CANADA. LAND OPERATIONS (ENGLISH, 2008)

Land Operations

Figure 6-1: Illustration of Campaign Authority Indicating Changes over Time

During any campaign, and particularly those in which the support of population groups is

vital for success, commanders must strive to build and maintain campaign authority. This is not

meant to highlight or advertise the campaign and its own goals for its own sake. Rather, it is

done to build the legitimacy of the campaign in the eyes of those who are affected by it, and

most importantly, whose support is required for successful conclusion.

Not all of the criteria need be satisfied in order to hold significant campaign authority.

For example, if a humanitarian crisis demands intervention, an intervening military force that

immediately relieves suffering and prevents a further deterioration of the situation will likely be

viewed as having legitimacy and thus campaign authority, even though no international

mandate may have been issued by an international forum.

Apart from building campaign authority through the actual conduct of the campaign and

the achievement of success, campaign authority may be built and maintained through influence

activities, such as psychological operations (PSYOPS), civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and

public affairs (PA). This will provide both information and evidence of campaign progress and

the resolution of sources of conflict. In many cases, these will be defensive information

operations (info ops) that seek to protect campaign legitimacy from adversary propaganda.

Influence activities, such as PSYOPS and PA, should not be conducted in such a manner that

they will be perceived to be propaganda. They must simply highlight the aim and objectives of

the campaign, its benefit for indigenous populations, and its moral justification.

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In the end, a campaign that is not seen to be legitimate or conducted in a legitimate

manner will likely fail as a result of a loss of popular support. This is particularly true for those

campaign themes that require popular support to succeed, that is, peace support and counter-

insurgency (COIN) campaigns.

SECTION 2

OPERATIONAL ART, OPERATIONAL

DESIGN, AND CAMPAIGN PLANNING

603. GENERAL

Operational art is defined as: “the skill of employing military forces to attain strategic

objectives in a theatre of war or theatre of operations through the design, organization and

conduct of campaigns and major operations.” ¹²⁶ Operational design, including campaign

planning, is realized through the application of operational art.

Operational art is the skilful employment of military forces to attain objectives through the

design, organization, integration, planning and conduct of theatre strategies, campaigns, major

operations and battles. It applies to all aspects of operational design including campaign

planning. It is not dependent upon the size of the committed forces.

It requires a clear understanding of the consequences of operational level decisions, and

their impact at both the tactical and strategic levels. Commanders must have broad vision, the

ability to anticipate, and an understanding of the relationship between end states, their

supporting objectives, and the activities and effects needed to realize them.

Using operational art, commanders at all levels apply intellect and intuition to the

situation to establish and verbalize, in the form of a commander’s intent, their vision of what is

required to achieve the end state. This should include a unifying theme to which all agencies in

the campaign could work.

Operational design is the process of expressing operational art. It examines the whole

situation and constituent elements of an environment, along with the nature of the problem at

hand, in order to conceive a framework that can be used to meet the desired strategic and

operational end states. It consists of: an operational estimate including mission analysis; a

series of concepts for articulating the campaign plan; and the campaign plan itself including

supporting operation plans and orders. It is the manner and process in which the campaign

plan is developed. Note that an effects-based approach is used to conduct operational design.

¹²⁶ B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Command in Land Operations. NATO Allied Administrative Publication 39

(AAP-39) NATO Glossary of Tactical and Logistical Land Operations Terms and Expressions, defines

operational art in similar terms: “the employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational

objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major

operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational

design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war.”

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A campaign is defined as: “a set of military operations planned and conducted to

achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve

maritime, land and air forces.”¹²⁷

A campaign plan is defined as: “a plan for a series of related military operations aimed

at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space.”¹²⁸ The

campaign plan should focus on the operational end state, operational objectives, and supporting

effects or decisive points to reaching the operational objectives. It should not focus on detailed

activities.

Campaign planning is part of operational design and applies established procedures and

a commander’s intuition to solve the problem. In general, “design” is problem setting while

“planning” is problem solving.

Operational design provides a means to gain understanding of a complex problem and

environment, along with insights towards achieving a workable solution. Although design

should precede planning, design is continuous throughout the operation, constantly testing and

refining to ensure the relevance of military action to the problem. In this sense, design guides

and informs planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. It allows for adjustments to be

continually made to the campaign plan as required.

10.

Campaign planning focuses on the operational objectives and on the physical and

intellectual activities intended to have a direct effect on the threat or environment. A

commander is typically assigned a mission and a set of resources, and required to devise a plan

to use those resources to accomplish that mission or achieve the desired objective.

604. PLANNING LEVELS ACROSS CAMPAIGN THEMES

Campaigning forces have traditionally planned at a level reflective of their level of

command and employment. Thus, tactical level formations have been limited to the conduct of

tactical level planning and subsequent activities. In planning processes, units have conducted

the estimate process while formations have performed the formal staff-assisted operational

planning process. Elements of campaign planning have rested solely at the operational and

strategic levels. Furthermore, combat support elements rested mainly at the higher tactical and

formation levels, and joint resources have been normally controlled at the higher formation and

operational levels. Finally, integration with other agencies has traditionally been conducted only

at the highest levels and has been limited in scope.

Much of this paradigm will remain extant during campaigns of major combat. However,

many campaigns, such as a peace support or COIN, will have particular characteristics such as:

the involvement of other elements of power to achieve success; the requirement to deal with

environmental elements and actors in addition to an adversary; the limited involvement from

alliance or coalition members, such as the commitment of units or brigades only; forces working

in expansive areas of operations (AO); and, the use of joint enablers at tactical levels.

¹²⁷ NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6 (AAP-6) NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

¹²⁸ NATO Allied Administrative Publication 39 (AAP-39) NATO Glossary of Tactical and Logistical Land

Operations Terms and Expressions.

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In such situations, there will be a compression of this paradigm that will see tactical

level commanders undertaking responsibilities and processes associated with higher tactical

and operational level headquarters (HQ). Thus, units and lower level formations will work

closely at all levels with other agencies, they will deal with a wide array of actors and influences

within the environment in addition to adversary forces, they will undertake long-term operational

planning, they will be responsible for the conduct or coordination of all aspects of the alliance’s

campaign within their large AOs, they will be responsible to implement their own national

campaigns, they will work on multiple lines of operation, they will be allocated a wide array of

combat support enablers (e.g., PSYOPS detachments at battle group level), and their tactical

level activities will be directly linked to operational objectives and end states.

As a result of this compression, elements of campaign planning, operational planning

and interagency operations are forced down to the tactical levels where they are incorporated,

or at the very least, must be understood and factored into tactical planning. This is illustrated in

Figure 6-2.

Figure 6-2: Compression of Planning Levels By Campaign Theme

The level, to which a tactical commander is planning in terms of incorporating elements

of campaign and operational planning, will depend upon the type of campaign being conducted.

Major combat operations will be relatively straightforward with a focus on a likely conventional

adversary. Peace support and COIN campaigns will demand much more complicated planning

considerations at lower levels. This compression in certain campaigns of operational planning

down to tactical levels stems from certain environmental characteristics and campaign

demands, which may include some or all of the following:

The environment and nature of the campaign requires a multi-agency,

comprehensive approach to the campaign to reach enduring outcomes. This

will see lower tactical levels planning and working with other agencies to restore

or create civil structures and institutions. Thus, the military tactical level forces

will share lines of operation and objectives with non-military agencies.

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Operational objectives are planned so that there is a direct and intimate link

between them and tactical level activities. For example, tactical level forces

may assume tasks to maintain civil order in a specific area, assist in the

stabilization through the creation of civil structures, and train local security

forces.

There is a need for tactical level commanders to understand the direct

relationship between their tactical level activities, the effects, both desired and

undesired, created by their activities, and the resulting impact on the

achievement of operational objectives.

Tactical commanders must understand the influence that their activities will have

on the various actors and groups within the environment, and plan for this

accordingly.

Tactical level commanders may be allocated joint capabilities, such as CIMIC or

PSYOPS detachments, that normally reside at higher echelons of command.

The complexity of the campaign lines of operation requires harmonization of the

actions of other agencies and elements at the lowest levels. For example,

tactical level commanders will have to coordinate their activities and effects with

other non-military agencies.

Some alliance member commitments will only occur at the tactical level and

therefore their understanding of, and influence in, the allied campaign will come

from the tactical level.

SECTION 3

THE ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN

605.

GENERAL

The purpose of operational design is to map out the framework for the campaign plan

and its detailed development. Operational design expresses operational art and consists of the

operational estimate, the operational concepts for articulating the campaign plan, and the

campaign plan itself. Operational design provides the guidance for the planning of major

operations or campaigns, based upon an analysis of the nature of the problem and desired end

state. It results in the commander’s visualization of the campaign’s conduct, and thus, leads to

operational campaign planning, including the continual issue of orders and directives.

Operational design relies upon a number of operational concepts to support campaign

planning.

While strategic and operational objectives remain consistent throughout the joint

operating area (JOA), the capabilities, activities and effects used to accomplish them can vary

significantly from one AO to another.

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606. OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE AND MISSION ANALYSIS

The operational estimate will produce the campaign plan, followed by the operation plan

(OPLAN) and operation order (OPORD) needed to initiate the campaign plan. Sequence:

The operational estimate begins with an assessment of the environment and the

issues that led to the crisis or decision to undertake a campaign and intervene

with military forces. It is here that all elements and systems of the

environment—political, military, economic, social (including culture and religion),

information and infrastructure (PMESII)—are identified and assessed. Here,

thought can be given to other elements of power and agencies that are best

suited to deal with these systems.

Mission analysis is the logical process for extracting and deducing from a

superior’s order the requirements necessary to fulfil a mission. At the

operational level, it places in context what objective and supporting effects are

to be achieved by the campaign:

(1)

The commander conducts a mission analysis of the strategic and

operational direction issued to him, which should include a strategic end

state and objectives, including the military strategic objective. From this

he identifies the military operational objectives that must be fulfilled in

order to support the end state. In doing so, he must focus on the

strategic objectives as the guiding elements of operational design.

(2)

During mission analysis, the commander must analyze and discuss the

strategic directive with senior military or governmental leaders to ensure

that the policy goals are clear, and that the national level authorities are

made fully aware of the consequences of committing military forces to a

campaign.

(3)

Planning in a crisis will be an iterative process with political and

diplomatic activity occurring in parallel. Even in domestic operations, the

ideal content of a strategic directive is unlikely to be available at an early

stage. In some cases, it must be acknowledged that contingency

planning and some preparations may begin without a politically approved

mission. If a clearly enunciated strategic directive is not forthcoming, the

commander should prepare options for approval.

(4)

The mission analysis should consider what other instruments of the JIMP

framework will be used to achieve the overall objective or be available for

coordination in the field.

The operational commander’s mission analysis allows him to provide planning guidance

to his staff. It should clearly state the key operational objectives to be achieved and the key

supporting effects and activities in their realization. At this point, the commander should be able

to vocalize his visualization of the campaign through a unifying theme in the form of his

commander’s intent. Together, the commander and his staff develop the campaign plan.

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Once the campaign plan is developed, the initiating OPLANs and OPORDs are

conceived. Based upon the commander’s direction, a number of courses of action will be

developed, validated and compared.

The commander will select the preferred course of action and resulting plan. These will

be refined and issued as OPLANs and OPORDs. As the campaign progresses, the OPLANS

will be continually modified and issued to reflect progress and developments in the campaign

and environment.

Flexibility and adaptability in operational design and planning are essential as each new

campaign or development during a campaign brings unforeseen complexities and opportunities

for which there may be no pre-planned solutions. Commanders must anticipate developments,

plan for them, and act in parallel with JIMP activity. This will ensure the effective application of

combat power.

607. THE CONCEPTUAL ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND CAMPAIGN

PLANNING

The elements of operational design provide a framework for analysis of the mission.

They help commanders visualize the operation and shape their intent. The elements of

operational design are as follows:

end state and military battlespace conditions to be achieved;

centre(s) of gravity;

objectives;

decisive points;

lines of operation;

culminating point;

operational reach, approach and pauses;

simultaneous and sequential operations;

linear and non-linear operations; and

tempo.

608. END STATE

The strategic end state is the situation the government/higher authority wants to exist

when operations conclude, both military operations, as well as those in which the military is in

support of other instruments of power. It is the desired situation derived from national policy

direction. It is realized by the achievement of strategic objectives. A strategic objective is a

constituent of the desired strategic end state. The strategic end state and supporting objectives

are used to determine the military operational end state and objectives.

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At the operational level, the operational end state is the desired military situation derived

from strategic direction, taking into account the end state and objectives of the other instruments

of power. At the operational and tactical levels, it is the set of conditions that when achieved

accomplish the assigned mission and meet the desired objectives that support the end state. It

may be reached before the overall strategic end state. Upon achieving it, the military

involvement in a campaign may cease or be reduced substantially.

An operational objective is a constituent of the desired operational end state and is

achieved through the aggregation of one or a number of operational effects, created through

one or more activities. The operational objectives are the military goals needed to produce the

desired operational end state. Determining the operational end state and supporting operational

objectives, by use of mission analysis, are the critical first steps in operational design using an

effects-based approach.

Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders determine the operational end state for campaigns

or joint major operations, and set the operational objectives necessary to accomplish them.

Operations at the theatre level focus on achieving the operational objectives necessary to

achieve the commander’s end state. They are used to develop campaign lines of operation that

link decisive points or effects leading to the fulfilment of those objectives. These campaign lines

of operation should focus and harmonize military activities with those of the other JIMP

elements, particularly the other agencies. Measures of effectiveness (MOE) are identified at the

outset in order to ascertain the effectiveness of activities in meeting the desired effects and

objectives in the ultimate fulfilment of the end state.

