.13

REVIEW WITH MANAGEMENT

4.13.1 BP Management

4.13.2 Contractors

4.13.3 Agree with Owner

2120

4.14

ACTIONS

4.14.1 Prioritization

4.14.2 Owner

4.14.3 Responsible Party

4.14.4 Close-Out of Actions and use of Traction system

4.15

INCIDENT REPORT ORIGINATOR

REPORT DISTRIBUTION

ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.22

DISTRIBUTION OF LESSONS LEARNED

STORAGE OF RECORDS

7.1

MAJOR INCIDENTS

7.2

MINOR INCIDENTS

APPENDIX A - MAJOR INCIDENT NOTIFICATION PRO-FORMA

APPENDIX B - HIGH POTENTIAL INCIDENT NOTIFICATION PRO-FORMA25

10 APPENDIX C - MODEL TERMS OF REFERENCE TEMPLATE

11 APPENDIX D - COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF CAUSES CHART

12 APPENDIX E - DEFINITIONS

13 APPENDIX F - INJURY AND ILLNESS REPORTING DECISION TREE

14 APPENDIX G. SEVERITY MATRIX - HSE IMPACT LEVELS

15 APPENDIX H. SEVERITY MATRIX - BUSINESS IMPACT LEVELS

16 APPENDIX I. SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION - LOPC OF FLAMMABLE GASES,

LIQUIDS AND OTHERS

17 APPENDIX J. SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION -

LOPC

OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES………………………………………………………...38

18 APPENDIX K. Exports PU Internal Incident Notification

Requirements for Illegal taps incidents …………………………….………….39

19 APPENDIX L. Onshore Operations External Notification Requirements….40

20 APPENDIX M. LESSONS LEARNED DOCUMENT FORMAT………………….41

REVISION/REVIEW LOG…………………………………………………………..……

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Incident Investigation and Reporting

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE

This document describes the procedures employed for investigating incidents related to

BP activities in the Azerbaijan Strategic Performance Unit (AzSPU) and in the preparation

of associated reports.

Note: The prime objectives of such an investigation are to establish the causes, analyze

them and make recommendations to prevent recurrence of a similar incident. It is

not to attribute blame.

1.2 SCOPE

This process is to be used for all types of incidents, including:

 Fatalities

 Workplace injuries and illness

 Security breaches

 Spills and leaks

 Vehicle accidents

 Near misses with G+ potential severity (refer to Severity Matrices in Appendices

G-J)

 Process safety incidents e.g. overpressure of design plant, excursion from

design temperature, formation of hydrate plugs, misdirection of process fluids,

ESD or pressure safety valves lifting (whether to flare or vent)

 Plant/technical integrity incidents i.e any incident where the root cause would be

addressed by the IM Standard and there is actual or potential harm to people or

the environment, including loss of primary containment or failure of an

engineered system.

All events resulting in workplace injure, industrial illness, damage to assets and

environmental harm (together with near miss events in these categories) are to be

reported immediately to the supervisor and / or the BP representative.

1.3 CONTRACTOR INVESTIGATIONS

Contractor management may wish to conduct a separate internal incident investigation for

serious incidents involving contractor employees. BP policy is to respect the wishes of

contractors, and to encourage completion of a joint investigation in a cooperative manner

with representatives of both BP and affected contractors.

For incidents that occur at BP controlled sites or activities the investigation shall should be

led by BP representative.

2 RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1 ALL PERSONNEL

Any person involved in or observing an accident or near miss must immediately report it to

his / her supervisor or BP Representative.

Control Tier:

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Incident Investigation and Reporting

2.2 SPU LEADER (SPUL)

SPU Leader is responsible and accountable for ensuring that this procedure is

implemented in the Business Unit and for reporting major incidents and HiPos to the

corporation.

SPU Leader is responsible for

 Notification of a Major Incident to the appropriate Group Vice President through

personal conversation within 8 hours

 Issue of MIA/HiPo notification

 Is the “owner” of all major incidents in AzSPU

2.3 VICE PRESIDENT (VP) OR NOMINATED PERFORMANCE UNIT LEADER (PUL)

Vice President (VP) or nominated PUL is responsible and accountable for:

 Ensuring that this procedure is implemented in their performance units

 Reporting MIA/HiPo/DAFWC incidents to SPU leader

 Owner of DAFWC and HiPo severity incidents in their respective PUs

2.4 SITE MANAGER

Site Manager is responsible to estimate the worst probable (not imaginable) outcome of

the particular incident and make an initial assessment of the severity of an incident and

determine the level of management that should own the investigation process.

(Refer to

Section 4.1)

Site Managers are responsible for:

 Initial Reporting of the Iincident

 Preservation of the incident scene

(Preserve physical data and prevent

destruction/alteration) and early collection of material evidence, making

photographs etc.

