Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1)

CJCSM 3314.01A

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Figure 11. A&P Tasks and Responsibilities

5. All-Source and Single Discipline A&P Capability Assessments. These

sections of the PRMx are dedicated to recording the results of A&P capabilities

assessments conducted following the procedures contained in Enclosure F.

Typically, only all-source A&P centers, to include the supported CCMD JIOC,

are designated as RACs. Either all-source or single-source agencies are eligible

for designation as CACs. In addition to the limitation codes, analytic centers

are expected to provide amplifying information regarding their respective

capabilities and limitations. The Remarks sections depicted in Figures 12 and

13 are for illustration purposes. The IP Tool provides the capability for RACs

and CACs to include expanded remarks for identified shortfalls. Analytic

centers may also use these fields to further define internal responsibilities.

During NISP development under an accelerated timeline, analytic centers may

rely on the Remarks sections in the IP Tool to describe internal tasks in lieu of

developing complete FSPs.

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Figure 12. All-Source A&P Capability Assessments

Figure 13. Single Discipline A&P Capability Assessments

6. PRMx Maintenance. The PRMx is intended to be a living document and

maintained accordingly. The IP Tool will allow users to enter and maintain

their organization’s respective A&P capabilities as a part of the running staff

estimate process. As intelligence requirements are satisfied or are no longer

relevant, they are removed from the active portion of the PRMx on the IP Tool.

New A&P tasks and subtasks are developed as new intelligence and

information requirements are generated. Although users can update their

capability status at any time via the IP Tool, NISP assessments conferences

provide a venue for the supported CCMD to provide evaluation and feedback

data on a periodic basis, generate new A&P tasks, and for all users to

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ENCLOSURE K

CRMX FORMAT

1. Purpose. This enclosure provides guidance for the development and

maintenance of the CRMx. The CRMx is a worksheet that compiles CCMD-

generated collection requirements to inform initial integrated collection

planning efforts. As the plan matures during follow-on Plan Assessment

cycles, supporting all-source production centers may also contribute to the

spiral development and maintenance of the CRMx. The CRMx is also used to

record assessed collection capabilities against anticipated requirements. The

CRMx is a component of the Concept of Collection Operations described in

Enclosure A.

2. CRM Format and Intent. The notional CRMx format is based on a

combination of worksheets found in existing doctrinal publications. These

include the Intelligence Synchronization Matrix found in reference d (JIPOE) as

well as the Sample Collection Plan and Collection Tasking Worksheet found in

reference b (Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations).

The intent of the CRMx is to identify anticipated collection requirements

(described in terms of SIRs) for all phases of the plan and to correlate these

with the collection capabilities that are best suited to satisfy the anticipated

collection task. Primary and alternate collection responsibilities should be

identified. In some instances, tipping and cueing responsibilities may also be

assigned. When completed, the CRMx reflects the core elements of an

integrated collection plan that is synchronized with the phases of the

supported plan. It is intended to optimize the employment of all available

Defense Intelligence Enterprise collection and ISR resources (to include

collection assets of the supported CCMD). The IP Tool will enable virtual

collaboration for the development and maintenance of the CRMx. It will

facilitate dynamic updates to the priorities or substance of the supported

CCMD’s intelligence requirements during steady-state and contingency plan

execution.

3. CRM Sections. The CRMx is a complex matrix that highlights the priorities

and the relevance of intelligence requirements to the supported plan, the

collection of information required to satisfy these intelligence requirements, the

assignment of responsibilities, and the collection capabilities of tasked

organizations. Figure 14 shows that it is difficult to clearly display the entirety

of a notional CRMx on one page. The IP Tool will enable users to generate

tailored reports to show portions or the totality of the CRMx. Not all data sets

resident on the IP Tool are described in the paragraphs below. What follows is

a brief, conceptual explanation of each of the sections with a supporting

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4. Hierarchy. Refer to Paragraph 3, Enclosure J, for an explanation of the

relationships between the prioritized intelligence requirements, phasing

construct, and elements of operational design. The main difference between

the Hierarchy section of the PRMx and the Hierarchy section of the CRMx is

that the CRMx introduces the need to identify indicators as the basis for the

development of SIR. All information requirements (to include EEIs) are

concerned with identifying the specific indicators that could fill a gap in the

command’s knowledge and understanding of adversary activities and other

relevant aspects of the operational environment. Indicators are defined in

intelligence usage as an item of information which reflects the intention or

capability of an adversary to adopt or reject a COA. Many indicators are

developed through the JIPOE process and can be detected through CI,

GEOINT, HUMINT, MASINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and friendly unit reports such as

spot reports, situation reports, and mission reports, as well as by other means.

Refer to Paragraph 4.e, Enclosure A, for additional information regarding the

use of indicators within the context of plan assessments.

Figure 15. CRMx Hierarchy

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5. SIRs and Collection Responsibilities. This section of the CRMx is intended

to capture the relationship of indicators to SIRs, the relative priority of these

SIR, and the assignment of organizations with primary, alternate, and if

required, tipping responsibilities. Based on indicators, SIRs are then developed

to focus the employment of available collection capabilities in a manner that is

synchronized with the supported plan.

Figure 16. SIRs and Collection Responsibilities

6. Collection Capability Assessments. These sections of the CRMx are

dedicated to recording the results of C&E capability assessments conducted

following the procedures contained in Enclosure F. The assignment of

collection responsibilities generally results from these capability assessments.

To facilitate the optimal employment of available theater collection assets and

the integration of DoD/national-level collection resources, initial collection

capability assessments performed by CCMD collection managers and ISR

planners through the J-2 Staff Estimate process may be discussed with the

C&E working group during NISP development. Remarks sections included in

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7. CRMx Maintenance. The CRMx is intended to be a living document and

maintained accordingly. The IP Tool will allow users to enter and maintain

their organization’s respective collection capabilities by discipline as a part of

the running Staff Estimate process. As SIRs are satisfied or are no longer

relevant, they are removed from the active portion of the CRMx on the IP Tool.

As new SIRs are generated, the IP Tool will allow the user to search collection

requirements databases to identify standing collection requirements that, if

satisfied, would answer the SIR. Upon the identification of a gap in existing

collection requirements databases, users can generate and submit new

collection requirements through the appropriate tasking system of record.

Although users can update their organization’s capability status at any time via

the IP Tool, NISP assessments conferences provide a venue for the supported

CCMD to provide evaluation and feedback data on a periodic basis, generate

and validate new SIRs, and for all users to synchronize their updates to the

CRMx to inform Joint Combat Capability Assessments.

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ENCLOSURE L

REQUIREMENTS EXAMPLES

1. Purpose. This enclosure provides examples of intelligence requirements,

their supporting information requirements, associated indicators, and Specific

Information Requirements through which the characteristics of collection

targets in terms of observables and collectables should be identified. These

examples also show how intelligence requirements could link to termination

and assessment criteria as a way to highlight their operational relevance. They

are intended to be used as a guide to facilitate collection and production

planning through appropriate capability assessments and the assignment of

responsibilities.

2. Expectations. In leading the development of intelligence requirements and

nominating PIRs, intelligence planners should consider and continuously apply

four principles of joint intelligence: Prioritization, Prediction, Synchronization,

and Unity of Effort.

a. Prioritization. The effective management of the intelligence mission

relies on the prioritization of the intelligence requirements against which

available intelligence capabilities may be employed. For this reason, the

manner in which intelligence requirements are written and prioritized should

be determined by the ability of the resulting intelligence to inform the staff and

support CCDRs’ decisions. Considerations that affect the prioritization of

intelligence requirements include, but are not limited to: Decision Criticality

and Specificity.

(1) Decision Criticality. The relative priority a particular intelligence

requirement may be assigned should reflect the criticality of the decision it is

intended to support. Simply put, some decisions are more critical than others.

For instance, a CCDR’s decision to commit forces to hostile action might be

considered inherently riskier and more critical than a decision to revise a

multi-year campaign strategy. Therefore, the level of intelligence effort required

to inform these decisions should follow suit. A CCDR’s retention or delegation

of certain decision authorities might indicate decision criticality and could be

used as a tool to inform the prioritization of intelligence requirements.

Ultimately, a thorough understanding of the Commander’s Intent, knowledge of

the supported plan, and anticipated decisions included therein should guide

PIR nominations for CCDR approval.

(2) Specificity. To facilitate prioritization, intelligence requirements

should be narrowly-defined. Due to the many topics they address, broadly

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posed questions are not only difficult to answer, but also difficult to parse. In

turn, the difficulties associated with dividing an intelligence requirement into

its component parts makes it difficult to prioritize the entirety of the collection

and production workload associated with them. Because of their scope,

broadly crafted questions oftentimes include low priority topics. Broadly

crafted intelligence requirements may reflect an incomplete JIPOE effort or a

lack of knowledge of the information that might already be available in existing

intelligence holdings or databases. For this reason, intelligence planners

should routinely collaborate with analysts to identify what intelligence is

already known, what intelligence is not known (and therefore assumed in the

planning process), and what new information and intelligence must be

produced to inform CCDR decisions during planning or to guide the conduct of

operations. To that end, the use of “Intelligence Objectives” is not

recommended, as they have been shown to address broad topics. Ideally, each

of the supporting production requirements entered on the PRMx should

prescribe only one verb (i.e., the analytic task to be performed) and one object

to be analyzed. Similarly, use of concepts such as “ISR Objectives” is

discouraged as they introduce a parallel requirements structure that may not

be aligned with the intelligence requirements designated by the CCDR as PIR.

Likewise, the use of concepts such as “ISR Effects” is also discouraged as they

introduce additional elements in the intelligence requirement hierarchy that

can be satisfied through the proper application of EEIs and associated

indicators. To that end, each of the supporting collection requirements to be

entered on the CRMx should prescribe SIRs that address a limited number of

anticipated collection targets.

b. Prediction. Ideally, questions should be posed in such a manner that

their answers create a decision “advantage.” That is, they should be crafted to

allow CCDRs’ to direct action before it is too late. Complicating the ability of

the intelligence planner to craft intelligence requirements — the answers to

which would create a decision advantage — are the complexities of the

operational environment that affect decision making at the CCMD level. These

complexities are difficult to anticipate during the JOPP. In these instances, a

decision “advantage” is enabled by a command climate of continuous learning

and adaptation to an ever-changing situation. To enable continuous planning

during the execution of operations and to enhance the agility of the command

to adapt to new circumstances, staffs typically maintain running estimates

relevant to their functional area. The continuous gathering of information

within the context of the CCIR and assessment processes allows staffs to

maintain their respective running staff estimates. By collecting and analyzing

information regarding changes to the operational environment, changes to

system behavior, or changes to adversary capabilities, analysts have the ability

to draw conclusions related to the next series of adversary COAs and to provide

early warning. The continuous nature of the JIPOE process resulting in

periodic updates to the intelligence estimate informs the command’s continued

planning effort. (See Enclosure A, Figure 7). Crafting intelligence requirements

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that are directly linked to and inform assessments facilitates prediction and

thus creates a decision advantage. For more information on the relationships

between the CCIR process, the assessment process, collection planning, and

JIPOE, refer to reference f.

c. Synchronization. To be relevant to the decision maker, intelligence

products need to be disseminated in time to affect the supported decision.

Thus, to effectively plan intelligence operations to support all phases of a

contemplated operation, intelligence planners should craft and recommend the

prioritization of tailored intelligence requirements aimed at focusing the

employment of available intelligence capabilities in a manner that is aligned

with phasing construct of the supported plan. Intelligence requirements that

remain constant for all phases of an operation may not provide sufficient focus

to synchronize intelligence operations with the supported plan. Additionally,

some JSCP-tasked plans developed to the concept or lesser level of detail may

be completed without undergoing a thorough COA Analysis and Wargaming

effort. In these cases, a detailed Decision Support Matrix or Decision Support

Template showing anticipated decision points in time and space might not be

developed. Absent devices such as these, intelligence planners can still craft

and recommend the prioritization of intelligence requirements for all phases of

the plan by examining the operational objectives and desired effects that are

unique to each phase. Developing intelligence requirements linked to and in

support of the assessment process supports CCDR’s decisions when decision

points have not been predetermined through Wargaming. Instead, decisions

may be informed when situational trends reach certain thresholds. Trend

analysis is performed through continuous JIPOE efforts and the analyst’s use

of MOE. The detection of collectable or observable indicators informs MOE

analysis and is the basis for synchronizing ISR with the supported plan.

d. Unity of Effort. Effective coordination with lateral headquarters and

supporting agencies is essential to effective intelligence operations. It optimizes

the employment of available intelligence capabilities by reducing redundancy

and duplication in intelligence collection and production. Unity of effort is

facilitated by centralized planning and direction and decentralized execution.

Several JSCP-directed plans include intelligence topics that are of interest to

multiple CCMDs. The IP process allows for the identification of similar or

related intelligence requirements across CCMDs and facilitates the

identification of gaps, seams, and mitigation strategies.

3. Examples. Below are a series of figures reflecting sample intelligence needs

of a CCDR. Each table is structured to show how focused intelligence

requirements might be crafted to support the assessment of operational

objectives along with anticipated decisions. They include A&P Tasks and

Subtasks as well as SIRs leading to potential collection tasks by discipline.

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ENCLOSURE M

REFERENCES

a. Joint Publication 2-0, 22 June 2007, “Joint Intelligence”

b. Joint Publication 2-01, 5 January 2012, “Joint and National Support to

Military Operations”

c. Joint Publication 2-01.2, March 2011, “Counterintelligence and Human

Intelligence in Joint Operations”

d. Joint Publication 2-01.3, June 2009, “Joint Intelligence Preparation of the

Operational Environment”

e. Joint Publication 3-0, August 2011, “Joint Operations”

f. Joint Publication 5-0, August 2011, “Joint Operation Planning”

g. CJCSI 3100.01 series, “Joint Strategic Planning System”

h. CJCSI 3110.01 series, “Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)”

i. Adaptive Planning Roadmap II, 5 March 2008

j. Adaptive Planning and Execution System Implementation Plan 2012

k. CJCSI 3110.02 series, “Intelligence Planning Guidance, Objectives, and

Tasks”

l. CJCSI 3141.01 series, “Management and Review of Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan (JSCP)-Tasked Plans”

m. DoD Directive 3000.06, 10 July 2007, Change 1, 15 April 2010, “Combat

Support Agencies”

n. CJCSM 3122.03 series, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

(JOPES) Volume II Planning Formats and Guidance”

o. Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) Execute Order (EXORD), MOD 3

p. Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), series

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q. DoD Directive 5105-21, 18 March 2008 “Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)”

r. CJCS message DTG 040001ZOCT 11, Subject: Joint Intelligence Operation

Center (JIOC) Execute Order (EXORD) Modification 3

s. CJCSI 3370.01 series, “Target Development Standards”

t. DI-2820-4-03, Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Quick Guide February

2003 (updated on 3 January 2006)

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/sites/mtc/Reference%20Library/BDA%20Quick

u. DI-2820-2-03, Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Reference Handbook

March 2003 (updated on 3 January 2006)

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/sites/mtc/Reference%20Library/BDA%20Refere

v. CJCSI 3401.01 series, “Joint Combat Capability Assessment”

w. Defense Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP) Management Guide, August

2011

x. CJCSM 3130.03 series, “Planning Formats and Guidance”

y. CJCSI 5711.01 series, “Policy on Action Processing”

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GLOSSARY

PART I - ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

A&P

Analysis and Production

APEX

Adaptive Planning and Execution

CAC

Collaborating Analytic Center

CAP

Crisis Action Planning

CCDR

Combatant Commander

CCIR

Commander’s Critical Information Requirement

Counterintelligence

CCMD

Combatant Command

COCOM

Combatant Command (Command Authority)

COLISEUM

Community On-Line Intelligence System for End Users

and Managers

CONPLAN

Concept Plan

CRMx

Collection Requirements Matrix

CSA

Combat Support Agency

DIA

Defense Intelligence Agency

DIAP

Defense Intelligence Analysis Program

DoD

Department of Defense

DTA

Dynamic Threat Assessment

DUSD(JCWS)

Defense Under Secretary of Defense for Joint & Coalition

Warfighter Support

EEI

Essential Element of Information

FFIR

Friendly Force Information Requirement

FSP

Functional Support Plan

GEF

Guidance for Employment of the Force

GEOINT

Geospatial Intelligence

HUMINT

Human Intelligence

I&W

Indications and Warning

Intelligence Community

IMINT

Imagery Intelligence

IMO

Intermediate Military Objective

Information Operations

Intelligence Planning

IPSG

Intelligence Planning Steering Group

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ISR

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

ITL

Intelligence Task List

JCCA

Joint Combat Capability Assessment

JFCC-ISR

Joint Functional Component Command - Intelligence

Surveillance Reconnaissance

JIOC

Joint Intelligence Operations Center

JIPA

Joint Intelligence Posture Assessment

JIPOE

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational

Environment

JPEC

Joint Planning and Execution Community

JSAP

Joint Staff Action Process

JSCP

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JSPS

Joint Strategic Planning System

JWICS

Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System

MASINT

Measurement and Signature Intelligence

MCIA

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

MOE

Measure of Effectiveness

MOP

Measure of Performance

MSO

Military Strategic Objective

NASIC

National Air and Space Intelligence Center

NGA

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NGIC

National Ground Intelligence Center

NIPF

National Intelligence Priorities Framework

NISP

National Intelligence Support Plan

NIST

National Intelligence Support Team

NSA

National Security Agency

NSRP

National SIGINT Requirements Process

ODNI

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

ONI

Office of Naval Intelligence

OPLAN

Operation Plan

OSINT

Open Source Intelligence

PIR

Priority Intelligence Requirement

POA&M

Plan of Actions and Milestones

Production Requirement

PRMx

Production Requirements Matrix

RAC

Responsible Analytic Center

RFI

Request for Information

RSC

Regional Support Center

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PART II - DEFINITIONS

Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) system. A Department of Defense

system of joint policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures,

supported by communications and information technology that is used by the

Joint Planning and Execution Community to monitor, plan, and execute

mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and

demobilization activities associated with joint operations.

