Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2)

OPCON of all assigned and attached joint special operations aviation

assets through the JSOAC.

• Naval Special Warfare Task Unit (NSWTU). Navy special operations

forces (NAVSOF) assigned to the JSOTF (or Navy component

commander) are normally under the C2 of a naval special warfare task

group (NSWTG), when activated, or an NSWTU. A task group or task

unit staff plans, coordinates, and oversees execution of special

operations executed by assigned operational elements in support of

fleet commanders, JFCs, or the CDRJSOTF as appropriate.

• Marine Special Operations Battalion (MSOB). There are two

MSOBs, each with four to five Marine special operations companies

(MSOCs).

• Marine Special Operations Company (MSOC).These companies can

be task organized to conduct special reconnaissance (SR), direction

action (DA), and foreign internal defense (FID) missions in support of

USSOCOM or the supported GCC.

7. Command Relationships

a. Properly crafted command relationships can directly support decentralization

and nurture trust in order to gain synergy and harmonization. These command

relationships can change the mindset from a ‘vertical’ focus on receiving and

unilaterally accomplishing tasks from the higher commander to that of working

much more closely and harmoniously with our horizontal war fighting partners.

b. Command relationships can help reinforce the recognition that we fight as one

team of joint, interagency, and multinational partners—and depend on access to

each other’s capabilities for success.

c. Command relationships must be established up front, and they are absolutely

critical to success. One key decision is whether to transfer “ownership” of forces

to another commander or empower him with access to their capabilities.

OPCON and tactical control (TACON) provide authority to “own” and directly

control the necessary forces to take on the fight without support from other

forces, while support command relationships focus on providing access to the

capabilities of other forces that can bring more to the fight and help in mission

accomplishment.

d. The types of command relationships include (1) COCOM, (2) OPCON, (3)

TACON, and (4) support. Table 1 provides a quick look at these relationships

and the responsibilities associated with them.

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Table 1. Joint Command Relationships and Inherent Responsibilities

Combatant Command (Command Authority)

(Unique to Combatant Commander)

• Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process Input

• Assignment of Subordinate Commanders

• Relations with Department of Defense Agencies

• Directive Authority for Logistics

When

• Authoritative direction for all military operations and

OPERATIONAL

joint training

CONTROL

• Organize and employ commands and forces

is delegated

• Assign command functions to subordinates

• Establish plans and requirements for intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance activities

• Suspend subordinate commanders for duty

When TACTICAL

• Local direction

When

• Aid, assist,

CONTROL is

and control of

SUPPORT

protect, or

delegated

movements or

relationship is

sustain another

maneuvers to

delegated

organization

accomplish

mission

e. Combatant Command (Command Authority): COCOM is a nontransferable

command authority exercised only by combatant commanders unless directed

otherwise. Combatant commanders exercise COCOM over assigned forces.

COCOM provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces to

accomplish missions. Combatant commanders exercise COCOM through

subordinate commands, to include subunified commands, Service component

commands, functional component commands, and JTFs.

f. Operational Control (OPCON): OPCON is inherent in COCOM. It is the

authority to perform those functions of command that involve organizing and

employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and

giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. It provides for

“ownership” of the forces and authorizes the commander to task both “what to

do” and “how to employ.” However, it requires expertise in planning and

employment. OPCON may be exercised at any echelon at or below the level of

the combatant command. It can be delegated or transferred. Commanders use it

routinely to task organize forces. OPCON remains the preferred command

relationship over forces that the commander will continuously own and employ

and for which he and his staff have the expertise and capability to command and

control.

g. Tactical Control (TACON): TACON is a subset of OPCON and is the authority

normally limited to the detailed and specified local direction of movement and

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maneuver of forces to accomplish a task. It allows commanders below combatant

command level to apply force and direct the tactical use of logistics and

sustainment assets, but does not provide authority to change organizational

structure or direct administrative or logistic support. The commander of the

parent unit continues to exercise those responsibilities unless otherwise specified

in the establishing directive. Combatant commanders use TACON to delegate

limited authority to direct the tactical use of combat forces. TACON is often the

command relationship established between forces of different nations in a

multinational force. It may be appropriate when tactical-level units are placed

under another Service headquarters. Commanders can make one force TACON

to another in order to allow administrative support or logistics and sustainment

with the parent unit of the subordinate force. While normally thought of as a

temporary arrangement, it can be an enduring command relationship. Current

examples of CF/SOF TACON enduring relationships are in Operation IRAQI

FREEDOM (OIF) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) where the

combined joint special operations task forces (CJSOTFs) are TACON to the JTF

commanders.

h. Support: Support is a command authority established by a superior

commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should

aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force.

(1) Support Relationships. Support relationships are normally the most

effective and preferred relationship between CF/SOF.

(a) Support relationships afford an effective means to weight the main

effort and ensure unity of effort for various operations. Such

relationships allow the supported commander to set requirements and

allow the supporting commander the flexibility to determine methods

and tactics. Degree, type, and priority of support need to be

established. Support allows a flexible relationship for dynamic

operations. The commander of the supported force will have the

authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort, to

include target and objective prioritization, timing and duration of the

supporting action, and coordination measures. The common superior

commander is responsible for clearly defining support command

relationships. There are four categories of support as depicted in

table 2. General support and direct support describe the supporting

command’s focus. Mutual support and close support are forms of

activity based on proximity and combat actions. Support relationships

work best when there is a high degree of trust and confidence between

the affected commanders.

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Table 2. Categories of Support

GENERAL SUPPORT

That support which is given to the supported force as a whole rather than to a

particular subdivision thereof.

MUTUAL SUPPORT

That support which units render each other against an enemy because of their

assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their

inherent capabilities.

DIRECT SUPPORT

A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to

answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance.

CLOSE SUPPORT

That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are

sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or

coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of

the supported force.

(b) An establishing directive is typically issued to specify the purpose of

the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action

to be taken. It should also include the forces and other resources

allocated to the supporting effort; the time, place, level, and duration of

the supporting effort; the relative priority of the supporting effort; the

authority, if any, of the supporting commander to modify the supporting

effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency; and the

degree of authority granted to the supported commander over the

supporting effort.

(2) Establishing Authority. The establishing authority for the support command

relationship is the common higher commander. The establishing authority

defines the support command relationship among the subordinates in

terms of who is supported and who is supporting, the respective degree of

authority, and overall priorities, especially where there are limited

resources supporting numerous operations. SOF and air assets are good

examples of some limited resources. The establishing authority is the

adjudicator when subordinates cannot work out the necessary balance of

access to capabilities (figure 5). The establishing authority should—

(a) Give clear direction to subordinates in terms of priorities, acceptable

risk, and intent to allow subordinates to work horizontally with each

other in accomplishing tasks. This is critical and requires continuous,

hands-on involvement in today’s environment of multiple ongoing

missions with limited resources.

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(b) Set conditions for, and demand crosstalk amongst, supported and

supporting commanders to build and reinforce the necessary horizontal

personal relationships which builds trust and confidence.

capabilities to one another through horizontal crosstalk. The crosstalk

amongst the supported commander and the supporting commander

will allow them to arrive at the optimal apportionment of capabilities to

accomplish both their assigned tasks and support the supported

commanders.

(d) Arbitrate and resolve conflicts related to understanding priorities.

Figure 5. Supported/Supporting Command Authority

(3) Supporting Commander. The supporting commander provides

augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or the

commander who develops a supporting plan. In the context of a support

command relationship, the supporting commander aids, protects,

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complements, or sustains another commander’s force and is responsible

for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. The

supporting commander is also responsible to ascertain and satisfy the

needs of the supported commander within the priorities directed by the

establishing authority. The supporting commander should—

(a) Recognize and understand the role of a supporting commander to

ensure success of the supported commander by understanding the

“one team, one fight” mindset. The supporting commander should also

understand and respect the authority of the supported commander,

recognizing that the support provided to the supported commander

may have a higher priority than even the mission to which the

supporting unit is assigned.

(b) Understand the supported commander’s intent. The supporting

commander must take time to ascertain the supported commander’s

requirements and overall priorities, be prepared to assist the supported

commander by sharing assessments on risks to forces and the mission

as well as positive effects forces can provide. The supported

commander may not always know how to best employ forces. It may

be the supporting commander’s job to educate the supported

commander regarding relevant capabilities and assets that supporting

forces can provide.

subordinates. Allow and encourage subordinates to support the

command relationship by empowering them to work directly with their

“supported” counterparts.

(4) Supported Commander. The supported commander has primary

responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the higher establishing

authority. The supported commander is given access to supporting

capabilities and has the authority to provide general direction, designate

and prioritize targets or objectives, and other actions for coordination and

efficiency. In the context of a support command relationship, the supported

commander is one who receives assistance from another commander’s

force or capabilities and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting

commander understands the assistance required. The supported

commander should—

(a) Foster a “one team, one fight” relationship with the supporting

commander and his forces from the beginning of the mission.

(b) Brief the supporting commander regarding his responsibilities

immediately and ensure the supporting commander understands the

assistance required. Discuss any issues or differences in guidance in

order to reduce misconceptions or misinterpretations later.

necessary, to the establishing authority for resolution.

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(d) Recognize the supported commander’s accountability in developing his

concept of operations and supported requirements, taking into account

potential risk and hardship to the supporting commander’s forces.

(e) Be open to recommendations from the supporting commander.

Request a capabilities brief, especially with SOF, so that the supported

commander can best implement the capabilities into the plan.

8. Command and Control Systems and Tools

Although occasionally the result of malfunctioning weapons, fratricide has often

been the result of confusion on the battlefield. Causes include misidentification

of targets, inaccurate target locations or descriptions, target locations incorrectly

transmitted or received, and loss of situational awareness….

—JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support [CAS], 8 July 2009

a. Standard Joint C2 Systems and Tools. Numerous command, control,

communications, and computer capabilities are resident within each Service

and/or SOF organizational level. While the overall supporting network

architectures are varied, they generally include classified and unclassified, United

States and coalition, and voice and data connectivity supporting a host of

different C2 systems and tools. Every effort should be made to establish and use

standard joint systems and tools which are generally broken into these two

groups: situational awareness (SA) systems and collaboration tools.

Collaboration tools are such capabilities as chat, file sharing, video

teleconferencing, and text messaging. Careful interoperability consideration

should be given to the specific system or tool used at each organization and

level, as many are stove-piped within the Service or SOF. In addition,

commanders should be aware of the following shortfalls:

(1) Commanders, when forming their SA of the OE, should temper their C2

decision-making process with consideration of the time latency between

actual and represented positions. They must recognize that not all

personnel or vehicles of a friendly force carry FFT devices. Additionally,

they must consider the timeliness of the displayed positional or unit data to

determine its accuracy. These factors are especially important with highly

mobile SOF units that, under certain mission conditions, are separated

from the individual or platform carrying the unit’s FFT device.

(2) Moreover, while available systems offer the commander an enhanced

ability to reduce fratricide and an increased efficiency and opportunity to

strike the enemy, consider the fact that the failure and/or improper

operation of these systems will likely compound the fog of war. An LNO is

and will remain a critical part of the C2 architecture required for real-time

SA. An effective LNO can highlight these considerations relative to the

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operations of his unit while operating in a convergent OE to reduce

confusion or misinterpretation of actual unit locations.

(3) Commanders must also consider that each organization may have different

FFT devices providing SA to higher echelons using different architectures.