 Making an initial assessment of the severity of an incident

 Requesting Drugs and Alcohol testing whenever potential probability for

substance abuse is under question

 Obtaining initial witness statements (eyewitnesses) while incident details are still

fresh

 Instigating the appropriate investigation process

 Assuming ownership of minor incidents on his site

 Accepting the Incident Report and allocating the resultant actions.

 Ensuring that all equipment is verified to be “fit for purpose” after a significant

incident or event prior to returning to service

2.5 INCIDENT OWNER

The Owner is the individual who requested the Incident Investigation to be performed and

has the responsibility for the investigation through to closeout of the remedial actions. The

level of the Owner must commensurate with the severity or potential severity of the

incident and should be:

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 SPU Leader (SPUL) for major incidents in AzSPU - Traction actual severity A-E

 Vice President (VP) or nominated PUL is Owner for DAFWC‟s or HiPo (potential

severity A-E).

 Site/Facility/Installation Manager Traction actual or potential incident severity

Levels F-H.

The Owner shall:

 Appoint the Investigation Team

 Draw up the terms of reference for the investigation

 Ensure investigation team is provided with all resources required for

investigation

 Provide a business overview on actions prior to entry into the tracking system

and shall review each action item for confidentiality

 Review the selection of the Responsible Party for handling the action items

 Ensure that all new or reassigned action items are entered in to the Accident

and Incident database (Traction) under the appropriate category

 Review progress reports to ensure that all outstanding action items are being

completed within specified deadlines

 Take appropriate action with the Responsible Party if action items are not being

completed within the required deadline.

2.6 INVESTIGATOR / INVESTIGATION TEAM

The Investigator/Investigation Team will be appointed by the Investigation Owner (Site

Management, VP, PUL or SPUL) depending on severity of incident and is responsible for:

 Investigating the circumstances leading to the event

 Making recommendations to prevent recurrence

 Ensuring that the written report is completed.

 Ensuring the MIA‟s, HiPo‟s and DAFWC‟s report is handed over to the “owner”

The Investigation Team shall:

 Establish the situation before the incident

 Determine what happen during the incident

 Determine the critical factors

 Determine the immediate and system causes

 Determine actions to prevent recurrence of a similar incident

 Produce the incident report

Incident report should contain information described in section 4.11.2

In order to achieve these objectives the Investigation Team is required to seek any expert

advice that might enable it to provide the most informed opinion.

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2.7 APPROVER

The Approver of the Incident report is the

“Owner” of the incident and he/she is

responsible for agreeing actions with the Investigation Team who then enter actions into

Traction. If the Owner is not satisfied that the actions recommended fully address the

immediate and system causes of the incident, he should instruct the Investigation Team to

seek further advice and formulate further actions before he approves the incident report

and actions in Traction.

The Approver is responsible for assuring the quality of the investigation report and the

data entered into the Accident and Incident Reporting database (Traction).

Note: The”Owner” will normally undertake the role of Approver. MIAs will be approved by

the SPUL. HiPos and DAFWCs will be approved by the VP or nominated PUL

The Approver shall:

 Review the Incident Report to ensure an accurate document with proper root

cause analysis

 Ensure that:

o appropriate causes have been identified

o action items will effectively mitigate the hazards

o action items are clear and provide the Responsible Party with adequate

details to implement the action item

 Review the selection of the Responsible Party for handling the action item in

order to ensure that the action item has been assigned to an individual or job

position with sufficient authority and expertise to complete the action

 Approve the report in the Accident and Incident database (Traction)

2.8 INCIDENT REPORT ORIGINATOR

The Incident Report Originator is responsible for entering the Incident Report into the

Accident and Incident database.

Note: This will normally be a nominated Traction operator at the site of the incident. This

needs to be done following Traction requirements as below:

MIA/HiPo notifications should be placed into MIA/HiPo database.

MIA/HiPo database is located at: http://miahipo.bpweb.bp.com

Type of Incident

Recording

Recording System

Timescale

Major Incidents (MIAs)

<24 hours

MIA/HiPo database

Levels A-D

<5 days

Traction

Major Incidents (MIAs)

<24 hours

MIA/HiPo database

Level E - Health and Safety

<5 days

Traction

Major Incidents (MIAs)

<24 hours

MIA/HiPo database

Level E - Other

<5 days

Traction

High Potential Incidents (HiPos)

<24 hours or on

MIA/HiPo database

identification

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Incident Investigation and Reporting