609. CENTRE OF GRAVITY

A centre of gravity (CoG) is a source of strength or power. It has been defined as:

“characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or

other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight.”¹²⁹ Centres of

gravity exist at all levels of command for any military force. They are strengths that create

effects; therefore, they are better defined in terms of people—individuals or groups—that can

create effects. They may benefit from characteristics or certain localities but are tangible. They

may be a moral leader, such as a political or religious leader, or a group, such as an operational

armour reserve, or a particular tribe supporting an insurgency.

An alternative, more accurate definition for a CoG is: “a dynamic and powerful physical

or moral agent of action or influence that possess certain characteristics and capabilities, and

benefits from a given location or terrain.”¹³⁰

A CoG is an agent from which an adversary or force will gain his strength, either moral

or physical, or both. A CoG will exist at each level of command, and an adversary may have

more than a single CoG. A CoG will exist wherever forces are most concentrated and where

there is significant cohesion. It may be a centre of power and influence and/or a collection of

physical capabilities.

¹²⁹ NATO AAP-6.

130

“What Clausewitz (Really) Meant by Center of Gravity,” by Dr. J. Strange, USMC War College and

Colonel R. Iron, UK Army, 2006. Much of this section is taken from this source. The NATO AAP-6

definition has been derived from an interpretation of the original concept proposed by the military theorist

Clausewitz. Instead of capabilities or locations, a centre of gravity is a strength that can create an effect.

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In short, a CoG is a main centre of strength, be it physical, moral or both. A CoG can

deliver a significant effect, again be it physical or moral. Thus, a CoG exists because of the

effect that it can have on an adversary or situation (from the striking of a blow), not because of

its inherent capabilities. Certainly, a CoG needs certain capabilities, characteristics and

locations to achieve the effect, but it is the effect this is key in determining a CoG. CoGs may

change over time.

CoGs are people, groups or individuals, which create a physical or moral/psychological

effect. A CoG may be a military force or a key component of a military force, such an elite,

highly trained manoeuvre force. Physical CoGs function as active agents that endeavour to

destroy the adversary’s capability and will to resist. Moral CoGs function as active agents that

influence or control physical CoGs. It may be a leader, a key ruling element, or a population

segment capable of creating a motivational effect.

A CoG is a key strength of an adversary or military force. It is important only in terms of

its relationship to another military force, normally its adversary, and the effect that it can create.

A powerful military formation may only be a CoG if it is suitably capable, by virtue of its relative

strength and location, to strike the blow and create the significant effect against its adversary. If

for example, the adversary’s armour reserve is an operational CoG, but it cannot manoeuvre to

be effective because all bridges have been destroyed, then it is no longer a CoG. Hence, CoGs

are determined and identified based upon their relationship to the adversary and the potential to

create significant effects against him.

CENTRES OF GRAVITY IN RELATION TO THE ADVERSARY

In the American Civil War, the Army of Northern Virginia was a centre of gravity not because its

soldiers were particularly key, but because of the threat it posed to Washington DC and its ability

to block the Union Army of the Potomac’s march on Richmond, the Confederate capital. This

was a combination of capabilities, location and time.

In 1991 the Iraqi Republican Guard was a centre of gravity because of what it could

potentially do to VII Corps, not just because it was well trained with capable armour. In

2003 the Republican Guard was once again identified as an Iraqi centre of gravity, key

to the defence of “Fortress Baghdad”. In retrospect, the Saddam Fedayeen turned out to

be the more worrisome threat, at least for a short while, because of their ability to

maintain Saddam’s grip on numerous cities along the Coalition’s supply lines running

back to Kuwait. Yet the Kurdish peshmerga, would likely have relished fighting the

Fedayeen on their terms. For the Kurds it was the Republican Guard with their superior

firepower, mobility, and protection that was a much more potent centre of gravity. This is

a graphic example of how centres of gravity are formed out of the relationships between

the two adversaries. The Iraqi operational centre of gravity may have been the

Republican Guard against the Kurds; but was likely to have been the asymmetric forces

of the Fedayeen against the Coalition, against which the Republican Guard could not

survive in open combat.

Source: “What Clausewitz (Really) Meant by Center of Gravity,” by Dr. J. Strange,

USMC War College and Colonel R. Iron, UK Army, 2006.

Moral centres of gravity will be focused upon people and their will. One can defeat an

opponent’s army, destroy the economy and occupy the land, but victory will unlikely be lasting if

the will to resist remains strong amongst the populace. In any campaign, the moral CoGs must

be identified. They are normally strategic. The two key elements of a moral CoG are the will

to fight and the ability to command the resources to fight.

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In order for a campaign to achieve a long lasting settlement such as self-sustaining

peace, one must undermine the adversary’s strategic CoGs, especially the moral CoGs. There

must be clear linkage between the campaign objectives at the operational level, and

undermining or defeating the moral CoG(s) (the adversary’s moral resistance) at the strategic

level. This will take more than just the military instrument to achieve—the total strategy should

embrace all the instruments of national power, military and non-military, along with other

agencies capable of creating the campaign objectives and attacking moral CoGs. In other

words, a comprehensive approach will be required to harmonize the activities of all elements of

power to attack and defeat the moral CoGs. Military operations should not stand-alone;

otherwise, it is unlikely that the defeat of an adversary’s physical operational CoG will lead to

undermining the strategic moral CoG(s), which may stem from standing grievances.

In many cases, an individual moral CoG is difficult to destroy in only physical terms.

Someone else would likely replace him. It is better, albeit a more time consuming, to remove

the legitimacy or claim to legitimacy from the moral CoG. In many cases, this will involve

solving the reasons that led to the conflict in the first place.

10.

A moral CoG in many campaigns may be the will of the majority of a population, or the

will of a particular segment of the population. Such will be the case in a COIN campaign. The

key battle between the insurgent and the campaigning forces will be to win the enduring support

of the populace.

11.

Thus, a successful campaign plan must first appraise, as accurately as possible, the

moral and physical character of the opponent to include his moral and physical CoGs. There is

no alternative and there is no short cut or analytical model that can make up for an inaccurate

assessment of the adversary when deciding upon CoGs. It is a matter of careful assessment

and the art of command to accurately assess physical and moral CoGs.

MORAL CENTRES OF GRAVITY

The outcome of the 1991 Gulf War was a resounding military victory that achieved the

Coalition's limited objective, the liberation of Kuwait, by defeating Iraq's operational centre of

gravity, the Republican Guard. But Saddam Hussein, a strategic moral centre of gravity,

remained undefeated. Saddam held the position of a moral centre of gravity for his ability to

command both military forces and a large mass of the populace, and to control through fear

other elements of the populace.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, Saddam was effectively neutralized early in the war, and

the information operations undermined the will of the population (another potential strategic

centre of gravity) to fight on his behalf. Thus, the enemy's moral centre(s) of gravity was

neutralized simultaneously with defeating his operational centers of gravity—the Republican

Guard and the Fedayeen. The Coalition was thus able to achieve its operational objectives:

the seizure of Baghdad; and, the toppling of the regime. However, neutralizing a strategic

centre(s) of gravity is not the same as defeating it, which is necessary for the much wider

strategic objective of achieving lasting peace. The failure to quickly achieve the support or

will of overwhelming majority of the populace to support/accept the Coalition strategic post-

war objectives fuelled the insurgency that erupted shortly after the major combat was

complete.

Source: “What Clausewitz (Really) Meant by Center of Gravity,” by Dr. J. Strange, USMC War

College and Colonel R. Iron, UK Army, 2006.

12.

Physical centres of gravity tend to be easy to visualize—armies or units, things that

resist an opponent. Moral CoGs are sometimes less obvious, and less easy to grasp. Yet, it is

essential to understand moral CoGs, for these are likely to be the most important ones at the

strategic level.

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13.

A moral centre of gravity is linked to people, be they individuals or groups, for only

people can create and maintain moral will and resistance. This focus on people may be

classified as follows:

An Individual. This is normally a leader, military or intellectual or both. A

strong-willed individual who has the will to develop, lead and sustain an

opposition to a potential adversary, along with the ability to exert his will through

an armed force and/or people. Such an individual might be Saddam Hussein in

1990-91 and Winston Churchill in 1940-41.

The Ruling Elite. Ruling elite is normally a closed group, within which the real

power of the state or entity resides. This group will direct policy and wield

control over the armed forces and/or people. The group may be ideologically

focused or claim a special, exclusive inheritance within the society, and thus

seek their legitimacy through their key role in spreading this ideology or claiming

a special social status. An example would be the clerical elite of the 1979

Iranian Revolution.

A Strong-willed Population. The moral CoG may rest within a large group of

people who share a common belief that is held strongly enough to engage in

conflict with an adversary. Examples include both the Palestinians and Israelis

in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

14.

Ideas themselves do not form a CoG because they cannot create an effect on their own.

However, they may be the key characteristic or root of a CoG in terms of its motivation, authority

and legitimacy. The motivating ideas will be embodied and empowered by individuals who are

the proponents of the ideas and who wield influence over a populace and control over an armed

force. If successful, the ideas will be adopted by a large segment of a population, thus making

that segment of the populace a CoG. This is the aim, for example, of the narrative formed by

insurgent forces. The ability of an idea or ideology to motivate a population will differ with

culture, and any intelligence assessment of potential CoGs must take this cultural aspect into

consideration.

15.

In general, CoGs will be:

Active, dynamic agents capable of creating an effect. They will be people, in

either units or formations, or individual leaders or groups with moral authority

and will.

Obvious. This will be more so the case with physical CoGs, but intelligence

must work to identify both types.

Powerful and capable of striking or directing significant blows.

16.

Within a campaign there will be both strategic and operational CoG. During an

insurgency, for example, a strategic CoG may be an individual or a segment of the populace

while an operational CoG will be their related armed element.

17.

An adversary will likely have a number of CoGs, some more critical than others. It may

be difficult to identify CoGs. In attempting to identify them, the commander will develop an

understanding of the complex interplay between all of the relevant entities and dynamics of the

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particular environment, including those aspects of the situation that are imperfectly recognized

or understood. This will allow the identification of key vulnerabilities on both the physical and

psychological planes, along with key objectives to reaching the desired end state. As the

situation becomes better understood, one of these objectives may develop to be a CoG.

18.

Commanders must plan campaigns in such a manner that allows their forces and

actions to attack adversary CoGs, both physical and moral. Lines of operation that attack a

physical CoG will normally be fairly straightforward. The CoG need not be destroyed, but may

only be neutralized until it no longer possesses a capability or relative location from which to

strike a significant blow.

19.

Operations against moral CoGs will be much more difficult to plan and may take a

significant amount of time. Leaders or elites and their ideas may be attacked in a number of

ways. As individuals, they may be eliminated, but they will likely be replaced; indeed, their

elimination may only enhance the moral influence that is assumed by their successors. Their

physical means of communication and control may be destroyed, thus limiting their capabilities.

The legitimacy of the individuals and groups and their ideas may be attacked or alternative

ideas and leaders may be offered. In order to successfully defeat a moral CoG, a number of

measures on both the physical and psychological planes will likely be required. Long-term and

enduring solutions will come from the intellectual defeat of these CoGs, or at least their

neutralization, to the point that they become irrelevant. Much of this will be done through

influence activities that persuade individuals and groups to support the campaign.

20.

Destruction or neutralization of the adversary CoG(s) is the most direct path to achieving

the end state. The adversary will recognize this and shield his CoG(s), and commanders must

examine many approaches, direct and indirect, on both the physical and psychological planes.

Once the CoG(s) have been identified, they become a focus of the commander’s intent and

operational design.

21.

Commanders must not only consider the adversary CoG(s), but also identify and protect

their own CoG(s).

22.

Lines of operation group similar operational objectives and may be devised to attack or

neutralize the CoGs and reach those operational objectives. Although CoGs are vital

considerations in operational design, they are not the sole focus of activities and operations.

The lines of operation should work towards the desired end state, while defeating, neutralizing

and protecting the identified CoGs.

610. OBJECTIVES

An objective is defined as “a clearly defined and attainable goal for a military operation,

for example seizing a terrain feature, neutralizing an enemy's force or capability or achieving

some other desired outcome that is essential to a commander's plan and towards which the

operation is directed.”¹³¹

Objectives are the constituent elements, which when combined achieve the end state at

the strategic and operational levels as described above. They also apply at the tactical level,

but are realized in more immediate time frames and are often tied to geographic features.

¹³¹ NATO AAP-6.

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Objectives exist on the physical and psychological planes. In the former context, an

objective may be the destruction of an adversary force. In the latter context, an objective may

be to convince a hostile populace to accept a temporary military presence, or to stop supporting

an insurgency.

An operational objective is a constituent of the desired operational end state realized

through the aggregation of one or a number of interrelated effects and circumstances.¹³² It may

be described as a decisive condition for the realization of the operational end state.

Operational objectives may be delivered by elements of power other than the military.

Operational objectives may be grouped into thematic lines of operation.

611. DECISIVE POINT

A decisive point is defined as: “a point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity

can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the information environment.”¹³³

As with other taxonomy, the complications of many operating environments and an

effects-based approach to campaign planning require a broader conceptualization and

application of the concept of decisive points. Just as lines of operation have been expanded to

be thematic groups of operational objectives, the concept of decisive points must be viewed in

relation to the operational end state and objectives.

Decisive points will exist on the psychological and physical planes, and may be

achievements or circumstances to be created on the path to an operational objective, vice a

point from which to attack a CoG. Although, they will likely be planned in consideration of

assessed centres of gravity.

Decisive points are supporting effects to be created by the conduct of activities on the

path to an operational objective. For example, the achievement of an effective ministry of

defence, or an operational command and control (C2) system, may be decisive points or

supporting effects en route to reaching the objective of establishing a competent military force.

Some decisive points are geographic, such as a port facility, a bridge crossing site, a

transportation network or node, or a base of operations. Other physical decisive points include

elements of an adversary force, such as units, command posts, fire support units capable of

delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or important communications sites. Events,

such as the commitment of the threat operational reserve, may also be decisive points. Once

identified and selected for action, decisive points become an effect, groups of effects, or a set of

circumstances or conditions to be achieved. A decisive point may be a single effect to be

achieved, or a collection of related effects on the way to achieving an operational objective.

