Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U) LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

(U) Marking Title:

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

(U) Authorized Abbreviation:

LIMDIS

(U) Portion Marking:

(DS)

(U) Example Banner Line:

UNCLASSIFIED//LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

(U) Marking Sponsor/Policy Basis: NGA / 10 USC, Section 455

(U) Definition:

Marking used to identify unclassified geospatial products and data sets, which the

Secretary of Defense may withhold from public release.

(U) Further Guidance:

NGA GIPS, Chapter 2

(U) Notes:

LIMDIS data may not be disseminated outside DoD or DoD contractor control

without the express permission of a NGA Release Officer.

May only be used with UNCLASSIFIED.

(U) LIMDIS geospatial data must be marked with the following caveat:

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

Distribution authorized to DoD, IAW 10 U.S.C. §§130 & 455. Release authorized to

U.S. DoD contractors IAW 48 C.F.R §252.245-7000. Refer other requests to:

Headquarters, NGA, ATTN: Release Officer, Mail Stop D-120, 4600 Sangamore

Road, Bethesda, MD 20816-5003. Destroy IAW DoD 5030.59. Removal of this

caveat is prohibited.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U) EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION

(U) Marking Title:

EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION

(U) Authorized Abbreviation:

EXDIS

(U) Portion Marking:

(XD)

(U) Example Banner Line:

SECRET//EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION

(U) Marking Sponsor/Policy Basis: DoS / 5 FAH-2 Sec. H-443

(U) Definition:

Information with exclusive distribution to officers with essential need-to-know. This

caption is used only for highly sensitive traffic between the White House, the Secretary,

Deputy, or Under Secretaries of State and Chiefs of Missions.

(U) Further Guidance:

None

(U) Notes:

Used with classified or administratively controlled information.

Documents bearing this special distribution caption shall be treated as NOFORN.

EXDIS and NODIS markings cannot be used together. Only one or the other

may be used on a document.

(U) Notional Example Page:

SECRET//EXDIS

(S//XD) This is the portion marking for a portion which is classified SECRET

EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION. This portion is marked for training purposes only.

(U) Note: The classification authority block is required on all US classified

information. See the ISOO Marking Booklets and Section 2 of this Manual for more

information.

SECRET//EXDIS

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U) NO DISTRIBUTION

(U) Marking Title:

NO DISTRIBUTION

(U) Authorized Abbreviation:

NODIS

(U) Portion Marking:

(ND)

(U) Example Banner Line:

SECRET//NO DISTRIBUTION

(U) Marking Sponsor/Policy Basis:

DoS / 5 FAH-2 Sec. H-442.3

(U) Definition:

This caption is used only on messages of the highest sensitivity between the President,

the Secretary of State, and Chief of Mission. No distribution is allowed other than the

addressee without the approval of the Executive Secretary.

(U) Notes:

Used with classified or administratively controlled information.

Documents bearing this special distribution caption shall be treated as NOFORN.

NODIS and EXDIS markings cannot be used together. Only one or the other

may be used on a document.

NODIS has priority over EXDIS.

(U) Notional Example Page:

SECRET//NODIS

(S//ND) This is the portion marking for a portion which is classified SECRET NO

DISTRIBUTION. This portion is marked for training purposes only.

(U) Note: The classification authority block is required on all US classified

information. See the ISOO Marking Booklets and Section 2 of this Manual for more

information.

SECRET//NODIS

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Marking Title:

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Authorized Abbreviation:

SBU

(U) Portion Marking:

(SBU)

UNCLASSIFIED//SENSITIVE BUT

(U) Example Banner Line:

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Marking Sponsor/Policy Basis: DoS / 12 FAM, Sec. 540

(U) Definition:

Administrative information originated within the Department of State, which warrants a

degree of protection and administrative control and meets criteria for exemption from

mandatory public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act

(U) Further Guidance:

None

(U) Notes:

May be used only with UNCLASSIFIED.

When a document contains both SBU and FOUO portions, FOUO takes

precedence in the banner line.

(U) Notional Example Page:

UNCLASSIFIED//SBU

(U//SBU) This is the portion marking for a portion that is SENSITIVE BUT

UNCLASSIFIED. This portion is marked for training purposes only.

UNCLASSIFIED//SBU

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED NOFORN

(U) Marking Title:

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED NOFORN

(U) Authorized Abbreviation:

SBU NOFORN

(U) Portion Marking:

(SBU-NF)

(U) Example Banner Line:

UNCLASSIFIED//SBU NOFORN

(U) Marking Sponsor/Policy Basis: DoS / 12 FAM, Sec 540

(U) Definition:

Information originated within the Department of State that warrants a degree of

protection and administrative control, meets criteria for exemption from mandatory

public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, and is prohibited for

dissemination to non-US citizens.

(U) Further Guidance:

None

(U) Notes:

May be used only with UNCLASSIFIED.

REL TO is not authorized in the banner line if any portion contains SBU

NOFORN information

(U) Notional Example Page:

UNCLASSIFIED//SBU NOFORN

(U//SBU-NF) This is the portion marking for a portion that is SENSITIVE BUT

UNCLASSIFIED NOFORN. This portion is marked for training purposes only.

UNCLASSIFIED//SBU NOFORN

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

100

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

11. (U) Legacy Markings

(U) Banner Line and Portion Marking

(Table is UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO)

Authorized

Authorize

Replace

Rescinde

Handling

Marking Title

Abbreviatio

d Portion

d By

d By/Date

Instructions

Marking

Non-US Classification Markings

//NATO

None

(//NS-S)

None

MC101/11

SECRET-

(Final) 09

SAVATE

Dec 2005

//NATO

None

(//NS-A)

None

MC101/11

SECRET-

(Final) 09

AVICULA

Dec 2005

SCI Control System Markings

BYEMAN

BYE

(BYE)

DCI

The BYEMAN control

memo/ 10

system was retired on

Jan 2005

20 May 2005. The

word BYEMAN is

unclassified. The

trigraph BYE is

unclassified. All

previous data

protected in the BYE

control system,

except BYE Special

Handling, will be

protected in the

TALENT-KEYHOLE

Control System. BYE

Special Handling is

now protected in

compartments in the

new NRO control

system “RESERVE.”

For more information

view

http://www.byeretirem

ent.ic.gov.

HUMINT

HCS

Upon

Previously the term

publication

"HUMINT" was

of Register

registered as the

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

101

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Version 31

marking title for the

Oct 2006

HUMINT control

system. Since then,

there has been

confusion between

collateral “HUMINT”

and “HUMINT” in the

SCI category. When

creating new

documents, if

"HUMINT" is present

in the SCI category,

change to "HCS".

Dissemination Control Markings

LACONIC

None

(LAC)

New ECI

Non-Intelligence Community Dissemination Control Markings

SINGLE

SIOP-ESI

(SIOP)

NC2-ESI

CJCSI

Refer to CJCSI

INTEGRATED

3231.01B /

3231.01B, dated 21

OPERATIONA

1 Oct 06

Jun 06

L PLAN-

EXTREMELY

SENSITIVE

INFORMATIO

(U) Note: The Declassification Value has been eliminated from the Banner Line. Refer

to the Banner Syntax History section below for more details.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

102

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U) Classification Authority Block

(Table is UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO)

Replaced

Handling

Marking

Abbreviation

Rescinded By/Date

Instructions

10 Year

X1 through

None

ISOO Dir. 1

Refer to ISOO DIR.1,

Exemption

Sections. 2001.12(e)

ISOO Marking

and 2001.22(d) (2)(i)

Booklet, October

(Source documents

2007, and ISOO

cannot be dated on

Marking Booklet, May

or after 22 Sep

2005 for handling

2003)

instructions.

Originating

OADR

None

1.) ISOO Dir. 1

Refer to ISOO DIR.1,

Agency's

Sections.

ISOO Marking

Determination

2001.12(e),

Booklet, October

Required

2001.22(d)(i)

2007, and ISOO

(Source documents

Marking Booklet, May

cannot be dated

2005 for handling

after 14 Oct 1995)

instructions.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

103

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

12. (U) Banner Syntax History

(U) The following changes to the banner line syntax have been made since inception of

the standard:

(Table is UNCLASSIFIED)

Effective Date

Change Description

Handling Instructions

October 2003

Moved the Special Access Required (SAR)

Remarking of legacy

marking from the Non-Intelligence

documents is not

Community Dissemination Control

required.

Markings category to a new category called

Special Access Program Markings. The

new category follows the existing SCI

Control Markings category.

July 2005

Changed the separators from commas to a

Remarking of legacy

single forward slash for multiple

documents is not

Dissemination Control Markings and the

required.

Non-Intelligence Community Dissemination

Control Markings categories. For the “REL

TO” marking, the lower case “and” was

eliminated as the indicator for the end of a

country code and/or tetragraph code list.

February 2008

Eliminated the Declassification Value

Remarking of legacy

category in the Banner Line per DD,

documents is not

CAPCO memo, dated 22 January 2008.

required.

This action:

Does not eliminate or

Made the Manual Review (MR)

rescind ISOO’s

marking obsolete - MR is no longer

requirement for a

a valid marking on classified

“Declassify On” value in

documents and was never an

the classification authority

authorized value for the

block on the first page of

classification authority block.

each classified

Eliminates the need to link a

document, regardless of

declassification value in the banner

media.

line to the “Declassify On” line in the

classification authority block as

required by ISOO Dir. 1.

Makes proper use of the “Declassify

On” line even more critical as this

value reflects applicable

declassification review and

exemption information.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

104

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

13. (U) Miscellaneous Banner Line Marking Examples

(U) Basic Example:

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) Multiple SCI Examples:

TOP SECRET//COMINT-GAMMA/TALENT KEYHOLE//RISK

SENSITIVE/ORIGINATOR CONTROLLED

Or abbreviated as: TOP SECRET//SI-G/TK//RSEN/ORCON

(U) HCS Example:

TOP SECRET//HCS//NOFORN

(U) Multiple SCI and SAP Examples:

TOP SECRET//HCS/TALENT KEYHOLE//SPECIAL ACCESS REQUIRED-BUTTER

POPCORN//NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

Or abbreviated as: TOP SECRET//HCS/TK//SAR-BP//NOFORN

(U) ECI Examples:

TOP SECRET//SI-ECI XYZ//NOFORN

TOP SECRET//SI-ECI ABC//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR

TOP SECRET//SI-ECI LMN

TOP SECRET//SI-ECI QRS//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

(U) Multiple ECI Example:

TOP SECRET//SI-ECI ABC-ECI EFG-ECI XYZ

(U) Multiple COMINT Sub-Control Systems Example:

TOP SECRET//SI-G-ECI ABC//ORCON

(U) Non-US Examples:

//COSMIC TOP SECRET-BOHEMIA

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

105

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

//DEU SECRET

(U) JOINT Classification Example:

//JOINT SECRET CAN GBR USA

(U) FGI Examples:

TOP SECRET//FGI DEU GBR

SECRET//TK//FGI//NOFORN

SECRET//FGI

(U) Notional Unpublished SCI control systems AUNPUB (ABC) and XUNPUB

(XYZ) along with SI and TK:

TOP SECRET//AUNPUB/XUNPUB/COMINT/TALENT KEYHOLE

Or abbreviated as: TOP SECRET//ABC/XYZ/SI/TK

(U) DEA Examples:

SECRET//NOFORN/DEA SENSITIVE

UNCLASSIFIED//DEA SENSITIVE

(U) RELIDO Examples:

SECRET//RELIDO

SECRET//REL TO USA, DEU/RELIDO

(U) REL TO Examples:

SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, NZL

SECRET//RSEN/REL TO USA, AUS, GBR

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

106

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT

CHIEFS OF STAFF

MANUAL

J-2

CJCSM 3314.01A

DISTRIBUTION: A, B, C, S

17 September 2012

INTELLIGENCE PLANNING

References: See Enclosure M

1. Purpose. This manual provides guidance to Joint Staff, Service (including

Service intelligence centers and reserve components), Combatant Command

(CCMD), and Combat Support Agency (CSA) personnel for conducting

collaborative intelligence planning (IP) primarily in support of Combatant

Commander (CCDR) campaign plans, contingency plans, and orders. These

planning efforts are directed by reference p, reference h, and other planning

directives, such as those that may be published during Crisis Action Planning

(CAP). This manual describes the procedures to be applied in the development

of a variety of IP products, to include the production, coordination, approval,

and implementation of National Intelligence Support Plans (NISP).

2. IP Intent. As the intelligence component of the Adaptive Planning and

Execution (APEX) system, IP procedures are applied during deliberate planning

for campaign and contingency plans and crisis action planning. IP is a

methodology for coordinating and integrating all available Defense Intelligence

Enterprise capabilities to meet CCDR intelligence requirements. It ensures

that prioritized intelligence support is aligned with CCDR objectives for each

phase of the operation. The IP process also identifies Defense Intelligence

Enterprise knowledge gaps and intelligence capability shortfalls and develops

mitigation strategies where possible. Identified knowledge gaps and capability

shortfalls also inform a variety of processes and products within the Joint

Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and, in collaboration with the Office of the

Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the development of Unifying

Intelligence Strategies (UIS).

3. Cancellation. CJCSM 3314.01 28 February 2008

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

4. Applicability

a. This manual applies to the Joint Staff, Services, CCMDs, and Defense

Intelligence CSAs. It is distributed to other agencies for information.

b. This manual will be followed except when, in the judgment of the CCDR,

exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. This manual will take precedence

if conflicts arise between it and Service publications.

c. Guidance contained in this manual does not preclude the Joint Staff,

CCMDs, Services, and Defense Intelligence CSAs from conducting collaborative

intelligence planning for CCDR plans or operations not tasked in reference p,

reference h or CAP directives.

5. Intelligence Planning (IP) Roles and Responsibilities

a. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)). The

USD(I) exercises the Secretary of Defense’s authority, direction, and control

over the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities that are Defense

intelligence, counterintelligence, or Components and exercises planning,

policy, and strategic oversight over all DoD intelligence, counterintelligence,

and security policy plans and programs.

(1) Provide policy guidance and oversight of the IP process.

(2) Participate in IP Steering Groups (IPSG) to determine the scope and

level of NISP support and collaborate in the management of NISP development,

staffing, and coordination when applicable. For a detailed discussion of the

IPSG, see page A-22.

(3) Participate in Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC)

review of CCMD campaign and contingency plans and applicable NISPs.

(4) Co-chair the quarterly IP Governance Board. For a detailed

discussion of the IP Governance Board, see page A-22.

(5) Support Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Socializations and

In-progress Reviews (IPR) of Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)-tasked

plans and other plans as directed.

(6) Represent OSD intelligence equities in APEX forums to include the

Adaptive Planning Implementation Team (APIT) and its subordinate working

groups, the Adaptive Planning Senior Steering Group (AP SSG), and the

Adaptive Planning Executive Committee (AP EXCOM). Collaborate with JS J-2

to fully implement and integrate IP into the APEX system.

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

b. Joint Staff, Director of Intelligence (J-2)

(1) Exercise DoD-level Functional Management of IP; oversee the

development of IP along the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel,

Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) spectrum of

capabilities.

(2) Represent Joint Staff intelligence equities in APEX forums, to

include the APIT and its subordinate working groups, the AP SSG, and the AP

EXCOM. Collaborate with OUSD(I) to fully implement and integrate IP into the

APEX system.

(3) In accordance with planning priorities and NISP guidance

established in reference h, provide CCMDs, CSAs, and Services supplemental

IP instructions and NISP development requirements through reference k

guidance IP Objectives Guidance and Tasks.

(4) Support Joint Staff Socializations and IPRs of JSCP-tasked plans

and other plans as directed.

(5) Support Joint Staff Joint Combat Capability Assessments (JCCA) for

JSCP-tasked plans.

(6) Coordinate, integrate, and synchronize the IP activities of CSAs,

Service intelligence centers, and other Defense Intelligence Enterprise

organizations. When appropriate, and in close coordination with the supported

CCMD, lead the development staffing and coordination of NISPs.

(8) Co-chair IPSGs which determine the scope and level of intelligence

planning support for each assigned top priority planning effort and manage

NISP production process when applicable.

(9) Coordinate targeting support from across the Intelligence

Community (IC) and operational centers/agencies/enterprises as required, and

produce Targeting Functional Support Plans (FSP).

(10) In coordination with JS J-5, facilitate review of NISPs during the

JPEC’s review of the supported plan. If NISP development lags behind that of

the supported plan facilitate its review through a separate Joint Staff Action

Process (JSAP), ensuring the supported basic plan and annexes B and C are

included in the review package.

(11) Lead the development of an annual Joint Intelligence Posture

Assessment (JIPA) in support of CCMD campaign plans and the JSPS.

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

(12) Represent and advocate CCMD intelligence interests to the Joint

Staff, OSD, and the ODNI.

(13) Integrate IP with the UIS process.

(14) Consolidate IP-identified capability shortfalls to develop statements

of Defense Intelligence capability requirements as input to programs and

budget proposals.

(15) Coordinate Defense Intelligence Enterprise response to crises;

serve as IC manager for support to military operations.

(16) Co-chair the quarterly IP Governance Board.

c. Intelligence CSAs, Service Intelligence Centers, and other Defense

Intelligence Organizations

(1) Maintain sufficient capability to support multiple intelligence

planning efforts simultaneously.

(2) Produce FSPs in accordance with Figure 1.