This SA data may not be readily available to all elements in an integrated

manner. This remains a critical joint/coalition warfare shortfall. There are

some data interoperability capabilities contained in the Army Forces

Strategic Command’s (ARSTRAT) FFT material management center

(MMC). These capabilities require planning and coordination for execution

and useful dissemination.

b. Situational Awareness Systems. SA systems employed by ground fires and

maneuver elements only provide a near real-time representation of track data

and not an instantaneous snapshot. Friendly force locations are only updated

based on preset reporting time frequency and/or distance threshold of the FFT

device the unit is carrying. Current SA systems include, but are not limited to—

• Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2).

• Maneuver control system (MCS).

• Command and control personal computer (C2PC).

• Command post of the future (CPOF).

• Common operational picture (COP).

• Theater battle management core system (TBMCS).

• Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS).

Careful consideration must be given to the capabilities, limitations, and

interoperability concerns of each system.

(1) FBCB2 is an Army system providing SA and C2 to the lowest tactical

echelons. This system is normally mounted in tactical vehicles with

graphical displays of the common OE picture representing forces in near

real-time. The system also provides a basic messaging capability,

facilitating text-based collaboration. The following is a list of employment

considerations:

(a) During planning, consider what FBCB2 mode the units will be using.

FBCB2 has two modes of operation: a secure line of sight

communications mode and a nonsecure satellite communications

mode. The line of sight mode has limited range capabilities and is

hindered by natural and manmade obstructions.

(b) SOF commanders should designate which SOF units will be

represented in FBCB2 and how the tracks will be managed. In

addition, planners should consider the classification of SOF data

(generally classified as SECRET) and how that data will be integrated

into the FBCB2 system.

combat identification of SOF elements during an operation and agree

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on policies/procedures for the manual or automatic representation of

such units in FBCB2.

(d) Special consideration should be given when attempting to share either

track data or OE geometry overlays (e.g., fire support coordination

measures [FSCMs]) with other joint tactical units since this effort

requires the manual entry of data into the FBCB2 system and may be

prone to human data entry errors. In many cases, commanders may

find that SA data within the FBCB2 architecture is not automatically

integrated or interoperable with other CF or SOF tactical/operational

level SA systems, such as C2PC. Nonetheless, it may be possible to

exchange FFT data with other CF or SOF tactical/operational SA

systems using ARSTRAT MMC.

(e) The MMC receives, processes (including message format translation),

and disseminates FFT data from disparate SA systems as directed by

combatant commanders. The ARSTRAT MMC has the capability to

inject FFT track data from various SA systems into the FBCB2 network

operations center based upon mission requirements. An example is

the injection of Iridium FFT data into FBCB2 architecture in support of

Joint Task Force-National Capital Regions (JTF-NCR) operations.

Additional information on the MMC’s capabilities can be found in the

United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) FFT CONOPS.

(f) The use of the FBCB2 basic text messaging capability should be the

tool considered for collaboration.

(2) MCS is an Army system providing SA and C2 at the brigade and higher

levels. This system provides graphic displays of OE forces in near real-

time in a common OE picture and creates and disseminates operation

plans and orders for combined arms maneuver commanders. The

following is a list of MCS employment considerations:

(a) There is the potential for conflicting track data as MCS receives track

data and overlay information from both FBCB2 and the Global

Command and Control System (GCCS)—Army, common operational

picture (COP). Give special consideration to ensure that MCS

operators are diligent with the maintenance and deconfliction of track

data.

(b) SOF LNOs, which may be able to communicate directly with SOF

elements, should be used to help ensure the integrity of this track and

overlay SA picture.

(3) C2PC is a Marine Corps system, also employed throughout SOF, that

provides SA and C2 at all echelons. The system provides graphic displays

of the common OE picture representing OE forces and a basic text

messaging tool. C2PC receives track data and overlay information from

the GCCS—Maritime COP track database. C2PC is incorporated in the

SOF digital environment C2 suite known as the tactical local area network

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(TACLAN). While the SOF TACLAN and Marine Corps versions of C2PC

offer essentially the same functionality, the versions of the fielded software

may differ. The following are a couple C2PC employment considerations:

(a) During mission planning, one must identify and address differences in

C2PC versions and functionality.

(b) One must conduct premission compatibility checks during the planning

process to ensure that all elements involved in the operation are

accurately displayed on the C2PC system.

Note: C2PC and FBCB2 are not interoperable.

(4) CPOF enables forward command elements to reduce the staff operating

C2 systems. In the distant future, advanced CPOF systems will eliminate

parts of the brigade's tactical operations centers (TOCs), primarily the

forward and assault TOCs, which could be transformed into virtual TOCs.

CPOF relies on wideband data-communications links currently available to

the Army, via military and commercial satellite communications services.

The following is a list of CPOF employment considerations:

(a) CPOF is a system currently used at the division-to-company levels

enabling commanders to discuss and collaborate when processing

information and sharing ideas. It allows commanders to attend virtual

meetings without assembling at one place.

(b) The current version of CPOF does not directly exchange FSCM,

airspace coordinating measures (ACMs), and radar sensor data with

Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) or Automated

Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS) among other

systems.

concern.

(5) COP is a joint mission application residing in the GCCS that provides SA at

the JTF and component commander echelons. This system provides

graphic displays of the common OE picture representing OE forces and a

basic text messaging capability. The JTF headquarters, or a designated

component command, maintains the “top COP” track database for the

entire joint operational area. The “top COP” is a manned responsibility

consisting of track database managers actively managing the integrity of

the area of operations OE SA picture. The following is a list of COP

employment considerations:

(a) The JTF manager, referred to as the “top COP,” must diligently

manage the integrity of the SA picture throughout all echelons (e.g., by

setting standards, establishing reporting frequency, managing track

time latency, and deconflicting dual tracks).

(b) LNOs must recognize that the “top COP” is the primary point of contact

(POC) for final deconfliction of all tracks.

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• Assign responsibility for development and maintenance of the unit’s

COP architecture (e.g., trackers, feeds, displays, and

communications).

• Assign responsibility for and determine how each unit’s tracks are

inserted (i.e., manually or electronically) and how often.

(d) Liaison elements must have access to the full SA COP with a method

for track and OE geometry deconfliction. (Reporting requirements for

units that are using “reporting windows” to conserve FFT unit battery

life need to be stipulated.)

(e) Commanders may decide to implement discrete feeds, giving explicit

guidance to the ARSTRAT MMC regarding when and which specific

internet protocol addresses may be provided to the feed. Commanders

may also deliberately maintain a discrete feed until just prior to H-hour

and then switch to an open feed for dissemination of SOF locations to

all forces. This requires the SOF commander to weigh the risks of

compromise and fratricide prevention.

• During planning, give consideration to how and under what

conditions a SOF discrete feed should be switched to an open feed

visible by CF.

• Commanders can opt to provide the “top COP” with either open or

discrete feeds.

• Commanders may decide to also implement an open feed with a

“generic” code limiting the COP track database information only to

SOF locations, but not unit identification.

• During planning, give special consideration to how CF/SOF units will

manage the dissemination and response to an emergent situation

“911” distress call through FFT devices. Understand that CF distress

calls are disseminated within CF units throughout the FBCB2, MCS,

and COP SA, and SOF distress calls are received by the MMC and

passed to the designated SOF unit.

• Consider and rehearse manual methods of position reporting, FFT,

and SA for all phases of conflict as a method of guarding against

failures in technology and associated processes.

• During operational conditions requiring a real-time understanding of

actual unit positions, commanders must rely on the known ground truth

of unit locations, which can only be obtained by direct liaison with the

tactical elements themselves. LNOs play a critical part in this effort.

(6) TBMCS provides air commanders a means to plan, direct, and control air

operations. The system consists of multiple mission applications providing

SA, collaboration, messaging, and force employment capabilities. The

following are employment considerations for TBMCS:

(a) SOF commanders must consider that an increasing number of

conventional unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) are occupying

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previously unhindered airspace. Many of these UASs are being

operated in real or near real-time at all echelons from the strategic

level to the company level Soldier-deployable UAS. Since not all

UASs are listed on the air tasking order (ATO), LNOs should be aware

of the need to deconflict airspace with unmanned systems.

(b) UASs used to perform “danger close” close air support or lethal strikes

for CF or SOF units must employ a method for UAS sensor operators

to electronically, and/or visually, identify friendly forces prior to

engagement to prevent fratricide.

operation. Ensure UAS operational frequencies are listed on the joint

restricted frequency list at the electronic warfare coordination cell.

Additionally, UAS usage must be deconflicted with collocated and

adjacent units. UAS frequency and communications deconfliction must

occur at every level to avoid catastrophic failure or interference with

other communications systems operating in the same frequency

spectrum.

(d) During planning, commanders should consider the allocation of

complementary UAS resources in the ATO and other mission planning

processes.

(e) LNOs are critical elements in deconflicting airspace for manned and

unmanned SOF air assets via TBMCS, as well as voice and online

collaboration tools.

(f) Establishing altitude blocks for SOF and UAS aircraft should be

considered in the event of lost system communications. Ensure these

block altitudes are incorporated into the airspace control plan and

airspace control order.

(7) JADOCS is a joint mission management system providing OE visualization,

OE management, air interdiction planning and execution, time-sensitive

targeting, and FSCM analysis. The following are employment

considerations for JADOCS:

(a) Although JADOCS is found throughout almost all SOF echelons, there

is limited deployment to the lower CF echelons. Thus, the real-time

identification of time-sensitive targets (TSTs), and attack coordination

below the component level, is conducted using voice C2 systems and

processes.

(b) LNOs are critical elements for facilitation and coordination of tactical

CF/SOF prosecution of TSTs. LNOs must have access to the

necessary systems and tools (e.g., JADOCS, chat, voice

communications) to dynamically coordinate and deconflict CF/SOF

resources.

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The two systems are not 100% compatible and JADOCS may drop some of the

FSCM/ACM changes when TBMCS files are imported. This usually applies to

FSCM/ACM files that have been deleted or are no longer active. This has

potential to cause delays if JADOCS is the primary system to clear TST fires.

c. Collaboration Tools

(1) Microsoft SharePoint. Microsoft SharePoint is a web-based tool used by a

JSOTF or SOTF to create a portal page that allows users to collaborate

(e.g., using postings, operations centers logs, or updating shared files) and

to link to other collaboration tools providing chat, video teleconferencing,

and text messaging functionality. The following are employment

considerations for Microsoft SharePoint:

(a) Microsoft SharePoint architecture allows varying degrees of

permissions for visibility of information posted on the hosted portal

page. These permissions can be used to restrict external visibility of

in-progress and sensitive documents while allowing internal

coordination. The LNO should be given full access to other

organizations, thus improving situational awareness and allowing them

to identify any potential conflicts during initial planning.

(b) Individuals requiring portal access must be identified during planning to

develop and promulgate a portal concept of operations.

access to the required portal pages.

(d) Commanders must understand the criticality of keeping their portal

page content up-to-date.

(e) The operation’s published classification guidance has to be clearly

understood in order to minimize the amount of information handled

within “focal point” (compartmentalized programs) channels. This

prevents complicating or undermining the commander’s C2 decision

making process.

(2) Collaboration Applications. CF/SOF collaboration tools include internet

relay chat client for Windows, Info WorkSpace, and NetMeeting, which

provide the functionality of chat rooms, text messaging, text chat, video

teleconferencing, file sharing, and whiteboard discussions and

presentations. The following are employment considerations for

collaboration applications:

(a) One common tool for collaboration should be selected during planning.

If this is not possible, interoperability challenges associated with using

different tools must be taken into consideration.

