Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1)

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Forward Operating Location (FOL) (USMTF Only) TYPE: SUA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Description

Planning Considerations

YES

An advance position, usually of a

temporary nature, from which air or

Only checks

Checks for

ground units operate.

for conflict

conflict

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

Free-Fire Area (FFA)

TYPE: PROC

FSCM

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

Displayed

An area into which any weapon system

YES

only.

may fire without additional coordination

Checks for

with the establishing headquarters.

This is an

conflict but

Normally, it is established on identifiable

FSCM not an

does not

terrain by division or higher

ACM.

import from

headquarters. For further US

the ACO

implementation guidance, see JIEO

circular 9152, item 35.

Hand-Over Gate (HG)

TYPE: REFPT

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

The point at which the control of the

aircraft, if radar hand-over is used,

Only checks

Checks for

changes from one controller to another.

for conflict

conflict

(JP 3-52)

and displays

*Default Off

if built using

a corridor

shape

High-Altitude Missile Engagement Zone (HIMEZ) TYPE: ADAREA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

In air defense, that airspace of defined

HIMEZ normally is used when a high-

dimensions within which the

altitude missile system has a clear

Only checks

Checks for

responsibility for engagement of air

operational advantage over using

for conflict

conflict

threats normally rests with high- altitude

aircraft. These advantages could

and displays

*Default Off

surface-to-air missiles.

include range, command and control,

if built using

(JP 3-52)

rules of engagement, or response time.

a corridor

It provides airspace users with location

shape

of the engagement zone of a high-

altitude missile system for mission

planning purposes. Design of the

HIMEZ is contingent on specific

weapon system capabilities.

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

High-Density Airspace Control Zone (HIDACZ) TYPE: ADAREA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

Airspace designated in an airspace

HIDACZ allows ground commanders to

YES

control plan or airspace control order, in

restrict a volume of airspace from

Only checks

Checks for

which there is a concentrated

users not involved with ongoing

for conflict

conflict

employment of numerous and varied

operations. It restricts use of the

and displays

weapons and airspace users. A high

airspace because of the large volume

Default On

if built using

density airspace control zone has

and density of fires supporting the

a corridor

defined dimensions, which usually

ground operations within the described

shape

coincide with geographical features or

geographic area. The volume of air

navigational aids. Access to a high

traffic demands careful coordination to

density airspace control zone is

limit the potential conflict among

normally controlled by the maneuver

aircraft needed for mission essential

commander. The maneuver

operations within the HIDACZ and

commander can also direct a more

other airspace users. When

restrictive weapons status within the

establishing a HIDACZ, consider the

high density airspace control zone. (JP

following: (1) Minimum-risk routes

3-52)

(MRR) into and out of the HIDACZ and

to the target area. (2) Air traffic

advisory as required. Procedures and

systems also must be considered for

air traffic control (ATC) service during

instrument meteorological conditions.

(3) Procedures for expeditious

movement of aircraft into and out of the

HIDACZ. (4) Coordination of fire

support, as well as air defense

weapons control orders or status within

and in the vicinity of the HIDACZ. (5)

Location of enemy forces inside of and

within close proximity to the HIDACZ.

HIDACZ is nominated by the ground

commander and approved by the ACA.

Identification Safety Point (ISP)

TYPE: REFPT

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

A point at which aircraft, on joining a

maritime force, will attempt to establish

Only checks

Checks for

two-way communications with the

for conflict

conflict

surface force and commence

and displays

*Default Off

identification procedures. (JP 3-52)

if built using

a corridor

shape

Identification Safety Range (ISR)

TYPE: ADOA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

The minimum range to which an aircraft

may close to a maritime force without

Only checks

Checks for

having been positively identified as

for conflict

conflict

friendly. (JP 3-52)

and displays

*Default Off

if built using

a corridor

shape

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Identification, Friend or Foe Switch Off Line (IFFOFF) (USMTF: IFF Switch Off Line) TYPE: PROC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

The line demarking where friendly

aircraft stop emitting an IFF signal. (JP

Only checks

Checks for

3-52)

for conflict

conflict

and displays

*Default Off

if built using

a corridor

shape

IFF Switch On Line (IFFON)

TYPE: PROC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

The line demarking where friendly

aircraft start emitting an IFF signal. (JP

Only checks

Checks for

3-52)

for conflict

conflict

and displays

*Default Off

if built using

a corridor

shape

Joint Engagement Zone (JEZ)

TYPE: ADAREA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

In air defense, that airspace of defined

A JEZ provides airspace users with a

dimensions within which multiple air

location for mission planning purposes.

Only checks

Checks for

defense systems (surface-to-air

JEZs are highly dependent on correct

for conflict

conflict

missiles and aircraft) are simultaneously

differentiation between friendly, neutral,

and displays

*Default Off

employed to engage air threats. (JP 3-

and enemy aircraft.

if built using

52)

a corridor

shape

Joint Operations Area (JOA)

TYPE: ADAREA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

Area of land, sea, and airspace, defined

by a geographic combatant commander

Only checks

Checks for

or subordinate unified commander, in

for conflict

conflict

which a joint force commander

and displays

*Default Off

(normally a joint task force commander)

if built using

conducts military operations to

a corridor

accomplish a specific mission. (JP 3-0)

shape

Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA) ) (Not incorporated in USMTF)

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

An area of land, sea, and airspace

JSOA is listed in JP 3-52 but is not

assigned by a JFC to the commander of

defined in the USMTF 2000 or 2004

a joint SOF to conduct special

ACM set. If required to be parsed by

operations activities. It may be limited in

airspace systems, the JOA USAGE

size to accommodate a discrete direct

can be used if properly labeled.

action mission or may be extensive

enough to allow a continuing broad

range of unconventional warfare

operations.

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Landing Zone (LZ)

TYPE: ROZ

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Any specified zone used for the landing

of aircraft. (JP 3-17)

Only checks

Checks for

for conflict

conflict

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

Land Missile Engagement Zone (LMEZ) (USMTF Only) TYPE: ADAREA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition/Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

Airspace of defined dimensions within

which the responsibility for engagement

Only checks

Checks for

of air threats normally rests with the

for conflict

conflict

surface based air defense system.

and displays

*Default Off

if built using

a corridor

shape

Low-Altitude Missile Engagement Zone (LOMEZ) TYPE: ADAREA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

In air defense, that airspace of defined

LOMEZs provide airspace users with

dimensions within which the

the location of the engagement zone of

Only checks

Checks for

responsibility for engagement of air

low-altitude missile systems for mission

for conflict

conflict

threats normally rests with low-to

planning purposes. The design of the

and displays

*Default Off

medium- altitude surface-to-air missiles.

LOMEZ is contingent on specific

if built using

(JP 3-52)

weapon system capabilities.

a corridor

shape

Maritime Fighter Engagement Zone (MFEZ) TYPE : ADOA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

The airspace beyond the crossover

zone out to limits defined by the officer

Only checks

Checks for

in tactical command, in which fighters

for conflict

conflict

have freedom of action to identify and

and displays

Default On

engage air targets. (JP 3-52)

if built using

a corridor

shape

Maritime Missile Engagement Zone (MMEZ) TYPE : ADOA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

A designated airspace in which, under

weapons control status "weapons free,"

Only checks

Checks for

ships are automatically cleared to fire at

for conflict

conflict

any target which penetrates the zone,

and displays

Default On

unless known to be friendly, adhering to

if built using

airspace control procedures or unless

a corridor

otherwise directed by the anti-warfare

shape

commander. (JP 3-52)

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Marshalling Gate (MG)

TYPE: REFPT

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

The point to which aircraft fly for air

traffic control prior to commencing an

Only checks

Checks for

outbound transit after takeoff or prior to

for conflict

conflict

landing. (JP 3-52)

and displays

*Default Off

if built using

a corridor

shape

Military Operating Area (MOA) (USMTF: Military Operations Area)

TYPE: SUA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Airspace established outside Class A

airspace area to separate or segregate

Only checks

Checks for

certain non-hazardous military from IFR

for conflict

conflict

traffic and to identify for visual flight

and displays

Default On

rules (VFR) traffic where these activities

if built using

are conducted. (JP 3-52)

a corridor

shape

Minimum-Risk Route (MRR)

TYPE: CORRTE

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

A temporary corridor of defined

MRRs are used primarily for cross

dimensions recommended for use by

forward line of own troops operations.

Only checks

Checks for

high-speed, fixed-wing aircraft that

Close air support aircraft do not usually

for conflict

conflict

presents the minimum known hazards

use MRRs in the vicinity of the target

and displays

Default On

to low-flying aircraft transiting the

area. MRRs are established based on

if built using

combat zone. (JP 3-52)

known threats.

a corridor

shape

Missile Arc (MISARC)

TYPE: ADOA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

An area of 10-degrees or as large as

ordered by the officer in tactical

Only checks

Checks for

command, centered on the bearing of

for conflict

conflict

the target with a range that extends to

and displays

Default On

the maximum range of the surface-to-air

if built using

missile. (JP 3-52)

a corridor

shape

No Fire Area (NFA)

TYPE: SUA

FSCM

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

Displayed

An area in which fires or the effects of

YES

only.

fires are not allowed without prior

Checks for

clearance from the established

This is an

conflict but

headquarters, except when the

FSCM not

FSCM not an

does not

commander's force must defend

an ACM.

ACM.

import from

against an engaging enemy force

the ACO

within the no fire area. For further US

implementation guidance, see JIEO

circular 9152, item 35.

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

No Fly Area (NOFLY)

TYPE: SUA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Airspace of specific dimensions set

aside for a specific purpose in which no

Only checks

Checks for

aircraft operations are permitted, except

for conflict

conflict

as authorized by the appropriate

and displays

Default On

commander and controlling agency. (JP

if built using

3-52)

a corridor

shape

Pickup Zone (PZ)

TYPE: ROZ

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Aerial Retrieval Area. (JP 3-52)

Only checks

Checks for

for conflict

conflict

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

Prohibited Area (PROHIB)

TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

A specified area within the land areas of

a state or its internal waters,

Only checks

Checks for

archipelagic waters, or territorial sea

for conflict

conflict

adjacent thereto over which the flight of

and displays

Default On

aircraft is prohibited. May also refer to

if built using

land or sea areas to which access is

a corridor

prohibited. (JP 1-02)

shape

Reconnaissance Area (RECCE)

TYPE: ROZ

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Airspace of defined dimensions

established specifically for airborne

Only checks

Checks for

platforms conducting reconnaissance.

for conflict

conflict

Generally, it is designed for aircraft

and displays

Default On

such as the SR-71, U-2. (JP 3-52)

if built using

a corridor

shape

Reduced Coordination Area (RCA)(USMTF: Reduced Coordination ) TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

A portion of defined dimensions within

which general air traffic is permitted “off-

Only checks

Checks for

route” without requiring general air

for conflict

conflict

traffic controllers to initiate coordination

and displays

Default On

with operational air traffic controllers.

if built using

(JP 3-52)

a corridor

shape

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Restricted Area (RA)

TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

An area (land, sea, or air) in which there

are special restrictive measures

Only checks

Checks for

employed to prevent or minimize

for conflict

conflict

interference between friendly forces.

and displays

Default On

(JP 1-02)

if built using

a corridor

shape

Restricted Fire Area (RFA)

TYPE: PROC

FSCM

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

An area into which specific restrictions

YES

are imposed and into which fires that

Checks for

exceed those restrictions are prohibited

conflict but

conflict

without prior coordination. For further

does not

US implementation guidance, see JIEO

Default On

import from

circular 9152, item 35.

the ACO

Restricted Fire Line (RFL)

TYPE: PROC

FSCM

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

Displayed

A line established between converging

YES

only.

forces that prohibits fires or the effects of

Checks for

fires across the line without prior

This is an

conflict but

coordination. For further US

FSCM not

FSCM not an

does not

implementation guidance, see JIEO

an ACM.

ACM.

import from

circular 9152, item 35.

the ACO

Restricted Operations Area (ROA)

TYPE: ROZ

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

Airspace of defined dimensions,

A ROA is used to separate and identify

YES

designated by the airspace control

areas. For example, artillery, mortar,

Only checks

Checks for

authority, in response to specific

naval surface fire support, UAV

for conflict

conflict

operational situations/requirements

operating areas, aerial refueling,

and displays

within which the operation of one or

concentrated interdiction areas, areas

Default On

if built using

more airspace users is restricted. (JP 3-

of combat search and rescue (CSAR),

a corridor

52)

SOF operating areas, and areas which

shape

the area air defense commander

(AADC) has declared “weapons free.”

Commonly used for drop zones,

landing zones, SAR areas, UAV launch

and recovery sites, UAV mission areas,

surface-to-surface missile launch sites,

missile flight paths (if necessary), and

predicted missile munitions impact

locations, and special electronics

mission aircraft. ROA can adversely

affect air defense operations; therefore,

air defense missions generally have

priority over ROAs.

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Restricted Operating Zone (ROZ) (Not incorporated in USMTF)

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

Older doctrinal term for restricted

Replace any request for a ROZ with

airspace.

the most appropriate usage.

Return to Force (RTF)

TYPE: ADOA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Planned route profiles for use by

RTF provides a means for easily

Only checks

friendly aircraft returning to an aviation-

identifying friendly aircraft.

Checks for

for conflict

capable ship. (JP 3-52)

conflict

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

Safe Lane (SL)

TYPE: CORRTE

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

A bi-directional lane connecting an

Only checks

airbase, landing site and/or base

Checks for

for conflict

defense zone to adjacent

conflict

and displays

routes/corridors. Safe lanes may also

Default On

be used to connect adjacent activated

if built using

a corridor

routes/corridors. (JP 3-52)

shape

Safe Area For Evasion (SAFE) (USMTF Only) TYPE: PROC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

A designated area in hostile territory

Only checks

that offers the evader or escapee a

Checks for

for conflict

reasonable chance of avoiding

conflict

and displays

capture and of surviving until he can

*Default Off

be evacuated. For further U.S.

if built using

a corridor

implementation guidance, see JIEO

shape

circular 9152, item 61. (JP 3-52)

Safe Sector (SAFES) (USMTF: Safety Sector) TYPE: ADOA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

A sector established to route friendly

Only checks

aircraft to maritime forces with minimum

for conflict

Checks for

risk. (JP 3-52)

and displays

conflict

if built using

Default On

a corridor

shape

Search and Rescue Point (SARDOT) TYPE: REFPT

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

A reference point used in search and

Only checks

rescue operations. (JP 3-52)

for conflict

Checks for

and displays

conflict

if built using

*Default Off

a corridor

shape

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Ship Control Zone (SCZ)

TYPE: ADOA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

An area activated around a ship

operating aircraft, which is not to be

Only checks

Checks for

entered by friendly aircraft without

for conflict

conflict

permission, in order to prevent friendly

and displays

Default On

interference. (JP 3-52)

if built using

a corridor

shape

Short-Range Air Defense Engagement Zone (SHORAD) TYPE: ADAREA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

In air defense, that airspace of defined

A SHORAD is normally established for

dimensions within which the

the local air defense of high-value

Only checks

Checks for

responsibility for engagement of air

assets. It provides airspace users with

for conflict

conflict

threats normally rests with short range

the location of the engagement zone of

and displays

*Default Off

air defense weapons. It may be

short-range air defense systems for

if built using

established within a low- or high-

mission planning purposes. Centralized

a corridor

altitude missile engagement zone. (JP

control of SHORAD may not be

shape

3-52)

possible.

Special Corridor (SC)

TYPE: CORRTE

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

An area established to accommodate

the special routing requirements of

Only checks

Checks for

specific missions. (JP 3-52)

for conflict

conflict

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

Special Electronic Mission Area (SEMA) TYPE: ROZ

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Airspace of defined dimensions

established specifically for airborne

Only checks

Checks for

platforms conducting special electronic

for conflict

conflict

missions. Generally, it is designed for

and displays

Default On

aircraft such as Compass Call. (JP 3-

if built using

52)

a corridor

shape

Special Operations Forces (SOF) (USMTF Only) TYPE: ROZ

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Airspace of defined dimensions

created specifically for special

Only checks

Checks for

operations forces missions by SOF

for conflict

conflict

airspace.

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Special Use Airspace (SUA) (Not incorporated in USMTF)

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

A term used to define airspace for a

Special use airspace is typically

specific purpose. It may also designate

applied to BDZs and CAP/orbit areas.

airspace in which no flight activity is

It typically is a peacetime term

authorized. (JP 3-52)

contained in Federal Aviation

Administration 7610.4, Special Military

Operations.

Standard Use Army Aircraft Flight Route (SAAFR) TYPE: CORRTE

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

Routes established below the

SAAFR is an airspace coordinating

YES

coordinating altitude to facilitate the

measure used by Army assets for

Only checks

Checks for

movement of Army aviation assets.

administrative and logistic purposes. If

for conflict

conflict

Routes are normally located in the

altitudes are at or below the

and displays

corps through brigade rear areas of

coordinating altitude, SAAFRs are

Default On

if built using

operation and do not require approval

implemented by the using authority. If

a corridor

by the airspace control authority. (JP 3-

a coordinating altitude has not been

shape

52)

established, an air corridor is

established by the ACA at the request

of the appropriate ground commander.

Surface-to-Surface Missile System (SSMS) TYPE: SUA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Airspace of defined dimensions

Used for sending ATACMS PAH/TAH

designed specifically for Army Tactical

data.