See Figure 6-3.

¹³² It should be noted that some effects would not be within the purview of the operational commander to

deliver, even if they may be necessary for the desired end state.

¹³³ NATO AAP-6.

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Figure 6-3: Decisive Points as Supporting Effects in the Campaign Plan

Where decisive points exist on the psychological plane, they may be somewhat

intangible and the linkage between them harder to define. For example, to reach the objective

of wide spread domestic support for a campaign, a decisive point may be the establishment of

essential services to slum areas of a population centre.

Normally, a situation presents more decisive points than the force can effect with

available resources. Operational art enables the commander to select decisive points that will

most quickly and efficiently overcome the threat CoG and/or reach the operational objectives.

Decisive points shape operational design and allow commanders to select those that are clearly

defined, decisive, and attainable. A good number of them will require the support of other

agencies.

While strategic and operational objectives remain consistent throughout the JOA, the

decisive points may vary from AO to AO, particularly in campaigns that require all elements of

the JIMP framework for success.

Once decisive points have been identified, they may be plotted logically and sequenced

accordingly in a path to create operational objectives. The groupings of similar operational

objectives and the path of decisive points leading to their realization may be termed lines of

operation. Some decisive points will be conducted sequentially or simultaneously depending

upon their nature, the available resources, and the logical sequence required for the building of

successful outcomes. See Figure 6-4.

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612. LINES OF OPERATION

A line of operation is defined as: “in a campaign or operation, a line linking decisive

points in time and space on the path to the centre of gravity.”¹³⁴

Operational objectives correspond to and are reached by lines of operation. Although

the traditional definition for a line of operation places it in context of moving to attack a CoG, the

complexities of the operating environment and an effects-based approach to operations have

expanded this concept, so that a line of operation will thematically group similar operational

objectives and lead, through decisive points or supporting effects, to the realization of the

operational objective and eventually the desired end state. They link decisive points and

provide a logical, sequenced progression of activities. See Figure 6-4.

Figure 6-4: An Example of Lines of Operation in a Campaign with

Decisive Points (Supporting Effects) Plotted

Lines of operation dealing with conventional threats will be rather straightforward and

seek to defeat the adversary. Lines of operation that deal with operational objectives other than

the defeat of an adversary force, such as the creation of self-sustaining governance, will be

more difficult to conceive and will likely require the support of a variety of elements of power.

¹³⁴ NATO AAP-6.

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A campaign may have single or multiple lines of operation. A single line of operations

concentrates forces and simplifies planning. Multiple lines of operations increase flexibility and

create several opportunities for success. The best approach may to use multiple lines, attaining

a multidimensional effort where several attacks converge upon and defeat the threat CoG.

Each potential option further complicates the adversary’s situation and stresses his C2 system.

The synchronization of multiple lines of operations can overload the adversary commander by

presenting him with several threats at the same time. The tactical agility of Land forces allows

for simultaneous operations along multiple lines of operations.

Lines of operation that consider approaches on both the physical and psychological

planes are key in harmonizing the activities of the military with those of other elements within

the JIMP framework, and illustrating how each may complement and support the other. Note

that a line of operation may span both the physical and psychological planes and involve a

combination of fires and influence activities in order to achieve the successive decisive

points.

When considering combat operations against a conventional threat, the lines of

operation that counter the adversary conventional forces may still be viewed as either interior or

exterior:

A force operates on interior lines when its operations diverge from a central

point. With interior lines, friendly forces are closer to separate threat forces than

the threat forces are to each other. Interior lines allow a weaker force to mass

combat power against a portion of the threat force by shifting resources more

rapidly than the threat.

A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on the threat.

Operations on exterior lines offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a

weaker or less mobile threat; however, they require stronger or more mobile

forces.

The relevance of interior and exterior lines depends upon the relationship of

time and distance between the opposing forces.

An adversary force may have interior lines with respect to the friendly force;

however, that advantage disappears if the friendly force is more agile and

operates at a higher tempo. Conversely, if a smaller friendly force manoeuvres

to a position between larger but less agile threat forces, the friendly force may

defeat them in detail before they can react effectively.

Where the decisive points are physical, lines of operation can be defined in physical

terms. A military force can be manoeuvred from its base of operations to tactical and

operational objectives. In geographical terms, lines of operations connect a series of decisive

points that lead to the control of the objective or the defeat of the adversary force.

Where decisive points exist on the psychological plane, lines of operation will likely

involve a mix of fires and influence activities, with the focus likely on the latter. The creation of a

decisive point on a governance line of operation, for example, will require the creation of an

institution supported by the education of its members and the populace at large.

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When assigned operational objectives, the commander must determine how to define

them, what decisive points or supporting effects will lead to them, and thus what activities must

be assigned to create those effects, the locations and targets where they must occur, and the

subordinates who will conduct them. This results in the development and issue of OPLANs and

OPORDs.

10.

Lines of operation that seek more than simply the destruction of an adversary force will

be complicated, will require careful visualization, and will involve a mixture of activities, both

fires and influence, and thus conducted on both the physical and psychological planes.

Decisive points may require the use of military forces alone, non-military agencies, or a

combination of the two. For example, a line of operation dealing with the security environment

of a region may include the following: military forces to provide the physical security framework

and neutralize belligerent forces; other agencies to create a domestic constabulary; and a

combination of military and non-military forces to create a national, indigenous security force

with a civilian department in charge.

613. CULMINATING POINT

The culminating point is that point in an operation or campaign at which a force’s fighting

power is about to be exhausted and any further operations will risk tactical or even operational

failure. At the culminating point, the current situation can just be maintained, but not developed

to any greater advantage. Nor can the force react sufficiently to a new or unforeseen threat.

A culminating point has both operational and tactical relevance. It may exist for a force

regardless of the campaign’s predominating theme. Culminating points exist on both the

physical and the psychological planes.

In the offence, the culminating point is that point in time and space at which the

attacker’s effective fighting power no longer exceeds that of the defender, or the attacker’s

momentum is no longer sustainable, or both. Beyond their culminating point, attackers risk

counterattack and catastrophic defeat, and would continue the offence at great peril.

Defending forces reach their culminating point when they can no longer defend

successfully, or they can no longer counterattack to restore the cohesion of the defence. The

defensive culminating point marks that instant when the defender must withdraw to preserve the

force.

On the psychological plane, the culminating point may result from a lack of national will

(politically or amongst the national population), a decline in the support from the local populace,

a loss of legitimacy, or a lack of force protection leading to high casualties, and thus, a loss of

support and will. In some campaigns, the will of a national populace may be a strategic CoG.

The culminating point of this national will must be carefully monitored and measures taken to

avoid it.¹³⁵

¹³⁵ For a more detailed discussion of the role played by domestic populations, see B-GL-323-004/FP-003

Counter-insurgency Operations.

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614. OPERATIONAL REACH, APPROACH AND PAUSE

General. Good operational design balances operational reach, operational approach,

and operational pauses to ensure the force achieves its objectives without overextending its

fighting power. Commanders carefully assess the physical and psychological condition and

capabilities of friendly and adversary forces, anticipate culminating points, and plan operational

pauses if necessary. They commit the required forces and conduct operational risk

assessments. Commanders aim to extend operational reach while avoiding culminating points

and operational pauses.

Operational Reach. Operational reach is the distance over which activities and effects

can be successfully achieved or conducted. It will vary depending upon the situation as fighting

power, sustainment capabilities, and the geography surrounding and separating friendly and

threat forces all influence it. Operational reach can be extended by: locating reserves, bases,

and support forward; increasing the range of weapons systems; echeloning and disciplining

supply; and improving lines of communications (LOC). A limit in operational reach will limit the

projection and effects of fighting power. The operational reach of a force will be an important

consideration in campaigns such COIN and the conduct of an “ink spot” technique to extend the

influence and presence of campaigning forces.¹³⁶

Operational Approach. Operational approach is the direct or indirect manner in which

a commander attacks the threat CoG. The direct approach applies combat power directly

against the threat CoG or the threat’s principal strength. The indirect approach attacks the

threat CoG by applying combat power against a series of decisive points that avoid threat

strengths. When possible, commanders choose an indirect approach where they manoeuvre to

avoid threat strengths and degrade threat capabilities, and refuse combat when the situation is

unfavourable or the outcome does not significantly affect the operation. An effective operational

approach, whether direct or indirect, focuses symmetric and asymmetric activities on the

objective. Direct and indirect approaches apply to activities undertaken on the psychological

plane. For example, reconstruction activities undertaken for a local population sees the key

effect of winning public support and legitimacy created indirectly by providing basic needs of the

populace. This, in turn, will undermine the legitimacy of the adversary and his claims to moral

superiority.

Operational Pause. An operational pause is a deliberate halt taken to assist in

achieving operational objectives. It can be used to consolidate gains, reinforce influences,

extend operational reach, or prevent culmination. An operational pause may occur because the

force has culminated, because the character of the operation has changed (e.g., by the

intervention of another threat), or through a combination of other factors. If the situation

requires an operational pause, the commander should consider the designation a new main

effort. Land forces coordinate operational pauses with other components so that the joint force

is able maintain the initiative and momentum. If an operational pause is required for a particular

line of operation, activities on other lines of operation should continue. Ideally, the requirement

for operational pauses is foreseen and planned.

¹³⁶ For a more detailed discussion of the role played by domestic populations, see B-GL-323-004/FP-003

Counter-insurgency Operations.

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615. SIMULTANEOUS AND SEQUENTIAL OPERATIONS

Operational objectives are not generally attainable through a single activity, so the

operational commander would normally design his campaign to comprise a number of related

phases. He must therefore have a clear understanding of the relationship between events in

terms of time, space, resources and purpose. Without this, he cannot establish which events

can be done simultaneously, which have to be done sequentially, and in what order.

Simultaneous operations employ combat power against the entire adversary system and

its supporting systems by concurrently engaging as many decisive points as possible. On the

physical plane, simultaneity exploits depth and agility to overwhelm threat forces. It threatens

opponents with immediate consequences throughout the AO. The presence of multiple threats

overloads threat C2 systems. Adversary commanders confront many decisions within a very

short period. Secondary effects also occur on the psychological plane for such intensity also

undermines the threat’s confidence and overall moral cohesion.

Simultaneous decisive and shaping operations should be planned so as to complement

one another. They may occur simultaneously on the physical and psychological planes. For

example, measures seeking to increase public security in a COIN campaign, or to dissuade

former belligerents from breaking peace agreements, should be explained to the local populace

as a shaping info ops campaign. This, in turn, helps maintain the legitimacy of the military

presence and operations.

Simultaneous operations place a premium on information superiority and on the ability to

employ overwhelming combat power. In practical terms, the force size and force projection

constraints may limit the ability of Land forces to achieve simultaneity. Effective operational

designs employ complementary and reinforcing joint and service capabilities to achieve

maximum simultaneity.

Sequencing is the arrangement of events within a campaign in the order most likely to

achieve the elimination of the threat's CoG. It can also be thought of as the staging of decisive

points along lines of operation leading to the threat CoG or to key objectives.

The sequence of operations is closely related to the use of resources and capabilities,

and limits here will often force operations to be conducted sequentially. In this regard,

commanders must synchronize subordinate unit activities in time, space, and effects in order to

link the theatre strategy and design of joint major operations to tactical execution. Without this

linkage, operations deteriorate into haphazard battles and engagements that waste resources

without achieving decisive results or operational objectives.

Operations may also be sequenced to ensure one decisive point or supporting effect is

realized before the next one is attempted in the logical sequence that leads toward the

operational objective.

Sequential operations achieve the operational objective by phases. Commanders

concentrate combat power at successive points over time, achieving the mission in a controlled

series of steps. Often the scale and scope of the campaign or major operation, together with

the resiliency of the threat, compel commanders to destroy and disrupt the threat in stages,

exposing the CoG step by step. On the psychological plane, an effect may take time to create

and thus must be done in stages.

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616. LINEAR AND NON-LINEAR OPERATIONS

Linear operations are the traditional form of combat against a conventional opponent in

which there are clear front lines and manoeuvre units operate in contiguous AOs. Each force

directs and sustains combat power toward the adversary in concert with adjacent units. The

ratio of forces to space and the array of manoeuvre forces emphasize geographic positioning

and tends to create a continuous forward line of own troops (FLOT). This protects and

simplifies LOC. Protected LOC, in turn, increases the endurance and operational reach of land

forces and ensures freedom of action for extended periods. A linear battlefield organization

may be best for some operations or certain phases of an operation. Conditions that favour

linear operations include those in which land forces lack the information needed to conduct non-

linear operations or are severely outnumbered and thus must resort to sequential operations.

Linear operations are also appropriate against a deeply arrayed, echeloned adversary force, or

when the threat to LOC reduces friendly force freedom of action. In these circumstances, linear

operations allow commanders to more easily concentrate and synchronize combat power.

Coalition operations may also require a linear design.

Non-linear operations are those in which manoeuvre units usually operate in non-

contiguous areas throughout the AO. Even when operating in contiguous AOs, manoeuvre

forces may orient on objectives without geographic reference to adjacent forces. They are the

norm in the many peace support and COIN campaigns, and must be considered in the various

aspects of operational design.

617. TEMPO

Tempo is the rhythm and rate of activities in operations. Controlling or altering that

rhythm and rate is necessary to retain the initiative and avoid culmination. Land forces adjust

tempo to maximize friendly capabilities. Tempo has military significance only in relative terms.

When the sustained friendly tempo exceeds the threat’s ability to react, friendly forces can

maintain the initiative and have a marked advantage.

Combat forces generally pay a price for rapid tempo through greater fatigue and

resource expenditure. Commanders judge the capacity of their forces to operate at high tempo

based upon resources and deteriorating performance. They design the campaign for various

tempos that take into account the endurance of the force.

Commanders complement rapid tempo with three related concepts: firstly, through the

use of simultaneous operations rather than a deliberate sequence of operations; secondly, by

avoiding needless combat; and thirdly, by the use of mission command to allow initiative by

subordinate commanders.

