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Airbus A320. AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS AIRPORT AND MAINTENANCE PLANNING (2016-2023) - page 20

A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

NORMAL OPERATION

!

Use of RADAR

Effective TILT MANAGEMENT is the MOST IMPORTANT KEY FOR WEATHER AVOIDANCE:

-

TILT is directly linked to PHASE OF FLIGHT and ND RANGE,

-

WEATHER SCANNING is achieved by VARYING THE TILT,

-

the basic value of ANTENNA TILT IS SUCH TO ALLOW IT TO PAINT THE FIRST GROUND RETURNS on

TOP OF THE ND.

• GAIN is mostly used in AUTO or CAL.

-

Before EVALUATING WEATHER, start with GAIN in AUTO/CAL.

-

MANUALLY VARY THE GAIN TO DETERMINE THE STRONGEST PART OF A CELL.

-

Set the GAIN BACK TO AUTO.

• WX + T and TURB are used to locate the WET TURBULENCE AREAS.

-

When using TURB DETECTION, adjust TILT to eliminate GROUND RETURNS up to 90 NM.

-

TURB is detected within approx. 50 NM and not affected by GAIN setting.

• For MAPPING, TILT and GAIN have to be adjusted harmoniously because the ground returns vary greatly with the

angle of the radar beam, which illuminates them.

-

MAP is to be used to detect PROMINENT TERRAIN (mountain, city, coastline).

-

Adjust TILT and GAIN - MAPPING COVERAGE VARIES WITH TILT and A/C ALTITUDE.

TILT ANGLE (MAP)

AREA SCANNED AT FL 330

3° DN

72 NM to 190 NM

5° DN

47 NM to 190 NM

7° DN

36 NM to 70 NM

10° DN

26 NM to 41 NM

PHASE OF

DETECTION AND MONITORING PROCEDURES

REMARKS

FLIGHT

Clear on parking area, set ND to lowest RNG, TILT DOWN

RADAR CHECK

TAXI

then UP; check appearance/disappearance of GND

AWAY FROM

RETURNS

PEOPLE

Weather suspected SLOWLY SCAN up to + 10° then TILT +

Scanning along

TAKE OFF

4°

departure path

TILTangle function

To avoid OVER SCANNING, TILT DOWNWARD as the A/C

CLIMB

of

ALT/ND

climbs and maintain GND RETURNS ON TOP OF ND

RANGE

No ground returns

Use WX TILT slightly NEGATIVE: maintain GND RETURNS

beyond line of

ON TOP OF ND.

sight

Range 320 - TILT ≈ - 1°

In higher altitudes when closing

Dnm=1,23√ ALT ft

CRUISE

Range 160 - TILT ≈ - 1.5°

Weather:

- Decrease ND range

FL 370 D 240 NM

Range 80 - TILT ≈ - 3.5°

- TILT move down.

Poor ground

Range 40 - TILT ≈ - 6°

return over calm

Use TURB to ISOLATE Turbulence - GAIN to AUTO

sea / even ground

During DES, TILT UPWARD about + 1° / 10.000 ft in higher

DESCENT

altitudes, then + 1°/5000 ft below 15.000 ft

To avoid ground

APPROACH

TILT + 4°

returns

DATE: JAN 2001

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A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

NORMAL OPERATION

30 - ADVERSE WEATHER OPERATIONS

!

General

The adverse weather operation addresses following topics:

-

Cold Weather operation and icing conditions

-

Turbulence

-

Windshear

-

Volcanic ashes

Refer to FCOM VOL 3 (3.04.30 and 91).

!

Cold weather operation and flight in icing conditions

A wing contaminated with ice has different characteristics from a clean wing. The airflow, which smoothly follows the

shape of the wing when clean, separates from the wing covered with ice when AOA increases. Thus the Maximum Lift

is reduced, stall may occur at lower AOA and Drag increases as well.

➥ Ice accretion on the wing while the A/C is on the ground may significantly affect the safety of the

Take

Off, and the initial climb performance.

➥ Ice accretion on the wing in flight has the same consequences; minimum speeds are affected.

Consequently whenever OAT is below 0° C and there are moisture cues around (fog, rain, snow, ice crystals, slush, ice

etc.) a thorough exterior inspection must be carried out and ALL CRITICAL SURFACES have to be inspected and clear

of ice/snow: wing leading edge and upper surface, vertical and horizontal tailplane, slats, flaps and control surfaces.

Furthermore specific equipment shall be checked to be free of ice and snow: landing gear, engine inlet, fan, drains,

bleeds, probes, radome, Fuel Tank Vent.

➥ This inspection will determine the Captain’s Decision to proceed for a ground De icing/Anti icing treatment.

NOTE :

An aircraft after landing may have its wing temperature below 0° C while OAT is above 0° C. In case of drizzle or rain

falling on the wing, ice will accumulate on the upper wing, with light frost under wing.

3 mm of frost under wing is acceptable.

The exterior inspection may be affected by the cold soak procedure, which is applied in very cold weather conditions:

-

the Outflow valves are closed, the Cpt seat is full forward, the batteries may have been removed and specific water

draining procedures have been applied,

-

these systems shall be more specifically verified.

In very cold weather some systems might be affected:

-

the EFIS/ECAM when cockpit temp is very low,

-

the IRS alignment which takes a longer time (15 mn).

Pitot and window heat may be used on ground; they automatically operate at low level.

The ground de icing / anti icing procedure is decided by the Captain.

When an aircraft is contaminated with frost, ice, snow etc., it must be DE ICED prior to take off; furthermore if there are

risks of further icing, the surfaces must be ANTI ICED.

The DE ICING / ANTI ICING process consists in spraying fluid over the aircraft.

DATE: JAN 2001

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A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

NORMAL OPERATION

•

In flight

-

Taxi, Take off and Landing precautions on contaminated runways have been detailed in chap. 29.

-

Consider using ANTI ICE when SAT / TAT < 10° C and visible moisture.

ENG A/I

when SAT between 0° and - 40° C and Icing conditions

or if SAT below - 40° C and flight in CBs.

WING A/I

when Ice apparent on wipers or Ice detectors.

-

If Anti ice is used at T/O, apply TOW weight or FLX TEMP penalty.

-

If ENG ANTI ICE must be selected ON with ice build up apparent (late selection).

• Eng mode selector to IGN.

• Retard one engine and select ENG A/I.

• Adjust thrust back smoothly and wait for stabilization.

• Proceed the same with other engines.

• Eng mode selector back to NORM.

-

In approach, whenever temperature is below ISA -10, the target altitudes provided by ATC must be corrected by

adding the values provided in the hereunder table:

Corrections to be added [ft]

HEIGHT [ft]

ISA - 10 °C

ISA - 20 °C

ISA - 30 °C

500

20

40

60

1000

40

80

120

2000

80

160

240

3000

140

260

380

4000

180

340

500

5000

220

420

620

Miscellaneous

• With SLATS EXTENDED, avoid prolonged flight in icing conditions or retract them.

• If ICE ACCUMULATION on wings, the minimum speed VLS is increased by 5 kt (10 kt on A 321 for CONF 3).

• A prolonged flight in icing conditions shall be reported to maintenance (engine inspection… ).

NOTE:

Icing on surfaces occur when TAT is lower than 0° C.

Risks of water in clouds are encountered when SAT between 0° and - 15° C.

-

TAT = SAT + ∆:

∆ is function of Mach: + 25°C (0.7), + 20°C (0.6), + 13°C (0.5), +5°C (0.3).