Only checks

Checks for

Missile System and Tomahawk land-

for conflict

conflict

attack missile launch and impact points.

and displays

Default On

(JP 3-52)

if built using

a corridor

shape

Temporary Minimum Risk Route (TMRR) (USMTF Only) TYPE: CORRTE

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

A temporary route of defined

dimensions recommended for use

Only checks

Checks for

by high speed fixed-wing aircraft to

for conflict

conflict

route them between transit routes or

and displays

Default On

the rear of the forward area and

if built using

their operations areas.

a corridor

shape

Temporary Segregated Area (TSA)

TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

An airspace of defined dimensions

Only checks

within which activities require the

for conflict

Checks for

reservation of airspace for the exclusive

and displays

conflict

use of specific users during a

if built using

Default On

determined period of time. (JP 3-52)

a corridor

shape

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Terminal Control Area (TCA)

TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

A control area or portion thereof

normally situated at the confluence of

Only checks

Checks for

air traffic service routes in the vicinity of

for conflict

conflict

one or more major airfields. (JP 1-02)

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

Terminal Radar Service Area (TRSA) TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Airspace surrounding designated

airports wherein ATC provides radar

Only checks

Checks for

vectoring, sequencing, and separation

for conflict

conflict

on a full-time basis for all IFR and

and displays

Default On

participating VFR aircraft. (JP 3-52)

if built using

a corridor

shape

Training Area (TRNG)

TYPE: ROZ

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Airspace of defined dimensions created

during contingency for the purpose of

Only checks

Checks for

training. (JP 3-52)

for conflict

conflict

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

Transit Corridor (TC)

TYPE: CORRTE

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

A bi-directional corridor in the rear area.

Established to route aircraft through air

Air traffic services not normally

defenses, in the rear area where

Only checks

Checks for

provided.

appropriate, with minimum risk. Pre-

for conflict

conflict

(JP 3-52)

planned TCs will be published in ACPs,

and displays

Default On

as will their horizontal and vertical

if built using

dimensions.

a corridor

shape

Transit Route (TR)

TYPE: CORRTE

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

A temporary corridor of defined

dimensions established in the forward

Only checks

Checks for

area to minimize the risk to friendly

for conflict

conflict

aircraft from friendly air defenses or

and displays

Default On

surface forces. (JP 3-52)

if built using

a corridor

shape

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Traverse Level (TL)

TYPE: PROC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

That vertical displacement above low-

TLs normally will be used in

level air defense systems, expressed

conjunction with TCs as specified in

Only checks

Checks for

both as a height and an altitude, at

ACPs.

for conflict

conflict

which aircraft can cross the area. (JP 1-

and displays

*Default Off

02)

if built using

a corridor

shape

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) (USMTF: Unmanned Aerial System [UAS]) TYPE: ROZ

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Airspace of defined dimensions created

specifically for UAV operations.

Only checks

Checks for

Generally, this airspace will consist of

for conflict

conflict

the area in which UAV missions are

and displays

Default On

conducted, not en route airspace. (JP 3-

if built using

52)

a corridor

shape

Warning Area (WARN)

TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

Airspace of defined dimensions

extending from three nautical miles

Only checks

Checks for

outward from the coast of the US that

for conflict

conflict

contains activity that may be hazardous

and displays

*Default Off

to nonparticipating aircraft. (JP 3-52)

if built using

a corridor

shape

Weapons Free Zone (WFZ)

TYPE: ADAREA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

An air defense zone established for the

A weapons free zone is normally used

protection of key assets or facilities,

for high-value assets defense and in

Only checks

Checks for

other than air bases, where weapons

areas with limited command and

for conflict

conflict

systems may be fired at any target not

control authority. This zone provides

and displays

*Default Off

positively recognized as friendly. (JP 3-

airspace users with the location of a

if built using

52)

weapons free area for mission planning

a corridor

purposes. The AADC declares

shape

weapons free with the ACA

establishing the zone.

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

USMTF 2004 ACMs & FSCMs

Ground Area of Responsibility (GNDAOR)* (USMTF 2004 Only) TYPE: PROC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES*

An area of ground within which the

Cannot be submitted to TBMCS or

responsibility for engagement normally

other systems using USMTF 2000.

Only checks

Checks for

rests with the appropriate ground force

for conflict

conflict

commander.

and displays

*Default Off

if built using

a corridor

shape

Killbox (KILLBOX)* (USMTF 2004 Only) TYPE: SUA

FSCM & ACM

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

FSCM Joint Fires Definition: A three-

Killboxes in USTMF 2004 are Air

dimensional area used to facilitate the

Defense Control measures. They are

Only checks

Checks for

integration of joint fires. (JP 3-09)

not the same as the Killbox FSCM

for conflict

conflict

used for fires. As a result, the

and displays

ACM USMTF Definition: A volume of

Default On

selection of the USMTF 2004 Killbox

if built using

airspace (sanitized airspace), which is

ACM may result in unnecessary

a corridor

prohibited to friendly aircraft and in

operator action to resolve checks for

shape

which any aircraft is automatically

fire.

declared hostile and subject to

engagement. For further US

Cannot be submitted to TBMCS or

implementation guidance, see JIEO

other systems using USMTF 2000.

circular 9152, item 307.

Kill Zone (KILLZ)* (USMTF 2004 Only) TYPE: ADAREA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

An air defense system area in which

Cannot be submitted to TBMCS or

friendly fighters may use less restrictive

other systems using USMTF 2000.

Only checks

Checks for

rules of engagement.

for conflict

conflict

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

Marshall Point (MP)* (USMTF 2004 Only) TYPE: REFPT

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

A point used to assemble, hold, or

Cannot be submitted to TBMCS or

organize troops, aircraft, or ships for a

other systems using USMTF 2000.

Only checks

Checks for

mission.

for conflict

conflict

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

Appendix C

HIDACZ Plan Examples

NOTE: These examples are notional and based on historical plans. They

are provided as examples to show the breadth and depth of detail required

to execute a complex HIDACZ operation and reflect theater vice doctrinal

terms and procedures.

EXAMPLE ONE

1. HIDACZ NIMITZ Airspace Control Plan Example

AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT - Operation (OP) VIRGINIA CAPES Phase 2

SITUATION

1. General. As force levels build, robust airspace management will be

accomplished using HIDACZ procedures.

2. Insertion. Task Force BG, Task Force T, and Task Force 3 will be given

OPS boxes within AO from the start of Phase 2. 12 hours prior to the

insertion of Task Force T a HIDACZ will be established. At all times during

the OP, the tactical operations center (TOC) will be the HIDACZ

commander and will dynamically and procedurally control HIDACZ

NIMITZ and will allocate and control air assets in accordance with the

CDR’s intent. Airspace control, above the coordination altitude, will be

delegated to AWACS, when on station (AWACS has been requested to be

on station 3 hours prior to the insertion). This airspace control plan will be

effective from 15 Feb - 29 Feb.

Figure 1. HIDACZ NIMITZ Vertical Separation

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

CAUTION

ALL AIRCREW SHALL BE FAMILIAR AND COMPLY WITH THE

PROCEDURES CONTAINED IN THIS PLAN, ASSOCIATED SPINS, AND THE

CFACC AIRSPACE CONTROL PLAN. NON- COMPLIANCE POSES GREAT

RISK FOR MID-AIR COLLISIONS AND SUBSEQUENT MISSION

DEGRADATION. AIRCREW FOUND NOT IN COMPLIANCE MAY BE

SUBJECT TO EXPULSION FROM THE HIDACZ.

a. Tactical situations may dictate deviation from this plan by the HIDACZ

controller, however, such deviations shall be coordinated w/AWACS, TOC,

and CRC as required. If substantive changes are required, they must be

forwarded to the CAOC for integration into this plan and dissemination

throughout the theater.

b. No more than two flights of 2 fixed-wing CAS assets shall be allowed in the

HIDACZ at any time. Deviation from this mandate requires CAOC battle

director approval.

AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT (ASM)

PHASE 2

3. ASM CONOPS

12 hrs before the insertion of the RCE T; HIDACZ NIMITZ will be activated

HOT.

b. Existing ROZ EAST and WEST will cease to exist once the HIDACZ is

established.

c. HIDACZ NIMITZ will be deactivated within 10 days or at operation

completion. Following termination of the HIDACZ, the airspace will return to

normal operating procedures. Considerations will be made at that time for

additional ACMs to be imposed for continuing operations.

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

Figure 2. HIDACZ NIMITZ Comm Plan

4. Airspace Coordinating Measures

a. HIDACZ NIMITZ: The boundaries contain the following keypads: XXXXX,

XXXXX, and XXXX from GL - FL300. The HIDACZ commander is TOC

and the HIDACZ controllers will be AWACS or TOC. All aircrew will

monitor the HIDACZ primary control frequency while in the confines of

the HIDACZ.

b. BULLSEYE: The BULLSEYE will be used and is the center of the HIDACZ

- L/L. The BULLSEYE will be used as an expeditious way of giving SA to

aircraft with respect to other friendly air call signs. This minimizes

extraneous comms between air platforms and controlling call signs.

c. Hold Area: The primary hold area for all fixed-wing assets has been

established outside the confines of the HIDACZ at PEKO from FL180-

FL280. This will be controlled by either AWACS or CRC.

d. Air-to-Air Refueling (AAR): Refueling track, HAPPYHOUR, has been

established and is comprised of the following points XXXX. It is a N-S race

track and is from FL170 - FL280. The AAR consists of the following: IP

XXXX; CP XXXX. This will be controlled by either AWACS or CRC.

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

e. Airway: Airway A123 between DRONE and WAVEY will be closed when

the HIDACZ is active. Additionally, the position of the HIDACZ will leave

V123 and A456 routes open and keep assets away from high traffic areas.

f. Coordinating Altitude: Due to varying terrain, the coordinating altitude

within the HIDACZ is 3,500 AGL to a maximum of FL 100 MSL. All aircraft

operating at, or above FL100, will remain 1013.2mb/29.92 in. This will

ensure that all fixed-wing assets are on the same pressure setting and

afford additional flight safety between formations. All aircraft operating

below the coordinating altitude will remain on the pressure setting that they

have been given and are flying with. ALL AIR ASSETS ARE

RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR OWN TERRAIN AVOIDANCE.

g. AWACS Stationing: The AWACS station includes the following kill boxes

and keypads: XXAXX, and XXAXX from the coordinating altitude to FL320.

CONCEPT OF CONTROL/C2 COORDINATION

5. Airspace Hierarchy. The hierarchy of airspace control within the HIDACZ is

as follows:

a. Primary: AWACS

b. Secondary: TOC

6. HIDACZ Controller. The HIDACZ controller is responsible for managing the

airspace within the HIDACZ and allocating operating areas for ALL assets

that fly within the HIDACZ.

7. TOC Control.

a. The TOC will procedurally control the airspace below the coordinating

altitude within the HIDACZ and deconflict those assets from kinetics

(surface-to-surface/air-to-ground/air-drops) in coordination with the HIDACZ

controller.

b. The TOC maintains control of asset allocation and priority of fires/effects to

meet the ground commander intent. The TOC will communicate those

priorities to the HIDACZ controller for 3-dimensional integration in the

operations area.

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

Figure 3. HIDACZ NIMITZ C2 Depiction w/AWACS

8. CGRS. CGRS keypads will be used to internally deconflict the airspace. In

addition to lateral deconfliction, assets will be deconflicted vertically by the

appropriate controller. Each type of aircraft has been assigned its own

altitude parameter. Additionally the Elb River, that runs north and south,

may be used as a visual reference for procedural deconfliction.

FUNCTIONAL ROLES

9. TOC:

a. Track ground commander’s priorities for air assets/friendly locations and

communicate those as necessary to the HIDACZ controller.

b. Set priority of fires (execute ground/CC intent for air support).

c. Track JTAC priorities with respect to fires.

d. Allocate air assets in coordination with/HIDACZ controller.

e. Control those assets below the established coordinating altitude within the

HIDACZ when AWACS is on station and controls all assets in the HIDACZ

when AWACS is not on station.

f. Establish a dedicated chat window for C2 coordination for this operation

named “VIR_CAPES_FF”.

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

Figure 4. HIDACZ NIMITZ C2 Depiction w/TOC as Controller

10. AWACS:

a. Controls HIDACZ, hold area, and refueling area.

b. Sole responsibility for deconfliction of aircraft within the HIDACZ above

coordinating altitude.

c. Updates fuel priorities and coordinates with/ASOC, CRC, and CAOC.

d. Passes aircraft to JTAC when tasked by TOC.

e. Update TOC on status of a/c (inbound/hold stack).

f. Pass AO updates to aircraft as required.

g. Coordinates with/TOC for priority of fires (execute Ground/CC’s intent).

h. Primary airborne relay as required.

i. Gate keeper for HIDACZ, safety monitor.

j. Assist TOC with/SA of aircraft below the coordinating altitude as able.

11. CRC:

a. Controls hold area and AAR when AWACS not on station.

b. When AWACS not on station, controls flow into/out of HIDACZ as

requested by TOC.

c. When able, receives feedback/tracks airspace control/C2 issues for this OP

and passes to CAOC.

12. JTACs [Task Force T, SOF, Other Coalition Force (OCF)]

a. Must ensure they do not change assigned working area/altitude of aircraft

without coordinating through HIDACZ controller.

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

b. Cannot clear or otherwise imply that an aircraft is clear to deviate their

assigned working area/altitude or depart the HIDACZ without approval from

the HIDACZ controller.

13. Aircrew

a. Must not enter the HIDACZ without approval from the HIDACZ controller.

(This is applicable to ALL aircraft flying in AO to include all SOF, OCF

assets.)

b. Monitor the HIDACZ primary control frequency at all times while in the

HIDACZ to allow for the rapid deconfliction of FIRES and aircraft.

c. Will obtain clearance out of assigned working block before exiting that block

and will check out with HIDACZ controller prior to RTB or AAR. (This is

especially critical when the TOC is procedurally controlling the HIDACZ.)

d. Required to read, understand, and comply with this airspace control plan,

SPINS, and all other applicable directive (CFACC ACP, AIP, etc) prior to

flying in this operation.

e. Understand that failure to strictly comply with procedures outlined in this

plan presents an unacceptable risk to assets and mission accomplishment.

f. Pass post mission feedback on issues with C2.

14. CAOC AWACS/CRC LNOs, CPD/COD Airspace

a. Responsible for monitoring implementation of this plan.

b. Focal point for any integration/coordinating any changes to this plan.

c. Focal point for consolidating feedback from all players.

d. Informing CAOC CCO/DCO of issues identified with airspace control in this

OP.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

15. AWACS On Station (coordinating altitude and above)

a. Aircraft check in with CRC on takeoff/entry in JOA.

b. CRC reports check-in with AWACS; AWACS provides altitude for aircraft

handover and entry to hold area.

c. CRC controls aircraft in transit.

d. CRC directs aircraft to required hold altitude and transfers control to

AWACS PRIOR to aircraft entry of the hold area.

16. Aircraft control passed to AWACS on HIDACZ check-in frequency:

a. Pass AO updates and fighter to FAC brief info as required.

b. AWACS notifies TOC aircraft are on station.

c. Stack aircraft within the hold area as necessary.

d. As directed by TOC, pushes aircraft to JTAC.

e. AWACS controls aircraft from HIDACZ to AAR/hold area or coordinates with

CRC for return to base.

f. AWACS updates TOC status of aircraft within the HIDACZ, etc.

AWACS NOT ON STATION

17. TOC as HIDACZ Controller (coordinating altitude and above)

a. Aircraft checks in with CRC on take-off/entry in JOA.

b. CRC report checks in with TOC and request required altitude in HIDACZ.

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

c. Aircraft remains with CRC for transit and hold area entry at required

altitude.

18. Aircraft passed to TOC at required altitude/location for entry into HIDACZ.

a. TOC controller controls the HIDACZ procedurally, establishes

stacks/working areas and pushes aircraft to JTAC as required.

b. TOC coordinates with CRC for aircraft exit of the HIDACZ.

c. TOC updates CRC on status of aircraft in HIDACZ, etc.

d. CRC controls aircraft outside HIDACZ to AAR/hold area or return to base.

19. JTAC Coordination

a. JTAC takes requests from ground/CC.

b. JTAC sends TOC request.

c. ALL JTAC requirements coordinated and prioritized through TOC.

d. TOC assigns priority and passes to HIDACZ controller for asset allocation.

e. For simultaneous TICs, TOC will prioritize in coordination with HIDACZ

controller.

f. JTAC releases aircraft back to HIDACZ controller for exit of the HIDACZ.

g. JTAC must not direct aircraft outside assigned working area and altitude

before coordination with the HIDACZ controller.

h. HIDACZ controller sends aircraft to another tasking within the HIDACZ or to

CRC to hold, tank, etc.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

a. Aircraft unable to make contact with AWACS or TOC are to inform CRC

immediately, remain outside of the HIDACZ and await further instructions.

CRC will inform TOC via internet chat and the C2 coordination frequency.

b. All rotary-wing aircraft that are unable to contact TOC/AWACS are to inform

their Task Force HQ and await further instructions. The HQ must contact

TOC immediately.

TERRAIN MANAGEMENT (TM)

20. Terrain Considerations. Task Force BG, Task Force T, and Task Force 3

are deploying in the CAPE HENRY area. As such, they will be given an

area each to operate in. All prior traces will cease to be valid. The area has

been divided into 3 OPS Boxes in order to facilitate initial C2.

21. OPS Boxes

a. TRUMAN. AA 12A AA 12345678, following E bank of Elb River to AA 12A

AA 12345678, AA 12A AA 12345678.

b. STENNIS. AA 12A AA 12345678, following mountain ridge to AA 12A AA

12345678, AA 12A AA 12345678, AA 12A AA 12345678.

c. MIDWAY. AA 12A AA 12345678, AA 12A AA 12345678, following E bank

of Elb River to AA 12A AA 12345678. Exclusion Zones: TBN

22. Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs)

a. RFLs. All OPS Boxes boundaries are fixed and subject to cross boundary

fire restrictions.