SECTION 4

CAMPAIGN PLANNING AND AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH

618. GENERAL

Campaign planning applies established procedures to solve the largely understood

problem developed through operational design. It establishes an operational end state and

details the operational objectives and supporting effects needed to realize the end state.

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Once this is done, the campaign plan is implemented through a series of OPLANs and

corresponding OPORDs. These allow the commander to map out the tactical activities

necessary to achieve the supporting effect, decisive points, and operational objectives. They

are developed through the operational planning process (OPP).¹³⁷

In the development of the campaign plan, a comprehensive approach is used, along with

an effects-based approach to planning. This will help incorporate all elements of power and

agencies needed to reach a successful conclusion to the campaign. Secondly, it will help

ensure that the tactical level activities eventually planned and conducted will directly support the

operational objectives. It will ideally preclude the conduct of tactical activities for their own sake,

or as a natural assumption on the part commanders, as to their view of the role of the military.

In incorporating an effects-based approach to the extent that operational outcomes can be

translated into coherent tactical activity, an effects-based approach is complementary to existing

procedures, terminology and practice at all levels of command. The significance of the

commander’s unifying theme provides the focus for the operational design and resulting

campaign plan.

Despite the formal campaign planning process, operational art, intuition and command

will still have major parts to play, especially in uncertain conditions and in those situations where

there is a compelling need to act. In all circumstances, operational freedom of action will be

preserved. This is necessary for there will always be gaps in knowledge, and a commander’s

intuition will still be required. Indeed, regardless of the lengths to which commanders and staff

may go to anticipate all the actions and reactions of the systems in an environment, there

remain too many variables, not the least of which are individual personalities and motives, to

allow an accurate prediction of all cause-and-effect relationships. Thus, commander’s intuition

and responsiveness to the unforeseen will remain key to successful operations and campaigns.

The application of an effects-based approach is pervasive at all levels throughout the

planning and execution of operations, from the campaign plan downwards. While the strategic

direction gives the long-term perspective, the campaign plan will provide the medium-term

framework, focusing on an operational end state, constituent operational objectives, and the

supporting effects required to reach the operational objectives. The near to medium term

timeframe is covered through OPLANs and OPORDs that issue the activities that create the

desired effects. Assessment of the situation, the environment and the progress of the campaign

are continuous and inform subsequent iterations of the OPLAN. Each successive OPLAN

adjusts operations to reflect the progress made during the campaign. This is illustrated in

Figure 6-5.

¹³⁷ It is important to recognize that the commander may not complete the mission or complete his

assigned tasks in the time that his unit or formation is deployed to a campaign. The operation plan that

the commander must develop to accomplish or further the accomplishment of his assigned mission

objectives does not replace the campaign plan, but is an adjunct to it, tailored specifically for the

commander’s assigned area and situation.

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Figure 6-5: Campaign Plan Implemented Through Operation Plans and Orders

An effects-based approach to campaigns and operations does not significantly alter the

process of operational design and planning, but it provides a better focus and a measurable

progress. An effects-based approach provides just enough structure and process to the

commander’s intuitive operational design and planning to ensure that tangible products are

produced, end states and objectives are considered before activities, and the eventual activities

link directly to desired objectives and end states.

Terminology for campaign design will remain extant, but the application of it, on both the

physical and psychological planes, will have to be conceptually expanded. The steps involved

in an effects-based approach are the same as those in operational design and the OPP;

however, the scope of these planning processes will need to broadened to fully encompass all

the disparate, yet interconnected systems and players pertinent to the situation. In other words,

the planning will focus on enduring outcomes and operational objectives over the long term and

concerning all aspects of a society, vice short-term activities focused on an adversary’s military

capability.

619. EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH CONSTRUCT FOR CAMPAIGN PLANNING

An effects-based approach will be used in the development of the campaign plan. The

effects-based approach is a planning philosophy combined with specific processes that enable,

firstly, the integration and effectiveness of the military contribution within a comprehensive

approach with other elements of power, and secondly, the realization of operational

objectives.¹³⁸ In simple terms, it ensures that the military activities are integrated with those of

other agencies, and secondly, it ensures that military activities are directly linked to operational

objectives. That is, the results or effects of the activities directly contribute to operational

objectives.

¹³⁸ Army Terminology Panel approved definition May 2007.

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An effects-based campaign plan follows a series of steps. However, the process is

flexible and allows for the exercise of intuition throughout. The steps produce a coherent, mid to

long-term outline, which guides the development of the OPLANs and OPORDs that put the

campaign plan into action.

620. STEP 1—ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION

Apart from studying the obvious problem at hand that has led to military deployment and

intervention, all elements of society must be examined to ascertain the role they play in the

situation and crisis, and in the achievement of a successful campaign outcome. The analysis

should view these elements from the environment’s cultural and historical perspective. The

following aspects of an environment should be examined in as much detail as possible from a

historical or background perspective, and in terms of the current situation:

administration and governance;

politics and diplomacy to include official power structures;

economy, wealth distribution and commerce;

humanitarian and health issues;

social structures to include traditional tribal or informal power structures and

criminal elements;

ethnicity and religion;

information, including media control and pervasiveness of access; and

military capability, including both conventional and irregular forces.

The result of this step should provide the commander and his staff with an appreciation

of the human environment that has led to the current situation, and the root causes in the

society that have led to it or aggravated it. It should also indicate the various power structures

and leaders that exist within the society, including any potential moral CoGs. This will form the

broad knowledge base that will inform the remainder of the operational and tactical planning

processes.

621. STEP 2—IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM OR CRISIS

The second step is broken down into two parallel processes. The commander will

conduct a mission analysis to ascertain the mission and operational end state. Meanwhile, the

staff will review the various factors within the environment, and current situation in particular,

building from Step 1. The two processes are then brought together and further analyzed. This

will allow the commander to identify and select the major building blocks of the campaign plan

and issue initial campaign guidance. The steps:

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Step 2(a)—Mission Analysis:¹³⁹

(1)

The mission analysis in terms of campaign planning must have a specific

focus on the desired operational end state. This will be a constituent of

the strategic end state. At this level, the questions and considerations in

mission analysis are somewhat broader:

(a)

Superior commander’s intent with respect to outcomes and end

state.

(b)

The outcomes that the campaign plan and the campaigning force

are to achieve (specific and implied) that will realize the superior

commander’s intent.

(c)

The freedoms, capabilities and authority to realize the specified

and implied outcomes. This will lead the commander to examine

the role of other agencies and the elements of power that may be

needed to ensure successful outcomes in certain areas or

systems in the environment.

(d)

Continuous monitoring of any environmental or situational

changes that may affect the overall intent or the plan.

(2)

This step allows the commander to begin framing initial campaign

guidance, a provisional operational end state, and some of the

operational objectives. It will also being to develop the commander’s

planning guidance, commander’s critical information requests (CCIRs),

requests for information (RFIs), constraints, clarifications and questions.

Step 2(b)—Evaluation of the Factors:

(1)

The staff will conduct an evaluation of the factors, specifically those that

have led to the current situation and those that will play a role in its

resolution. This step should also seek to examine the situation in its

fullest sense, including but not limited to terrain, infrastructure,

meteorology and oceanography, and also population distribution,

economic and agricultural factors, religious and ethnic distribution, and

centres of cultural importance. Economic and logistical factors must also

be thoroughly comprehended, together with the factors most amenable to

change.

(2)

It includes a detailed study of own, opposing, aligned and neutral

elements that influence the conduct of operations and the final outcome.

This understanding can be developed through an analysis of the critical

capabilities, requirements and vulnerabilities of the various systems, in

order to better understand how to influence and change understanding

and will, or how to affect capability.

¹³⁹ For a detailed discussion of the conduct of mission analysis, see B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Command in

Land Operations.

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(3)

The aim here is to understand the physical and psychological

characteristics of all the actors, systems and attitudes within the

environment. The staff should back-brief their findings but should

distinguish between the factors that will have an enduring influence

through the campaign, and thus become a focus of the campaign plan,

and those that have immediate or near-term importance and therefore will

be addressed in the OPLAN and OPORD.

Step 2(c)—Commander’s Analysis and Planning Guidance:

(1)

The commander and senior staff conduct analysis of the factors to

discern the major building blocks of the campaign plan.

(2)

They will select and analyze the CoG(s) that dominate the situation,

along with their critical requirements and vulnerabilities. Furthermore,

they will confirm the desired operational end state, and most importantly,

what is required to realize it. This must include consideration of the

various elements in the environment that hold influence over the CoG(s).

(3)

Based upon the key CoG(s) the commander and staff will determine the

operational objectives needed to achieve the end state. Analysis will

occur throughout in order to confirm the validity of the decisions.

Deductions from pervious analyses should be viewed in light of the

selected CoG(s) in order to confirm their validity and importance. This

may also lead to an adjustment of the CoG or selected operational

objectives.

(4)

The selected operational objectives should be viewed as the major

building blocks of the campaign. Once selected, they should be viewed

to confirm that they are coherent, focused on the operational end state,

focus on or address the identified CoG(s), and address all the issues

identified in the earlier analysis.

(5)

The commander will issue campaign guidance to his staff. The

requirement to incorporate other elements of power and agencies, if not

already begun, must be identified and articulated at this point. This

should include a unifying theme in his commander’s intent.

622.

STEP 3—FRAMING THE CAMPAIGN PLAN AND THE INITIAL OPERATION PLAN

The analysis and outputs to this point will allow the commander and staff to develop the

campaign plan itself. This will lead to the development of the initial OPLAN that will implement

the campaign plan in the short to near-term:

Step 3(a)—Developing the Campaign Plan:

(1)

The operational end state and building blocks—operational objectives—

are used to develop the campaign plan itself. Decisive points or

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supporting effects,¹⁴⁰ which build to each operational objective, are

identified in the process.

(2)

Operational objectives may be grouped thematically into lines of

operation, which would help with the visualization of the campaign, as

they illustrate the direction and progressive movement towards the

operational end state.

(3)

The lines of operation will indicate where the military has primacy and

where it supports other instruments of power. Note that all lines of

operation—regardless of the primary agency involved—move towards the

operational end state.

(4)

Once the framework has been established, the commander and staff

analyze the operational objectives to determine the supporting effects

required at each operational objective.

(5)

The measures of effectiveness (MOE) associated with each supporting

effect should be identified and recorded.

(6)

Careful judgement will be needed regarding the number of supporting

effects selected so that subordinate units and staff do not become

overwhelmed in trying to assume the required activities beyond their

capabilities.

(7)

Lines of operation in many campaigns in a complex operating

environment will incorporate a large array of objectives, effects and

activities. Together, the lines of operation will span diverse, but

interrelated aspects such as security, governance and development.

Some will be prosecuted by a single element of power while others, such

as governance, will be shared by several agencies, none of which may be

military.

(8)

A campaign directive should be issued at this point. Figures 6-6, 6-7 and

6-8 illustrate the thematic lines of operation that may exist for a campaign

plan, along with the supporting effects/decisive points illustrated

graphically and in a tabular format.

¹⁴⁰ Decisive conditions may be viewed and termed as supporting effects. They will be the results of

activities that build to realize operational objectives.

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Figure 6-7: Lines of Operation with Supporting Effects Plotted

THEMATIC LINES OF OPERATION

Governance

Security

Political Process

Reconstruction

Operational Objectives

Interim

Self-

Secure

Self-

Electoral

Elected

Key

Sustained

Governance

governance

Environment

sustaining

Process

Government

Restoration

Infrastructure

Provided

Established

Maintained

Security

Reformed

Empowered

Established

DECISIVE POINTS/SUPPORTING EFFECTS

Transitional

Military

Provincial

Militia B

Electoral

Government

Essential

Equitable

government

control

capitals

repatriated

process

structures

services re-

control

is established

reformed

secured

designed

reformed

established in

achieved

all areas

Provincial

Police control

Border

Military

Ethnic

Political

Resource

Accountability

governments

reformed

crossings

training re-

leaders

oversight of

infrastructure

procedures in

re-

secured

established

engaged

security

secured

place

established

institutions

Economic

Militia B

Police

Interim

Enduring

reforms for

deterred

training re-

control of

infrastructure

distribution

established

resources

rebuilt

achieved

Militia B

Sustained

defeated

growth

Figure 6-8: Supporting Effects for Operational Objectives and Thematic Lines of Operations

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Land Operations

(9)

There is no standard format for a campaign plan. The campaign plan

should be concise. It should describe (to subordinates and superiors

alike) the following:

(a)

The intent of the campaign.

(b)

The operational end state.

(c)

Operational objectives.

(d)

The overall concept and intent of the campaign.

(e)

The strategic and operational centre(s) of gravity.

(f)

Supporting effects (decisive points) needed to be created for each

operational objective.

(g)

Lines of operation that have thematically grouped the operational

objectives and their supporting effects.

(h)

Concept for the prosecution of the campaign including its initiation

and its development through successive OPLANs.

Step 3(b)—Framing of the Initial Operation Plan:

(1)

While the campaign plan lays out the long-term plan, the initial OPLAN

and OPORD will address the short to medium term and will initiate the

campaign itself.

(2)

The staff will select the supporting effects most relevant to the immediate

situation that should be created first and are most likely achievable. This

will be based upon the analysis of the factors that occurred earlier.

(3)

Selection and prioritization of supporting effects will develop a number of

options for the design of the initial OPLAN. These will be presented to

the commander for a decision based upon his intuition and analysis.

(4)

The commander will select what he assesses is the best option in terms

of design of the initial OPLAN, specifically the supporting effects that are

to be developed first. He issues initial planning guidance including a

general scheme of manoeuvre. The manner in which the supporting

effects are to be created in terms of time and space may be represented

schematically in a number of ways.

At the conclusion of this step, the commander and staff will have developed a campaign

plan and the means by which it will be initially implemented, that is, an OPLAN.