(3) Provide annual supportability estimates and capability assessments

as required to meet CCMD stated intelligence requirements.

(4) Provide intelligence support to CCMDs in accordance with annual

supportability estimates, approved NISPs, and other requests generated during

the conduct of operations.

(5) Participate in JPEC review of CCMD campaign and contingency

plans as well as supporting NISPs.

(6) Participate in the JCCA process for select JSCP-tasked plans.

(7) Participate in APEX and IP governance forums and associated

working groups.

d. Combatant Commands

(1) Initiate the IP process to meet the requirements specified in

references h, k, and p; or as tasked by the Chairman through planning

directives issued subsequent to reference h; or as required to support CCDR-

directed plans and cross-CCMD planning coordination.

(2) Co-Chair the IPSG.

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

(3) To the extent possible, identify and prioritize anticipated collection

and all-source intelligence production tasks for all phases of supported plan(s).

(4) Develop an intelligence annex (Annex B) appropriate to the level of

detail of the supported plan.

(4) Articulate specific personnel augmentation or operational support

required from external organizations, including additional required capabilities

to be included in Requests for Forces (RFF) messages.

(5) Provide an assessment of intelligence and counterintelligence

capabilities of assigned, allocated, and apportioned forces with the goal of

identifying knowledge gaps and capability shortfalls.

(6) Reference the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Dynamic Threat

Assessment (DTA)/Theater Intelligence Assessment (TIA) used for plan

development/refinement per guidance in reference k.

(7) In accordance with reference k, the CCDR, via the CCMD J-2, will

request the development, staffing, and production of NISPs through the JS J-2.

6. Procedures. Specific guidance regarding IP procedures is provided in the

enclosures to this document.

7. Summary. This revision to CJCSM 3314.01:

a. Defines IP as the intelligence component of the APEX system that

provides a methodology for integrating Defense Intelligence Enterprise

capabilities to satisfy the intelligence requirements of the supported CCDR.

b. Outlines procedures for the conduct of IP in support of steady-state

campaign plans, contingency branch plans, crisis action planning, and

continued planning during execution.

c. Introduces the concept of two mutually supportive IP Lines of Effort:

Intelligence Support to Joint Operation Planning and Planning Intelligence

Operations.

d. Highlights the importance of an IP Team (IPT) composed of intelligence

planners, analysts, and collection managers who collaborate to develop

operationally-relevant intelligence plans and facilitate enhanced mission

management.

e. Clarifies the lexicon and hierarchy of intelligence requirements and their

association to anticipated collection and production requirements.

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ENCLOSURE A — THE INTELLIGENCE PLANNING PROCESS

A-1

Authority

A-1

IP Overview

A-1

IP Output

A-2

Linkage to APEX

A-7

The IP Process

A-10

Crisis Action Planning

A-21

IP Governance

A-22

ENCLOSURE B - NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN

DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

B-1

Purpose

B-1

NISP Components

B-1

NISP Initiation

B-2

Requirements Development

B-2

NISP Planning Conferences

B-3

NISP Development

B-4

NISP Production

B-5

NISP Completion

B-8

NISP Staffing and Approval

B-8

ENCLOSURE C - INTELLIGENCE PLANNING IN SUPPORT OF CAMPAIGN

PLANS

C-1

Purpose

C-1

Campaign Plan Overview

C-1

Resource Requirements and Intelligence Support

C-1

Annual Joint Intelligence Posture Statement

C-3

ENCLOSURE D - INTELLIGENCE PLANNING SUPPORT TO

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

D-1

Purpose

D-1

Overview of Crisis Action Planning

D-1

IP Activities during CAP

D-2

ENCLOSURE E - FEDERATED TARGETING SUPPORT

E-1

Overview

E-1

Roles, Responsibilities, and Targeting FSPs

E-1

Tasking

E-3

Allied Participation

E-3

ENCLOSURE F - CAPABILITY ASSESSMENTS

F-1

Purpose

F-1

Phased Assessments

F-1

Assessment Procedures

F-2

Overall Capability Ratings

F-2

A&P Limitation Codes

F-3

C&E Limitation Codes

F-3

The IP Tool

F-4

iii

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

ENCLOSURE G - COMBATANT COMMAND J-2 STAFF

ESTIMATE PROCESS

G-1

Purpose

G-1

Initial J-2 Staff Estimate

G-1

Revised J-2 Staff Estimate

G-1

Final J-2 Staff Estimate

G-1

Use of the J-2 Staff Estimate

G-2

Sample J-2 Staff Estimate Format

G-2

ENCLOSURE H -NISP BASE PLAN FORMAT

H-1

Administrative Instructions

H-1

ENCLOSURE I -FUNCTIONAL SUPPORT PLAN FORMAT

I-1

Administrative Instructions

I-1

ENCLOSURE J - PRMX FORMAT

J-1

Purpose

J-1

PRMx Sections

J-1

Hierarchy

J-3

A&P Tasks and Responsibilities

J-3

All-Source and Single Discipline A&P Capability Assessments

J-4

PRMx Maintenance

J-5

ENCLOSURE K - CRMX FORMAT

K-1

Purpose

K-1

CRM Format and Intent

K-1

CRM Sections

K-1

Hierarchy

K-3

SIRs and Collection Responsibilities

K-4

Collection Capability Assessments

K-4

CRMx Maintenance

K-6

ENCLOSURE L - REQUIREMENTS EXAMPLES

L-1

Purpose

L-1

Expectations

L-1

Examples

L-3

ENCLOSURE M - REFERENCES

M-1

ENCLOSURE GL - GLOSSARY

GL-1

Abbreviations and Acronyms

GL-1

Definitions

GL-5

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

FIGURE

Page

Products by Plan Type

A-2

Sample Task Hierarchy

A-5

Concept of Collection Operations

A-6

Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and Products

A-8

IP Lines of Effort

A-11

Notional IPT and Related Functions

A-14

JIPOE Support to Plan Assessment

A-19

Notional TCP Framework

C-3

PRMx Overview

J-2

10.

PRM Hierarchy

J-3

11.

A&P Tasks and Responsibilities

J-4

12.

All-Source A&P Capability Assessments

J-5

13.

Single Discipline A&P Capability Assessments

J-5

14.

CRMx Overview

K-2

15.

CRMx Hierarchy

K-3

16.

SIRs and Collection Responsibilities

K-4

17.

Theater Collection Capability Assessments

K-5

18.

DoD/National Collection Capability Assessments

K-5

19.

Strategic End State 1.0

L-4

20.

Strategic End State 2.0

L-5

21.

Strategic End State 3.0

L-6

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

ENCLOSURE A

THE INTELLIGENCE PLANNING PROCESS

1. Authority. The requirement for the IP process in support of top priority

plans is established in reference p and amplified in reference h. Reference p

directs CCMDs to conduct IP to support top priority campaign and contingency

plans. The results of this planning will be formalized in intelligence annexes

(Annex B) to CCMD plans, Joint Intelligence Posture Assessments, and, when

applicable, National Intelligence Support Plans (NISP). Reference k specifies

NISP development requirements. For emerging problem sets not addressed in

the biennial JSCP, intelligence planning requirements may be incorporated into

subsequent planning directives such as CJCS Warning Orders (WARNORD)

and Planning Orders (PLANORD) issued during CAP.

2. IP Overview

a. IP Guiding Principles

(1) IP efforts are focused in support of CCMD plans as prioritized in

reference h, with supplemental instructions published in reference k, or other

planning directives issued subsequent to reference h.

(2) Intelligence requirements developed during IP are directly linked to

the objectives of the supported plan, prioritized, and narrowly defined to

support the CCDR’s decisions.

(3) IP levels of effort and required products mirror the level of detail and

purpose of the plan they support.

(4) The IP process is focused on meeting the supported CCDR’s

requirements.

(5) IP optimizes the employment of Defense Intelligence resources to

support plan development and to support the continuous execution and

assessment of activities and joint operations.

b. IP Levels of Effort and Products Required. Figure 1 depicts how the

intelligence planning level of effort varies to mirror the level of detail and

purpose of the supported plan. Contingency plans are developed to identify

potential responses to anticipated crises. Campaign plans are developed to

prevent crisis maturation, achieve GEF-directed end states, and inform steady-

state resource allocation decisions. IAW the NISP development requirements

A-1

Enclosure A

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

(3) Defense Intelligence Enterprise supporting plans

(a) National Intelligence Support Plan.

(b) Functional Support Plans.

(4) Annual Joint Intelligence Posture Assessment

(a) Annual production supportability estimates.

(b) Annual collection supportability estimates.

b. Intelligence Estimates and Assessments

(1) Dynamic Threat Assessment. The DTA is a Defense Intelligence

strategic assessment developed by DIA’s Directorate for Analysis (DIA/DI) that

identifies the capabilities and intentions of adversaries for each JSCP-directed

top priority plan, except Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs). CCDRs and CCMD

planning staffs use the DTA to inform Mission Analysis during Strategic

Guidance. To support Plan Assessment, DIA analysts update DTAs periodically

or as changes to the strategic environment are identified. CCDRs will consider

the most likely and/or most dangerous enemy courses of action (COAs) from

the range of scenarios and associated confidence level reflected in the DTA.

The version of the DTA used will be cited in Annex B. CCDRs who deviate from

the DIA validated or produced baseline will brief departures during IPRs.

(2) Theater Intelligence Assessment. DIA/DI will produce a TIA for

each TCP. The TIA is a Defense Intelligence, theater-wide strategic assessment

scoped in accordance with the actors of concern as defined by reference p, with

particular emphasis on how these actors are affected by the strategic

environment. DIA/DI will coordinate with the Geographic CCMDs to

determine the specific content and production timeline to inform TCP revisions.

(3) Intelligence Estimate. In accordance with reference w, CCMD

analysts are responsible for performing Joint Intelligence Preparation of the

Operational Environment (JIPOE) to inform CCMD joint operation planning.

Results of the JIPOE process may be disseminated in a variety of tailored

products, culminating with the production of an intelligence estimate. An

intelligence estimate is the appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available

intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to

determining the COAs open to the enemy or adversary and the order of

probability of their adoption. It is generated as one of the functional staff

estimates used to inform the Commander’s Estimate.

c. Annex B. CCMD J-2s lead development of Annex B. Annex B is the

intelligence annex to a plan or order that includes the Intelligence Estimate,

A-3

Enclosure A

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

establishes intelligence priorities, assigns intelligence tasks, requests support

from higher echelons, describes the concept of intelligence operations, and

specifies intelligence procedures. The format and guidance for Annex B is

contained in reference n. Although use of the formats in reference n is

mandatory, additional appendices can be added to Annex B if circumstances

warrant. (Upon approval and publication, the formats contained in reference n

will be superseded by those in reference x).

d. CCMD Identified Intelligence Priorities. IP efforts are intended to satisfy

the intelligence requirements prioritized by the CCDR. For campaign plans,

the relative priority of steady-state intelligence requirements is determined

following the evaluation of the intelligence requirements across all

simultaneous planning efforts and ongoing operations. For contingency plans,

anticipated prioritized intelligence requirements are further refined into either

production requirements or collection requirements. To facilitate planning for

the employment of available Defense Intelligence resources, anticipated

production and collection requirements are compiled and further prioritized on

a PRMx or CRMx, respectively. Appendix 1 to Annex B will identify intelligence

priorities by phase. Figure 2 depicts a sample task execution hierarchy, links

to operational objectives and assessment Measures of Effectiveness (MOE), and

their association to the PRMx and CRMx.

(1) The PRMx (identified in reference b as the Intelligence Task List) is

an analytic planning worksheet that identifies focused all-source analysis and

production requirements to support all phases of the plan. It is organized into

a two-tier hierarchy of prioritized analytic tasks and subtasks required to

satisfy the CCDR’s intelligence requirements. Tasks are derived from Essential

Elements of Information (EEI) and linked to assessment MOE. On the other

hand, analytic subtasks are the constituent elements of the task, which, when

taken together, define the tasks’ scope and content. Subtasks are based on the

need to evaluate the various indicators associated with EEIs and assessment

MOE. Although the PRMx can be used to manage the Joint Intelligence

Operations Center (JIOC) internal analytic efforts for plans not requiring NISPs,

the primary purpose of the PRMx is to facilitate the development of a federated

production plan through the NISP process. Based on the responsibilities

outlined in reference w, the resulting production plan should reflect the

appropriate division of labor between the analytic resources assigned to CCMD

JIOC and the broader Defense Intelligence Enterprise. The PRMx detailing the

CCMD’s analytic capabilities identified in the J-2 Staff Estimate is the starting

point for developing a federated production plan.

(2) The CRMx is a collection planning worksheet that is used to compile

anticipated collection requirements and capabilities. The CRMx links

intelligence requirements, (to include Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)),

their associated information requirements (to include EEI), related indicators,

and Specific Information Requirements (SIR), to the collection capabilities that

A-4

Enclosure A

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

are best suited to satisfy the anticipated collection task. The CRMx is intended

to facilitate the development of integrated collection strategies against priority

collection targets and to optimize the employment of collection assets under

combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) and requested national-

level collection resources. The CRMx and CCMD collection capabilities

included on the J-2 Staff Estimate lay the initial foundation for integrated

collection plans. As the plan matures during follow-on Plan Assessment cycles,

supporting all-source production centers may contribute to the spiral

development and maintenance of the CRMx through the generation of

additional collection requirements.

Figure 2. Sample Task Hierarchy

(3) Concept of Collection Operations. The Concept of Collection

Operations described in this manual is based on and inclusive of the ISR

CONOP outlined in reference b. While the ISR CONOP is typically associated

with allocable airborne ISR capabilities, the Concept of Collection Operations is

intended to capture collection activities to be conducted in all domains and

across all collection disciplines. It documents the synchronization, integration,

and employment of all collection capabilities in support of current and future

operations. A component of the Concept of Collection Operations is the CRMx,

which provides the means to identify and address collection capability

shortfalls relative to the CCDR’s PIRs. It outlines command and control

A-5

Enclosure A

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

relationships and collection management authorities exercised at the CCMD,

DoD, and ODNI levels, and describes tasking and reporting channels. It is

used to justify requests for the allocation of additional collection capabilities

and the integration of national-level collection resources. Figure 3 compares

the purpose, periodicity, and content of Concepts of Collection Operations

developed for either campaign or contingency plans.

Figure 3. Concept of Collection Operations

e. NISP. The NISP is a Defense Intelligence Enterprise supporting plan to

a CCMD top priority contingency plan that details how the intelligence

capabilities of Combat Support Agencies, Services and other Defense

Intelligence organizations will be employed to meet the CCDR’s stated

intelligence requirements. NISPs may also contain information regarding

intelligence activities to be performed by organizations falling outside of the

Defense Intelligence Enterprise. Supported CCDRs use the NISP to integrate

theater and DoD national-level intelligence capabilities and coordinate

intelligence operations as described in Annex B to the supported plan. It

contains annexes, known as FSPs, from supporting Defense Intelligence

Enterprise agencies and organizations that detail their concept for functional

support. FSPs capture projected personnel augmentation requirements in

A-6

Enclosure A

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

response to CCMD capability requests and identify knowledge gaps, capability

shortfalls, and mitigation strategies. A NISP consists of four primary

components: the NISP Basic Plan, prioritized requirements for production and

collection support (i.e., PRM and CRM), capability assessments performed

against these requirements, and FSPs. Refer to Enclosure B for NISP

development procedures, Enclosure I for the NISP format, and Enclosure J for

the FSP format.

f. Annual Joint Intelligence Posture Assessment. The Annual JIPA is a

summarized estimate of the collection and production support CSAs and

Services can provide CCDRs throughout a given year. It is developed in

response to CCDRs’ Annual Statement of Intelligence Priorities (“CCDR’s Top

10”) submitted through the Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA) Survey.

Ideally, the “CCDR’s Top 10” should relate to the near-term (0-2 years) and

mid-term (3-8 years) threats and security concerns also reported in the CJA to

inform the development of the Joint Intelligence Estimate. The JIPA contains

annexes from CSAs and Services that describe their steady-state posture to

address CCDR priorities based on the National Intelligence Priorities

Framework (NIPF) in effect at the time. JS J-2 will compile the Annual JIPA

and use it to inform a variety of CJCS resourcing recommendations generated

within the JSPS. CCMDs may use the Annual JIPA to inform follow-on year

planning efforts, Concepts of Collection Operations, and future intelligence

resource requests. Refer to Enclosure C for IP support to Campaign plans.

4. Linkage to APEX. IP is the intelligence component of APEX and is

synchronized with joint operation planning. Joint operation planning consists

of three operational activities: Situational Awareness, Planning, and

Execution. The Planning activity is further subdivided into four planning

functions: Strategic Guidance, Concept Development, Plan Development and

Plan Assessment. Figure 3 provides an overview of joint operation planning

activities, functions, and associated products.

A-7

Enclosure A

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

Figure 4. Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and Products

a. Operational Activities

(1) Situational Awareness. Situational awareness consists of the

continuous monitoring of the global situation and identifying current or

anticipated threats to national security. It facilitates the analysis of events and

revisions to relevant intelligence assessments and estimates used to support

deliberate or crisis action planning.

(2) Planning. Planning translates strategic guidance and direction into

campaign plans, contingency plans, and orders. Joint operation planning may

be based on tasks specified in references h and p; the need for a military

response to an unforeseen event, emergency, or time sensitive crisis; or as

directed by the CCDR.