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

b. No Fly Area. Gun position locations will be posted as no fly areas on

internet chat throughout the duration of the operation.

23. Altitude Deconfliction. Aircraft operating in the HIDACZ will be stacked

vertically according to type; the HIDACZ controller, however, will

dynamically set altitude blocks.

24. Aviation.

a. All rotary wing are to contact TOC prior to entering the HIDACZ. Aviation

Task Forces are responsible for planning routes to/from the HIDACZ and

informing TOC. Additionally, all rotary wing are to contact TOC and

obtain clearance prior to entering keypad 12A34. If unable to contact

TOC due to line-of-sight problems, contact AWACS or any available unit

TOC and ensure clearance into the HIDACZ and keypad 12A34 prior to

entry.

b. Task Force T Insertion. An ingress and egress route will be established

for the initial insertion and extraction from the HIDACZ.

25. UAS. All UAS assets in support of Task Force T must ensure they check

into the HIDACZ with TOC in order to ensure their dynamic deconfliction.

a. MUAV. Will deconflict by JTAC, who is to inform TOC of all missions prior

to launch.

b. Predator. Check-in with AWACS, when on station, or TOC prior to entering

the HIDACZ. Aircraft may be forwarded to a JTAC for detailed tasking

control. Predator will maintain connectivity with AWACS and/or TOC on the

HIDACZ primary control frequency or the VIR_CAPES_FF internet chat

window.

c. TUAV. Check in with TOC prior to entering the HIDACZ. Aircraft may be

forwarded to a JTAC for detailed tasking control. Controllers should give

considerations to racetracks in the vicinity of likely tasking. Controllers

should be aware of all aviation entry/exit points and aviation holds as these

may be used to aid deconfliction. The VIR_CAPES_FF window on internet

chat will be the primary means of communication.

26. Guide Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS). TOC will deconflict all

GMLRS fire missions within HIDACZ NIMITZ and is responsible for ensuring

that all other assets are outside of the ACM during firing. If the system is

required to fire outside of the HIDACZ, TOC will be responsible for clearing

the airspace up to the boundary of the HIDACZ and for coordinating the

clearing of the airspace beyond the boundary of the HIDACZ via AOC.

27. Point of Contacts. All questions, issues, feedback on this plan or its

execution should be routed to:

CAOC OPS Airspace

SIPR EMAIL

CENTRIX EMAIL

DSN

Internet chat

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

NOTE: This example is notional and based on a USMC historical plan. It is

provided as an example to show the breadth and depth of detail required to

execute a complex HIDACZ operation and may reflect theater vice doctrinal

terms and procedures.

EXAMPLE TWO

2. HIDACZ MAMELUKE Airspace Control Plan Example

OPERATION TUN TAVERN SPINS dtd XX0422

1. General

a. Refer to ANNEX F to FRAGO ABC TUN TAVERN dated 22 Apr XX for

general airspace management instructions.

b. Airspace is allocated by means of the ACO in response to ACM REQs.

c. A comprehensive but simple airspace control plan is essential to maximize

operational effectiveness while mitigating the risk of fratricide. These

SPINS are to provide additional instructions and information to users of

HIDACZ MAMELUKE and participants of TUN TAVERN.

d. Indirect fire and air will be dynamically deconflicted by the controlling Direct Air

Support Center (DASC)/FSCC/JTACS and FSTs as required. HIDACZ

MAMELUKE will be established over the AO to facilitate the coordination of

air, aviation, ISR and joint fires. This airspace management plan will be in

effect from D-2 day until the end of the operation.

Figure 5. HIDACZ MAMELUKE Vertical Separation

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

2. Coordinating Instructions

a. ASM

i. HIDACZ MAMELUKE will be established ISO OP TUN TAVERN. The

HIDACZ is shaped and built primarily around CGRS kill box keypads and

will extend from SFC to FL280. The HIDACZ TRP/KEYHOLE is centered

on the bridge of I-664 and I-64 north of Norfolk at AB 11X AB123456.

ii. HIDACZ MAMELUKE will be procedurally controlled by the DASC (C/S

DASC) who will be collocated with the MEU FSCC and FOB NASA BCP.

All aircraft ISO OP TUN TAVERN will be allocated by either MEU AO or by

TFH WIDOW TOC and in accordance with CDR’s intent. BLOODLUST will

control all a/c outside of HIDACZ MAMELUKE and will handover to the

DASC at an appropriate altitude for entry to the HIDACZ.

iii. HIDACZ MAMELUKE

(1) HIDACZ MAMELUKE Grids: AB 11X AB123456, AB 11X

AB123456, AB 11X AB123456, The latitude/longitude are: XXXXN/XXXXW,

XXXXN/XXXXW, and XXXXN/XXXXW. Figure X is a depiction of HIDACZ

MAMELUKE.

(2) Indirect fires will be coordinated by the controlling FSCC/FSTs.

(3) The ACMR for HIDACZ has been resubmitted by the MEU AO and

will be activated from D-2. All additional requests are to be passed via MEU

AO.

(4) When not required, HIDACZ MAMELUKE will be deactivated and

the space returned to normal procedures. Additional, ACMs may be

requested to support further OPS.

(5) Assets will be deconflicted both vertically and laterally using

keypads, kill boxes, and control points. Additionally, obvious physical

features may be used as visual references for procedural deconfliction.

(6) Existing ROZs ABLE and BAKER will be activated when HIDACZ

MAMELUKE is cold

(7) Entry to HIDACZ will be at the designated entry/exit points. Entry

will be at FL200 and exit will be at 14,000 ft AGL.

(8) An LZ control zone will be established on D-4 3 nm around FOB

NASA, from SFC to 1,500 ft AGL. The controlling agency is the Marine Air

Traffic Control Mobile Team 2 (MMT2). Their call sign is LAND 2 and

additional instructions are below.

(9) 105mm artillery is located at FOB NASA and 155mm artillery will be

located immediately east of FOB PIER. MGRS locations will be issued

SEPCOR and updates provided upon check-in with DASC.

(10) Transition Altitude (TA). The TA for the theater is 14,000 ft AGL.

Within the HIDACZ all aircraft operating at, or above, 14,000 ft AMSL will

remain on 1013.2 mb/29.92 inches.

(11) The vertical separation matrix is in figure 5.

IN ALL INSTANCES, AIR ASSETS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR OWN

TERRAIN AVOIDANCE

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

Figure 6. HIDACZ MAMELUKE Communications Diagram

iv. Fixed Wing CPs/IPs

(1) Keyhole.

(a) ECHO - Keyhole TRP (AB 11X AB123456).

(b) ALPHA/BRAVO/CHARLIE/DELTA. 10 nm each side of the

keyhole.

(2) CAS stack will be established between points C and D from FL170 -

220. CAS stack has been deconflicted vertically and laterally from artillery

GTLs.

(3) Entry/Exit CPs:

(a) TOYOTA, AB 11X ABXXXXXX

(b) DODGE, AB 11X AB1XXXXXX

(4) Additional CPs:

(a) FORD, AB 11X ABXXXXXXX

(b) FERRARI, AB 11X ABXXXXXXX

v. Rotary Wing BPs/HA. RW BPs are named and centered as follows:

(1) RW BP NEWT - AB 11X ABXXXXXXX

(2) RW BP EEL - AB 11X ABXXXXXXX

(3) RW BP RATTLER - AB 11X ABXXXXXXX

(4) RW BP SERPENT - AB 11X ABXXXXXXX

(5) RW HA WILMA - AB 11X ABXXXXXXX

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

vi. RW Deconfliction. All aviation is to check in with the DASC who will provide

deconfliction, clear routing, and provide tasking.

vii. UAS. Prior to entry of HIDACZ MAMELUKE, the UA controller is to check

in with the DASC via fixed wing control frequencies listed in the

communications table 11 and/or IRC.

viii. Tanker Track STINK.

(1) Tanker track is separated laterally, entry altitude is FL210 and exit

altitude is FL230. Primary tanking altitude is FL220.

(2) Tanker frequency is (P) Lemon26, (S) Gray21.

(3) Tanker track coordinates are: AB 11X ABXXXXXXX, AB 11X

ABXXXXXXX, AB 11X ABXXXXXXX, AB 11X ABXXXXXXX.

ix. LZ Control Zone E-Sunbow ACMR, FOB NASA.

(1) The control agency is MMT2. C/S LAND 2:

(P) CHERRY44

(S) CRIMSON17

TACAN channel 92Y “MMT”

(2) Dimensions of the LZ control zone are 3 nm, SFC - 1,500 ft AGL with a

center grid AB 11X ABXXXXXXX. Tactical phraseology in accordance with

table 8.

(3) Sectors lettered counter clockwise from ENE, A - H.

(4) Left-handed pattern with a No Fly Area 45-135Deg magnetic due to

105mm gun line. Inbound altitude is 500 ft AGL and outbound is 300ft AGL.

The arm/dearm heading is 310Deg magnetic.

(5) Lost communication procedures: Overfly AM2 matting south to north at

500 ft, circle FOB counter clockwise for landing upon receipt of appropriate

signal. Refer to table 7.

Table 7. Lost Comm Visual Signals

Day Signal

(VS-17

Night Signal

A/C on Ground

Aircraft in Air

Panel)

Steady

Steady light

Cleared for

Cleared to land

orange

takeoff

Alt

Flashing light

Return for landing

Orange/cerise

Left to right

Left to right light

Stop

Give way,

orange

continue circling

Circle orange

Circle light

Airport unsafe, do

not land

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

Table 8. Tactical Phraseology FOB NASA

Item

CALL WORD

5 mins out

On Deck

Request Fuel & Ordnance

Happy Hour

Taken Battle Damage

Tagged

Gun Line is Hot

Flames

Request Corpsman

Angel

x. ROZ WINDY, FOB DOG

(1) The control agency is Marine Air Traffic Control Team 1 (MMT1). C/S

LAND 1:

(P) ZINC18

(S) TAN17

TACAN channel 29Y “MMT”

(2) Dimensions of the ROZ are 5 nm, SFC - 14,000 ft AGL with a center

grid AB 11X ABXXXXXXX. Tactical phraseology in accordance with table 9.

(3) Sectors lettered counter clockwise from N to S, from A to D.

(4) Right-handed pattern with inbound altitude of 500 ft AGL and outbound

is 300 ft AGL. The assault landing zone is setup as a day/night AMP-3

runway.

(5) Lost communication procedures: Overfly runway east to west at 500 ft,

circle FOB clockwise for landing upon receipt of appropriate signal. Refer to

table 7.

Table 9. Tactical Phraseology FOB DOG

Item

CALL WORD

5 mins out

United

Request Fuel & Ordnance

Arsenal

Taken Battle Damage

Derby

Gun Line is Hot

Newcastle

Request Corpsman

Fulham

xi. Radio In/Out Sequence.

(1) FIXED-WING: ATC (TOWER) to CRC to DASC to FAC/JTAC

(2) AAR: ATC (TOWER) to CRC to DASC

(3) RW: ATC (TOWER) to CRC to TFH to DASC to JTAC

(4) Aircraft at NASA: MMT (LAND 2) to DASC to JTAC

xii: Radio In/Out (RIO) procedures.

(1) Fixed Wing

(a) Inbound. FL200, RIO prior to entry of HIDACZ MAMELUKE via

CPs Dodge or Toyota with C/S, mission #, number & type ac, position,

altitude, and status (i.e., up as fragged or with exceptions).

(b) Transiting. State C/S, location and intentions. DASC will provide

routing clearance to transit.

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

Dodge or Toyota. Pass situation update, SALUTE and BHA.

(2) Rotary Wing

(a) Inbound. RIO prior to entry of HIDACZ MAMELUKE with C/S,

mission #, number & type ac, position, altitude, and status (i.e., up as

fragged or with exceptions). State position in reference to FOB NASA

wagon wheel.

(b) Transiting. State C/S, location and intentions. North and east

bound aircraft will be at odd altitudes and south and west bound aircraft will

be at even altitudes.

SALUTE, BHAS (if applicable).

xiii. JTAC Procedures

(1) Deployed JTACs are to provide DASC with regular situation reports

(SITREPs) in order to maintain SA.

(2) JTACs are not to make changes to the ASM nor SPINS without prior

authorization (no bird-catching).

xiv. FSCMs. Aircrews are responsible for mission prep with latest FSCMs.

Real-time updates will be provided upon check-in with the DASC.

(1) All NFAs and RFAs will be promulgated SEPCOR and updates will be

provided by the DASC upon check in.

(2) Key routes, PLs and OPS boxes for the convoy move from LGL to ORF

can be found at Annex A - OP TUN TAVERN dtd 22 Apr XX.

(3) PLs can be found on the BM schematic at Appendix 1 to Annex F of the

FRAGO.

(4) A spotmap has been produced for usage by all assets taking part in OP

TUN TAVERN.

(5) No fire area locations within HIDACZ MAMELUKE are at App 2 to Annex

F of FRAGO. All users within the AO should be aware of the NSL.

xv. OPS Boxes. OPS boxes are located within HIDACZ MAMELUKE to

support the FPoL of MEU through the AO prior to their deployment to FOB

DOG. Additional OPS Boxes are depicted to support the C company

objective at OCEANA and both the B and C companies objective following

the air assault. Any call sign believing that they may have positive

identification of friendly forces within their OPS Box are to immediately pass

that information to the DASC and FSCC by the quickest means available.

xvi. Overlays/Schematic. Operational overlays and schematics will be

provided via SEPCOR.

b. C2.

i. Functional Roles.

(1) TOC

(a) Update the DASC on local air situation.

(b) Pass information from CRC/ASCC and other agencies.

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

(2) FSCC

(a) Track friendly locations and ground CDR’s priorities for air assets

and coordination with the DASC and TACPs for priority fires.

(b) Control, coordinate, and clear fires within the HIDACZ.

(3) DASC

(a) Process immediate air support requests.

(b) Manage terminal control assets.

(d) Procedurally control the HIDACZ.

(e) Ensure information flow between TOCs, MEU FSCC, and the MEU

Aviation Combat Element (ACE).

(4) CRC

(a) Control flow into/out of HIDACZ as requested by TOC.

(b) Control AAR and organize hold outside HIDACZ if required.

(5) Air/Aviation. To ensure the efficient coordination of airspace within

HIDACZ, all air/aviation:

(a) Must not enter the HIDACZ without approval from the DASC (this

applies to ALL aircraft including SOF assets).

(b) Are to monitor the DASC’s HIDACZ control frequency(ies) or the

assigned TACP at all times while in the HIDACZ, to allow rapid deconfliction

of fires and aircraft.

check out with DASC prior to RTB or AAR.

ii. Launch and divert authorities for MEU assets are in table 10 below.

Table 10. Delegation of Authority

MISSION TYPE

LAUNCH

DIVERT

OAS (RW)

DASC

OAS (FIXED-WING)

DASC

ASLT SPT

ACE COC

DASC

CAS EVAC

DASC

ISR

ACE COC

DASC

iii. Communications. The primary check in for OP TUN TAVERN is with the

MEU DASC on PLUM14, secondary check-in if no comm on primary is with

TOC on PLUM37. Following check-in with DASC/TOC aircraft will be

pushed to the relevant terminal control. The communications and aviation

C2 integration diagrams with JTAC callsigns and frequencies are in figure 6.

All communication will be primarily secure. If no communication, secure roll

clear as a last resort.

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

Appendix D

Example Airspace Control Checklists

The following examples of Airspace Control Checklists were gathered from

recent operations to present a schematic representation of an airspace control

process. The intent with the examples is not to present a specific solution to

airspace coordination but rather to show a step-by-step process that could be

modeled to clearly lay out to users the airspace control process needed to

support a given operations.

In the following examples, steps are identified in order (e.g., 1, 2, 3, etc.), the

node (i.e., organization), the cell (i.e., individual within the organization or a

separate sub-organization), followed by the input (i.e., trigger event), process to

be used, tools to be used in the process, and output. If more than, one

organization is involved in an individual step then that is highlighted in the

examples by adding decimals to the step number (e.g., 3.1, 3.2). If an individual

step of a specific organization has identified sub-steps that is highlighted in the

example by sub-dividing the steps (e.g., 2.1.a.1; 2.1.a.2, etc.). Figure 7

illustrates the step numbering sequence used in the examples.

Figure 7. Step-by-step Explanation

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

REFERENCES

Joint Publications

CJCSI 3900.01C, Position (Point and Area) Reference Procedures, 30 Jun 07.

DOD 4500.54-G, Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide, 10 Jul 09.

(https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil).

JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 12 Apr 2001.

JP 3-0, Joint Operations.17 Sep 2006 .

JP 3-01,Countering Air and Missile Threats. 5 Feb 2007

JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations. 19 Sep 2001

JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support

(CAS). 3 Sep 2003.

JP 3-17, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air

Mobility Operations, 14 Aug 2002.

JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, 5 Jan 2007.

JP 3-52, Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in a Combat Zone, 30 Aug 2004.

JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. 13 Apr 2007

JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 26 Dec 2006.

Multi-Service Publications

FM 1-02.1/MCRP 3-25B/NTTP 6-02.1/AFTTP(I) 3-2.5, Multi-Service Brevity

Codes. 30 Oct 2007

FM 3-60.2/MCRP 3-23C/NTTP 3-03.4.3/AFTTP(I) 3-2.72, Multi-Service Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance.

26 Nov 2008.

Other

FAA JO 7610.4M, Special Military Operations (FOUO), 18 Jan 07.