623. STEP 4—DEVELOPMENT OF THE OPERATION PLAN

With the commander’s guidance and outline scheme of manoeuvre as to the initiation of

the campaign through the initial OPLAN and OPORD, staff may develop the OPLAN itself in

detail. The commander’s scheme of manoeuvre will have broadly described the implementation

of the campaign and initial supporting effects. It will not have described in detail how those

supporting effects will be created.

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The development of a detailed OPLAN will come to task subordinate components,

formations and units with specific missions and activities that will create or help to create the

initial supporting effects. This will follow an OPP:

Step 4(a)—Development and Validation of Courses of Action:

(1)

The identification and sequencing of the activities required to create the

supporting effects will be considered along with the allocation to

formations and units of those activities. This will be developed through

detailed courses of action.

(2)

The prioritized supporting effects to be implemented through the initial

OPLAN are considered and analyzed by the staff, if possible in

conjunction with subordinate HQ or other elements of power and

agencies as applicable. This will determine what activities are needed to

create these supporting effects. They are guided by the commander’s

scheme of manoeuvre.

(3)

In accordance with the OPP, different possibilities for the implementation

of the plan will lead to the development of different possible courses of

action (COAs). A full concept of operations (CONOPS) will be developed

for each considered COA.

Step 4(b)—Course of Action Evaluation:

(1)

The considered COAs are compared using a number of techniques or

options including comparison of each against the Principles of War and

through war gaming. The evaluation must assess each COA for

suitability, adequacy, feasibility, and the likelihood of creating the

supporting effects desired.

(2)

This evaluation process will provide feedback to the selection and

prioritization of supporting effects and may indicate that some supporting

effects are not feasible within the allocated resources and constraints.

They may therefore be moved to subsequent OPLANs.

Step 4(c)—Commander’s Decision and Development of the Operation

Plan:

(1)

A decision brief regarding the various COAs will allow the commander to

select his preferred COA and to give direction for its refinement.

(2)

Direction is issued for further plan development and the creation of

products including the OPORD.

With the campaign plan devised and the initial OPLAN and OPORD issued, the

campaign may commence. The environment and the achievement of supporting effects en

route to operational objectives are closely monitored, particularly through the application and

assessment of measures of effectiveness (MOE). As the campaign progresses, subsequent

OPLANs and OPORDs are issued and are adjusted to reflect the situation and the progress of

the campaign. This may be timed with a subsequent rotation of forces into theatre.

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Commanders must realize that unless deployed indefinitely, they will not conduct the entire

campaign, but will only contribute to its incremental progress towards achieving operational

objectives and the end state. The progress that they create and the refinement of the campaign

should be briefed during the relief-in-place process.

In the early stages of a campaign, the military may assume a role in each or at least

most lines of operation. As the security situation improves, the responsibilities for non-security

related lines of operation should be passed to those other agencies best suited to conduct them.

For example, initial reconstruction of infrastructure may fall to the military. However, as the

security situation improves and other governmental agencies and non-governmental

organizations (NGOs) arrive in theatre, such responsibilities should be assumed by them.

Commanders may not necessarily have all the integral resources required to generate

the effects they envision. By leveraging and synchronizing the resources and capabilities

across the JIMP framework, they can produce the right combination of effects on the right lines

of operation to lead to the desired end state. This places particular emphasis on the

collaboration required at all levels with JIMP participants. Some lines of operation may be

conducted only by the military, while others will be the sole responsibility of other agencies, and

others may be shared between the military and others. In either case, a campaign seeking to

establish enduring solutions for conflicts in complex environments must accept a long-term view

and the requirement for a range of instruments of power to be employed.

We have seen that is only by a close combination of civil and military measures that

insurgency can be fought, so it is logical to expect soldiers whose business it is to know

how to fight, to know also how to use civil measures in this way. Not only should the

army officers know about the subject, they must also be prepared to pass on their

knowledge to politicians, civil servants, economists, members of the local government

and policemen where necessary.

General Sir Frank Kitson

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THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPREHENSIVE CAMPAIGN PLANNING

“Peace enforcement (sic) is wearing everybody out…This is much harder [than combat].”

LtCol. Jeff Ingram, TF 2-70 AR

Substantial evidence exists indicating that much of the post-conventional military

operation conflict in Iraq could have been avoided if greater attention had been paid to

Phase IV (“post-hostility operations”) strategy during the campaign planning stage of

Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Telic in 2002. For numerous and primarily political

reasons serious attention was not given to post-combat stability operations during the

campaign plan construction prior to the invasion of Iraq despite the existence of a

voluminous US State Department study from 2002 dedicated to that very subject.

Without a serious plan to follow, US administrators made several grievous errors in the

immediate aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Most notably, the

political and administrative structure of the former government was dismantled and the

Iraqi army was disbanded. The latter error caused 400 000 military-age men to become

unemployed with no viable means of support for their families. With the stroke of a pen

the Coalition Provisional Authority dismantled a political-military landscape that had

existed for 30 years without providing a viable replacement. The resultant vacuum

sowed the seeds for the multi-faceted insurgency and sectarian conflict which now

afflicts Iraq. In the contemporary operating environment as much attention must be paid

to stability operations as warfighting operations. Failure to do so may induce serious

errors that produce a longer than desired campaign or outright failure.

Sources: Col. G. Fontenot, LtCol. E.J. Degen, LtCol. David Tohn, On Point: The US

Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Leavenworth Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press,

2004; Maj. M.W. Shervington PARA, Small Wars and Counter-Insurgency Warfare:

Lessons From Iraq, MA Thesis, Cranfield University, UK, July 2005.

624. EMPLOYMENT OF SPECIAL FORCES

Special forces are troops selected, trained, equipped and organized to conduct specific,

special operations in pursuit of strategic or other high-level operational objectives. They may

operate in support of conventional forces, or independently.

The principal roles of special forces may include: special reconnaissance, including

information reporting and target acquisition; direct action, which includes direction of air, artillery

and naval gunfire, designation for precision guided munitions, and raids; work with specific

portions of indigenous populations; very important person (VIP) protection; combat search and

rescue; and, hostage rescue. Use of special forces outside of these roles is a waste of valuable

resources particularly when line units are available.

Special forces extend the conflict in depth. The effects may be purely physical through

destruction, or they can achieve effects on the psychological plane by creating confusion,

uncertainty and surprise through unexpected actions and operating in threat rear areas. Their

influence will often be out of proportion to the size of forces involved. The mere existence of a

special forces threat can have a significant adverse impact on the threat’s morale and cause an

increase in the level of threat forces dedicated to rear area protection. Similarly, special force

support can significantly bolster moral and the physical efforts of friendly indigenous factions.

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Special forces should be employed on high value tasks, exploiting their potential while

limiting their vulnerability. They should be commanded at the highest appropriate level, and be

tasked using operational directives that allow maximum freedom of action for the conduct of

operations. Special forces operations, however, must be coordinated with tactical conventional

operations. They rely heavily upon surprise and must also have access to the highest level of

intelligence to conduct operations and facilitate precision targeting. Consequently, their

operations require tight security measures, as compromise may come with serious penalties.

Public information plans should normally neither confirm nor deny special force activity.

Special forces must be employed in line with the campaign plan and in direct support of

the operational objectives and supporting effects. As with the application of any other capability,

their employment must be done in manner that seeks to avoid undesirable effects. For

example, there is likely little net value in special forces seizing a key adversary leader (who will

likely be quickly replaced) if the operation creates collateral damage and casualties that lead to

the alienation of campaign supporters or neutral parties.

625. PLANNING HORIZONS

Formation commanders are faced with the decision of how far ahead to plan without

planning becoming irrelevant to preparation and execution. Planning too far into the future may

overwhelm staff capabilities, especially those of lower-echelon staffs. However, not planning far

enough ahead may result in losing the initiative and being unprepared.

A planning horizon is a point in time that commanders use to focus the organization’s

planning efforts to shape future events. Planning horizons will be relative to the level of

command.

The concept of time horizons can help commanders organize and resource their

planning efforts. Time horizons depend upon the type of operation being conducted; they can

range from hours to months. As a rule, the higher the echelon, the farther out the time horizon.

A useful way to use time horizons is to associate general time periods (based upon the

situation) with the planning effort’s purpose. The planning efforts are long-range, mid-range,

and short-range. Refer to Figure 6-9.

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Figure 6-9: Planning Time Horizons

626. LONG-RANGE PLANNING HORIZON

Long-range planning is the initial purview of the campaign plan for it looks out to the

operational end state. Short to medium-term plans are reflected in sequential OPLANs and

OPORDs.

Formations and units will have relatively shorter planning horizons, particularly if they are

not deploying for the entire duration of the campaign. In such cases, the long-range planning at

these lower levels may consist of planning for an end state at the end of tour that represents

progress towards the operational objectives.

These time horizons are common in limited intervention operations.

Long-range planning occurs in the plans centre using the OPP, and at the higher levels,

operational design. The plans centre develops solutions to problems and passes them to the

operations centre if a fragmentary order (FRAGO) is needed. If a full OPORD is required, the

plans centre performs the OPP as time allows and issues the OPORD. Responsibility for

integrating the OPORD is transferred to current operations during preparation.

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627. MID-RANGE PLANNING HORIZON

Mid-range planning is focused at the next decisive point and may range from hours to

days and weeks. Mid-range planning includes branch planning and the refinement of products

from long-range planning, such as branches in concept form and OPLANs.

The mid-range time horizon addresses planning for short-range operations not

anticipated in the long-range plan. These operations may last weeks or a few months. This

horizon includes major branches of ongoing operations. They are frequently separate, clearly

identifiable missions with a distinct mission statement, starting time and end state. They require

OPP to develop COAs and control mechanisms for the operation. Mid-range planning remains

the responsibility of the plans centre.

628. SHORT-RANGE PLANNING HORIZON

Based upon changes to the situation and an assessment of the operation’s progress,

commanders perform short-range planning to modify the current OPORD. The focus of short-

range planning is on the immediate future. It may be represented in hours and days. The

resulting product of short-range planning is a FRAGO. Depending upon the complexity of the

problem and the time available to plan, short-range planning may involve representatives from

all operational functions, or include only selected staff members and the commander. It is

normally performed in the operations centre. Situations may dictate that it be performed in the

plans centre.

Regardless of the problem being addressed in short-range planning, all plans and

activities must continue to support the operational objectives and their supporting effects.

A common characteristic of short-range planning is that it is done rapidly in a time-

constrained environment. The staff may use the OPP modified for time-constrained conditions.

These include situations arising outside the normal decision or assessment cycles that demand

immediate action, such as opportunities and threats that commanders must exploit or counter.

Failure to recognize such situations and act without delay may result in lost opportunities or the

destruction of the force.

Situations of this type constitute a particular challenge to commanders. They must

recognize that situations outside the normal decision or assessment cycle exist. Situational

awareness and forecasting in the staff estimates aid such recognition. Then, they must swiftly

organize resources within the HQ to address the problem and perform planning to implement

the decision for resolving it. The operations centre leads the short-range planning process,

although it may receive support from the plans centre.

629. CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Options must be built into a campaign plan to anticipate opportunities (or reverses) and

preserve the commander’s freedom of action. Required changes can usually be reflected in

subsequent OPLANs and OPORDs.

Despite the issue of OPORDs, contingency planning gives the lower level commanders

the flexibility to retain the initiative and to meet unexpected challenges or exploit opportunities.

The planned sequence of events to the desired end state is not immutable. Therefore, a

commander must be prepared to adjust the sequence, quicken or reduce the tempo, or develop

new options to seize unforeseen opportunities that unfold themselves.

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Contingency plans will most likely be applicable at the formation level and below. They

will be issued in the form of OPORDs, or possibly as FRAGOs if time is short and the need

immediate.

Continuous contingency planning will keep a range of options available for commanders

to maintain agility and tempo. These options may be incorporated into the initial plan, enabling

a commander to adjust his lines of operation and vary his plans to offer or decline battle on his

own terms. Contingency planning should give the commander the freedom of action to maintain

the initiative, or to regain the initiative if a developing situation results in its loss. This can be

accomplished by developing branches and sequels.

Branches are contingency options built into the basic plan for changing the disposition,

orientation, or direction of movement, and for accepting or declining battle. Sequels are

subsequent operations based upon the possible outcomes of the current operation. Sequels

should reflect the current situation and the progress to date in the campaign.

Branch plans and sequels will support each line of operation within the overall campaign

plan. Sequels will have to reflect anticipated and actual transitions in campaign themes, with

the shifting balance between offensive, defensive and stability operations.

As campaigns develop, their predominant themes will shift and ideally improve in terms

of the levels of violence and their relative place on the spectrum of conflict. The continuous

assessment should identify such shifts. The continual planning element of battle procedure,

supported by the assessment and direction of the commander, will allow the lines of operation

within the campaign to be adjusted to meet the shifting campaign theme and continue to meet

the desired objectives. This will cause a shift in the balance between the tactical activities of

offensive, defensive and stability operations.

SECTION 5

BATTLE PROCEDURE ¹⁴¹

630. GENERAL

Battle procedure is defined as: “the entire military process by which a commander

receives his orders, makes his reconnaissance and plan, issues his orders, prepares and

deploys his troops and executes his mission.” ¹⁴²

Battle procedure has become entrenched in the lexicon and in the training and

operational activities of the Land Force. It is the procedure of decision-making that transcends

the levels of command, from the lower tactical levels that are characterized by commanders

who do not possess staff in support, to levels of command that employ staff to provide focus in

multi-dimensional planning for the commander in relation to the complexities of the operating

environment.

¹⁴¹ For complete details regarding the operations process, battle procedure and their constituent

elements, see the following publications: B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Command in Land Operations; B-GL-

331-001/FP-000 Command Support in Land Operations; and, B-GL-331-002/FP-000 Staff Duties for Land

Operations.

¹⁴² B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Command in Land Operations.

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At subunit level, battle procedure is usually a set drill. It ensures tactical commanders

consider and address all the pertinent issues required for the effective planning and conduct of

tactical activities.