FUEL TEMPERATURE must be above the minimum specified temp so as to keep its fluidity. When the temp is too low

a caution is triggered (- 48°C for A319 & A320, -46.5° C for A321).

The TAT is a good indicator of fuel temp potential problems.

Consider increasing Mach, or descending if necessary: refer to chap. 8.

DATE: JAN 2001

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A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

NORMAL OPERATION

In case of SEVERE TURBULENCE:

• Keep AP ON; the altitude might temporarily vary. This is normal.

If you feel like setting the AP OFF because it reacts roughly, preferably use the I/D on the stick and keep

ATTITUDE constant.

Avoid overriding the AP with the stick, since when AP goes OFF, the resulting stick deflection may cause a

brutal A/C response.

• SET the ATHR OFF more specifically in cruise: set thrust levers to turbulence N1 as per QRH and press I/D.

The turbulence speed profile must be followed:

A319 & A320

250 kt below FL 200

275 kt/M 0.76 above FL 200

A321

265 kt below FL 230

300 kt/M 0.76 above FL 230

Avoid high thrust changes; however don’t let the speed drop too significantly since this decreases the buffet

margins.

In approach set the ATHR ON with managed speed, to gain benefit from GS mini guidance.

-

Miscellaneous:

SEAT BELTS ON / NO SMOKING ON,

PILOT harness ON,

ALL WHITE LIGHTS ON in thunderstorm.

SET SEAT BELTS ON WHENEVER EXPECTING TURBULENCE

TO PREVENT INJURIES

NOTE:

-

It is not necessary to set the engine mode selector to Ignition. Indeed, in case of engine flame out, the igniters will

be triggered automatically.

-

When you set the ATHR OFF, set the thrust levers to the intended N1 and depress the I/D.

This will minimize the thrust changes, which have to be avoided in those conditions.

!

WINDSHEAR at T/O and LDG

-

Windshear awareness

Extensively use MET Reports, Tower reports in order to locate possible Windshear in T/O segment or Approach

area.

The PREDICTIVE W/S (PWS) system must be set ON; it advises the crew of potential windshear AHEAD of the

A/C.

The REACTIVE W/S system detects a windshear and sends an AURAL warning as well as a message on PFD. It

is available between ground and 1300 ft AGL.

-

Operational Rules

-

If W/S suspected at T/O, DELAY T/O.

-

If W/S reported in approach area, or detected by PWS, AVOID the W/S area.

-

If necessary, hold as long as necessary and consider fuel requirements or fly to ALTN.

-

In case W/S is encountered, immediately and WITH NO ARGUMENT:

• SET TOGA thrust (if DERATED T/O, set TOGA when required; be aware of VMC potential problem).

• FLY SRS FD pitch orders rapidly, smoothly but not aggressively,

• consider using full back stick if necessary to follow SRS or minimize height loss,

• while in the windshear, DON’T CHANGE THE CONFIGURATION (it induces additional drag, or rises the

minimum speeds).

DATE: JAN 2001

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A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

NORMAL OPERATION

31 - FERRY FLIGHT WITH LANDING GEAR DOWN

!

General

All data linked to ferry flight is provided in FCOM VOL 2 and MEL.

One of the key issues for this flight is obviously the performance degradation at T/O, CLB, CRUISE.

!

Flight with Landing gear down

Before such a flight refer to FCOM VOL 2 (2.04.25) and to MEL.

The flight is possible with the gear doors properly closed.

In case of a normal flight, if the landing gear fails to retract, refer to FCOM VOL 2 for flight continuation.

PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS

The TOW determination must take into account:

•

2^nd segment gradient requirement,

•

Final Take off requirement,

•

En Route requirement (eng failure drift down net flight path obstacle clearance).

The 2^nd segment gradient requirement is fulfilled by applying a CONSTANT WEIGHT REDUCTION to the normal

MTOW as determined on RTOW.

Once an MTOW is determined, read the speeds corresponding to this weight in the normal RTOW charts.

Final T/O, Climb and Drift down Speeds

• In Final T/O segment, IAS = VLS.

• In Climb, IAS / MACH = 230/0.50.

• Drift down out of cruise, IAS = Green Dot.

Go Around Performance

Determine the Go Around limiting weight as for a normal flight and apply a 15 % reduction to this limiting weight.

Some System Limitation

• Disregard FMS fuel predictions.

• Disregard FMS Speed Computation: use SELECTED SPEEDS.

• VMO / MMO - 235 / 0.60.

➥ modify VMO/MMO selection in avionics compartment (LDG DOWN configuration).

• Should a failure lead to ALTN Law, DIRECT Law will actually be triggered due to the fact that landing gear is

down.

Procedure

• T/O: CONF 1 + F - No Tail Wind.

• Preset 230 kt Climb SPD on PERF CLB.

• Holding: CONF1

• Avoid Icing conditions

NOTE:

In certain cases the ferry flight may be associated to flight without pressurization due to structural issues. In that case:

-

either limit FL to 100,

-

or climb to a higher level with 02 masks,

In both cases, keep PACK ON with outflow valves fully open.

DATE: JAN 2001

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A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

NORMAL OPERATION

32 - WET AND CONTAMINATED RUNWAYS

!

General

The take off and landing from wet and contaminated runway has 2 operational aspects:

1.

Performance and limitations and

2.

Specific operational characteristics.

There are major differences in operational constraints between a so-called WET RUNWAY (which can be covered with

a small amount of slush, standing water, wet/dry snow) and a CONTAMINATED RUNWAY (which is covered with a

bigger amount of wet/dry snow or slush).

The definitions of those runways are quite accurate, and provided in FCOM VOL 2 (2.04.10).

!

Performance Considerations

-

The problem consists essentially in determining the take off data.

-

The dispatch from WET or CONTAMINATED RUNWAY is possible if:

WET and CONTAMINATED

CONTAMINATED

A/SKID & GND SPOILERS available

All reversers available

Uniform depth & density of contaminant

Take off with TOGA thrust (no FLX)

Friction coefficient derived from flight tests

or DERATED TOGA thrust

-

The take off data for WET and CONTAMINATED runways assume:

15 ft screen height at the end of T/O segment

Instead of 35 ft

15 ft obstacle clearances provided by net trajectory

-

Consequently the principle in determining the Take off data from wet and contaminated runway is as follows:

• Determine MTOW and associated V1/VR/V2

on DRY runway taking

Or FLX TEMP and associated V1/VR/V2

into account QNH/BLEED

• Determine if the runway is WET or CONTAMINATED; if CONTAMINATED determine the level of

contamination (e.g. 6.3 mm or 1/4 inch slush…).

• Then apply the corrections or decrements as provided in the related tables.

•

Check that the resulting take off speeds are GREATER than MINIMUM V1 (VMCG considerations),

MINIMUM VR/V2 (VMCA or VMU considerations).

If they are LOWER than the minimum values, apply further decrements.

However in some cases SPECIFIC RTOW CHARTS must be computed because the decrement method

is not accurate enough.

-

For WET runways, several tables are provided depending upon the availability of thrust reversers.

On WET runways, decrements can be applied EITHER on MTOW or on FLX TEMP.

-

For CONTAMINATED runways, several tables are provided depending upon the type of contamination (standing

water, compacted snow …).

DATE: JAN 2001

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A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

NORMAL OPERATION

Landing and return to gate parking

•

Consider a diversion to an airport with better runway conditions, if the destination runway conditions are poor, more

specifically if additionally there is crosswind, or if the reversers or ground spoilers are failed.