(3) Execution. Execution begins when the President decides to use a

military option to resolve a crisis. Only the President or Secretary of Defense

can authorize the Chairman to issue an execute order (EXORD). The EXORD

directs the supported commander to initiate military operations, defines the

time to initiate operations, and conveys guidance not provided earlier. During

execution, the assessment process allows the CCDR to measure progress

A-8

Enclosure A

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

towards the achievement of operational objectives and make decisions

regarding the allocation of resources or the conduct of operations to ensure the

mission remains focused on the end state.

b. Planning Functions. The four planning functions consist of Strategic

Guidance, Concept Development, Plan Development, and Plan Assessment.

During planning, commanders and staffs apply the Joint Operation Planning

Process (JOPP) as an orderly and tested methodology to analyze a mission;

develop, analyze, compare, and select COAs; and develop a plan or an order.

While joint operation planning includes four planning functions, the JOPP

follows seven planning steps. For the purposes of this manual, any mention of

JOPP Step 7, “Plan or Order Development,” will be limited to “Plan

Development.” For more information on the JOPP, refer to reference f.

(1) Strategic Guidance. This function is used to formulate politico-

military assessments at the strategic level; develop and evaluate military

strategy and objectives; apportion and allocate forces and other resources;

formulate concepts and strategic military options; and develop planning

guidance leading to the preparation of COAs. JS J-5 schedules milestones for

all JSCP-tasked plans. At the CCMD level, planning is initiated upon receipt of

strategic guidance. The CCDR in turn may publish a planning order containing

a planning timeline. Upon receipt of the mission, the CCMD J-5 may call for a

meeting of the Joint Planning Group or appropriate planning board, bureau,

cell, committee, or working group (B2C2WG) to alert the staff of the pending

planning effort. The staff prepares for mission analysis immediately upon

notification by gathering the tools required. These tools may include relevant

strategic guidance documents or planning directives, maps of the operational

area, and initial staff estimates. Following mission analysis, the Strategic

Guidance function ends with IPR-A (Strategic Guidance), which will focus on

amplifying guidance and validating assumptions. The CCDR will incorporate

the results of IPR-A into subsequent planning guidance.

(2) Concept Development. Upon receipt of the CCDR’s planning

guidance following IPR-A, the staff develops and analyzes a variety of friendly

options. The staff then compares them against the decision criteria established

by the CCDR and presents them for his approval. The CCDR develops a

Commander’s Estimate, which is a narrative statement with supporting

graphics that broadly outline how forces may be employed to accomplish the

mission. The Commander’s Estimate is the basis for IPR-C (Concept

Development), in which the CCDR reviews the enemy situation and presents

several COAs and options for SecDef approval and further development.

During IPR-C, interagency coordination, multinational involvement, and

capability requirements may also be discussed.

(3) Plan Development. During plan development, the CCMD completes

detailed planning and produces the base plan with required annexes. The

A-9

Enclosure A

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

CCMD staff and subordinate commanders conduct deployment, employment,

force, support, and other functional planning; perform comprehensive

feasibility analyses; and perform other actions pursuant to guidance and

direction received during IPRs. Finally, the CCDR submits the plan summary,

basic plan, and required annexes to the Chairman for review by the JPEC.

Following JPEC review, the CCDR will present the plan to the Chairman in a

JCS Tank before briefing the Secretary of Defense in IPR-F (Plan Development).

The intended result of IPR-F is SecDef understanding of plan ends, ways,

means, and risk resulting in approval of the basic plan and required annexes,

the resolution of any remaining key issues, and approval to proceed with plan

execution and assessment (if applicable) with any amplifying guidance or

direction.

(4) Plan Assessment. During Plan Assessment, the CCDR refines the

complete plan while supporting and subordinate commands, Services, and

supporting agencies complete their plans for review and approval. All

commanders continue to develop and analyze branches and sequels as

required. The CCDR and the Joint Staff continue to evaluate the situation for

any changes that would trigger decisions to refine, adapt, terminate, or execute

(RATE) the plan. If required, the CCDR will brief the Secretary of Defense

during IPR-R (Plan Assessment). This plan assessment IPR will address

modifications and updates to the plan based on assessments of the situation

and the plan’s ability to achieve military end states. A key result of this IPR is

dialog with the Secretary of Defense regarding the direction of future planning,

and a RATE recommendation. Plan refinement continues on a regular basis as

circumstances related to the contingency change. Planners frequently adjust

the plan based on evolving commander’s guidance, results of force planning,

support planning, deployment planning, shortfall identification, or revisions to

intelligence assessments and estimates highlighting changes to the operational

environment or to adversary capabilities and intentions. Plan refinement

continues even after execution begins with changes typically transmitted in the

form of fragmentary orders (FRAGOs).

5. The IP Process

a. IP Lines of Effort. Joint and national intelligence activities help identify

and monitor threats to national security, which inform the development of

policy and the Department’s overall planning efforts. Through joint operation

planning, intelligence priorities are further refined to focus the employment of

limited Defense Intelligence resources. Thus, as the intelligence component of

APEX, IP activities are generally organized along two mutually supporting lines

of effort (LOE): providing intelligence support to joint operation planning; and

planning intelligence operations, as illustrated in Figure 5.

A-10

Enclosure A

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

Figure 5. IP Lines of Effort

(1) IP LOE # 1: Providing Intelligence Support to Joint Operation

Planning. IP activities along this LOE include the production of intelligence

assessments and estimates of adversary intentions, capabilities, and COAs.

Specific outputs of this LOE are the DIA-produced DTA or TIA and the

development of tailored products from the CCMD’s JIPOE process, which

culminate in the production and maintenance of the CCMD’s Intelligence

Estimate. These finished intelligence products are disseminated to inform joint

operation planning and the development of the Commander’s Estimate,

through which CCDRs provide the Secretary of Defense with military options to

meet strategic objectives. Activities along this LOE are continuous and

typically conducted in parallel to, and in support of, the appropriate CCMD

joint operation planning and assessment B2C2WG.

(2) IP LOE # 2: Planning Intelligence Operations. IP activities along this

LOE include identifying information gaps, prioritizing intelligence

requirements, developing federated production and collection strategies as

required, and identifying intelligence capability shortfalls and mitigation

strategies. Specific outputs of this LOE are: the CCMD J-2 Staff Estimate,

which identifies all available intelligence capabilities under COCOM and their

A-11

Enclosure A

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

anticipated shortfalls; CSA and Service Intelligence Center estimates as

requested or appropriate for federated support; the Annex B to a campaign or a

contingency plan; and, when appropriate, a NISP. Additional outputs of this

LOE may include intelligence resource demand signals articulated through the

CCDR’s Integrated Priority List (IPL), Concepts of Collection Operations, Force

Readiness Reporting, or RFF messages. Activities along this LOE are

continuous and typically conducted internal to the command as facilitated by

an IPT led by CCMD intelligence planners who participate directly in joint

operation planning and assessment B2C2WG. To effectively integrate national-

level intelligence support, activities along this LOE are performed ICW CSA and

Service component LNOs, DNI representatives, or the IPSG.

b. IP Activities During Strategic Guidance

(1) IP activities along IP LOE # 1: Intelligence Support to Joint

Operation Planning

(a) DIA will validate, update, or produce a DTA or a TIA.

(b) At the theater level and below, intelligence planners orchestrate

the command’s JIPOE effort to provide a baseline assessment of the operational

environment, adversary capabilities, centers of gravity, vulnerabilities, and

estimated adversary COAs. The analytical cell of the CCMD JIOC evaluates

relevant databases and intelligence holdings to identify gaps relevant to the

planning effort under consideration. This includes the status of targeting

information. The J-2 may form a JIPOE Coordination Cell to draw relevant

information from other staff elements, IC representatives, and partner nations,

as appropriate, as well as request tailored products from the Defense

Intelligence Enterprise. The JIPOE process culminates with the production of

an intelligence estimate which is incorporated into the plan as an appendix to

Annex B. For more information on JIPOE, refer to reference d.

CCMD’s JIPOE process as well as other externally generated intelligence

products in order to offer alternative assessments.

(d) As core members of the command’s planning and assessment

B2C2WG, theater-level and below intelligence planners contribute to the overall

plan design and nominate operational objectives, desired effects, and other

mission success criteria. In nominating mission success criteria, intelligence

planners also advocate for the adoption of measurable and achievable

objectives while considering how intelligence capabilities might be employed to

assess them.

A-12

Enclosure A

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

(2) IP activities along IP LOE # 2: Planning Intelligence Operations

(a) CCMD intelligence planners assemble an IPT or similar

community of interest with all source analysts, target intelligence analysts, and

collection managers as its core members (Figure 6). Intelligence systems

architects, single source analysts, and representatives from CSAs, Service

components, and the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) may also collaborate

with the IPT.

(b) The IPT develops an IP timeline that is synchronized with the

command’s planning timeline. This ensures tailored JIPOE products, the

initial Intelligence Estimate, and the initial J-2 Staff Estimate are developed to

meet the B2C2WG initial planning requirements.

from Service component or subordinate Joint Force Commanders, identifies

and analyzes intelligence capabilities under COCOM authority available to

support the execution of the plan. For contingency plans, this may include

assigned and apportioned forces. For ongoing operations and steady-state

campaign plans this may include assigned and allocated forces. CSA LNOs

may also contribute to the CCMD’s J-2 Staff Estimate by providing their initial

supportability estimates for consideration early in the planning process.

Conducting this analysis for ongoing operations, steady-state campaigns, and

CAP may inform requests for additional forces.

(d) The IPT evaluates current theater collection and production

posture to identify available assets that may need to be redirected to support

the planning effort or the execution of the plan under consideration. In

collaboration with the CCMD’s collection strategists, J-2X, the JRC, and

representatives from USSTRATCOM’s Joint Functional Component Command

for Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR), the IPT conducts

a preliminary assessment of available collection assets and capabilities. In

collaboration with the CCMD production manager, and representatives from

the JIOC’s analytical cell, the IPT performs an initial assessment of available

analytic capabilities.

A-13

Enclosure A

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

Figure 6. Notional IPT and Related Functions

(e) Based on the list of available intelligence capabilities, the IPT

drafts the initial J-2 Staff Estimate, which is submitted to the appropriate

B2C2WG to support the command’s overall force structure analysis. In

addition to listing available intelligence capabilities, the initial J-2’s Staff

Estimate identifies factors that may affect the employment of these capabilities.

Factors such as logistical supportability, basing rights, communications and

intelligence systems architecture, linguist availability, and legal restrictions

should be considered. Certain employment limitations can be mitigated during

COA Development ICW the appropriate B2C2WG. Other limitations however,

may require mitigation through friendly actions outside the control of the

command. In these instances, intelligence planners, in collaboration with the

appropriate B2C2WG, may nominate appropriate planning assumptions. To

validate these planning assumptions prior to COA Approval, they may

nominate initial Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR) to the J-5 for

presentation to the commander during planning prior to execution. If left

unanswered prior to completion of Plan Development, initial FFIR should be

submitted to the appropriate B2C2WG to the J-3 for presentation to the

commander as part of the final CCIR to be monitored during Plan Assessment

to inform RATE decisions.

A-14

Enclosure A

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

(f) Considering the identified intelligence gaps relevant to the

planning effort and recognizing the uncertainties in analytical conclusions,

intelligence planners, in collaboration with the appropriate B2C2WG, may

nominate additional planning assumptions and initial PIR for validation during

the current planning cycle. Upon consolidation by the J-2 and approval by the

CCDR, initial PIRs are then passed to the IPT for action and coordination with

appropriate mission managers. If left unanswered prior to the completion of

Plan Development, initial PIR should be considered by the J-2 for update and

presentation to the commander as a part of the final CCIR to be monitored

during Plan Assessment to inform RATE decisions.

c. IP Activities During Concept Development

(1) IP activities along IP LOE # 1: Intelligence Support to Joint

Operation Planning

(a) CCMD intelligence planners evaluate JIPOE products to be

disseminated to the appropriate CCMD B2C2WG. The CCMD intelligence

planner or the analyst will present these products orally or submit them to the

appropriate B2C2WG lead in written form in accordance with the established

planning timeline.

(b) CCMD intelligence planners coordinate personnel to participate

in COA Analysis and Wargaming. The CCMD J-2 may employ multiple

representatives to support the appropriate B2C2WG during the wargame.

These may include:

1. Intelligence planner to develop and analyze the overall

intelligence support strategy.

2. Red Cell personnel to emulate the opposition force role of an

uncooperative adversary and Red Team personnel challenge planning

assumptions and provide alternative assessments.

3. Intelligence analyst to capture potential detectable signatures

from which to nominate indicators of progress or regression used in the

command’s assessment process.

4. Collection strategists to initiate the development of a

supporting collection plan.

5. Target intelligence analyst to help develop and analyze the

overall intelligence support strategy, capture potential target intelligence

requirements, initiate target development processes, and assist in PIR, EEI,

and SIR development and evaluating intelligence supportability.

A-15

Enclosure A

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

participate in COA Comparison by determining intelligence governing factors

and highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of each friendly option from

an intelligence supportability perspective.

(2) IP activities along IP LOE # 2: Planning Intelligence Operations

(a) During COA development, theater-level and below intelligence

planners coordinate with appropriate mission managers (to include collection

and production managers) to consider how theater-level and below intelligence

assets and national-level intelligence resources could be employed to support

execution of the plan.

(b) Based on potential adversary reactions (effects) evaluated during

COA Analysis and Wargaming, the CCMD intelligence planner and the

collection manager determine how the various collection disciplines could be

employed to monitor relevant indicators.

capturing additional factors unique to each of the proposed friendly COAs,

which may limit the employment of intelligence capabilities. Once identified,

the CCMD intelligence planner ensures these factors are considered during

COA Comparison.

(d) The CCMD intelligence planner consolidates final PIR

nominations from across the staff and drafts PIRs as required to support CCDR

decisions. During COA Approval, the CCMD intelligence planner recommends

PIR through the J-2 for CCDR approval.

(e) Following COA Approval, the intelligence planner, in

collaboration with the IPT, develops EEIs and associated indicators required to

satisfy the PIR. To maximize support to the commander’s operational

objectives, the IPT integrates and reconciles these requirements with MOEs

and associated indicators developed by the appropriate B2C2WG.

(f) If required, the IPT will use PIRs, EEIs, their associated

indicators, and anticipated SIRs to then generate a PRMx and a CRMx.

(g) The J-2 Staff Estimate process culminates with the CCMD’s

collection and production capability assessments performed against anticipated

requirements entered on the CRMx and PRMx, respectively, as appropriate.

(h) Based on the CCMD J-2 Staff Estimate and in accordance with

reference k, the CCMD J-2 will determine whether a NISP is required and will

request IP support from the JS J-2 to initiate NISP development. The JS J-2 is

responsible for publishing a message announcing the NISP effort and

A-16

Enclosure A

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

requesting points of contact from the relevant communities of interest.

Collaboration between the CCMD, JS J-2, CSAs, and Service intelligence

centers is encouraged and can occur at any time during the planning process.

However, the NISP process begins in earnest after the CCMD’s initial draft PRM

and Concept of Collection Operations (with CRMx) are reviewed by the IPSG

and refined as required.

d. IP activities during Plan Development

(1) IP activities along IP LOE # 1: Intelligence Support to Joint

Operation Planning

(a) CCMD intelligence planners coordinate with analysts (including

the Red Team) to complete the Intelligence Estimate. Selected portions of the

Intelligence Estimate are used to complete the Enemy Situation paragraphs

throughout the plan. Reference x contains the revised Annex B format to

include a complete Intelligence Estimate format.

(b) The CCMD J-2 may also provide analytical support and input to

other portions of the plan, to include Annex H, Meteorological and

Oceanographic Operations (METOC), and other annexes as required.

(2) IP activities along IP LOE # 2: Planning Intelligence Operations

(a) The IPT’s lead intelligence planner develops the basic Annex B

that outlines the intelligence mission, concept of intelligence operations, PIRs,

and guidance for how collection, processing & exploitation, analysis &

production, dissemination & integration, and evaluation & feedback will be

performed during execution. The Annex B also details the communications

and intelligence systems architecture and specifies tasks to subordinate

intelligence organizations and requirements for external support.

(b) The appropriate B2C2WG evaluates whether targeting is

necessary to accomplish the operation. If so, the IPT facilitates the

development of Appendix 4 (Targeting) to Annex B.

managers to develop required functional appendices to Annex B (e.g., J-2X for

Appendix 3, Counterintelligence).

(d) To ensure the collection plan is fully integrated and

synchronized with the contemplated operation, the IPT lead intelligence

planner and collection managers contribute to other portions of the plan, such

as Appendix 8 (Reconnaissance) to Annex C (Operations), Annex S (Special

Technical Operations), and other annexes as required.

A-17

Enclosure A

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

(e) If the plan will be supported by a NISP, the lead intelligence

planners from JS J-2 and the CCMD J-2 will co-chair the IPSG and lead the

NISP development, production, completion, staffing, and approval process. For

more information on NISP development, see Enclosure B.

e. IP activities during Plan Assessment

(1) IP activities along IP LOE # 1: Intelligence Support to Joint

Operation Planning

(a) The assessment process is continuous and linked to the CCIR

process by the commander’s need for timely information and recommendations

to make decisions. Intelligence support to plan assessment applies during

steady-state as well as to the execution of military operations. By assessing

the impacts of shaping activities the J-2 supports decisions to refine or adapt

the steady-state campaign plan or to refine, adapt, or terminate “living”

contingency plans. During execution, the J-2 continues to provide support to

assessments that informs FRAGO development reflecting decisions to refine,

adapt, or terminate ongoing military operations.