(JP 5-0)

All-Source Intelligence.

1. Intelligence products and/or organizations and

activities that incorporate all sources of information, most frequently including

human resources intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and

signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open source data, in the

production of finished intelligence.

2. In intelligence collection, a phrase that

indicates that, in the satisfaction of intelligence requirements, all collection,

processing, exploitation, and reporting systems and resources are identified for

possible use and those most capable are tasked. (JP 1-02)

Analysis and Production (A&P) Task (formerly ITL Task). Tasks are all-source

analysis and production requirements designed to satisfy the intelligence

requirements (to include Priority Intelligence Requirements) of the supported

Combatant Command plan. (IP-specific term)

Analysis and Production (A&P) Subtask (formerly ITL Subtask). Subtasks are

the constituent elements of an A&P task which, when taken together, define

the task’s scope and content. (IP-specific term)

Annex B. Annex B is the intelligence annex to a plan or order that provides

detailed information on the adversary situation, establishes priorities, assigns

intelligence tasks, identifies required intelligence products, requests support

from higher echelons, describes the concept of intelligence operations, and

specifies intelligence procedures. Combatant Command J-2s lead development

of Annex B. (JP 2-01)

Assumption. A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the

future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of

positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning

to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of

action.

(JP 1-02, JP 5-0)

Collaborating Analytic Center (CAC). An intelligence organization that has

responsibility to support and assist a Responsible Analytic Center produce an

intelligence product to answer a specific Combatant Command Analysis and

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Production sub task. CACs may provide all-source analysis, application of

analysis, or single-source analysis. This term was developed for use in

Intelligence Planning and is derivative of the COLISEUM phrase “contributing

centers or elements.”

(IP-specific term)

Collectables. The unique descriptive features associated with emanations from

the target. Collectables are associated with SIGINT and MASINT. (JP 2-01,

Joint Tactical Exploitation of National Systems (JTENS) Manual)

Collection. In intelligence usage, the acquisition of information and the

provision of this information to processing elements.

(JP 2-0, JP 2-01)

Collection Management. In intelligence usage, the process of converting

intelligence requirements into collection requirements, establishing priorities,

tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies,

monitoring results, and retasking, as required. (JP 2-01, JP 2-0)

Collection Requirement. An established intelligence need considered in the

allocation of intelligence resources to fulfill the essential elements of

information and other intelligence needs of a commander or an agency.

(JP 1-02)

Collection Requirements Matrix (CRM). A worksheet that compiles Combatant

Command-generated collection requirements to inform the initial integrated

collection planning efforts. This collection planning worksheet links Priority

Intelligence Requirements, their associated Essential Elements of Information,

and related indicators to supporting Specific Information Requirements, and all

Combatant Command collection capabilities available to support the execution

of a given plan. The CRM is intended to facilitate the development of integrated

collection strategies against priority collection targets during the National

Intelligence Support Plan process and to optimize the employment of theater

assets and national-level collection resources.

(IP-specific term)

Commander’s Critical Information Requirement (CCIR). An information

requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely

decision making. (JP 3-0)

Concept of Intelligence Operations. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad

outline, of an Intelligence Directorate’s assumptions or intent regarding

intelligence support of an operation or series of operations. The concept of

intelligence operations, which complements the commander’s concept of

operations, is contained in the intelligence annex (Annex B) of operation plans.

The concept of intelligence operations is designed to give an overall picture of

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intelligence support for joint operations. It is included primarily for additional

clarity of purpose.

(JP 1-02, JP 2-0)

Constraint. In the context of joint operation planning, a requirement placed on

the command by a higher command that dictates an action, thus restricting

freedom of action. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0)

Defense Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP). The DIAP integrates all general

military intelligence and scientific/technical intelligence analysis conducted at

DIA, the Service intelligence centers, and the Combatant Command intelligence

centers. DIAP ensures efficiency and effectiveness of defense intelligence all-

source analysis by assigning analytic responsibilities based on capabilities,

workforce characteristics, and command, Service, or DIA mission

requirements. (DIAI 3115.300)

Defense Intelligence Enterprise. The organizations, infrastructure, and

measures, to include policies, processes, procedures, and products of the

intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), and security components of the Joint

Staff, Combatant Commands, Military Departments, and other Department

elements that perform National Intelligence, Defense Intelligence, Intelligence-

related, CI, and security functions, as well as those organizations under the

authority, direction, and control of the USD(I).

(IP-specific term pending

approval in revisions to DoDD 5143.01)

Dynamic Threat Assessment (DTA). The DTA is a defense strategic intelligence

assessment developed by DIA’s Directorate for Analysis which identifies the

capabilities and intentions of adversaries for each Joint Strategic Capabilities

Plan-directed top priority plan, except Theater Campaign Plans. The DTA is

used by the Combatant Commander and Combatant Command planning staff

to conduct Mission Analysis during Step 1 (Strategic Guidance) of the Adaptive

Planning and Execution (APEX) Process. DIA produces and continuously

updates DTAs as strategic factors of the operational environment change and

provides the Combatant Commands an updated DTA to support RATE (Refine,

Adapt, Terminate or Execute) decisions under APEX Step 4 (Plan Assessment).

Effect.

1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an

action, a set of actions, or another effect.

2. The result, outcome, or

consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of

freedom. (JP 3-0)

End state. The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the

commander's objectives. (JP 3-0)

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Essential Elements of Information (EEI). The most critical information

requirements regarding the adversary and the environment needed by the

commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and

intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision.

(JP 1-02, JP 2-0)

Friendly Force Information Requirement. Information the commander and staff

need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities. (JP

3-0)

Functional Support Plan (FSP). An FSP is an intelligence agency enterprise/

annex to a National Intelligence Support Plan in support of a Combatant

Command top priority plan. It details the agency/enterprise concept for

providing discipline/functional support to meet the Combatant Command’s

intelligence requirements. It assesses agency/enterprise capabilities across all

phases of the plan and identifies significant knowledge gaps and capability

shortfalls as well as potential mitigation strategies where appropriate.

(IP-

specific term)

Indications and Warning (I&W). Those intelligence activities intended to detect

and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that

could involve a threat to the United States or allied and/or coalition military,

political, or economic interests or to U.S. citizens abroad. It includes

forewarning of enemy actions or intentions; the imminence of hostilities;

insurgency; and nuclear/non-nuclear attack on the United States, its overseas

forces, or allied and/or coalition nations.

(JP 2-0)

Indicator. In intelligence usage, an item of information which reflects the

intention or capability of an adversary to adopt or reject a course of action.

(JP

1-02, JP 2-0)

Information Requirement. In intelligence usage, those items of information

regarding the adversary and other relevant aspects of the operational

environment that need to be collected and processed in order to meet the

intelligence requirements of a commander. (JP 1-02, JP 2-0)

Intelligence.

1. The product resulting from the collection, processing,

integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information

concerning foreign countries or areas.

2. Information and knowledge about an

adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or

understanding. (JP 1-02, JP 2-0)

Intelligence Estimate. The appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available

intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determine

the courses of action open to the enemy or adversary and the order of

probability of their adoption.

(JP 1-02, JP 2-0).

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Intelligence Federation. A formal agreement in which a Combatant Command

Joint Intelligence Operations Center receives preplanned intelligence support

from other joint intelligence operations centers, Service intelligence

organizations, Reserve organizations, and national agencies during crisis or

contingency operations. (JP 1-02, JP 2-0)

Intelligence Operations. The variety of intelligence and counterintelligence

tasks that are carried out by various intelligence organizations and activities

within the intelligence process. Intelligence operations include planning and

direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production,

dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback. (JP 2-0)

Intelligence Planning (IP). The intelligence component of the Adaptive Planning

and Execution system. IP is a methodology for coordinating and integrating all

available Defense Intelligence Enterprise capabilities to meet Combatant

Commander intelligence requirements. It ensures that prioritized intelligence

support is aligned with Combatant Commander objectives for each phase of the

operation. The IP process identifies DoD knowledge gaps and intelligence

capability shortfalls and develops mitigation strategies where possible.

Identified knowledge gaps and capability shortfalls also inform a variety of

Joint Strategic Planning System processes and products and the development

of Unifying Intelligence Strategies.

(CJCSI 3110.02G)

Intelligence Requirement.

1. Any subject, general or specific, upon which

there is a need for the collection of information, or the production of

intelligence.

2. A requirement for intelligence to fill a gap in the command’s

knowledge or understanding of the operational environment. (JP 1-02, JP 2-0)

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). An integrated operations-

intelligence activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and

operation of sensors, assets, and the processing, exploitation, and

dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This

is an integrated intelligence and operations function.

(JP 2-0)

Intelligence Task List (ITL). See Production Requirements Matrix (PRMx).

Intermediate Military Objective. A measureable objective that directly

contributes to the achievement of an end state. It reflects objectives achievable

by the Combatant Command within the 5-year timeframe of a campaign plan.

(CJCSI 3110.01H)

ITL Task. See A&P Task.

ITL Subtask. See A&P Subtask.

GL-9

Glossary

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

J-2 Staff Estimate. An assessment of intelligence and counterintelligence (CI)

capabilities available to support the operation. It identifies and addresses

known or anticipated factors pertaining to CI or intelligence collection,

processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination and

integration that may limit the intelligence staff function's ability to support

proposed friendly courses of action.

(JP 2-01)

Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC). An interdependent, operational

intelligence organization at the Combatant Command or joint task force (if

established) level, that is integrated with national intelligence centers, and

capable of accessing all sources of intelligence impacting military operations,

planning, execution, and assessment. (JP 2-0)

Joint Intelligence Posture Assessment (JIPA). An estimate of the collection and

production support the Defense Intelligence Enterprise may be able to provide

Combatant Commanders throughout a given year. It contains annexes from

Combat Support Agencies and Services that describe their steady-state posture

to address Combatant Commander priorities based on the National Intelligence

Priorities Framework in effect at the time.

(IP-specific term)

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE). The

analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce

intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support

of the joint force commander’s decision-making process. It is a continuous

process that includes defining the operational environment; describing the

effects of the operational environment; evaluating the adversary; and describing

adversary potential courses of action.

(JP 1-02, JP 2-0)

Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The primary means by which the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff carries out statutory responsibilities

assigned in titles 6, 10, 22 and 50 of the United States Code. The primary roles

are to: 1) conduct independent assessments; 2) provide independent advice to

the President, Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, and Homeland

Security Council; and 3) assist the President and Secretary of Defense in

providing unified strategic direction to the Armed Forces. The JSPS is a system

that enables the Chairman to effectively assess, advise, direct, and execute in

fulfillment of these statutory responsibilities.

(CJCSI 3110.01B)

Measure of Effectiveness (MOE). A criterion used to assess changes in system

behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the

attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.

(JP 3-0)

GL-10

Glossary

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

Measure of Performance (MOP). A criterion used to assess friendly actions that

is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 3-0)

National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF).

1. A dynamic process that

reflects the enduring and current national and homeland security challenges

and opportunities. 2. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) sole

mechanism for establishing national intelligence priorities. Intelligence topics

reviewed by the National Security Council Principles Committee and approved

by the President semiannually shall form the basis of NIPF and the detailed

procedures established by the DNI. (National Security Presidential Directive

(NSPD) 26, Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 204)

National Intelligence. All intelligence, regardless of the source from which

derived and including information gathered within or outside the United States,

that pertains, as consistent with any guidance issued by the President, to more

than one United States Government Agency, and that involves threats to the

United States, its people, property, or interests; the development, proliferation,

or use of weapons of mass destruction; or any other matter bearing on United

States national or homeland security. (JP 1-02, JP 2-0)

National Intelligence Support Plan (NISP). The NISP is a supporting plan to a

Combatant Command top priority plan that details how the intelligence

capabilities of Combat Support Agencies, Services and other Defense

Intelligence Enterprise organizations will be employed to meet the Combatant

Commander’s stated intelligence requirements. It contains annexes from

applicable components of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise agencies /

organizations that detail their concepts for functional support and identify and

prioritize knowledge gaps, capability shortfalls, and mitigation strategies.

(CJCSI 3110.02G)

National Intelligence Support Team (NIST). A nationally sourced team

composed of intelligence and communications experts from Defense

Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-

Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, or other intelligence community

agencies as required.

(JP 1-02, JP 2-0)

Objective.

1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which

every operation is directed.

2. The specific target of the action taken which is

essential to the commander's plan. (JP 5-0)

Observables. The unique descriptive features associated with the visible

description of the target, whether it is specific units, equipment, or facilities.

Observables are associated with GEOINT, HUMINT/CI, and MASINT. (JP 2-01,

Joint Tactical Exploitation of National Systems (JTENS) Manual)

GL-11

Glossary

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

Operational Environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and

influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions

of the commander. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR). An intelligence requirement, stated as

a priority for intelligence support, that the commander and staff need to

understand the adversary or operational environment. (JP 1-02, JP 2-0)

Production Requirements Matrix (PRMx). Formerly ITL. The PRMx is a

compilation of prioritized Combatant Command all-source analysis and

production requirements that support all phases of the plan and are organized

in a two tier hierarchy of tasks and subtasks. (IP-specific term)

Red Team. An organizational element comprised of trained and educated

members that provide an independent capability to fully explore alternatives in

plans and operations in the context of the operational environment and from

the perspective of adversaries and others.

(JP 1-02, JP 2-0)

Responsible Analytic Center (RAC). The Intelligence organization that has

primary responsibility for integrated all-source analysis, or the application of

analysis, to produce an intelligence product to answer a Combatant Command

analysis and production task or subtask. This term was developed for use in

Intelligence Planning and is similar to the COLISEUM term “Responsible

Intelligence Analysis Center.” (IP-specific term)

Restraint. In the context of joint operations, a requirement placed on the

command by a higher command that prohibits an action, thus restricting

freedom of action. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0)

Specific Information Requirement (SIR). A basic question that must be

answered to satisfy a collection request.

(JP 2.01, Joint Tactical Exploitation of

National Systems (JTENS) Manual)

Supported Commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for

all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other

joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning,

this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation

orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who

receives assistance from another commander’s force or capabilities, and who is

responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the

assistance required.

(JP 1-02)

Supporting Commander. 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces

or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting

GL-12

Glossary

CJCSM 3314.01A

17 September 2012

plan. Includes the designated Combatant Commands and Defense agencies as

appropriate.

2. In the context of a support command relationship, the

commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another

commander’s force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance

required by the supported commander. (JP 2-01)

Synchronization. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources

and methods in concert with the operation plan to ensure intelligence

requirements are answered in time to influence the decisions they support.

(JP1-02, JP 2-0)

Theater Intelligence Assessment (TIA). The TIA is a theater-wide Defense

strategic intelligence assessment developed by DIA Directorate for Analysis that

identifies the capability and intentions of Actors of Concern listed in the

Guidance for the Employment of the Force, with particular emphasis on how

these actors are affected by the strategic environment.

(CJCSI 3110.02G).

Targeting. The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the

appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and

capabilities.

(JP 1-02)

Unifying Intelligence Strategy (UIS). Provide the Office of the Director of

National Intelligence staff and the Intelligence Community (IC) mission

partners with the organizing principles, focus, and direction to respond to

national security issues. Developed by National Intelligence Managers in

partnership with National Intelligence Officers, National Intelligence Collection

Officers, and National Counterintelligence Officers and other IC elements, these

strategies orient and guide the IC’s analytic and collection activities to satisfy

customer information needs. (http://intellipedia.intelink.ic.gov/wiki/Unifying

Intelligence Strategy and http://intellipedia.intelink.ic.gov/wiki/National

Intelligence Manager .)

Validation. A process associated with the collection and production of

intelligence that confirms that an intelligence collection or production

requirement is sufficiently important to justify the dedication of intelligence

resources, does not duplicate an existing requirement, and has not been

previously satisfied.

(JP 1-02, JP 2-0)

GL-13

Glossary

AIRSPACE CONTROL

MULTI-SERVICE

TACTICS,

TECHNIQUES, AND

PROCEDURES FOR

AIRSPACE CONTROL

FM 3-52.1

AFTTP 3-2.78

MAY 2009

US Army Training and Doctrine

Command

Curtis E. LeMay Center for

Doctrine and Education

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution

authorized to U.S. Government Agencies and their

contractors only to protect technical or operational

information from automatic dissemination under the

international Exchange Program or by other

means. This determination was made on 30 June

2008. Other requests will be referred to: HQ

TRADOC, ATTN: ATFC-EJ, Ft Monroe, VA 23651-

1067 or LeMay Center, ATTN: DDJ, Maxwell AFB,

AL 36112-6112.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method

that must prevent disclosure of contents or

reconstruction of the document.

PREFACE

1. Purpose

This multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publication

facilitates multi-Service coordination, integration, and regulation of airspace

during exercises and operations where more than one Service shares airspace

for operational use.

2. Scope

This MTTP publication is a tactical-level document to synchronize and integrate

airspace command and control functions and serves as a single source reference

for planners and commanders at all levels. It synchronizes airspace control roles

and responsibilities within the campaign plan while unifying individual Service

doctrine and TTP for airspace control planning and execution. In addition, it

provides planning, assignment, execution, and transition procedures to address

specific complex and unique airspace coordinating measures. This publication

also outlines enabling information and communications interfaces necessary to

establish integrated airspace control.

3. Applicability

This MTTP publication applies to the operating forces of the Army and Air Force.