•

Use of AUTOBRAKE is recommended as long as the contamination is even; preferably MED

•

Approach is achieved with NORMAL VAPP (standard + 5 kts correction on top of VLS is taking care of ice

accretion).

•

Shoot for a firm touch down and select MAX REV as soon as MLG is on ground (PLD will then increase weight on

wheels).

➥ Be aware that in case of XWIND, and directional control problems, the reversers destabilize the rudder

efficiency and creates a side force increasing the intowind turn tendancy of the aircraft.

Consider using Idle Rev.

➥ Use of Diff Braking might be necessary (release totally the pedal on the opposite side to the expected turn

direction).

•

The maximum sustainable crosswind is a function of the reported braking action (see table hereunder)

•

Stick into wind shall be avoided since it increases directional control problems.

•

Taxi back to the gate with SLATS/FLAPS extended. Don’t retract them in order to avoid any potential damage,

caused by crushing the ice present in slats slot during retraction.

•

Be smooth on the tiller.

•

Once engines are stopped, a visual inspection shall be achieved to determine whether the flat / slats system is free

of contamination. Then only, these may be retracted using the ELEC HYD PUMP.

•

Be aware that the deceleration is much less than normal (DECEL light might not illuminate on Auto Brake panel)

and that directional problems increase at low speed.

Reported braking

Reported Runway

Equivalent Runway

Maximum Crosswind

action - Index

friction coef.

Condition

for Landing

Good -5

≥ .4

Dry / Damp / Wet

35 kts

Damp / Wet

Good / Medium - 4

.39 to .36

30 kts

(< 3 mm)

Medium - 3

.35 to .30

Slush or Dry snow

25 kts

Medium / Poor - 2

.29 to .26

Dry snow

20 kts

Standing water /

Poor -1

≤ .25

15 kts

Wet snow

Ice - Risk of

Unreliable - 9

Unreliable

5 kts

hydroplaning

- Maximum sustainable crosswind function of runway condition -

NOTE:

The concept of Equivalent runway condition is to be used only to determine the maximum crosswind, but not for

the computation of take off and landing performances since it does not account for the effects of the displacement

and impingement drag.

NOTE:

• With dry snow the reverser might reduce the visibility, more specifically at low speeds. Set Idle Rev or stow it in

case of reduced visibility.

• The maximum XWIND component recommended in approach is the same as for T/O.

• Landing distances with A/BRAKE are provided in QRH; it gives a good assessment of the runway distance

required at various levels of contamination.

DATE: JAN 2001

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A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

ABNORMAL OPERATION

1 - ECAM PHILOSOPHY

!

General

The ECAM system is a central component of the Airbus 2 crew member cockpit; it is fully linked to the Dark Cockpit

and Forward Facing Crew Cockpit concepts.

The purpose of the ECAM is:

-

to display the aircraft system information,

-

to monitor the aircraft systems,

-

to provide the actions required by the crew in most normal/abnormal and emergency situations.

As a consequence, the ECAM being available in most failure conditions, it is a significant step forward towards the

paperless cockpit and the removal of memory items.

The ECAM being used for SYSTEMS OPERATION, it provides

-

PERMANENTLY the engine control parameters, total FOB, S/F CONF, as well as TAT/SAT, TIME, GW, CG,

which is data needed throughout all flight phases,

-

WHEN NEEDED, the system synoptics, which is necessary for the pilot to achieve a task, or during a given

phase,

-

WHEN NEEDED, written messages describing actions required in case of failure, or improving crew awareness of

the OPERATIONAL STATUS of the aircraft in degraded situations, or assisting the crew in TEMPORARY

SYSTEM operation.

The ECAM is driven by three essential computers:

-

the DMCs (which drive the DUs),

-

the SDACs (which acquire most of the data and send the signals necessary to display the synoptics; it sends to the

FWCs the data necessary to generate the ECAM msg),

-

the FWCs (which acquire data from SDACs and some A/C sensors in order to generate alert messages, aural

alerts, flight phases etc. and also to achieve R/A, DH/MDA call outs and Landing Speed increment computations.

RED WARNINGS are processed by FWCs, amber cautions as well but through SDACs).

Thus, in case of total failures of the FWCs, the system operation is done using QRH and OVHD panel.

!

3 Design Principals and Particulars

1. INFORMATION PROVIDED WHEN NEEDED

The information is provided only when needed; else it disappears.

This dictates the OPERATING MODES OF THE ECAM:

-

Normal mode: automatic flight phase related mode (for System Display and Memo),

-

Failure related mode: automatic display of abnormal/emergency procedures and of associated system synoptic

on SD in case of failure,

-

Advisory mode: automatic display of the SD associated to a drifting parameter and

-

Manual mode: manual display of any SD by acting on the ECP (ECAM CTL panel).

Additionally some failures are NOT DISPLAYED during a given flight phase in order not to distract the pilot from his

essential task during a touchy flight phase: T/O INHIBIT - LDG INHIBIT.

DATE: JAN 2001

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A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

ABNORMAL OPERATION

2. FAILURE LEVELS AND CRITICALITY

The failures are classified in 3 LEVELS depending on their CRITICALITY, in other words on the OPERATIONAL

CONSEQUENCES.

The FWC will thus display the failures in their order of criticality.

Furthermore if a failure of a system affects another system, the FWC will display the PRIMARY FAILURE first, the

consequential or SECONDARY failure subsequently.

In order to make it INSTINCTIVE to the crews, a simple COLOR CODING of the information is used to indicate the

CRITICALITY of the SITUATION, as well as an adapted AURAL signal.

LEVEL OF FAILURE

CRITICALITY

COLOR/AURAL

PILOT REACTION

LEVEL 3

SAFETY

RED / CONTINUOUS

IMMEDIATE

REPETITIVE

LEVEL 2

ABNORMAL

AMBER / SINGLE

AWARENESS, THEN ACTION

CHIME

LEVEL 1

DEGRADATION

AMBER / NONE

AWARENESS / MONITORING

NOTE:

The color coding is also used for other purposes such as Green for normal ops, Blue for required actions and

limitations, White for titles/remarks, Magenta for messages.

3. FEED BACK PRINCIPLE

In case of MEMO (messages, or T/O and LANDING memos), in case of ADVISORY, in case of a FAILURE, there is a

feedback to the crew materialized

-

on the system synoptic regarding the status of given components,

-

by the action line disappearing when the related action is completed.

In other words, whenever a failure or an advisory occurs, the associated System Display page is provided on the

bottom CRT. Allowing the crew to analyze the situation, materialized by the status of the various affected components

of the synoptic. If a procedure is proposed to the crew by various action lines, each action line disappears once the

corresponding action is achieved.

The ECAM reacts to failures as well as to pilot actions.

4. ECAM PARTICULARS

Redundancy:

in case of loss of one DU, the remaining DU is able to display both the E/W-D, and the SD, called by the pilot on the

ECP. The ND may also be used to recover the second DU. In case of loss of 2 ECAM DUs, the ND is able to do the

same after having switched the selector ECAM/ND XFR to associated side.

DATE: JAN 2001

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A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

ABNORMAL OPERATION

The PNF never touches the Thrust Levers even if so asked by the ECAM (normally action of PF unless otherwise

advised by customer's procedure).

When a failure or abnormal occurs, the general scheme of actions is as follows:

-

the first pilot to recognize the problem announces the

-

MASTER WARNING or CAUTION - TITLE OF THE FAILURE,

-

the PF properly controls the A/C: FPA/BANK/BETA/IAS - Once properly stabilized (at around 400 ft AGL, at T/O -

GA or APPR; this is a good compromise between A/C stabilization and action delay), the PF orders ECAM

ACTION.