(b) Normally, the J-3 and the J-5, assisted by the J-2, are

responsible for coordinating assessment activities. Intelligence assessments of

the current situation provide the means for intelligence analysts (including Red

Teams) to draw conclusions of a potential future situation and estimate the

next series of adversary COAs. In so doing, CCMD intelligence planners

coordinate with analysts to revise and maintain a running Intelligence Estimate

to facilitate continuous planning across multiple horizons. These planning

horizons are tailored by the command to best suit the conduct of operations.

For the purpose of assessing steady-state campaign plans, the planning

horizons specified in the CJA are: near-term (0-2 years), mid-term (3-8 years),

and long-term (9-20 years). See Figure 7.

A-18

Enclosure A

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

Figure 7. JIPOE Support to Plan Assessment

participate in assessment B2C2WG and coordinate with intelligence analysts to

apply MOEs aimed at determining changes to the operational environment,

system behavior, or adversary capabilities. Following the battle rhythm

established by the Chief of Staff, the J-2 assists the J-3 and J-5 in coordinating

assessment activities. Through these measures, the J-2 supports the

commander in timely decision making by determining if shaping activities

and/or military operations are producing desired or undesired effects, when

objectives have been achieved and when unforeseen opportunities can be

exploited or require a change in planned operations to respond to unforeseen

adversary actions.

(d) MOE assessment is implicit in steps 1, 2, and 3 of the JIPOE

process. By continuously performing JIPOE, intelligence analysts have the

ability to compare the baseline Intelligence Estimate used to inform the plan

with the current situation. MOE assessment is informed through the detection

of observable or collectable indicators which provide evidence that certain

conditions exist. Several indicators may make up an MOE, just like several

MOEs may assist in measuring progress toward achievement of an objective.

Indicators may be either favorable or unfavorable. While favorable indicators

A-19

Enclosure A

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

reflect progress towards the achievement of an objective, unfavorable indicators

reflect regression and could provide warning of a potential crisis and the need

to execute a branch plan. For more information on the relationships between

the CCIR process and the assessment process and continuous planning during

execution, refer to reference f.

(e) National-level intelligence support to Plan Assessment prior to the

execution of military operations is primarily provided through the maintenance

and periodic publication of DTAs and TIAs. These products provide a national-

level perspective of the threat and inform RATE decisions for top priority

contingency plans and refinements to selected campaign plans. Additional

Defense Intelligence and National-level intelligence support to Plan Assessment

prior to execution is provided in response to CCMD collection and production

requests and by monitoring I&W and the reporting of critical intelligence.

(f) National-level intelligence support to plan assessment will also

inform the Joint Staff JCCA processes by determining the near-term likelihood

of plan execution. For more information on JCCA, refer to reference v.

(g) Plans for national-level collection and production support to Plan

Assessment during execution are based on the supported CCMD’s anticipated

requirements reflected in the CRM and PRM respectively. During execution,

preplanned collection and production requirements will likely change in

response to dynamic changes to the CCDR’s PIR. In these cases, time

sensitive, ad hoc Requests for Information (RFIs) are submitted in lieu of pre-

planned requirements.

(2) IP activities along IP LOE # 2: Planning Intelligence Operations

(a) When applicable, NISP development lags slightly behind the

development of the supported plan and can be finalized during Plan

Assessment if not completed prior to IPR -F.

(b) Upon completion of the NISP, the CCMD J-2 validates selected

preplanned collection and production requirements and enters them into the

appropriate requirements tasking system such as the Community Online

Intelligence System for End Users and Managers (COLISEUM) and the National

SIGINT Requirements Process (NSRP). Future IP Tool spiral development will

facilitate the dynamic modification and validation of preplanned requirements

for automated submission through appropriate tasking systems. Results of

these tasks are used to update a variety of intelligence products used to inform

RATE. For additional information on steady-state intelligence operations, refer

to Chapter III, reference b.

Red Team) as required to ensure their continuous JIPOE efforts are not only

A-20

Enclosure A

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

assessing the current situation, but also producing estimates with threat

projections that are synchronized with the planning horizon they are intended

to support. See Figure 7.

(d) The CCMD JIOC will monitor the execution of Defense Intelligence

tasks assigned to supporting organizations and will coordinate with JS J-2 to

ensure satisfaction of requirements specified in the FSPs. CCMD intelligence

planners will maintain a running J-2 Staff Estimate and, if required, update

their capability assessments against new collection and production

requirements.

(e) If a NISP has been produced, the IPSG will coordinate periodic

assessment conferences and events as required. These venues provide the

opportunity for:

(1) Defense Intelligence analysts to provide updated intelligence

assessments with an eye towards gauging the impact of shaping activities.

(2) CCMDs to submit evaluation and feedback data to supporting

organizations and to review and prioritize future collection and production

requirements.

(3) CSAs and Service intelligence centers to provide updated

production and collection assessment matrices as required in response to new

requirements. Significant changes to requirements or supporting capabilities

may be cause to revise the NISP.

(f) The CCMD’s running J-2 Staff Estimate and National-level collection

and production capability assessments will also support JCCA processes and

should be used to inform CCMD risk, readiness posture, IPLs, and other

processes and products within the JSPS used to inform the acquisition and

development of joint capabilities. For additional information on the JSPS, refer

to reference g.

6. Crisis Action Planning. In general, IP activities during CAP will be tailored

to support the orders process based on whether a crisis situation is related to a

contingency plan supported by a NISP, a contingency plan not supported by a

NISP, or if military operations will be conducted in response to unforeseen

situations. For more information on IP support to CAP, refer to Enclosure D.

7. IP Governance

a. IP Governance Board. Referred to in reference k as an “O-6 NISP

Production Board,” IP governance will be achieved by a board of O-6/Planners

co-chaired by the JS J-2 and OUSD(I) and composed of representatives from

CCMDs, intelligence CSAs, and Service intelligence centers. The board will

A-21

Enclosure A

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

convene quarterly to evaluate ongoing planning efforts, disseminate best

practices, discuss IP and APEX implementation, schedule new NISP efforts,

and synchronize NISP production and assessment with the IPR, JCCA plan

assessment process, and Joint and National exercise schedules for the

following 6 months. If required, it will address issues and adjust timelines and

Plans of Action & Milestones (POA&Ms). The IP Governance Board is

supported by the action officer level IP Synchronization Team, chaired by the

JS J-2, convened every other week and composed of representatives from

CCMDs, intelligence CSAs, and Service intelligence centers.

b. Intelligence Planning Steering Group. An AO-level IPSG will be formed

for each NISP effort. The IPSG consists of the lead intelligence planners from

the CCMD J-2, JS J-2, and OUSD(I). It is co-chaired by the CCMD and the JS

J-2 representatives. This group works together to guide the NISP production

process. The IPSG produces the POA&M for the NISP effort, coordinates

timelines, sets suspenses and conference dates, and monitors preparations for,

and progress between, conferences. The IPSG also establishes agendas;

conducts conferences, IPRs, and Secure Video Teleconferences (SVTCs); and

resolves issues as they arise. The IPSG oversees the review of NISPs and

makes recommendations for the adjudication of resulting comments. Internal

coordination, collaboration, and free exchange of information within the IPSG

are vital to the successful development of the NISP.

A-22

Enclosure A

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

ENCLOSURE B

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

1. Purpose. This enclosure details the steps required to develop, staff, and

approve NISPs. It is based on best practices and is intended to serve as a guide

with options that allow the process to be tailored to meet specific CCMD

requirements and circumstances.

2. NISP Components. A NISP consists of a base plan (BPLAN) and a series of

annexes. The exact number and type of annexes will vary depending on the

nature of the supported plan and its requirements for intelligence support.

a. NISP BPLAN. The BPLAN plan provides overall guidance to integrate

and synchronize Defense Intelligence Enterprise support to the supported

CCMD’s plan. It supports the Annex B concept of intelligence operations,

assigns tasks and responsibilities, requests interagency support as required,

and identifies critical information gaps and capability shortfalls. The NISP

BPLAN also describes how the JS J-2 will manage Defense Intelligence tasks to

support the execution of operations. It can also convey information regarding

intelligence activities in support of the planned operation to be conducted by

organizations falling outside of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

b. NISP Annexes. See Enclosure I for a listing of common NISP annexes

and Enclosure J for FSP formats.

(1) Prioritized Requirements for Intelligence Support. See the

discussion of the PRMx and CRMx in Enclosure A. The PRMx and the CRMx

are included in Annex A to the NISP and can be included as Appendix 1 to

Annex B as determined by the CCMD J-2.

(2) Capabilities Assessments. Capability assessments represent the

culmination of the staff estimate process for a given planning cycle. They are

conducted by the CCMD JIOC and Defense Intelligence Enterprise, to include

the CSAs, Service intelligence centers, and the Defense CI and HUMINT

enterprises, to determine capability and capacity to satisfy production and

collection requirements entered into the PRMx and CRMx, respectively.

Capability assessments are displayed with, and incorporated into, the

supported PRMx or CRMx in Annex A of the NISP.

(3) Functional Support Plans. An FSP is an intelligence agency/

organization/enterprise’s annex to a NISP that describes the intelligence

capabilities and concept for their employment in support of the CCMD plan.

B-1

Enclosure B

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

The FSP also identifies critical information gaps, intelligence capability

shortfalls, and mitigation strategies, in support of the CCMD mission.

3. NISP Initiation

a. Based on the CCMD J-2 Staff Estimate, and in accordance with

reference k guidance, the CCMD J-2 determines whether a NISP is required

and requests IP support from the JS J-2. In turn, the JS J-2 will coordinate

with the other members of the IPSG to determine which supporting agencies

will be required for the effort and then publishes a message initiating the NISP

effort.

b. Upon receipt of the JS J-2’s NISP initiation message, participating

organizations will review initial CSA/Service estimates provided to the CCMD

during Mission Analysis. These estimates will reflect their current posture and

capabilities relevant to steady state support of the CCMD plan. This includes a

review of current collection and production tasks to support the plan. These

estimates should also consider assumptions and factors affecting the

employment of Defense/National-level intelligence resources during execution

phases. In the case of an update to a plan with an existing NISP, the NISP and

its FSPs will serve as a point of departure.

4. Requirements Development

a. PRMx Development. Analysis and production (A&P) tasks to support the

CCMD’s plan are compiled in the PRMx. At this stage, the CCMD will divide

the initial PRMx into requirements that will be performed solely by the CCMD

and its components, and those that it will coordinate with the IPSG for

validation, refinement if required, and subsequent federated production

planning.

b. CRMx Development. Anticipated collection requirements, expressed as

SIRs, will be compiled into a CRMx and submitted to the IPSG for validation,

refinement if required, and subsequent integrated collection planning efforts.

The CRMx will be refined in subsequent planning cycles as supporting analytic

centers identify additional collection needs. Collection planning should be

focused on the indicators of anticipated activity along with associated SIR. To

the maximum extent possible, anticipated SIRs should be refined to a level that

that would allow them to be assigned to the appropriate collection discipline.

To that end, SIRs should yield collection target characteristics in terms of

observables or collectables.

c. Concept of Collection Operations. In addition to the CRMx, the CCMD

J-2 will generate and submit to the JS J-2 a Concept of Collection Operations

as described in Enclosure A.

B-2

Enclosure B

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

5. NISP Planning Conferences

a. The IPSG will determine the number and type of NISP planning

conferences and SVTCs required for each planning effort and include them in

the POA&M. There is no fixed number of conferences required for NISP

development; the number will vary depending on the nature of the plan, the

location of the CCMD, time available, and other factors. The IPSG will

determine the duration, timing, location, participants, agenda, and desired

outcomes for each conference. It should be stressed that the majority of the

NISP development effort occurs offline and that NISP Planning conferences

(whether conducted in person or virtually) are not intended to serve as the

primary planning venues. NISP planning conferences should be scheduled on

the POA&M as a forum to present the results of planning activities conducted

in between conferences or to discuss issues that if not resolved would affect the

NISP development POA&M. Once details are finalized, the JS J-2 will publish a

message announcing the conference.

b. NISP Conference Participation. Representation from the following

organizations should be considered when planning a NISP conference.

(1) CCMD J-2, J-5, JIOC, and other staff elements. Joint Task Force J-

2 and/or Service component commands as appropriate.

(2) Joint Staff J-2 and OUSD(I).

(3) Intelligence Combat Support Agencies (CSA): DIA, National

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and National Security Agency (NSA).

(4) Service Intelligence Centers: National Ground Intelligence Center

(NGIC), Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

(MCIA), and National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC).

(5) Other organizations, as appropriate: Supporting commands,

subordinate and sub-unified commands, and other supporting DoD elements

and non-DoD agencies. Partner nations can be included if the classification of

the plan and the material to be discussed permits.

c. Briefings and discussions during plenary sessions of the conferences

provide a baseline of knowledge and understanding of the issues. The

conferences also provide subject matter experts, with an opportunity to develop

or expand communities of interest. Participation by CCMD JIOC and Defense

Intelligence Enterprise analysts is critical during PRMx development and

capability/capacity assessments. Collaboration between CCMD and JS J-2

intelligence planners, CCMD and Defense collection managers, and

representatives from single discipline agency/organization is critical for the

refinement of collection requirements and the development of an integrated

B-3

Enclosure B

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

collection plan. An executive outbrief to the CCMD J-2 or other seniors is often

conducted at the end of a conference.

d. Working Groups. In addition to plenary sessions at conferences,

working groups (WGs) may be established for particular issues such as the

development of an appropriate communications and intelligence systems

architecture, the refinement of the PRMx or the development of collection

requirements and associated strategies. These WGs can meet during or

between conferences or virtually (e.g. SVTC, Tandberg, or by e-mail) to form

electronic communities of interest.

e. After conferences or WG meetings, the JS J-2, in coordination with the

other members of IPSG, will issue a message summarizing the results,

capturing any tasking and providing an updated POA&M, if required.

6. NISP Development

a. NISP Development. Development of the NISP is based on the supported

CCMD’s intelligence requirements (to include CCDR-identified PIRs), their

associated information requirements (to include EEIs), concept of intelligence

operations, and the CCMD J-2 Staff Estimate of available capabilities to satisfy

the anticipated requirements entered on a draft PRM and CRM. The IPSG

establishes the POA&M for NISP production and deliverables. Coordination

may occur online, via SVTC, or via conference. Formal coordination occurs via

electronic message.

b. Initial Coordination. The IPSG will conduct initial coordination with

supporting agencies either through an initial NISP development conference or

via SVTC. The intent is to socialize the CCMD plan and its Annex B

requirements among Defense Intelligence Enterprise participants and begin

NISP development. The IPSG will establish the agenda as well as ensuring

conference outcomes/deliverables are developed and methodologies for

achieving the outcomes are defined. The JS J-2 publishes a message

announcing the initial conference to addressees expected to participate in NISP

development. Following the conference and the distribution of refinements to

the PRM and Concept of Collection Operations (w/CRM), JS J-2 will task

participating organizations and set suspenses in accordance with the agreed

POA&M via the JSAP process. The conference will include, but is not limited

to, the following information briefings:

(1) DIA/DI briefs the highlights of the applicable DTA.

(2) CCMD provides an overview of their Intelligence Estimate and the

status of their JIPOE effort to date.

B-4

Enclosure B

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

(3) CCMD J-2 outlines their concept of intelligence operations,

capability assessments, and identified capability shortfalls resulting in requests

for support from the broader Defense Intelligence Enterprise and operational

risk determinations if capabilities gaps are not mitigated.

(4) The JS J-2 briefs the POA&M for NISP production which identifies

key milestones and deliverables.

7. NISP Production

a. PRMx and CRMx Refinement. During NISP production, the CCMD will

consider recommendations from Defense Intelligence Enterprise participants to

continue to refine their anticipated production and collection requirements.

b. Assignment of Analytic Responsibilities. The CCMD passes the draft

PRMx to the JS J-2 for coordination with the IPSG. The IPSG identifies

analysis and production responsibilities in accordance with the Defense

Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP) and tentatively identifies collaborating

DoD and non-DoD agencies. DIA/DI will confirm these assignments and

adjudicate DIAP disputes. Based on best practices, the nomination of

Responsible Analytic Centers (RAC) and Collaborative Analytic Centers (CAC)

before a planning conference can accelerate and simplify the PRM process.

However, the CCMD and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise must have an

opportunity to review these recommendations and provide additional input.

A&P capability assessments are performed prior to the final assignment of

analytic responsibilities. A NISP Production Conference may be held to finalize

the PRM. Where DoD capability is minimal or lacking, the JS J-2 may identify

a non-DoD agency as a potential source; however, their participation is

voluntary. Participants can also propose adjustments to the PRMx. After these

issues are resolved, the IPSG will review and consolidate the various inputs

and post an updated PRMx.

c. Assignment of Collection Responsibilities. The lead CCMD intelligence

planner coordinates the draft Concept of Collection Operations (to include the

CRMx) with the IPSG. The IPSG, in coordination with CCMD and Defense-level

collection managers, ISR planners, and representatives from single discipline

intelligence entities, tentatively identify the collection capabilities that could be

employed to satisfy anticipated collection requirements by phase. Collection

capability assessments are performed prior to the assignment of primary and

alternate collection responsibilities. In some cases, tipping and cueing

responsibilities may also be considered to enable collection against designated

collection targets. Where DoD collection capabilities are minimal or lacking, a

non-DoD agency may be identified as a potential source; however, their

participation is strictly voluntary. An NISP Production Conference may be held

to finalize the CRMx.