<5 days

Traction

Any BP Employee Fatality in the BP Work

<24 hours

MIA/HiPo database

Environment

<5 days

Traction

Any BP Contractor Fatality in the BP Work

<24 hours

MIA/HiPo database

Environment

<5 days

Traction

Any Third Party Fatality in the BP Work

<24 hours

MIA/HiPo database

Environment

<5 days

Traction

Any non work-related Fatality in the BP Work

<24 hours

MIA/HiPo database

Environment

<5 days

Traction

Loss of Primary Containment

<5 days

Traction

(LOPC)/uncontrolled release

Day Away from Work Case-Employee

<5 days

Traction

Day Away from Work Case-Contractor

<5 days

Traction

Restricted Work/Job Transfer-Employee

<5 days

Traction

Restricted Work/Job Transfer-Contractor

<5 days

Traction

Medical Treatment-Employee

<5 days

Traction

Medical Treatment-Contractor

<5 days

Traction

Vehicle Accidents-Employee

<5 days

Traction

Vehicle Accidents-Contractor

<5 days

Traction

Spills >1 bbl

<5 days

Traction

Fires

<5 days

Traction

Explosions

<5 days

Traction

Note: The requirement of Group Security Standard is that Fraud incidents are not

reported through Traction, but should be reported in line with BP‟s Fraud Reporting

Instruction, which can be found at:

HTTP://FCANDA.BPWEB.BP.COM/DEFAULT.ASP?P=2062&MI=4719

All other type of security incidents should be recorded in Traction system.

2.9 RESPONSIBLE PARTY

The Responsible Party is the individual who has been assigned an action item arising from

an Owner‟s Incident Investigation. The Responsible Party must have sufficient authority

and expertise to carry out the action.

The Responsible Party shall:

 Review validity of assignments of an action item with the Owner, if and when

they consider the assignment inappropriate

 Take accountability for ensuring that all of his/her action items are completed by

the target date

 Take appropriate action with the Owner if the action items are not being

completed within the desired deadline

 Ensure that all comments against their action items, updates of the status of

their action items and closure of their action items when completed are entered

into the Traction database.

 Ensure actions are approved by the Owner and are closed in Traction.

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Incident Investigation and Reporting

2.10 CENTRAL HS&ER MANAGER

Central HS&ER Manager is responsible for:

 Maintaining this procedure

 Providing support to the respective Manager in setting up the Investigation

Team.

3 CORPORATE REPORTING & NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

The following paragraphs describe incident notification requirements. See also section 3.3

and Table 3.1 Incident Notification Flowchart.

3.1 SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES

All incidents shall be reported immediately to the appropriate supervisor or line manager

and through the line management to the Site Manager/OIM. The Site Manager/OIM shall

ensure that the scene of the incident is made safe and then protected from disturbance.

3.1.1 Site Manager/OIM

The Site Manager/OIM shall immediately verbally notify the Operations/Asset Manager of

any MIA, HiPo or DAFWC (Level F - Health and Safety) incidents.

The Site Manager/OIM shall verbally notify the Operations/Asset Manager of all Level F

(other than Level F - H&S) and Level G at the earliest opportunity, but within 8 hours.

The Site Manager/OIM shall verbally notify the Operations/Asset Manager of all Level H

incidents at the earliest opportunity, but within 24 hours.

3.1.2 Operations/Asset Manager

Operations/Asset Manager shall notify the PUL immediately of MIA or HiPo incidents.

The Operations/Asset Manager shall notify the PUL of DAFWC and all Level F incidents at

the earliest opportunity, but within 8 hours.

The Operations/Asset Manager shall notify the PUL of Level G - H&S incidents at the

earliest opportunity, but within 24 hours.

The Operations/Asset Manager should exercise their best judgment whether further

notification is required for all other incidents.

3.1.3 Performance Unit Leader (PUL)

The PUL shall immediately notify the line Vice President of MIA and HiPo incidents.

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Incident Investigation and Reporting

The PUL or nominee shall at the earliest opportunity, but within 8 hours send an AzSPU

email notification of MIA and HiPo incidents to

“G EUBAK MIA/HiPo Notification”

distribution list.

The PUL shall notify line Vice President of DAFWC and all Level F incidents at the earliest

opportunity, but within 24 hours.

The PUL should exercise their best judgment whether further notification is required for

Level G - H&S incidents.

3.1.4 Vice President (VP)

The VP shall immediately notify the Strategic Performance Unit Leader (SPUL) of MIA and

HiPo incidents.

The VP shall notify SPUL of Level G - H&S incidents (including DAFWC) at the earliest

opportunity, but within 24 hours.

The VP should exercise their best judgment whether further notification is required for

Level F (other than Level F - H&S) incidents.

3.1.5 Strategic Performance Unit Leader (SPUL)

The SPUL shall verbally notify the Group Vice President of an MIA and HiPo incidents at

the earliest opportunity but within 8 hours.

The initial verbal MIA and HiPo notification shall be confirmed with global email notification

within 8 hours for Level A-D and Level E - H&S incidents and within 24 hours for HiPo and

all Level E (other than H&S) by using the pro-forma reports in Appendix A for MIA and

Appendix B for HiPo.

The SPUL should exercise their best judgment whether further notification is required for

Level F - H&S incidents.