Then:

PF

PNF

« ECAM ACTION »

Reviews SD and reads ECAM

Achieves the action

Checks associated line disappears

Once all lines away asks « CLR XYZ* »

After crosscheck actions properly done

confirms « CLR XYZ* »

Continues the action or reads STATUS

Calls « STOP ECAM » if specific procedure

has to be done (except in case of fire); then

« CONTINUE ECAM »

Once all done asks « CLR STATUS »

After crosscheck confirms « CLR STATUS »

« ECAM ACTION COMPLETED »

* XYZ - call affected system or component

Operation of the ECAM with one ECAM DU only available

-

In case of one ECAM DU failed, the other one displays the E.W/D.

In that case, there is not Automatic System or Status page display when a failure or advisory occurs; the display of

a system synoptic is provided on the remaining DU by pressing on the related system P/B on ECP. The synoptic is

displayed as long as the P/B is pressed.

-

In case of an advisory or a failure, the PNF has therefore to call for the affected system synoptic by pressing the

associated key on the ECP. When an advisory occurs, ADV flag pulses white at the bottom ot the E.W/D.

Some remarks on ECAM

-

When a failure occurs it is important to review the SD prior to act, in order to get a proper assessment of the

situation. This is the main reason to have the SD associated to the failure being displayed.

-

LAND ASAP RED: indicates a high level of emergency. Don't delay actions and consider closest airport.

-

LAND ASAP AMBER: the crew has to assess the seriousness of the situation and possibly review the selection of

a suitable airport.

-

Some actions have no feedback on ECAM; the blue line does not disappear. For example, ATC NOTIFY or VHF 1

(2) (3) USE or MIN RAT SPEED 140 etc.

Some procedures require reference to QRH; this is the case of ABNORMAL CONF, EVACUATION etc. This is

indicated by PROC APPLY on the ECAM. It is good practice to LOCATE the associated C/L in the QRH.

-

In case of OEB, the affected procedure or status is suppressed.

The ECAM states: REFER TO QRH (if applicable - depending on FWC status).

The OEB modified procedure is provided at the end of the QRH.

DATE: JAN 2001

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A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

ABNORMAL OPERATION

-

In some failure cases, the STATUS asks for a specific procedure to be achieved in approach.

STS page is automatically displayed when (among others - refer to FCOM) CONF 1 is selected, as a reminder for

APPR C/L. Properly review the STS and apply the required procedure.

-

All procedures, not provided on the ECAM in case of abnormal situation, are in the QRH.

The ECAM is an EFFICIENT TOOL in case of ABORMALS, provided:

- it is CAREFULLY handled,

- actions are done and checked on SD,

- proper crosscheck is applied and

- care is taken not to be distracted.

DATE: JAN 2001

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A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

ABNORMAL OPERATION

2 - REJECTED TAKE-OFF (REFER FCOM 3-02-01)

The rejected T/O is a difficult, touchy and potentially hazardous procedure at high speed because

-

being seldom achieved, this induces a delay,

-

there are many reasons not to obtain proper deceleration: brake wear, tire status, brakes not fully applied if pilot

takes over,

-

remaining RWY not enough in case of RWY limited (e.g. A/C lines up too long, rolling T/O with slow thrust

application etc.)

-

uncertainty on A/C GW, thus non adequate speeds and

-

in certain cases CM1 decides to call STOP; then PF acts, which causes a delay.

Consequently AI recommends:

-

CM1 to set thrust at T/O and keep thrust lever control till V1 call out and

-

CM1 to call STOP and to STOP the A/C e.g. CM1 is PF till V1.

Furthermore the earlier a malfunction is detected the safer is the RTO; therefore in case of any ECAM at low speed

BELOW 100 kts " STOP.

At high speed ABOVE 100 kts, STOP ONLY FOR SERIOUS matters:

-

either in case of not inhibited ECAM warnings (ENG FAIL - LO OIL PR - ENG/APU FIRE - REV UNLK - L + R ELV

FAULT) which affects flight safety on short term basis or

-

in case of detected thrust loss or tire failure till V1 - 20 kt inducing noticeable engine damage etc.

But heavy vibration on NLG at high speed should not cause a stop.

* The procedure is therefore as follows:

CM1

CM2

Calls STOP

Sets thrust Idle + Rev

Monitors

REV GREEN + SPLRS + DECEL

Advises ATC of RTO

Sets PKG BRAKE to PARK

Cabin crew advises " Cabin Crew at your station "

Calls for ECAM ACTION

Confirms ATC " Abort T/O + additional info "

Achieves ECAM actions

Locates " On Gnd Emer Evac C/L" in QRH

Reads the on ground Emer EVAC C/L

If required, request " EVAC C/L"

Advises CC of which side EVAC

Presses EVAC and cancels the horn

Advises ATC

DATE: JAN 2001

PAGE 181

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A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

ABNORMAL OPERATION

3 - ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE AFTER V1

In case such type of failure occurs after V1, the essential and primary actions are linked with the A/C handling; the

A/C must be properly STABILIZED in PITCH/SPEED and LATERALLY on the proper TRACK before starting any drill.

Thus the PF controls:

-

PITCH at around 12.5° or SRS,

-

YAW and BANK without RUSH: when β target comes up, smoothly and continuously press on the pedal to center it

and then act on the stick laterally to fly constant heading,

no rush; don't forget that the Yaw Damper will react to a detected side slip and, hands off the stick, the aircraft will

bank at about 5° maximum. Thus laterally the A/C is a stable platform. On the other hand, if with full rudder you

cannot center the beta target, this means that the A/C speed is too low (most probably below VMCA). In that case,

check IAS and PITCH; most probably pitch down is required and

-

consider the use of TOGA which will provide you extra thrust in order to achieve the initial climb even more safety.

The A/C control in case of EO at T/O and GA is most comfortable and by far easier than on certain mechanically

controlled A/C. This is due to the pitch and roll control laws which make the A/C very stable, and to the efficiency of the

Yaw Damper which assists the pilot in counteracting the yaw movement.

Thus be calm, don't over control it! Act in following order:

PITCH for SPD " RUDDER (ZERO BETA TARGET) " STICK (HDG CONSTANT)

PF may then use the RUDDER TRIM to release the pressure required on the pedal. Finally PF may ask PNF to set AP

ON. PF must then closely monitor the reaction of the AP in the same order.

NOTE:

Once CONF1 "

0 is ordered, normal side slip (yellow) is provided on the PFD. When it comes up, it is not properly

centered due to the difference of the nature of the information (calculation source and meaning). Adjust rudder pedals

accordingly.

Don't fight with the rudder trim, use it once stabilized.

PROCEDURE

The principle of this procedure is obviously to ensure a SAFE A/C handling, a proper task sharing, and to define an

order in the various drills which facilitates the proper achievement of each one:

STABILIZE A/C PATH " INITIAL ECAM " ACCEL and CLEAN UP " REMAINING ECAM (to STS) " AFTER T/O

C/L " STATUS

The PF will command the various sequences of those drills.

When the failure occurs, the PNF announces ENG FAILURE/FIRE and cancels the MASTER WARNING thus the

aural.