The focus of the publication is at the tactical level, but it has application for

warfighters at all levels. The target audience for this publication includes

commanders, staffs, warfighters, and agencies at all levels within the joint force.

4. Implementation Plan

Participating Service command offices of primary responsibility (OPRs) will

review this publication, validate the information and, where appropriate,

reference and incorporate it in Service manuals, regulations, and curricula as

follows:

Army. Upon approval and authentication, this publication incorporates the

procedures contained herein into the United States (US) Army Doctrine and

Training Literature Program as directed by the Commander, US Army Training

and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Distribution is in accordance with applicable

directives and the Initial Distribution Number (IDN) listed on the authentication

page.

Air Force. The Air Force will incorporate the procedures in this publication in

accordance with applicable governing directives. Distribution is in accordance

with Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-360.

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

5. User Information

a. TRADOC and the Curtis E. Lemay Center for Doctrine Development and

Education (LeMay Center) developed this publication with the joint participation

of the approving Service commands. TRADOC and the LeMay Center will

review and update this publication as necessary.

b. This publication reflects current joint and Service doctrine, command and

control (C2) organizations, facilities, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures.

Changes in Service protocol appropriately reflected in joint and Service

publications will likewise be incorporated in revisions to this document.

c. We encourage recommended changes for improving this publication. Key

your comments to the specific page and paragraph and provide a rationale for

each recommendation. Send comments and recommendations directly to—

Army

Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command

ATTN: ATFC-EJ

Fort Monroe VA 23651-1067

DSN 680-3951 COMM (757) 788-3951

E-mail: doctrine.monroe@us.army.mil

Air Force

Commander, LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education

ATTN: DDJ

115 North Twining Street

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6112

DSN 493-2640/2256 COMM (334)953-2640/2256

E-mail: lemayctr.ddj.workflow@maxwell.af.mil

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1

AFTTP 3-2.78

FM 3-52.1

US Army Training and Doctrine Command

Fort Monroe, Virginia

AFTTP 3-2.78

Curtis E. Lemay Center for Doctrine

Development and Education

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

22 May 2009

AIRSPACE CONTROL

MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND

PROCEDURES FOR

AIRSPACE CONTROL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CHAPTER I AIRSPACE OVERVIEW

1. Introduction

2. Establishing Airspace Control

3. Command Relationships for Airspace Control

4. Summary

CHAPTER II AIRSPACE AUTHORITIES

1. Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs)

2. Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)

3. Airspace Control Authority (ACA)

4. Area Air Defense Commander (AADC)

5. Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR)

6. Air Operations Center (AOC)

7. Control and Reporting Center (CRC)/Airborne Warning and Control

System (AWACS)

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to DOD and DOD contractors only to protect

technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program

or by other means. This protection applies to publications required solely for official use and to those

containing valuable technical or operational information. This determination was made on30 June 2008.

Other requests will be referred to:

HQ TRADOC, ATTN: ATFC-EJ, Ft Monroe, VA 23651-1067,

or LeMay Center, ATTN: DDJ, Maxwell AFB, 36112-6112.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction

of the document.

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

iii

8. Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) / Joint Surveillance Target Attack

Radar System (JSTARS)

9. Tactical Air Control Party (TACP)

10. Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC)

11. Army Forces (ARFOR) Commander

12. Corps/Division Airspace Command and Control (AC2) Element

13. Brigade Combat Team (BCT)

14. Component Liaisons

CHAPTER III PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

1. Planning, Implementation, and Execution

2. Phase 0 - Shape

3. Phase I - Deter

4. Phase II - Seize Initiative Planning Considerations

5. Phase III - Dominate Planning Considerations

6. Phase IV - Stabilize Planning Considerations

7. Phase V - Enable Civil Authority Planning Considerations

8. Post Hostility Airspace Control

CHAPTER IV REAL-TIME COORDINATION OF AIRSPACE

1. Airspace Users

2. Fires Coordination Between Airspace Users

CHAPTER V COMPLEX AIRSPACE

1. Introduction

2. High-Density Airspace Control Zone (HIDACZ)

3. Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA)

4. Restricted Operations Areas (ROA)

APPENDIX A RISK AND THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

APPENDIX B ACM & FIRE SYSTEMS COORDINATION

1. ACM and Fires System Interoperability

2. ACM and Fires Protection

APPENDIX C HIDACZ PLAN EXAMPLES

1. HIDACZ NIMITZ Airspace Control Plan Example

2. HIDACZ MAMELUKE Airspace Control Plan Example

APPENDIX D EXAMPLE AIRSPACE CONTROL CHECKLISTS

REFERENCES

GLOSSARY

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

List of Figures

Figure 1.

HIDACZ NIMITZ Vertical Separation

Figure 2.

HIDACZ NIMITZ Comm Plan

Figure 3.

HIDACZ NIMITZ C2 Depiction w/AWACS

Figure 4.

HIDACZ NIMITZ C2 Depiction w/TOC as Controller

Figure 5.

HIDACZ MAMELUKE Vertical Separation

Figure 6.

HIDACZ MAMELUKE Communications Diagram

Figure 7.

Step-by-step Explanation

Figure 8.

Example of Army Fires Checklist

Figure 9.

Example of CAS Outside of Army Airspace Checklist

Figure 10.

Example of Dynamic UA Retask Checklist

Figure 11.

Example of Fires in Vicinity of Airfield Checklist

Figure 12.

Example of Immediate ROZ Checklist

List of Tables

Table 1. Example of Land Component Request for HIDACZ

Table 2. Example Strategic/Operational Risk Level

Table 3. Example JFC Established Baseline Airspace Risk

Table 4. Example BCT Baseline Airspace Risk

Table 5. Airspace Control System Shapes

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Table 7. Lost Comm Visual Signals

Table 8. Tactical Phraseology FOB NASA

Table 9. Tactical Phraseology FOB DOG

Table 10. Delegation of Authority

Table 11. DASC and Terminal Control Communications

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

AIRSPACE CONTROL

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airspace Control

This publication establishes tactics, techniques, and procedures for the tactical

synchronization and integration of airspace necessary for combat operations

within the operational environment. With the proliferation and concentration of

airspace users, this publication outlines airspace control authorities, establishes

airspace planning considerations, outlines the steps for the immediate execution

of airspace in support of operations, and defines airspace measures necessary

for a specific, finite period to support a specific military objective.

Chapter I Airspace Overview

Chapter I provides the tactical imperative, which shifts the focus of airspace

operations from the deconfliction of airspace to integration and synchronization of

airspace users that is established by the joint force commander. Additionally,

this chapter lists the doctrinal command relationship necessary for airspace

integration to support all joint components.

Chapter II Authorities

Chapter II provides the key airspace authorities within each component and the

critical documents used to exercise airspace integration among the operational

commanders.

Chapter III Planning Considerations

Chapter III provides airspace planning considerations throughout the military

operational phases from shaping through enabling civil authorities.

Chapter IV Real-time Coordination of Airspace

Chapter IV provides the “who” of the Service components and the “how” for real-

time coordination of airspace and fires during joint operations.

Chapter V Complex Airspace

Chapter V provides for the coordination and operation of complex airspace

necessary to support specific military objectives.

Appendices

The appendices discuss risk in the operational environment, airspace

coordinating measures, fires coordination, examples of complex airspace, and

examples of airspace control checklists, which could be used as models for

tactical units during military operations.

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS

The following commanders and agencies participated in the development of this

publication:

Joint

Joint Airspace Command and Control Joint Test, Ft Bliss, TX

Joint Unmanned Air Systems Center of Excellence, Creech AFB, NV

Multi-National Corps Iraq, Camp Victory, Al Faw Palace Baghdad, Iraq

Army

US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Army Capabilities Integration Center,

Fort Monroe, VA

US Army Field Artillery School, Ft Sill, OK

US Army Air Defense Artillery School, Ft Bliss, TX

US Army Aviation Warfighting Center of Excellence, Ft Rucker, AL

US Army Combined Arms Center, Ft Leavenworth, KS

US Army Joint Support Team, Hurlburt AFB, FL

Air Force

Headquarters, Air Force, Washington, DC

Headquarters, Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, VA

LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, Maxwell AFB, AL

Headquarters, Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt AFB, FL

505^th Command and Control Wing, Hurlburt AFB, FL

623^th Air Operations Center, Hurlburt AFB, FL

728^th Air Control Squadron, Eglin AFB, FL

US Air Force Flight Standards Agency, Andrews AFB, MD

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

vii

Chapter I

Airspace Overview

1. Introduction

a. Combat operations require effective airspace control in the combat zone.

The proliferation of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) and the fielding of

indirect fire platforms capable of higher altitudes and greater ranges create

additional demands and complexities on the airspace control process. In

addition to military airspace users, current and future operational environments

may include civilian airliners, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and relief

agencies, especially during stability operations. These increased user demands

require an integrated airspace control system to enable mission

accomplishment and minimize risk.

b. Integration and synchronization of all airspace users is required to establish

the unity of effort necessary for effective combat operations. Historically, the

primary method of airspace control and deconfliction has been to reserve

airspace for each user and then ensure they remained within their assigned

airspace. This method is time consuming and not responsive enough to support

current dynamic operations, forcing commanders to accept risk for airspace

users, operations, or both. With the proliferation of airspace users in a

congested space, there may not be enough airspace to effectively divide,

separate, or partition areas for deconflicted operations.

2. Establishing Airspace Control

a. Joint Publication (JP) 3-52, Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in a Combat

Zone, defines airspace control in the combat zone as “a process used to

increase combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use

of airspace. Airspace control is provided to reduce the risk of friendly fire,

enhance air defense operations, and permit greater flexibility of operations.”

b. Airspace control procedures within the joint operations area (JOA) are

approved by the joint force commander (JFC) and are derived entirely from the

JFC’s authority. Commanders should adhere to JFC guidance on airspace

coordinating measures (ACMs) so as not to exceed the JFC’s acceptable level

of risk. Effective airspace control should maximize combat effectiveness

without unduly restricting combat operations. In accordance with the JFC’s

guidance (i.e., airspace control plan [ACP]), airspace control agencies direct

the maneuver of aircraft and integrate fires for the best use of assigned air-

space. “Airspace control does not infringe on the authority vested in com-

manders to approve, disapprove, or deny combat operations.” (JP 3-52)

c. Airspace is inherently joint. Any action taken by an airspace user may

impact other airspace users. The airspace control authority (ACA) delegates

authority to control airspace to elements of the theater air ground system

(TAGS). The ACA establishes an airspace control system (ACS) responsive to

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

the needs of the JFC and integrated with the host nation (HN). “The ACS is an

arrangement of those organizations, personnel, policies, procedures, and facil-

ities required to perform airspace control functions. Airspace control should be

executed through a responsive theater/tactical air control system capable of real

time control that includes surface and airborne assets, as necessary (e.g., CRC

and AWACS). The ACS requires timely exchange of information through reli-

able, secure, and interoperable communications networks. Elements of the ACS

may have dual-roles as DCA assets (e.g., a CRC can be a SADC).” (JP 3-01)

d. The definition of coordinating altitude in JP 3-52 is “a procedural airspace

control method to separate fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft by determining an

altitude below which fixed-wing aircraft will normally not fly and above which

rotary-wing aircraft normally will not fly.” Current Operation Iraqi Freedom

(OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) operations use the term

“coordinating altitude” as the vertical limit between airspace controlling

agencies [i.e., the top of Army controlled airspace and the bottom of control

and reporting center (CRC) controlled airspace]. The current theater usage is

outside the JP 3-52 doctrinal definition.

e. The use of ACMs (e.g., high-density airspace control zone [HIDACZ],

restricted operations zone [ROZ] usages or sectors) to employ lateral,

horizontal, and vertical limits between airspace controlling agencies should be

the preferred method of assigning airspace control responsibilities.

3. Command Relationships for Airspace Control

a. The JFC may designate a joint force air component commander (JFACC),

an ACA, and an area air defense commander (AADC). The responsibilities of

the JFACC, ACA, and AADC are interrelated and are normally assigned to one

individual to unite joint air operations with joint airspace control and joint air de-

fense in support of the JFC’s campaign. They may be assigned to two or more

individuals when the situation dictates. If the JFC decides not to assign the

JFACC, ACA, and AADC to one individual, then close coordination between all

three positions is essential for mission accomplishment. Designating one

component commander as JFACC, AADC, and ACA often simplifies the coord-

ination required to develop and execute fully integrated joint air operations.

b. Joint doctrine establishes priority of airspace use to the supported

commander, in accordance with JFC priorities. Often, the priority of airspace

use is blurred when multiple supported commanders require access to the

same airspace for different missions. The area of operations (AO) commander

is normally the supported commander for operations in his assigned AO;

however, the JFACC is normally the supported commander for counterair,

which includes defensive counterair (DCA) over the land component AO. Other

commanders (i.e., special operations) frequently have JFC priority for

operations without respect to the boundaries of an AO. These conflicting

priorities and requirements often lead to confusion that is not an airspace

control specific problem but rather a joint C2 problem.

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

c. The JFACC/ACA/AADC uses the air operations center (AOC) to publish

airspace control procedures and requirements. The primary products for

airspace control are the ACP, air tasking order (ATO) and its associated special

instructions (SPINS), airspace control order (ACO), air defense plan (ADP), and

air operations directive (AOD). When these documents are created and

modified, Army forces (ARFOR) must participate in the process to ensure Army

priorities are addressed in all of these products. In most cases, the ARFOR

commander’s liaison to the AOC is the battlefield coordination detachment

(BCD). After the AOC develops the ACP, it is approved by the JFC and

becomes directive. Army echelons incorporate ACP guidance and integrate the

ACO, ADP, SPINS, AOD, and ATO via operations orders (OPORDs) and

associated annexes.

d. Effective airspace control in the combat zone requires interoperable

equipment and an understanding of Service and joint doctrine. Familiarity with

procedures through joint exercises and training can enhance airspace control

operations within the JOA. Standardized airspace procedures rely upon an

effective mix of identification and control measures. A common airspace control

structure facilitates accurate and timely coordination of airspace operations

between friendly forces. Identification requirements for airspace control should

be integrated with those for air defense. Procedures and terminology need to

be compatible, mutually supporting, and interoperable to ensure commonality of

procedures for airspace users and control agencies.

e. Airspace control agencies should work out procedural agreements and

establish required communication links with each other to ensure effective

coordination. Airspace control can be achieved through both procedural and

positive control methods. Procedural control is a method that relies on a

combination of previously agreed procedures and orders, while positive control

relies on positive identification, tracking, and direction of a user by an agency.

Procedural control provides the basic design for an airspace control

system while positive control employs greater technological capabilities

to increase the efficiency, safety, and effectiveness of airspace control.

Airspace control procedures provide maximum flexibility through an effective

mix of positive and procedural control measures.

f. Procedural control relies on common procedures, designated airspace, and

instructions promulgated by a control agency to deconflict and activate

airspace. Procedural control uses a common area reference system, points,

routes, and standard procedures that are promulgated via an ACO or

aeronautical document to deconflict air operations. Procedural control is

employed in airspace by defined volume and time using ACMs or weapons

control status. For example, procedural control can be executed by defining a

corridor with a specified altitude and/or time for an aircraft to pass each

waypoint along a course. The procedures deconflict the corridor and aircraft

from other airspace users. When appropriate communications exist, an

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

airspace control agency can provide procedural control instructions in real time

to increase operational flexibility for airspace users.

g. Positive control relies on surveillance, accurate identification, and effective

communications between a designated airspace control agency and the

airspace user. It is normally conducted by agencies equipped with radar;

identification, friend or foe (IFF) interrogators and receivers; beacons; track

processing computers; digital data links; and communications equipment. The

minimum requirements for surveillance, identification, and communications

equipment will vary in each theater, but are likely to be driven by a combination

of military and civil aviation regulations and the level of fidelity or risk the JFC is

willing to accept. Positive control requires the means to locate and identify

airspace users in real time and the ability to maintain continuous

communications with them for required control instructions. Positive control

procedures must include instructions on transition to procedural control if

positive control systems are degraded or become unavailable and take into

account differences between civil and military communications and surveillance

systems.

h. There is a continuum of efficiency, risk, and level of effort (resources

required) between procedural and positive control. Uncontrolled airspace

exerts a small drain on resources, but may increase risk. Standing airspace

procedures, such as a restricted operations zone (ROZ) incrementally increase

control and resources required while reducing risk. As the density of aircraft and

fires involved in combat operations increases, commanders can decrease risk

and increase the safety and effectiveness of airspace control by assigning

control of the airspace [e.g., a high-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ)]

under a control agency/element. This airspace control can be positive,

procedural, or a combination of both.

i. The ACS should provide situational awareness and the capability to respond

to evolving enemy situations and friendly air operations. Timely integration of

sensor data and networked inputs between airspace control agencies and C2

nodes to develop a common operational picture (COP) provides crucial

situational awareness for airspace agencies, users, and command decision

authorities.

4. Summary

Airspace management and control procedures enhance effective and efficient

airspace operations in support of JFC objectives. All joint force components

have legitimate mission requirements for airspace that should be integrated

and/or coordinated within the airspace control system. Airspace control is

required to prevent friendly force fratricide, enhance air defense operations,

facilitate fire support, and maximize the effectiveness of operations conducted

from and through the air to accomplish JFC mission objectives. When planning

joint air operations, planners must consider integrating airspace requirements

from the outset.