(b) When selecting a common tool for collaboration, operational need,

bandwidth, interoperability, and training requirements should be

considered.

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during different operational conditions need consideration.

(d) Continuous chat collaboration tools are recommended for monitoring

operations. The sessions must be recorded and the transcripts must

be saved to the command journal.

9. CF/SOF Liaison.

a. Liaison between all components of the joint force and SOF is vital for effective

employment to prevent fratricide, minimize missed opportunities, and prevent

delayed action. LNOs are critical to a command’s ability to coordinate,

synchronize, and deconflict CF/SOF operations. The limited window of

opportunity normally associated with the majority of SOF missions, as well as the

sensitive nature of those missions, requires a C2 structure capable of sharing

information in order to prosecute targets quickly and effectively. This function is

enhanced by LNOs. For more information on LNOs refer to Joint Publication

(JP) 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, Appendix C,

"JSOTF Liaison Personnel Procedures"; and JP 3-33, Joint Task Force

Headquarters.

(1) Liaison Officer. Exchanging LNOs is the most commonly employed

technique for establishing and maintaining close, continuous, physical

communications between CF/SOF commanders.

(a) LNOs may be exchanged between higher, lower, or adjacent units.

LNOs may also be provided to and from coalition forces, government

agencies, nongovernmental organizations, or intergovernmental

organizations. LNOs can be assigned—

• At any level of command as the mission requires.

• On a permanent basis.

• On a temporary basis as operations dictate.

• From SOF to CF and CF to SOF.

(b) The LNO should be a competent and experienced person with the

appropriate rank and communications skills to best convey the TTPs

and SOPs of the unit.

anticipated mission support requirements, which may be modified

throughout the operation.

(d) LNOs serve as the principal representative of their commander and

should be authorized direct face-to-face liaison with the supported

commander.

(e) LNOs are not staff augmenters, watch officers, or full-time planners.

They must retain the freedom of action required to perform the broader

functions tasked by the supporting organization’s commander.

(f) LNOs are not a substitute for transmitting critical information through

normal C2 channels or for proper staff-to-staff coordination.

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(2) Functions. LNOs perform four primary functions: monitor, coordinate,

advise, and assist. The functions of either CF/SOF LNOs are essentially

the same; however, due to the classification and complexity of SOF

operations, LNOs must clearly understand SOF operations in order to be

effective.

(a) Monitor.

• Examine current and planned operations, anticipate potential

problems, and recognize supported/supporting unit issues.

• Consider second and third order effects on all operations, including

consequence management, enemy reactions, and IO messages.

• Consider operating styles to gain insight into that of the commander

and staff to help ensure a smooth relationship.

• Examine daily unit battle rhythm to determine where and when to

engage to maintain SA and keep the supported/supporting unit fully

informed.

• Ensure required network connectivity and access (e.g., shared

folders, intelligence/operational spaces) to keep abreast of operations,

activities, and events.

(b) Coordinate.

• Know staff procedures and organization.

• Routinely meet with commanders, their staffs, and other LNOs and

know how to contact them.

• Share appropriate information between headquarters (e.g., unit

SOPs, draft CONOPS, intel, targeting, meeting notes, other

documents).

• Be heavily involved in the orders production and mission approval

process. Move between the different staff sections to ensure that key

functional elements are addressed and dissemination occurs.

• Possess expert knowledge of supported/supporting unit’s

capabilities, limitations, and current status.

• Possess rank and experience that ensures credibility with the

supported/supporting unit, and the ability to influence the

decisionmaking process.

• Anticipate questions from the commander and the commander’s

staff; know where to quickly find the right answers.

• Anticipate problems/friction points and develop recommended

solutions.

• Understand the level of authority that LNOs have to make decisions

on behalf of their units. It will vary with each LNO and each unit.

• Synchronize SOP and the CONOPS. The CF/SOF liaison must be

able to present all operational aspects of the mission, including

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branches and sequels to the parent command and other supporting

units.

(d) Assist.

• Integrate into the staff and attend meetings and planning sessions.

• Facilitate submission of required reports from supported/supporting

unit to higher headquarters.

• Consider opportunities to better synchronize forces.

(3) Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities.

(a) Possess excellent interpersonal skills.

(b) Possess excellent communication skills (oral/written) with the ability to

articulate the SOF unique methods of operations and

capabilities/limitations.

(d) Be detail-oriented and proactive in staff interaction.

(e) Understand the supported/supporting commander’s thought process

and quickly gain an understanding of the supported/supporting unit

commander’s thought processes.

(f) Possess the security clearance level required to effectively perform

duties at the supported organization.

(g) Consider the need for proficiency in the supported unit’s language.

(h) Consider any special training/qualification requirements (typing, C2

systems, computer collaboration tools, voice communications, etc.)

(4) Liaison Procedures.

(a) Before departure for the supported/supporting unit, be knowledgeable

of—

• Operation order/operation plan, and unit SOPs.

• Current situation activities and intentions of supporting unit.

• Supporting commander’s intent, including details of the concept of

operation.

• Current status and missions of the supported unit.

• Operations security applicable to the mission.

• Specific information and/or LNO requirements from each staff

section.

• LNO mission, responsibilities, and commander’s intent.

• Communications and transportation needs.

• Supporting command points of contact, telephone numbers, and

e-mail addresses.

• Supporting command commander's critical information requirement

(CCIR)/commander wake-up criteria.

• Supporting command communications-electronics operating

instructions (CEOI).

• Passport requirements.

• Specifics of when and how your security clearance was forwarded.

• Language and interpreter requirements.

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• Potential issues, capabilities, employment doctrine, operational

procedures of the supporting unit, and, to the extent possible, the

supported unit.

• Command relationships and the commanders who impact your

operations.

• The key player in the supported organization (e.g., chief of staff,

assistant division commander for operations [ADC-O], J-3, etc.).

• Internal communication and computer equipment.

(b) Upon arrival at the supported unit—

• Report to the commander or their representative.

• Be prepared to brief supporting unit’s situation, activities, intentions,

capabilities, and limitations.

• Visit and introduce yourself to each staff section.

• Notify supporting unit of arrival.

• If replacing another LNO, ensure smooth transition.

• When assigned to the supported unit, the LNO must maintain SA on

how the unit may be employed in a supported/supporting role (e.g.,

mission, unit location, future locations, future operations, and

commander’s intent). Make recommendations for employment as

necessary.

• Notify the supporting unit if unable to accomplish the LNO mission

(unsuitable workspace/tools/communication/connectivity).

• Report to supporting unit the LNO relationship and rapport with

supported unit.

• Ensure the supported unit knows the LNO whereabouts at all times.

• Determine attendance requirements at briefings and meetings for

accomplishment of the LNO mission. As a rule of thumb, LNOs should

be proactive in pushing information to parent unit.

• Maintain a record of LNO actions and reports issued by supported

unit. In conjunction with parent unit, determine reporting requirements.

• At the completion of the LNO mission, conduct an out-brief with the

unit commander.

(d) Upon returning to the supporting unit—

• Brief supporting unit commander of completion of mission, including

any requests from the supported commander.

• Pass any appropriate information to pertinent staff sections.

(5) Receiving Unit Responsibilities. The receiving unit has certain support

responsibilities and should plan to integrate the LNO/LNO team fully into

the command. At a minimum the receiving unit should consider—

• Billeting and messing.

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• Dedicated workspaces, communications equipment, automated data

processing (ADP) equipment, telephones, administrative supplies,

e-mail, etc. Administrative and service support to include postal; legal;

chaplain; security; exchange/commissary; finance; medical and dental;

and morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR).

• Publications and documents to include operational maps, receiving

unit SOPs, communications security (COMSEC), CEOI info, and

relevant contact information (phone books, etc.).

10. SOF C2, Coordination, and Liaison Elements.

One of the SOF liaison elements is the special operations command and control

element (SOCCE) for command and control and to coordinate SOF activities with

CF. The JFSOCC, or the JSOTF commander, as appropriate, normally provides

a special operations liaison element (SOLE) to the joint force air component

commander (JFACC) to coordinate and synchronize SOF air, surface, and

subsurface operations with joint air operations. Although not part of a SOF

organization, there is also the special forces liaison element (SFLE) that advises

Army corps commanders on special operations. These elements improve the

flow of information, facilitate concurrent planning, and enhance overall joint force

mission accomplishment. The SFLE is a SOF or joint SOF element that

conducts liaison between SOF, US CF, and host nation (HN) or multinational

forces. It is formed only as needed. See table 3 for a cross-reference of LNO’s.

For more information on SOF liaison elements refer to, JP 3-05, Doctrine for

Joint Special Operations.

a. SOCCE

(1) The SOCCE is the focal point for the synchronization of SOF activities with

CF operations. It performs C2 or liaison functions according to mission

requirements and as directed by the establishing SOF commander,

JFSOCC, or JSOTF commander, as appropriate. Its level of authority and

responsibility may vary widely.

(2) The SOCCE is typically employed when SOF conduct operations in

support of CF. It colocates with the command post, usually Corps level

and higher, of the supported force to coordinate and synchronize special

operations with the operations of the supported force to ensure

communications interoperability with that force. There can be a SOCCE at

each Corps in theater. The SOCCE also can receive SOF operational,

intelligence, and target acquisition reports directly from deployed SOF

elements and provide them to the supported component headquarters.

The JFSOCC and JSOTF commander may attach liaison teams from other

SOF elements to the SOCCE as required.

(3) The SOCCE remains under the operational control of the establishing SOF

commander and performs the following functions:

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(a) Exercises C2 of SOF tactical elements attached to, or placed in direct

support of, the supported CF commander.

(b) Advises the CF commander on the current situation, missions,

capabilities, and limitations of supporting and supported SOF units.

commander’s current situation, missions, intentions, and requirements.

(d) Provides required secure communications links.

(e) Coordinates and synchronizes special operations activities with

supported force operations.

(f) When link-up becomes imminent, assists the supported force

commander and staff with link-up planning and execution.

b. SOLE

(1) A SOLE is a team provided by the JFSOCC to the JFACC or appropriate

Service component air C2 organization to coordinate, synchronize, and

integrate special operations air, surface, and subsurface operations with

conventional operations. The JSOTF and the JFACC share common

operational areas. Therefore, whether operating autonomously or in

conjunction with CF, SOF aviation and surface assets must be integrated

with all joint air operations, from planning through execution. Integration is

critical since air assets and SOF are typically the only forces operating

deep into enemy territory. The SOLE integrates all SOF air and surface

activity into the air tasking order (ATO) and airspace control order (ACO).

The SOLE works directly for the JFSOCC. Members of the SOLE are not

in the SOF chain of command, and thus have no command authority for

mission tasking, planning, and execution of special operations.

(2) The SOLE director places SOF ground, maritime, and air liaison personnel

in divisions of the joint air operations center (JAOC) to integrate with the

JFACC staff. The SOLE accomplishes the coordination, synchronization,

and integration of SOF air operations by providing a SOF presence in the

JAOC that is aware of the activities of SOF units in the field and by

providing visibility of SOF operations in the ATO and the ACO. The SOLE

must also coordinate appropriate ACMs and FSCMs to help prevent

fratricide. A typical SOLE consists of 44 personnel, but in practice is

tailored to meet specific mission requirements.

c. SFLE. The SFLE is a US Army special forces or joint SO element that

conducts liaison between SOF, CF, and HN or multinational forces. It is formed

only as needed. SFLE’s conduct these functions when CF or HN or multinational

forces have not practiced interoperability before the operation, the forces do not

share operational procedures or communications equipment, or when a

significant language or cultural barrier exists.