DATE: JAN 2001

PAGE 183

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A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

ABNORMAL OPERATION

PF

PNF

Stabilizes the A/C:

PITCH/SPD - YAW/BETA - AIL/TRK

TOGA if necessary

Asks for ECAM ACTION

Executes ECAM till ENG relit/

2^nd agent discharge

EO ACCEL ALT " Stop ECAM "

“ PUSH TO LEVEL OFF "

Orders A/C CONF clean up

At G.DOT asks " OP CLB " and sets

Acts on FCU as per PF orders

thrust levers to MCT

and selects successive CONF

Asks " Continue ECAM "

Resumes ECAM action

Asks “ CLR XYZ ”

Announces “ STATUS ”

Orders " Stand by STATUS”

Asks " After T/O C/L "

Reads “ After T/O C/L ”

“ After T/O C/L completed ”

Reads STS - asks " CLR STATUS "

Orders " Read STATUS "

“ ECAM ACTIONS COMPLETED ”

REMARKS

-

The procedure asks to retard Thrust Levers " done by PF.

-

The procedure asks to set MASTER SWITCH OFF and PRESS FIRE P/B. This must be confirmed by PF prior to

be achieved by PNF.

-

The procedure asks to determine if there is any structural damage. This is not so simple. Some cues might be:

high vibration prior engine stopped, stall, OIL very low quantity or low press, hydraulic failure, N1 or N2 around 0,

etc.

-

If a relight is considered, it may be attempted at a later stage once A/C is cleaned up.

-

If an immediate return in considered, the crew might consider to keep CONF1 (be aware it will be 1 + F thus

penalizing if more climb required! Flap autoretraction may be used to get slats extended only).

-

TOGA is allowed for 10 mn (5 mn FAA) maximum.

-

Consider starting the APU and the use of APU BLEED if performance limited.

-

Be aware of MSA.

-

Use of AP is recommended.

-

Bank angle is limited to 15° if IAS < maneuvering speed (F or S or G.DOT).

-

If EOSID is in the Data Base, TMPY EOSID is triggered if BEFORE the diversion point between SID/EOSID. Else

it is displayed for information on the ND. Thus either INSERT EOSID, or in the second case follow it with HDG

mode.

DATE: JAN 2001

PAGE 184

UDY0202

A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

ABNORMAL OPERATION

4 - FAILURE OF SOME ENGINE COMPONENTS

!

EIVMU

There is one EIVMU per engine which achieves the interface function between various peripherals and the FADEC

(e.g. BMC - Norm start - Norm Ign selection…), as well as vibration monitoring.

EIVMU is a Go Item. If it fails the following functions are lost:

-

Manual start,

-

Vibration indication,

-

ATHR on the affected engine,

-

Reverser,

-

Modulated Idle (only approach Idle) and

-

FLX T/O.

However Alternate auto start / CONT REL with ENG ANTI ICE ON / ATHR on other engine are available.

!

TLA DISAGREE / FAULT

There are 2 resolvers per thrust lever and per engine.

The thrust levers are directly linked to the FADEC.

Two types of problem may occur:

TLA DISAGREE which means that the 2 resolvers are seen to disagree by the FADEC which has therefore a problem

to set a given thrust.

Thus the thrust will be set as follows depending upon the moment of the failure:

Prior T/O

"

Idle

During T/O

"

Highest T/O thrust or TOGA maintained

In flight in clean

"

Highest thrust from the 2 resolvers (max MCT)

Whenever CONF 0 "

1

"

Idle (or if LDG DN)

TLA FAULT which means that no signal is transmitted from thrust levers to FADEC.

The thrust is set as follows:

Ground

"

Idle

During T/O

"

Thrust is frozen (FLX or TOGA)

In flight, clean

"

MCT

CONF 0 "

1

"

Idle (for approach and Go Around) (or if LDG DN)

ATHR is available with those thrust limits; LVR CLB is flashing even with TLA in CLB.

The REVERSER on affected engine is INOP.

NOTE:

The TLA symbol, moves along the N1 (EPR) gauge erratically in case of disagree; whereas it goes from MCT to IDLE

in case of fault.

DATE: JAN 2001

PAGE 185

UDY0202

A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

ABNORMAL OPERATION

5 - EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL CONFIGURATION

The Emergency Electrical Configuration is due to the loss of all AC BUSSES (AC BUS 1+2) causing the engagement

of the CSM-G or STANDBY GEN. This malfunction may be caused by:

-

either the loss of all AC GEN,

-

or the loss of one engine and the failure of the opposite and APU generators,

-

or the loss of both engines.

In all those cases, the CSM-G comes in line; the CSM-G is driven by the BLUE HYD system which is not powered with

such failures. This is why the RAT extends.

Consequently, when such a combination of malfunctions occurs, the RAT extends and then, the CSM-G comes on line

which explains why during 5 sec the electrical network is powered by batteries only.

They are two RAT types: the “old” or smaller/less powerfull one which equippes the early A320s. The “new” or

bigger/more powerfull one which equippes the A319/A321 and the latest A320s.

The role of the RAT is to provide 5 kVA electrical power either in emergency electrical configuration where it is used for

CSM-G and blue hyd power for flight controls, or in certain cases of double hydraulic failures (B+Y, B+G) where it

supplies blue hydraulic pressure only.

The RAT is a kind of a turbine which runs at roughly constant RPM; when aircraft IAS drops, the RAT stalls, which is

more symptomatic when the landing gear is down.

Therefore, in all cases of RAT extended, it is recommended by ECAM to fly at or above RAT MINI speed 140 kts;

-

but with the “old” RAT, when landing gear is selected down, the CSM-G automatically disconnects,

-

with the “new” RAT, when landing gear is selected down, the CSM-G remains on line.

The CSM-G provides 5 kVA on the network and feeds the AC/DC ESS bars and the AC/DC ESS SHED bars; the loads

on those bars are such that the flight is comfortable.

The batteries feed only the AC/DC ESS bars and DC HOT bars; which means that the loads are reduced and that the

flight time is limited. Furthermore when the aircraft is on ground, typically at rest (IAS < 50 kts), the AC ESS which

feeds the CRTs is lost, in order to minimize the electrical use of the batteries: keep in mind that when the battery

voltage drops down to 20 V, there is little time left of battery operation, and the battery life drops down as well.

Note that once the CSM-G powers the electrical network, it has priority on the AC/DC ESS bars feeding over any other

generator which might still be available.

-

with the “old” RAT, if the CSM-G has disconnected with landing gear selected down, it may be reconnected by

selecting landing gear up and pressing the EMER GEN MAN ON P/B; if the landing gear cannot be retracted,

CSM-G is recovered by pulling the LGCIU1 C/B and pressing the EMER GEN MAN ON P/B.

-

with the “new” RAT if the CSM-G is in line, it cannot be disconnected.