Information Required

The notifications should provide the following information:

 Type of occurrence (fire, explosion, injury, spill, etc)

 Site / location

 Date and time of incident

 Brief description of the event

 Actual severity (Level A-H)

 Injury details

 Damage

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Incident Investigation and Reporting

 Oil or chemical spilled

 Immediate corrective action taken to prevent further loss

 Contact name (person supplying information) and telephone number.

3.2 Incident Notification Flow

Figure 3.1 describes the AzSPU incident notification flowchart.

Figure 3-1 Incident Notification Flowchart

Immediately

Within 8 hours

Within 24 hours

Note 1: Figure 3-1 specifies the minimum incident notification requirements which must be

followed at all times, however more stringent notification requirements may be exercised if

deemed necessary.

Note 2: Details on the description of the actual and potential severities of accidents can be

found in Severity Matrices in Appendices G-J.

Note 3: All Major incidents (A-E levels), HiPos and certain security sensitive incidents (e.g

illegal taps) shall initially be sent to “G EUBAK MIA/HiPo Notification”, and shall not be

distributed any further without prior SPUL agreement. AzSPU outside distribution of

Lessons Learned One-Pagers, HiPlus and similar documents should not go from

individual assets but from SPUL office.

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Incident Investigation and Reporting

4 THE INVESTIGATION PROCESS

4.1 DETERMINING INCIDENT SEVERITY

The processes used to investigate an incident always follow the same principles.

However, the make up of the Investigation Team, and the investigation process followed,

is determined by the potential severity of the incident.

The first stage of the process is therefore to make an estimate of the most serious

probable outcome of the incident in order to determine the process to be followed. This

will be done by the Site Manager/OIM.

Note: Potential Incident severity is based upon the most serious probable outcome. For

example:

If a man cuts his finger with a knife, the most likely outcome of the incident is a cut

finger and the potential severity of the incident should be judged on that basis

but...

If a man cuts his finger on a power saw, the most serious probable outcome could

easily have been an amputation and the potential severity of the incident is

therefore judged to be much greater.

Additionally the Figure 4.1 below can assist in assessment of the potential severity of

incident. Refer to Appendices G-J for Actual Severity matrices.

Figure 4.1 Guidelines to Assess Potential Severity

Assessment of Potential Severity

Intent: That the potential Severity classification of an incident or unsafe/unhealthy condition is

based on the most serious probable outcome.

Ask: Under different circumstances, could the consequence of the Incident or Unsafe/Unhealthy

Condition have been more serious for the Health and Safety of People, the Environment, Business

Impact, or Privilege to Operate?

Different circumstances include but are not limited to: 

Time of day 

Weather (e.g. wind direction or strength)

Presence or absence of people going about their normal routine/business 

Exceptional intervention of people 

Similar activity with similar controls carried out by the same operation elsewhere

It shall ALWAYS be assumed that:

A source of ignition could have been present, even if the likelihood is low.

If someone or something was struck with enough energy to injure them or break the equipment, then this outcome

could have happened, even if there is no actual injury.

Be cautious: Initially consider the most serious probable outcome/consequence that might have

happened.

Consult your HSSE team for advice if the probable serious probable outcome/ consequence seem extremely

unlikely. (e.g., a wasp sting can occasionally be fatal for someone allergic to wasp stings, but a first aid case is a

much more foreseeable consequence).

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4.1.1 Major Incident (Definition)

Major incident is an incident, including a security incident, involving any one of the

following:



1 or more fatalities associated with BP operations



10 or more injuries or health effects to BP workforce, either permanent or

requiring hospital treatment for more than 24 hours.

 Significant adverse reaction from authorities, media, NGOs or the general

public

 Costs from accidental equipment and property damage, and/or loss of

business value equal to or exceeding US $ 5 Million

 Environmental Impact with A-E severity level (refer to Appendix G)

 Loss of Primary Containment with A-E severity level (refer to Appendix I-J)

4.1.2 High Potential Incident (HiPo) Determination

A High Potential Incident (HiPo) is an Incident or Unsafe/Unhealthy Condition or near miss,

including a security incident, where the most serious probable outcome is a Major Incident.

Figure 4-2 below provided to facilitate the process of decision making while determining

the HiPo relevance of the incident. Many HiPos are not identified at the time of the incident

and it is only after investigation that true the severity of the probable outcome becomes

clear. If, after investigation, an incident is found to fit these definitions, it should be

reported as a HiPo, even if it is outside the nominated reporting timeframe, or does not

explicitly meet these definitions. This requires a HiPo to be posted in the MIA/HiPo

Database system and the severity in the Traction Potential Risk Matrix to be increased to

level A-E. (Refer to severity matrices in Appendices G -J)

Figure 4-2 - HiPo Incident Determination Flowchart

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Incident Investigation and Reporting

4.2 TRACTION

Traction is a software tool designed to provide a single data entry system for all Health,

Safety, Environmental, Property Damage, Reputation and Business Interruption/Unit

Outage incidents. Traction also offers an actual and potential severity matrix that allows

the user to assess the incident severity on a consistent basis.