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

GLOSSARY

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AADC

area air defense commander

AADP

area air defense plan

AAGS

Army air-ground system

AAR

Air-to-air refueling

ABC

airborne command and control

AC2

airspace command and control

ACA

airspace control authority

ACCE

air component coordination element

ACE

aviation combat element

ACE

aviation combat element

ACM

airspace coordinating measure

ACO

airspace control order

ACP

airspace control plan

ACS

airspace control system

ADA

air defense artillery

ADAA

air defense action area

ADAM

air defense airspace management

ADIZ

air defense identification zone

ADP

air defense plan

ADVRTE

advisory route

ADZ

amphibious defense zone

AEW

airborne early warning

AFATDS

Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System

AFFOR

Air Force forces

AFI

Air Force Instruction

AFTTP

Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures

AGL

above ground level

air interdiction

AIC

air information center

AIP

aeronautical information publication

AIRCOR

air corridor

AIRRTE

air route

ALERTA

alert area

ALO

air liaison officer

ALSA

Air Land Sea Application Center

ALTRRV

altitude reservation

area of operations

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

AOA

amphibious objective area

AOC

air operations center

AOD

air operations directive

AOR

area of responsibility

APPCOR

approach corridor

ARFOR

Army forces

ARWY

airway

ASM

airspace management

ASOC

air support operations center

ATACMS

Army Tactical Missile System

ATC

air traffic control

ATO

air tasking order

ATS

air traffic system

ATSRTE

air traffic service route

AVN

aviation

AWACS

airborne warning and control system

BAE

brigade aviation element

BCD

battlefield coordination detachment

BCT

brigade combat team

BDZ

base defense zone

BNDRY

boundary

BULL

bullseye

buffer zone

command and control

CADA

coordinated air defense area

CALCM

conventional air launched cruise missile

CAOC

combined air operations center

CAP

combat air patrol

CAS

close air support

CBA

cross-border area

CCA

close combat attack

CCZONE

carrier control zone

CDR

commander (JP 1-02); conditional routes (USMTF

usage)

CFACC

combined force air component commander

CFL

coordinated fire line

CGRS

common geographic reference system

CHOPS

chief of operations

CJCSI

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction

CLSA

class A airspace

100

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

CLSB

class B airspace

CLSC

class C airspace

CLSD

class D airspace

CLSE

class E airspace

CLSF

class F airspace

CLSG

class G airspace

COA

courses of action

COMAFFOR

Commander, Air Force forces

CONTZN

control zone

COP

common operational picture

COZ

crossover zone

control point

CRC

control and reporting center

CSAR

combat search and rescue

CTA

control area

danger area

DASC

direct air support center

DBSL

deep battle synchronization line

DCA

defensive counterair

DOD

Department of Defense

drop zone

electronic combat

entry/exit gate

electronic warfare support

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FAAO

Federal Aviation Administration Order

FAC(A)

forward air controller (airborne)

FADIZ

fleet air defense identification zone

FARP

forward arming and refueling point

FEBA

forward edge of the battle area

FFA

free-fire area

FIR

flight information region

FLOT

forward line of own troops

field manual

FOB

forward operating base

FOL

forward operating location

FRAD

falcon radial

FRAGORD

fragmentary order

FSCL

fire support coordination line

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

101

FSCM

fire support coordination measures

FSCOORD

fire support coordinator

FSO

Fire Support Officer

feet

fixed wing

GARS

global area reference system

GCC

geographic combatant commander

holding area

HIDACZ

high-density airspace control zone

HIMEZ

high-altitude missile engagement zone

host nation

headquarters (JP 1-02); hand-over gate (USMTF

usage)

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

IDN

initial distribution number

IFF

identification, friend or foe

IFFOFF

IFF switch off line

IFFON

IFF switch on line

information operations

IRC

internet relay chat

ISP

identification safety point

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (JP 1-

ISR

02); identification safety range (USMTF usage)

JAAT

joint air attack team

JACE

joint air coordination element

JAOC

joint air operations center

JAOP

joint air operations plan

JEZ

joint engagement zone

JFACC

joint force air component commander

JFC

joint force commander

JFLCC

joint force land component commander

JFMCC

joint force maritime component commander

JICO

joint interface control officer

JOA

joint operations area

joint publication

JSOA

joint special operations area

JSOAC

joint special operations air component

JSOACC

joint special operations air component commander

102

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

JSTARS

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

JTAC

joint terminal attack controller

JTF

joint task force

LAT

latitude

LCC

land component commander

LMEZ

land missile engagement zone

LNO

liaison officer

LONG

longitude

LOMEZ

low-altitude missile engagement zone

landing zone

MBC

mortar ballistic computer

MFEZ

maritime fighter engagement zone

marshalling gate

MISARC

missile arc

MLRS

multiple launch rocket system

MMEZ

maritime missile engagement zone

MOA

military operating area

MRR

minimum-risk route

MSL

mean sea level

MTTP

multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures

NAVRTE

area navigation route

NFA

no fire area

NGO

nongovernmental organization

nautical mile

NOFLY

no fly area

NOTAM

notice to airmen

OCF

other coalition forces

OEF

Operation Enduring Freedom

OGA

other governmental agency

OIF

Operation Iraqi Freedom

OPORD

operations order

OPR

office of primary responsibility

OPS

operations

OPTASKLINK

operations task link

PROHIB

prohibited area

pickup zone

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

103

restricted area

RCA

reduced coordination area

RECCE

reconnaissance area

RFL

restricted fire line

ROA

restricted operations area

ROE

rules of engagement

ROZ

restricted operations zone

RTB

return to base

RTF

return to force

rotary wing

S-2

battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer

S-3

battalion or brigade operations staff officer

SAAFR

standard use Army aircraft flight route

SACC

supporting arms coordination center

SAFE

safe area for evacuation

SAFES

safe sector

SAR

search and rescue

SARDOT

search and rescue point

special corridor

SCARC

strike coordination and reconnaissance coordinator

SCZ

ship control zone

SEAD

suppression of enemy air defenses

SEMA

special electronic mission area

SIF

selective identification feature

SIPRNET

SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network

SITREP

situation report

SHORAD

short-range air defense engagement zone

safe lane

SOCCE

special operations command and control element

SOF

special operations forces

SOLE

special operations liaison element

SPINS

special instruction

SSMS

surface-to-surface missile system

SUA

special use area

TACC

tactical air control center

TACOPDAT

tactical operational data

TACP

tactical air control party

TACS

theater air control system

TAGS

theater air ground system

104

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

TAIS

Tactical Airspace Integration System

TAMD

theater air and missile defense

TBMCS

theater battle management core system

TBN

to be notified

transit corridor

TCA

terminal control area

TDL

tactical data link

TIC

troops in contact

traverse level

TLAM

Tomahawk Land Attack Missile

terrain management

TMD

theater missile defense

TMRR

temporary minimum risk route

TOC

tactical operations center

TPFDD

time-phased force and deployment data

TRNA

training area

transit route

TRADOC

US Army Training and Doctrine Command

TRSA

terminal radar service area

TSA

temporary segregated area

TTP

tactics, techniques, and procedures

unmanned aircraft

UAS

unmanned aircraft system

UAV

unmanned aerial vehicle

United States

USA

US Army

USAF

US Air Force

USMC

US Marine Corps

USMTF

United States Message Text Format

WARN

warning area

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

105

FM 3-52.1

AFTTP 3-2.78

22 May 2009

By Order of the Secretary of the Army

Official:

GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.

General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army

0917501

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve: Distribute in

accordance with the initial distribution number (IDN) 116000, requirements for

FM 3-52.1.

By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force

STEPHEN J. MILLER

Major General, USAF

Commander

Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education

ACCESIBILITY:

Publications and forms are available on the e-Publishing website at www.e-

publishing .af.mil for downloading or ordering.

RELEASABILITY:

Distribution authorized to DOD and DOD contractors only to protect technical or

operational information from automatic dissemination under the International

Exchange Program or by other means. This protection applies to publications

required solely for official use and to those containing valuable technical or

operational information. This determination was made on 30 June 2008.

FOREWORD

This multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publication is a project of

the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center in accordance with the memorandum of

agreement between the Headquarters of the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force

doctrine commanders directing ALSA to develop MTTP publications to meet the

immediate needs of the warfighter.

This MTTP publication has been prepared by ALSA under our direction for

implementation by our respective commands and for use by other commands as

appropriate.

WILLARD M. BURLESON III

R. B. TURNER JR

Brigadier General, US Army

Brigadier General (Sel), US Marine Corps

Director

Mission Command Center of Excellence

Capabilities Development Directorate

S. A. STEARNEY

TIMOTHY J. LEAHY

Rear Admiral, US Navy

Major General, US Air Force

Commander

Navy Warfare Development Command

Curtis E. Lemay Center for Doctrine

Development and Education

This publication is available through the following websites:

ALSA (http://www.alsa.mil/);

US Army (https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html);

US Marine Corps (https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil);

US Navy at Navy Doctrine Library System (https://ndls.nwdc.navy.mil);

US Air Force at Air Force E-Publishing System (http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/);

and Joint Electronic Library Plus (https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=0).

PREFACE

1. Purpose

This publication identifies multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) for

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). At the tactical level, it assists military

planners, commanders, and individual Department of Defense (DOD) components

employing military resources and integrating with National Guard Civil Support activities

while responding to domestic emergencies in accordance with United States (US) law.

Note: For the Army, the term “command and control” was replaced with “mission

command.” Mission command now encompasses the Army’s philosophy of command

(still known as mission command) as well as the exercise of authority and direction to

accomplish missions (formerly known as command and control).

2. Scope

This publication provides procedures for actions taken by DOD components when

directed to support local, territorial, state, federal, or tribal agencies responding to

domestic emergencies. Support can be: expertise, equipment, personnel, plans,

organization, communication, training, or other resources.

3. Applicability

This publication establishes MTTP applicable to DOD components tasked with

supporting domestic incident response, including: natural or man-made disaster

response operations, national special security events (NSSEs), or support to law

enforcement. This MTTP enables DOD organizations to integrate their capabilities with

civil authorities into response operations. The focus of this MTTP is on those DOD

forces serving in a Title 10, United States Code (USC) role. National Guard Civil

Support in either a Title 32, USC or state active duty role are discussed, but are not

limited by the discussion within this MTTP.

4. Implementation Plan

Participating Service command offices of primary responsibility will review this

publication, validate the information; and, where appropriate, reference and incorporate

it in Service manuals, regulations, and curricula as follows:

Army. Upon approval and authentication, this publication incorporates the tactics,

techniques, and procedures contained herein into the US Army Doctrine and Training

Literature Program as directed by the Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine

Command (TRADOC). Distribution is in accordance with applicable directives listed on

the authentication page.

Marine Corps.¹ The Marine Corps will incorporate the procedures in this publication

in US Marine Corps doctrine publications as directed by the Deputy Commandant,

Combat Development and Integration (DC, CD&I). Distribution is in accordance with the

Marine Corps Publication Distribution System.

Navy. The Navy will incorporate these procedures in US Navy training and doctrine

publications as directed by the Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command

Marine Corps PCN: 143 000170 00

(3 2015

ATP 3-28.1/MCWP 3-36.2/NTTP 3-57.2/AFTTP 3-2.67

(NWDC) [N5]. Distribution is in accordance with MILSTRIP/MILSTRAP Desk Guide,

Naval Supply Systems Command Publication 409.

Air Force. The Air Force will incorporate the procedures in this publication in

accordance with applicable governing directives. Distribution is in accordance with Air

Force Instruction 33-360, Publications and Forms Management.

5. User Information

a. US Army Combined Arms Center; Headquarters Marine Corps, DC, CD&I;

NWDC; Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education (LeMay

Center); and Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center developed this publication with

the joint participation of the approving Service commands. ALSA will review and

update this publication as necessary.

b. This publication reflects current joint and Service doctrine, command and control

organizations, facilities, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures. Changes in

Service protocol, appropriately reflected in joint and Service publications, will be

incorporated in revisions to this document.

c. We encourage recommended changes for improving this publication. Key your

comments to the specific page and paragraph and provide a rationale for each

recommendation. Send comments and recommendations directly to:

Army

Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center

ATTN: ATZL-MCK-D

Fort Leavenworth KS 66027-6900

DSN 552-4885 COMM (913) 684-4885

E-mail: usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil

Marine Corps

Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration

ATTN: C116

3300 Russell Road, Suite 204

Quantico VA 22134-5021

DSN 278-3616/6233 COMM (703) 784-3616/6233

E-mail: doctrine@usmc.mil

Navy

Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command

ATTN: N52

1528 Piersey St, Building O-27

Norfolk VA 23511-2723

DSN 341-4185 COMM (757) 341-4185

E-mail: NRFK_NWDC_DOCTRINE_AO@navy.mil

Air Force

Commander, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education

ATTN: DDJ

401 Chennault Circle

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428

DSN 493-7864/1681 COMM (334) 953-7864/1681

E-mail: LeMayCtr.DDJ.wrkflw@us.af.mil

ATP 3-28.1/MCWP 3-36.2/NTTP 3-57.2/AFTTP 3-2.67

6(3 2015

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

ATP 3-28.1/MCWP 3-36.2/NTTP 3-57.2/AFTTP 3-2.67, Multi-Service Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).

This revision provides an update and restructure of the February 2013 document. It:

Updates:

x And clarifies how the United States Coast Guard uses its normal statutory

authorities while responding to domestic operations and does not utilize

Department of Defense specific DSCA tactics, techniques, and procedures.

x And consolidates two previous chapters into chapter IV.

x Mission approval procedures and DSCA standing rules for the use of force

(chapter II).

Deletes:

x Appendix A.

Adds:

x A maritime forces section and moves content to chapter I.

x Dual-status commander command structure and procedures into chapter I.

x Incident awareness assessment and using unmanned aircraft systems to chapter

II.

x Explosive ordnance disposal and military working dogs sections to chapter IV.

x A cyberspace section to chapter V.

x New appendices A, B, and C.

(3 2015

ATP 3-28.1/MCWP 3-36.2/NTTP 3-57.2/AFTTP 3-2.67

*ATP 3-28.1

MCWP 3-36.2

NTTP 3-57.2

AFTTP 3-2.67

ATP 3-28.1

US Army Training and Doctrine Command

Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

MCWP 3-36.2

Headquarters, USMC, Deputy Commandant, CD&I

Quantico, Virginia

NTTP 3-57.2

Navy Warfare Development Command

Norfolk, Virginia

AFTTP 3-2.67

Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine

Development and Education

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

6(3 2015

DSCA

MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CHAPTER I THE HOMELAND AND DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

(DSCA) OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

1. Background

2. Authorities Governing DSCA

3. Legal Landscape

4. Overview of the National Response Framework (NRF), National Incident

Management System (NIMS), and Incident Command System (ICS)

5. Overview of the Department of Homeland Security

6. Maritime Forces’ Capability

7. Tiered Response Overview

8. State and NG Responses

9. Federal DOD DSCA Response

10. Request for Assistance (RFA) and Mission Assignment Process

11. JFO

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.

*Supersedes ATP 3-28.1/MCWP 3-36.2/NTTP 3-57.2/AFTTP 3-2.67, dated 11 February 2013.

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12. Parallel Federal and State Military Command Structures

13. Dual-Status Commander (DSC) Structure

CHAPTER II LEGAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

1. Overview

2. Approval Authorities

3. IRA

4. Emergency Authority

5. DOD Support to Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) and Civil Disturbance

Operations

6. Civil SAR

7. Operational Constraints and Exceptions to the PCA

8. Intelligence Oversight

9. RUF

CHAPTER III GENERAL OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND EXECUTION

1. Planning Considerations in the DSCA Environment

2. Mission Analysis

3. Facilities (Bases, Airports, Seaports, or Sea Basing)

4. Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI)

5. Developing SA

6. Operational Concept and Initial Planning

7. Evacuation Considerations

8. Communications and Planning Factors

CHAPTER IV COMMANDER AND STAFF DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL

AUTHORITIES MISSION CONSIDERATIONS

1. Overview

2. Tactical Level Leadership

3. Personnel and Administration

4. Intelligence

5. Plans and Operations

6. Logistics and Resource Management

7. Communications

8. Civil Authority Information Support

9. PAO and PIO

10. SJA

11. Religious Support

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12. Medical Officer, Surgeon, and Medical Teams

13. Aviation

14. EOD

15. Military Working Dogs (MWD)

CHAPTER V DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES AND SPECIAL EVENTS

1. Overview

2. Wildland Firefighting

3. Wind Storms (Tropical Cyclones, Hurricanes, Typhoons, and Tornadoes)

4. Earthquakes

5. Floods

6. Winter Storms

7. CBRN Incidents

8. Special Events

9. Cyberspace-Related Incident

APPENDIX A DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA) MISSION

APPROVAL AUTHORITIES MATRIX

APPENDIX B INCIDENT AWARENESS AND ASSESSMENT (IAA) SUPPORT

REQUEST SAMPLE

APPENDIX C SUPPORTING TABLES AND FORMATS

1. Federal Emergency Support Functions (ESFs)

2. United States Marine Corps (USMC) and United States Navy (USN) Maritime

Capabilities

3. Airfield Planning Considerations

4. Seaport Survey

5. Task Support Assignments

6. Planning for a Military-Assisted Evacuation

7. Examples of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Information

Requirements

8. A Medical Situation Report (SITREP) Example

REFERENCES

GLOSSARY

List of Figures

Figure 1. DSCA and NGCS

Figure 2. ICS

Figure 3. FEMA Regions

Figure 4. USCG Districts

Figure 5. DCE

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Figure 6. JFO Structure

Figure 7. DSC Structure

Figure 8. Example Assignment List (ICS 204)

List of Tables

Table 1. A Commander’s SRUF Example for Title 10, USC Forces

Table 2. A SRUF Card Template Example for Title 10, USC Forces

Table 3. A RUF Card Template Example for Title 32, USC and SAD NG

Table 4. DSCA Missions Approval Authorities Matrix

Table 5. ESFs

Table 6. United States Marine Corps (USMC) and United States Navy (USN) Maritime

Capabilities

Table 7. Airfield Planning Survey Format

Table 8. Seaport Survey Format

Table 9. Task Support Assignments

Table 10. Sample Survey for a Military-Assisted Evacuation

Table 11. Examples of DSCA Information Requirements

Table 12. Medical SITREP Example

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

DSCA

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (MTTP) for Defense Support of Civil

Authorities (DSCA) describes Title 10, United States Code (USC), military involvement

as they operate unilaterally or along with state National Guard (NG) forces in DSCA

environments. Military (operating under all authorities) and civilian after-action reports

identify the need for expanded joint military and interagency procedures to enhance

military and civil interoperability. For effective DSCA operations, active, reserve, and NG

personnel operating under differing military authorities should understand the integration

of capabilities, duties, and legal limitations as they support state and federal civilian

agencies.