Operational Consequences in Case of Emer. Elec. Configuration

• Sequence of events

EVENT

“OLD” A320 RAT

“NEW” A320-A319-A321 RAT

AC BUS 1 + 2 LOSS

→

5 sec Batt only

→ RAT extends + CSM-G on line

LDG DOWN

BATT ONLY (AC/DC SHED lost)

CSM-G

IAS < 125 kts

BATT ONLY

RAT stalls

IAS < 50 kts

BATT ONLY and AC ESS lost

DATE: JAN 2001

PAGE 187

UDY0202

A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

ABNORMAL OPERATION

- WHAT ARE THEY LEFT WITH -

ASSOCIATED

OLD RAT

NEW RAT

TASK

SYS

LDG UP

LDG DN

IAS > 125

IAS < 125

ELAC1/SEC1

X

X

X

X

FAC1

X

LOST

X

LOST

FCDC1

X

X

X

X

CONTROL LAW

ALTN

DIRECT

ALTN

DIRECT

DMC1 (3)

X

X

X

X

PFD1

X

X

X

X

FADEC1

X

X

X

X

ND1

X

LOST

X

LOST

VOR1

X

X

X

X

DME1 - ADF1

X

LOST

X

LOST

ILS1

X

X

X

X

ADIRS1 (3)

X

X

X

X

FMGC1

X

LOST

X

LOST

E.W/D

X

X

X

X

SDAC1 / FWC1

X

X

X

X

RMP1

X

X

X

X

VHF1

X

X

X

X

HF1

X

LOST

X

LOST

ACP1 + 2

X

X

X

X

BMC1

X

LOST

X

LOST

X BLEED

X

AUTO ONLY

X

AUTO ONLY

CPC1

X

X

X

X

O2CREW

X

X

X

X

O2PAX

X

LOST

X

LOST

NOTE:

If switching has been done on DMC3 or ADIRS3 prior to electrical failure, those are powered in emer elec conf

On IAE engines, N1 UNRATED or DEGRADED mode only is provided by the FADEC.

NEW RAT on A320 available from MSN 1045 onwards provided FWC E3 is installed.

DATE: JAN 2001

PAGE 189

UDY0202

A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

ABNORMAL OPERATION

6 - DOUBLE HYDRAULIC FAILURE

Although this is an improbable double failure in operation, it is a dimensioning failure case for abnormal operation on

Airbus aircraft because of the following consequences:

-

loss of APs,

-

Flight Controls degraded law (alternate and direct law),

-

landing in abnormal configuration,

-

thorough use of ECAM, QRH and paper c/l and

-

properly envisage different safety factors for approach and go around.

The loss of two hydraulic systems systematically causes the loss of the auto pilot system, thus the role of the PF on

stabilizing the a/c flight path will be more demanding.

Although ALTN law (with landing gear retracted) is available and quite comfortable, the handling of the a/c will be

affected by the loss of the following flight control parts or systems:

-

pitch trim,

-

elevators,

-

ailerons,

-

slats/flaps,

-

brake system (normal, autobrake, alternate, antiskid),

-

NWS and

-

spoilers.

Major effects on a/c handling and procedures:

-

Roll control is always affected by loss of spoilers. With one hydraulic system remaining, there is always one part of

the high lift devices lost (whether slats or flaps).

-

Landing gear has to be extended by gravity (paper c/l) and NWS is systematically lost. In the event of loss of G +

B, the speed has to be increased to 200 kt during gravity extension to provide a good pitch control until stabilized.

The flight controls revert to direct law. To leave the runway after landing under these circumstances might become

a demanding exercise. Thus high speed turn off may preferably satisfy the demand rather than 90° turns.

-

The landing will need most likely a high speed touch down as the abnormal configuration may require a greater

speed increment (i.e. VREF + 30 kt - depending on a/c version - refer to QRH chapter 2). Both normal and

alternate braking may be lost and the braking relies on yellow brake accumulator without antiskid.

-

The approach after landing gear extension may require (ECAM procedure) a voluntary disconnection of the ATHR

(G + B) in order to obtain an easier a/c pitch control during approach and go around.

-

In the event of loss of G + Y hydraulics, the pitch trim is lost. The procedure thus requires the landing gear

extension at VAPP at the earliest, since the integrator provides a trim with the elevator as long as the landing gear

is not extended. If this procedure is missed, the flare and the pitch control in case of go around may be difficult.

The PFD message MANUAL PITCH TRIM USE after landing gear extension should thus be disregarded.

-

In the event of loss of G + Y there is high pitch during approach and go around expected (slats may be extended

only), causing a duck under during approach because of PFs eye position in relation to the runway and causing a

risk of tail strike upon touch down (A321). To properly brief the PNF to watch the pitch during approach and touch

down becomes thus essential.

-

Hard pitch inputs on side stick during approach may trigger spurious stall warnings. The PF should thus manage a

well stabilized approach with the landing gear down early in order to avoid those distractions that may cause an

unnecessary go around.

DATE: JAN 2001

PAGE 190

UDY0202

A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

ABNORMAL OPERATION

7 - ABNORMAL SLATS/FLAPS

The slats and/or flaps abnormal configuration may be essential due to the following causes:

-

dual hydraulic (G + B or G + Y) malfunction,

-

dual SFCC (dual channel faults) failure and

-

slats and/or flaps jammed (locked by WTB activation).

The consequences of malfunctions as such may be serious since

-

a/c handling is affected (flight control reconfiguration law),

-

modification of approach attitude references,

-

approach speed and landing distances increase and

-

frozen high lift devices during go around and diversion, if applicable.

Consequences in case of SFCC dual channel fault:

-

F/CTL SLATS FAULT (dual SFCC slat channel fault)

⇒ flight control protections are lost (alternate law and direct law with landing gear extended),

⇒ no characteristic speed calculation available (red SPD LIM flag on PFD). There is no slat position detection

available. VAPP is provided by FMGC on the PFD,

⇒ speed is limited to VFE next (corresponding to next slat position),

⇒ aural stall warning and overspeed warning are provided,

⇒ selected speed for landing configuration should be systematically engaged when the malfunction occurs,

⇒ AP, ATHR and FDs are lost and

⇒ increased VAPP and landing distances may apply (depending upon slat position).

-

F/CTL FLAPS FAULT (dual SFCC flap channel fault)

⇒ flight controls remain in normal law,

⇒ AP, ATHR and FDs are lost,

⇒ in order to avoid degraded handling characteristics, flaps full shall not be used,

⇒ abnormal attitude references may apply for approach and landing,

⇒ increased VAPP and landing distances may apply (depending upon flap position) and

⇒ selected speed for landing configuration should be systematically engaged when the malfunction occurs.

In case of slat malfunction caused by dual SFCC slat channel fault, the SFCC slat position information provided to the

flight control computers is lost. Thus causing the loss of V_S1G calculation and switching the flight controls to alternate

and direct law subsequently. The warnings are actually processed by the FWC specific sensors, which are detecting

the real slat position.

Slats/Flaps jammed procedure applies for a/c configuration preparation.

NOTE:

VSW is not provided in case of dual slat channel fault or in case of dual SFCC fault (all 4 channels have failed). G DOT

speed is displayed if the dual SFCC failure has occurred in clean configuration. AP is still available in this case.

DATE: JAN 2001

PAGE 192

UDY0202

A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

ABNORMAL OPERATION

8 - ZFW ENTRY ERROR (PILOT'S ENTRY)

The a/c gross weight (GW) is an important parameter for the flight.

There are two computer sets supposed to elaborate the GW - FMGC and FAC.

1. FMGC (Flight Management and Guidance Computers)

Before engine start, the pilot enters data into INIT B page:

-

ZFWCG / ZFW and

-

FOB.

These values are memorized in the FMGC.

Once the engines are started, FMGC makes predictions for GW and CG.

[GW = ZFW + FOB - Estimated Fuel Used]

NOTE:

When the approach phase is activated, the calculation is updated with the actual fuel used value.

[GW = ZFW + FOB - Actual Fuel Used]

Based on this FMGC calculated GW value (displayed on ECAM SD and MCDU FUEL PRED page), the MCDU

displays:

-

characteristic speeds,

-

performance predictions and

-

VAPP on PFD.

2. FAC (Flight Augmentation Computers)

Each FAC receives AOA (angle of attack) information from 3 AOA probes. It takes an average value from these 3

inputs and calculates the stall speed as a function of:

-

AOA,

-

speed (EAS),

-

load factor (CG) and

-

CONFIG.