4.3 ESTABLISH INVESTIGATION TEAM

The responsibility to establish the Investigation Team is with the initiating PUL VP and

SPUL. An Owner for the investigation will be designated.

The Owner shall initiate the investigation by issuing

“Terms of Reference” to the

Investigation Team Leader.

4.4 TERMS OF REFERENCE

Terms of Reference detail the requirements of the investigation and give official status to

the investigation. In particular they will:

 Identify references

 Define the scope of work

 List the team members

 Provide objectives/guidance

 Indicate any requirements for intermediate reporting.

Note: The investigation shall remain strictly within the Terms of Reference and deviate

from them only after discussion with the Owner. A model Terms of Reference

template is provided in Appendix C

Copies of the Terms of Reference shall be provided to the Investigation Team and the Site

Manager.

The Team Leader of the Investigating Team shall discuss the Terms of Reference with the

Owner to ensure that he is fully briefed.

4.5 TEAM SELECTION

Incident investigation teams are determined according to the type of incident. Generally,

the team will consist of the following:

 A member designated as the Investigation Team Leader with seniority

dependent on severity of the incident

 At least one person knowledgeable in the process involved, e.g. operations or

technical engineer

 A contract employee, contractor management representative, and / or HSE

representative if the incident involved the work of a contractor

 A person knowledgeable in incident investigation techniques and system cause

analysis - Root Cause Specialist

 Other persons, as needed, with appropriate knowledge and experience to

thoroughly investigate and analyze the incident, i.e., may include persons from

other assets or within the industry as a third party representative in major

investigations.

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Note: Major Incident investigations require the Team Leader and at least one other

member to be from a different Performance Unit (e.g. Offshore or Onshore

Operations BUs) and be of sufficient seniority in the organization, e.g. ALT Direct

Report or above. Additionally the Root Cause Specialist should a person trained in

the BP Group Master Root Cause Specialist (MRCS).

Incidents with fatalities initiate the Group Fatal Accident investigation which

requires an external BUL/SPUL and MRCS from another SPU to lead the process.

DAFWC and HiPo investigations require the Team Leader and at least one other

member from a different Performance Unit (e.g. external to “Exports” or “Azeri”)

and be of sufficient seniority in the organization e.g. ALT Direct Report or above.

4.6 TEAM MOBILIZATION

All team members shall be mobilized within 48 hours of the incident.

4.7 CONDUCT INVESTIGATION

The Team Leader is responsible for completing the investigation.

4.7.1 Scope and Objectives

The investigation shall:

 Establish the facts surrounding the incident

 Review the application of management systems and management practices

and their impact

 Identify critical factors, immediate and system causes and make

recommendations to prevent recurrence.

4.8 FACT FINDING

Information on the incident can be obtained by collecting information from people,

positions, parts and papers - PPPP technique.

Interviews with witnesses shall be carried out as soon as possible after the incident; while

the incident is fresh in their minds and before too much discussion has taken place with

their colleagues.

Witnesses should be interviewed individually, so that they are not interrupted or

questioned by others involved. One member of the team shall interview the witness and a

second record the interview. The interviewee must sign interview transcripts.

Checklists are useful in the early stages to keep the full range of inquiry in mind, but they

cannot cover all possible aspects of an investigation, nor can they follow all individual

leads back to system causal factors. To ensure that all facts are uncovered, ask the broad

“who, what, where, when, why and how” open-ended questions.

4.9 ESTABLISH THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

As the investigation progresses, the investigators should begin to identify the sequence of

events and concentrate efforts on increasing their knowledge in areas of uncertainty.

As the extent of physical factors involved in an incident becomes clear, the investigators

should shift the emphasis of their investigation and questioning to the system causes and

the reasons for people‟s actions.

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Establish a chronology of events by date, time and place. The construction of a diagram

showing the connections between the various events and conditions leading up to the

incident, called Sequence of Events or timeline, is a useful technique in the investigation

process, especially for more complex incidents.

4.10 ESTABLISH AND ANALYZE FINDINGS

The findings of the investigation should establish the immediate and system causes of the

incident so that corrective measures can be taken to prevent future incidents.

4.10.1 Identify Critical Factors and Causes and Make Recommendations

The investigation process shall identify actions to prevent recurrence. This is achieved by

addressing the substandard acts and conditions and by identifying and correcting the

latent failures.

Not all causes can be completely eliminated and some may be eliminated only at

prohibitive cost. Some recommendations will, therefore, be focused on reducing the risk

to a tolerable level, while others will be focused on improving protective systems (the

defenses) to limit the consequences.

At least one recommendation should be made for each finding.

Actions shall be ranked for order or priority as follows.