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Table 3. CF/SOF Liaison and Control Elements

Element

Sent From

Sent To

Function

Air Liaison

Air Force

CF or SOF

Air Force forces (AFFOR)

Officer (ALO)/

representative to ground

tactical air control

units for fire support

party (TACP)

coordination.

Air Component

CF or SOF

JFACC representative to

Coordination

other component

Element (ACCE)

commanders. Primary

conduit to resolve

coordination challenges of

joint air-land operations.

ANGLICO

Marine

CF, SOF, or

As required for fire

Corps

Multinational

support coordination.

BCD

Army

JFACC/

Army forces (ARFOR)/

AFFOR

JFLCC rep to JFACC.

Resolve coordination for

joint air operations.

DLD

Army

CF or SOF

Established as required

for land force

Multinational

coordination.

LNO

CF or SOF

As required.

SOCCE

SOF

Established at a CF unit

by JFSOCC/JSOTF

commander to perform C2

or liaison functions to

synchronize SOF

activities with CF

operations.

SOLE

SOF

JFSOCC representative

to JFACC (if designated)

or appropriate Service

component air C2

organization to

coordinate, deconflict, and

integrate special

operations air, surface,

and subsurface

operations with

conventional air

operations.

SFLE

SOF

Liaison

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Table 3. CF/SOF Liaison and Control Elements—Cont.

ACCE - air component coordination element

AFFOR - Air Force forces

ALO - air liaison officer

ANGLICO - air and naval gunfire liaison company

ARFOR - Army forces

BCD - battlefield coordination detachment

C2 - command and control

CF - conventional forces

DLD - digital liaison detachment

JFACC - joint force air component commander

JFLCC - joint force land component commander

JFSOCC - joint force special operations component commander

JSOTF - joint special operations task force

LNO - liaison officer

SFLE - special forces liaison element

SOCCE - special operations command and control element

SOF - special operations forces

SOLE - special operations liaison element

TACP - tactical air control party

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Chapter II

CF/SOF Operations

On 13 December 2003 at approximately 8:26 PM local time, elements of the 4th

Infantry Division (4th ID) and Special Operations Forces raided a farm compound

just north of the town of Ad Dawr, on the Tigris River, about 15 kilometers south

of Tikrit, capturing Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. At Least 600 troops

were involved in the raid, which resulted in the capture of Hussein and two men,

armed with AK-47s. Hussein was found hiding in a 6’ x 8’ crawl space below an

outbuilding, armed with a pistol and carrying $750,000 USD. Saddam Hussein

was then transported by helicopter en route to a secure, undisclosed location

without incident.

Operation RED DAWN was launched after gaining actionable intelligence

identifying two likely locations near the town of Ad Dawr. The First Brigade

Combat Team (BCT) of the 4th ID was assigned the mission to support SOF in

the capture or kill of Saddam Hussein.

—Global Security Organization, Operation RED DAWN

13 December 2004

1. Introduction

a. History and the OE have shown that the force which best combines the

capabilities of its assets in military operations—wins! Current and future

operations see CF/SOF operations becoming increasingly intertwined, especially

as irregular warfare (IW) operations become the predominant challenge for US

and coalition forces. This is particularly evident when CF is adopting traditional

SOF roles, such as providing advisor teams to foreign security forces (FSF) in

support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI

FREEDOM (OIF). Accordingly, CF/SOF must plan and integrate operations,

beginning with the first efforts at mission development and concluding with the

achievement of the desired end state. Traditional warfare and IW are not

mutually exclusive as both forms of warfare may occur in a given conflict

presenting unique challenges in the OE.

b. CF/SOF each possess unique capabilities which, when integrated, can

produce even greater war fighting potential for JFCs. When properly integrated,

CF/SOF complement each other’s strengths, mitigate vulnerabilities, and achieve

an effect greater than would be accomplished if each force was used separately.

c. The previous chapter discusses and defines the hierarchy of the SOF

command structure and outlines the preferred command relationships for

CF/SOF operations to achieve the synergistic effects of each other’s capabilities

on the battlefield. This chapter discusses the OE in which CF/SOF operate,

including the four most common CF/SOF operational scenarios. It also

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discusses some important planning and execution considerations specifically for

CF/SOF operations.

2. Lessons Learned

a. CF/SOF units should meet and integrate early, prior to combat rotations, to

foster the relationship, instill the “one team, one fight” mentality, understand each

other’s staff planning procedures, and defuse any misconceptions or friction

points. If at all possible, units should attend training events together, specifically,

National Training Center (NTC) or joint readiness training center (JRTC). Good

practices include traveling to one’s home station, briefing each other’s

capabilities and limitations, mission goals, and linking up staff function sections.

b. During operations, CF/SOF commanders should understand each other’s

mission planning cycle, intel/operations cycle, and mission approval processes.

Mission type orders (task and purpose) are optimal to convey the commander’s

intent to permit flexibility, initiative, and responsiveness.

3. CF/SOF Operational Structure

a. Figure 6 depicts operational areas within a theater of war where CF/SOF

operate. It illustrates CF areas of operation (AO) as well as SOF JSOA in order

to highlight the potentially different operational areas. CF and SOF can operate

in their own AOs or work inside of one another’s, as discussed in further detail

with the four CF/SOF operational scenarios. These AOs, while usually long

lasting can be set up for an “on-mission” basis. For example, a JSOA could be

established for a direct action mission requiring only a few hours or could require

a larger portion of area for an ongoing mission requiring days, weeks, or even

months.

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Figure 6. Operational Areas Within a Theater (Source: JP 3-05.1)

b. JFCs define operational areas to assist in coordination and deconfliction. The

size of these areas depends on the scope and nature of the crisis and anticipated

duration of operations. JFC-designated areas can include joint operations area

(JOA), AOR, and JSOAs.

c. Specifically for a JSOA, the scope and duration of SOF's mission, friendly and

hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number,

composition, and sequencing of SOF deployed into a JSOA. It may be limited in

size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive

enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations.

JSOAs are normally exclusive to special operations and are not integrated with

other airspace users. JSOAs are normally used to separate operational forces

and actions. The JFC may establish a JSOA when geographic boundaries

between SOF and CF are the most suitable control measures. The CDRJSOTF

may also request the establishment of a JSOA. When a JSOA is designated, the

CDRJSOTF is the supported commander within the designated JSOA. The

CDRJSOTF may further assign a specific area or sector within the JSOA to a

subordinate commander for mission execution.

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d. Area of Operations (AO) Commander Authorities / Responsibilities.

(1) Ownership of an operational area carries many authorities and

responsibilities. AO commander authorities/responsibilities include—

(a) Priorities and desired effect of all fires (lethal and nonlethal) within the

AO.

(b) Targeting.

(d) Designation of FSCMs.

(e) Land management, including designating internal boundaries.

(f) Enemy force tracking.

(g) Friendly force tracking.

(h) Airspace deconfliction when required.

(i) Civil-military operations.

(2) When operating in an AO assigned to another commander, that

commander must comply with the AO commander’s “owner’s authorities.”

Targeting fires, force tracking, and land management must be in

accordance with the direction provided by the AO commander. SOF units

operating within an AO must keep the AO commander apprised of

locations and recognize that the AO commander retains authority for

establishing FSCMs and clearing fires.

4. CF/SOF Spheres of Influence

a. As CF/SOF commanders begin to plan operations, it is important to

understand and plan for areas where CF/SOF spheres of influence (SOIs) will

converge. This convergence can be synergistic (as with Operation RED DAWN)

or detrimental. It is vital that both the CF/SOF commanders work out the

parameters of this convergence to achieve the former rather than the latter.

Commanders can do this by understanding each other’s capabilities and

limitations, how each other’s targeting and operations cycles work (e.g., find, fix,

finish, exploit, assess, disseminate [F3EAD] and decide, detect, deliver, and

assess [D3A]), as well as how and where to deconflict converging spheres of

influences. Figure 7 depicts the CF/SOF convergence of SOI. By leveraging the

CF/SOF combined capabilities, commanders can capitalize on the full spectrum

of operations and influence all political, military, economic, social, information,

and infrastructure (PMESII) lines of operations.

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Figure 7. CF/SOF Spheres of Influence

b. The PMESII model, is shown in figure 7 within the CF SOI area. It is a

standard way of understanding the OE. As seen, military is one aspect of the

PMESII model. Under the military aspect, CF/SOF commanders use the six

warfighting functions (WFFs)—movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires,

sustainment, C2, and protection—to plan for combat operations. CF

commanders can leverage SOF experience in the other aspects of PMESII to

fully understand the OE. (Note: The US Army uses the acronym PMESII-PT

where “PT stands for physical environment and time.")

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5. CF/SOF Operational and Planning Scenarios

a. There are four primary scenarios where CF/SOF may converge/operate

together for planning or operations. The four scenarios are meant to give an

understanding how CF/SOF can work together. For each scenario, one can

utilize different tools and apply them to the current planning or operations

conducted. Scenarios one and two show where CF/SOF operate in one

another’s OE, with either CF or SOF as the OE owner. Scenarios three and four

outline where CF/SOF may conduct planning for operations either deliberate or

crisis. The four scenarios are—

(1) Scenario 1: CF enters an existing SOF OA, such as a JSOA.

(2) Scenario 2: SOF enters an existing CF OA.

(3) Scenario 3: CF/SOF conduct deliberate planning.

(4) Scenario 4: CF/SOF conduct crisis action planning.

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b. Scenario 1: Conventional Forces Enter a JSOA. SOF are conducting

unconventional warfare in a designated JSOA. JSOAs are established by the

JFC with C2 of the OE delegated to the SOF commander. This provides the SOF

commander freedom of movement to conduct time-sensitive operations. An

increasing enemy threat in this less than mature OE requires CF to deploy in

support of SOF to conduct operations against larger enemy units. With CF/SOF

operating in proximity, the challenge is to maintain SOF freedom of action to

conduct operations while reducing the potential for fratricide. Examples of this

type of convergence include Operation ANACONDA or Operation REDWINGS in

Afghanistan (figure 8).

Figure 8. CF Enter a JSOA

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c. Scenario 2: Special Operations Forces Enter a Conventional Force

Operational Area. CF are engaged in combat operations when intelligence is

received that high-ranking members of an insurgent cell are located within the

operational area. A specially trained and equipped unit is required to neutralize

enemy personnel. SOF are assigned TACON of a CF unit or SOF are in direct

support to CF to conduct direct action missions against these high-value targets

(HVTs). The most commonly accepted command relationship is the

supported/supporting concept. This relationship often replaces the traditional

more rigid relationships and serves to determine who has the overall

responsibility for the OE. The challenge is to provide a framework in which SOF

has responsive fire support, freedom of action with reduced risk of fratricide, and

no hindrance to the combat operations of CF. This type of convergence occurs

daily in the current theater of operation (figure 9).

Figure 9. SOF Enter a CF OA

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d. Scenario 3: CF/SOF Conduct Deliberate Planning Together. During

deliberate planning (operation plan [OPLAN] and operation order [OPORD]

development) CF/SOF might be tasked to provide a specific capability to the

supported organization. This task may include foreign internal defense (FID);

SOF are TACON to CF in Afghanistan for FID missions. Other tasks might

include site exploitation (SE), special reconnaissance (SR), or special

intelligence functions that may drive the larger CF campaign or operation. The

challenge is to conduct as much CF/SOF coordination as possible.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations such as in Tal Afar and Al Qaim in Iraq

and Operation SERPENT FURY or in Lalam Nish in Afghanistan represent

large-scale deliberate planning operations supporting a campaign plan requiring

both organizations (figure 10).