From this stall speed, according to the a/c configuration, FAC determines the GW.

The characteristic speeds, displayed on the PFD:

-

VLS,

-

S - speed,

-

F - speed and

-

G - dot speed

are generated by the FACs.

On ground and up to take-off phase (landing gear extended), the FAC takes the GW parameter from the FMGC (pilot's

entry).

Below 14 600 ft and

-

speed < 240 kt (255 kt for A321) and

-

bank angle < 5° and

-

speed brakes retracted and

-

no dynamic maneuvers and

-

no configuration change (being not in FULL)

DATE: JAN 2001

PAGE 194

UDY0202

A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

ABNORMAL OPERATION

9 - DOUBLE RADIO ALTIMETER FAILURE

The double Radio Altimeter (R/A) failure has various consequences on many systems of the a/c, since the R/A

information is used to switch flight control laws or AP - ATHR modes etc. or in auto call outs and warnings. It is clearly

materialized by RA red flag on PFD (just underneath the horizon).

The procedure is simple, since the ECAM provides all required information. However, the consequences of such

malfunction affect the a/c normal operations in many directions.

Consequences upon Fly by Wire systems:

Rather than using R/A information, the FBW systems use the LGCIU outputs for most of the logics.

a. APPROACH

-

The flare law (usually blended in at 50 ft) engages when the landing gear is extended.

-

The warning USE MANUAL PITCH TRIM comes up few seconds later on PFD, in order to remind the crew that

the remainder of the approach is to be flown in a comfortable direct law (with pitch rate feed back).

b. LANDING

-

The ground law engages when MLG is compressed and pitch attitude is less than 2.5°.

-

The ground spoilers extend using wheel speed information.

c. WARNINGs

-

The low energy warning is lost in case of double R/A malfunction.

Consequences for FMGC:

Basically LAND modes do not engage, since it ensures that (for autoland) subsequently FLARE and ROLLOUT will

engage which is not possible as the R/A information is missing.

Consequently (landing gear extended):

-

FD basic modes available only,

-

approach modes are not available (no LOC, no G/S),

-

autoland modes are not available (no LAND, no FLARE, no ROLLOUT),

-

ATHR remains in speed mode, in approach (no RETARD),

-

APs are lost.

Consequences for GPWS / EGPWS:

Most functions require R/A signal information. Therefore GPWS and EGPWS, if applicable, are lost.

DATE: JAN 2001

PAGE 197

UDY0202

A320 INSTRUCTOR SUPPORT

ABNORMAL OPERATION

2. Check POBE / WINDOW HEAT ON

Declare emergency and set A7700 on ATC.

3. Check whether altitude is reliable or not.

-

If positive, the BIRD may be used.

-

If negative, the bird is unreliable.

4. Refer to QRH, chapter 5 in order to determine the required, pitch and thrust data.

The following table may assist the crew in determining the nature of the problem and the information that are still

valuable:

UNRELIABLE

DISREGARD

USE

ALT

GPS ALT* and GPS GS

ALTITUDE

IAS / TAS

GS on ND

WIND

R/A

V/S - FPA

CAB ALT

SPEED

IAS / TAS

GPS GS

WIND

BIRD

WIND reported by other a/c

GPS altitude is different from barometric but allows a reasonable use.

The unreliable speed and/or altitude indication may cause the following undue phenomena (but most distracting):

-

SPD LIM flag on PFD,

-

ALPHA FLOOR activation,

-

stall - windshear warnings (due to Mach effect),

-

flap auto retraction,

-

ALPHA LOCK system activation,

-

overspeed warning on ECAM,

-

altitude discrepancy warning on ECAM and

-

rudder TLU fault on ECAM.

NOTE:

Unreliable speed indication procedure is provided in FCOM VOL3 Abnormal and Emergency chapter and in QRH OPS

DATA chapter.

DATE: JAN 2001

PAGE 200

UDY0202

SAFETY EXTERIOR INSPECTION - CM2

• Wheel Chocks

• Landing Gear Doors

• APU Area

PRELIMINARY COCKPIT PREPARATION OVERVIEW

1

AIRCRAFT SETUP

Wx Radar, Engines, Landing Gear, Wipers

2

ELEC POWER

Battery Check & External power

CM2

RMP Setting

3

APU

Fire Test & Starting

4

ADIRS

Alignment

L

LIGHTS

CM1 + CM2

E

EFB

CM1 + CM2

Recall Warnings & Acceptance - CM1

A

ACCEPTANCE

TECH-LOG, MEL/CDL, QRH (A/C Config Summary, OEB) - CM1 + CM2

P

PERFORMANCE

Preliminary Takeoff Performance Calculation- CM1 + CM2

BEFORE WALKAROUND

PM

2

PRELIMINARY COCKPIT PREPARATION - EXPANDED

AIRCRAFT SETUP

Radar - OFF

WEATHER RADAR ¹

This is the only step

Windshear / PWS- OFF

that is to be done in

Gain knob - AUTO/CAL

the transit checks.

Mode Selector - As Required

Masters Switch 1 and 2 - OFF

ENGINE

Mode Selector - NORM

LANDING GEAR

Lever - Down

WIPERS

Both Selectors - OFF

BATTERY CHECK & EXTERNAL POWER

• A/C Not Electrically Supplied for > 6 hours

¾ Batt Voltage Check ²

o Above 25.5 V - Batt 1,2 AUTO

ELECTRICS

o At or Below 25.5 V - Charge for 20 mins and check again ³

• A/C Electrically Supplied within < 6 hours

¾ Batt 1,2 AUTO ⁴

o EXT PWR ON if AVAIL light is on.

1. Procedures throughout this document refer to Collins WXR-1200. For Honeywell RDR-4000 (installed in some aircraft

like AP-BMX), please refer to the A320 Line Training Document.

2. Check batteries voltage with Batt Pb OFF.

3. Charge with Batt Pb on AUTO & EXT PWR ON. Check charging on ELEC page (i.e. battery contactor closed).

4. Batt voltage >25.5 ensures a charge above 50%. If APU is to be started on batteries then start within 30 mins of

putting Batt Pb on AUTO (delay of more than 35 mins can lead to battery charge of <25% of max capacity).

APU

• RMP

o Power - ON

o Nav Light - OFF

o SEL Light OFF

o FREQ - TUNE (communication frequencies)

• APU

o Fire Test - Perform ¹

o Start - Perform ²

o Bleed - ON (temperature as required) ³

1. Automatic shutdown of APU & discharge of APU fire extinguisher bottle may occur if APU FIRE test pb is pressed for

more than 3 seconds. APU fire pb switch is lighted partially if AC power not available.

2. Use ground support & delay APU start. After master switch, wait 3s before selecting APU START pb. Keep external

power on to reduce APU load especially in hot weather. Follow LIM-APU-Start/Shutdown during refueling/defueling.

3. Do not use APU bleed with LP or HP ground air unit connected. To determine if HP ground air unit is connected,

check BLEED page to see if there is pressure in the bleed air system.

3

ADIRS

•

ALL IR Modes - SEL to NAV

•

A complete IRS alignment must be performed in the following cases:

o Before the first flight of the day, or

o When there is a crew change, or

o When the departure airport is located between latitudes 2 ° North and 2 ° South, or

o When the GPS is not available and the NAVAID coverage is poor on the expected route, or

o When the GPS is not available and the expected flight time is more than 3 hours.