1. Requires immediate action before activity at the site resumes.

2. Must be completed to an agreed plan.

3. Should be considered but not a priority.

4.10.2 System Cause Analysis

All incident findings should be reviewed to determine the critical factors, immediate causes

and system causes of the incident.

Identification of system causes of an incident may often reveal underlying management

system failures that resulted in the incident occurring.

System Cause Analysis is a process for analyzing incidents to:

 Provide consistent and repeatable results

 Provide objective and not punitive results

 Provide final results from which system causes can be identified.

 Identify actions which can be taken to correct the cause and prevent a similar

type incident

After examining all the critical factors involved in an incident and arriving at the system

causes, a good check to use is to ask, “If these system causes were corrected, would this

prevent the incident from happening again?” If the answer is no, further evaluation is

needed.

4.10.3 Antecedent Behaviour Consequence Analysis (ABC Analysis)

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ABC Analysis is a technique for understanding why people intentionally behaved as they

did and identifying how to change this type of behaviour for another desired behaviour.

It is not suggested that ABC analysis is used in all investigations - rather it should be

invoked as required by investigation teams whenever they need a deeper understanding

intentional behavioural factors.

ABC analysis should be performed once evidence gathering has been completed and

critical factors have been identified and written. It is performed at the beginning of the

analysis phase of the investigation and allows the investigator to reach a deeper

understanding around why a person acted or behaved the way they did, so that

investigator is in the best possible position to recommend appropriate corrective actions.

4.10.4 System Cause Analysis - Example

It is very easy to mistake an immediate cause for a system cause of an incident. As stated

above, the system causes of an incident will often be a management system failure. The

following example illustrates this point:

A spill occurred when an employee overflowed a fuel truck while loading it at the

bulk fuel loading facility.

The initial investigation revealed that the operator of the truck overestimated the

amount of fuel required to fill the truck. By the time he realized he was running out

of tank capacity, he couldn’t reach the shutoff switch before the truck overflowed.

The initial finding was that the operator of the fuel truck was inattentive. However

further questioning of the driver and a survey of the scene revealed that the truck

was being loaded from the top and the emergency shutoff switch for top loading

was not functioning properly. This required the operator to climb down off of the

truck and to enter the pump room to shut off the flow of fuel. The malfunctioning

switch had been reported several weeks prior to the incident but had not yet been

repaired.

Note: One system cause of the incident was subsequently found to be a management

system that allowed a critical component of an emergency shutdown system to

remain in service while not functioning properly.

After arriving at one of the most obvious causes of the incident, it is important to ask,

“Why?” In the case above, asking why the employee overflowed the tank resulted in the

identification of the malfunctioning switch, and the need for a system to prioritize work

requests so critical safety components are repaired as soon as possible.

The BP Comprehensive List of Causes Chart in Appendix D shall be used to determine

system causes for all incident investigations.

Critical Factor: An event, action or condition contributing to the incident that, if eliminated

would have either prevent the incident from happening or reduce its severity.

4.11 COMPILE REPORT

Note: Minor Incidents (severity level F to H) need only be reported through the Traction

reporting system. Major and High Potential Incident Reports must follow the layout

described. Incident Investigation Report should be completed in 30 days (GHSER

Control Tier:

Revision Date: 30 April 2008

Document Number: AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00054-2

Print Date: 24 July 201013 May 2008

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE CONTROLLED

VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CAN BE FOUND AT http://docs.bpweb.bp.com/dkazspu/component/hssesms

AzSPU-HSSE-DOC-00054-2

Page 19 of 43

Incident Investigation and Reporting

requirement

- Key Process

6 and Recommendation of BP Group Defined

Operating Practice for Incident Investigation).

4.11.1 Records

A copy of all BP Major Investigation Reports shall be kept in the SPU files and in

Corporate HSE files. The incident shall also be entered into the Accident and Incident

Database (Traction). The original of the report will be kept in the files of the site or area in

which the incident occurred for the life of the facility.

4.11.2 Report Outline

The report contents should adhere to the following outline:

Title Page: Includes title, location and date of the incident and date of the report.

Executive Summary: “High-level” summarized description of the incident, highlighting

significant

findings/

conclusions and referencing the investigating team‟s

recommendations. The executive summary should be restricted to one page.

Table of Contents: A listing of the report contents and page numbers.

Terms of Reference: An example is attached in the Appendix C

Core report: Critical factors identified during investigation should be addressed clearly

and specifically. Critical factors are those events which if eliminated would prevent the

incident from occurring or significantly reduce the severity of the incident.

Incident Description: Describe the situation before the incident, what happened during

the incident and actions taken after the incident. The questions who, what, where and

when must be answered.

Incident Timeline: various events and conditions (including date and time) leading up to

the incident. The timeline may extend to events and conditions after the incident to

demonstrate the emergency response.

Discussion of the Evidence & Losses: This section should take the Leader through the

logical discussion of the evidence that leads to the conclusion of immediate causes.