Figure 10. CF/SOF Deliberate Planning

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e. Scenario 4: Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Conduct

Crisis Action Planning Together. In instances such as personnel recovery (PR),

CF may support SOF or request for SOF support during all or part of the

recovery operation. SOF specific capabilities or assets may be necessary for the

operation, and CF must request these assets or conduct joint hasty planning to

accomplish the mission. In many cases, a SOF unit may be given the lead in

these type of operations due to their ability to transition information feeds into

intelligence; direct either organic or national level intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance (ISR) assets; have forces specifically trained to accomplish

complex, high risk missions; and finally have the command structure organized

and trained to manage these types of operations. The challenge is to coordinate

CF support to SOF objectives given the short amount of time available for

planning and the inherent complexity of this type of operation. Examples of

these operations include the recovery of Rory Carrol (Sadr City, Iraq), the Italian

and South Korean hostages in Afghanistan, and the attempted recovery of Tom

Fox (Sadr City) (figure 11).

Figure 11. CF/SOF Crisis Action Planning

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6. Planning.

a. SOF Units.

SOF units, like special forces operational detachment-alpha (SFODA) have the

ability to plan and conduct operations unilaterally. They plan for operations and

are configured like a battalion (BN) staff for planning operations. They can plan

unilaterally, jointly, or with their CF counterparts for the applicable operational

scenarios discussed previously.

b. Targeting Cycles.

OIF and OEF provide both CF/SOF tactical units with the experience and ability

to conduct, collect, and process their own intel and then act on the information.

Primarily, land and maritime forces use the D3A targeting cycle shown in

figure 12, and air operations tend to use the find, fix, track, target, engage, and

assess (F2T2EA) as outlined in JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. With the current

counterinsurgency (COIN) fights in OIF and OEF, SOF has adapted a modified

D3A targeting cycle shown in figure 13. Additionally, SOF has modified the

F2T2EA targeting cycle to F3EAD shown in figure 14. Assessment is critical

because it may lead to other targets or networks, and disseminating the

information to all members of the JTF helps to defeat the network. CF/SOF units

should understand the other units’ operations/intel cycle and SOPs to find where

and how to interject a complementing capability in order to fully synchronize

operations.

IT TAKES A NETWORK TO DEFEAT A NETWORK

Figure 12. Joint D3A Targeting Cycle

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c. CF/SOF Synchronization.

Successful CF/SOF synchronization begins during planning. Rehearsing

interoperability challenges during training and exercises provides the best means

of reducing the number of missed opportunities, unnecessary delays, and the

potential for fratricide during operations. The following are some mission

planning considerations that CF/SOF commanders at all levels should address

as a minimum.

(1) Understand the capabilities and limitations of each other’s forces. This

should include the capability to support differing missions, specific force

limitations and shortfalls, and unique operational capabilities. Input from

exchanged LNOs is essential to provide this understanding to unit planners

and staffs.

(2) Review initial supporting and supported relationship. It is important that

both CF/SOF commanders achieve a common understanding of the

supported and supporting relationships during joint mission operations,

fires, logistics, and coalition force integration.

(3) Ensure rules of engagement (ROE) are clearly understood by all CF, SOF,

and coalition forces. If differences occur, determine which will govern the

mission and be aware of potential impact. Particular attention should be

paid to coalition ROE and the impact it can have on course of action (COA)

development.

(4) All forces must understand the CONOPS and mission approval process.

Key considerations include OE ownership, target priority level,

resource/assets availability, and supporting forces’ mission approval

processes and timelines.

(5) Synchronize battle rhythms—battle staff changeover times, scheduled

video teleconferences, and other battle rhythms. Battle rhythms should be

discussed and coordinated between all staffs. Additional areas of

discussion may include time, location, and purpose of routine meetings, as

well as required reports and formats.

(6) Understand quick response force (QRF) coordination and POC procedures

for requesting a QRF. Short notice requests and accelerated approvals

should be discussed.

(7) Address casualty evacuation (CASVAC) preplanning needs. Ensure that

communication and logistical coordination is thorough and down to the

lowest level.

(8) Chain of custody procedures—procedures, rules, and regulations for

handling detainees—need to be coordinated and understood at all levels of

command. If there are differences in procedures between CF and SOF,

then handoff criteria must be preplanned and coordinated.

(9) Synchronize personal relationships with JOA partners. CF/SOF do not

routinely work together, so it is important for commanders and their staffs

to take the time and effort to synchronize as an effective and efficient team.

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(10) Make COP—a dynamic picture, covering all CF/SOF functions—

available to all units. In the case of SOF compartmented operations, the

exact location, target, timing, purpose, and/or task organization may not be

available to CF. If CF assumes the role of a QRF or some other supporting

function for SOF, the CF commander must have enough information to

successfully plan and rehearse the assigned mission in accordance with

the planning priorities.

(11) Select common tools (i.e., radios, identification systems, call for fire

processes) for collaboration. If this is not possible, consider the

interoperability challenges associated with using different tools and ensure

that the controlling node can use or have access to any and all tools used

for collaboration.

d. Concept of Operations (CONOPS).

In planning, it is important to note that SOF units develop CONOPS to facilitate

the mission approval process. While the term CONOPS is becoming common

vernacular between all forces, SOF CONOPS will typically consist of the

following items:

(1) Level of operation and approval authority needed.

(2) OE owner acknowledgement of operation.

(3) Target (TGT) description and source of target information.

(4) TGT/high-value individual (HVI)/high-value target/persons of interest

description.

(5) Enemy most probable course of action (EMPCOA)/enemy most dangerous

course of action (EMDCOA).

(6) Task organization.

(7) External support needed and/or used.

(8) Ground force commander's (GFC) intent.

(9) SOF mission statement.

(10) Concept of operation by phase.

(11) Scheme of maneuver [main effort (ME), supporting effort 1(SE1),

supporting effort 2 (SE2)] with task and purpose.

(12) GFC by name, specifically when CF/SOF are integrated.

(13) Fires needed (artillery, air, etc.) with task and purpose.

(14) Air assets/UAS needed with task and purpose, show times, etc.

(15) QRF location, time of response, composition, contact, and POC info.

(16) Mission timeline.

(17) Abort criteria.

(18) Detainee plan with detailed info about chain of custody, temporary holding

facility (THF), etc.

(19) Type of breaching planned with justification (e.g., mechanical, ballistic, or

explosive).

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(20) Sensitive political or cultural factors (entering a mosque, detaining an

official, etc.).

(21) CF/SOF involvement: mission, composition, disposition of

supported/supporting unit.

(22) Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)/CASEVAC plan, location, time of

response, compositions, contact, and POC info.

(23) Signal—all units call signs and frequencies (CF, SOF, aircraft, etc.).

(24) Risk assessment.

(25) Execution checklist, operational schedules (OPSKEDs), or code words.

(26) IO and psychological operations (PSYOP) plan.

(27) Consequence management plan.

e. SOF CONOPS Approval Process Example.

(1) Figure 15 depicts a common SOF CONOPS approval process. It is

important for the CF/SOF commanders to understand this process and

timelines associated with the different levels of CONOPS to prevent

unnecessary delays in operations.

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Figure 15. SOF Example CONOPS Approval Process

f. CONOPS Levels and Approving Authorities.

(1) Tables 4 and 5 illustrate current examples of SOF CONOPS levels in OIF

and OEF, respectively, with the criteria for each CONOPS level and the

approval authority for each level. CONOPS have permeated the CF/SOF

community. CONOPS are currently submitted to higher and adjacent

commands for approval and SA by both CF/SOF elements.

(2) In OIF, CONOPS levels are labeled I, II, and III, with a level I CONOPS

requiring the highest command approval. However, in OEF, CONOPS are

labeled II, I, and 0, with a level II CONOPS requiring the highest command

approval. CONOPS levels generally depend on three criteria: sensitivity of

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the site, HVI level, and level of risk. Criteria are dependent upon enemy

threat, commander’s ability, and desire to accept or not accept risk. Some

theaters have additional criteria. An example is in Iraq where provinces

that are under provincial Iraqi control (PIC) require all CONOPS to be

level I CONOPS due to OE ownership. Commanders must clearly define

operations by level and authority prior to combat operations. In tables 4

and 5 CONOPS levels are listed from low risk to high risk operations.

Table 4. OIF EXAMPLE CONOPS LEVELS

CONOPS

CRITERIA

EXAMPLES

APPROVAL

LEVELS

AUTHORITY

LEVEL III

Routine

Convoys, force

AOB or NSWTU with

operations.

protection, low risk

concurrence from OE

CONOPS, FID

owner.

activities, intel

activities, combined

patrols.

LEVEL II

Disruption

Combined SOF and

SOTF with

type missions

FSF operations

concurrence from OE

and means of

owner. (Can be

entry/exit.

delegated to AOB.)

LEVEL I

Operations

High risk entry into

AOB to SOTF, with

that may have

sensitive sites.

concurrence from OE

significant

owner, to CJSOTF to

political and/or

multi-national division

IO impact;

(MND) POC to JTF

meets or

POC with possible

exceeds host

approval/notification

nation elected

by host nation elected

officials

officials.

criteria.

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Table 5. OEF EXAMPLE CONOPS LEVELS

CONOPS

CRITERIA

EXAMPLES

APPROVAL

LEVEL

AUTHORITY

LEVEL 0

Routine

Convoys, force

AOB or TU with

operations.

protection, low

concurrence from

risk CONOPS,

OE owner.

FID activities,

intel activities,

combined

patrols.

LEVEL I

Disruption type

Combined SOF

SOTF with

missions, means

and FSF

concurrence from

of INFIL/EXFIL.

operations.

OE owner. (Can be

delegated to AOB.)

LEVEL II

Operations that

High risk entry

AOB to SOTF with

may have

into sensitive

concurrence from

significant

sites.

OE owner to JTF

political and/or

POC and may

IO impact; meets

require International

or exceeds host

Security Assistance

nation elected

Force (ISAF) POC

officials criteria.

approval with

possible

approval/notification

by host nation

elected officials.

7. Operational Considerations during Execution.

During execution, key considerations include information flow, C2 systems, battle

tracking, and COP. CF/SOF commanders should consider the following during

operations:

a. Maintain information cross-talk between CF/SOF. LNOs must closely monitor

current and planned operations and ensure their parent unit receives accurate

and timely unit tracking information. When possible, LNOs should push draft

copies of CONOPS for upcoming operations to provide their host and parent

command the maximum amount of time to prepare for future operations.

b. Leverage interoperable C2 systems. Consider joint cross-domain fire support

and review priority of fires through battle tracking (situation reports [SITREPs],

position reports [POSREPs], execution checklists [EXCHECKs], etc.).

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c. Deconflict FSCMs. As SOF ground teams move across the battlefield, air

operations center (AOC) and SOLE personnel must continually update C2

systems to cover SOF movement. This becomes extremely critical after the ATO

is released. C2 nodes need to keep COPs current and operations floor

personnel need to vet against engaged targets.

d. Maintain battle tracking. Maintain an overall picture of the OE that is

accurate, timely, and relevant. The simplest form of battle tracking is the mental

and graphic picture built and maintained by using maps, observations, and battle

updates from higher headquarters.

e. Manage COP. COP is defined as a single identical display of relevant

information shared by more than one command. A COP facilitates collaborative

planning and assists all echelons to achieve SA. The CF/SOF LNOs should

ensure that the COP of the hosting and parent unit presents an accurate picture

of the OE and includes the appropriate tracking of the following:

(1) Friendly and enemy tracking.