DSCA domestic emergencies or activities (including all hazard disaster response

operations) present unique challenges for the Department of Defense (DOD) because

personnel work under differing legal authorities and chains of command when

coordinating and working with non-DOD, state, local, and tribal agencies. This

publication enhances military understanding as Title 10, USC, and Title 32, USC, DOD

forces work side by side in typical DSCA force organizations and outlines some of the

challenges impacting DOD support operations.

Chapter I The Homeland and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)

Operating Environment

Chapter I provides an overview of how operating in the homeland differs from overseas

areas of responsibility. It explains homeland security, homeland defense, and DSCA.

This chapter discusses the role of federal military forces and state NG forces. It

introduces authorities including: Title 10 and Title 32, USC, and state active duty. This

chapter summarizes the National Incident Management System and National Response

Framework. It includes a section on basic command and control and illustrates dual-

status and parallel command structures. Overall, it emphasizes unity of effort with or

without unity of command.

Chapter II Legal and Policy Considerations

Chapter II highlights the unique legal and policy considerations associated with DSCA

operations. It discusses approval authorities, immediate response authority, disaster

response under the Posse Comitatus Act and the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and

Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act). Furthermore, it addresses rules for using

force and intelligence oversight, and using DOD imagery support.

Chapter III General Operational Planning and Execution

Chapter III highlights general planning and execution considerations in a DSCA

environment, such as facility availability, evacuation considerations, and

communications. This chapter focuses on factors unique to the DSCA mission.

Chapter IV Commander and Staff Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)

Mission Considerations

Chapter IV provides DSCA environment-specific planning and execution considerations

for military forces. This chapter describes and compares the overall responsibility of

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each key billet and its coordination with civilian counterparts. Additionally, it provides a

breakdown of anticipated requirements of a typical operation to a tactical-level staff by

phase of operation.

Chapter V Domestic Activities and Special Events

Chapter V provides an overview of the environment, impacts, and likely military

missions for specific DSCA events, including: wildfires; earthquakes; floods; winter

storms; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear events; special events; and

cyber-attacks.

Appendix A Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Approval Authorities

Matrix

Appendix A provides approval authority and applicable guidance for unmanned aircraft

systems and intelligence community capabilities for multiple operations (e.g., DSCA,

civil disturbance operations, search and rescue, support of law enforcement agencies

and training).

Appendix B Sample 9-Line Incident Awareness and Assessment Approval

Request

Appendix B provides a list of information needed when submitting an incident,

awareness, and assessment request in support of DSCA operations.

Appendix C Supporting Tables and Formats

Appendix C organizes additional information requirements, surveys, and capabilities

into formats and tables.

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PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS

The following commanders and agencies participated in creating this publication:

Joint

North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and US Northern Command

(USNORTHCOM) J5, Peterson AFB, Colorado

The Joint Staff J5, Plans Directorate of Joint Staff, Suffolk, Virginia

Joint Improvised Explosive Devices Defeat Organization, Reston, Virginia

Army

US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Joint Base Langley-Eustis,

Virginia

US Army South, Fort Sam Houston, Texas

US Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, Fort Leonard Wood, Mississippi

US Army, Headquarters, Alexandria, Virginia

Marine Corps

US Marine Corps Forces North, New Orleans, Louisiana

Navy

Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), Norfolk, Virginia

US Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia

Naval Expeditionary Command (NECC), Norfolk, Virginia

Air Force

Air Combat Command Future Operations, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia

Air Combat Command Judge Advocate General, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia

Coast Guard

US Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, District of Columbia

US Coast Guard Force Readiness Command, Portsmouth, Virginia

National Guard

National Guard Bureau, Pentagon, Washington, District of Colombia

Army National Guard Office, Arlington, Virginia

Air National Guard Readiness Center, Joint Base Andrews, Maryland

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Chapter I

THE HOMELAND AND DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

(DSCA) OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Background

a. There are critical differences among homeland defense operations, DSCA, and

operations conducted outside the United States (US). Principally, these differences

are the roles of civilian organizations; the relationship of military forces to federal,

state, tribal, and local agencies; and the legal authorities under which military forces

operate. US military personnel must understand the domestic environment so they

can legally employ military capabilities efficiently and effectively.

b. The US exercises sovereignty of its land areas and 12 nautical miles out to sea

and has internationally recognized responsibilities extending 200 nautical miles from

the coast. Military forces may support civil authorities anywhere within this area, with

the proper approvals.

c. Homeland security and homeland defense are complementary components of the

National Security Strategy. Homeland defense is the protection of US sovereignty,

territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external

threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President of the United

States (POTUS) according to joint publication (JP) 3-27, Homeland Defense.

Missions are defined as homeland defense if the nation is under a concerted attack.

The Department of Defense (DOD) leads homeland defense and is supported by the

other federal agencies. In turn, the DOD supports the nation's homeland security

effort, which is led by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Homeland

security is the concerted national effort to: prevent terrorist attacks within the US;

reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies;

and minimize damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other

emergencies described in JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities. A review of

the relationship among homeland defense, homeland security, and DSCA is located

in JP 3-28. This publication principally focuses on aspects associated with homeland

security: DSCA and National Guard Civil Support (NGCS).

d. DSCA operations are vital aspects of the military’s service to the nation. DSCA is

support provided by the US federal military forces, DOD, component assets, and

National Guard (NG) forces in response to requests for assistance from civil

authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic

activities, according to DOD directive (DODD) 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil

Authorities.

e. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) defines NGCS as support provided by the

National Guard (NG) of the states while in state active duty (SAD) status or Title 32,

United States Code (USC) duty status to civil authorities for domestic emergencies

and designated law enforcement and other activities. Figure 1 provides a

comparison of DSCA and NGCS.

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Note: Laws and statutes determine whether NG forces are conducting NGCS, DSCA, or

both. NG authorities are under Title 32 or Title 10 USC. These authorities as well as

duty status (e.g., SAD) determine the restrictions under which NG forces operate and

are discussed further in chapter II.

Figure 1. DSCA and NGCS

f. When in support of civilian authorities, all military forces remain under the

operational control (OPCON) and administrative control (ADCON) of their federal or

state military chains of command. Federal military forces always remain under the

command of the POTUS through the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and the

supported combatant commander (CCDR).

g. United States Coast Guard (USCG) forces integrate into the federal response

under Title 14, USC authority and remain under the OPCON and ADCON of their

USCG chain of command.

Authorities Governing DSCA

a. The authorities for provision of DSCA are found in US law, DOD policy, Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) orders, and CCDR orders. The authorities for

DOD components to conduct DSCA operations are found in DODD 3025.18, and

standing CJCS, US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and US Pacific

Command (USPACOM) DSCA execute orders (EXORDs). JP 3-28 and Service-

specific implementation listed in the references section of this publication provide

additional guidance. Chapter II and appendix A discuss approval authority in more

detail.

b. Each state has laws specifying NG authority for providing DSCA. Agreements

among states for mutual aid under the emergency management assistance compact

(EMAC) and memoranda of agreement also fall under state laws. DODD 5105.77,

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National Guard Bureau, outlines the responsibilities of the NGB established in

federal law.

3. Legal Landscape

Operations conducted by the US military in the homeland and US territories are very

different from operations conducted overseas. These homeland operations are

conducted under the authority and within the limitations of federal, state, and local laws.

During these operations, Titles 10 and 32 USC forces support civil authorities as part of

federal or state-led responses. DSCA operations provide a unique legal landscape not

typical of the usual range of military operations trained for and conducted by the DOD.

Chapter II provides additional information regarding legal considerations.

Overview of the National Response Framework (NRF), National Incident

Management System (NIMS), and Incident Command System (ICS)

a. The NRF presents the guiding principles preparing all response partners to

provide a unified national response to domestic disasters and emergencies. It

establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to a domestic incident

response. The NRF defines the principles, roles, and structures to organize a

national response.

b. The Federal Government, and many states, use emergency support functions

(ESFs) as the primary mechanisms to organize and provide assistance. Under the

NRF, ESFs organize into 14 functional areas. Appendix C lists the federally

recognized ESFs. Many states have more than 14 ESFs.

c. The NIMS provides terminology and organizational processes establishing a

template for incident management. This system enables unity of effort among local,

tribal, state, and federal governments, as well as private sector and

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), in disaster response operations. Five major

components make up this system’s approach: preparedness; communications and

information management; resource management; command and management; and

ongoing management, maintenance, and supporting technologies.

d. The ICS is a management system enabling effective, efficient, and flexible

incident management. ICS addresses incident command in terms of single incident,

area and unified command. Command and general staffs support the incident

commander (IC) with functions depicted in figure 2.

Note: ICS forms are part of the National Interagency Incident Management System.

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Figure 2. ICS

Note: ICS concept of “command” is different from the military use of this term. Military

forces in a DSCA environment will remain under the OPCON and ADCON of the military

chain of command. DOD components are not directly under the command of the IC, but

instead, work in a supporting role by providing a capability or resource.

5. Overview of the Department of Homeland Security

a. DHS is a Presidential, cabinet-level organization with the responsibility of security

of the homeland, including response to national disasters at the federal level. The

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and USCG are part of DHS.

b. FEMA is organized into ten regions, shown in figure 3. Each region serves as the

focal point for organizing and coordinating state and federal emergency

management for incidents within the region.

Figure 3. FEMA Regions

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Maritime Forces’ Capability

a. The United States Navy (USN) and United States Marine Corps (USMC) have

forces that are useful for DSCA operations. Overseas combat contingencies are

their primary missions, but they can serve as dual-use forces for DSCA missions.

(1) USN.

(a) Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC). NECC serves as the

single functional command and force provider for the Navy's expeditionary

forces.

(b) Coastal Riverine Forces. While primarily tasked with combat theater

operations, these small-boat units are useful for shallow water DSCA

operations.

survey and clear harbors of navigational hazards, conduct underwater search

and recovery, and perform limited underwater repairs.

(d) Naval Construction Force. Navy engineer units, such as Navy mobile

construction battalions, construction battalion maintenance units, and

underwater construction teams, offer substantial capabilities for route

opening, collapsed structure search and rescue (SAR), and expedient

infrastructure repair.

(2)

USMC.

(a) Commander, Marine Corps Forces North and Commander, Marine Corps

Forces Pacific (as subordinate Service components) conduct coordination,

planning, and operations in support of DSCA; including maritime DSCA

operations.

(b) Naval response to a CCDR identified or anticipated requirement will drive

identification of available capabilities, planning, and execution timelines;

including marshalling, movement, and embarkation.

Ground Task Forces scaled and tailored in accordance with the requirements

of each specific situation and mission.

(3)

Appendix C depicts dual-use capabilities resident with USN and USMC

Forces.

The USCG is one of the US Armed Forces, as prescribed in Title 14, USC,

Section 1. The USCG executes a variety of missions, including SAR, maritime law

enforcement, and defense readiness. The USCG may have support teams assisting

the federal response during incidents. Figure 4 shows the USCG districts.

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Figure 4. USCG Districts

(1) USCG bases span the US, and a major disaster response likely will involve

the USCG. The USCG does not require a declaration of the Robert T. Stafford

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) to engage in

emergency response activities because this authority is inherent in Title 14, USC,

federal laws, and DHS policies covering USCG activities. USCG forces involved

in a federal response may include:

(a) District and sector staffs.

(b) Marine safety units and detachments.

(d) Air stations.

(e) Cutters.

(f) Strike teams and deployable specialized forces.

(g) Incident management assist teams.

(2) These assets normally are under the direction of the USCG sector

commander who also serves as the:

(a) USCG captain of the port (COTP).

(b) Federal on-scene commander.

(d) Officer in charge of marine inspection.

(e) Federal maritime security coordinator.

(f) Maritime IC for disaster response operations.

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(3) Deployable, specialized forces include strike teams providing hazardous

materials (HAZMAT) and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)

response, maritime safety and security teams, maritime security response teams,

and tactical law enforcement teams. Deployable specialized forces provide

expertise to law enforcement units and augment local forces with small-boat units

and personnel.

(4) Aids-to-navigation units provide emergency harbor surveys, in coordination

with National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), to ensure ports

and waterways are navigable.

(5) Marine transportation system recovery units and incident management

assistance teams are specialized teams that augment local commanders,

reestablish port operations, and run large-scale incident responses.

(6) For more information on USCG support of DSCA operations, refer to USCG

Commandant Publication (COMDTPUB) P3120.17B, Incident Management

Handbook.

c. US Army watercraft and water terminal forces provide support for DCSA

operations. Their primary mission is bolstering overseas combat contingencies, but

they serve as dual-use forces for DSCA missions, often with USN, USMC, and

USCG maritime forces.

(1) US Army Forces Command serves as the single, force provider for the Army

Forces supporting DSCA operations.

(2) The Army employs watercraft capable of moving supplies, equipment and

personnel in shallow coastal waters, inland waterways, and rivers. Army

watercraft support logistics operations at sea ports, small terminals, and in

environments where shore-based facilities have been damaged or do not exist.

(3) Army terminal units conduct cargo operations in sea ports, water terminals,

and environments where shore-based facilities have been damaged or do not

exist. Army terminal forces include mobile communications systems and, ocean-

going and harbor tug boats and mobile cranes. Army engineer dive teams

operate closely with terminal units to conduct port clearance and salvage.

Tiered Response Overview

a. The primary responsibility for responding to domestic disasters and emergencies

rests with the lowest level of government able to manage the response. If local and

state capabilities prove insufficient, state authorities may ask for assistance from

other states under existing agreements and compacts. States will normally exhaust

their resources and execute existing mutual aid agreements and EMAC before

requesting federal assistance. This is known as a tiered response to the disaster.

b. Although tiered response is a guiding principle, the stress of an actual disaster

response may overwhelm resources and capabilities almost simultaneously at all

response levels. NG forces may receive an alert order through state channels at the

same time federal military forces receive their alert and prepare-to-deploy orders

through DOD channels.

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State and NG Responses

a. The NG is the first line of military response to most state or local incidents within

a state or territory. When the governor of a state mobilizes the NG, the forces are

typically in SAD under command and control (C2) of the governor. SAD forces

conduct all missions in support of state requirements and within state guidelines and

statutes.

b. The Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) is the principal advisor to the SecDef,

through the CJCS, on matters relating to the NG. The CNGB is also the principal

adviser to the Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force on all NG

issues. The CNGB serves as the DOD’s official channel of communication with the

governors and adjutants general of the 54 National Guards (50 states and territories

of Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands, Guam, and the District of Columbia). The CNGB

facilitates and coordinates among states and the DOD, integrating NG support in

domestic incidents.

c. Each state has a joint force headquarters-state (JFHQ-State) providing C2 of all

Army and Air NG forces. The JFHQ-State serves as the focal point for all NG

domestic operations within each state. JFHQ-States can serve as operational

headquarters when NG forces conduct domestic operations support in Title 32,

USC, or SAD.

d. Each joint task force state (JTF-State) may stand up one or more joint task forces

(JTFs) supporting internal and external missions. Typically, the JTF-State acts as

the tactical headquarters for all in-state NGCS missions.

e. In addition to the NG, some states authorize a state defense force as allowed by

Title 32, USC, Section 109. These forces augment the state NG and other civil

authorities in an emergency. State defense forces are state entities and are not part

of DOD. State defense force members wear the military uniform assigned by the

adjutant general (TAG) of the state.

f. EMAC is a congressionally ratified, mutual aid agreement between all states and

territories of the US, which provides form and structure to interstate mutual aid.

Through EMAC, a disaster-impacted state can request and receive assistance from

other member states quickly and efficiently, resolving two key issues up front: liability

and reimbursement.

Federal DOD DSCA Response

a. The defense coordinating officer (DCO) is the DOD single point of contact for

domestic emergencies. The DCO is assigned to a joint field office to process

requirements for military support, forward mission assignments to the appropriate

military organizations, and assign military liaisons to activated emergency support

functions. The DCO has a defense coordinating element (DCE) consisting of staff

and military liaison officers coordinating and supporting activated ESFs. See figure 5

for a sample of an augmented DCE structure.