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Chapter II

Airspace Authorities

1. Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs)

a. Combatant commanders and other JFCs exercise sufficient airspace

authority to conduct joint operations, achieve military objectives, and to employ

combat forces effectively. The ACA must design an ACS that is responsive to

the needs of the joint force, and integrates airspace with HN, coalition partners,

and OGA requirements. Airspace may be granted by sovereign nations via

international agreements or seized by force from enemy nations during combat

operations. If a GCC establishes a subordinate joint task force, he/she may

delegate ACA, within that area of responsibility (AOR), to the subordinate JFC

or retain it at the theater level. This should be clearly specified in the

establishing directive. Unless clearly stated otherwise, this publication assumes

that JFCs have authority to control airspace within their AORs.

Airspace Control Document

b. Airspace Control Plan. The ACP is developed by the ACA, in conjunction

with other components, to detail the broad policies and procedures for airspace

control within the JOA. The ACP should include transitions between phases or

the ACP should be updated as phase transitions occur. The ACP is signed by

the JFC and becomes the JFC’s airspace policies and procedures. Some of the

major components of the ACP include:

(1) Description of the operational area within which airspace applies.

(2) List of current existing capabilities within the AOR/JOA to provide airspace

control.

(3) Description and duties of the ACA, each airspace user (to include

requirements for liaisons to and coordination with the ACA), and elements

used in airspace control system.

(4) Description of the interface between ACA, AADC, and fires elements with

procedures for deconflicting air defense and operational requirements.

(5) Description of interface with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), HN

air traffic control (ATC) system and / or International Civil Aviation

Organization (ICAO).

(6) Description of the interface between US and multinational forces to

coordinate and deconflict airspace requirements.

(7) Plans to provide for continuity of airspace control operations under

degraded conditions.

(8) Description of the airspace control procedures for the joint force including

requesting, approving, modifying, and promulgating procedures.

(9) Description of IFF/ selective identification feature (SIF) procedures.

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2. Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)

a. The JFACC is a functional component commander, designated by the JFC.

The JFACC exercises tactical control of air forces made available for tasking in

accordance with the JFC’s direction. The JFACC is normally designated as the

ACA and AADC.

Airspace Control Documents

b. Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP). The JAOP is the JFACC’s plan for

integrating and coordinating joint air operations that include tasked forces,

message format, suspense for planning and execution phases, and rules of

engagement (ROE). The JAOP translates JFACC tasking from the JFC into an

air strategy and establishes the JFACC’s objectives. The JAOP accomplishes

the following:

(1) Integrates the efforts of joint air and space capabilities and forces.

(2) Identifies desired end state objectives and tasks to be achieved through

air operations.

(3) Identifies measures or indicators of success, used to determine whether

air operations are meeting assigned objectives.

(4) Accounts for current and potential adversary offensive and defensive

courses of action.

(5) Incorporates space capabilities into the JAOP.

(6) Synchronizes the phasing of air and space operations with the JFC's

operation or campaign plan:

(a) The first phase normally will involve counter-air operations to attain and

maintain the required degree of air superiority to accomplish other joint

actions.

(b) Offensive air operations may begin in conjunction with the initial

counterair operations or be delayed until the requisite air superiority is

achieved to reduce losses and attain greater freedom of action.

(7) Specifies what capabilities and forces are required to achieve joint air

objectives.

c. Air Operations Directive (AOD). The AOD is an air component document

similar to a fragmentary order (FRAGORD). The daily AOD gives planners the

priority of effort, operational constraints, and any other specific guidance

governing the planning / execution of air and space operations during a

particular ATO period. Airspace personnel should review the AOD to gain an

overall view of what airspace requirements the ATO development created and

to understand daily priorities for airspace deconfliction. In addition, the AOD

may have specific guidance references for the airspace (i.e., plan for high value

airborne asset retrograde procedures due to threat). The AOD translates the

JFACC’S JAOP into guidance for the planning and execution of a specific ATO.

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The AOD is developed within the AOC’s Strategy Division by the strategy

guidance team and is distributed via theater battle management core system

(TBMCS) and on the air component network, typically SECRET Internet

Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). The AOD, while not authoritative for

Army forces, should be read and understood by AC2 personnel to understand

the JFACC airspace priorities and guidance.

d. Air Tasking Order (ATO). The ATO is the “operation order” or mission

assignment for all aircraft missions available for JFACC tasking. Other

component air missions that appear on the ATO are not under control of the

JFACC, but their presence on the ATO provides visibility to assist overall

coordination and deconfliction. This daily document shows all missions

operating in theater and aircrews must ensure they are on this daily mission

tasking prior to flight.

e. Special Instructions (SPINS). In some theaters, numerous airspace

procedures and airspace usages are published in the SPINS. The SPINS carry

a section that lists the airspace procedures. Other SPINS sections such as

tanker procedures or cruise missile procedures also address airspace

procedures within those particular sections. The SPINS may include ROE and

combat identification criteria for air defense along with any additional

guidance/directives/information that weapons system operators and/or aircrews

will require such as: HN restrictions, base defense zone (BDZ) procedures, and

special weapons systems control procedures (e.g., unmanned aircraft (UA) or

cruise missiles). SPINS are published as baseline SPINS, weekly SPINS, and

daily SPINS.

f. Operations Task Link (OPTASKLINK). The OPTASKLINK details specifics of

the data link architecture. The joint interface control officer (JICO) monitors the

data link nets to ensure transfer and display of critical air defense information.

When directed, the JICO will transmit, via data link, engagement commands

and air defense warning changes to linked agencies. The JICO coordinates the

development of the OPTASKLINK message and manages all tactical data link

(TDL) interfaces to create a consolidated air picture.

g. Tactical Operational Data (TACOPDAT). The TACOPDAT lays down the

tasking for air defense assets to include locations and C2 alignments of USAF

and USA air and ground based air defense systems. The JICO coordinates the

development of the TACOPDAT message and manages all TDL interfaces to

create a consolidated air picture.

3. Airspace Control Authority (ACA)

a. The component commander designated as the ACA assumes overall

responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in the JOA. The

ACA develops broad policies and procedures for airspace control and the

coordination required among units within the operational area. When approved

by the JFC, these policies and procedures are promulgated via the JFC’s ACP.

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b. A key responsibility of the ACA is to provide an effective and adaptive

airspace control system to meet contingency situations and to necessitate the

rapid employment of forces in support of the JFC mission. Matters on which the

ACA is unable to obtain agreement are referred to the JFC for resolution. A

summary of the key ACA responsibilities is provided below:

(1) Identify and coordinate airspace access required for the JFC’s mission.

(2) Provide effective and timely integration of the airspace control system with

that of the HN, coordinating and deconflicting airspace user requirements

to include conduct of operations in support of normal air commerce

operators as governed by HN and ICAO guidance.

(3) Delegate control of specific airspace for a commander to accomplish a

specified mission or facilitate decentralized execution in accordance with

the ACP (e.g., amphibious objective area [AOA] or air defense sector).

Airspace Control Document

c. Airspace Control Order (ACO). The ACO is developed after component

commanders consolidate, deconflict, and forward their airspace requests to the

ACA for further consolidation with other theater-wide inputs. Typically, the

combat plans division of the AOC develops and promulgates the ACO. The

ACO implements specific ACMs for specific time periods. The ACO activates

and deactivates procedural control measures, and updates positive control

procedures. The ACO is normally published as a stand-alone document, but it

may be published as part of the ATO SPINS.

4. Area Air Defense Commander (AADC)

a. The AADC is responsible for DCA, which doctrinally includes both air and

missile threats. The AADC must identify those volumes of airspace and control

measures, airspace management systems, and procedures that support DCA

operations, and ensure they are incorporated into the theater air ground system

(TAGS). The AADC may also designate regional or sector air defense

commanders to allow for ease of C2 in airspace based on the size and scope of

the mission/operation.

Airspace Control Document

b. Area Air Defense Plan (AADP). This plan implements JOA wide DCA

priorities, authorities, procedures, and tasks. Defensive counterair forces

execute the AADP to protect assets on the defended asset list, other critical

assets, friendly forces, and civilian population centers in accordance with JFC

guidance. Some of the major components of the AADP include:

(1) A layered and/or overlapping defense to allow for multiple engagement

opportunities.

(2) Information operations (IO) strategies for counterair.

(3) Detailed weapons control and engagement procedures and authorities

integral to a joint counterair operation.

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(4) Specific ACMs required to accomplish the mission.

(5) All surface-to-air capabilities assigned, attached, and supporting.

(6) Provisions for protection of high value airborne assets.

(7) Guidance on electronic warfare to disrupt or destroy guidance systems.

The integration of air defense in the ACP is critical. The location of specific

types of air defense operations and specific procedures for the identification of

aircraft are critical to a viable ACP. The AADP needs to be written with detailed

engagement procedures that are consistent with the ACP and operations in the

combat zone. Drafters of the AADP must be cognizant of the capabilities and

limitations of fielded equipment employed by the joint/combined forces.

Airspace control and area air defense operations need to be capable of

functioning in a degraded C2 environment.

5. Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR)

a. The COMAFFOR normally exercises operational control over Air Force

forces assigned or attached to a JTF. The USAF theater air control system

(TACS) is an organic Air Force system used to conduct C2 of Air Force forces

(AFFOR). The senior node of the USAF TACS is the AOC. If the JFC decides

not to organize functionally, the COMAFFOR may still be designated as the

ACA, AADC, or both. If the JFC does not organize functionally, Service

components should still consider exchanging liaison elements at the appropriate

command level.

b. If the COMAFFOR is designated as the JFACC, the AOC will become a joint

or combined AOC (JAOC or CAOC) and the USAF TACS with the airspace

control elements of other Services will combine to form the TAGS in accordance

with JFC direction.

6. Air Operations Center (AOC)

a. The Air Force air and space operations center is the senior element of the

TACS and is where centralized planning, direction, control, and coordination of

air and space operations occur. If the COMAFFOR is designated as the

JFACC, other components and coalition partners provide personnel to the AOC

for coordinating and deconflicting the operations of their forces. In this case,

the Air Force air and space operations center becomes a joint or combined

AOC (JAOC or CAOC.)

b. The AOC has five divisions (strategy; combat plans; combat operations;

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and air mobility), as well

as multiple support/specialty teams. Each division integrates numerous

disciplines in a cross-functional team approach for planning and execution. The

combat plans division is primarily responsible for developing the daily ACO

leveraging airspace control expertise, which may be resident in all divisions.

The operations division is responsible for immediate changes during execution,

unless delegated to another TACS/TAGS element.

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7. Control and Reporting Center (CRC)/Airborne Warning and Control

System (AWACS)

a. The CRC and airborne elements (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar

System [JSTARS] and AWACS aircraft) of the TACS provide air battle

management and airspace control to joint air forces and airspace users

throughout their sectors. Although the capabilities of these systems are

different, they are generally able to locate, identify, and communicate among

aircraft within their areas. The CRC is deployable but fixed, while the AWACS

has mobility and longer range, which allows flexibility in assignment. These

systems are not certified to provide ATC services, but typically coordinate

closely with ATC facilities, which share the airspace in their sectors.

b. Some airspace control responsibilities may be delegated to the

CRC/AWACS, for example: the authority to establish a restricted operations

area (ROA) in response to immediate requests and the authority to coordinate

directly with airspace users (e.g., brigade combat teams (BCTs) or divisions) to

make real-time airspace changes. Other airspace control authorities may be

retained at the AOC level.

c. In general, delegation of airspace control to the lowest appropriate level

produces the most responsive execution of the ACP. The ACA, when

developing the ACP, will consider a variety of factors when determining what

authorities to delegate to lower levels. These include the workload of the

CRC/AWACS, the density of air traffic within a given sector, and the JFC’s

acceptable level of risk. For example, in a highly dense area of air traffic where

the JFC’s tolerance for risk is very low (e.g., near a civil airfield), the ACA might

seek to limit the number of real-time change requests and may require changes

to be coordinated via the Army division and AOC. Conversely, if the JFC

requires a highly responsive airspace control system in a certain area, airspace

control should be delegated to a lower level (e.g., BCT and CRC) to reduce the

response time and the ACA may need to adjust the configuration of the TACS

to support the JFC’s requirements.

8. Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) / Joint Surveillance Target Attack

Radar System (JSTARS)

a. Air Support Operations Center (ASOC). The ASOC is the principal Air Force

C2 node for integrating air power into Army land operations. As a subordinate

element of the JAOC, the ASOC is responsible for the direction and control of

air operations directly supporting the Army land operation. It processes and

coordinates air missions requiring integration with other supporting arms and

ground forces. The ASOC is usually collocated with the senior Army tactical

echelon, and coordinates operations with the permanently aligned tactical air

control party (TACP), Army fires cell airspace C2 element, and the JAOC. The

ASOC has five primary functions:

(1) Manages CAS assets within the supported ground commander’s AO

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(2) Processes CAS air support requests and controls the flow of CAS aircraft

(3) Deconflicts airspace coordinating measures and fire support coordination

measures with aircraft

(4) Assigns and directs attack aircraft, when authorized, to the joint terminal

attack controllers (JTACs)

(5) Manages the Air Force air request net with its specific tactical air direction

net frequencies. Additionally, the ASOC may also coordinate in other

mission areas, to include air interdiction (AI), ISR, suppression of enemy

air defenses (SEAD), and personnel recovery operations (PRO).

b. The E-8 JSTARS aircraft is an airborne battle management and C2 platform

that supports targeting by conducting ground surveillance to develop enemy

location for rapid interdiction and retargeting of enemy ground forces. The

JSTARS can also function in a limited capacity as a backup ASOC to assign or

divert sorties onto more lucrative targets while coordinating with TACP, Army

C2 centers, and the AOC. JSTARS normally utilizes procedural control for

close coordination with AWACS and CRC to ensure appropriate coordination of

airspace.

9. Tactical Air Control Party (TACP)

A TACP is the principal Air Force liaison element aligned with Army maneuver

units from battalion through corps. For airspace management, TACPs integrate

with fires cells and the Army airspace command and control (AC2) cells. TACPs

assist ground maneuver units in the planning and coordinating of fire support

coordination measures (FSCMs) and ACMs needed to integrate air and ground

operations. TACPs assist the ASOC and joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC)

for tactical control of CAS and forward air controller (airborne) (FAC [A]) aircraft

transiting from the ASOC contact point to the JTAC contact point.

10. Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC)

The JFLCC is the functional land force commander, designated by the JFC.

Within the Army, the JFLCC headquarters (HQ) can be at the theater, corps, or

division level.

11. Army Forces (ARFOR) Commander

The ARFOR commander is the component commander of Army forces provided

to the JFC and JFLCC. The ARFOR HQ could be designated at the theater,

corps, or division level. The theater Army’s AC2 element is responsible for

integrating Army airspace requirements into the theater’s deliberate and

contingency plans. The ARFOR’s AC2 element provides Army input into the

ACO, as well as the SPINS. The ARFOR also ensures that JFC’s guidance for

airspace use and risk is integrated into the Army AC2 annexes. This should be

done in collaboration with the JFACC’s development of the AOD to ensure that

airspace personnel from both functional components receive coordinated

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guidance. The interface between the JFACC and the ARFOR is accomplished

through the BCD.

12. Corps/Division Airspace Command and Control (AC2) Element

Note: For simplicity, the term division applies to corps or division and the term

BCT applies to BCT or multifunctional brigade.

a. The corps or division AC2 element can perform all AC2 tasks required for a

tactical or operational headquarters. The division AC2 element can operate

under a higher Army HQ or function as the ARFOR airspace staff. The division

AC2 element can perform all functions of a joint force land component or joint

task force (JTF) airspace element and has the digital compatibility to interface

with USMC and coalition automation systems. The AC2 element does not have

the capability to function as an ACA. If the division is a JTF or JFLCC HQ, the

division AC2 element will work directly with the BCD to interface with the

JFACC/ACA. Corps/division AC2 responsibilities include:

(1) Division AC2 remains responsible for AC2 over the entire division AO,

regardless of whether the AO has been further subdivided into BCT AOs.

(2) When a division divides part of its AO to a BCT some AC2 responsibilities

may be delegated to the BCT.

(3) Division AC2 is responsible for portions of the division’s AO unassigned to

BCTs.

(4) Division AC2 is also responsible for integrating joint, multinational, and

non-military airspace users over the entire division AO both in planning

and in execution.

(5) If the division has an unusually large AO, or if the division AO is non-

contiguous, the division can delegate AC2 responsibilities to the BCTs, but

this may require augmentation of additional AC2 personnel to the BCT.

Airspace Control Document

b. Operations Order (OPORD). Division airspace control information is

contained within the division AC2 annex of the OPORD. This document

contains not only Army specific AC2 information but should contain airspace

control information from the ACP, ACO, SPINS, and any relevant AOD

information to ensure unity of effort in airspace control operations throughout

the theater.

13. Brigade Combat Team (BCT)

All of the multifunctional BCT/brigades (except sustainment) have an organic air

defense airspace management (ADAM)/brigade aviation element (BAE). This

staff element is composed of air defense artillery (ADA) and aviation personnel

and performs the AC2 integration function for the brigade in addition to its air and

missile defense and aviation functions. While other members of the brigade staff

are key AC2 members (fires cell, air liaison officer (ALO)/TACP, UA operators),

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the ADAM/BAE is the AC2 integrator for the S-3, Operations. BCT AC2

responsibilities include:

(1) The authority that a BCT controlling an AO has over Army airspace users

is the same as the BCT’s authority over ground units transiting its AO.

(2) BCTs have authority over all Army airspace users in their AO, as well as

CAS aircraft in support of BCT operations.

(3) All Army airspace users transiting a BCT AO are expected to coordinate

with the BCT responsible for the AO they are transiting.

(4) Division will only integrate Army airspace use between BCTs if

adjudication between BCTs is necessary.

(5) For certain situations, it may be necessary to request approval for a BCT

to control a volume of airspace such as a HIDACZ. However, if a BCT is to

control airspace for an extended period, the ADAM/BAE should be

augmented with additional air control assets from the combat aviation

brigade air traffic service company.