(2) Friendly and enemy picture updates.

(3) Track filter updates.

(4) Redundant and correlated tracking.

(5) Joint fire support and review priority of fires and FSCMs considerations.

(6) Maneuver control measure (MCM).

(7) Intelligence updates.

f. Achieve end states. To effectively achieve desired end states, CF/SOF must

continuously assess effects and share information through collaboration,

coordination, and communications architecture (e.g., LNOs, voice, data systems,

collaboration tools, and COP architecture). Information shared should include

the following:

(1) Battle damage assessment (BDA).

(2) SITREPs and intelligence summaries (INTSUMs).

(3) Site Exploitation. Tracking intelligence from mission sites for future targets

and utilizing all available national assets, etc.

(4) Detainee tracking and evidence chain-of-custody to ensure a detainee and

his/her items of intelligence value arrive at the same place and can be

located during prosecution.

(5) Post-operation detainee intelligence tracking, collection systems, and battle

drills for immediate input back into the targeting cycle.

(6) Operational summaries (OPSUMs).

(7) Compile target lists. Target lists would include HVIs, HPTs, “be on the

lookout” (BOLO), and politically sensitive individuals or properties.

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Chapter III

CF/SOF Fires and Effects

1. Introduction

a. SOF will often operate within the CF operational area and vice versa.

Therefore, it is imperative that both CF/SOF have a thorough understanding of

joint doctrine, Service doctrine, and the OE in accordance with the commander’s

intent in regards to fires and effects (e.g., operational versus tactical fires,

employment of kill boxes, and supported command forward of a fire support

coordination line).

b. Joint fire support is the synergistic product of three subsystems: (1) target

acquisition, (2) command and control, and (3) attack resources. These

subsystems will inevitably cross intra theater boundaries and must be properly

planned and executed to prevent fratricide and duplication while supporting

operational momentum, maintaining the initiative, and conducting maneuver.

This chapter discusses differences in CF/SOF effects capabilities as well as

ways to streamline the fires process to engage the enemy quickly and accurately

while reducing chances for fratricide.

2. Fires and Effects Lessons Learned

a. CF/SOF commanders must be knowledgeable about each other’s fires

process, including the supported commander’s guidance, targeting priorities,

targeting cycles, ATOs, and attack guidance matrix. A clear common

understanding of the fires process early will assist in preventing delays during the

immediate/emergency and time-sensitive moments. The use of LNOs will help

facilitate this understanding.

b. Ensure the JSOAC, through the SOLE, conducts airspace deconfliction with

the Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM) liaison officer located within the joint

force air component headquarters.

c. Activate and deactivate small gridded areas of operation during rapid decisive

operations. Use kill boxes overlaid on or outside of these defined areas to

facilitate more responsive fire support. For more information on kill boxes, refer

to FM 3-09.34, MCRP 3-25H, NTTP 3-09.2.1, and AFTTP 3-2.59, Multi-Service

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box Employment.

3. Joint Fire Support Capabilities and Characteristics

Early, detailed, and integrated CF/SOF fire support planning is required to

capitalize on complementary fires capabilities. Failure to conduct this planning

can cause the joint fire support process to respond less effectively and efficiently

by adding unnecessary layers of coordination during execution and causing

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missed opportunities, delays in action, and increased potential for fratricide.

Table 6 identifies CF/SOF fire support capabilities.

Table 6. Joint Fire Support Capabilities

SOF Supports CF Mission

CF Supports SOF Mission

ISR platform including special

Lethal and nonlethal fires (e.g.,

reconnaissance capabilities.

IO and electronic warfare [EW]).

Joint terminal attack controllers

Robust joint fire support C2.

(JTACs).

Positive identification of specific

Multiple attack/strike resource

targets.

options.

Target marketing / terminal guidance.

Conventional strike assets (e.g.,

F/A-18, A-10, F-15E, B-52,

etc.).

Battle damage assessment.

ISR.

Recommendations to no-

Amphibious platforms.

strike/restricted target list.

AC-130 gunship support.

Heavy combat ground

formations.

Deception and denial operations.

JTACs (e.g., controllers in

Remote area operations.

tactical air control party (TACP)

Indigenous force status.

or Air Naval Gunfire Liaison

Austere weather operations.

Company).

Mobility (to include airlift).

ACMs / FSCMs.

Austere weather support.

4. CF/SOF Fire Support Planning

Planning for joint fires that assist land, maritime, amphibious, and SOF to move,

maneuver, and control territory, populations, and key waters is essential. The

following is a list of considerations CF/SOF commanders and planners must

consider when planning joint fires:

a. Review the intelligence preparation of the OE (IPOE) or intelligence

preparation of the battlefield/battlespace (IPB). This includes leveraging and

fusing complementary capabilities and ensuring that there is continuous

coverage and established required intelligence updates to compensate for

changing CF and SOF capabilities during the targeting process.

Note: The US Army use IPOE and the USMC use IPB.

b. Develop common fire support database. Ensure that common software

versions are employed on all communications and intelligence systems.

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c. Establish OE geometry. OE geometry refers to three-dimensional digital

representations of the OE. Ensure that graphics are accurately prepared without

overlaps or gaps and are disseminated in a manner that maintains the integrity of

the zones. Note that graphics developed on very large map scales greater than

1:250,000 are often inaccurately depicted.

d. Identify zone of responsibility (ZOR). Missions are generally planned around

maneuver control measures (MCMs) identified by unit boundaries. In land

warfare, a boundary is a line between adjacent units and/or formations, which

defines surface areas of operation. ZORs are three-dimensional areas assigned

to commanders for the conduct of military operations. The AFATDS requires the

commanders’ OE to be depicted in the database by a line around the assigned

area.

e. Develop FSCM in accordance with OPLANs/theater guidance. JP 3-09,

Close Air Support, Appendix A, contains a list of FSCMs.

f. Exchange story boards and gridded reference graphic (GRG). A GRG is a

graphical depiction of target area, usually produced on overhead imagery,

gridded for easy identification of key terrain, buildings, etc.

Develop ACM and plan within the ATO cycle, reference JP 3-52, Joint Doctrine

for Airspace Control in a Combat Zone and the multi-Service publication FM

3-52.1, AFTTP 3-2.78, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for

Airspace Control for more information on ACMs.

g. Synchronize airspace control requirements and procedures in accordance

with airspace control order (ACO) and special instructions (SPINS). Synchronize

Service-specific, CF/SOF procedures. Ensure that input to ATOs are

coordinated with CF/SOF units.

h. Know the TTP. The areas of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are

controlled by the CF with SOF operating within CF AOs. The artillery, mortars,

and most of the air assets are controlled by CF. The following TTP will aid SOF

fires:

(1) Understand which CF unit owns the artillery and mortars in the AO SOF

are operating. If SOF are operating out of a firebase with indirect fire

support attached, be sure to understand the command relationship (e.g.,

OPCON, TACON, etc.).

(2) Understand the CF commander’s intent when executing fires (e.g., indirect

fires can only be executed with the approval of airspace, and a collateral

damage assessment must be conducted).

(3) Meet with the CF commander’s fire support officer (FSO) to establish a

request/call for fire routine or sequence. By doing so, the CF will be more

prone to providing SOF with indirect fires.

(4) Understand that CF typically controls the air assets in theater. Ensure that

the CF is familiar with SOF procedure of requesting air support through the

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combined joint special operations task force (CJSOTF), which will be

cleared through the CF AO command.

(5) Ensure the CF AO commander understands the SOF TTP when dealing

with fire support. SOF commanders are given the autonomy to make

decisions on the ground and develop the situation. For example, CAS and

ISR platforms appear above a SOF objective without SOF requesting these

assets. Although the CF commander had good intentions by providing

these assets, the enemy forces fled the SOF engagement area upon

identifying the air assets. The opportunity for SOF to destroy the enemy

was lost.

(6) Identify locations that are often targets of fire support operations. If the CF

have not already created target packages on these locations, SOF should

coordinate with CF to establish these targets. This will facilitate the fire

support missions on these particular targets. Additionally, these targets will

provide the CF commander with new named area of interest (NAI) and

target areas of interest (TAI) for possible future operations.

5. Fire Support Coordination

a. FSCMs enhance the expeditious attack of targets; protect forces,

noncombatants, critical infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural

significance; and set the stage for future operations. Locations and implementing

instructions (e.g., establishing headquarters and date/time/group for which a

FSCM is in effect) for FSCMs are disseminated electronically by message,

database update, and/or overlay (e.g., digital file or transparency) through both

command and joint fire support channels to higher, lower, and adjacent

maneuver and supporting units.

b. Knowledge of the various FSCMs employed by each Service and functional

component (e.g., joint force land component), in addition to joint measures, is

necessary for effective joint fire support coordination. Examples of nonjoint

doctrinal FSCMs include operating a battlefield coordination line (Marine Corps),

and deep battle synchronization line (Army). Additionally, theater-specific kill box

procedures using the Global Area Reference System (GARS) may be

established. Refer to FM 3-09.34, MCRP 3-25H, NTTP 3-09.2.1, AFTTP 3-2.59,

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box Employment; and

JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. Additionally, refer to multi-Service publication FM

3-52.1, AFTTP 3-2.78, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for

Airspace Control, for some specific translation errors between transportation

automated information systems (TAIS), TBMCS, and AFATDS, as well as

coordination requirements for ACMs. CF/SOF commanders and planners must

understand the following in the development of FSCMs:

(1) Follow established procedures for dissemination, receipt confirmation,

tracking, and deletion of FSCMs.

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(2) Understand the impact of FSCMs on CF/SOF current and future

operations.

(3) Ensure LNOs maintain SA of all FSCMs impacting their supporting unit.

(4) Ensure operational graphics are included in the COP.

(5) Ensure LNOs and planners use the JFC-approved GARS.

(6) Ensure FSCMs are only as restrictive or permissive to the degree

necessary to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously

provide safeguards for friendly forces.

(7) Recognize the timeliness of reporting. FSCMs may not be depicted the

same on all C2 and joint fire support systems. If the FSCM is delayed, the

LNOs may have to assist in clearing the fires.

c. When planning deliberate joint fire support, CF/SOF commanders and

planners must coordinate and rehearse a fire plan that supports operational

elements. Planning should consider the following:

(1) Review and understand the CF/SOF commanders’ intent as applied to joint

fire support planning (e.g., ROE, national caveats, timing, effects, and risk).

(2) Identify and coordinate CF/SOF capabilities and limitations. Discuss the

capabilities and mission planning requirements of each

supporting/supported section.

(a) Fire support assets available (air, surface fires, naval).

(b) Target identification.

(d) Fire request and target control procedures.

(e) Consider communication requirements (e.g., digital or voice).

(3) Leverage mutually supporting effects. CF and SOF employ an array of

weapons systems that may complement parent unit capabilities in a joint

environment. Nonlethal fires include those effects from EW, nonlethal

weapons (NLWs), civil affairs (CA), PSYOP, space control, and IO such as

disrupting the enemy’s information networks.

(4) Coordinate and synchronize targeting priorities. The commander’s target

guidance and priorities must be incorporated into the fire support planning

process. The importance of a target set and/or category may change

during subsequent phases of operation.

(5) Determine requirements for input to the joint targeting cycle. Synchronize

CF/SOF input to the joint targeting cycle, including combined targeting

meetings, target nomination submission requirements (format and timing),

etc.