B-5

Enclosure B

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

d. The preferred means of PRMx and CRMx dissemination is the

automated IP Tool, which should be used as early as possible in the NISP

development process. The IP Tool facilitates collaboration and the recording of

capability assessments to be included in the NISP. Once the data is entered

into the IP Tool it is easily displayed and manipulated in various views and

formats. The IP Tool accommodates several prioritization schemes, including

priority banding and ordinal prioritization at the production task or subtask

level. Future spirals of the IP Tool will facilitate the prioritization of anticipated

collection requirements. Prioritization of collection and production

requirements entered into the IP Tool is essential to focus the collection and

production effort and to prevent the employment of available capabilities on

topics of limited or peripheral interest to the CCDR.

e. Capability Assessments

(1) General. Capability assessments are integral elements of the J-2

and CSA/Service staff estimate processes. As the planning process unfolds

and staff estimates are revised, so too are the capability assessments. The J-2

Staff Estimate process culminates for a given planning cycle with the CCMD’s

collection and production capability assessments performed against their

anticipated requirements. Likewise, the CSA and Service intelligence center

estimate process culminates following the completion of their respective

capability assessments. Once the CCMD enters their requirements into the IP

Tool, participating organizations can initiate their capability assessments. The

IPSG will determine the scope of these assessments based on the nature and

level of detail of the supported plan. To the extent possible, requirements for

contingency plans should be assessed for all phases of the operation. For

contingency plans developed without a phasing model, capabilities will be

assessed against requirements leading up to the established termination

criteria. Assessing capabilities required to support execution phases will

require tailoring the requirements to the appropriate phase. Additionally,

intelligence planners and analysts should agree on a series of assumptions to

forecast the situation at a particular phase of the operation and the availability

of relevant forces and associated intelligence capabilities at those phases. COA

Analysis and Wargaming results may provide the basis for making

assumptions related to the execution phases. Detailed capability assessment

procedures are described in Enclosure F.

(2) Collection and Exploitation (C&E) Capability Assessments. Effective

C&E capability assessments rely on the level of specificity of the anticipated

collection tasks to be satisfied. For this reason, anticipated SIRs should

include anticipated focus areas (typically expressed as Named Areas of Interest

or Target Areas of Interest) and should yield target characteristics (i.e.,

observables or collectables). The CCMD intelligence planner, in collaboration

with relevant members of the IPT, conducts initial C&E capability assessments

within the context of the J-2 Staff Estimate process. The CCMD’s initial C&E

B-6

Enclosure B

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

capability assessments are refined as the Collection/ISR Working Group

develops an integrated collection and, if required, a federated exploitation plan

with an associated communications and intelligence systems architecture. The

CCMD can help focus C&E capability assessments by developing Concept of

Collection Operations including graphics depicting collection focus areas for

the various phases of the operation.

(3) A&P Assessments. Organizations with A&P responsibilities can

begin their capability assessments to support the PRMx in parallel with C&E

capability assessments. However, these assessments should be informed by

the C&E assessments which can be viewed as they are entered into the IP Tool.

The A&P and C&E capability assessments will be reviewed and reconciled by

the relevant RACs in coordination with the IPSG before NISP staffing.

f. Functional Support Plans. During NISP production, supporting

agencies/organizations draft their FSPs to describe their concept of intelligence

operations to meet CCMD intelligence requirements. Based on their

assessments of individual requirements, the agencies will identify significant

knowledge gaps and capability shortfalls. Where possible, the FSPs will also

identify mitigation strategies to address these gaps and shortfalls. Unmitigated

gaps and shortfalls will translate into risk to the supported plan. FSPs also

cover operational support issues such as augmentation, communications and

intelligence systems architecture, federated support arrangements, and

deployment of elements into the CCMD area of responsibility (AOR). The FSPs

should also address any major support requirements specifically identified in

the CCMD’s Annex B and its discipline-specific Appendices. Non-DoD

intelligence agencies or activities that participate in the capability assessment

process are not required to produce a FSP.

g. NISP Production Conference (NPC). If the CCMD in coordination with

the IPSG decides to hold a NISP Production Conference, the IPSG determines

the methodology for a conference or VTC announcement. The purpose of the

conference is to finalize the PRMx and CRMx, resolve remaining issues, and

synchronize the CCMD’s concept of intelligence operations and Defense

Intelligence Enterprise concepts of intelligence support. At a minimum, the

following briefings should be considered in the agenda:

(1) CCMD J-2 briefs changes or updates to the BPLAN or Annex B, and

discusses information gaps, capability shortfalls, mitigation strategies, and

operational risk determinations if critical capability shortfalls are not mitigated.

(2) CCMD J-2 and JS J-2 review the PRMx and CRMx and resolve any

remaining issues concerning the assignment of analytic or collection

responsibilities.

(3) Supporting agencies brief their concept of intelligence support.

B-7

Enclosure B

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

8. NISP Completion

a. Finalize PRMx, CRMx, and Capability Assessments. The IPSG ensures

that the final requirements and capability assessment have been entered into

the IP Tool.

b. Complete the FSPs and NISP Base Plan (BPLAN). The IP participants

complete their FSPs. The JS J-2 completes the NISP BPLAN with emphasis on

identifying significant gaps and shortfalls as well as mitigation strategies and

risks. The CCMD J-2 then reviews the draft NISP basic plan, PRMx, CRMx,

and FSPs to ensure they are synchronized with Annex B and support the

CCDR’s decision requirements and the assessment of progress towards the

accomplishment of objectives. The JS J-2 will work with the supported CCMD

to determine the best avenue to engage other non-DoD organizations that may

be able to assist filling the remaining gaps and determine the risk associated if

no mitigation strategy exists. DIA Directorate for Information Management

(DS) draws on the CCMD J-2-developed Communications and Intelligence

Systems Architecture and, in coordination with supporting agencies, finalizes

the Communications and Intelligence Systems Architecture FSP.

c. NISP Completion Conference/SVTC(s). If conducted, a final NISP

Conference or SVTC(s) will provide a venue to review the complete NISP and

brief its content to the CCMD J-2 or a designated representative. Briefings

should highlight critical information gaps, capability shortfalls, and mitigations

strategies.

9. NISP Staffing and Approval. If possible, the completed NISP with all

Annexes (Requirements, Capability Assessments, and FSPs) will be submitted

for JPEC review ICW the staffing of the supported plan prior to IPR-F. If

concurrent staffing is not feasible, JS J-2 will formally staff the NISP using the

JSAP process in accordance with reference y. JS J-2 will ensure the review

package includes the NISP BPLAN, Annexes to the NISP, and the supported

plan’s BPLAN, Annex B, and Annex C. NISPs should be evaluated following the

JPEC review criteria outlined in references f and l. The purpose of this staffing

is to ensure that the NISP supports the CCDR’s requirements and that it is

complete, operationally and technically feasible, and supportable.

a. Step 1: Action Officer (AO) Review. The JS J-2 will conduct an informal

AO review of the final draft NISP BPLAN, Requirements, Capability

Assessments, and FSPs with the supported CCMD and supporting intelligence

organizations via e-mail. The intent is to identify and resolve substantive

issues as well as correct administrative and format errors. AO-level review can

occur in conjunction with the NISP Completion Conference/SVTC.

b. Step 2: Planner (0-6) Review. The JS J-2 will formally staff the NISP

with Annexes using the JSAP system in accordance with reference y. All

B-8

Enclosure B

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

critical comments require endorsement by a GO/FO or SES. Depending on the

quantity and level of the comments received during the initial staffing, a second

planner review may be required as coordinated with and determined by the

IPSG.

c. Step 3: Adjudication. The JS J-2 will lead the IPSG’s adjudication of

comments and, following IPSG concurrence, submit a consolidated comment

resolution matrix with recommended adjudications to the appropriate JS J-2

division chief or designated O-6/GG-15 level representative for approval.

Attempts to resolve critical comments will first take place at the O-6/GG-15

level and, if required, be elevated to the JS J-2 or designated GO/FO/SES for

resolution. When adjudication is complete, the JS J-2 will disseminate the

approved comment resolution matrix and post the revised NISP.

d. Step 4: CCDR Approval. After adjudication is complete, the Joint Staff

will forward the NISP with annexes to the CCMD, requesting approval by the

CCDR or his designated GO/FO/SES representative. The Joint Staff

transmittal memo will state that the NISP was developed in close coordination

with the CCMD J-2 staff, has undergone a formal review, that all comments

have been adjudicated, and that remaining issues for this planning cycle have

been resolved. CCMD concurrence and approval is documented with an

approval memo. Once the CCDR or his designated GO/FO/SES signs the

approval memo, the NISP process is complete. The NISP is posted to the JS J-2

portal and electronically disseminated.

e. Step 5: Post-approval processing. Once complete, JS J-25 forwards the

NISP packet, including the CCMD’s memorandum of approval, to the FSP

producers to secure agency director signatures on the FSPs. As these are

received, the signed copies are posted to JS J-25 portal.

B-9

Enclosure B

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

ENCLOSURE C

INTELLIGENCE PLANNING IN SUPPORT OF CAMPAIGN PLANS

1. Purpose. IAW reference k guidance, NISPs in support of CCDR campaign

plans are no longer required. Beginning in FY 2013, one annual JIPA will be

generated in lieu of these NISPs. This enclosure outlines procedures for the

identification and prioritization of steady-state intelligence requirements and

the development of the annual JIPA.

2. Campaign Plan Overview. CCDRs are tasked to operationalize their

strategies through the development and execution of campaign plans that

integrate, synchronize, and prioritize daily activities, including security

cooperation and Phase 0 actions, to achieve reference p’s prioritized end states.

Campaign plans also serve as the vehicle for conducting comprehensive

assessments of how the conduct of these activities are contributing to the

achievement of IMOs and GEF strategic end states.

3. Resource Requirements and Intelligence Support

a. CCDRs use their campaign plans to articulate resource requirements in

a comprehensive manner instead of on an incremental basis. To that end, IP

support to campaign plans provides the means for CCDRs to: prioritize

intelligence requirements across all ongoing operations and contingency

planning efforts; generate requests for allocable intelligence resources; and

determine the level of intelligence support required from CSAs and Service

intelligence centers.

b. Figure 8, derived from JSCP Figure E1, illustrates the relationships

between a CCMD TCP, its Subordinate Campaign Plans (SCP), ongoing

operations, JSCP-tasked contingency plans, CCDR-directed contingency plans,

and other AOR security concerns for which no plans have been developed.

When viewed in the aggregate, the intelligence support these problem sets

require exceeds available collection and production capacity. To more

effectively inform resource allocation decisions and to optimize the steady-state

employment of available Defense Intelligence Enterprise resources, CCMDs will

evaluate intelligence requirements and forecast near-term, steady-state

intelligence priorities annually through the CJA survey.

c. When identifying and nominating steady-state intelligence priorities,

CCMD intelligence planners evaluate the relative priority of intelligence

requirements across all plans, and operation orders and fragmentary orders in

execution, and other threats or security concerns for which no contingency

plans have been developed. In so doing, they may consider: the likelihood of a

C-1

Enclosure C

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

threat event occurring or the security concern materializing; the impact of the

forecasted event or security concern, to include the likelihood of triggering

other CCMD contingency plans; the criticality of the supported decision; and

the confidence levels required to inform said decisions. Generally speaking,

steady-state intelligence requirements include the following:

(1) Intelligence requirements developed to support theater and global

assessments and gauge the impact of shaping activities consistent with IMOs.

These intelligence requirements support Plan Assessment and inform decisions

to refine or adapt campaign plans.

(2) Intelligence requirements developed to support the assessment of

SCPs. These intelligence requirements should be aligned with those of Global

Campaign Plans (GCPs) and are designed to assess progress towards the

achievement of GCP IMOs and their associated end states.

(3) Intelligence requirements developed to drive collection and

production efforts to ensure “living” contingency plans remain current and

viable for execution at any time. These intelligence requirements support Plan

Assessment and inform decisions to refine, adapt, or terminate a given

contingency plan.

(4) Intelligence requirements developed to maintain situational

awareness on evolving trends, or other anticipated threat events or security

concerns reported in the CJA, for which no contingency plans have been

developed.

(5) Intelligence requirements that monitor indicators and provide

warning of potential crises. These intelligence requirements are designed to

monitor “triggers” that support Plan Assessment and inform decisions to

execute a given contingency plan.

(6) Intelligence requirements to support ongoing execution of military

and stability operations. These intelligence requirements support Plan

Assessment and inform critical decisions typically published in FRAGOs.

C-2

Enclosure C

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

Figure 8. Notional TCP Framework

4. Annual Joint Intelligence Posture Assessment

a. Purpose. The intent of annual JIPA is twofold: inform CCDRs steady-

state planning by describing the ability of intelligence CSAs and Service

intelligence centers to provide intelligence support and to inform CJCS

recommendations for the annual allocation of Defense Intelligence resources.

b. Articulation of Forecasted Intelligence Priorities

(1) The CJA survey will serve as the means for CCMDs to articulate

annually-forecasted, steady-state intelligence priorities. Once the relative

priority of intelligence requirements across all plans, operations, and security

concerns has been determined, CCMDs will submit their “CCDR’s Top Ten”

intelligence priorities to the JS J-2 via the CJA survey tool. The degree of

specificity or refinement of each of the “CCDR’s Top 10” intelligence priorities

will typically be limited to the association of an NIPF topic with a NIPF actor

that will be used as points of departure for more focused collection and

production requirements to be submitted throughout the course of the fiscal

year.

(For more information regarding topic definitions, refer to the NIPF

Intelligence Topic Information Needs).

(2) The CCDR’s Top 10 does not prevent CCMDs from submitting

collection and production requirements to CSAs and Service intelligence

centers in support of other topics of lesser priority, nor does it prevent CCDRs

from updating their priorities throughout the course of the year as dynamic

changes occur in the strategic environment. The purpose of identifying all

C-3

Enclosure C

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

CCDRs’ intelligence priorities simultaneously is to evaluate them against the

NIPF in effect at the time, determine the annual, baseline assessment of the

Defense Intelligence Enterprise to satisfy them, and to inform follow-on year

force requests and allocation decisions with the goal of optimizing the

employment of theater assets and national-level resources.

c. Development of the JIPA

(1) No later than 15 days following the receipt of annual CJA Survey

data, the JS J-2 will disseminate a consolidated list of CCDRs’ “Top 10” to

intelligence CSAs and Service intelligence centers. To enhance situational

awareness and to advocate on behalf of CCDRs, the JS J-2 will disseminate

these intelligence priorities to other Defense Intelligence Enterprise

organizations and the ODNI. Intelligence CSAs and Service intelligence centers

will evaluate the consolidated list of CCDRs’

“Top 10” against their steady-

state posture and provide brief descriptions in response to each of the CCDRs’

stated priorities based on the NIPF in effect at the time. In evaluating CCDR

priorities, single discipline intelligence entities consider existing collection

programs and capabilities with access to potential collection targets and/or the

ability to acquire raw data and process it into useable information related to

CCDRs’ intelligence needs. All-source and single-source analytic centers

consider factors such as levels of effort associated with CCDR priority topics,

annual production plans if developed, or production that might be scheduled

as a part of relevant UIS.

(2) No later than 60 days following receipt of the consolidated list of

CCDRs’ “Top 10,” intelligence CSAs and Service intelligence centers will submit

to JS J-2 their respective supportability estimates in the form of an Information

Memorandum with command-specific enclosures. Enclosures will provide brief

descriptions of their ability to address each of the CCDR’s priorities. Brief

descriptions should not exceed one paragraph in length and should include

supporting organizations’ analyses of the CCDR’s topic against the NIPF in

effect, current collection programs and capabilities, analytic levels of effort and

scheduled production. Given the relationships between TCPs and GCPs, it is

likely that CCDRs’ intelligence priorities may overlap. In these cases,

supporting organizations may use the same description for multiple CCMDs. If

a particular CCDR intelligence priority is not related to the mission of a

supporting organization, they will state so by entering “N/A” in the appropriate

subparagraph. If a supporting organization has capabilities that are limited to

the extent that a description is not practical, “NSTR” should be used.

(3) Upon receipt of CSA and Service intelligence center supportability

estimates, JS J-2 will consolidate inputs and publish a summary

memorandum assessing the ability of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to

satisfy CCDR’s top intelligence priorities.

C-4

Enclosure C

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

d. Utilization of the JIPA. The JIPA is developed to inform CCDRs of the

ability of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to satisfy the steady-state

intelligence priorities identified across all ongoing operations and planning

efforts and to facilitate risk determinations. To that end, the CCMD JIOC

leadership may use the annual JIPA to inform: readiness assessments and

reports; IPLs; follow-on year Concepts of Collection Operations prepared in

response to the annual GFMAP PLANORD; and the effective steady state

management of the JIOC and the theater intelligence enterprise. The JS J-2

will integrate the JIPA into a variety of Joint Strategic Planning System

processes to inform the Chairman’s recommendations for the allocation of

resources or the development of required joint intelligence capabilities and as

an input to the ODNI’s Global Coverage Study/Decision Aid Framework.