•

A fast IRS alignment must be performed if:

o A complete IRS alignment is not necessary and

o Difference between IRS position & FMGC position is at or above 5 NM (Position Monitor Page).

LIGHT UP

•

Cockpit Lights - As Required

EFB

•

Version - Check

•

Initialization - Start

AIRCRAFT ACCEPTANCE

•

RCL - Push for 3 second to recall all cleared/cancelled warnings.

•

Technical Log - Check

•

MEL/ CDL - Check and activate in the performance application.

•

QRH:

o A/C Reg, MSN, Revision & Insertion Date

o OEB - Check

o A/C CONFIG SUMMARY - Check (Ops Data)

•

A/C Acceptance - Perform

•

In icing condition with OAT +3°C or below, check taxi-in time of the previous flight to determine the remaining

taxi-out time before next engine acceleration for ice shedding (PRO-NOR-SUP-ADVWXR).

PRELIMINARY PERFORMANCE

•

IPAD:

o Jeppesen FD Pro - Check Updated

o Fly Smart - Check Updated

o Digital Crew App:

ƒ Operator’s Data - EO SID Check Updated

ƒ Manuals - Check Updated

•

Airfield Data - Obtain

•

Preliminary Performance - Compare OPT vs CONF2 performance. If difference in TFLEX is < 3^oC, select

higher flaps config. For short/badly paved runways - Higher Flaps. For better climb gradient - Lower Flaps.

•

NAV Charts - Prepare

BEFORE WALKAROUND

4

•

ECAM SD PAGES:

o ENG - Check Oil Quantity ¹

o HYD - Check Reservoir Fluid Level ²

o DOOR - Check Oxygen pressure ³

•

FCTL: ⁴

o Flaps - Confirm Flap position agrees with the handle position.

o SPD Brake - Check retracted and disarmed.

•

Brakes:

o Parking Brake:

ƒ ACC Pressure - Check in Green ⁵

ƒ Parking Brake Handle - ON ⁶

ƒ Brake Pressure Indicator - Check Normal

o Alternate Brake - Check: ⁷

ƒ Yellow Elec Pump - Off

ƒ Chocks - On

ƒ Parking Brakes - Off

ƒ Brake Pedals - Press to Check Pressure on Brake Pressure Indicator ⁸

ƒ Brake Pedals Release - Parking Brakes ON

•

Emergency Equipment - Check ⁹

o Life Jackets

o Smoke Hoods

o Gloves

o Axe

o Portable Fire Extinguisher

o Oxygen Masks (goggles attached)

o Escape Ropes

•

CB Panels - Check:

o Overhead (49 VU)

o Rear (121, 122, 123, 124, 125 VU)

•

Landing Gear Pins - Onboard and Stowed

1. FCOM Limitations ENG OIL. Oil quantity >9.5qt + Estimated Consumption (approx. 0.5 qt/h).

2. Fluid volume may change with OAT and appear out of range w/o any low air pressure/level warning. Contact

maintenance in this case.

3. If half boxed in amber, refer to FCOM LIM-OXY Minimum Flight Crew Oxygen Pressure.

4. For a flight control surface/handle position disagree, check with maintenance before applying hydraulic power.

5. Use yellow electric pump to recharge if required. Yellow & Green systems required ground clearance before use.

6. With 1 brake > 500^oC, or 350^oC with brake fans ON, avoid parking brakes unless necessary. Parking brake must

be on for exterior inspection to check brake wear indicators.

7. Check before first flight of the day.

8. Pressure must build up without delay symmetrically on left & right sides for the same application simultaneously

applied on left & right pedals. With full pedal deflection, the pressure must be between 2000 and 2700 PSI.

9. Imagine yourself wearing a "Life Jacket" and a "Smoke Hood". Then putting on your "Gloves" with "Axe" in one

hand and "Fire Extinguisher" in the other. You then use the "Rope" to exit the cockpit to breath some fresh "Oxygen".

5

EXTERIOR WALKAROUND

Flight crew must perform a complete walkaround before each flight and ensure:

• General condition of the aircraft is satisfactory.

• Visible aircraft components and equipment are safe.

o No impact/damage to the structure.

o No evident fuel, oil, or hydraulic leak.

o All ground access doors are closed.

• Parking brake must be ON in order to check the brake wear indicators.

6

BEFORE BOARDING CLEARANCE

CM1

CM2

Man

Check

Cabin Crew Briefing

Aircraft Onboard Documents

A

Air Travel

Taxi & Flight Time, Routing, FL & WX.

• Certificate of Registration

• Certificate of Airworthiness

• Air Operator Certificate

B

Baggage

Baggage & seating related CG issues.

• Insurance Certificate

• Certificate of Radio Installation

C

Communication

Intercom, discrete code & cockpit door.

• Mobile Wireless License

• Weight Certificate

• Noise Certificate

D

Documents

Valid crew (cabin/cockpit) documents.

• RVSM Certificate

• IPAD Approval

E

Emergencies

Evacuation, emergency descent etc.

• Fuel Carnet

• Residual Disinfection Certificate

Machine

• Dent and Repair Chart

• Emergency Equipment Location Chart

• GACA Foreign Operator Authorization

• Technical Status

Other

Environment

• SAFA checklist ^*

• Misc. Blank Forms File

• Weather conditions

• Latest revision record (within 20 days)

• Cabin Status (temperature, catering etc.)

• Flight Pack List

* SAFA (Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft) CHECKLIST

7

COCKPIT PREPARATION

8

DEPARTURE BRIEFING ¹

•

FMS

¾ DATA Page

ƒ Type and Model

ƒ APD & Nav Database Date

¾ FMS INIT- B Pag

ƒ Block Fuel (FOB on EWD)

ƒ Estimated TOW

ƒ Extra Time / Fuel at Destination

¾ PERF TAKEOFF Pag

AIRCRAFT

ƒ TO RWY

ƒ TO CONF

ƒ Flex / TOGA

ƒ V1, VR, V2

ƒ Transition Altitude

ƒ Thrust Reduction / ACC Altitude

¾ F-PLN & PROG Page

ƒ Route Waypoints

ƒ Time, Distance and Fuel

ƒ Strategy in secondary flight plan

WEATHER &

•

Weather reports and applicable procedures

NOTAMS

•

Applicable NOTAMS and procedures

•

ATC Procedures (push and start procedures)

STARTUP &

•

A/C Procedures (engine start etc.)

TAXI

•

Routing to the anticipated runway

•

Dimensions (Length, Width, Stopway)

•

Surface Condition

RUNWAY

•

Lighting

•

Packs / Anti ice - On/Off Takeoff

•

Normal SID - Routing and Constraints

•

Engine Out SID - Routing and Constraint

DEPARTURE

•

Navigation Frequencies to be used (RAD NAV)

•

MSA

•

NADP

•

Weather

SPECIAL

•

Terrain

PROCEDURES

•

Failures (Communication, Technical etc.)

•

Contingencies & Procedures - EO SID, DGR etc.

1. The main purpose of a

briefing is that all team

members should have the

same game plan to achieve

the target which in this case

is a safe flight from A to B.

The game plan in this case

comprises of:

a) Identifying threats.

b) Identifying deviations

from routine line operations.

c) Agreement on: “Actions to Mitigate Identified Threats” and “Strategies to Tackle Deviations”.

Instead of giving too much importance to “which crew (PF or PM)” will brief “which element” and losing the bigger picture,

it is important to keep the briefing interactive and in a logical sequence so that in the end everyone has the same mental

image regarding the game plan.

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