(6) Consider the ATO and clarify processes for dynamic retasking of air

support.

(7) Understand airspace management procedures and review established

ACMs as defined in the ACO and FSCMs defined in OPORDs, fragmentary

orders (FRAGORDs), and fire support plans.

(8) Standardize map datum. The OPLAN will define the map datum used in

theater in either annex B or annex M. It will further define which coordinate

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system to be used when reporting locations (military grid reference system

[MGRS], universal transverse mercator [UTM], or lat/long.) It is important

to recognize that not all assets use the same map datum. Depending on

platform and available equipment, care must be given when passing

coordinate information to ensure a common standard is used.

6. Clearance of Fires

CF/SOF commanders must coordinate the clearance of fires procedures prior to

starting operations. This coordination helps prevent fratricide between the

different elements as well as provide timely prosecution of targets. The following

are some considerations for CF/SOF commanders:

a. OE commanders have the responsibility for clearance of fires, with

management delegated under the lead of the fire support coordination element.

b. SOF must positively clear all indirect fires (not precleared or allowed by

permissive FSCMs) with the fire support coordination center (FSCC) that is

responsible for the OE.

c. SOF must provide and update unit locations, to include foreign forces

operating with SOF to the OE FSCC.

d. SOF units must ensure that CF units can positively identify them if they are

operating in an unconventional manner (nonstandard vehicles or dress).

e. Use FSCMs to facilitate clearance of fires. Permissive measures, if

positioned correctly and disseminated to all, permit safe and responsive fires on

targets of opportunity.

7. Immediate Fire Support Planning

Unplanned, immediate fire support is a rapid process that mandates CF/SOF

have functional and operational procedures in place. CF/SOF commanders and

planners should consider—

a. Primary, alternate, contingency, emergency (PACE) communications plan.

b. Joint fires network communications. CF and SOF gain enhanced SA by

receiving feeds from ground and fires C2 networks. Plan for the ability to view

unit tracks and trajectories of friendly fire support assets, as well as trajectories

from counter mortar radar acquisitions. This helps prevent the potential for

CF/SOF fratricide.

c. Quick-fires channels. CF/SOF units should establish a standardized link to

rapidly respond to requests, receive approval, and control fires from all friendly

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fire support assets available (e.g., aircraft and ground units responding to troops

in contact [TIC] will all be on previously established frequencies).

d. Establish preplanned targets. To eliminate redundancy and minimize

engagement delays, CF/SOF units should codevelop preplanned targets for

inclusion into AFATDS. Target reference point (TRP) in support of SOF

CONOPS should be sent to a fire support element (FSE) fires cell (FC) and/or

FSCC and be entered into AFATDS during CONOPS coordination.

e. Precleared fires (kill boxes, engagement zones, free-fire areas). CF and SOF

should become familiar with established procedures and approving authorities for

preclearance of fires. Co-use or independent operations within specific areas

determine maneuver requirements, fires synchronization processes, movement

coordination, and hand-over requirements. Additionally, ensure that CAS assets

designated for a particular mission have the most current graphics.

8. Time-sensitive Targets

a. A TST is a JFC designated target or target type of such high importance to

the accomplishment of the JFC's mission and objectives, or one that presents

such a significant strategic or operational threat to friendly forces or allies, that

the JFC dedicates intelligence collection and attack assets or is willing to divert

assets away from other targets in order to use the F2T2EA targeting cycle. TSTs

comprise a very small or limited number of targets due to the required investment

of assets and potential disruption of planned execution and are only those targets

designated by the JFC and identified as such in the JFC’s CONOPS. In most

cases, TSTs require immediate response because they pose (or will soon pose)

a direct danger to friendly forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of

opportunity. TSTs are normally executed dynamically; however, to be successful,

they require considerable deliberate planning and preparation within the joint

targeting cycle. If the TST is a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) or could have

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) effects, proper planning

needs to be done regarding appropriate personnel protective measures as well

as potential collateral effects. For more information, refer to JP 3-40, Combating

Weapons of Mass Destruction, Appendix A, "WMD, Elimination Operations," and

Appendix B, "WMD Interdiction Operations."

b. Commanders may designate high-payoff targets (HPTs) that present

significant risks to or opportunities for component forces and/or missions. These

are generally targets that the component commander(s) have nominated to the

JFC's TST list, but did not "make the cut." This class of targets may require

time-sensitive processing and cross- component coordination, even though they

did not qualify for inclusion on the JFC's TST list. The JFC and component

commanders should clearly designate these targets prior to execution of military

operations. These targets should receive the highest priority possible, just below

targets on the JFC's TST list.

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c. The JFC requires an integrated approach to TST C2. Because multiple

organizations (national, theater, and component-level) require TST-related

planning and execution data, the goal is to create a mutually agreed upon,

comprehensive, and accurate COP. Options for achieving this include—

(1) Collaboration.

(2) Liaison and control elements.

(3) Consolidation and collocation.

d. Preestablished and well-rehearsed C2 procedures permit the engagement of

TST within the window of opportunity.

e. Establish and deconflict FSCMs against specific TSTs.

f. Validate the target still meets the TST criteria.

g. Identify the TST engagement authority and execute as permitted.

h. Understand the level of risk acceptable to the JFC (e.g., risk to friendly forces

and noncombatants; possible collateral damage; and the disruption of diverting

attack assets from their deliberately planned missions versus the danger of not

attacking the TST in time and risking mission failure or harm to friendly forces).

i. Although targeting is a continuous, cyclical process, the cycle for one routine

preplanned target may take hours or even days. Successful prosecution of a

TST requires that this cycle be completed in a matter of minutes. Means to

achieve this time-compressed cycle include—

(1) Using preplanned target reference methods such as kill boxes to expedite

the clearance and deconfliction process.

(2) Using IPOE/IPB to determine the most probable areas where TSTs will

emerge, permitting effective scheduling and positioning of acquisition and

strike assets to ensure rapid response to TSTs.

(3) Making organizational enhancements (e.g., streamlining TST procedures

within each organization, connecting specific TST prosecution nodes within

the command into a virtual cell, collocating specific TST-related functional

assets, or by a combination of these options).

(4) Making communications enhancements such as direct, dedicated, and

redundant real-time links (collaborative planning suites, voice, and data)

between TST cell nodes.

j. Coordinate and deconflict SOF locations with TST attacks. The primary

method to accomplish deconfliction and clearance of fires is through the SOF

chain of command, but it may be facilitated via liaison and control elements—

(1) The SOLE is linked with the JAOC for air operations interface.

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(2) The SOCCE is linked with surface agencies (e.g., deep operations

coordination cell, fire support element, FSCC, supporting arms

coordination center [SACC]) for land operations.

k. The SOLE and SOCCE have SA on the locations and activities of SOF in and

outside of the operational area.

l. Should CF operations put SOF at risk, the JSOTF, assisted by the SOLE or

SOCCE, is responsible for deconfliction and/or recommending COAs to avoid the

potential for fratricide.

m. SOF’s primary actions against TSTs are clandestine reconnaissance,

surveillance, terminal guidance, and control of weapons systems. SOF can be

employed to destroy or disable a TST, but if not planned well in advance of the

operation, this may compromise their primary mission and require extraction of

the team.

9. Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS)

a. Naval gunfire is a near-immediate, all-weather, around-the-clock support

option that is limited to use in the littoral area. Naval gunfire provides fire support

for targets in coastal regions in circumstances where traditional artillery support

is not available or as augmentation to the ground forces’ existing fires assets. As

a general rule, naval gunfire has a range of 23-24 km and is called in via high

frequency (HF). For further NSFS information and planning guidance, refer to

MCWP 3-31.6, Supporting Arms Coordination in Amphibious Operations.

Employment considerations should include the following:

(1) Hydrography and the mine threat affect the location of preplanned fire

support areas (FSAs)/fire support stations.

(2) Naval ships are multimission platforms that may simultaneously provide fire

support to ground forces, as well as antiair and antisubmarine protection to

other ships at sea. This complicates their employment and will need to be

considered in the planning process.

(3) Naval gunfire provides high rates of fire for limited periods of time.

(4) The naval gunfire high velocity and flat trajectory affords—

(a) Direct fire against fortifications.

(b) Limited use against targets in defilade.

(5) Gun-target line—

(a) Changes when the ship is underway within the FSA.

(b) Consider the elliptical dispersion pattern, as shown in figure 16, with

the long axis of the pattern along the direction of fire (e.g., plan the

gun-target line parallel to the forward line of own troops).

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Figure 16. Naval Gunfire Dispersion Pattern

b. Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM)

(1) There are three TLAM variants that can be launched from destroyers,

cruisers, and submarines. The Block III TLAM-C (500-lb. class unitary

warhead) and Block III TLAM-D (sub-munitions warhead) fly single

outcome missions. The Block IV TLAM-E (500-lb. class unitary warhead)

is an improved variant capable of loitering and redirection based on in-flight

two-way communications with the launch platform. Tomahawk missions

are primarily planned by the Cruise Missile Support Activities (CMSA) and

Tomahawk Strike Mission Planning Cells (TSMPC). Some Shooters also

have the capability to plan and shoot their own Tomahawk missiles, which

in combination with the CMSAs and TSMPCs provides a 24/7 capability

that has been operationally proven. The evolution of cruise missile

technology has enabled TLAM to go from a purely strategic weapon to a

tactical weapon uniquely capable of supporting CF/SOF by use of the

following attributes:

(a) Deep strike capability (1,000+ nautical mile range).

(b) Denied airspace utility (unmanned system, difficult to counter with

antiair).

Positioning System [GPS] and/or back-up nonjammable navigation

aids).

(d) Precise time on target selectability.

(e) All-weather, day, or night strike capability.

(f) High reliability (low dud rate.)

(g) In-flight reprogrammable capable of loitering and retargeting to support

call for fires and TSTs (Block IV).

(h) Low to medium altitude target attack profiles (< 300 ft. to 15,000+ ft.).

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(i) High element of surprise (multi axis multisimultaneous time on target,

small radar/visual profile, variable run-in headings and programmable

dive angles).

(j) Quick strike capability (attack targets within 70 nm of the shooter in less

than 10 minutes).

(2) Employment Considerations

(a) TLAM execution timeline is very fluid and dependent on several factors

such as precoordination, deconfliction, TLAM variant, and whether or

not the firing unit (FRU) is in the “basket” and prepared to fire, etc.

From receipt of tasking to launch can take from minutes to hours,

depending on the level of precoordination. Refer to FM 3-60.1, MCRP

3-6D, NTTP 3-60.1, AFTTP(I) 3-2.3, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques,

and Procedures for Time Sensitive Targeting, Appendix D, "Dynamic

Execution of TLAM in Support of TST."

(b) During mission planning, the joint fires element must coordinate the

employment of TLAMs with the SACC (afloat), the FSCC (ashore), or

the Tomahawk strike coordinator cell to assign the necessary launch

platforms to the TLAM support mission. Once TLAM assets have been

apportioned, calls for fire can be initiated at the special operations

force/firing unit level via voice communications.

when launched the missile will strike its assigned target. Commanders

should ensure the target aim-point is positioned in a location that will

provide the most benefit to their mission. Additionally, care must be

taken to ensure that the terminal attack explosion does not

compromise the overall effectiveness of the mission.

(d) The Block IV missile can be planned to 15 different outcomes. Once

launched, the missile will strike the assigned target or may be

reassigned to one of 14 other outcomes. One outcome may include a

loiter track that allows the missile to loiter for up to 2 hours while

waiting reassignment. If a new target appears or the target has

returned, the missile can be retargeted in-flight to the new location

using information from a 9-line, chat, etc. If a new target is not

nominated, the missile will proceed to a previously coordinated

remotely located dump point to limit detection and collateral damage.