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Figure 5. DCE

b. Emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLO) are senior reserve officers who

represent their Service at the appropriate joint field office conducting planning and

coordination responsibilities in support of civil authorities. The USCG, operating

under DHS, maintains EPLOs similar to DOD EPLOs but coordinates directly with

the FEMA regions.

c. Military units in a Title 10, USC status are under federal C2 and usually under the

OPCON of USNORTHCOM or USPACOM. In the EXORD or operation order

(OPORD) the CCDR will normally authorize direct liaison to designated military unit

commanders. As such, they should contact the joint force commander (JFC) or DCO

as soon as possible after receipt of DSCA deployment orders to obtain mission

specifics, process requests for information, and facilitate mission planning.

10. Request for Assistance (RFA) and Mission Assignment Process

FEMA coordinates the federal response to a disaster. The agency evaluates a RFA

within the joint field office (JFO) and issues a mission assignment to other federal

agencies. For more information on these processes, see JP 3-28.

11. JFO

a. The JFO is a temporary, multiagency coordination center established at the

incident site to provide a central location for coordination of federal, state, local,

tribal, nongovernmental, and private-sector organizations. These organizations have

primary responsibility for incident oversight, direction, or assistance to effectively

coordinate protection, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery actions.

See figure 6 for a sample of the JFO structure.

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Figure 6. JFO Structure

b. Normally, the DCO validates and coordinates DSCA requests originating at the

JFO for SecDef approval. With FEMA state emergency manager, state NG, and

combatant command (CCMD) support, the DCO reviews DOD suitability to perform

a particular RFA and mission assignment.

12. Parallel Federal and State Military Command Structures

In many DSCA operations, federal and state military forces operate in overlapping areas

but under separate chains of command. Within a parallel command structure, there is

no single force commander. Federal and state military leaders retain separate C2 of

their assigned forces as they provide their individual support to the civil authority.

13. Dual-Status Commander (DSC) Structure

a. To unify the military response, federal law permits a DSC to command federal

military personnel in a Title 10, USC status and NG personnel in a Title 32, USC

status or on SAD. Simultaneously, the DSC holds two commissions: state and

federal. The commander then commands both Federal and state forces to

coordinate the military response and provide unity of effort.

b. In accordance with Title 32 USC § 325(a)(2), a NG DSC requires the approval of

the POTUS (this authority is currently delegated to SecDef) and the consent of the

officer’s governor to serve in both duty statuses. For an active duty commissioned

officer, pursuant to 32 USC § 315, the Secretaries of the Army or Air Force may

detail regular officers to duty with the NG, and with the permission of the POTUS.

The detailed officer may accept a commission in the NG without vacating his or her

regular appointment. The state or territory will commission the officer in its NG to

command its NG forces serving under state authority. State law will dictate the

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requirements and procedures for the appointment and, typically, require the

governor’s consent.

c. A DSC operates two chains of command simultaneously. The DSC exercises

command on behalf of, and receives separate orders from, a federal chain of

command and exercises command on behalf of, and receives separate orders from,

a state chain of command. As such, DSCs typically establishes their own

subordinate federal and state chains of command, having Title 10, USC and Title 32,

USC or SAD staffs. The subordinate officers and military forces operate in only one

status, either state or federal. See figure 7 for an augmented DSC chain of

command structure.

Figure 7. DSC Structure

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Chapter II

LEGAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Overview

a. This chapter provides a synopsis of legal principles in DSCA operations. DSCA

operations temporarily support US civilian agencies for domestic emergencies, law

enforcement support, and other domestic activities. DODD 3025.18 provides policy

guidance for executing and overseeing DSCA. Each Service and the NGB

augmented DODD 3025.18 with its own regulations, instructions, and doctrine.

b. DSCA operations involve unique legal and policy issues and approval authorities.

Typically, Title 10, USC, federal military forces are not first responders. In scope and

duration, federal law defines and limits the federal military’s role in DSCA operations.

Commanders and their staffs, especially planners and judge advocates, work

together closely to plan, monitor, and control DSCA operations to comply with

federal and state laws and DOD policies. Additionally, based upon the limitations on

the federal military’s role, military members (Title 10 and Title 32, USC and SAD)

should be aware of the legal considerations and the legal authority under which they

are operating.

c. Capability does not equal authority. Approval authorities vary depending on the

mission and assets. Planners must carefully navigate and apply the appropriate

guidance to ensure mission accomplishment, consistent with the law. For further

details, see appendix A.

d. Operational constraints vary, but include the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) and

intelligence oversight (IO). Additionally there are detailed restrictions for operations

involving intelligence community capabilities (ICC). IO provides oversight

requirements and governs the collection, dissemination, and timelines for retention

of data.

e. A Stafford Act request moves from the state emergency operations center (EOC)

through the DCO to the SecDef for a decision. At each level, cost, appropriateness,

readiness, risk, legality, and lethality (CARRLL) factors determine if the DOD can

and should provide the requested support.

(1) Cost. Who will pay or reimburse DOD for the requested assistance? How

much will the assistance cost? How will it impact the installation’s budget?

(2) Appropriateness. Who normally provides, and is best suited to satisfy, the

requested assistance? Is it in DOD’s and the local community’s interest to

provide the assistance? Is it in DOD’s interest to provide the support? Have other

options, such as local businesses, been considered to meet the need?

(3) Readiness. Is there an adverse impact on the DOD’s ability to perform its

primary mission? Can a carefully tailored response provide the needed

assistance and maintain unit readiness at the same time?

(4) Risk. What are the potential health and safety hazards to federal military

forces? Are there ways to mitigate these hazards? Are there public relations or

political risks?

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(5) Legality. Does the request comply with the law? Do any legal provisions

prohibit or restrict the DOD from providing the requested assistance? If

prohibited, are there any exceptions? Can an appropriate authority waive the

restriction?

(6) Lethality. Is there a potential for lethal force by or against federal forces?

Approval Authorities

a. The SecDef, with limited exceptions or unless otherwise delegated, is the

approval authority for all types of DSCA requests submitted by a primary agency.

The immediate response authority (IRA) (see paragraph 3.a.) and emergency

authority are exceptions for local commanders’ responses to civil authorities’

requests for assistance. There are limitations on the use of certain types of DOD

assets which require SecDef approval, such as unmanned aircraft systems (UASs).

Normally, the Assistant Secretary of Defense or Principal Deputy Assistant

Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense Integration and DSCA) has been

delegated to approve RFAs on behalf of the SecDef.

b. The SecDef has designated the Commander, United States Northern Command

(CDRUSNORTHCOM) and Commander, United States Pacific Command

(CDRUSPACOM), as supported commanders for conducting DSCA operations; as

such, they are principle planning agents for DSCA. SecDef approved RFAs are

tasked to the appropriate commander for execution. Incident awareness and

assessment (IAA), when requested and approved, may be used for:

(1) Situational awareness (SA).

(2) Damage assessment.

(3) Evacuation monitoring.

(4) SAR.

(5) CBRN survey following hazard prediction.

(6) Hydrographic survey.

(7) Dynamic ground coordination.

Note: The DSCA EXORD 071415 JUN 13, permits USNORTHCOM and USPACOM to

request traditional ICC resources to conduct DSCA missions. SecDef approval

authorizes using IAA capabilities for non-intelligence purposes. These missions must be

conducted in accordance with federal IO requirements, including DOD 5240.1-R,

Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United

States Persons.

c. DODD 3025.18 codifies the DOD policy for providing disaster assistance in

accordance with the Stafford Act, Public Law 93-28, and Public Law 100-707, the

primary statutory authorities for federal disaster assistance within the US and its

territories. The Stafford Act authorizes the POTUS to issue emergency or major

disaster declarations concerning catastrophes that overwhelm state governments.

Once a declaration is made, DOD and other federal assistance may be provided.

The Stafford Act is not an exception to the PCA. Federal military forces may only

provide indirect assistance following a disaster or emergency declaration.

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Note: The Economy Act of 1932 permits federal agencies to provide resources and

services to other federal agencies on a reimbursable basis. The Economy Act is also

the basis for the general rule the DOD will not compete with commercial businesses.

d. Presidential declarations of emergencies are situations in which federal

assistance is required to save lives, protect health and property, or mitigate or avert

a disaster. The POTUS may not declare an emergency, unless requested by the

affected governor, except when the incident primarily concerns federal functions,

property, or personnel. Generally, in terms of scope and time, emergency assistance

is not as extensive as major disaster declaration assistance.

e. Major disasters are any natural catastrophe (e.g., hurricane, tornado, earthquake,

or snowstorm) or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion of sufficient

severity. Under the Stafford Act, the governor requesting disaster assistance from

the Federal Government must demonstrate the state’s lack of capacity or resources

to mount an effective response. Under the designation of a major disaster, the type

of assistance may include:

(1) Sharing information indicating the existence of a threat to life or property or

the violation of law incidentally collected during the normal course of military

training or operations. Specifically, this does not permit tasking units or personnel

to collect intelligence within the US.

(2) Using military equipment, spare parts, supplies, and facilities.

(3) Providing personnel for equipment maintenance and operation.

(4) Providing CBRN incident support.

(5) Distributing medicine, food, and consumables.

(6) Removing debris and clearing roads.

(7) Providing emergency medical care.

(8) Transporting supplies and persons.

(9) Restoring essential public services.

(10) Constructing temporary bridges, shelters, and other necessary structures.

(11) Demolishing unsafe structures.

(12) Disseminating public information on health and safety measures.

(13) Providing technical and advisory assistance to state and local officials.

(14) Conducting precautionary evacuations and recovery.

(15) Conducting SAR.

(16) Providing IAA.

IRA

a. DSCA normally requires high levels of approval. Upon receiving a civilian

authority’s request, when time does not permit approval from higher authority, and

under imminent conditions, local commanders may exercise IRA to save lives,

prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage within the US. This

authority excludes using UAS or ICC. IRA is not an exception to the PCA. Local

commanders do not have complete discretion to support civil authorities under IRA;

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CARRLL provisions must be met. Support provided under IRA will not be delayed or

denied based on the inability or unwillingness of the requester to make a

commitment to reimburse the DOD.

b. IRA is applicable during POTUS declared emergencies, major disaster

declarations, and non-declared incidents. Intent empowers commanders to act while

awaiting official approval, but higher authority must approve the continuation of the

IRA mission.

c. Through the chain of command, notify the National Joint Operations and

Intelligence Center (NJOIC) when forces deploy. The NJOIC will notify the

geographic CCDR. For Navy units, an Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

instruction (OPNAVINST) 3440.16D requires notification within two hours. USMC

commanders must report the decision immediately (via chain of command) to

Headquarters, Marine Corps per Marine Corps Order 3440.7B. Per DODD 3025.18:

Section 4, paragraph G(1) “The DoD official directing a response under immediate

response authority shall immediately notify the National Joint Operations and

Intelligence Center (NJOIC), through the chain of command, of the details of the

response. The NJOIC will inform appropriate DoD Components, including the

geographic Combatant Command”. NG forces in Title 32, USC status must report

IRA activities to the NGB as soon as practicable, in accordance with CNGB Notice

1401.

d. An immediate response shall end when the necessity giving rise to the response

is no longer present or when the initiating commander or a higher authority directs

an end to the response. The commander directing a response under IRA shall

reassess whether there remains a necessity for the DOD to respond under this

authority not later than 72 hours after the request for assistance was received.

e. Commanders providing the IRA support should seek reimbursement after it

terminates, with the exception of support provided under the National SAR Plan.

Reimbursement arrangements should not affect DOD support of the IRA request

and is not mandatory.

Emergency Authority

Under emergency authority, federal military commanders can engage, temporarily, in

activities necessary to quell large-scale, unexpected civil disturbances. In these

instances prior authorization by the POTUS is not possible and duly constituted, local

authorities are unable to control the situation. Use an emergency authority when under

the following circumstances.

a. When such activities are necessary to prevent significant loss of life or wanton

destruction of property and are necessary to restore governmental functioning and

public order.

b. When duly constituted federal, state, or local authorities are unable to, or decline

to, provide adequate protection for federal property or Federal Governmental

functions. Federal action, including the use of federal military forces, is authorized

when necessary to protect federal property or functions.

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DOD Support to Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) and Civil Disturbance

Operations

a. For fear of military encroachment on civil authority and domestic governance, the

PCA and policy limit DOD support to LEA. Department of Defense instruction (DODI)

3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, provides guidance

on DOD support to LEA. Appendix A lists approval authorities and guidance for

employing UAS and ICC for DSCA missions.

b. US domestic civil disturbances include riots, acts of violence, insurrections,

unlawful obstructions and assemblages, and disorders prejudicial to public law and

order. The primary responsibility for protecting life and property and maintaining law

and order in the civilian community is vested in the state and local government.

Involvement of military forces will only be appropriate in extraordinary

circumstances. The authority for civil disturbance operations primarily derives from

the Insurrection Act, which vests decision-making authority in the POTUS. The

Insurrection Act permits the POTUS to use armed forces under a limited set of

specific circumstances and are subject to certain limitations. Responsibility for

managing the federal response rests with the Attorney General of the US. Although

the Attorney General will have primary responsibility for response to civil

disturbances, military forces shall remain under DOD C2 at all times. Use of the

military under the Insurrection Act to conduct law enforcement activities is a specific

exception to PCA.

c. DODI 3025.21 addresses DOD policy on civil disturbance operations. It states,

“the employment of federal military forces to control civil disturbances shall only

occur in a specified civil jurisdiction under specific circumstances as authorized by

the President, normally through issuance of an Executive Order or other Presidential

directive authorizing and directing the SecDef to provide for the restoration of law

and order in a specific state or locality”.

d. With higher headquarters coordination, commanders should prepare

recommended mission specific rules for the use of force (RUF).

e. Commanders should prepare to conduct operations against personnel,

equipment, and installations using non-lethal weapons capabilities.

Civil SAR

a. It is DOD policy to support domestic civil authorities providing civil SAR to the

fullest extent practicable on a non-interference basis with military duties. Specifically,

the authorities in the National Search and Rescue Plan encourage DOD personnel

to provide domestic SAR support. Approval authorities for SAR will depend on the

asset used. At a minimum, DODI 3003.01 DOD Support to Civil SAR, DODD

3025.18, and the DSCA EXORD will apply.

b. DODI 3003.01 designates USNORTHCOM as the US Inland SAR Coordinator for

the search and rescue regions (SRR) for the 48 contiguous states and USPACOM

for mainland Alaska and Hawaii. The US Air Force provides funding, manpower, and

personnel services to operate fully functional rescue coordination centers (RCCs).

They promote efficient organization of SAR services and coordinate civil SAR

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operations within the inland US SRRs. The Air Force rescue coordination center

(AFRCC) for the 48 contiguous states is located at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida.

The Alaska rescue coordination center (AKRCC) is located at Joint Base Elmendorf-

Richardson. The AFRCC and AKRCC request units to provide SAR assistance;

neither can task them. AFRCC and AKRCC do not approve missions; they

coordinate them. The USCG is the supported Service for maritime SAR. The USCG

maintains RCCs at sector and district headquarters.

c. Frequently, when the AFRCC or AKRCC contacts a unit, the commander will

respond under IRA (depending upon the nature of the distress call). But, IRA is not

automatic; the DSCA CARRLL factors and IRA definition still apply. It is DOD policy

to support RCC requests for civil SAR, and DOD forces will fund their own activities

without allowing cost reimbursement to delay response to any person in danger or

distress. Additionally, despite a commander’s IRA, using UASs or ICC for SAR still

requires SecDef approval. Confer with the judge advocate for the most up-to-date

guidance with regard to UAS employment for SAR missions involving potential loss

of life.

7. Operational Constraints and Exceptions to the PCA

In addition to varying levels of approval authorities for DSCA, certain laws and policies

constrain the type of support DOD can provide. This section discusses the impact of the

PCA and IO policies on DSCA operations.

a. PCA. The PCA remains the primary federal statute restricting federal military

support to civilian LEAs. The PCA prohibits Title 10, USC forces from engaging in

any direct civil law enforcement activities unless constitutional guidance or an Act of

Congress exception applies (e.g., the Insurrection Act of 1807). Evidence of criminal

activity obtained by DOD personnel in violation of the PCA may be inadmissible in a

criminal trial thereby preventing a successful prosecution. Personnel who violate the

PCA also may be subject to criminal and civil penalties.

(1) Through federal law and applicable DODDs, the PCA applies to all members

of the federal military forces, as well as each of their reserve components serving

in a federal status. The USCG, when consisting of Title 14, USC, personnel is

authorized to conduct law enforcement activities as part of the USCG mission.

(2) Whether the PCA applies to Army or Air NG personnel depends upon the

legal authority under which the guardsmen are serving. It is imperative personnel

know the various legal restrictions associated with these authorities when

engaged in a DSCA operation. One of the following three statutory frameworks

order NG personnel to duty:

(a) SAD NG personnel are state funded and under state control. Typically,

this is the authority in which NG personnel perform duties when a governor

mobilizes the NG to respond to state emergencies, civil disturbances, or

disasters, or to perform other duties authorized by state law. The Federal

Government, pursuant to a Presidential major disaster or emergency

declaration, may reimburse the costs of a SAD response. NG personnel on

SAD authority do not fall under PCA restrictions and may perform those law

enforcement duties authorized by state law.

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(b) Title 32, USC, NG personnel are federally funded but remain under the

control of the state. Because they fall under state control, they do not fall

under PCA restrictions and may perform law enforcement duties authorized

by state law.

control; consequently, they are subject to the PCA.