C-5

Enclosure C

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

ENCLOSURE D

INTELLIGENCE PLANNING IN SUPPORT OF CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

1. Purpose. This enclosure describes the intelligence activities required to

support CAP. A crisis is defined as an incident or situation involving a threat

to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops

rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military

importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated

to achieve national objectives. CAP is defined as the APEX system process

involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and operation

orders for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and

allocated forces and resources in response to an imminent crisis. CAP

procedures are employed when a contingency response is anticipated to be

executed in 12 months or less.

2. Overview of Crisis Action Planning

a. Relationship to Deliberate Planning. Deliberate planning supports CAP

by anticipating potential crises and operations and developing contingency

plans that facilitate transition to execution planning. Deliberate planning

prepares for hypothetical situations and is heavily dependent on assumptions

regarding the threat and the availability of friendly forces. On the other hand,

during CAP, some planning assumptions are replaced with facts and the actual

conditions that exist at the time. Deliberate planning results in the

development and maintenance of “living” plans. Conversely, CAP can result in

the development and issuance of orders, or revert to a “living” plan status.

b. CAP Activities and Functions. CAP follows the same operational

activities and functions that apply to deliberate planning (see Figure 4).

However, depending on the time available some steps may be compressed or

eliminated altogether.

(1) Situational Awareness. As with Deliberate Planning, Situational

Awareness provides the means for CCMDs to continuously monitor their

respective AORs and to identify indicators of incidents that could develop into a

crisis. Once an event has occurred, the CCDR issues an operational report

(OPREP-3) PINNACLE to advise the chain of command. Upon receipt of the

OPREP, the Chairman provides an assessment of the situation from the

military point of view to the President and the Secretary of Defense. The

supported CCMD continues to monitor the situation and provide updates as

required. Depending on the urgency of the situation, the CCDR’s assessment

may include a recommended COA(s). At this point, options for action include:

continued monitoring, increased reporting, gathering additional information,

D-1

Enclosure D

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

publishing a CJCS WARNORD to initiate more detailed planning, or return to

pre-crisis situation monitoring.

(2) Planning. The Planning activity normally begins with the issuance

of a CJCS WARNORD, PLANORD, or Alert Order (ALERTORD) indicating that a

threat to national security exists or a response is warranted. Planning consists

of two parts: COA Development and Detailed Plan Development.

(a) Under CAP procedures, COA Development begins with mission

analysis, the issuance of CCDR’s planning guidance, and the development of

staff estimates. COA Development ends with the preparation of a

Commander’s Estimate with COA recommendations for the Chairman,

Secretary of Defense, and President to consider.

(b) The Chairman may issue a PLANORD to direct the initiation of

detailed planning pending COA approval by the President or Secretary of

Defense. Upon COA approval, the Chairman issues an ALERTORD conveying

the Presidential or SecDef decision. Following the receipt of a PLANORD or

ALERTORD, the supported CCDR expands the approved COA into a detailed

Operation Order (OPORD) and sourced time-phased force deployment data

(TPFDD). To facilitate detailed OPORD development, the supported CCDR may

modify an existing OPLAN or expand an existing CONPLAN. In the event of an

unforeseen crisis situation, the supported CCDR develops an OPORD from

scratch without the benefit of an existing OPLAN.

(3) Execution. Execution begins when the President or the Secretary of

Defense decides to execute a military option in response to a crisis. The

Chairman issues an EXORD conveying the decision and to direct the

deployment and employment of forces. The CJCS EXORD also defines the

timing for the initiation of operations and conveys guidance not provided

earlier. In turn, the supported CCDR issues an EXORD to supporting and

subordinate commanders and directors of CSAs. Supporting and subordinate

commanders and directors of CSAs execute their respective OPORDs and

conduct operations to accomplish assigned missions. The Chairman monitors

the deployment and employment of forces, acts to resolve shortfalls, and

directs actions as needed to ensure successful completion of military

operations. If the crisis is prolonged, the CAP process may be repeated

continuously as circumstances and missions change. For additional

information on CAP, refer to Enclosure E, reference n.

3. IP Activities During CAP

a. Potential Crisis Scenarios. In general, IP activities during CAP will be

tailored to support the orders process based on whether a crisis situation is

related to a contingency plan that is supported by a NISP, a contingency plan

D-2

Enclosure D

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

that is not supported by a NISP, or if military operations will be conducted in

response to unforeseen situations.

(1) Crisis Situation with a Contingency Plan Supported by a NISP. If

the crisis is related to the scenario of a contingency plan that is supported by a

NISP, the NISP and the CCMD Annex B will serve as the basis for Defense

Intelligence Enterprise’s response and continued planning during the execution

of military operations. Upon the issuance of a CJCS PLANORD or ALERTORD,

the CCMD J-2 will determine which portions of the Annex B require

modifications to support the approved COA. The CCMD J-2 will coordinate

with the JS J-2 to determine which portions of the NISP may require changes.

Paragraph 3 (Execution) of the basic NISP will detail how the JS J-2 will

manage intelligence support to the CCMD during the execution of military

operations. The IP Tool will enable virtual, real-time collaboration between the

supported CCMD J-2, the JS J-2, and supporting organizations for the purpose

of modifying the pre-existing federated production plan and, if developed, an

integrated collection plan. The IP Tool will also enable the CCMD J-2 to submit

and the JS J-2 to manage crisis-related RFIs related to pre-planned production

requirements.

(2) Crisis Situation with a Contingency Plan without a NISP. If the

crisis is related to the scenario of a contingency plan that is not currently

supported by a NISP, the updated Annex B will serve as the basis for Defense

Intelligence Enterprise’s initial response, and continued planning during

execution. In this situation, the CCMD J-2 will determine which steps of the IP

process offer immediate benefit and can be executed in the time available. The

IP Tool will enable virtual, real-time collaboration among the supported CCMD

J-2, the JS J-2, and supporting commands and organizations for the purpose

of developing a federated production plan and an integrated collection plan for

high priority collection targets.

(3) Unforeseen Crisis Situation. If an unforeseen crisis emerges for

which no contingency plan exists, CCMD J-2s will follow CJCS and CCDR

planning guidance and will coordinate requests for external support through

the JS J-2 as required. The CCMD J-2 will determine which steps of the IP

process can be executed in the time available. When the urgency of the

situation does not allow for the development of an Annex B and/or supporting

OPORDs from directors of intelligence CSAs, the IP Tool will enable virtual,

real-time collaboration among the supported CCMD J-2, the JS J-2, and

supporting organizations for the purpose of developing a crisis federation.

b. IP Lines of Effort (LOE). The IP activities organized along the two IP

LOEs discussed in Enclosure A also apply to CAP. Depending on the situation,

these activities may be performed on an accelerated basis (i.e., “Fast Track”)

and under some circumstances certain steps of the IP process may be omitted.

D-3

Enclosure D

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

The following paragraphs offer exceptions to the IP activities previously

discussed in Enclosure A.

(1) IP LOE # 1: Intelligence Support to Joint Operation Planning

(a) DIA will update an existing DTA or produce appropriate strategic

level intelligence assessments tailored to the crisis, such as an Intelligence

Summary, that will be used to inform CJCS and CCMD-level CAP procedures.

(b) CCMD intelligence planners will coordinate with JIOC analysts

to accelerate the JIPOE effort, identify critical information gaps relevant to the

crisis, facilitate the development of threat-related planning assumptions, and

to produce an Intelligence Estimate to support the development of the

Commander’s Estimate generated during CAP.

(2) IP LOE # 2: Planning Intelligence Operations

(a) CCMD intelligence planners and relevant JIOC mission

managers may assemble a crisis IPT. The functions of the crisis IPT performed

on behalf of the CCMD J-2 include, but are not limited to, the following:

1. ICW the appropriate CCMD B2C2WG, nominating changes to

PIRs and submitting recommended changes through the CCMD J-2 to the

CCDR for approval.

2. Updating the running J-2 Staff Estimate by identifying the

current readiness status, posture, and disposition of intelligence assets

assigned or allocated to the CCMD.

3. Evaluating available collection/ISR and processing,

exploitation and dissemination (PED) capacity, assessing the risks of

redirecting the employment of available collection/ISR and PED assets to

support the crisis, and modifying collection plans as required to monitor the

situation as the crisis unfolds.

4. Identifying requirements for additional collection/ISR and

PED resources not already included in the TPFDD, coordinating national-level

collection support, and/or generating and submitting RFFs for collection/ISR

and PED resources as required.

5. Evaluating available analytic capacity, assessing the risks of

redirecting the employment of available analytic capabilities to support the

crisis, identifying analytic capacity shortfalls, and either reviewing existing

crisis federation plans included in NISPs or developing a crisis federation

CONOPs for further coordination with the JS J-2.

D-4

Enclosure D

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

6. Identifying requirements for additional personnel, generating

and submitting RFFs for augmentation as required, and coordinating with JS

J-2 to reconcile RFFs with pre-planned augmentation captured in relevant

NISPs.

7. ICW the JS J-2 and intelligence CSAs, developing plans for

the deployment of individual augmentation not already entered in the TPFDD

and coordinating plans for their Reception Staging Onward Movement and

Integration (RSO&I) and sustainment.

8. Developing a communications and intelligence system

architecture tailored to support the crisis, identifying the need to deploy

additional communications capabilities (such as those of a National Intelligence

Support Team), and coordinating through JS J-2 to address shortfalls.

9. Recommending the task organization of available intelligence

assets to support the approved COA.

10. Modifying or drafting the Annex B as required to support

final OPORD development.

11. Reviewing draft CJCS WARNORDs and PLANORDs and

recommending to the CCMD J-2 modifications as required, to request

accelerated NISP development.

(b) If accelerated NISP development is tasked in a CJCS WARNORD

or PLANORD, the JS J-2 will convene the IPSG to coordinate the level of detail

required to mirror the supported plan and develop a POA&M.

collaboration via the IP Tool or other means to coordinate anticipated

production requirements to be performed in support of the execution of military

operations and to codify federated all source production responsibilities.

Future IP Tool spiral developments will enable the deconfliction of collection

responsibilities against CCMD-identified priority collection targets, the

integration of National-level collection resources, and the synchronized

deployment and employment of theater-level and below collection/ISR and PED

capabilities. NISPs may also identify requirements for individual augmentation

from throughout the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

(d) Crisis responses from intelligence CSAs are generated within the

context of established CAP procedures and tailored to suit the needs of the

CCMD within the time available. To that end, NISP development may take

various forms. It may be limited to the NISP BPLAN, NISP BPLAN with Annex A

(to include the PRMx and CRMx), or it may include FSPs with abbreviated

content. In developing the PRMx and CRMx for inclusion in Annex A to the

D-5

Enclosure D

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

NISP, emphasis should be placed on the assignment of production and

collection responsibilities. During CAP, detailed capability assessments are not

required.

(e) Following the issuance of a CJCS WARNORD, PLANORD, or

ALERTORD, the JS J-2 may declare an intelligence crisis and establish

appropriate crisis management structures with augmentation from DIA as

required. Depending on the scope and potential duration of the crisis, the JS

J-2 may also establish an Intelligence Crisis Management Team, Intelligence

Crisis Management Element, or an Expanded Intelligence Task Force. In

general, these structures will provide direct intelligence support to the

Chairman, facilitate the timely management of and responses to the supported

CCDR’s crisis-related RFIs, and coordinate overall intelligence support to the

supported CCMD to enable continued planning during execution.

D-6

Enclosure D

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

ENCLOSURE E

FEDERATED TARGETING SUPPORT

1. Overview

a. Federated targeting intelligence involves establishing partnerships to

share responsibilities and leverage appropriate expertise. Intelligence

federation is defined in reference b and serves as the foundation for target

intelligence federations. Federation can result in a more effective and efficient

division of labor and use of resources. It involves both intelligence analysis

and production. Federated targeting strives to leverage the responsibilities and

capabilities of Defense and National intelligence agencies and other

governmental organizations to support CCMD or Joint Task Force target

development, target vetting, and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) processes.

b. Federated targeting may include, but is not limited to:

(1) Target System Analysis.

(2) Producing Electronic Target Folders (ETFs), which include:

(a) Associated target graphics.

(b) Core and supplemental target graphics and mensurated

aimpoints graphics, etc.

(d) Joint Desired Points of Impact.

(e) Weaponeering solutions and Collateral Damage Estimates.

(f) Other federated ETF as outlined in Appendix B to Enclosure E to

reference s.

(3) Battle Damage Assessment.

2. Roles, Responsibilities, and Targeting FSPs

a. Joint Staff Targeting (JS J-26) is the responsible office for coordinating

CCMD target development support with national-level organizations,

supporting CCMDs, and Service elements, upon CCMD request. It establishes

the most productive and efficient federation partnerships based on available

E-1

Enclosure E

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

resources and capabilities. J-26 also assists the CCMD J-2 in integrating

cyberspace operations and special technical operations by coordinating with

national-level organizations, supporting CCMD and Service elements to bridge

white and black targeting programs.

b. The CCMD J-2 is responsible for generating Appendix 4 (Targeting) to

OPLAN/CONPLAN Annex B (Intelligence), as required. In addition, the CCMD

J-2 assesses organic capabilities to support CCMD selected COAs, develop

target intelligence shortfalls, and identify and develop related production tasks

and subtasks to address these shortfalls.

(1) Targeting FSP. Specific procedures for federated targeting will be

documented in the Targeting FSP to NISPs IAW command requirements and

responsibilities established by intelligence planning. JS J-26 acts on behalf of

the supported CCMD to leverage prospective allied and non-IC federated

partners. Targeting FSPs will be developed when the supported plan requires a

NISP and the supported plan will include an Appendix 4 (Targeting) to Annex

(a) Target intelligence is intelligence that portrays and locates the

components of a target or target complex and indicates its vulnerability and

relative importance to the adversary. This all-source intelligence underpins the

target development process. It supports both the analysis of system- and

entity-level targets. All federated target intelligence production must meet the

minimum standards outlined in reference s.

(b) Target Materials (TM). TM production is primarily the

responsibility of CCMD JIOC with federated support provided as needed.

CCMDs determine whether existing theater TM production resources are

capable of meeting operational requirements and may request federated

assistance IAW procedures.

theater. For Phase II, the following two procedures may apply:

1) the

organization responsible for data base management for a particular target set

may conduct BDA; or 2) the CCMD may direct its components and/or JIOC to

address designated target sets IAW Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. For

target systems assessments, DIA is responsible for producing Phase III reports

(with inputs from other collaborators on specific targets as required). JS

Targeting may be tasked to coordinate national level support. Federated BDA

production will be conducted IAW references t and u, the PRM, targeting FSPs,

and Appendix 4 of Annex B of the supported plan.

E-2

Enclosure E

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

3. Tasking

a. Adaptive Planning and Execution. Preliminary and/or finished target

intelligence support may be required to support CCMD adaptive planning

requirements. CSAs and Service intelligence centers have a role in producing

target intelligence in response to CCMD requirements. National Agencies,

Service intelligence centers, and the supported CCMD JIOC may be tasked to

produce specific target intelligence and/or materials. All federated targeting

intelligence tasks should be documented in the PRM. Targeting related tasks

in the PRM that require Defense Intelligence Enterprise support should be

tasked directly to the supporting RAC and reflected in the NISP.

b. Ad hoc Support to Current Operations. All requests for ad hoc and/or

current operations targeting support should be directed to JS J-26 for review

and coordination. J-26 will coordinate with JS J-2 and ensure these

requirements are aligned with suitable federated partners. JS J-26 will assist

the supported CCMD J-2 and other customers by clarifying and validating all

target-related analytic tasks, and in concert with DIA/DI, ensure production

requirements (PRs) are forwarded to the appropriate RACs.

4. Allied Participation. Allied intelligence centers may be requested to support

federated targeting IAW DIAP agreements and relationships established under

the Military Target Intelligence Management System and command bi-lateral

agreements. Memorandums of Agreement shall govern tasking for allied

partners. Per guidance above, tasking for U.S. agency participation will be

coordinated and directed as part of the normal intelligence planning process.

E-3

Enclosure E

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

ENCLOSURE F

CAPABILITY ASSESSMENTS

1. Purpose. This enclosure provides guidance for the conduct of intelligence

capability assessments. An assessment of CCMD and Defense Intelligence

Enterprise capabilities is critical to the IP process. Capability assessments

represent the culmination of the Staff Estimate process required to effectively

plan intelligence operations. These assessments address the ability to collect

single-source data, perform processing and exploitation, conduct all-source

analysis and production, and disseminate the required finished intelligence.

Capability assessments should not be considered to represent the

organization’s overall readiness to perform mission essential tasks, but rather

the ability to satisfy particular intelligence requirements identified within the

supported plan. Through these capability assessments, the IP process provides

an input to the overall operational and strategic risk assessments associated

with plan execution. To that end they inform plan IPRs and the Joint Combat

Capability Assessment-Plan Assessment (JCCA-PA) process as described

reference v. Capability shortfalls identified through these assessments also

inform the development of a variety of possible mitigations strategies. Brief

assessments of capabilities to satisfy these requirements are recorded in the IP

Tool.