(6) Several multifunctional brigades do not routinely control AOs but conduct

operations throughout the division AO (fires brigade, combat aviation

brigade, battlefield surveillance brigade). These brigades will normally

coordinate their airspace use with the BCTs whose AO they will transit (or

with division AC2 for portions of the division AO unassigned to a BCT).

(7) When these brigades are tasked by division to execute a mission (e.g.

interdiction attack, strike, ISR,) that affects airspace use by other brigades,

the brigade conducting the operation is the lead AC2 planner. The

division AC2 element provides planning and airspace integration support

to the brigade ADAM ensuring that the division airspace plan is adjusted to

take into account the brigade commander’s priorities and concept of the

operation.

14. Component Liaisons

a. Battlefield Coordination Detachment. The BCD is the ARFOR component

liaison to the AOC; the BCD is neither an operational commander nor a staff.

The BCD responsibilities include:

(1) Coordinate Army requests for air support and JFACC requests for support

from ground units.

(2) Coordinate air defense, theater missile defense (TMD), and airspace

requirements with the AOC and the land force air defense headquarters.

(3) Provide information on friendly and enemy ground order of battle and

assist in interpreting this information.

(4) Coordinate all changes that affect the current ATO and changes in the

land forces' current operations, objectives, priorities, nominated targets,

and FSCMs.

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(5) Provide the AOC with the Army commander's intent, guidance, objectives,

priorities for air support, FSCMs, and planned concept of operations.

b. Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE). The ACCE is the JFACC’s

component liaison to the JFC/JTF commander or component commander

headquarters. The ACCE’s responsibilities include:

(1) Facilitate interaction between the respective component staffs. Normally,

has no authority to direct or execute operations.

(2) ACCE may include plans, operations, intelligence, airspace management,

logistics, space, and air mobility expertise.

(3) If JFC authorizes, ACCE may represent the JFACC to the HN during

enabling civil authority phase of military operations as the direct JFACC

liaison on air operations.

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Chapter III

Planning Considerations

1. Planning, Implementation, and Execution

a. Successful planning, implementation, and execution of airspace control

requires the JFC, JFACC, ACA, AADC, and component commanders to

accomplish specific actions. Airspace control is not static, and airspace control

planning will change with each phase as identified in JP 5-0, Joint Operation

Planning. Components must be involved in initial ACP planning and remain

involved as conditions change during each phase of the conflict. Regulation of

the airspace control function should be decentralized to the maximum extent

possible.

b. Joint airspace control must accomplish the following:

(1) Maximize combat capability of friendly forces.

(2) Minimize restrictions on friendly combat operations, both surface and air.

(3) Maximize commonality while retaining individual component protocol.

(4) Minimize fratricide.

c. The following paragraphs list the planning actions, which should occur during

each joint phase of an operation. This publication recognizes that operations

can be in more than one joint phase at any point in time and that operations

may not start or remain sequential.

2. Phase 0 - Shape

a. Coordination with the HN, regional authorities, and ICAO.

(1) The HN retains airspace control authority and the joint forces primarily use

existing international or HN aeronautical information publications for

airspace procedures or guidelines. Airspace and navigation services are

the sovereign right and responsibility of the HN.

(2) Although the JFC may choose not to designate a standing ACA during this

phase, the JFC should appoint an executive agent, normally the JFACC,

for airspace management, ATC, and issues with navigation aids in the

JOA. The joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) normally

retains authority for airspace procedures applicable to fleet air operations

over international waters within the operational area and advises the JFC’s

executive agent as appropriate. In the absence of an ACA, the JFC’s

executive agent may be delegated the authority for developing joint force

airspace requirements in coordination with the other Service components,

DOD, interagency, international, and HN authorities as appropriate.

b. Normal / Routine Military Airspace Considerations.

(1) In addition to ensuring continuation of routine DOD flight operations during

the shaping phase, joint force airspace planners establish effective

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relationships with key regional airspace authorities, develop specific

airspace control plans in preparation for future operations, and build

airspace planning expertise. Regular DOD or joint force interaction with

HN authorities and participation in regional airspace conferences help

establish relationships with the HN for quick resolution of issues and

effective coordination of airspace requirements.

(2) Development of ACPs should be as thorough as possible and include

airspace control considerations from peacetime to combat operations,

which allow for rapid and flexible transitions into follow-on phases for a

variety of possible contingencies. Additionally the ACP should integrate

civil air traffic, airspace, and air defense capabilities. Primary planning

considerations include identification of airspace required for joint force

operations and a proposed coordination process for obtaining that

airspace. Joint operational planning should consider procedures to

transfer airspace control authority from the HN to the ACA; rerouting of

airways; ACA responsibilities to continuity of civil aviation operations; and

HN notification for ACA areas of control through notices to airmen

(NOTAMs) or aeronautical information publication (AIP) entries.

3. Phase I - Deter

a. General Considerations.

(1) ATC/airspace elements or their liaisons must be involved from the outset

in planning and executing ATC and airspace management. They ensure

that airspace requirements are coordinated and approved by the proper

agencies.

(2) Planning should consider the establishment of an ATC cell to liaise with

the current HN infrastructure. Establishing relationships with key HN and

neighboring nation’s ATC and establishing an aircraft diplomatic clearance

process (e.g., for US Embassy personnel) should be accomplished as

early as possible during the planning process. Critical issues to be

covered during planning include:

(a) Identify key personnel and obtain their contact information.

(b) Identify existing agreements (e.g., AIPs, site surveys).

bilateral agreements/arrangements that govern operations (i.e., ICAO,

FAA, regional organization, or HNs). For planning purposes, this type

of information may be located in the DOD 4500.54-G, Department of

Defense Foreign Clearance Guide (https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil).

(d) Establish requirements to integrate liaison officers (LNOs), equipment,

processes, and functions.

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(e) Establish a process to terminate peacetime flying/ATC and begin

combat operations/combat airspace. Ensure that relationships are

established with the air attaché or AFFOR ATC/airspace manager.

(f) Identify critical airfields capable of supporting wartime and sustainment

operations.

b. Considerations for Combined Civil-military Operations.

(1) Determine current infrastructure that supports both civil and military

combat operations.

(2) Determine the ACA (i.e., JFACC, HN, or a combination). If airspace

control authority is retained by civil authorities, determine who is

coordinating military efforts.

(3) Planning should recognize the requirement to sustain and support civil

aviation as soon as possible.

(4) The integration plan must consider the following:

(a) Available personnel and equipment, including those of coalition

partners.

(b) Certification standards for controllers and equipment.

theater / intra-theater procedures.

(d) Information flow to all airspace users.

(e) Ability to continue combat operations as necessary.

(f) Notification of airspace use to outside agencies.

(g) Working with the HN to produce AIPs.

(h) Existing rules, regulations, and agreements/arrangements that govern

operations.

c. JFACC/AADC/ACA Planning and Products. The plans, orders, and

directives must be continually updated as conditions change in the JOA (e.g.,

initially combat operations may be limited to military airspace users, however, in

later phases civil, HN, and NGO airspace users would be allowed into the JOA).

• ADP

• ACP

• ACO

• AOD

• Army OPORD AC2 Annexes

• ATO/SPINS

d. Airspace Control Planning for Transition from Peace to War:

(1) Identification of all airspace users.

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(2) Airspace control for conventional support of special operations forces

(SOF).

(3) Joint and component UAS planning.

(4) Airspace control for sequential operations.

(5) Airspace control for simultaneous operations.

(6) Joint/coalition agreements on TACS/Army air-ground system (AAGS)

construct/architecture in preparation for Phase II. These agreements may

affect time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) priorities/flow in

the initial stages of the operations.

(7) Planning for ground based TACS/AAGS end state in Phase III/IV. Ensure

the logistical planning for follow on TACS/AAGS system architecture is

accomplished to enable the necessary sequencing of assets.

(8) Types of control to be used (positive, procedural, combination of both).

(9) Common theater wide reference systems to be used (e.g., GARS, CGRS).

(10) ASOC/joint air coordination element (JACE) movement sequencing and

placement during follow-on phases.

(11) CRC movement sequencing and placement during follow-on phases.

(12) Integration and location of Army sensors (includes ADA and ATC radars)

to include self reporting systems during each phase.

(13) Theater-wide communications architecture.

(14) Communication procedures

(15) Data Networks

(16) C2 / internet tactical chat procedures.

(17) Identify the complex airspace areas which may require a higher level of

control and integration due to airspace/fires density (may require real

time procedural or positive control).

(18) Airspace control integration with JOA-wide fires.

(19) Plan for deconfliction of ACMs with fires in phase (fires in critical ACMs,

such as tanker tracks and JSTARS orbits, should be deconflicted in initial

planning to the maximum extent possible).

(20) Agreement on theater-wide FSCMs (e.g., kill box, fire support

coordination line [FSCL] placement).

e. Airspace Control Planning for Transition from War to Peace.

(1) Infrastructure Availability. Determine what airways, HN navigational aids,

airfields, certified ATC personnel, and ATC facilities are available.

(2) Rules and Regulations. Determine what rules and regulations (i.e.,

ICAO/FAA, HN) will be used to certify and authorize air traffic controllers to

work air traffic in the HN and what standards apply.

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(3) End State. Consider the JFC’s goals and end state during the transition.

(a) Coordinate with the HN Ministry of Transportation or equivalent.

(b) Determine requirements to establish an end state.

OIF, a combined airspace planning group (including HN, FAA, ICAO,

and DOD members) was chartered to do this function.

(d) Strategically place ATC/airspace LNOs within HN

aviation/ATC/airspace organizations.

(e) Ensure that letters of procedure, AIPs, flight information publications,

and terminal instrument procedures are established, updated, and

coordinated with sovereign nation(s) as required. Further, ensure that

this information is provided to US Embassy personnel in affected HNs

and to the promulgators of DOD 4500.54-G, Department of Defense

Foreign Clearance Guide, at https://fcg@pentagon.af.mil.

4. Phase II - Seize Initiative Planning Considerations

a. Determine the airspace control arrangement when the JFACC is the

supported commander for strategic attack, counterair, suppression of enemy air

defenses (SEAD), and AI.

b. Determine the integration of joint fires when the trajectories fall outside or

cross airspace control boundaries.

(1) Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM).

(2) Army fires to include:

(a) Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).

(b) Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).

(d) Mortars.

(3) Conventional air launched cruise missiles (CALCMs).

(4) SOF AC2.

(5) UAS.

(6) Other joint forces.

(7) SOF.

(8) Other governmental agencies (OGAs).

c. Operations with and without ASOC/JACE including transitions.

d. Operations with and without CRC including transitions.

e. Integration of AADC and theater air and missile defense (TAMD).

f. Integrate post hostility planning.

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g. Authorities for real time execution in the following mission areas:

(1) DCA.

(2) Time sensitive targets.

(3) High-payoff targets.

(4) Combat search and rescue (CSAR).

(5) Personnel recovery.

(6) Troops in contact.

(7) AI.

(8) Counterfire.

h. AOD priorities for pre and post air superiority:

(1) Airborne early warning mission priorities.

(2) CRC mission priorities.

(3) ISR mission priorities.

i. Transition plan between control agencies when JFLCC becomes supported

commander.

(1) JFLCC requirements included in the ACP.

(2) Integration of fixed/rotary/UA.

(3) Integration of SOF air in JFLCC AO.

(4) Placement of ASOC/CRC/JACE.

(5) Use of airborne C2 [AWACS/JSTARS, FAC(A)] for real time control.

(6) Integration of brigade combat team ADAM/BAE.

j. JFLCC post hostility airspace control planning and potential utilization of

captured equipment and personnel in post hostilities.

k. TACS changes to support a moving JFLCC. Initial movement of ground

based TACS.

l. Authorities and procedures for real time execution in JFLCC AO:

(1) DCA.

(2) Time sensitive targets.

(3) High-payoff targets.

(4) CSAR.

(5) Personnel recovery.

(6) Troops in contact.

(7) AI.

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m. ACP/ACO integration/deconfliction for:

(1) Fires

(2) CAS

(3) UAS

(4) Joint air attack team (JAAT)

(5) ISR

(6) AI

n. Determine if there will be a coordinating altitude. Will the coordination be for

fixed-wing/rotary-wing safety, fires, or both?

o. Integration of ASOC with fires cell.

p. Airspace control nodes and authorities for special missions:

(1) Joint pickup zone (PZ)/ landing zone (LZ) operations.

(2) Airbase opening.

(3) Joint airborne and air assault operations.

q. Risk.

r. Theater-wide communications architecture:

(1) Communications.

(2) Data networks.

(3) C2/internet chat procedures.

5. Phase III - Dominate Planning Considerations

a. Determine if any unassigned airspace areas are within the JFLCC AO.

b. Procedures and ATC considerations for forward operating bases

(FOB)/airfields.

c. ATC functions at captured airfields.

d. ADA integration behind the forward line of own troops (FLOT).

e. UAS integration.

f. Update authorities in ACP.

g. Update integration of airborne C2 elements with ASOC.

h. Integration of airspace control element and fires cell with ASOC.

i. Placement of CRC/ADA radar coverage.

j. Creation of airspace control for complex areas (e.g., HIDACZ, airport traffic

areas).

k. AO-wide communications for airspace users.

Integration of AADC and TAMD.

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m. Post hostility airspace control actions.

n. AOD priorities for post air superiority. Airborne C2/CRC level of effort

transition from JFACC to JFLCC support during campaign phasing.

o. Termination/modification of interdiction ROE and/or transition to theater-

wide CAS procedures.

p. Update FAC(A) and strike coordination and reconnaissance coordinator

(SCARC) procedures.

q. Airspace control elements/airspace and authorities for special missions.

(1) Joint PZ/LZ operations.

(2) Airbase opening.

(3) Joint airborne and air assault operations.

r. DCA requirements.

s. HIDACZ/sector requirements.

t. Theater-wide communications architecture.

(1) Communications.

(2) Data networks.

(3) C2/internet chat procedures.

6. Phase IV - Stabilize Planning Considerations

a. Establish airspace control requirements. The JFACC could be required to

perform roles traditionally associated with a HN aviation authority which may

include the development of aeronautical information (e.g., instrument

procedures, publications, NOTAMs), civil flight planning procedures,

certification of procedures, aviation safety investigation, training of

HN/contract personnel, or operation of airspace infrastructure systems.

b. Determine the area and method of airspace control requirements (e.g.,

positive control, procedural control).

c. Sectors/HIDACZ/coordinating altitude/routes.

d. Define authorities in ACP.

e. JFACC/ACA updates ACP/AOD if required.

f. Locations of TACS/AAGS elements.

g. CRC/ASOC/JACE/ATC locations.

h. Location of ATC elements.

(1) HN capabilities.

(2) Neighboring country considerations.

(3) Communications.

(4) Radar coverage.

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(5) Airfields and FOBs.

(6) Navigational aids and airfield approach procedures.

i. Integrate with AOC.

j. Integrate with ground commander command elements.

k. ACA transitions from airborne to ground-based TACS/AAGS.

l. Coordinate fires in the presence of civil air.

m. Integrate UAS in the presence of ICAO/civil air.

n. DCA requirements.

o. Establish AOR wide distribution of joint airspace control information.

p. Determine requirements and plan for Coalition, HN, contract, and civil users’.

ACA creates procedures to integrate military and civil airspace.

q. Re-establish HN airspace control capability.

7. Phase V - Enable Civil Authority Planning Considerations

a. Complete transition of ATC to HN:

(1) Determine if the joint force continues to maintain portions of airspace

control system/airspace in support of combat operations during this

transition.

(2) Access the availability of infrastructure (e.g., available airways, HN

operational navigational aids, airfields, certified ATC personnel, and ATC

facilities).

(3) Determine rules and regulations (i.e., ICAO/FAA, HN, military) that will be

used to certify and authorize air traffic controllers to work air traffic in the

HN.

(4) Provide ATC/airspace LNOs with HN aviation/ATC/airspace authorities.

(5) Ensure that letters of procedure, aviation/flight information publications,

and terminal instrument procedures are established, updated, and

coordinated with HN.

b. Dual or combined CRCs.

c. Coalition considerations.

8. Post Hostility Airspace Control

a. Build an integrated/joint/coalition/interagency plan across all phases to

create an HN airspace control capability.

b. Identify the HN air/ground system in place post hostility.

(1) Location, bases, places.

(2) Identify who operates the system (i.e., civilian system, civilian/military

system, or military system).

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c. US/coalition/HN:

(1) Determine who will train HN ATC personnel.

(2) Determine who will train and certify HN technicians.

(3) Determine the source and funding for HN equipment.

(4) Identify the phase when HN ATC will be operational.

(5) Identify the portions of the former enemy airspace control system that can

be used.

(6) Identify the former enemy personnel, units, and groups that can be trusted

to participate in airspace structure development.

(7) Determine the critical airspace control infrastructure that should be

safeguarded during phases II/III/IV.

(8) Determine the transition date for when the HN is capable of its own

airspace control operation.

(9) Determine the units/organizations tasks that must be complete during

each phase to enable HN success.

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

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Chapter IV

Real-time Coordination of Airspace

1. Airspace Users

Regardless of the success of advanced airspace planning, there will always

remain a requirement for immediate, real-time coordination of airspace to support

the evolving tactical battle. The following list identifies the facilities and the

systems required to support real-time coordination of airspace within the US

Army and US Air Force.

a. Army - Field Artillery / Rotary-wing Aircraft / Army UAS

(1) Coordination Facilities

(a) BCD

(b) AC2 (Division or higher)

(d) Fires Cell

(2) Coordination Systems

(a) Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (AFATDS)

(b) Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS)

b. Army - Mortars

(1) Coordination Facilities

(a) Fire Support Officer (FSO)

(b) Battalion HQ

(2) Coordination Systems

(a) Mortar Ballistic Computer (MBC). The MBC is a handheld, lightweight,

battery-powered computer that is used for automated computations,

digital communications, and display of mortar-related information,

which is then relayed to the gun line.