Higher echelons of command require the integration and synchronization of varied tools

and processes (e.g., planning and targeting) that, as greater emphasis is placed upon these

functions in the contemporary operating environment, need a battle procedure that provides a

clear model for understanding and incorporating them along with other command and HQ’s

responsibilities.

631. THE BATTLE PROCEDURE MODEL AND THE CONSTITUENT PARTS

The overarching battle procedure model is a simple three-step process: plan; prepare;

and, execute. Throughout battle procedure, continuous assessment is conducted of the

situation and the interrelated influences of all the elements existing within the environment (i.e.,

PMESII). At the centre of the process is the commander, whose lucid direction guides every

element. Battle procedure is applied to the overall campaign or operation, and to each line of

operation therein.

Figure 6-10: Battle Procedure Model

As depicted in Figure 6-10, battle procedure is a process of planning, preparing and

executing, with assessments conducted throughout. It is a command-centric¹⁴³ procedure such

that it places the commander at the centre as the executive authority responsible for C2. The

¹⁴³ Chief of Defence Staff, Concept of Operations: CF Strategic Command (NDHQ, 14 Nov 05) 2-3. The

CF command structure, shall “be command-centric with a clear and unambiguous chain of command

from the strategic to tactical level (sic), with commanders at all levels clearly understanding their assigned

authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities.” It “will be shaped by the doctrine of mission command

with commanders at every level possessing a comprehensive understanding of their commander’s explicit

and implicit intent and an overriding operational focus dedicated to the realization of this intent.”

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commander is the focus of all command support activities. The commander directs and

influences each of the aspects of battle procedure. At the lower tactical levels, C2 resides

solely with the commander. At the higher echelons of command, the staff provides the

commander with the means to exercise control.

Planning, preparing, and executing do not necessarily have distinct start and end points.

Planning is continuous. While preparing for or executing one mission, the unit/formation is

planning (at least refining) the branches and sequels to the current mission, or for the next

operation or mission. Preparation, by virtue of training and structuring, is also continuous

anytime a unit is not executing an operation.

Within each of the constituent parts of battle procedure, there will be a number of

activities and subordinate processes that either enable decision-making (i.e., command support

activities) or result from it. See Figures 6-11, 6-12 and 6-13.

ASSESS

PLAN

PREPARE

EXECUTE

Estimate (for Commanders

Rehearsals

Assessing the current state

without Staff)

and forecasting progress of

Inspections

the operation

Operational Planning

Preliminary Movement

Process (for Commanders

Making execution and

Subordinate Planning and

with Staff)

adjustment decisions to

Preparation

account for unforeseen

ISTAR¹⁴⁴ Activities

threat actions and to exploit

opportunities

Security

Directing actions to apply

Force Protection

combat power to accomplish

Revisions and Refinements to

the mission

the Plan

Training

Coordination, Liaison and Re-

grouping

Command and Information

Systems Preparation

ONGOING C2 ACTIVITIES

Battlespace Management

Information Operations Coordination

Fire Support Coordination

Force Protection Coordination

Combat Service Support Coordination

Information Management

Systems Management

Figure 6-11: Battle Procedure and its Constituent Activities

¹⁴⁴ Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance.

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ASSESS

PLAN

PREPARE

EXECUTE

Initiation

Plan Review

Operations Planning

Process

Orientation

Ref: B-GJ-005-500/FP-

Course of Action

000 CF Operational

Development

Planning Process

Plan Development

Decide

Detect

Deliver

Land Force Targeting

Track

Assess

Intelligence Cycle

Direction

Collection

Ref: B-GL-357-001/FP-

Processing

001 Intelligence Field

Dissemination

Manual

Draft Named Areas of

Information

Battle Damage

Interest (NAIs) / Target

Collection by

Assessment

ISTAR Process

Areas of Interest (TAIs)

Sensors

(as required)

Draft High Value Targets

Assessment of

Ref: B-GL-352-001/FP-

(HVTs) / High Payoff

Information

001 Intelligence,

Targets (HPTs)

Information

Surveillance, Target

Draft ISTAR Overlay

Disseminated

Acquisition and

Reconnaissance

Finalize ISTAR Overlay,

(ISTAR)

HVTs, HPTs

Complete ISTAR Matrix

Identify Threats

Supervise and

Risk Management

Review

Process

Assess Threats

Ref: B-GJ-005-502/FP-

Develop Controls and

000 Risk Management

Make Risk Decisions

for CF Operations

Implement Controls

Figure 6-13: Battle Procedure for Commanders With Staff

632. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Fundamentally, a commander exercises C2 by planning for a mission or operation,

enabling preparation activities, and directing the execution of the mission or operation.

Throughout, the commander continually assesses activities against the ever-changing operating

environment in order to make the best decisions possible.

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Commanders exercise control over the force to achieve unity of effort using control

measures to synchronize activities. The following control measures are applied during battle

procedure:

commander’s intent;

commander’s planning guidance;

commander’s critical information requests (CCIRs);

allocation of main effort;

delegation of authority;

plans and orders, to include the assignment of missions and tasks, target lists

and supporting plans;

graphic control measures;

force and unit standing operating procedures (SOP);

applicable laws and regulations.

633. ECHELONING AND SYNCHRONIZATION OF BATTLE PROCEDURE

The elements and activities of battle procedure are closely synchronized and echeloned

with one another across different levels of formations and units. Agility and the initiative in

operations are achieved through the synchronization of activities. Concurrent activity between

and within echelons of command is imperative. Battle procedure facilitates this concurrent

activity through ongoing and concurrent activities conducted throughout the staff and the

subordinate echelons of command.

Planning will include the issue of orders to subordinate formations and units, which is the

executive authority to begin planning and preparation. Warning orders will be issued before the

planning stage is completed, and hence subordinate elements will begin their own planning, and

even preparation stages, before those of their superior are completed.

Likewise, the execution of some supporting plans, such as ISTAR activities, will

commence while planning and preparation for the decisive operations continues. Thus, those

units assigned such activities will be in the execution stage of battle procedure while their

superior echelons continue within planning and preparation stages. Those subordinate units

executing their respective operations must be allocated time and resources to permit their own

planning and preparation. The early execution of ISTAR activities will support the continuous

assessment function.

A range of activities relating to battle procedure—plan, prepare and execute—occur

concurrently with the activities of higher and lower echelons of command and within their own

echelon of command. The tools that higher echelons of command use to direct and guide

concurrent activity are warning orders, orders and fragmentary orders, along with other control

measures.

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CHAPTER 7

THE CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS

Many years ago, as a cadet hoping some day to be an

officer, I was poring over the 'Principles of War,' listed in the

old Field Service Regulations, when the Sergeant-Major came

up to me. He surveyed me with kindly amusement. “Don't

bother your head about all them things, me lad,” he said.

“There's only one principle of war and that's this.

Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as

you can, where it hurts him most, when he ain't lookin'!”

Field Marshall Sir William Slim

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

701. GENERAL

The implementation of the campaign plan will guide the conduct of the campaign

towards achievement of the desired objectives and end state. The overriding consideration in

conducting the campaign is an unwavering focus on the requirements of the strategic objectives

and end state. This is done by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the

strategic objectives, sequencing effects to achieve the operational objectives, and initiating

activities and applying resources to create and sustain those effects.

Command at the operational level involves deciding when, where, for what purpose, and

under what conditions operations against the adversary are to be conducted. This includes

deciding when to give battle, when to decline engagement, when to engage with intellectual

activities, and when to use lethal or non-lethal force. The operational level governs the

deployment of forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from combat, and the sequencing of

successive tactical actions to achieve strategic objectives.

This chapter contains a wide array of material that links the operational and tactical

levels of campaign implementation and execution. It discusses:

the preparation, deployment, command and conduct of a campaign;

the targeting process;

offensive operations;

defensive operations;

stability operations;

enabling operations; and

concluding a campaign.

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702. PREPARATION AND DEPLOYMENT

The first stage of conducting the campaign, whether it is for domestic or overseas

operations, includes the preparation and deployment of the force. This entails establishing a

point of entry, securing a base of operations, building-up the force, and preparing to execute the

campaign.

Coordination of movement and logistics support during deployment is essential.

Deployment is primarily a strategic responsibility. However, the flow into the theatre should be

monitored, and where facilities (e.g., airfields or ports) are limited, it should be coordinated by

the operational commander. All deployment planning should be based upon the commander's

intent so that the right equipment and personnel arrive at the proper time. The commander

must insist on the correct phasing and balance of the combat functions to develop operations in

line with the campaign plan. The force may be vulnerable in the early stages of a conflict, and

therefore, it must have satisfactory combat power, robust command and control, and

infrastructure elements to adapt to changes in the situation.

Early in the campaign, and prior to deployment, the knowledge base of the operational

environment must be assessed and developed to the greatest extent using all available

resources. This knowledge base must extend well beyond an assessment of military

adversaries, and consider all the aspects of the operational environment that will influence

operations, affect stability of the area, and that will be affected by operations. Apart from real or

potential adversaries, the elements to be assessed include political aspects and power

structures, social and cultural structures, economic influences and practices, informational and

media systems, and the status of local infrastructure. These must be assessed not only in

terms of how they will affect the campaign, but also in terms of how they relate to one another

and how they will be affected by the campaign’s activities. This activity must continue

throughout the campaign.

Information operations (info ops) may be started prior to arrival of campaign forces in the

theatre. They should seek to influence the local populace and potential adversaries regarding

the arrival of campaign forces and the aims of the campaign. Activities, such as the extension

of information networks, deception, electronic warfare (EW), operations security (OPSEC),

psychological operations (PSYOPS), and public affairs (PA) often take time to produce results.

They can be conducted with resources split, where the majority of resources are located in

Canada or another forward location and the remainder deployed to theatre only when required.

Info ops also give the commander flexibility to begin the conduct of operations without

committing irretrievably to a particular course of action.

The conduct for the deployment of the force will differ, depending upon whether or not

the entry is opposed. If it is, then movement will be tactical with formed combat units leading. If

unopposed, movement may be administrative with units subdivided to make the most efficient

use of the available transport.

Preparations for the campaign will also include preparing personnel for the mission

through realistic pre-deployment and in-theatre training. The operational commander must

provide direction to his subordinates to facilitate focused training in line with the commander's

intent. He must also train the senior commanders and staff, and get to know them personally.

This fosters trust and mutual understanding, and can rectify weaknesses and

misunderstandings.

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It is likely that the deployment will be part of a coalition operation. In such cases, pre-

deployment preparations should include early liaison with those other forces, particularly those

that will exercise operational control (OPCON) over our forces and those that will be under our

command and control. Operational objectives, standing operating procedures (SOP), area of

operations (AO) assignment, delegation of responsibilities, coordination of functions, and

communication infrastructure will all have to discussed and planned in the earliest stages.

Standing coalition agreements and procedures, such as NATO standardization agreements

(STANAGs) and the ABCA¹⁴⁵ Coalition Operations Handbook should be used to assist in

planning and coordination.

SECTION 2

COMMAND OF LAND OPERATIONS

703. ESTABLISHING POSITIVE CONDITIONS

The operational commander focuses his efforts on establishing positive conditions for

the achievement of the operational and strategic objectives and end states in accordance with

his campaign design. He does this by employing a number of tools to shape the battlefield and

will often allocate them to the tactical level commanders. These include, but are not limited to:

the use of tactical and operational reserves;

air interdiction;

special forces;

major airborne, airmobile and amphibious forces;

theatre level intelligence assets, such as counter-intelligence (ci) detachments

and human intelligence (humint) teams;

operational level info ops; and

control over the allocation of theatre level logistics stocks.

The operational commander must look beyond the immediate battlefield in both time and

space to make the best use of resources.

The commander must plan and prepare for the reception and introduction of other

elements from the joint, interagency, multinational and public (JIMP) framework into the

campaign. This will apply to a wide range of elements, but his initial responsibility will likely

focus on the integration of other elements of governmental power from international

organizations (IOs), such as the United Nations (UN) or the Organization of American States

(OAS), and the domestic government. Furthermore, the commander must take the lead in

integrating those local agencies, such as local security forces, with the operations of his own

military forces and other resources. This may include local security forces, political institutions

and the civil service.

¹⁴⁵ American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies’ Standardization Programme.

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704. EARLY USE OF INTELLIGENCE

The comprehensive intelligence picture and knowledge base¹⁴⁶ developed during

preparation, which assessed all the environmental elements, systems and actors that will

influence and affect the campaign, will undoubtedly have been incomplete. Once the campaign

begins, the commander must ensure that an emphasis in placed on further development of the

comprehensive intelligence picture. This will confirm the make-up of the various interrelated

elements and systems within the environment (i.e., political, military, economic, social,

infrastructure, informational [PMESII]) that will affect the operational and tactical situations and

will be affected by the friendly force actions. With a more fully developed comprehensive

intelligence picture, the commander will be able to better understand the effects that his actions

will have across all these systems in relation to achieving the operational objectives.

This appreciation for the broader aspects of the intelligence assessment, and the effects

of the interrelated systems of the environment, must be understood at the tactical level,

particularly in operations short of major combat that may involve a wide variety of conventional

and unconventional adversaries and systems. Actions at the tactical level will have an effect on

systems other than purely military ones, and thus commanders at this level must keep this in

mind when planning and conducting their tactical activities.

As the campaign forms the framework for combat, the tactical activities and effects

shape the conduct of the campaign. The continuous comprehensive intelligence assessment

will help ensure that those tactical results support the campaign plan and its operational

objectives. At the operational level, the task is to exploit tactical effects to strategic advantage

and to minimize, nullify, or even reverse the strategic effect of tactical losses and undesirable

effects. The commander attempts to create the most favourable conditions possible for those

activities, both physical and intellectual, that he chooses to undertake. Tactical results will

impact on the progress of the campaign, so he must have the flexibility to react to any changes,

that is, to exploit or reinforce success or to ameliorate the influences of undesirable effects. He

seeks to anticipate the results of both physical and intellectual activities and to be prepared to

exploit them to the greatest operational and strategic advantage.