2. Phased Assessments

a. Phase 0/Steady-State. The assessment of Phase 0/Steady State

intelligence requirements is based on current capabilities and existing

priorities. Capability assessments performed against these requirements

should consider the current posture of intelligence CSAs based on the NIPF in

effect, forces currently assigned to the CCMD and those allocated via the

annual GFMAP.

b. Phases I - V. Capability assessments for the execution phases should

not be conducted based on the current situation. Instead, they should be

based on a set of common assumptions about the situation that might exist at

the time/phase of execution and the relative priority of the supported

intelligence requirement and supporting collection and production

requirements. Factors to consider include: apportioned forces, anticipated

changes to the NIPF; the total collection and production requirements of

associated plans likely to be executed in conjunction with the plan under

consideration; changes in collection capability as a result of the deployment of

additional ISR assets and partner nation capabilities in the Joint Operations

Area; reallocation of agency assets to surge in response to the crisis; changes to

F-1

Enclosure F

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

the collection environment due to the granting of authorities for the conduct of

intrusive ISR; and possible adversary activity such as area denial or

degradation of collection capabilities to include National Technical Means.

3. Assessment Procedures

a. General. Capability assessments are made on a five-level scale and are

required prior to the final assignment of responsibilities. Capability

assessments are conducted virtually and collaboratively using the IP Tool or

automated spreadsheets. Future spiral development of the IP Tool will

facilitate all capability assessments and the identification and analysis of

systemic capability shortfalls affecting multiple plans. CCMD J-2 and Defense

Intelligence Enterprise will apply the overall capability ratings listed in

paragraph 4. Capability limitation digraph codes are used to explain the

overall rating. Remarks sections can be used to provide additional details.

b. Analysis and Production. The principal causes of A&P capability

shortfalls are annotated using the digraph codes listed in paragraph 5 below.

List all limitations that drive the overall rating. In cases where one of the major

limitations driving the overall rating is lack of relevant, timely information from

collection resources, analytic centers should use the “PI - Information

Limitation” code but leave the detailed collection capability assessment of the

SIR to the CCMD-level collection strategists, ISR planners, and representatives

from single-source collection agencies.

C. Collection and Exploitation. The principal causes of C&E capability

shortfalls are annotated using the digraph codes listed in paragraph 6 below.

List all limitations that drive the overall rating. To the extent possible,

anticipated collection requirements, expressed as SIR, should be developed for

all phases of the plan. If collection managers are not provided SIRs upon

which to base collection capability assessments, they should refer to analysts

to provide the indicators of activity that would satisfy the EEI so that SIRs can

then be developed. Collection capability assessments and limitation codes will

be applied against the SIR following the analysis of key element sets.

4. Overall Capability Ratings. CCMDs, CSAs, and Service Intelligence Centers

will rate their overall ability to satisfy the requirement according to the

following five-level scale. The IP Tool will reflect the numerical rating and color

in the box:

0/Red = Unable to produce the required intelligence or incapable of

collecting and processing the required information.

1/Orange = Marginally capable of producing the required intelligence or

collecting and processing the required information (< 1/4).

F-2

Enclosure F

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

2/Yellow = Somewhat capable of producing the required intelligence or

collecting and processing the required information (< 1/2).

3/Light Green = Mostly capable of producing the required intelligence or

collecting and processing the required information (< 3/4).

4/Green = Excellent capability for producing the required intelligence or

collecting the required information (> 3/4).

5. A&P Limitation Codes. The nature of the capability limitation(s) driving the

overall ratings will be identified using the following codes:

a. PM - Mission Limitation: Not a mission area for this organization, or the

topic of the requirement does not fall under the organization’s DIAP

responsibility.

b. PA - Analytic Resource Limitation: Inadequate analytic manpower will

be dedicated to support the task based on current or anticipated priorities and

competing requirements.

c. PE - Expertise Limitation: Lack of specific analytic, subject matter

expertise, analytic tools or cultural/linguist expertise to support a task.

d. PI - Information Limitation: Lack of sufficient relevant, timely all-source

information to support analysis and production to the required confidence

levels.

e. PD - Dissemination Limitation: Lack of communications and

intelligence system architecture required to support the timely dissemination of

finished intelligence.

6. C&E Limitation Codes. The nature of the capability limitation(s) driving the

overall ratings will be identified using the following codes:

a. ID - Discipline Limitation: Information required cannot be obtained

through the employment of this collection discipline.

b. IA - Access Limitation: Available platforms lack access to the

anticipated collection target or access poses too great of a risk to either the

platform or the sensor.

c. IS - Source Limitation: Lack of source validation or vetting.

d. IP - Processing Limitation: Collected data cannot be adequately

transmitted, processed, stored, or retrieved.

F-3

Enclosure F

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

e. IE - Exploitation Limitation: Lack of single-source analysts or linguists

to conduct timely exploitation.

f. IL - Legal or Policy Limitation: Lack of authority to collect on certain

targets or to operate in specific geographic regions or domains.

g. IQ - Tipping and Cueing Capability Limitation: Collectors require a tip-

off from another source in order to focus collection on relevant targets.

h. IT - Technical Capability Limitation: Lack of technical capability to

collect relevant information on a target (including an inability of available

sensors to detect required signals, signatures or yield the required levels of

fidelity).

i. IC - Coverage Resource/Limitation: Lack of capacity to maintain

persistent surveillance or required periodicity for collection.

j. IR -Priority Limitation: Collection is constrained by completion from

higher priority efforts.

7. The IP Tool. The IP Tool will be used to conduct capability assessments

directly into the PRMx and the CRMx. In addition to allowing virtual

collaboration, the IP Tool offers considerable flexibility in customizing

assessment displays and formats. The IP Tool is accessible at the following

links:

a. JWICS -

http://nediacweb0170j.dodiis.ic.gov//jfccisr/plantaskmgt/buildPlanList.do

b. SIPRNET -

http://nediacweb0069s.dse.dia.smil.mil:7101/jfccisr/plantaskmgt/

F-4

Enclosure F

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

ENCLOSURE G

COMBATANT COMMAND J-2 STAFF ESTIMATE FORMAT

1. Purpose. In general, the purpose of the J-2 Staff Estimate process is to

identify and maintain situational awareness of all intelligence capabilities

assigned, apportioned, or allocated to the CCMD which may be employed in

support of the CCDR’s mission. As a continuous process the resulting product

is a living document; that is, a “running” staff estimate, not unlike other

functional staff estimates. The J-2 Staff Estimate is referenced in reference f

and defined in reference b as an assessment of intelligence and

counterintelligence (CI) capabilities available to support the operation. It

identifies and addresses known or anticipated factors pertaining to CI or

intelligence collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production,

and dissemination and integration that may limit the intelligence staff

function's ability to support proposed friendly COAs. In the absence of

guidance provided in relevant doctrinal publications, this enclosure provides

guidance for the development and maintenance of the J-2 Staff Estimate,

which can be tailored to suit the needs of the CCMD.

2. Initial J-2 Staff Estimate. The initial J-2 Staff Estimate is generated to

identify available intelligence capabilities as part of the command’s overall force

structure analysis conducted during Mission Analysis. To facilitate the

development of a comprehensive list of available intelligence capabilities,

CCMD intelligence planners may consult with representatives from within the

CCMD J-2 staff, J-3 force managers, and liaison officers from Service

component commands and intelligence CSAs. To support deliberate planning

for the development of a contingency plan, assigned and apportioned forces are

considered. If the J-2 Staff Estimate is being developed to support steady-state

activities, current operations, or CAP, the latest operational status of assigned

and allocated capabilities should be determined.

3. Revised J-2 Staff Estimate. During Concept Development, the J-2 Staff

Estimate is revised as required to inform each subsequent step of the JOPP.

Critical to the J-2 Staff Estimate process is the evaluation of each of the

proposed friendly COAs from an intelligence supportability perspective. To

facilitate this evaluation, CCMD intelligence planners, ICW the IPT, consider

the operational objectives, desired effects, and potential decision requirements

associated with each of the proposed friendly COAs.

4. Final J-2 Staff Estimate. Although the J-2 Staff Estimate is a living

document, it is finalized for a particular planning cycle to support Plan

Development. Based on PIRs approved during COA Approval, the intelligence

G-1

Enclosure G

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

staff then develops a series of EEIs and their associated indicators for all

phases of the plan. From these anticipated requirements, the IPT then

identifies and prioritizes potential A&P tasks and subtasks and anticipated

collection requirements described in terms of SIR. Capability assessments

performed IAW Enclosure F represent the culmination of the J-2 Staff Estimate

process.

5. Use of the J-2 Staff Estimate. Portions of the J-2 Staff Estimate may be

used to inform the development of the Commander’s Estimate by highlighting

anticipated intelligence capability shortfalls. The most immediate use of the J-

2 Staff Estimate is to inform the development of paragraphs 2 (Mission) and 3

(Execution) of Annex B. The Concept of Operations and Tasks subparagraphs

are based in large part on available intelligence capabilities that are identified

and assessed through the J-2 Staff Estimate process. The J-2 Staff Estimate

may also serve to inform requests for additional ISR capabilities and individual

augmentation through GFM and the integration of DoD/National-level

capabilities through the NISP process, when applicable.

6. Sample J-2 Staff Estimate Format. An abbreviated J-2 Staff Estimate

format is provided below. It follows the sample Staff Estimate format outlined

in reference f, with slight modifications to support the intelligence staff

function. It may be tailored as required to meet the requirements of the

supported CCMD.

G-2

Enclosure G

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

J-2 STAFF ESTIMATE

1. Mission

a. Mission Analysis.

[Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks

related to the intelligence staff function. These may be used to inform the

development of Paragraph 3 (Execution) of Annex B.]

b. Mission Statement. [Express the intelligence mission in terms of who,

what, when, where, and why. This may be used to inform the development of

Paragraph 2 (Mission) of Annex B.]

2. Situation and Courses of Action

a. Situation.

[Refer to the higher headquarters planning guidance,

Dynamic Threat Assessment, or Intelligence Estimate to provide a brief

overview of the broader geostrategic context. Include additional subparagraphs

as required. This information may be used to inform Paragraph 1 (Situation) of

Annex B.]

b. Situation Analysis.

[Provide analyses of how the current situation may

affect the conduct of intelligence operations. Consider all factors that may

affect the employment of friendly intelligence collection, exploitation, analysis

and production, and dissemination capabilities. These may include, but are

not limited to: logistical requirements, basing rights, and legal authorities.

Include additional subparagraphs as required to address operational

limitations, relevant assumptions, and conclusions.]

c. Course of Action Development and Analysis. [Provide analyses of each

friendly COA from an intelligence supportability perspective. Consider

operational objectives, desired effects, assessments, and potential decision

requirements. Include risk assessments of redirecting available intelligence

capabilities to support each of the proposed friendly COAs. A detailed list of all

available intelligence capabilities may be included in subparagraphs or

submitted as an appendix to the J-2 Staff Estimate. The detailed list of

available intelligence capabilities may be developed along functional lines (i.e.,

C&E by discipline and A&P), following the Task Organization of subordinate

commands, or a combination of the two.]

3. Analysis of Adversary Capabilities and Intentions.

[Provide analyses of each

of the estimated adversary COAs with an eye towards determining how they

may affect the employment of friendly intelligence capabilities. Assess the

capabilities of available intelligence assets to confirm or reject adversary COAs.

CCMDs may opt to apply capability assessment procedures described in

Enclosure F for all plans irrespective of NISP requirements and include detailed

capability assessment matrices as appendices to the J-2 Staff Estimate.]

G-3

Enclosure G

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

ENCLOSURE H

NISP BASE PLAN FORMAT

1. Administrative Instructions. This enclosure consists of the properly

indented paragraph and subparagraph headings for the NISP and explains the

intended content. All five major paragraphs (e.g. “3. Execution”) and the first

level of subparagraphs (e.g. “a. Concept of Intelligence Operations”) are

required. If one of these paragraphs is inappropriate for a particular plan,

annotate the heading as “not applicable” or “N/A.” Further subdivisions (e.g.

“(1) Limitations”) can be deleted if not needed and additional subparagraphs

added if necessary for clarity.

2. During time sensitive situations or CAP, a NISP can be developed under an

accelerated timeline (i.e., “Fast Track”) to meet the planning requirements of

the supported CCDR. In these cases, NISP development may be limited to: the

NISP BPLAN; the NISP BPLAN and select annexes; or the NISP BPLAN with

FSPs containing abbreviated content. The IPSG will coordinate the level of

detail required to mirror that of the supported plan and a POA&M to meet the

supported CCDR’s timeline.

H-1

Enclosure H

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE J-2

2000 JOINT STAFF PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC

20318-2000

[DATE]

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN (NISP) TO [OPLAN/CONPLAN

XXXX-XX TITLE OF PLAN] (U)

(U) References.

[List all documents essential to this NISP, e.g.]

(U) CJCSI 3110.01H, 10 Jun 2011, “Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

(JSCP) FY 2010”

(U) DoD Directive 5105.21, 18 March 2008, “Defense Intelligence Agency

(DIA)”

(U) Joint Pub 2-01, 5 January 2012, “Joint and National Intelligence

Support to Military Operations”

(U) etc.

(U) Situation

(U) Enemy. [Reference and, if appropriate, provide links to the primary

threat assessments used in the development of the supported CCMD plan.

These usually include the CCMD intelligence estimate (Appendix 11 to Annex

B) or paragraph 1b of Annex B. If desired, a short summary of key findings

and conclusions relevant to the NISP can be included.]

(U) Friendly

(1)

(U) Mission of Supported Plan

(2)

(U) Key Assumptions. [List any assumptions from Annex B to the

supported plan, related to intelligence and intelligence support that have a

direct impact on the NISP and any additional assumptions specific to the

NISP.]

(U) Limitations.

[Considering paragraph 4a of Annex B, list and describe

significant federated intelligence support limitations characterized as either

restraints or constraints.]

H-2

Enclosure H

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

(1)

(U) Restraints.

[Restraints are restrictions imposed by higher

headquarters that limit the subordinate’s freedom of action.]

(2)

(U) Constraints.

[Constraints are actions required by a higher

headquarters that requires specific action in a given situation.]

(3)

(U) Legal Considerations.

[Identify any significant legal

considerations that will impact DoD/national intelligence support to this plan.]

(U) Mission.

[State the mission/purpose of this NISP. The mission

statement should address the who, what, when, where, and why. How is

addressed in paragraph 3.]

(U) Execution

(U) Concept of Operations. [Outline the concept of DoD and national

intelligence support to the CCMD plan. One method is to state the

DoD/national intelligence emphasis by phase for those phases where the

concept is sufficiently developed. Describe JS J-2 procedures for managing the

execution of the NISP during all phases.]

(1)

(U) Phase 0 / Steady State

(2)

(U) Phase 1, Deter

(3)

(U) etc.

(U) Prioritized List of Intelligence Requirements.

[Explain the

prioritization scheme of intelligence requirements of Annex B of the supported

plan, to include those designated as PIR by the CCDR. Reference Annex A of

the NISP for the complete, prioritized list by phase. When applicable, provide a

link to PRMx and CRMx files on the IP Tool.]

(U) Collection.

[Provide any general collection guidance not covered by

published instructions, regulations, manuals, etc., for the management or

federation of DoD collection activities in support of the plan.]

(1)

(U) CRMx and Integrated Collection. [Describe the composition and

prioritization scheme of the CRM and its relation to collection disciplines.]

(2)

(U) CRMx Activation and Management. [Provide guidance on the

mechanics of how relevant collection requirements will be submitted into the

appropriate requirements tasking system of record. Describe how planned

collection requirements will be dynamically managed during crisis and plan

execution. Potential topics include tailoring the CRM to meet evolving phase

H-3

Enclosure H

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

requirements, changing priorities, the role of JS J-2 for the management of

execution phase, and the roles of relevant collection management boards.]

(U) Processing and Exploitation.

[Provide any general guidance not

covered by published instructions, regulations, manuals etc., on converting

information into a usable form. Outline concepts for federated exploitation if

required.]

(U) Analysis and Production

(1)

(U) PRMx and Federated Production. [Provide any general guidance

not covered by published instructions, regulations, manuals etc., on all-source

fusion and the production of finished intelligence. Describe the composition

and prioritization scheme of the PRMx and its relation to DIAP responsibilities.]

(2)

(U) PRMx Task Activation and Management. [Provide guidance on

the mechanics of how relevant production tasks will be submitted into

COLISEUM or other requirements tasking system of record. Describe how

anticipated production tasks will be dynamically managed during crisis and

plan execution. Potential topics include tailoring of PRMx task language to

meet evolving phase requirements, changing priorities, and the use of the IP

Tool for CCMD submission and JS J-2 management of execution phase, crisis-

related RFIs.]

(3)

(U) Responsible Analytic Center Responsibilities.

[Provide summary

guidance on the responsibilities of the RAC and details of any specific guidance

unique to this plan.]

(4)

(U) Collaborative Analytic Center Responsibilities.

[Provide

summary guidance on the responsibilities of CACs and details of any specific

guidance unique to this plan.]

(U) Dissemination and Integration. [Provide specific guidance on

conveying single-source information and finished all-source intelligence to

appropriate operational levels, to include partner nations. If applicable,

describe how dissemination will change during crisis and plan execution.

Identify primary and secondary means of dissemination.]