Note: Some states may have PCA-like legal restrictions that limit using NG personnel in

SAD or Title 32, USC duty status.

b. National Emergency Declaration. The POTUS has an inherent authority under

Articles II and IV of the Constitution to declare a national emergency. Further, the

National Emergency Act of 1976 permits the POTUS to declare an emergency to

preserve order and ensure public health and safety during time of war, insurrection,

or national crisis. If the POTUS declares a national emergency, the POTUS could

issue an executive order waiving PCA restrictions and permitting federalized military

forces to perform law enforcement functions to protect federal facilities, property,

and personnel.

c. Insurrection Act. First, the POTUS must issue a disperse and retire peaceably

proclamation ordering a cessation of unlawful behavior. If the unlawful behavior

continues, the Insurrection Act permits the POTUS to use the Armed Forces,

including the NG, in federal service (Title 10, USC) to perform law enforcement

functions, within a state, to restore law and order under the three following

circumstances:

(1) When there are unlawful obstructions or rebellions preventing enforcement of

the laws by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the POTUS may act

unilaterally without a request from state or local authorities. For example, the

POTUS used the authority under the Insurrection Act in April 1992 when he

ordered federal troops to restore order in Los Angeles during the riots after the

Rodney King verdict.

(2) There is an insurrection within a state, and the state legislature or governor, if

the legislature cannot be convened, requests assistance from the POTUS.

(3) An insurrection or domestic violence results in the deprivation of

constitutional rights and the states are unable or unwilling to protect those rights.

d. Emergency Situations Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Upon the

request of the US Attorney General, the SecDef may authorize DOD personnel to

arrest, search, seize, and conduct any other law enforcement activity to protect

persons and property from WMD. For this exception to apply, civilian law

enforcement must be unable to enforce the law.

e. USCG Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs). Under the Maritime Drug Law

Enforcement Act, several hundred USCG personnel serve on LEDETs authorized to

perform maritime drug interdiction. When engaged in maritime drug interdiction,

USCG LEDET personnel may perform traditional law enforcement functions, such as

searching vessels, seizing contraband, and arresting suspects upon probable cause.

Navy personnel working with the LEDETs are bound by the PCA. Therefore, Navy

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personnel may not perform active, direct law enforcement functions and have a

limited supporting role. Indirectly, Navy personnel may assist a LEDET by:

(1) Providing force protection for a LEDET boarding party.

(2) Transporting a LEDET boarding party to a target vessel.

(3) Acting as interpreters.

(4) Supplying welding and cutting equipment assistance aboard the target

vessel.

(5) Recording the LEDET’s activities while aboard the target vessel.

(6) Recovering contraband jettisoned from the target vessel.

(7) Effecting damage control to keep the target vessel afloat.

(8) Billeting and maintaining persons apprehended from the target vessel.

f. Authorized and Restricted Activities in Support of LEA. DODI 3025.21 and Title 10

USC 371 authorize sharing information collected during military operations, using

military equipment and facilities, training with LEA, and funding and reporting

mechanisms for such support. Additionally, they authorize SAR, explosive ordnance

disposal (EOD), domestic terrorist incident support, and civil disturbance operations.

DODI 3025.21 addresses training with LEA in detail. DOD directives prohibit

interdicting vehicles, searches and seizures, arrest, and similar activities (e.g.,

apprehension, stop, and frisk). Furthermore, engaging in questioning potential

witnesses; using force or threats to do so, except in self-defense or defense of

others; collecting evidence; forensic testing; and surveillance or pursuit of individuals

or vehicles is prohibited.

g. Military Courtesy Patrol. A military courtesy patrol conducted in the local

community is not considered a PCA violation. To avoid violating the PCA, the

military courtesy patrol’s prescribed duties must fall short of law enforcement.

Military courtesy patrols are intended to preserve good order and discipline, and to

serve as liaisons with local law enforcement, not to actually enforce the law.

Intelligence Oversight

a. DOD and NG intelligence personnel performing intelligence duties must adhere

to federal and DOD IO rules. These include Executive Order 12333, United States

Intelligence Activities; DODD 5240.01, DOD Intelligence Activities; and DOD 5240.1-

R. In addition, each Service and the NGB has regulations and policy guidance. IO

rules ensure intelligence personnel protect US persons’ constitutional rights and

privacy, collect essential authorized information by the least intrusive means, and

disseminate information only for lawful government purposes. Information may be

collected only if it is necessary for conducting a function assigned to the collecting

component and if it falls within certain criteria. These criteria include consensual,

openly available information; foreign intelligence; counterintelligence; international

terrorist activities; international narcotics activities; threats to safety; and overhead

and airborne reconnaissance.

b. DOD and NG intelligence personnel operating in a Title 10 or Title 32, USC,

status must comply with all federal and DOD IO rules, regulations, and directions

regarding requirements for authorized activities. Army NG personnel in SAD status

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are prohibited from using DOD intelligence resources (i.e., sensors, systems,

equipment, or information) because they are not considered to be operating in a

DOD capacity. Thus, Army NG military intelligence personnel (in SAD status) are not

authorized to perform any intelligence activities as part of the intelligence

community. Military intelligence personnel in SAD status may use state-owned

equipment to perform any missions assigned by the governor, within the guidelines

of state laws.

c. Contractors or non-intelligence personnel assisting in the performance of

intelligence or counterintelligence work on behalf of DOD or NG intelligence have

the same IO responsibilities and training requirements as US Government civilian

and military intelligence personnel.

d. IAA is using intelligence assets for non-intelligence. Within the context of IAA

support to DSCA operations, the DSCA EXORD authorizes the following IAA tasks:

SA, damage assessment, evacuation monitoring, SAR, CBRN assessment,

hydrological survey, and dynamic ground coordination. SecDef approval of the

DSCA EXORD may authorize traditional intelligence capabilities to conduct DSCA

missions for non-intelligence purposes. Use of assets designated to provide IAA for

other than the seven IAA missions requires SecDef approval on a case-by-case

basis. The DSCA EXORD states CCDRs are authorized to use manned aerial

imagery assets, within their area of responsibility (AOR), to obtain imagery of

geography (not to observe people or human activity). Questions on whether DOD

intelligence capabilities may be used in a DSCA operation should be referred to the

command judge advocate if the authorities, permissible parameters, and limitations

are unclear. All data collection, retention, and dissemination will be performed in

accordance with standing DOD intelligence oversight guidance, including any

requirement to obtain a proper use memorandum (PUM). Compliance with IO

policies will require training personnel and issuing a PUM for manned and

unmanned IAA platforms.

e. A PUM defines an organization’s request for a domestic imagery requirement and

its intended use. It is issued for a one-time event or on an annual basis. A PUM

acknowledges awareness of the legal and policy restrictions regarding domestic

imagery collection, retention, dissemination, and use. Depending on content, PUMs

can be classified or unclassified. The appropriate certifying official verifies and signs

the PUM and remains accountable for the accuracy of the domestic imagery

request. A legal advisor must conduct a legal sufficiency review of the PUM. The

PUM provides an auditable trail of authority and responsibility up to the appropriate

levels, while ensuring the protection of the rights of US citizens and organizations.

RUF

a. In any situation, the standing rules for the use of force (SRUF) assist federal

military personnel in determining the application of the appropriate level of force.

SRUF are restrictive measures intended to allow only the minimum force necessary

to accomplish the mission. US constitutional and domestic law are the bases for

SRUF and provide guidance to DOD forces for using force against civilians within

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US territory. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01B,

Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces, for additional guidance.

b. Enclosures L through Q of CJCSI 3121.01B contain the SRUF for US forces.

These RUF do not apply to NG forces while on SAD or Title 32, USC status. NG

forces operate under the state’s RUF. The SRUF apply during all DSCA and routine

military department functions occurring within US territory and territorial seas.

Additionally, the SRUF applies to homeland defense missions occurring within US

territory and to DOD forces, civilians, and contractors performing law enforcement

duties at all DOD installations within or outside US territory.

c. A commander’s authority to modify the SRUF is limited to making the rules more,

not less, restrictive. Table 1 contains a template for a commander’s responsibilities

under the SRUF. Table 2 contains a SRUF template developed by US Army North.

These templates are general in nature and provided as examples only. In

coordination with the operational chain of command, commanders and judge

advocates must review the actual SRUF.

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Table 1. Example Commander’s RUF (Title 10 Forces)

Teach and Train. A commander must train personnel in the standing rules for the use of force (SRUF)

and implement them, when necessary. SRUF trainers must ensure the training does not introduce

procedures that effectively restrict the SRUF or introduce tactically dangerous or unsound practices.

Unit Self-Defense. A commander retains the inherent right and obligation of unit self-defense and

defense of other Department of Defense (DOD) forces in the vicinity, in response to a hostile act or

demonstrated hostile intent.

Individual Self-Defense. A commander may impose rules of proportionality on individual self-defense.

Normally, force is used only as a last resort and should be the minimum necessary. It must be

reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude to counter the threat ,based on the totality of the

circumstances. Lethal force is used only when all lesser means have failed or cannot be reasonably

employed.

Coordinate SRUF. A commander will coordinate the SRUF with civilian law enforcement agencies

(CLEAs) or security forces, when operating with them, to ensure a common understanding. Any RUF

issues, which cannot be resolved, will be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) through the

chain of command and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Imminent Threat. A commander will determine if a threat of death or serious bodily harm by an

individual or motor vehicle is imminent based on an assessment of all of the circumstances. If the

commander determines such a threat is imminent, lethal force is authorized to stop the threat.

Inherently Dangerous Property. A commander may designate DOD property, or property having a

DOD nexus, as inherently dangerous. This includes weapons, ammunition, explosives, portable

missiles, rockets, chemical agents, and special nuclear materials.

Pursue and Recover. A commander may not authorize forces to pursue and recover a stolen asset

vital to national security or inherently dangerous property unless delegated this authority by the

Commander, United States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM) and CLEAs, or when security

forces are not reasonably available. Any pursuit must be immediate and uninterrupted.

Changes To SRUF. A commander may augment the SRUF, as necessary, by submitting requests for

mission specific RUF to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval by the SecDef.

Violations. A commander will immediately report any suspected violation of or noncompliance with the

SRUF through the chain of command to CDRUSNORTHCOM.

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Table 2. Example RUF Card Template (Title 10 Forces)

Unit Self-Defense. Commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-

defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. This includes the defense of other

DOD forces in the vicinity.

Individual Self-Defense. Service members may exercise individual self-defense in response to a

hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. A commander may impose rules of proportionality on

individual self-defense. Normally, force is used only as a last resort and should be the minimum

necessary. It must be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude to counter the threat, based on

the totality of the circumstances. Lethal force is used only when all lesser means have failed or cannot

be reasonably employed. SRUF training must introduce procedures that effectively restrict tactically

dangerous or unsound practices.

De-escalation. When time and circumstances permit, Service members will give individuals a warning

and an opportunity to withdraw or stop the threatening actions before using force. Avoid confrontation

with individuals who pose no threat to the unit, non-DOD persons in the vicinity, or property secured by

DOD forces. If a confrontation appears likely, civilians are acting in a suspicious manner, or it is

immediately after a confrontation, notify civilian law enforcement agencies (CLEAs) or security agency

personnel as soon as practical.

Limitations on the Use of Force. Service members will use force of any kind only as a last resort. If

used, the force should be the minimum necessary to accomplish the mission. Any use of force must be

reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude to counter the threat based on all the circumstances.

Exercise due regard for the safety of innocent bystanders when using any type of force. Warning shots

are not authorized.

Use of Nonlethal Force. Service members may use nonlethal force to stop a threat, when it is

reasonable to:

x Control a situation and accomplish the mission.

x Provide protection for self and other DOD personnel.

x Defend non-DOD persons in the vicinity, if directly related to the assigned mission.

x Defend designated protected property.

Lethal Force in Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and Defense of Property. Service members may

use lethal force to stop a threat only when all lesser means have failed or cannot reasonably be

employed, and it appears necessary to:

x Protect DOD forces when a commander believes a person poses an imminent threat of death or

serious bodily harm.

x Protect non-DOD persons in the vicinity from the imminent threat of death or serious bodily

harm, if directly related to the assigned mission.

x Prevent the theft or sabotage of assets vital to national security, national critical infrastructure, or

inherently dangerous property.

Lethal Force is Not Authorized. Lethal force is not authorized to disperse a crowd, stop looting,

enforce a curfew, or protect nondesignated property.

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Table 2. Example RUF Card Template (Title 10 Forces) (cont’d)

Lethal Force Against a Serious Offense. Service members may use lethal force, if it is directly

related to the assigned mission and appears necessary to:

x Prevent a serious crime against any person, which involves imminent threat of death or serious

bodily harm.

x Prevent the escape of a prisoner where probable cause indicates the prisoner committed or

attempted to commit a serious offense and would pose an imminent threat of death or serious

bodily harm to DOD forces or others in the vicinity.

x Arrest or apprehend a person who, there is probable cause to believe, has committed a serious

offense that involved an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm or sabotage of

designated protected property.

Lethal Force Against a Vehicular Threat. Service members may fire their weapons at a moving land

or water vehicle when they believe the vehicle poses an imminent threat of death or serious bodily

harm to DOD forces or to non-DOD persons in the vicinity, if doing so is related to the assigned

mission.

Inspection of Personnel Entering and Exiting an Area. Per command security guidance, Service

members may inspect individuals and property prior to granting persons or property entry inside a DOD

perimeter or secured area and upon leaving such an area. An individual or item of property, which does

not meet the command security requirements for entry may be denied access inside a DOD perimeter

or secured area.

Temporary Detention of Threatening Personnel. Service members may detain an individual

temporarily, if the individual:

x Gains unauthorized access inside DOD perimeters or other secured areas and refuses to depart

such an area after being denied further access.

x Otherwise threatens the safety and security of DOD forces, property secured by DOD forces, or

non-DOD persons in the vicinity, if related to the assigned mission.

Detained Individuals. Detained individuals, vehicles, and property may be searched as a protection

measure. Detained individuals and any secured property will be released to CLEA at the earliest

opportunity, consistent with mission accomplishment.

Pursuit and Recovery of Stolen Property. Forces are not authorized to pursue and recover a stolen

asset vital to national security or inherently dangerous property, unless delegated this authority by the

Commander, United States Northern Command and CLEA or security forces are not reasonably

available. Any pursuit must be immediate, continuous, and uninterrupted.

Report Violations of the SRUF. Immediately, Service members will report any violation of or non-

compliance with the SRUF concerning who, what, when, where, and why to the chain of command,

Inspector General, Judge Advocate, or any commissioned officer.

Legend:

USC—United States Code

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d. The SRUF and RUF may differ for each state’s NG forces. State laws govern the

RUF of the NG serving in a state-controlled, Title 32, USC, or SAD status.

Additionally, the NG’s authority to perform law enforcement, law enforcement

support, or security operations varies in the laws of the various states. Depending on

the language of the state statutes involved, grants of, or limitations on, the NG’s

authority to act as police officers may apply to NG personnel in a Title 32, USC

status, SAD status, or both. Some states grant NG members (in a Title 32, USC

status, SAD status, or both) the authority of police officers, while others only

authorize those powers enjoyed by the population at large, such as citizen’s arrest.

Consequently, each of the states, territories, and the District of Columbia promulgate

separate RUF. While coordinating with state legal authorities, it is the duty of the NG

judge advocate to tailor the RUF to the particular mission and policies of the state.

The template in table 3 provides a planning aid for deploying forces. Prior to the

assumption of any DSCA mission, commanders in Title 32, USC, or SAD status

must ensure all personnel are briefed on the applicable state RUF.

Table 3. Example RUF Card Template (Title 32 and SAD NG Forces)

Minimum Force: Military personnel will use the minimum force required to accomplish the mission.

Self-Defense. Nothing in these rules for the use of force (RUF) shall limit a commander’s inherent

duty to safeguard the force or an individual‘s inherent right of self-defense. Proportional to the threat,

an individual is always authorized and expected to use necessary force in self-defense. A commander

may impose rules of proportionality on individual self-defense.

Lethal Force. Lethal force refers to physical force, which could reasonably result in death, whether or

not death is the intent. In all cases, discharging a firearm is considered lethal force. Before resorting to

lethal force, all of the following conditions must be met.

x All other means have been exhausted, are not appropriate, or are not reasonably available

(including restraining, detaining, and subduing).

x The use of lethal force does not increase the risk of death or serious bodily harm to innocent

bystanders.

Lethal force may be used for one or more of the following circumstances.

x Self-defense to avoid death or serious bodily harm. Threat of harm is not restricted to firearms.

It may include assault with large rocks, bricks, pipes, or other heavy missiles, incendiary and

explosive devices, or any other material, which could be expected to cause death or serious

bodily harm.

x Prevention of crime involving a substantial risk of death or very serious bodily harm, including

the defense of others.

x Detention or prevention of the escape of a person, who during detention, or in the act of

escape, threatens to kill or cause serious bodily harm to others. Attempt to escape does not

justify the use of lethal force. Use of lethal force is justified only when it is immediately

necessary to protect against death or serious bodily harm.

x Lethal force will be used to stop immediate threats, not to warn them. Warning shots and

blanks are not authorized.

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Table 3. Example RUF Card Template (Title 32 and SAD NG Forces) (cont’d)

Arming order. Local commanders determine the arming order based on mission requirements. Local

commanders may modify the arming order depending on mission, terrain, troop availability, and time

availability. Arming order considerations include the following.

x Deploying troops without weapons, in appropriate circumstances.

x Considering, arming orders are not necessarily sequential. Select the most appropriate posture

for the potential threat and observe the minimum necessary force principle.

When forces are fired upon, consider Arming Order-4 and Arming Order-5 and return aimed fire with

selected sharpshooters.

Arming Order

Rifle*

Pistol

Magazine

Chamber

Arming Order-2

Sling

In holster

In weapon

Empty

Arming Order-3

Port**

In holster

In pouch

Empty

Arming Order-4

Port**

In holster

In weapon

Empty

Arming Order-5

Port**

In holster

In weapon

Chambered

*Bayonet posture can be modified by local commanders based on mission, terrain, troops and time.