(e) Special attention must be given to the fact that TLAM and ISR aircraft

flight profiles often occupy the same airspace and either TLAM or ISR

overland flight profiles must be adjusted according to mission priority.

This is best accomplished at the JFACC’s AOC between the ISR LNO,

the TLAM LNO, and the airspace representative responsible for

airspace deconfliction.

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10. Artillery, Rockets, and Missile Support

a. SOF does not typically have inherent artillery support, while SOF does have

small mortar type systems. It is essential for SOF to understand the conventional

fire support of the CF units in their OE and integrate them into SOF operations.

b. Cannon artillery is usually the most abundant fire support system available to

the conventional ground force, providing near-immediate, all-weather, 24-hour

response. Artillery offers high volume and both precision and area fires (see

figure 17).

c. The Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) is an Army free-flight, area-fire,

artillery rocket system used primarily to attack counter fire, enemy air defenses,

and personnel targets. The MLRS supplements cannon artillery fires with a rapid

response, longer range, and large volume of firepower.

d. The Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) is similar to the MLRS,

although GMLRS is able to use fewer rockets to achieve the same effect by

using GPS/inertial measurement unit (IMU) guidance systems.

e. The Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) is a longer-range GPS-aided

missile system with the responsiveness of the MLRS. The ATACMS offers an

antipersonnel/antimateriel, antiarmor sub-munitions warhead and a dual purpose

improved conventional munitions with unitary and/or antiarmor warheads.

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Figure 17. Artillery/MLRS Range Relationship

f. Employment Considerations

(1) CF/SOF friendly unit synchronization is critical prior to employment due to

the range and dispersion of these weapon systems.

(2) Understand the MLRS—

(a) It has collateral damage concerns, due to munitions producing dud

bomblets (with a dud rate of 1 to 10 percent) that are hazardous to

dismounts, light vehicles, and civilians.

(b) It has limited effectiveness against hardened targets.

(3) Understand the ATACMS—

(a) Its high angle launch and impact, along with its very high altitude flight

path, does not require large amounts of airspace to be deconflicted

before firing.

(b) It is difficult to employ against moving targets because the missile

cannot be redirected after launch.

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11. Close Air Support

a. The speed, range, and maneuverability of aircraft allow them to attack targets

that other fire support means may not be able to effectively engage because of

limiting factors such as target type, range, terrain, or ground scheme of

maneuver. Attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft have capabilities that are

complementary, especially when employed in combined attacks, and can quickly

mass fires throughout the OE.

b. Manned aircraft offer both day and night capability and a wide variety of

munitions, but are weather and refueling dependent. Manned aircraft and UAS

can offer “eyes on target” and a closed loop from the “sensor to the shooter”

during an attack, particularly useful when exact target coordinates are not

available or when mobile targets are being targeted.

c. CF CAS Employment Considerations.

(1) Identify the need for preplanned CAS and understand the immediate CAS

request process.

(2) Plan for CAS at key points throughout the depth of the OE.

(3) Anticipate preplanned CAS requirements for inclusion in the joint ATO.

The ATO planning cycle is normally 72 hours and covers a 24-hour period.

The ATO is generally published 12 to 24 hours before the ATO period.

(4) Understand aircraft employment concepts.

(a) CAS attack aircraft typically fly in groups of two to four aircraft.

Bombers normally fly as single ships or in small groups. The Air Force

calls these “flights,” while the Navy and Marine Corps call them either

“sections” (two aircraft) or “divisions” (three to four aircraft).

(b) Army aviation units are organic to divisions and regiments and perform

missions as part of a combined arms team. The Army does NOT

consider its attack helicopters a CAS system, but rather a close

combat attack (CCA) mission. Helicopter units normally receive

mission-type orders and execute as an integral unit/maneuver element.

The preferred employment method is under the control of a maneuver

commander.

operate in groups of two to four and are integral to the Marine

air-ground task force.

(d) A joint air attack team (JAAT) is a combination of attack and/or scout

rotary-wing aircraft and fixed-wing CAS aircraft operating together to

locate and attack high-payoff targets and other targets of opportunity.

A JAAT normally operates as a coordinated effort against enemy

forces supported by fire support, air defense artillery, NSFS, ISR

systems, electronic warfare systems, and ground maneuver forces.

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(5) Consider the enemy air defenses and the joint force’s ability to counter

them.

(6) Understand the requirement to integrate CAS with fire and maneuver.

(7) Understand that CAS requires an integrated, flexible, and responsive C2

structure, and dependable, interoperable, and secure communications

architecture.

(8) Understand that if a support relationship exists, the supporting element

uses the CAS C2 system of the supported element. If a command

relationship does not exist, CAS requests are forwarded using their

respective CAS process to the JAOC for consideration/fill.

d. SOF CAS Employment Considerations.

(1) Understand SOF CAS can be requested through the ATO process but is

based on asset availability and priority of fires. Airspace deconfliction will

be accomplished through the JFACC airspace control plan and orders and

ATO SPINS.

(a) The primary missions of SOF aircraft are troop movement, CAS,

convoy escort, and limited air-to-ground interdiction. They can perform

force protection and interdiction missions where limitation of collateral

damage and/or fratricide is a primary concern.

(b) When working with AC-130, the 5-line call for fire is used to give

aircraft location of friendly forces and range and bearing to target with

target description.

(2) AC-130 Gunship (H and U Models).

(a) The primary missions of the AC-130 aircraft are CAS and air

interdiction. Special operations AC-130 gunships typically operate

single-ship sorties during hours of darkness and under low-threat

conditions (when survivability of aircraft is usually higher). They can

perform force protection and interdiction missions where limitation of

collateral damage and/or fratricide is a primary concern. The AC-130H

weapons suite consists of a 105-mm and 40-mm cannon; the AC-130U

also has a 25-mm cannon.

(b) With its accurate, low-yield munitions, AC-130s can fire extremely

close to friendly troops while limiting collateral damage.

targets (e.g., personnel, trucks, trains, and boats), with limited

capability against “hard” targets (e.g., buildings, armor, and

underground).

(d) In contrast to other attack aircraft, the AC-130 engages the target while

in a counterclockwise orbit as opposed to a run-in style attack (see

figure18.) The AC-130 orbit profile, combined with the sophisticated

sensor suite and long loiter time, allows the crew to continuously

(threat permitting) monitor the battlefield, affording exceptional

battlefield SA.

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Figure 18. AC-130 Gunship Target/Fire Line

(3) AC-130 Employment Considerations.

(a) Direct interaction with an AC-130 weapons officer/tactician is essential

when considering employment tactics.

(b) Gunships typically operate in the hours of darkness and must operate

in areas of friendly air superiority and outside the range of radar-guided

threat systems.

capability via coordinates and offset firing from a friendly radar beacon.

Additionally the AC-130U has a strike-radar to allow for engagement of

radar significant targets such as buildings and vehicles.

(d) The most important step for the AC-130 in any CAS engagement, and

especially in urban terrain, is the positive identification of friendly

forces; units must clearly mark their positions per standing operating

procedures to avoid fratricide.

(e) The unique procedures for requesting and controlling fires from the

AC-130 gunship should be considered.

(f) Do not ask the gunship to identify colors, as the optical system is

unable to display color.

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(g) Because the gunship target/fire line is constantly changing—

• Reference north/south/east/west (cardinal directions) and distance;

do not reference or make corrections by clock positions or left/right or

short/long.

• Identify friendly troop locations and no-fire areas (e.g., via beacon,

infrared strobe, gated laser intensifier tape, or verbally).

• Identify target (e.g., via laser or talk-on).

• Do not pass run-in headings (no-fire headings).

(4) AC-130 5-line call for fire format—

(a) Observer/warning order.

• “(AC-130 call sign), this is (observer call sign), fire mission, over.”

(b) Friendly location/mark.

• “My position is (TRP, grid, etc.) marked by (strobe, beacon, infrared

(IR) strobe, etc.), over.”

• “Target location is (magnetic bearing and range in [meters], TRP,

grid, etc.)”

(d) Target description/mark.

• “Target is (target description), marked by (IR pointer, tracer, etc.),

over.”

(e) Remarks.

• Give threats, danger close, restrictions, at my command, etc.

(5) For additional AC-130 employment considerations see JP 3-09.3, Close Air

Support, chapter 5; and FM 3-09.32, MCRP 3-16.6A, NTTP 3-09.2,

AFTTP(I) 3-2.6, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the

Joint Application of Firepower (JFIRE).

12. Information Operations

a. Nonlethal fires provide a force employment virtually unlimited by range,

terrain, or ground scheme of maneuver, but require detailed integration and

planning in support of CF/SOF operations. IO integrate employment of EW,

computer network operations (CNO), PSYOP, military deception (MILDEC), and

operational security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related

capabilities (to include space control), to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp

adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting all US

forces.

b. Liaisons from each specialized facet of IO (e.g., computer network attack

[CNA], versus computer network defense [CND]) must be integrated early in the

planning process. Targeting development, IPOE/IPB, and additional facets of

military planning require extended timelines for accurate deployment of IO tools.

Early identification of desired effects is critical to an effective IO campaign. Refer

to JP 3-13, Information Operations, chapter V, for a detailed discussion of IO

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planning and employment considerations. The following observations are for

commanders and planners in regards to IO in a CF / SOF OE:

(1) At the tactical level, IO in a joint CF/SOF environment should be

coordinated at every phase of an operation.

(2) No single source can control the information sphere. In today’s world, just

about anyone can conduct low-tech, yet sophisticated, “information

operations” with a global reach.

(3) A primary objective is to attract and keep the local populace on the side of

the friendly force. Disjointed or independent operations between CF/SOF

in the same OE can adversely affect that relationship. Planners must

ensure the synchronization message reaches the populace.

(4) The main IO “fire” is informational. The task is to discredit the enemy’s

strategy and means in the eyes of the population.

(5) The insurgent’s advantage is that they understand that the fight is for the

loyalty and support of their people. Their principal “fires” are informational

and political. That is how they are organized to fight.

(6) The US disadvantage is that IO continues to be focused more on

supporting tactical physical wins, than on creating strategic informational

effects. This is particularly challenging when CF/SOF share OE and are

not informed of each other’s missions.

(7) US forces cannot go it alone. All dimensions of national power must be

leveraged and coordinated in OE.

(8) An effective and coordinated information strategy requires a clearly defined

strategic end-state, comprehensively understood.

(9) A main focus of COIN operations is to convince the populace that their

presence, agenda, and local allies offer a more legitimate and credible

future than do the insurgents.

(10) The primacy of informational effects is that everything US forces do and

say affects the populace's perception of their legitimacy.

(11) Message consistency and coherence across all US forces’ plans, actions,

and IO campaigns need to be considered from an overall strategic

informational effects perspective; that is, the effects on the population’s

perceptual environment and subsequent behaviors and allegiances.

c. Not all IO messages must be detailed; however, common themes can be used

to reinforce command messages during full-spectrum operations. One

successful TTP of tactical IO, which can be used by CF/SOF, is integrating a

laptop computer and printer into a high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle

(HMMWV.) Upon arriving upon a scene of an accident or improvised explosive

device (IED) detonation or other situation which inflames the local population,

salient facts can be put into a preapproved flyer template and an IO message

can go out immediately, associating the known facts from the ground scene. The

predesigned templates for fliers currently used in Iraq can be approved by

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