Immediate Causes: These are “symptoms” of the system causes and may be identified

by utilizing the CLC Chart (Appendix D)

System Causes: Categorized as “System Causes” on the Comprehensive List of Causes

Chart (Appendix D), they are the “whys” of the immediate causes.

Recommendations to Prevent Recurrence: Review each of the immediate and system

causes to develop recommended actions to address all identified risks. If causes and

recommendations are related to other Controlled Documents and/or regulations, i.e.,

Traffic Regulations of Azerbaijan / Georgia, those documents should be referenced.

Signatories: After the report has been reviewed and agreed by the Owner, the

Investigation Team Leader will sign the report as representative of the Investigation Team

and the Owner will sign the report to signify acceptance of the findings and recommended

actions on behalf of the Business Unit.

Note: At the initial stage all incident investigations must be marked "draft" and after

completion of reviews and compilation of the final version marked "final". Upon receipt of

comments and approval on draft incident investigations and issue of the final report draft

versions will be destroyed.

Control Tier:

Revision Date: 30 April 2008

Document Number: AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00054-2

Print Date: 24 July 201013 May 2008

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE CONTROLLED

VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CAN BE FOUND AT http://docs.bpweb.bp.com/dkazspu/component/hssesms

AzSPU-HSSE-DOC-00054-2

Page 20 of 43

Incident Investigation and Reporting

Appendices:

Appendix A - Initial Incident Report - This initial report will be completed

by the Incident Investigation Team. It is the primary information required to

document the incident on Accident and Incident Reporting database

(Traction).

Appendix B - Diagrams and Photographs - To correlated and illustrate

locations and/or progressive locations of people, equipment, etc. that were

influential in incident cause and/or prevention.

Appendix C - Documentation - This information is generally the most

difficult to find, but the most objective. It is the primary reason why at least

one team member must be knowledgeable of the process (operations /

maintenance).

Supporting documentation of relevance to the overall report should be

contained in this section. This should include statements from witnesses,

photographs or drawings, copies of Work Permits, or other documents of

importance. If equipment was damaged the details could be recorded in this

section.

Appendix D - Interviews - Most information during investigation is obtained

from people. They must be interviewed separately and as quickly as

practical. The longer the interval between incident and interview, the more

distorted the information becomes.

Interview statements should not be a verbatim record of each interview, but

should summarize the information gained at each interview. The detailed

interview notes may be appended to the report or archived as considered

appropriate.

Note: At least one team member must be trained and competent in

interviewing.

4.12 NON-CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS

The Team may find deficiencies when investigating an incident, which have no bearing on

the incident or outcome. If recorded these must be clearly stated as such in the report.

4.13 REVIEW WITH MANAGEMENT

4.13.1 BP Management

HiPo/DAFWC Investigation reports shall be reviewed with management including the

event owner to confirm that the technical aspects are correct and the Terms of Reference

have been met.

4.13.2 Contractors

Investigations involving contractor owned / operated worksites or equipment, located on

BP operated areas, will be reviewed by BP and contractor management to obtain

agreement on the report

However the essential element is that the report is agreed internally within BP and that

management accepts the findings. Preferably these findings will not contradict any

contractor investigation however if this does occur then the reasons for the discrepancy

should be investigated.

Control Tier:

Revision Date: 30 April 2008

Document Number: AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00054-2

Print Date: 24 July 201013 May 2008

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE CONTROLLED

VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CAN BE FOUND AT http://docs.bpweb.bp.com/dkazspu/component/hssesms

AzSPU-HSSE-DOC-00054-2

Page 21 of 43

Incident Investigation and Reporting

4.13.3 Agree with Owner

The basic causes and actions of all Incident Reports must be agreed with the Owner

before the final

„approved‟ or signed off report is produced. Each action in the

recommendations must have been assigned to a person accountable for the action, a

target date for completion and a risk rating (low / medium/ high).

The Owner is responsible for making the actions, required completion date, and risk rating,

known to the person accountable for the action and assuring timely completion).

4.14 ACTIONS

Recommended actions must state explicitly what is to be done, when and by whom.

Before assigning actions Responsible Party must be consulted to agree a reasonable

timescale for completion to avoid actions going unnecessarily overdue.

Traction contains three possible choice of priority when entering actions - these are listed

below with their criteria:

4.14.1 Prioritization

The investigation process shall identify actions to prevent recurrence.

At least one recommendation should be made for each finding. The Investigation Team

must consult whatever technical experts it feels may be necessary to determine possible

actions.

Actions shall be ranked for order or priority as follows:

 H - Requires immediate action before activity at the site resumes

 M - Must be completed to an agreed plan

 L - Should be considered by the Owner but is not a priority

Note: the decision about the establishment of the target dates for the completion of the

actions should be made and agreed by the Investigation Team and the Owner (e.g. PUL,

Site/Installation Management) based on the levels of the priority prior to insertion into

Traction system.