**Defined as having the rifle at the ready.

Weapon Limitations:

x Automatic firing is not authorized at any time.

x Personnel who are armed must be trained, qualified, and tested on the type of weapon issued,

according to current qualification standards.

x Arms and ammunition will be secured, at all times, according to appropriate regulations and

policies. Military weapons will not be secured in private dwellings or transported in privately

owned vehicles at any time.

x There will be no deployment of automatic weapons, shotguns, riot batons, or riot control

agents, except upon expressed order of the adjutant general (TAG).

x Rounds will be chambered only on order of the commander, senior officer, or senior

noncommissioned officer present.

x Only ball ammunition will be issued. Armor piercing rounds and blank ammunition will not be

issued or fired.

Aircraft and Vehicle Operations:

x Firing weapons from aircraft is not authorized.

x Firing weapons from moving vehicles is not authorized unless exigent circumstances exist,

such as self-defense or defense of others in a life-threatening situation.

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Table 3. Example RUF Card Template (Title 32 and SAD NG Forces) (cont’d)

Changes to RUF. These RUF shall not be changed except upon order of TAG.

Acceptable Missions. Be prepared to conduct civil disturbance missions. Some examples are:

x Operating a traffic control post.

x Providing point and area security.

x Providing security and escort assistance for emergency personnel and equipment.

x Expressing a show of force.

x Transporting local law enforcement personnel.

x Dispersing crowds.

x Providing quick reaction and reserve forces.

x Protecting and escorting very important persons.

x Establishing a joint patrol.

x Accomplishing other missions mutually agreed upon with civil authorities.

Unacceptable Missions. Examples are:

x Hostage negotiation.

x Evidence searches.

x Barricaded suspect extraction.

x Criminal investigation.

Special Orders for Civil Disturbance Operations:

x Always present a neat military appearance and behave in a manner credible to the unit,

National Guard, and state.

x Civilian police make arrests. However, if it is necessary, military forces can take rioters, looters,

or other persons committing serious crimes into temporary custody. Deliver such persons to

the police or to designated military authorities as soon as possible.

x Avoid causing damage to private property unless it is necessary to perform the assignment.

x Adhere to the arming orders issued by the chain of command.

x Be courteous to civilians, to the maximum extent possible, under existing conditions (including

those in custody).

x Provide or arrange to deliver prompt medical attention to persons who are in need.

x Do not discuss the operation with others or otherwise violate operational security.

x Allow properly identified reporters and radio and television personnel to move freely throughout

the area, unless they interfere with the mission or create a substantial risk of harm to Service

members or others. Do not discuss the mission with members of the media in the absence of a

public affairs officer or the commander.

Legend:

USC—United States Code

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Chapter III

GENERAL OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND EXECUTION

1. Planning Considerations in the DSCA Environment

The joint operation planning process supports missions across the full range of military

operations. Chapter 3 of JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, describes the planning

process. Further planning information is provided in Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual

3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance.

For Service-specific processes, see:

a. Naval warfare publication (NWP) 5-01, Navy Planning.

b. Army doctrine reference publication (ADRP) 5-0, The Operations Process.

c. Marine Corps warfighting publication (MCWP) 5-1, Marine Corps Planning

Process.

d. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-401, Air Force Operations Planning and Execution.

e. Commandant of the Coast Guard instruction Manual (CIM), 3010.13B,

Contingency Preparedness Planning Manual, Volume III- Exercises.

Mission Analysis

a. The key inputs to mission analysis are the higher headquarters planning

directive, strategic guidance, information about the incident and the affected

operational environment, and initial staff estimates. The primary products of mission

analysis are the mission statement, the commander’s initial intent statement, the

commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs), and planning guidance. In

preparation for the mission analysis process, staff officers should develop a generic

list of requirements within their functional areas for particular types of missions.

During DSCA, the RFA process links missions and assignments. Mission analysis of

these assignments will result in fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs), passed down

from higher headquarters via the JTF. Within these FRAGORDs, the JTF and task

force commanders must translate civil authority requirements into an order

understood by supporting tactical commanders tasked with execution. These orders

are commonly in the form of an ICS Incident Action Plan or outlined in a state ICS

204 Form. Figure 8 shows a generic example of a state ICS 204 Form. If available,

include this form as an attachment or enclosure to the FRAGORD tasking the

subordinate tactical unit.

b. Coordinate and integrate federal agency support operations with state and local

government agencies. On-going military operations and homeland defense

requirements have priority over DSCA operations unless otherwise directed. The

severity and magnitude of the event and the requirements of DSCA operations

determine the duration and scope of DOD involvement.

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1. Incident Name

2. Operational Period:

Date From: MM/DD/YY Date To: MM/DD/YY

Time From: xxxx

Time To: xxxx

Branch:

4. Operations

Name

Contact Number(s)

Division:

Personnel:

Operations Section Chief:

XXX-XXX-XXXX

Group:

Branch Director:

XXX-XXX-XXXX

Staging

Division/Group

XXX-XXX-XXXX

Area:

Supervisor:

5. Resources Assigned:

Reporting Location, Special

Contact (e.g., phone, pager,

Equipmenttand Supplies, Remarks,

Resource Identifier

Leader

radio frequency, etc.)

Notes, Information

6. Work Ass

7. Special Instructions:

8. Communications (radio and/or phone contact numbers needed for this assignment):

Name

/Function Primary Contact: indicate cell, pager, or radio (frequency/system/channel)

9. Prepared by: Name:

Position/Title:

Signature:

ICS 204

IAP Page

Date/Time: Date

Figure 8. Example Assignment List (ICS 204)

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Facilities (Bases, Airports, Seaports, or Sea Basing)

a. During the initial stages of disaster response, facilities may be completely or

partially dysfunctional. After conducting immediate lifesaving activities, restoring

airports, ports, and staging areas is one of the most essential tasks and a critical

response capability of the DOD. These facilities allow response forces and

specialized equipment access to the affected area.

b. Airport, harbor, and marine channel support operations may involve clearing or

salvaging ships, aircraft, piers, marine railways, bridges, or other damaged

structures blocking runways, air terminal access, harbors, and marine shipping

channels. Units tasked in these operations include mobile air traffic control units, the

US Air Force rapid engineer deployable heavy operational repair squadron, and

Navy salvage assets, such as mobile diving and salvage units and salvage ships.

c. To the maximum extent possible, DOD forces will use DOD facilities for real

estate needs. Units should not occupy private land or facilities without specific legal

authority. The General Services Administration, US Army Corps of Engineers

(USACE), Naval Facilities Engineering Command, or other Government agencies

provide real property support.

Airports and Operations.

(1) Often, an airport requires a rapid, post-disaster assessment before declaring

it safe and open for emergency operations. Therefore, an early priority is a

disaster effects survey of existing airfields to determine if they are safe and

capable of conducting emergency operations. After being declared operational by

a civil authority, survey runways, taxiways, aprons, and navigational aids as soon

as possible. See appendix C for an airfield planning survey.

(2) Disaster response operations involve numerous aircraft, from military and

civilian organizations, flying into the affected area. Thus, it is essential to get

airfields partially operational as soon as possible. Local and wide-area air traffic

control procedures provide safe air traffic routing within the response area to and

from landing zones and airports.

(3) The JFC normally tasks the joint force air component commander (JFACC) to

function as the airspace control authority. The airspace control authority will

develop an airspace control plan, integrated with the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), to be executed via an airspace control order. The airspace

control order implements specific control procedures for established time periods.

Planners in the joint air tasking process will develop airspace control instructions

in sufficient detail to allow planning and execution of all air missions listed in the

air tasking order.

(4) Operation of UAS in a disaster area requires SecDef and FAA approval.

(5) Helicopter operations and response agency flight operations have priority for

air traffic control rules and routes in the affected area.

(6) Depending on equipment capabilities at airports, it may be necessary for

ship-borne systems to close within territorial waters to assist aircraft in collision

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avoidance and navigation in bad weather. Land-sea interface and other terrain

factors may affect shipboard radars.

(7) The JTF commander shall establish an air terminal operations center (ATOC)

to manage the site’s air logistic support operations. The ATOC acts as an

interface among the advanced logistic support site and the battle force logistics

coordinator, US Air Force Air Mobility Command, and the naval air logistics office.

The ATOC receives, processes, and dispatches all information relating to air

logistics to each functional area at the advanced logistic support site.

(8) Flight operations consist of ground handling of aircraft, providing passenger

services, and unloading and loading cargo and mail. The ramp controller is the

primary interface between the flight line and the ATOC, ensuring all personnel

working on the ramp adhere to directions and ATOC guidance.

Sea Ports and Sea Basing.

(1) Port opening is a joint operation coordinated through local officials and the

JTF port opening element, working to support the USCG COTP. These elements

coordinate port operations and prioritize vessel and terminal operations for critical

cargo needed for emergency operations and key industries.

(2) Natural and manmade events impact harbor navigation, aids to navigation,

and navigability due to sand bars, landslides, or debris. Normally, before the port

opens for emergency operations, the USCG, USACE, or civilian contractors

should perform a rapid post-disaster assessment. The USCG COTP determines

if the port is open for emergency operations. Operations include harbor and

marine channel clearance; salvage of ships, piers, marine railways, and bridges;

and other structural repairs affecting marine shipping channel operations.

Depending upon the type and scale of the situation, wrecks and debris at a

strategic access point could affect a substantial geographic area. The Navy has

additional survey and salvage capabilities, including the USN Supervisor of

Salvage and Diving, fleet survey teams, salvage ships, mobile diving and salvage

units, and associated commercial salvage contractors.

(3) Seaports must be surveyed to determine if they are safe and capable of

conducting emergency operations. Appendix C provides a sample seaport

survey.

(4) Navy Cargo-handling Battalions (NCHBs) augment and accomplish port

control, loading, and unloading. NCHBs have C2 for handling operations and

providing support personnel to discharge and load ships (either pier side or in-

stream) for all classes of cargo, including HAZMAT. They conduct port terminal

operations in developed or undeveloped ports, including discharging and loading

containers, cargo, and vehicles from ships. NCHBs perform heavy-lift crane

operations supporting maritime pre-positioning force squadrons, container ships,

fast sealift ships, fast logistics ships, and auxiliary crane ships.

(5) Army terminal battalions are employed in fixed ports, unimproved ports, and

bare-beach facilities to provide C2 and supervision to units employed in the water

terminal operations. Units assigned to terminal battalions include watercraft units,

harbormaster detachments, and seaport operations companies. Army watercraft

units provide vessels to support movement of cargo, equipment, and personnel in

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shallow coastal and inland waterways. Harbormaster detachments provide

mobile, joint, interoperable communications to support 24 hour operational

control for vessels conducting intra-theater lift, water terminal, inland waterway,

and joint amphibious and riverine operations. Army seaport operations

companies perform seaport terminal service operations to conduct shipboard and

pier-side discharge and loading of bulk cargo and vehicles.

(a) Mission Command. The transportation brigade (expeditionary) serves as

the mission command and planning headquarters for Army watercraft and

port terminal operations. The harbormaster C2 center provides theater-wide

communications and common operating picture capability.

(b) Landing Craft. The Army has several types of landing craft capable of

operations within the littorals and inland waterways and provides access to

small, austere ports, harbors, and beaches. Logistics support vessels and

landing crafts, utility are self-deployable assets capable of carrying tracked

and wheeled vehicles, containers, and oversized equipment.

needed to run a small to medium-sized seaport. The Army has small and

large tug boats used for port maintenance, salvage, and routine husbandry

requirements. Additionally, the Army has organizations required to load and

unload strategic lift assets, stage and marshal cargo, and clear port facilities.

(6) Disasters impact shore facilities, transportation corridors, and ports requiring

sea basing to support response operations ashore. Ships and ship-based aircraft

provide essential C2, medical, survey, SAR, support, and response operations.

Sea basing is valuable for disasters in low-lying areas where road, rail, and

airports are underwater or inaccessible due to damage. Large naval amphibious

ships with rotary wing landing platforms are ideal for sea basing operations, as

they can support sustained operations independent of land facilities. Damaged or

nonexistent port facilities may require using specialized landing craft, utility and

landing craft, air cushion to conduct logistics missions.

(7) Military Sealift Command, the Maritime Administration, and the Army

maintain additional capabilities to conduct maritime support with a variety of large

and small vessels. One of these is the transportation of bulk materials, vehicles,

and fuel from large ships to the shore, independent of port facilities, using joint

logistics over-the-shore capabilities. These services bring a tremendous

capability to impacted areas, but take weeks to establish.

(8) In littoral environments, naval forces establish a sea base as close to the

operation as possible. They quickly arrive with critical mass, commence response

support and sustain operations indefinitely. Damaged or destroyed shore

infrastructure does not deter naval forces from providing C2, lift, and

reconnaissance. Sea lines of communication provide an important bridge until

other DOD, government, or civilian agencies can organize and establish

operations.

Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI)

Establish RSOI, as soon as practical, in the operational area to receive all forces. DSCA

operations require all operating forces to receive additional guidance and briefings. This

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includes legal guidance on the constraints of the domestic environment, associated

RUF, commander’s communication strategy for potential contact with media, and safety

briefs. Safety considerations include hazard identification and individual protective

equipment (IPE) and personal protective equipment (PPE) requirements based on

specifics of the incident. Deconflict DOD RSOI with state EMAC RSOIs.

Developing SA

a. Media reports, local DOD activities, and government agencies may provide easy

access to photographs and news reports. This may enable a hasty analysis of the

situation, enabling direct support by responding forces. Official websites (e.g.,

FEMA) contain policies, reference materials, and information about organizations

involved in the area along with contacts. Representative Service EPLOs can assist

in developing SA for their Service units, and can facilitate coordination with the

Service component headquarters, and other Service resources. Additionally, EPLOs

have a community-wide chat capability to leverage for exchanging information.

b. The commander’s estimate of the situation is an analysis and establishes the

appropriate course of action. In DSCA operations, the estimate further develops SA

critical in providing operational support. Areas of particular emphasis include:

(1) Identifying factors affecting area access, including supplying and re-supplying

material.

(2) Identifying environmental conditions (e.g., geography, meteorology, and other

factors) affecting operational planning, C2, and force employment.

(3) Determining communications capabilities and connectivity within the area of

operations.

(4) Identifying capabilities and limitations of federal, state, and other participants

regarding national policy, public affairs guidance, and legal restrictions.

(5) Identifying cultural and local language factors affecting the common

understanding of the situation.

(6) Determining the health status of the population and the remaining healthcare

infrastructure and capability.

(7) Determining the safety of navigation for water access.

(8) Obtaining an infrastructure assessment.

c. Understanding the perception of the DOD’s actions and the Federal

Government’s response by the local government and population is a key element in

the development of SA. Commanders need to align their communication strategy

with federal response leadership. They must remain engaged with all sources (e.g.,

media and local authorities) and make necessary changes to develop, promote, and

sustain unity of effort and public trust. This should correct misunderstandings or

unrealistic expectations regarding the military’s role in the operation. Timing of the

call-up is a key factor. At the outset, commanders must determine and communicate

the military’s role, termination and transfer criteria, and a transition plan.

Commanders must address expectations as the operation progresses. The correct

and standardized use of terms is critical in DSCA operations. Make every effort to

use commonly understood terminology that does not hamper coordination with state

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and local officials, NGOs, or international organizations. For example, avoid

incorrectly using the terms refugee, displaced person, and evacuee, which have

legal and unintended connotations.

d. Short duration DSCA operations focusing on minimizing human suffering and

stabilizing the situation are ideal, such as SAR and recovery efforts during the crisis

stage. Once the situation stabilizes, state and local governments assume the

functions performed by the federal interagency and NG responders. Identify these

transition plans and transfer points early.

6. Operational Concept and Initial Planning

During the initial response phase, local, tribal, state, private sector, and federal partners

and FEMA collaborate on mission assignments supplementing on-scene and civilian

capabilities. See appendix C for task force assignments during the initial response

phase.

7. Evacuation Considerations

Evacuation order authority rests with civilian agencies. DOD units provide critical

logistical and medical support for evacuation operations. DOD involvement in civilian

evacuations demands a clear understanding of the specific operational requirements

and legal ramifications. The appropriate agency coordinates evacuation areas and

collection points, proper medical care, food, water, and shelter. See appendix C for

planning considerations for a military assisted evacuation.

Communications and Planning Factors

a. Communications support is critical to successful disaster assistance operations.

Often, disasters disable or destroy local communications systems, including cellular

capabilities. Expect military organizations to extend communication capability to non-

DOD disaster response task force partners.

b. DSCA operations demand timely action and interoperability of diverse groups

(e.g., military, federal, and civilian entities). The ICS requires unclassified

communications in clear text. Prioritize clarity over security when employing

traditional military communications, security paradigms, and jargon.

c. There are three main levels of voice communications planning: C2 nets’ satellite

communications/high frequency (SATCOM/HF), tactical C2 nets’ ultrahigh/very high

frequency (UHF/VHF), and tactical operational nets. Operation orders (OPORDs)

and special instructions provide frequency plans to support participants. To ensure

maximum interoperability, the airspace control plan assigns frequencies.

d. As an overarching goal, data communications planning should emphasize ease

of operability and availability of information to all participants. The goal of information

management for DSCA operations is the timely flow of critical information to

enhance a DSCA force commander’s SA. Also, these information networks must be

interoperable with NG forces executing DSCA.

e. C2 architecture planning considerations identify:

(1) Required reports and reporting frequency.

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