(b) AFATDS. While some infantry units have AFATDS for coordinating

mortars, AFATDS will NOT check mortar trajectory.

c. Naval Surface Fire Support/Tomahawk Land Attack Missile

(1) Coordination Facilities

(a) Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC)

(b) Tactical Air Control Center (TACC)

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FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

(2) Coordination Systems

(a) AFATDS

(b) TBMCS

d. Air Force - Fixed-wing / Rotary-wing Aircraft / Air Force UAS.

(1) Coordination Facilities

(a) AOC

(b) CRC / AWACS

(d) TACP

(e) ATC

(2) Coordination Systems

(a) Tactical internet chat

(b) TBMCS

e. SOF - Fixed-wing / Rotary-wing Aircraft / UAS

(1) Coordination Facilities

(a) Joint special operations air component (JSOAC)

(b) Special operations command and control element (SOCCE)

(d) JACE

(2) Coordination Systems

(a) AFATDS

(b) TBMCS

f. Host Nation / Civilian / NGO / OGA - Civil Air / Rotary-wing Aircraft / UAS

(1) Coordination Facilities

(a) ATC (i.e., FAA / ICAO)

(2) Coordination Systems

(a) Air traffic system

(b) ICAO

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2. Fires Coordination Between Airspace Users.

a. Coordination of mortars and aircraft.

(1) Mortars are by their nature decentralized from traditional fires coordination

and used as an infantry weapon that fills the immediate need for their

commanders. Consequently, not all mortars will be coordinated using

AFATDS.

(2) Infantry officers are trained and practice basic deconfliction vice

integration of mortars with aircraft. If the infantry commander is aware that

aircraft are in the area, he will hold his mortar fire until those aircraft are

clear.

b. Coordination of Army rotary-wing aircraft and fires.

(1) AC2 personnel will enter the required airspace coordination area - FSCM

data into the TAIS.

(2) The airspace coordination area data will be sent electronically to the fire

support coordinator (FSCOORD) and automatically entered into AFATDS.

(3) When fire missions are planned or requested, AFATDS will automatically

check the trajectory of the rounds against active ACMs. If the trajectory

intersects, AFATDS will alert the operator before firing the mission. The

operator may choose a different attack option; one that does not violate

any airspace measures.

Note: AFATDS will check the trajectories of rounds for conflicts with ACMs, but

only for:

ACO

ACMs built using a corridor shape

or the following ACMs entered directly into AFATDS

airspace coordination area

air corridors

minimum risk routes (MRRs)

standard use Army flight routes (SAAFRs)

Appendix B lists all the ACMs that are compatible with AFATDS, TAIS, and

TBMCS

c. Coordination of Army UAS with fires.

The UAS section will inform the ADAM/BAE cell of the launch and intended

search location of the UA.

(1) When fire missions are planned or requested, the FSO will coordinate with

the ADAM/BAE to ensure that the UA is not in conflict with the fires

trajectory.

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(2) When a conflict is identified, the fires cell and ADAM/BAE will resolve it by

delaying the fire mission or moving the UA. If the mission is urgent, the

chief of operations (CHOPS) may accept the risk.

d. Coordination of aircraft with fires outside Army controlled airspace.

(1) In the normal planning process:

(a) The BCD or ASOC will provide ACO information to the corps / division

fires cell for input into AFATDS.

(b) AFATDS will distribute airspace information throughout the fire support

system.

(2) In dynamic situations:

(a) The TACP will provide airspace coordination area information to the

fires cell and ADAM/BAE cell.

(b) If time permits, the airspace coordination area information will be

entered into AFATDS.

(3) When fire missions are planned or requested, AFATDS will automatically

check the trajectory of the rounds against active ACMs. If the trajectory

intersects, AFATDS will alert the operator before firing the mission. The

operator may choose a different attack option; one that does not violate

any airspace measures.

(a) When time does not permit, the ADAM/BAE, fires cell, and TACP will

deconflict operations by time, lateral, or altitude separation.

(b) Coordinate with CRC or ATC as required.

Note: AFATDS will check the trajectories of rounds for conflicts with ACMs, but

only for:

ACO

ACMs built using a corridor shape

or the following ACMs entered directly into AFATDS

airspace coordination area

air corridors

minimum risk routes (MRRs)

standard use Army flight routes (SAAFRs)

Appendix B lists all the ACMs that are compatible with AFATDS, TAIS, and

TBMCS

e. CAS coordination.

(1) Outside Army controlled airspace.

(a) After take-off, CRC activates airspace for the CAS mission. CRC will

push aircraft to the ASOC / TACP / JTAC.

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22 MAY 2009

(b) CAS complete, JTAC pushes aircraft back to ASOC or CRC. CRC

deactivates airspace and coordinates return to base (RTB).

(2) Inside Army controlled airspace.

(a) After take-off, CRC activates airspace for the CAS mission. CRC will

push aircraft to TACP / JTAC.

(b) JTAC coordinates airspace with Army fires cell and ADAM/BAE.

deactivates airspace and coordinates return to base.

f. Close combat attack (CCA). Army rotary-wing inside Army-controlled

airspace.

(a) Prior to departure, helicopter checks in with BCT aviation operations

(Avn Ops).

(b) BCT Avn Ops provides airspace clearance and instructions to the

aircraft.

(d) ADAM/BAE provides mission information to division AC2 element.

(e) ADAM/BAE deconflicts airspace with fires cell for fires and S-2 for

UAS.

g. SOF Operations.

(a) JSOAC contacts CRC / AWACS and identifies required airspace to

activate SOF ROZ and the participating aircraft for the SOF ROZ.

(b) CRC / AWACS clears all non-participating aircraft from SOF ROZ.

the CRC / AWACS.

(d) JSOAC notifies division AC2 cell of SOF ROZ.

(e) Division AC2 clears SOF ROZ of Army aircraft inside Army controlled

airspace.

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Chapter V

Complex Airspace

1. Introduction

a. General.

(1) To achieve a specific tactical objective, there will be occasions that require

synchronization of multiple airspace users from more than one Service or

functional component in a dense and constrained operational area. If the

airspace synchronization requires a near constant coordination among

users, for a finite period, this operation may require focused airspace

measures to accomplish the mission.

(2) For the purposes of this publication, complex airspace can be described

as airspace simultaneously used by two or more components, requiring

near constant coordination among airspace users to synchronize force

employment for a common objective. Complex airspace normally is

extraordinary in nature for a specific, finite period of time and space.

b. Common Reference System. A common reference system among airspace

users is a fundamental requirement for airspace control. For emergent and

immediate execution, this common reference system must be simple, widely

distributed, and integrated within the various platforms and weapons systems. A

common reference system is also an operational level means to “digitize” the

operational environment and provide a two-dimensional construct from which

three-dimensional control and coordination measures can be constructed.

(1) Description. Normally a reference system involves dividing the AOR into

grids. The grid cell that results from this division is further subdivided into

sub-sections called keypads similar to a telephone keypad, and/or

quadrants. How the reference system subdivides is dependent on the

system and may be confusing since reference systems use common

terms (e.g., keypads and quadrants).

(2) Types. Reference systems use a grid origin and intersections of latitude

and longitude to produce grids of approximately 30min by 30min. This

grid system is a simple, universal identifier recognizable by each

component and their associated C2 and attack assets. Latitude and

longitude coordinate references easily define cells since they are common

and exist on most military operational graphs and charts.

(a) Global Area Reference System (GARS). GARS is the standardized

area reference system across Department of Defense. It is based on

lines of longitude (LONG) and latitude (LAT), to provide an integrated

common frame of reference for joint force situational awareness to

facilitate air-to-ground coordination, deconfliction, integration, and

synchronization. This area reference system provides a common

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FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

language between the components and simplifies communications.

The point of origin for this system is 90 degrees south and 180

degrees east/west. The areas described by GARS are coincident with

even numbered WGS-84 degree and minute lines. GARS airspace is

divided into cells, further divided into quadrants, and subdivided into

keypads.

(b) Common Geographic Reference System (CGRS). The CGRS system

predates GARS and may still be in use. CGRS uses a theater

determined origin/starting point vice the global point that GARS uses.

CGRS airspace is divided into cells, further divided into nine keypads,

and may be subdivided into quadrants.

(3) Considerations.

(a) Since GARS and CGRS use common terms (i.e., keypads and

quadrants), there is a risk of confusion since these common terms

have different meanings in the individual reference systems. As an

example, a CGRS cell (~30nm x 30nm) is divided into keypads (~10nm

x 10nm), which may be further subdivided into quadrants (~5nm x

5nm), while a GARS cell (~30nm x 30nm) is divided first into quadrants

(~15nm x 15nm) then into keypads (~5nm x 5nm). The risk in

confusion is that a GARS keypad is ~5nm x 5nm while a CGRS

keypad is ~10nm x 10nm.

(b) The ACP should define the theater-specific area reference system in

use, as well as procedures for definition and activation of airspace

dimensions. Even using the global system of GARS, procedures and

authority for activating GARS airspace will vary from theater to theater,

based on the needs and intent of the JFC. The type of system used is

less important than ensuring all components use the same reference

system and procedures.

2. High-Density Airspace Control Zone (HIDACZ)

a. Description. HIDACZ is an area in which there is a concentrated employment

of numerous and varied weapons or airspace users. A HIDACZ has defined

dimensions that usually coincide with geographical features or navigational

aids. Access to or air defense weapons status within a HIDACZ is normally

approved by the appropriate commander.

b. Uses. HIDACZ allows ground / Marine air-ground task force commanders to

regulate a volume of airspace separate from users not involved with ongoing

operations. It regulates use of the airspace because of the large volume and

density of fires supporting the operations within the described geographic area.

c. Considerations. The volume of air traffic demands careful coordination to

limit the potential conflict among aircraft needed for mission essential

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22 MAY 2009

operations within the HIDACZ and other airspace users. When establishing a

HIDACZ, consider the following:

(1) Procedures for expeditious movement of aircraft into and out of the

HIDACZ.

(2) Coordination of fire support, as well as air defense weapons control orders

or status within and in the vicinity of the HIDACZ.

(3) Location of enemy forces inside and within close proximity to the HIDACZ.

(4) Establishment of MRRs into and out of the HIDACZ and to the target area.

(5) Air traffic advisory as required. Procedures and systems also must be

considered for ATC service during instrument meteorological conditions.

d. Establishment. The operational commander nominates the HIDACZ in

accordance with the procedures established within the ACP.

e. Basic requirements.

(1) A single command authority.

(2) Command authority is integrated with the AADC.

(3) Command authority has communications with all users (inability to

communicate with command authority prevents entry into HIDACZ).

(4) Command authority has command and control over all airspace users to

include fires using positive, procedural, or a combination of control.

(5) HIDACZ must be defined in time (e.g., established from 0001Z, 18 Dec to

2359Z, 18 Jan) with adequate user space.

(6) HIDACZ must be published in the ACO.

f. Planning.

(1) Requirements and HIDACZ coordination/request procedures/ approval

procedures will be published in the ACP. See table 1 for an example of

request procedures for a HIDACZ.

(2) All HIDACZs will be published in the ACO to ensure dissemination.

(3) Indirect fires will be planned and coordinated with the fire cells.

(4) HIDACZ airspace will be returned to the ACA when not required to support

ground operations.

(5) Airspace users (manned, unmanned, and fires) may be deconflicted

procedurally, both laterally and vertically, using keypads of the theater

reference system within the HIDACZ.

(6) HIDACZ entry/exit procedures will include entry and exit points at

established altitudes.

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Table 1. Example of Land Component Request for HIDACZ

Name of HIDACZ

HIDACZ Commander

HIDACZ Control Agency

Pri:

(Ex: AWACS)

Sec:

(Ex: Div TOC)

Frequencies

(UHF/VHF/FM, include coord freq of

other tasked orgs as req’d, e.g.,

ASOC.)

Internet Chat Procedures

(Identify method of CHAT, i.e. rooms,

authentication, procedures to allow

access.)

Time HIDACZ Window

Geographical Description

(If fixed wing air is supporting,

recommend min 20 x 20 nm area.)

Vertical Description

(MSL and AGL)

Entry & Exit Procedures

Reference System

(Grid/lat-long/GARS/CGRS/Urban

Area Ref System)

Reference Points

(Cont Pts, entry/exit pts, hold pts,

bullseye, BPs, RPs, HAs, FARPs,

FOBs, LZs, Phase lines)

Helo Altitudes

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Table 1. Example of Land Component Request for HIDACZ

Control Type

(Procedural, positive, or both)

FW A/C Hold Alts

(May limit # of FW aircraft in the

HIDACZ due to maneuver airspace.)

Planned Max Altitude of Fires

LZ/PZ Control Zones

(Freqs/call signs/procedures, if reqd.)

Radio Out Procedures FW/RW

(e.g., lost link UA)

JTAC Procedures

(Freq/call sign/procedures by

exception.)

Air Defense Procedures

(DCA procedures within HIDACZ.)

FSCMs

ACMs

Adjacent Coordination

Agencies

(Coord w/ adjacent units, e.g.,

ATS/NGO/civil/coalition.)

SOF Coordination

(As req for integration w/in HIDACZ.)

Notes: Component commanders may open a HIDACZ to provide real time control of a

volume of high-density airspace. At a minimum, the commander will provide the

information listed in this table to the ACA a minimum of 48 hours prior to the operation to

enable joint and Army aircrews and C2 elements time to become familiar with the

procedures and deconflict non-participating operations.

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FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

Example of HIDACZ during Operation Iraqi Freedom - Spring 2008

The BCT ADAM/BAE cell controlled a HIDACZ up to the coordinating altitude

with the assistance of the division Air Information Center (AIC), the division

AC2 cell, and the CRC. The BCT, Division AC2 Cell, and division AIC all

shared the same common air picture. This allowed the AIC to control all

airspace users not specifically supporting the ongoing operations. Standard

air routes were established through the HIDACZ to allow routine traffic (lift,

resupply, etc.) to continue support to BCT units and FOBs. The AIC

controlled this traffic in accordance with BCT priorities, allowing the BCT

ADAM/BAE to focus strictly on aircraft in direct support of current operations.

The remainder of the HIDACZ was controlled by the BCT ADAM/BAE to

allow complete freedom of maneuver for Air Weapons Teams, UAS, and

other direct support air assets. In order to control airspace above the

HIDACZ, the CRC established a ROZ and controlled entry, exit, and

positioning of aircraft based on constant real time coordination with the

supported BCT. The Division AC2 Cell assisted the BCT ADAM/BAE by

acting as an intermediary with the CRC, the AIC, and the Division

FSCOORD. The BCT established priorities and required positioning of

aircraft. This information was passed to the AIC and to the CRC through the

Division AC2 Cell. From this information, the CRC and AIC controlled all

airspace users in the HIDACZ and ROZ in accordance with BCT priorities.

Although the true HIDACZ only occurred below the coordinating altitude, this

innovative integration of different ACMs proved effective in very high density

airspace.

3. Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA)

a. Definition. A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint

force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to

conduct special operations activities. (JP 3-0)

b. Uses. The scope and duration of the special operations forces' mission,

friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the

number, composition, and sequencing of SOF deployed into a JSOA. It may be

limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be

extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare

operations.

c. Considerations. JSOAs are normally exclusive to special operations and are

not integrated with other airspace users. JSOAs are normally used to separate

operational forces and actions.

4. Restricted Operations Areas (ROA)

a. Definition. A ROA is airspace of defined dimensions designated by the

airspace control authority, in response to specific operational situations/

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

requirements within which the operation of one or more airspace users is

restricted (JP 3-52).

Note: The terms ROZ and ROA have become synonymous for defining a volume

of airspace set aside for specific operational missions or requirements. These

zones/areas restrict some or all airspace users until termination of the mission.

b. Uses.

(1) Preplanned ROZ/ROA. A ROZ or ROA is the prescribed ACM for

airspace planners to facilitate operations. A ROZ or ROA is used for

artillery, mortar, naval surface fire support, UA operating areas, aerial

refueling, concentrated interdiction areas, areas of CSAR, SOF operating

areas, and areas that the AADC has declared “weapons free.” Commonly

used for drop zones, landing zones, search and rescue (SAR) areas, UA

launch and recovery sites, UA mission areas, surface-to-surface missile

launch sites, missile flight paths (if necessary), and predicted missile

munitions impact locations, and special electronics mission aircraft orbits.

ROA can adversely affect air defense operations; therefore, air defense

missions generally have priority over ROAs.

(2) Immediate ROZ/ROA.

(a) Ideally, all ROAs would be preplanned and included in the published

ACO. However, during high intensity operations, there is often a

requirement to establish immediate measures that restrict the use of

airspace. The pace of operations could preclude the established

procedures for requesting and/or establishing an ROA for an

immediate operation. In these instances, the ACP and SPINS must

establish pre-planned procedures for establishing immediate

ROZ/ROA.

(b) One example of an immediate ROA/ROZ procedure is that followed in

OIF/OEF and categorized as troops in contact (TIC) ROZ. This

process proved to be highly effective and efficient in the rapid

employment of kinetic weapons against enemy indirect fire systems

during OIF operations in Sadr City. Before the implementation of the

TIC ROZ, CAS, or fires in support of TIC were often delayed until the

CRC could clear airspace needed for the mission. TIC ROZ

procedures as delineated in the ACP and the AC2 Annex to the Corps

OPORD significantly decreased CAS response times.

requests CAS and sends the TIC ROZ request via tactical chat to all

affected agencies (Division ALO, AC2, FSCOORD, CRC, RAPCON,

ATC/Tower, etc) as identified in the ACP. Each airspace controlling

agency then cleared the affected airspace using specified altitudes and

a radius from the TIC location. The published procedures establish

standard dimensions for the TIC ROZ, negating the requirement to

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

pass large amounts of unique data each occurrence. Aircraft below

the coordinating altitude are cleared by the ADAM/BAE or division AC2

cell, while aircraft above the coordinating altitude are cleared by CRC.