In assisting the tactical level commanders to create desired effects that support

operational objectives, the commander must assess the need or desirability to allocate

operational level assets to support tactical level commanders. This may include assets such as

CI teams, EW detachments, funds or assets for reconstruction, and HUMINT specialist

detachments. While these assets will undoubtedly maintain priority commitment to the

commander’s critical information requests (CCIRs) and other requirements of the commander,

their allocation or at least co-location with the tactical level will potentially reap significant

benefits, to include:

increased force protection, particularly through CI and EW detachments

supporting deliberate tactical activities;

the ability to support the intelligence requirements of the tactical level

commanders, such as target identification and the development of named areas

of interest (NAIs) into target areas of interest (TAIs), particularly when dealing

with unconventional adversaries;

¹⁴⁶ See Chapter 5, Section 2, Effects-based Approach to Operations, for a discussion of the knowledge

base formed prior to deployment and enhanced during the campaign.

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increased responsiveness to intelligence collection efforts at the tactical level by

troops in contact, and better direction and feedback to troops in contact; and

enhanced info ops through low-level, but immediate reconstruction projects.

705. OBTAINING AND ALLOWING FREEDOM OF ACTION

To allow freedom of action for subordinates, the operational commander must first obtain

maximum freedom of action for himself from the strategic authority. Military freedom of action is

ultimately built upon the trust of the public and therefore the government. It is enhanced

through the following:

diplomatic, economic and informational efforts at the strategic level;

sufficient logistic and personnel resources;

reasonable and clear limitations;

information technology; and

operations security (OPSEC).

An internal adversary to freedom of action is the capability, through information

technology, to exert minute-to-minute control of tactical operations from the operational and

strategic level, especially when they have a high media profile. This tendency must be avoided

to allow subordinate commanders to maintain an appropriate degree of authority and the

flexibility to respond quickly to changing circumstances.

Operational and tactical freedom of action, within the logical and legal constraints

anticipated at the outset of any campaign, is necessary for the successful conduct of the

campaign. Tactical commanders cannot normally sit idle while awaiting strategic level approval

for activities that should be logically expected for the prosecution of the campaign. Fleeting

targets that are characteristic of unconventional adversaries can only be engaged if tactical level

commanders are afforded freedom of action. Likewise, the opportunity to assist other elements

within the JIMP framework, such as local security forces, will be missed if commanders are not

allowed the executive authority to provide such support within the framework of the mission.

Furthermore, the credibility of the force in the eyes of other JIMP members, and in particular

other military forces, will be undermined without suitable freedom of action for a commander.

Once the degree of freedom of action has been obtained at the operational level, the

commander must decide how much freedom of action that subordinates can be allowed at

various stages of the operation. In doing so, the commander must likewise find the correct

balance between centralization and decentralization.

SECTION 3

FUNDAMENTALS IN THE CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS

706. INTRODUCTION

The conduct of land operations includes a good number of vital facets that come

together to build towards the successful conclusion of a campaign. A number of these facets

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stem from the campaign planning process and must continue throughout the prosecution of the

campaign itself. The commander and his subordinates must keep these key fundamentals at

the forefront of their minds throughout the campaign for action on both the physical and moral

planes, through both physical and intellectual activities.

707. SEIZING AND MAINTAINING THE INITIATIVE

The key to success at both the operational and tactical levels, whatever a theatre or

campaign theme, is the early seizure of the initiative, and keeping it, so that the adversary and

other elements of the environment are compelled or convinced to comply with the commander's

will. This must be done on both the physical and moral planes, against the adversary, the

potential adversary, and neutral audiences.

At any level, the commander that has the initiative will be able to pursue his desired

course of action. He will be able to foil the adversary's plans and ideally force him to conform to

his own campaign plan. This will lead to a rapidly deteriorating situation for the adversary as the

adversary is forced to react to the commander’s actions and be unable to determine when and

where tactical battles and engagements will occur. Therefore, it is a fundamental concern of the

commander to seize the initiative, maintain it, and regain it if it is lost. Only by doing so could he

dominate and begin to impose his will on the adversary.

The initiative can be seized by a combination of fixing upon the adversary’s strengths

and striking the adversary’s weakness on both the moral and physical planes of conflict. A

campaign may be designed to fix the adversary initially by denying him his objectives, robbing

him of his freedom of action, undermining his ability to influence a populace, and shaping events

in preparation for subsequent action. Consequently, commanders should plan to strike the

adversary through pre-emption in order to seize and exploit the initiative, then to defeat the

adversary at successive decisive points, and move toward the achievement of the operational

objectives.

At all levels, commanders attempt to: ascertain the adversary's intentions; identify his

main effort; isolate and target elements critical to his cohesion; manipulate his perceptions;

delay adversary reinforcements by interdiction; and, degrade critical adversary functions such

as command and control, air support or logistics.

In dealing with unconventional adversaries, efforts must be made to understand the

power structures and influences that exist between various systems within the environment. In

taking the initiative, the commander must identify the desired effects on the adversary and other

environmental systems that will support the operational objectives, and then assign the tactical

activities that will create these effects.

Commanders conduct these activities in coordinated defensive, offensive and stability

operations, all of which aim to create the desired effects in support of achieving operational

objectives. Activities related to the functional framework are planned to occur simultaneously,

or in sequence, throughout the battlefield framework, thus overloading and putting the adversary

commander off balance. All three types of tactical operations—offensive, defensive and

stability—must be planned and conducted in a harmonized fashion exploiting where possible all

elements of the JIMP framework. The three operations will complement and reinforce each

other. For example, in many campaigns offensive operations will likely occur from a defended

base, and successful engagements will likely be reinforced with control over civilian populaces,

emergency humanitarian aid where necessary, and long term reconstruction to ensure

continued support and stability.

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708. FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

Full-spectrum operations (FSO) are defined as: “the simultaneous conduct of operations

by a force across the spectrum of conflict.”¹⁴⁷ As described in Chapter 3, a commander must

plan for, and be prepared and able to conduct a wide range of tactical activities, simultaneously

at various points along the spectrum of conflict.

In accordance with the continuum of operations model, a military force will likely be

conducting offensive, defensive and stability operations simultaneously. By their own nature

and in line with the overall campaign theme, these tactical level activities will occur at different

points along the spectrum of conflict, that is, they will involve different levels of violence and will

require different levels of force from the tactical elements.

A commander at any level must be able to use offensive, defensive and stability

operations in combination, conduct them simultaneously and sequentially at various levels, and

flow seamlessly from one to the other. For example, he may use economy of effort through

defensive action in one sector to allow for a concentration of force for offensive action in another

sector. An operational level defensive may incorporate tactical level offensive actions and vice

versa. Stability operations will likely occur in harmony with the other operations in order to

secure gains, infrastructure and local populations. In essence, the three operations are each

part of the same continuum and have a common purpose—to defeat the adversary by

shattering his moral and physical cohesion and capabilities. The commander must find the

balance across these activities. He must always be ready to take action to seize the initiative,

maintain it, and regain it if lost.

The importance of, and emphasis placed upon, each type of operation will shift during

the campaign and between campaign themes. In certain campaign themes, the decisive

operations may be stability operations that, contrary to the physical destruction of an adversary

force, establish viable local institutions, reliable infrastructure, capable security forces, and

responsible government that over the long course undermine the influences of the adversary

forces, dislocate their power, and dispel their claims to legitimacy. Offensive and defensive

operations will still be required and will continue to occur, but they will unlikely be the main effort

or decisive operation. Indeed, too much emphasis on offensive and/or defensive operations

may undermine the long-term goals of the campaign.

709. TEMPO

A faster relative tempo will allow the commander to seize the initiative and dictate the

conduct of operations. Tempo incorporates the capacity of the force to transition from one

operational posture to another. By increasing and varying the tempo, or rhythm of operations,

the commander seeks to impose his will to which the adversary is increasingly unable to react.

It is focused on completing the decision-action cycle faster than the adversary such that his

responses are made increasingly inappropriate. The operational tempo will reflect the force’s

ability to conduct FSO, either simultaneously or consecutively, or both as appropriate.

The tempo will be affected by the need to balance offensive, defensive and stability

operations. Slowing the operational and tactical tempos may support long-term successes to

¹⁴⁷ Army Terminology Panel approved…

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secure seized areas, protect populations, or gain the trust of neutral elements in the

environment. Long-term objectives, not the desire for short-term tactical success, must

dictate tempo.

710. MAIN EFFORT

The purpose of designating a main effort is to achieve unity of effort and maximize

combat power through the integration of the combat functions, and ideally, across all elements

in the JIMP framework. The use of the term “main effort” must therefore be understood and

applied in an appropriate way at all levels of command. Once the commander has established

his main effort as that crucial activity that is essential to the success of his mission, and he has

ensured that his subordinates know it, it is their duty to do their utmost to support that main

effort.

Initially, the main effort may be to fix the adversary at his point of strength, prior to

shifting the main effort to striking him at a point of relative weakness. However, the commander

will not plan to shift his main effort lightly, and can only do so if he has the means available and

the time required to affect the shift. Repeatedly shifting the main effort may cause confusion

and have the undesired effect of dissipating combat power instead of achieving concentration.

On the other hand, a failure to shift the main effort at the appropriate time will result in an

inflexible plan, incapable of adjusting to the chaos and uncertainty of operations.

Within the contemporary operating environment (COE), the main effort in many

campaigns is unlikely to be combat related, at least for extended periods of time. The main

effort may focus on stability operations at the tactical level, such as reconstruction and security

in public areas, and a combination of physical and intellectual activities for all elements in the

JIMP framework in order to effect a change in the social and political structure of a campaign

theatre.

711. SYNCHRONIZATION WITHIN THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK AND

BATTLEFIELD FRAMEWORK

A key role of commanders is to oversee the effective synchronization of operations and

activities across the operational framework, in terms of purpose (shaping, decisive, sustaining),

in terms of time and space (deep, close and rear), by means (physical and intellectual), and in

terms of the plane (physical and/or moral). Operations and activities should be planned to occur

simultaneously to the greatest extent, or in rapid succession; should be complementary and

reinforcing to one another; and, should appear to the adversary as one continuous operation

against him. This all requires continuous coordination of a variety of assets, across and

between all levels.

Many operations will set the conditions or shape for decisive operations. However, an

adversary is best fought if he is engaged simultaneously in various locations, deep and close,

physically and intellectually. With respect to major combat operations, attacking adversary

formations in depth disrupts, dislocates, or reduces adversary combat capabilities, degrades

cohesion and hastens adversary defeat. These operations enable friendly forces to choose the

time, place, and method of conducting close operations. In other operations, an adversary force

may have to be engaged physically, while other elements of the environment that may support

an adversary force are engaged with other means. Whatever the campaign or operation, all

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activities must be planned such that their effects are complementary and come together to

achieve a common operational objective.

The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing friendly manoeuvre and air

interdiction produces significant advantages, especially at the operational level. Potential

responses to synchronized manoeuvre and air interdiction can create a dilemma for the

adversary. If he attempts to concentrate his forces against the manoeuvre, he can be exposed

to unacceptable losses from air interdiction. If the adversary disperses to reduce air interdiction

losses, his forces may not be able to respond to the manoeuvre.

The synchronization of operations is a complex undertaking that must be balanced with

the requirements of a command philosophy that emphasizes decentralization. It requires a

clear understanding of the commander's intent and main effort throughout the force, stimulating

both command and staff initiative. Continuous synchronization is neither possible nor desirable

and the emphasis should be on using synchronization to produce maximum combat power at

the decisive time and place.

SECTION 4

THE TARGETING PROCESS

712. INTRODUCTION

Targeting is a vital component of the conduct of operations. Within the COE it is vital

that the concept of what constitutes a target and the ensuing targeting process be broad enough

to include and consider targeting through physical and intellectual activities on both the physical

and moral planes.

713. DEFINITIONS

Target. A target is an area, structure, object, person, organization, mindset, thought

process, attitude or behavioural pattern that can be suitably and effectively influenced by a

capability.¹⁴⁸ They can be physically or mentally altered.

Targeting. The targeting process involves more than the application of fires. It is the

process of selecting, prioritizing and creating effects. This is achieved through the execution of

the appropriate activity to create that effect and assessing the result. In doing so, it accounts for

the operational environment and force capabilities. Targeting has utility across the spectrum of

conflict, on both the physical and moral planes, utilizing lethal and non-lethal activities. The

targeting function links targets with effects throughout the battlespace and provides a logical

process that ensures consistency with the commander’s intent. This process supports

commanders in decision-making.

714. FUNDAMENTALS OF TARGETING

The fundamentals of targeting are:

¹⁴⁸ NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.9 (AJP-3.9) Allied Joint Targeting.

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Focused. The process is focused on achieving the commander’s objectives.

Economy of Effort. Effects are designed to be achieved with the minimum

expenditure of resources.

Risk Management. Targeting must be conducted within the limits of acceptable

risk as detailed in the commander’s intent or planning guidance. Targeting and

the resulting effects should be achieved with minimum risk to friendly forces and

to others elements in the JIMP framework and civilian populace.

Interdisciplinary. The targeting effort relies upon the coordinated activities of

the elements of the JIMP framework.

Systematic. Targeting is a rational and iterative process that seeks to manage

effects in a systematic manner.

715. THE LAND FORCE TARGETING CYCLE

Targeting and Effects. Effective targeting is distinguished by the ability to identify lethal

and non-lethal targeting options to achieve the desired effect. Targeting decisions lead to

activities on either the physical or moral planes that subsequently create effects that in turn

realize defined objectives. These effects have been defined as follows:

Direct Effects. Direct effects are the consequence of activities (e.g., weapons

employment results, populace informed through leaflets, etc.), unaltered by

intervening events or mechanisms. They are usually immediate and easily

recognizable. Direct effects occur within the same system or group targeted.