(U) Evaluation and Feedback. [Provide a brief overview of procedures to

assess Defense Intelligence tasks performed in response to the supported

CCMD’s requirements. Potential topics include the discussion of venues such

as NISP assessments conferences whereby the supported CCMD J-2 can

submit periodic evaluation and feedback data on individual or an aggregate of

products. Discuss the use of the IP Tool to identify individual or aggregate task

satisfaction. As required, refer the reader to paragraph 4.c. Reviews and

H-4

Enclosure H

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

Updates as a means to highlight the relationships between and importance of

evaluation and feedback, NISP assessments, and JCCA-PA.]

(U) Tasks to Supporting Defense Intelligence Enterprise Elements. [List

tasks for each Defense Intelligence Enterprise agency or activity supporting the

plan in a separate subparagraph. Of note, specific requests to these agencies

contained in Annex B to the supported CCMD plan should be captured here as

tasks to those organizations. Direct updating of FSPs as a specified task under

the agency or in Coordinating Instructions. All agencies will not necessarily

prepare a FSP for every plan.]

(1)

(U) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

(a)

(U) Directorate for Analysis (DI)

(b)

(U) Defense Counterintelligence and HUMINT Center (DX)

(c)

(U) Directorate for Information Management (DS)

(d)

(U) National MASINT Management Office (NM)

(e)

(U) Directorate for Mission Services (DA)

(2)

(U) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

(3)

(U) National Security Agency (NSA)

(4)

(U) Service Intelligence Centers.

[Separate subparagraphs can be

added as needed to address specific tasks to each of the four Service

Intelligence Centers.]

(U) Requests to Cooperating Agencies. [List requests for support from

other DoD organizations that are not within the Defense Intelligence Enterprise

or requests to non-DoD organizations.]

(U) Coordinating Instructions.

[List instructions applicable to the entire

Defense Intelligence Enterprise or for two or more agencies that are not

included under their individual agency paragraphs in 3.h. Tasks to Supporting

Defense Intelligence Enterprise Elements.]

(U) Administration and Logistics

(U) National Intelligence Augmentation.

[Identify planned national

intelligence augmentation to support execution of the plan including National

Intelligence Support Teams, Quick Reaction Teams, or individuals with unique

skills not available from the Services. This could take the form of a summary

H-5

Enclosure H

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

statement and a reference to the portion of Annex B to the supported plan that

addresses these requirements. If additional augmentation requirements were

identified during NISP development cite them here. Reference relevant portions

of functional support plans (FSP) or include an augmentation matrix as an

appendix to Annex N (NISP Basic Plan Supplement). Specify their time phased

deployment and associated procedures (i.e., integration w/TPFDD or self-

deployment). Describe the manner in which JS J-2 will manage crisis

augmentation requests and reconcile these with relevant GFM procedures.]

(U) Gaps and Shortfalls

(1)

(U) Knowledge Gaps and Potential Mitigation Strategies. [List key

intelligence and information gaps that pose significant operational and

strategic risks to the execution of the plan. These include elaborations on

those addressed in paragraph 4a of the Annex B and other critical gaps not

previously considered. This is not intended to be a comprehensive list of every

requirement not rated green. Rather, focus on a small number of critical gaps

and describe efforts to be undertaken by JS J-2 to oversee the development

and implementation of mitigation strategies to address them.]

(2)

(U) Capability Shortfalls and Potential Mitigation Strategies.

[Based

on an analysis of common issues and trends identified in the capability

assessments (included in the PRMx and CRMx), and input from the FSPs, list

significant intelligence capability shortfalls that pose operational and strategic

risks to the execution of the plan. Potential areas include, but are not limited

to, collection, exploitation, analysis, and information technology shortfalls. List

mitigation strategies that have been developed to address these shortfalls and

describe efforts to be undertaken by JS J-2 to oversee the implementation of

mitigation strategies to address them.]

(U) Reviews and Updates. [Provide guidance on the procedures for

updating the NISP and its FSPs in conjunction with JCCA-PA and Plan

Assessment (RATE) cycles. Provide general guidance on the extent of change

that will require major revision, formal staffing, and approval of the NISP basic

plan and/or the FSPs.]

(U) Foreign Disclosure.

[As appropriate, provide guidance to facilitate

disclosure to allied and partner nations. At a minimum, include statements

regarding “write for release” and “responsibility to share.” Refer to foreign

disclosure requirements identified in the supported plan.]

(U) Command and Control

(U) Command Relationships. [Describe any unique command

relationships for intelligence operations and highlight any command

relationships that are critical to intelligence support.]

H-6

Enclosure H

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

(U) Communications and Intelligence Systems Architecture. [Highlight

any unique aspects of the intelligence architecture. As needed, reference

relevant sections of the supported plan, relevant portions of FSPs, and Annex

M (Communications and Intelligence Systems Architecture FSP).]

(U) IP Tool.

[Provide guidance on the use of the IP Tool in tracking,

updating, and executing this NISP.]

(U) Systems of Record. [Emphasize that CCMD production and

collection requirements identified in the NISP must be submitted during

steady-state through the appropriate systems of record. If these systems of

record such as COLISEUM, NSRP, GIMS, etc., are not covered elsewhere in the

NISP basic plan, they can be enumerated here.]

//Signed//

Rank

Director, JS J-2

Annexes: [If an Annex listed below is not included during coordination or in

the final NISP, annotate that listing with the appropriate parenthetical

explanation (Not Used or TBP - To Be Published.) Once the Tabs to Annex A are

produced in the IP Tool, a hyperlink can be provided next to the listing. The

IPSG will determine which annexes are required for a NISP. See below for a

sample of possible annexes.]

A - (U) Prioritized List of Intelligence Requirements

Appendix 1 - (U) CRMx and Collection and Exploitation Capability

Assessments

Appendix 2 - (U) PRMx and Analysis and Production Capability Assessments

B - (U) Cryptologic Functional Support Plan (SIGINT/IA) - NSA

C - (U) Counterintelligence (CI) FSP - DIA DCHC

D - (U) Federated Targeting FSP - JS J-2

E - (U) Human Intelligence (HUMINT) FSP - DIA DCHC

F - (U) Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) FSP - NGA

G - (U) Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) FSP - DIA DT

H- (U) Analysis and Production (A&P) FSP - DIA DI

I - (U) Air and Space A&P FSP - NASIC

J - (U) Expeditionary A&P FSP - MCIA

K - (U) Ground A&P FSP - NGIC

L - (U) Naval Intelligence FSP - ONI

M - (U) Communications and Intelligence Systems Architecture FSP - DIA DS

N - (U) NISP Base Plan Supplement - JS J-2

Appendix 1 - (U) Augmentation Matrix

H-7

Enclosure H

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

ENCLOSURE I

FUNCTIONAL SUPPORT PLAN FORMAT

1. Administrative Instructions. This enclosure consists of a sample format for

an FSP and [bracketed] explanations of the intended content. While FSP

content and level of detail may vary, the top two levels of paragraph headings

(e.g., 1. Situation, a. Enemy) will be included to ensure consistency across

FSPs. If any of these paragraphs are not needed simply annotate as “not

applicable” or “N/A.” Further subdivisions can be deleted and others added as

needed.

2. An FSP is an intelligence agency annex that details the agency’s concept for

providing intelligence discipline/functional support to meet the CCDR’s

intelligence requirements. In the context of this enclosure, the word “agency”

connotes the CSAs, Service intelligence centers, and, in some cases, a

federation of intelligence organizations.

3. During time sensitive situations or CAP, a NISP can be developed under an

accelerated timeline to meet the planning requirements of the supported

CCDR. In these cases, supporting agency FSPs may include abbreviated

content or be limited to entering their functional responsibilities and capability

assessments into appendices to Annex A of the NISP. The remarks fields in the

PRMx and CRMx on the IP Tool allow supporting agencies to provide additional

information on capabilities as well as gaps and shortfalls to supplement the

limitation codes outlined in Enclosure F.

I-1

Enclosure I

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

Agency Title

Directorate [If Appropriate]

City, State, Zip Code

Date

ANNEX X [TITLE] TO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN (NISP) IN

SUPPORT OF XX COMBATANT COMMAND OPLAN/CONPLAN XXXX-XX(U)

References

[List all documents that are essential to this FSP, e.g.]

a. CJCSI 3110.01G, 1 March 2008, “Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

[JSCP] FY 2008”

b. DoD Directive 5105.21, 18 March 2008, “Defense Intelligence Agency

[DIA]”

c. Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Intelligence 22 June 2007

d. Etc.

(U) Situation

(U) Enemy. [Reference and, if appropriate, provide links to the primary

threat assessments used in the development of the supported CCMD plan.

These usually include the CCMD intelligence estimate (Appendix 11 to Annex

B) or paragraph 1b of Annex B to the supported plan. If desired, a short

summary of key findings and conclusions relevant to the FSP can be included.]

(U) Friendly

(1)

(U) Mission of Supported Plan

(2)

(U) Key Facts and Assumptions. [List all relevant facts and

planning assumptions upon which the FSP is based. In listing relevant facts,

consider the facts and assumptions of the supported plan’s Annex B or any

other facts bearing on the FSP. In listing assumptions, include only those

specific to the agency authoring the FSP.]

(U) Limitations.

[As appropriate, list and describe significant agency

limitations characterized as either restraints or constraints; consider those

identified in paragraph 4a of Annex B to the supported plan.]

I-2

Enclosure I

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

(1)

(U) Restraints.

[Restraints are restrictions imposed by higher

headquarters that limit a subordinate’s freedom of action.]

(2)

(U) Constraints.

[Constraints are actions required by a higher

headquarters that require specific action in a given situation.]

(3)

(U) Legal Considerations.

[As appropriate, list and describe any

significant legal considerations that will impact execution of the FSP in support

of this plan; consider those identified in paragraph 1d of Annex B to the

supported plan.]

(U) Mission.

[State the mission/purpose of this FSP.]

(U) Execution

(U) Concept of Intelligence Operations.

[Outline the concept of agency or

functional community of interest support to this plan. If phases are used, one

method is to state agency emphasis by phase for those phases where the

concept is sufficiently developed, e.g.]

(1)

(U) Phase 0, Steady State

(2)

(U) Phase 1, Crisis

(3)

(U) Etc.

(U) Assignment of Intelligence Tasks.

[The assignment of collection and

production responsibilities is recorded in the IP Tool on the CRMx and PRMx,

as are agency assessments of their ability to satisfy the CCMD’s requirements.

Agencies will use the remarks blocks after the limitation codes to provide

amplifying information such as identification of relevant capabilities,

description of gaps and shortfalls, and designation of internal offices or primary

responsibility at the task and subtask level. While all this information is

resident in the IP Tool, agencies can produce a custom report that displays

only the task hierarchy, task assignment, assessments, and remarks from their

agency applying data. These custom CRMx and PRMx extracts can be included

as appendices to the FSP. Alternatively, agencies may choose to describe their

support in terms of internal functional components intelligence platform types

by which information is obtained. The description must provide the CCMD

with a comprehensive understanding of the agency’s approach and

commitment to effective support of the CCMD’s operational objectives.]

(U) Orders to Subordinate and Supporting Units. [As appropriate, list

specific functions of subordinate organizations supporting the CCMD.]

I-3

Enclosure I

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

(U) Requests to Cooperating Organizations. [If applicable, list external

organizations from which intelligence support is requested, including allied or

coalition partners.]

(U) Coordinating Instructions. List the instructions applicable to agency

or two or more elements of the agency that are necessary for proper

coordination of the operation.

(U) Administration and Logistics.

[Describe administrative and logistics

requirements for the conduct of intelligence operations.]

(U) Agency Augmentation. [Describe agency existing steady state

presence at CCMD facilities. Describe the agency’s general augmentation

policies, to include the deployment of personnel and equipment. Detail any

planned intelligence augmentation support to the CCMD for execution of the

supported plan. Reference the section of the CCMD’s Annex B or NISP that

requests this augmentation. If the planned augmentation is significant, a table

could be included as an appendix to the FSP. Describe procedures coordinated

with the supported CCMD for the RSO&I and sustainment of agency personnel

and equipment.]

(U) Gaps and Shortfalls

(1)

(U) Knowledge Gaps and Potential Mitigation Strategies. [List key

intelligence and information gaps that pose significant operational and

strategic risks to the execution of the plan. Elaborate on those addressed in

paragraph 4b of the NISP and other critical gaps not previously considered.

This is not intended to be a comprehensive list of every requirement not rated

green. Rather, focus on a small number of critical gaps and describe efforts to

be undertaken by the agency to oversee the development and implementation

of mitigation strategies to address them.]

(2)

(U) Capability Shortfalls and Potential Mitigation Strategies.

[Based

on an analysis of common issues and trends identified in the agency’s

capability assessments (included Appendix A to the NISP), list significant

intelligence capability shortfalls that pose operational and strategic risks to the

execution of the plan. Potential areas include, but are not limited to,

collection, exploitation, analysis, and information technology shortfalls. List

mitigation strategies that have been developed to address these shortfalls and

describe efforts to be undertaken by the agency to oversee the implementation

of mitigation strategies to address them.]

(U) Logistics.

[As required, describe the logistical arrangements, policies,

and procedures used during execution of the FSP.]

I-4

Enclosure I

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

(U) Foreign Disclosure.

[Provide a general discussion of agency issues

regarding release of intelligence to potential international partners.]

(U) Miscellaneous Instructions.

[Provide as necessary.]

(U) Command and Control. [Briefly describe any command and control

issues specific to the agency.]

(U) Communications and Intelligence Systems Architecture. [Provide an

overview of agency intelligence architecture interface with the supported and

supporting commands. Potential topics might include tasking, reporting, and

dissemination. If developed, include a graphic depicting the flow of information

as an appendix to the FSP or reference Annex M. Identify any limitations that

might impact CCMD support.]

(U) Relevant MOUs. [By exception, discuss any issues with existing

MOUs between the agency and supported CCMD or non-DoD organizations

that could have significant impact on support to CCMD.

(U) Agency Contact Information. [Provide agency contact information

that pertains to execution of the FSP, e.g.]

(1) HQ addresses.

(2) Plain Language Address.

(3) Monitored e-mail addresses.

(4) Watch center(s) phone numbers.

//Signed//

Rank/Title

Director, Specific Agency

Appendices:

I-5

Enclosure I

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

ENCLOSURE J

PRMX FORMAT

1. Purpose. This enclosure provides guidance for the development and

maintenance of the PRMx. The PRMx is a production planning worksheet that

identifies and prioritizes focused all-source analysis and production

requirements to support all phases of the plan. It integrates the A&P capability

assessment matrix with the anticipated all-source analysis and production

tasks and subtasks previously included in what is identified in reference b as

the Intelligence Task List (ITL). When completed, the PRMx reflects the

essential elements of a federated production plan that is intended to optimize

the employment of all available Defense Intelligence Enterprise analytic

resources (to include those of the supported CCMD JIOC). The IP Tool enables

virtual collaboration for the development and maintenance of the PRMx. It

facilitates dynamic updates to the priorities or substance of the supported

CCMD’s intelligence requirements during steady-state and plan execution. The

IP Tool also facilitates the submission and holistic management of crisis-related

RFIs.

2. PRMx Sections. The PRMx is a complex matrix that highlights the priorities

and the relevance of intelligence requirements to the supported plan, the

analytic efforts (in terms of PRMx tasks and subtasks) required to satisfy these

intelligence requirements, the assignment of analytic responsibilities, and the

capabilities of tasked organizations. Figure 9 shows that it is difficult to clearly

illustrate the entirety of a notional PRMx on one page. Tailored reports from

the IP Tool can be generated to show portions or the totality of the PRMx. Not

all data sets resident on the IP Tool are described in the paragraphs below.

What follows is a brief, conceptual explanation of each of the PRMx’s major

sections with a supporting graphic. The PRMx is divided into sections depicted

in Figure 9.

J-1

Enclosure J

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

3. Hierarchy. This section of the PRMx captures the relationships between

prioritized intelligence requirements and the elements of operational design

and phasing construct used in the supported plan. Typically, the elements of

operational design and phasing construct are listed to the upper left of the

matrix as a way to nest and synchronize the intelligence requirements with the

supported plan. This nesting highlights the operational relevance of the

requested intelligence and which phase of the operation these requirements

might be active. See Figure 10.

a. The IP Tool allows the CCMD

user to develop tailored hierarchies

that are applicable to the supported

plan. In addition to the phasing

construct, the elements of operational

design that are frequently used

include: end states, lines of

operation, operational objectives,

intermediate military objectives,

desired effects, and decision points.

b. The IP Tool allows the CCMD

user to list and prioritize all

intelligence requirements and identify

those designated by the CCDR as PIR.

The IP Tool also allows the user to list

related information requirements and

designate those that would answer a

PIR as EEIs.

4. A&P Tasks and Responsibilities.

This section of the PRMx captures the

association of the CCMD’s intelligence

requirements (including the PIRs) to

all-source A&P Tasks and Subtasks.

Figure 10. PRM Hierarchy

It also depicts how A&P tasks may be

further prioritized and assigned to organizations designated as either RAC or

CAC. Enclosure A provides a description of the PRMx and Figure 2 provides a

sample task hierarchy to guide the supported CCMD in the development of

A&P tasks and subtasks. (See Enclosure N for examples). See Figure 11.

J-3

Enclosure J

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1) - page 25