When the TIC ROZ overlaps other controlling agencies’ airspace,

these agencies clear airspace users from the airspace within the ROZ.

Once all aircraft are cleared, each agency responds back via tactical

chat that the area is cleared.

(3) SOF ROZ/ROA. While SOF ROZs can be preplanned, they are normally

activated with minimum prior notice and typically have priority over

surrounding operations due to daily AOD priority list. Planning for SOF

ROZ will occur via SOF channels and submitted to AOC. Upon

implementation, a SOF ROZ is coordinated with CRC / AWACS and

surrounding airspace control/ATC agencies and typically controlled by a

JTAC. A SOF ROZ technique for ease of use is to standardize the ROZ

dimension, as an example the lower level, surface-2,999 ft AGL in a 2 nm

radius, and an upper level 3,000 ft - 14,000 ft AGL in a 3 nm radius. ROZ

dimensions are minimum required to encompass operations while

minimizing impact on non-users.

c. Considerations. A ROZ and ROA are not recognized volumes of airspace

that restrict the application of fires. Automated ground fire computations (e.g.,

AFATDS) do not recognize these volumes of airspace as conflicts to fire

solutions. If the airspace planner desires automated ground fire computations

to restrict fires, planners must build an airspace coordination area with the same

dimensional data as the ROZ, within the automated ground fire systems to

restrict the use of fires within these airspace volumes.

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

Appendix A

Risk and the Operational Environment

Commanders at every echelon must consciously assess risk of conflicts between

airspace users, the consequences of these conflicts, and which consequences or

conflicts are acceptable based on the operational environment. Each

commander must determine what risks are unacceptable and include this in

orders issued to subordinate units. The criteria for risk tolerance will differ at

operational and tactical levels, as will the level of detail. This appendix is

designed to identify a framework for commanders to issue risk guidance to

subordinate organizations and does not attempt to identify all risks, situations,

and mitigation techniques that commanders must consider. Once the

commanders have agreed to the acceptable risk, this guidance should be

published in the ACP and promulgated in the ACO/division orders AC2 annex to

ensure widest dissemination. The acceptable risk guidance should be

readdressed as the military operations progress through the operational planning

phases.

At the strategic and operational level, the conflicts assessed could be as simple

as identifying the risk to civilian aircraft posed by military operations. One

possible conclusion is that no risk to civilian aviation is acceptable due to

potential repercussions in international relations. Some of the potential conflicts

that should be addressed at the strategic/operational level include civilian

aviation, high value assets, and United Nations operations. See table 2.

Note: Numerical values and approval authorities are notional and are

provided for illustration; actual values and approval authorities should be

identified based on the operational environment.

Table 2. Example Strategic/Operational Risk Level

Affected Element

Acceptable Risk

When Risk can be

Accepted

Civil Aviation

Not acceptable

None

High Value Assets

Extremely Low

Only to prevent

(JSTARS/AWACS/Rivet

CATASTROPHIC

Joint, etc.)

consequences.

(mass civilian casualties,

nuclear event, etc.)

These conflict types/risks will become more specific at each echelon and will

include considerations for operational phasing. Each commander must identify

their non-negotiable risks and the conditions under which the risk becomes

acceptable.

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FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

In addition to non-negotiable risks, (i.e., unacceptable) the JFC must establish

baseline risk criteria for airspace users. The criteria should be specific enough to

minimize uncertainty and enable execution nodes to make decisions in support of

JFC criteria. Some areas for consideration are listed in table 3.

Note: Numerical values and approval authorities are notional and are

provided for illustration; actual values and approval authorities should be

identified based on the operational environment.

Table 3. Example JFC Established Baseline Airspace Risk

Risk to

Risk from

Acceptable

When to accept risk

Risk

Civil

Any Military

None

On approval from JFC.

Aviation

System

Manned

Indirect Fires

Trajectory no

1. Immediate fires in

Aviation

closer than

support of troops in

1,000 ft of rotary-

contact.

wing and 1 nm of

AND

fixed-wing.

2. Division commander

approval.

Manned

1 nm lateral and

1. Immediate air support

Aviation

1,000 ft vertical

to troops in contact.

separation.

AND

2. Manned aircraft pilot

accepts responsibility for

separation.

AND

3. Division commander

approval.

Indirect Fires

Trajectory no

BCT commander or

closer than 1/2

above for component

nm to UA.

asset.

Division commander or

above for joint assets.

At the tactical levels, commanders must examine each potential conflict and

provide additional details specific to his unit. Whereas conflicts between artillery

and UA might not be an operational level concern, tactical commanders must

assess the criticality of both the UA and the artillery to the mission, how likely a

conflict is, and under what conditions this level of risk is acceptable. If individual

platforms are low density and extremely critical to the mission (communications

relay), the commander may be less likely to assume risk to this asset. However,

if the artillery mission is in support of a unit in danger of being over-run, the

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

commander may place a higher priority on the fire mission and assume the risk

to the UA. While not inclusive, an example of one potential method for

examining these risks and issuing guidance is shown in table 4.

Note: Numerical values and approval authorities are notional and are

provided for illustration; actual values and approval authorities should be

identified based on the operational environment.

Table 4. Example BCT Baseline Airspace Risk

Risk to

Risk from

Acceptable

When to accept risk

Risk

Civil

Any Military

None

On approval from JFC.

Aviation

System

Manned

Indirect Fires

Trajectory no

1. Immediate fires in

Aviation

closer than

support of troops in

1,000 ft of

contact.

rotary-wing and

AND

1 nm of fixed-

2. BCT CDR approval.

wing.

WITH

3. Aircraft warning to

ensure friendly fire is

not inadvertently viewed

as hostile.

Manned

UAS

1 nm lateral and

1. Immediate air support

Aviation

1,000 ft vertical

to troops in contact.

separation.

AND

2. Manned aircraft pilot

accepts responsibility

for separation.

AND

3. BCT CDR approval.

UAS

Indirect Fires

Trajectory no

1. Immediate fires in

closer than 1/2

support to troops in

nm to organic

contact

AND

2. BCT commander or

above for component

asset.

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FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

Additional airspace risks that should be considered at the tactical level are:

1. Indirect Fire to:

• UA

• Fighter/Attack Fixed Wing

• Manned Rotary Wing

• Tanker/Airlift/Civilian

2. UA flight operations to:

• UA

• Fighter/Attack Fixed Wing

• Manned Rotary Wing

• Tanker/Airlift/Civilian

3. Fighter/Attack Fixed Wing operations to:

• UA

• Fighter/Attack Fixed Wing

• Manned Rotary Wing

• Tanker/Airlift/Civilian

4. Manned Rotary Wing operations to:

• UA

• Fighter/Attack Fixed Wing

• Manned Rotary Wing

5. Tanker / Airlift / Civilian operations to:

• UA

• Fighter/Attack Fixed Wing

• Manned Rotary Wing

• Tanker/Airlift/Civilian

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

Appendix B

ACM & Fire Systems Coordination

1. ACM and Fires System Interoperability

a. ACMs are measures employed to facilitate the efficient use of airspace to

accomplish missions and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces.

(JP 3-52) While ACMs are described in JP 3-52 and other doctrinal / joint

standards documents, the implementation of these ACMs using current digital

airspace control systems (i.e., machine-to-machine exchange) is defined by the

United States Message Text Format (USMTF) 2000 or 2004 standard. USMTF

is a set of character-oriented message text formats used in command and

control systems for the exchange of information.

b. The difference between the standards has caused confusion at times. In

some cases, the name of the ACM differs between joint doctrine and USMTF.

An example is the ACM Coordinating Altitude defined in joint doctrine, which is

called Coordinating Level in USMTF. In other cases the nature of the control

measure changes. For example in JP 1-02 a ROZ is an airspace coordinating

measure similar to a ROA. In USMTF 2000/2004, a ROZ is a category (TYPE)

with many associated coordinating measures (USAGES) one of which is a

ROA. The same situation exists for Special Use Airspace (SUA), which in

USMTF is a TYPE, not an ACM. In summary, it cannot be overstated the

critical importance of clarity in the discussion of ACMs.

c. Since the language between the various Service C2 systems is USMTF,

airspace personnel need to understand how their automation systems use and

exchange airspace control measures. Airspace personnel will often have to

convert non digital airspace requests using doctrinal definitions which may not

be USMTF 2000/20004 terms (such as coordinating altitude or ROZ) into the

appropriate digital format. In addition, since some digital systems do not

process the entire USMTF set of coordinating measures, airspace personnel

must understand the effects of Type, Usage, and Shape selection when

translating text to digital measure to ensure that the ACM yields the desired

outcome in the operational environment.

d. USMTF 2000/2004 organizes ACMs into a set of broad categories called

TYPES. Each type includes a subset of control measures call USAGES. The

USMTF TYPES (with abbreviations and number of associated Usages) are:

•

Air Defense Area (ADAREA) (12 Usages). An area and the airspace

above it within which procedures are established to minimize mutual

interference between Air Force and ground based/Army air defense and

other operations.

•

Air Defense Operations Area (ADOA) (17 Usages). An area and

airspace above it within which procedures are established to minimize

mutual interference between maritime and amphibious air defense and

other operations.

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FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

•

Air Traffic Control Airspace (ATC) (24 Usages). Airspace of defined

dimension within which air traffic control service is provided to IFR and

VFR flights in accordance with civil air traffic control regulations.

•

Air Corridor/Route (CORRTE) (9 Usages). A bi-directional or directional

or restricted air route of travel specified for use by aircraft.

•

Procedural (PROC) (16 Usages). An airspace coordinating measures

that defines airspace dimensions for enabling other systems (e.g., fire

support systems) to discriminate: friendly coordination measures from

enemy, employ fires across boundaries, coordinate joint engagement of

targets for a particular operation, or to delineate an airspace boundary.

•

Reference Point (REFPT) (8 Usages). A point or set of coordinates

generally used for control purposes or to indicate a reference position.

•

Restrictive Operations Zone (ROZ) (15 Usages). Airspace reserved for

specific activities in which the operation of one or more airspace uses is

restricted.

•

Special Use Airspace (SUA) (10 Usages). Airspace defined for a

specific purpose; or to designate airspace in which no flight activity is

organized.

e. Shapes. The shape tool used in the creation of an ACM, is a critical aspect

on whether the ACM can be processed among the C2 systems. TBMCS has 9

shape choices while TAIS only has 8 shape choices. Table 5 lists the shape

choices available to the C2 systems.

Table 5. Airspace Control System Shapes

TBMCS

TAIS

Remarks

Circle

Cylinder

A cylinder is a circle with

three dimensions

Corridor

Route

Route is the same shape

as a Corridor

Orbit

Orbit Fan

Fan and Cake are

Rad-Arc

Cake

complex Rad-Arcs

Poly-Arc

Polyarc

Polygon

Track

Line

TAIS does not have a

point shape, rather TAIS

Point

uses its Airspace Control

Point tool for entering

point data

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

f. Usages. The USMTF Usages are listed in table 6. ACMs are specific usages

associated with a specific shape, name, time, and location attributes.

g. Airspace Control Systems. The primary airspace management tools of the

Services (TBMCS WEB AD and TAIS) will parse, display, and run conflict

checks against all USMTF 2000 compatible ACMs. While TAIS can run conflict

checks on all USTMF 2000/2004 ACMs, however the default setting for many

ACMs is set to not check for conflicts (“conflict check” off - the operator can

change the default setting based on SOP or orders). TAIS default settings for

ACM conflict checks are noted in the table 6.

NOTE: ACMs with a default setting to not perform a conflict check are marked

with an *.

h. Fire Control Systems. AFATDS is the primary fire control system used by

ground forces. AFATDS will parse and convert any USMTF 2000/2004 ACM

built using a corridor (route for TAIS) shape into corridor geometry. AFATDS

will display the converted ACM and run conflict checks with those geometries.

AFATDS will not parse ACMs built using a shape other than corridor

(route for TAIS) nor will it parse shapes built using serial waypoints as a

geo reference. In addition, the AFATDS database only retains the last

effective time for an ACM within an ACO. If the ACO contains an ACM with

multiple start and stop times, AFATDS will only retain the last active period for

the ACM.

2. ACM and Fires Protection.

a. If protection from fires is not required then any shape can be selected to

build the ACM. Many ACMs are not relevant for fires and there is no

requirement for AFATDS to process these ACMs. An example would be an air

defense action area (ADAA). However, some ACMs are established to provide

the airspace user protection from fires (e.g., airspace coordination area). If

protection from fires is a significant consideration then a corridor shape should

be used to ensure the automated deconfliction process is accomplished.

b. AFATDS will alert the operator, when an ACM is constructed using a

corridor shape, to develop alternative firing solutions if there is a conflict

between the initial firing solution and the ACM. If no alternative firing

solution is available, AFATDS will generate a “request coordination” message

putting an authorized decision maker in the loop. At this point, the decision to

fire or not fire will be a command decision.

c. If the airspace planner requires protection from fires but does not wish to use

a corridor (route for TAIS) shape when building a particular ACM (i.e., the shape

may not be possible or practical for that ACM), then the airspace planner could

build the ACM using any shape and place a second ACM, an airspace

coordination area using a corridor shape, over the top of those volumes of

airspace that require protection from fires. However, the easiest method is to

enter the ACA directly into AFATDS operated by the BCD or the fires cell since

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Advisory Route (ADVRTE)

TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

A designated route along which air

YES

traffic advisory service is available. (JP

Only checks

Checks for

3-52)

for conflict

conflict

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

Aerial Air Refueling Area (AAR) (USMTF Air-to-Air Refueling Area)

TYPE: ROZ

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

Airspace of defined dimensions set

AAR tracks are typically set up in a

YES

aside for aerial refueling operations,

race track configuration.

Only

Checks for

excluding SOF aerial air refueling

checks for

conflict

missions. (JP 3-52)

conflict and

Default On

displays if

built using a

corridor

shape

Airborne Command and Control Area (ABC)

TYPE: ROZ

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

Airspace of defined dimensions

YES

established specifically for airborne

Only checks

Checks for

platforms conducting battlefield

for conflict

conflict

command and control. Generally, it is

and displays

designed for aircraft such as the

Default On

if built using

Airborne and Warning Control System

a corridor

(AWACS) or the Joint Surveillance

shape

Target Attack System (JSTARS). (JP 3-

52)

Airborne Early Warning Area (AEW) (USMTF: Airborne Early Warning )

TYPE: ROZ

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

Airspace of defined dimensions

YES

established specifically for airborne

Only checks

Checks for

platforms conducting airborne early

for conflict

conflict

warning. Generally, it is designed for

and displays

aircraft such as the Airborne Warning

Default On

if built using

and Control System, E-2C, and E-3. (JP

a corridor

3-52)

shape

Air Control Point (ACP)

TYPE: REFPT

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

A point defined by latitude and longitude

Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) routing

YES

YES*

used for navigation, command and

is normally accomplished through

Only checks

Checks for

control, and communication. A series or

existing air control points.

for conflict

conflict

matrices of points may be used to

and displays

designate a route structure such as

*Default Off

if built using

spider routes (search and rescue

a corridor

routes) or minimum-risk routes. (JP 3-

shape

52)

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Air Corridor (AIRCOR)

TYPE: CORRTE

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

A restricted air route of travel specified

Air corridor procedures are used to

YES

for use by friendly aircraft and

route aviation combat elements

Only checks

Checks for

established for the purpose of

between such areas as forward arming

for conflict

conflict

preventing friendly aircraft from being

and refueling points, holding areas,

and displays

fired on by friendly forces. (JP 3-52)

and battle positions. Altitudes of an air

Default On

if built using

corridor do not exceed the coordinating

a corridor

altitude, if established. If a coordinating

shape

altitude has been established, an air

corridor is implemented by the using

authority. If a coordinating altitude has

not been established, an air corridor is

established by the airspace control

authority at the request of the

appropriate ground commander.

Air Defense Action Area (ADAA)

TYPE: ADOA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

An area and the airspace above it within

An ADAA is used for preference of a

YES

YES*

which friendly aircraft or surface-to-air

specific weapon system over another

Only checks

Checks for

weapons are normally given

without excluding the other from use

for conflict

conflict

precedence in operations except under

under certain operational conditions.

and displays

specified conditions. (JP 3-52)

From an airspace control perspective,

*Default Off

if built using

it provides airspace users with the

a corridor

location of air defense areas for

shape

mission planning purposes.

Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) TYPE : ADAREA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

Airspace of defined dimensions within

Associated with nations or areas of

YES

YES*

which the ready identification, location,

operation, the ADIZ is normally the

Only checks

Checks for

and control of airborne vehicles are

transition between procedural control

for conflict

conflict

required. (JP 3-52)

areas (outside) and the positive control

and displays

areas (inside). Typically, ADIZ is used

*Default Off

if built using

for sovereign national boundaries, or in

a corridor

the case of areas of operations, for

shape

identification in the rear areas. See

flight information publications/

International Civil Aviation Organization

for theater-specific ADIZ and

associated procedures and limitations.

Airspace Control Area (ASCA)

TYPE: SUA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

Airspace that is laterally defined by the

Airspace control areas are a means of

boundaries of the operational area, and

planning or dividing responsibility.