4.14.2 Owner

The Owner (as per section 2.5) shall allocate actions to a Responsible Party. The Owner

and Responsible Party shall reach an understanding on the scope of the action and the

time by which it is to be completed.

4.14.3 Responsible Party

The Responsible Party shall ensure that the action is closed out in the Action and Incident

Data Base. An action will not be considered finalized until the database has been updated.

4.14.4 Close-Out of Actions and use of Traction system

Traction is the system BP uses globally to report all safety related incidents as well as

Audits and Other events. Traction is a web based tool that enables BP to fulfill their

commitment to openly report, investigate, analyze and document all health, safety,

security and environmental incidents. It is expected that all BP reportable incidents that

occur during the course of working activities will be entered into Traction.

Control Tier:

Revision Date: 30 April 2008

Document Number: AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00054-2

Print Date: 24 July 201013 May 2008

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE CONTROLLED

VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CAN BE FOUND AT http://docs.bpweb.bp.com/dkazspu/component/hssesms

AzSPU-HSSE-DOC-00054-2

Page 22 of 43

Incident Investigation and Reporting

Each Performance Unit shall establish a process for tracking the close out of actions. The

Managers directly accountable to the Performance Unit Leader shall do this on a monthly

basis. The Performance Unit Leader shall be notified of the number of overdue actions

each month. Actions resulting from Major Incidents, High Potential Incidents, Day Away

From Work Cases and significant audits will be tracked to resolution at the SPU level in

Traction. Actions resulting from minor incidents will be tracked by means of action tracking

system operated at PU level.

All corrective actions from the final incident investigation report will be included into

Traction system for further follow-up and completion.

4.15 INCIDENT REPORT ORIGINATOR

Each Performance Unit shall formally appoint Incident Report Originators who will be

responsible for entering Incident Reports into the database and closing actions in the

database when advised to do so by Responsible Parties.

5 REPORT DISTRIBUTION

All incident reports shall as minimum be copied to:

 The Owner

 PUL, VP and SPUL depending on severity of the incident

 The Site Manager (if he is not the Owner)

 Responsible Parties (i.e. those allocated remedial actions)

 The senior HSSE personnel of the BU or service unit

 Central HS&ER Manager (Major Incident and HiPo Reports as defined above only).

All Major incidents (A-E levels), HiPos and certain security sensitive incidents (e.g illegal

taps) shall initially be sent to “G EUBAK MIA/HiPo Notification”, and shall not be distributed

any further without prior SPUL agreement.

All F-H severity incidents (excluding HiPos and security sensitive incidents) should be

distributed to “G EUBAK AzSPU Incident”.

6 DISTRIBUTION OF LESSONS LEARNED

The main objective of carrying out an incident investigation is to identify the causes of

incidents and to prevent recurrence. In order to achieve the biggest benefit from the

investigation, the lessons learned need to be distributed to other sites where a similar

incident might occur

Two types of documents currently utilised in AzSPU can be used for distributing of lessons

learned from accidents and incidents:

 AzSPU Lessons Learned One-Pager (example proforma LL One Pager can be

found in Appendix M)

 Safety Flash document

Note: AzSPU Outside Distribution of Lessons Learned One-Pagers, HiPlus and similar

documents should not go from individual assets but from SPUL office.

Control Tier:

Revision Date: 30 April 2008

Document Number: AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00054-2

Print Date: 24 July 201013 May 2008

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE CONTROLLED

VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CAN BE FOUND AT http://docs.bpweb.bp.com/dkazspu/component/hssesms

AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00054-2

Page 24 of

Incident Investigation and Reporting

8 APPENDIX A - MAJOR INCIDENT NOTIFICATION PRO-FORMA

BP Major Incident Announcement

URGENT

BP CONFIDENTIAL: contains BP confidential business information - do not forward

Send by e-mail to the relevant distribution list. Add other addressees as necessary to meet BU or Regional requirements, e.g.

Local Management Team or Joint Venture partner.

SPU/Business Unit:

Country:

Location of Incident:

Date of Incident:

Time of Incident:

Contact:

Brief account of Incident: (Report as fact only what you are clear is fact. Specify the status of anything

else which you report, e.g., a belief or an estimate):

Fatalities:

Control

Influence

Work-related

Not work-related

Work-related

Not work-related

Employee

Contractor

Third party

Business impact/damage/loss:

External agencies involved:

News media coverage seen:

What assistance has been requested:

BP person in charge of

Business Unit Leader:

response/Investigation:

Office telephone:

Mobile telephone:

Home telephone:

Control Tier:

Revision Date: 30 April 2008

Document Number: AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00054-2

Print Date: 24 July 201013 May 2008

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE CONTROLLED

VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CAN BE FOUND AT http://docs.bpweb.bp.com/dkazspu/component/hssesms

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 5) - page 33