Only checks

Checks for

may be subdivided into airspace control

Geographically defined, an airspace

for conflict

conflict

sectors. (JP 3-01)

control area may include political

and displays

*Default Off

boundaries.

if built using

a corridor

shape

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Air Route (AIRRTE)

TYPE: CORRTE

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

The navigable airspace between two

points, identified to the extent

Only checks

Checks for

necessary for the application of flight

for conflict

conflict

rules. (JP 1-02)

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

Airspace Control Sector (ACSS) (USMTF: Airspace Control Subarea/Sector) TYPE: SUA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

A sub-element of the airspace control

An airspace control sector provides

area, established to facilitate the control

airspace control of an area by a

Only checks

Checks for

of the overall area. Airspace control

component or other airspace control-

for conflict

conflict

sector boundaries normally coincide

capable entity best able to provide

and displays

*Default Off

with air defense organization

control in that geographic area. An

if built using

subdivision boundaries. Airspace

airspace control sector interface with

a corridor

control sectors are designated in

the airspace control system needs to

shape

accordance with procedures and

be developed. Airspace control sectors

guidance contained in the airspace

are designated by the ACA in

control plan in consideration of Service

consideration of joint force component,

component, host nation, and

host nation, and multinational airspace

multinational airspace control

control capabilities and requirements.

capabilities and requirements. See also

airspace control area. (JP 3-52)

Airspace Coordination Area

TYPE: PROC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

A three-dimensional block of airspace in

An airspace coordination area is used

a target area, established by the

primarily in close air support situations

Only checks

Checks for

appropriate ground commander, in

for high-volume fire. Friendly aircraft

for conflict

conflict

which friendly aircraft are reasonably

are reasonably free from friendly

and displays

*Default Off

safe from friendly surface fires. The

surface fires, with artillery, helicopters,

if built using

airspace coordination area may be

and fixed winged aircraft given specific

a corridor

formal or informal. (JP 3-09.3)

lateral or vertical airspace within which

shape

to operate. Timely implementation of

the area is dependent on the ground

situation. Burden of deconfliction rests

with the ground commander. It is

established by the appropriate ground

commander.

Air Traffic Service Route (ATSRTE)

TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

A specified route for channeling the flow

of traffic as necessary for the provision

Only checks

Checks for

of air traffic services. (JP 3-52)

for conflict

conflict

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

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FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Airway (ARWY)

TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

A control area or portion thereof

established in the form of a corridor

Only checks

Checks for

marked with radio navigational aids.

for conflict

conflict

(JP 3-52)

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

Alert Area (ALERTA)

TYPE: SUA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Airspace which may contain a high

volume of pilot training activities or an

Only checks

Checks for

unusual type of aerial activity, neither of

for conflict

conflict

which is hazardous to aircraft. (JP 3-52)

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

Altitude Reservations (ALTRV)

TYPE: PROC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

A block of altitude reserved for aircraft

to transit or loiter. (JP 3-52)

Only checks

Checks for

for conflict

conflict

and displays

*Default Off

if built using

a corridor

shape

Amphibious Defense Zone (ADZ)

TYPE: ADOA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

An area encompassing the amphibious

An ADZ provides an anti-air warfare

objective area and adjoining airspace

area for protection of the amphibious

Only checks

Checks for

as required for the accompanying naval

task force. If an amphibious defense

for conflict

conflict

force for the purpose of air defense. (JP

zone overlaps other land-based air

and displays

*Default Off

3-52)

defense areas, appropriate

if built using

coordination for responsibilities and

a corridor

boundaries must be conducted.

shape

Amphibious Objective Area (AOA)

TYPE: ADOA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

A geographical area (delineated for

It allows the Commander, Amphibious

command and control purposes in the

Task Force, freedom of air operations

Only checks

Checks for

order initiating the amphibious

within the AOA. Coordination with

for conflict

conflict

operation) within which is located the

nonorganic aircraft for entry into and

and displays

*Default Off

objective(s) to be secured by the

exit from the AOA and deconfliction

if built using

amphibious force. This area must be of

within the AOA with operations just

a corridor

sufficient size to ensure

outside the AOA normally requires the

shape

accomplishment of the amphibious

continuous, active involvement of the

force's mission and must provide

affected commanders and staffs.

sufficient area for conducting necessary

sea, air, and land operations. (JP 3-02)

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Approach Corridor (APPCOR)

TYPE: ADOA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Airspace established for the safe

passage of land-based aircraft joining or

Only checks

Checks for

departing a maritime force. (JP 3-52)

for conflict

conflict

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

Area Navigation Route (NAVRTE)

TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

An air traffic services route established

for the use of aircraft capable of

Only checks

Checks for

employing area navigation. (JP 3-52)

for conflict

conflict

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

Base Defense Zone (BDZ)

TYPE: ADAREA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

An air defense zone established around

A BDZ provides airspace users with

an air base and limited to the

location of the engagement zone for

Only checks

Checks for

engagement envelope of short-range air

the air defense systems defending a

for conflict

conflict

defense weapons systems defending

base for mission planning purposes.

and displays

Default On

that base. Base defense zones have

if built using

specific entry, exit, and identification,

a corridor

friend or foe procedures established.

shape

(JP 3-52)

Boundary (BNDRY) (USMTF Only)

TYPE: PROC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

A line by which AORs between adjacent

units and/or formations are defined. For

Only checks

Checks for

further US implementation guidance,

for conflict

conflict

see JIEO circular 9152, item 35.

and displays

*Default Off

if built using

a corridor

shape

Buffer Zone (BZ)

TYPE: ADAREA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

Airspace designed specifically to

provide separation between various

Only checks

Checks for

airspace coordinating measures. (JP 3-

for conflict

conflict

52)

and displays

*Default Off

if built using

a corridor

shape

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Bullseye (BULL) (USMTF: Bulls-Eye) TYPE: REFPT

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

An established reference point from

which the position of an object can be

Only checks

Checks for

referenced. (JP 3-60)

for conflict

conflict

and displays

*Default Off

if built using

a corridor

shape

Carrier Control Zone (CCZONE)

TYPE: ADOA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

An area activated around a ship

operating aircraft, which is not to be

Only checks

Checks for

entered by friendly aircraft without

for conflict

conflict

permission. (JP 3-52)

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

Class-A Airspace (CLSA)

TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Generally, airspace from 18,000 feet

mean sea level (MSL) up to and

Only checks

Checks for

including flight level 600, including

for conflict

conflict

airspace overlying the waters within 12

and displays

Default On

nautical miles of the contiguous states

if built using

and Alaska. VFR operations are not

a corridor

permitted in Class A airspace. (JP 3-52)

shape

Class-B Airspace (CLSB)

TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Generally, airspace from the surface to

10,000 feet MSL surrounding the

Only checks

Checks for

nation's busiest airports in terms of

for conflict

conflict

airport operations or passenger

and displays

Default On

enplanements. ATC provides

if built using

separation between all aircraft inside

a corridor

Class B airspace. (JP 3-52)

shape

Class-C Airspace (CLSC)

TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Generally, airspace from the surface to

4,000 feet above the airport elevation

Only checks

Checks for

(MSL) surrounding those airports that

for conflict

conflict

have an operational control tower are

and displays

Default On

serviced by radar approach control, and

if built using

that have a certain number of

a corridor

instrument flight rules (IFR) operations

shape

or passenger enplanements. ATC

provides separation between VFR and

IFR inside Class C airspace. (JP 3-52)

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Class-D Airspace (CLSD)

TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Generally, airspace from the surface to

2,500 feet above the airport elevation

Only checks

Checks for

(charted in MSL) surrounding those

for conflict

conflict

airports that have an operational control

and displays

Default On

tower. The configuration of each Class

if built using

D airspace is individually tailored and

a corridor

when instrument procedures are

shape

published, the airspace will normally be

designed to contain the procedures.

Prior to entering Class D airspace, two-

way radio communication must be

established and maintained with the

ATC facility providing air traffic service.

(JP 3-52)

Class-E Airspace (CLSE)

TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Generally, if the airspace is not class A,

B, C, or D and it is controlled airspace,

Only checks

Checks for

it is class E airspace. Also includes

for conflict

conflict

federal airways.

(JP 3-52)

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

Class F Airspace (CLSF)

TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

An airspace in which instrument flight

rule and visual flight rule flights are

Only checks

Checks for

permitted; all participating instrument

for conflict

conflict

flight rule flights receive an air traffic

and displays

Default On

advisory service and all flights receive

if built using

flight information service if requested.

a corridor

(JP 3-52)

shape

Class G Airspace (CLSG)

TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Y Checks for

An airspace in which instrument flight

conflict ES

rule and visual flight rule flights are

Only checks

Checks for

permitted; all flights receive flight

for conflict

conflict

Checks for

information service if requested. Other

and displays

conflict

nations may use ICAO or their own

if built using

Default On

definition of Class-G airspace. (JP 3-52)

a corridor

shape

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Close Air Support Holding Area (CAS) [USMTF: Close Air Support (CAS)]

TYPE: ROZ

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Airspace designed for holding orbits

and used by rotary- and fixed-wing

Only checks

Checks for

aircraft which are in close proximity to

for conflict

conflict

friendly forces. (JP 3-52)

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

Combat Air Patrol (CAP)

TYPE: ROZ

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

An anti-air warfare activity conducted in

support of air operations. (JP 3-52)

Only checks

Checks for

for conflict

conflict

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

Conditional Routes (CDR)(USMTF: Conditional Route) TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

A non-permanent air traffic service

route or portion thereof, which can be

Only checks

Checks for

planned and used only under certain

for conflict

conflict

conditions.

(JP 3-52)

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

Contact Point (CP)

TYPE: REFPT

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

In air operations, the position at which a

mission leader makes radio contact with

Only checks

Checks for

an air control agency. (JP 3-50)

for conflict

conflict

and displays

*Default Off

if built using

a corridor

shape

Control Area (CTA)

TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

A controlled airspace extending

upwards from a specified limit above

Only checks

Checks for

the earth. (JP 3-52)

for conflict

conflict

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Control Zone (CONTZN)

TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

A controlled airspace extending

upwards from the surface of the Earth

Only checks

Checks for

to a specified upper limit. (JP 3-52)

for conflict

conflict

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

Coordinated Air Defense Area (CADA) TYPE: ADOA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

A mutually defined block of airspace

between a land-based air commander

Only checks

Checks for

and a naval commander when their

for conflict

conflict

forces are operating in close proximity

and displays

Default On

to one another. (JP 3-52)

if built using

a corridor

shape

Coordinated Fire Line (CFL)

TYPE: PROC

FSCM

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

Displayed

A line beyond which conventional or

YES

only.

improved conventional indirect fire

Checks for

means, such as mortars, field artillery,

This is an

conflict but

and naval surface fire may fire without

FSCM not

FSCM not an

does not

additional coordination. For further US

an ACM.

ACM.

import from

implementation guidance, see JIEO

the ACO

circular 9152, item 35

Coordinating Altitude (USMTF: Coordination Level [CL]) TYPE: PROC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

A procedural airspace control method to

separate fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft

Only checks

Checks for

by determining an altitude below which

for conflict

conflict

fixed-wing aircraft will normally not fly

and displays

*Default Off

and above which rotary-wing aircraft

if built using

normally will not fly. (JP 3-52)

a corridor

shape

Cross-Border Area (CBA) (USMTF Only) TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

A temporary segregated area

established over international

Only checks

Checks for

boundaries for specific operational

for conflict

conflict

requirements.

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Crossover Zone (COZ)

TYPE: ADOA & ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

Airspace beyond the missile

engagement zone into which fighters

Checks for

Only checks

may pursue targets to complete

conflict

for conflict

interception. (JP 3-52)

and displays

*Default Off

if built using

a corridor

shape

Danger Area (DA)

TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

An airspace of defined dimensions

within which activities dangerous to the

Checks for

Only checks

flight of aircraft may exist at specified

conflict

for conflict

times.

and displays

Default On

(JP 1-02)

if built using

a corridor

shape

Deep Battle Synchronization Line (DBSL) TYPE: PROC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

The forward boundary of the land

DBSL is not an approved joint (JP 1-

component commanders (LCC) area of

02), Army (FM 1-02) or USAF (AFDD

Checks for

Only checks

operation. The DBSL defines the

1-2) doctrinal control measure. DBSL

conflict

for conflict

geographic areas of responsibility of the

was developed to meet theater specific

and displays

*Default Off

LCC and air component commander.

requirements.

if built using

a corridor

shape

Drop Zone (DZ)

TYPE: ROZ

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

A specific area upon which airborne

troops, equipment, or supplies are

Only checks

Checks for

airdropped. (JP 3-17)

for conflict

conflict

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

Electronic Combat (EC)

TYPE: ROZ

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

Airspace of defined dimensions

established specifically for airborne

Only checks

Checks for

platforms engaging in electronic combat.

for conflict

conflict

and displays

Default On

if built using

a corridor

shape

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Entry/Exit Gate (EG)

TYPE: REFPT

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

The point to which an aircraft will be

directed to commence the transit

Only checks

Checks for

inbound/outbound from an airfield or

for conflict

conflict

force at sea. (JP 3-52)

and displays

*Default Off

if built using

a corridor

shape

Falcon Radials (FRAD)

TYPE: ADOA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

Planned magnetic bearings along which

Falcon radials provide tracking, control,

aircraft depart or return to aviation-

and assistance to friendly aircraft within

Only checks

Checks for

capable ships. (JP 3-52)

the anti-air warfare surveillance area of

for conflict

conflict

the battle group.

and displays

*Default Off

if built using

a corridor

shape

Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) TYPE: SUA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

A point designated by a deployed

aviation commander that permits

Only checks

Checks for

combat aircraft to rapidly refuel and

for conflict

conflict

rearm simultaneously. For further US

and displays

Default On

implementation guidance, see JIEO

if built using

circular 9152, item 56

a corridor

shape

Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) TYPE: PROC

FSCM

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

Displayed

The foremost limits of a series of areas

YES

only.

in which ground combat units are

Checks for

deployed, excluding the areas in which

This is an

conflict but

the covering or screening forces are

FSCM not

FSCM not an

does not

operating, designated to coordinate fire

an ACM.

ACM.

import from

support, the positioning of forces, or the

the ACO

maneuver of units. For further US

implementation guidance, see JIEO

circular 9152, item 56.

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Fighter Engagement Zone (FEZ) (Not incorporated in USMTF) TYPE: ADAREA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

That airspace of defined dimensions

These operations usually take place in

within which the responsibility for

airspace above and beyond the

engagement of air threats normally

engagement ranges of surface based

rests with fighter aircraft. (JP 3-52)

(land and sea), short-range air defense

systems, and are an alternative type of

engagement operation if the detailed

control aspects of joint engagement

operations cannot be met. A FEZ

normally is used when fighter aircraft

have the clear operational advantage

over surface-based systems. These

advantages could include range,

density of fire, rules of engagement, or

coordination requirements. From an

airspace control perspective, it

provides airspace users with location of

the engagement zone for fighter

aircraft for mission planning purposes.

Coordination and flexibility within the

combat airspace control system may

be a limiting factor. Under FEZ

operations, surface-to-air missile

systems will not be allowed to fire

weapons unless targets are positively

identified as hostile and assigned by

higher authority, or unless they are

firing in self defense.

Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) TYPE: PROC

FSCM

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Description

Planning Considerations

Boundary used to coordinate fires of air,

YES

ground, or sea weapon systems against

Displayed

Checks for

surface targets. For further US

only.

conflict but

implementation guidance, see JIEO

does not

This is an

circular 9152, item 35.

import from

FSCM not

FSCM not an

the ACO

an ACM.

ACM.

Fire Umbrella (FIRUB)

TYPE: ADOA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

The airspace over a naval force at sea

YES

within which the fire of ships' anti-

Only checks

Checks for

aircraft weapons can endanger aircraft,

for conflict

conflict

and within which special procedures are

and displays

established for identification and

Default On

if built using

operation of friendly aircraft.

(JP 3-52)

a corridor

shape

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

22 MAY 2009

Table 6. ACMs and FSCMs

Fleet Air Defense Identification Zone (FADIZ) (USMTF: Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone)

TYPE:ADOA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES*

An area within which Navy ships

A FADIZ provides tracking, control, and

YES

distinguish friendly from hostile aircraft.

assistance to friendly aircraft within the

Checks for

Only checks

Checks for

(JP 3-52)

anti-air warfare surveillance area of the

conflict

for conflict

conflict

battle group

and displays

*Default Off

if built using

a corridor

shape

Flight Information Region (FIR)

TYPE: ATC

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

An airspace of defined dimensions

within which flight information service

Only checks

Checks for

and alerting service are provided. (JP 1-

for conflict

conflict

02)

and displays

*Default Off

if built using

a corridor

shape

Force Air Coordination Area (FACA) TYPE: SUA

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

YES

YES*

An area surrounding a force within

which air coordination measures are

Only checks

Checks for

required to prevent mutual interference

for conflict

conflict

between all friendly surface and air

and displays

*Default Off

units and their weapon systems. (JP 3-

if built using

52)

a corridor

shape

Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) TYPE: PROC

FSCM

AFATDS

TBMCS

TAIS

Definition / Description

Planning Considerations

Displayed

A line that indicates the most forward

The FLOT may be at, beyond, or short

YES

only.

positions of friendly forces in any kind of

of the FEBA. An enemy forward line of

Checks for

military operation at a specific time. The

own troops indicates the forward-most

This is an

conflict but

FLOT normally identifies the forward

position of hostile forces.

FSCM not

FSCM not an

does not

location of covering and screening

an ACM.

ACM.

import from

forces. For further US implementation

the ACO

guidance, see JIEO circular 9152, item

22 MAY 2009

FM 3-52.1 / AFTTP 3-2.78

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1) - page 26