Indirect Effects. Indirect effects are the consequences of an activity that occur

as a result of the application of a direct effect that is removed in time or purpose

from the initial point of application. Indirect effects are often difficult to recognize

due to subtle changes in adversary behaviour that may hide their extent.

Intended and Unintended Effects. Intended effects are those that are planned

in relation to the activities conducted and support the desired objective. They

may be direct or indirect. Unintended effects are those that were not foreseen

by the related activities. They may be direct or indirect and will likely undermine

the attainment of the desired objective.

Second, Third and Subsequent Order Effects. These are the effects that

relate to consequences of a direct effect. As an example, dropping leaflets has

the direct effect of causing adversary soldiers to desert. The intended second

order effect is that their unit becomes ineffective, and a third order effect is that

a particular area becomes undefended.

The Targeting Cycle. Targeting focuses capability to create specific effects in order to

achieve the commander’s intent. The targeting cycle provides a systematic approach to enable

the generation of the right activities at the right times against the right targets to create

the desired effects. It is a dynamic process that allows activities to be rapidly adjusted to meet

changing situations when required. Targeting is based upon the commander and his targeting

board performing a continuous cycle of steps: Decide, Detect, Track, Deliver and Assess. Staff

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officers whose functions are to harmonize and synchronize planning and targeting on both the

physical and moral planes support the targeting cycle and the entire planning process.¹⁴⁹ See

Figure 7-1.

Figure 7-1: The Land Force Targeting Cycle

Analysis of Targets. Within the targeting cycle, at each step the targets are continually

analyzed against the operational environment within a given geographical area to ensure

currency and applicability. This allows for the prosecution of targets as opportunities arise. The

process is supported by the knowledge base, enhanced by the products of intelligence

preparation of the battlespace (IPB) (e.g., NAIs and TAIs), and utilizes a comprehensive

approach through the JIMP framework.¹⁵⁰

The Decide Function. The Decide function is the initial most involved step in the cycle

and will take the greatest staff effort. Based upon his vision and analysis, it is initiated by the

commander who makes preliminary decisions with respect to the targets and the desired

effects. It continues as part of the planning process and the intelligence collection effort (i.e.,

IPB), and sets priorities for intelligence collection. It is key to establishing the CCIRs, the

priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), along with essential elements of friendly

information (EEFI), etc. This function will:

¹⁴⁹ These staff officers will be allocated to J5 Targeting Coordination cell. Three such officers will conduct

this function within a Brigade HQ Plans cell. One will oversee the entire targeting process, one will focus

and coordinate targeting for fires, and one will coordinate targeting with non-fires means, such as civil-

military cooperation (CIMIC), PSYOPS, and public affairs.

¹⁵⁰ The knowledge base that identifies and assesses all the interrelated systems and actors within an

environment is a key component to an effects-based approach to operations. For more details regarding

the IPB process, see B-GL-357-001/FP-001 Intelligence Field Manual.

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Identify Target Types. Target types and categories will depend upon the

nature of the operation and the range of effects desired (e.g., armoured reserve

on the physical plane, and hostility towards the government on the moral plane).

Target lists are developed as targets are identified and will be further refined

through intelligence collection and the need to manage the dynamic nature of

the commander’s operational requirements.

Identify Target Areas. This considers the AO and identifies areas of targeting

interest that are not identified in the IPB process. All dimensions of the

battlespace environment should be considered and limitations, such as

protected areas, taken into account. This will focus engagement efforts on both

the moral and physical planes (e.g., routes for the armoured reserve on the

physical plane, and a disenfranchised ethnic group on the moral plane). This

will augment the intelligence collection process.

Establish Target Accuracy. The required accuracy to effectively engage the

target will dictate the sense and delivery capabilities tasked. This considers

technical and procedural limits of the capability in order to establish engagement

parameters. This aids in the allocation of specific capabilities to targets.

Input to Intelligence Collection Plan. Targeting input to the intelligence

collection plan provides a focus for the management of detection systems. The

input will identify priority targets, how they may be detected, and whether target

tracking is required.

Develop Criteria for Measures of Performance and Measures of

Effectiveness. Criteria for a successful engagement must be decided early in

the process and consist of measures of performance (MOP) and measures of

effectiveness (MOE) as defined. This will include recommendation of the sensor

capabilities required to measure these criteria. On the physical plane, battle

damage assessment (BDA) provides an objective measure, and on the moral

plane, the assessment will be primarily subjective measure.

Develop Attack Guidance Matrix. The attack guidance matrix (AGM) provides

a consolidated, tabulated support tool for targeting decisions and is the

culmination of the Decide phase of the cycle. The matrix is intended to act, as

far as practical, as an executive document allowing rapid engagement decisions

to be made during current operations. The AGM should be developed for each

phase of an operation and for different operations.

Decide Function Products. The result of the Decide function should be a focused

targeting effort supported by the following products:

High Value Target List. High value targets (HVTs) are those, the alteration of

which will significantly damage the opponent's capability and/or will to achieve

his intentions. The HVT list (HVTL) is derived from consideration of the mission,

the opponents’ intentions and vulnerabilities, and the direction provided by the

formation/manoeuvre commander arising from the formation planning process.

The intelligence staff normally generates the HVTL.

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High Payoff Target List. The high payoff target list (HPTL) identifies those

HVTs whose alteration will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly

commander’s mission. The HPTL may change according to the phase and

nature of operations, and may be used to focus the intelligence collection effort.

The HPTL is a command decision and should be disseminated accordingly.

Target Selection Standards. Target selection standards (TSS) are pre-

established criteria that are applied to targets to determine what degree of

accuracy and timeliness is required from detection systems to enable the

selected means of delivery to achieve a successful engagement. If there is a

change to the TSS, the target may still be valid; however re-assessment will be

required prior to engagement.

Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness Criteria Issued

and Means of Collection. Criteria and allocated assets for the application of

the MOP and MOE are applied following an engagement. This product should

be able to illustrate the MOP, and particularly the MOE, in a readily

understandable fashion that will clearly indicate where success is being met.

Attack Guidance Matrix. The AGM provides detail on specific HPTs, when

and how they should be engaged and any restrictions. It allocates assets to

targets and facilitates future planning. The AGM may also identify target-

tracking requirements.

The Detect Function. During detection, the ISTAR¹⁵¹ coordination cell supervises and

coordinates the efforts of assets to execute the intelligence collection plan. Some assets can

identify targets, while others produce information that must be processed to identify targets.

The targeting priorities developed during the Decide function are used to expedite the

processing of target information. The information collected and processed is used to update

and amend the HPTL and AGM as necessary. The practical application of this function is the

execution of the intelligence collection plan. Targeting staff should be active in this process in

order to maintain the dynamic nature of the targeting cycle.

The Track Function. Target tracking supplements the Detect function, but is distinct

from it since target tracking requires specific asset management decisions. Many of these

tracking decisions will have been agreed in the Decide function and will be articulated in the

AGM. Once detected, HPTs that cannot be immediately engaged, which are planned for

engagement during a later phase, or which require validation, must be tracked to ensure that

they are not lost and to maintain a current target location. Targeting staff must bear in mind that

systems used for tracking will generally be unavailable for other target detection. On the moral

plane, this may consist of surveys to track public attitude and perception. Targeting staff should

be active in the execution of the intelligence collection plan (e.g., ISTAR matrix) in order to:

maintain the dynamic nature of the targeting cycle; to ensure that targets are not lost prior to

engagement; and to ensure that sensor handoff is accomplished.

¹⁵¹ Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance.

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The Deliver Function. The primary activity during the Deliver function of the targeting

cycle is the engagement of targets to generate the desired effects in accordance with the AGM.

Important targets may appear outside the Decide function. These targets are processed in the

same manner as planned HPTs. Targets, not on the HPTL, are first evaluated to determine

when and if they should be attacked. The decision to engage opportunity targets is based upon

a number of factors, such as the activity of the target and the potential target payoff compared

to other targets being processed for engagement and systems available. The final decision is to

confirm the selection of an appropriate capability for engaging each target in line with the AGM.

For planned targets, this decision will have been made as part of the Decide function.

Nevertheless, a check has to be made to ensure that the selected capabilities are available and

can conduct the engagement as planned. If not, the targeting board must determine the best

available means for the engagement. In some cases, more than one asset may be used to

engage the same target.

The Assess Function. Assessment is the concluding step in the targeting cycle and is

the determination of the effectiveness of the engagement. Assessment will be a dynamic

process and will be a constant feature of the staff effort.¹⁵² It consists of measures of

performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE):

Measures of Performance. A MOP is defined as: “a criterion used to evaluate

the accomplishment of a task.”¹⁵³ A MOP is the timely and accurate

assessment of an activity (Did we do things right?) and is conducted as a matter

of course. For specific HPTs, the criteria for MOPs are determined as part of

the Decide function and the requirements are recorded on the AGM. These

should be replicated in the intelligence collection plan. As part of the targeting

cycle, MOP help determine if further engagements on selected targets are

necessary. Commanders use this information to allocate, or redirect,

engagement systems to make best use of available combat power.

Measures of Effectiveness. A MOE is defined as: “a criterion used to evaluate

how a task has affected selected system behaviour or capabilities over time.”¹⁵⁴

They are used to evaluate how activities have affected target behaviour or

capabilities (Are we doing the right things to create the desired effect?). If the

MOP were met (things were done right), but the MOE were not, there will be a

requirement to a change to the activities or the manner in which they are

conducted. Note that on the moral plane, MOE are mainly subjective and it may

take a significant amount of time to determine effectiveness. Hence, these MOE

must be assessed routinely and an attempt made to recognize changes and

trends. The commander exercises judgement as to when an adjustment or

change to an activity against that target must be made. It must be noted that

on the moral plane, the time required to complete the cycle can be

significantly longer.

¹⁵² Combat assessment, which comprises battle damage assessment (BDA), munitions effectiveness

analysis (MEA), and re-attack recommendations.

¹⁵³ Army Terminology Panel approved May 2006.

¹⁵⁴ Army Terminology Panel approved May 2006.

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10.

Command, Control and Coordination. Targeting is a command responsibility that

requires the personal time, energy and attention of the commander. The commander has to

give clear direction for the aims, priorities and degree of effort to be accorded to targeting. The

targeting board will require a detailed understanding of how effects are created in order to

determine the required activities and their synchronization. The commander delegates the

detailed control of targeting to the chairman of the targeting board. The composition of the

targeting board is multidisciplinary in order to provide the required expertise for activities on both

the physical and moral planes.¹⁵⁵ The appropriate headquarters (HQ) coordination centres and

the G5 targeting coordination staff (e.g., the fire support coordination centre [FSCC], or the

targeting coordination cell) conducts the detailed coordination of the targeting activities.

11.

Allocation of Targets. Targets may be allocated by higher formations. These targets

must be included in the targeting decisions of the targeting board. They will have a direct

impact on the detection, tracking and engagement assets available. Conversely, activities

beyond the capability of the formation are passed to and coordinated with the higher formation.

12.

Legal Considerations. Targeting at all levels will always be governed by the

parameters set by the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) and rules of engagement (ROE). In

addition, there must be consideration of the distinction between military and civilian targets, as

well as between civilians and combatants. For these reasons, there is a requirement for legal

advice throughout the targeting cycle.

13.

Implications from Laws of Armed Conflict. The concepts of LOAC that have

particular relevance to targeting are:

Military Necessity. This means that belligerents are justified in applying force

to that extent which will ensure the submission of the adversary at the earliest

possible moment, with the least possible cost and using methods and means of

warfare that are not prescribed by international law in attacking a military

objective.

Unnecessary Suffering. This relates to the means of warfare and methods of

combat whose foreseeable harm would be clearly excessive in relation to the

military advantage to be gained. In relation to a civilian population, it means

whether the risk of incidental injury to the civilian population caused is so

indiscriminate as to constitute a direct attack on the civilian population.

Proportionality. The commander should have an expectation that a military

action will make a relevant and proportional contribution to military objectives.

In relation to civilians, this concept means that incidental civilian casualties and

damage to civilian property cannot be excessive in relation to the military

advantage to be gained.

14.

ROE will define when, where and how force may be applied. All commanders must

instruct their forces carefully on the ROE. It is essential that the targeting board know the ROE

and are able to apply them correctly.

¹⁵⁵ Detailed composition of the targeting board, its responsibilities and its procedures may be found in B-

GL-331-002/FP-000 Staff Duties in the Field.

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716. INTELLIGENCE LED OPERATIONS

Intelligence and targeting processes should guide all tactical level operations. Indeed,

the tempo of a campaign or particular operation may have to be reduced to ensure the thorough

development of intelligence sources and information. At times, however, particularly in those

campaigns that are short of major combat, operations can become routine when conducted over

a lengthy period of time or conducted without a great deal of detailed, specific intelligence.

Such is often the case with stability operations activities with its common application of

framework patrolling.

Whenever possible, specific and detailed intelligence should be cultivated in order to

give these routine operations focus and purpose. Standing PIRs should provide a backdrop for

all such activities, and specific IRs for particular activities and regions within an AO will help

focus routine activities, with a view to turning NAIs into point TAIs for prosecution by deliberate

operations. This may take an extended period of time, particularly when adversaries are

concealed in local populations and operate below the normal detection thresholds.

INTELLIGENCE LED OPERATIONS

On 20 August 2006, units of 1st Bn, The RCR and the Afghan National Army used timely

and actionable intelligence to decisively defeat a Taliban attack. On 19 August a

sizeable force of insurgents occupied dwellings Southeast of Panjwai village. The

insurgent’s intent was to attack government offices and interdict traffic on Highway 1, a

main MSR [main supply route]. Coalition forces were postured to counter the planned

insurgent attack based on the intelligence and recognized patterns of behaviour that the

insurgents had followed in past actions. Coalition elements were arrayed against enemy

weaknesses to disrupt the enemy ability to manoeuvre or bring accurate fire against

friendly elements.

The detailed intelligence-driven planning helped to inflict a significant defeat on the

attacking insurgent force. Caught unawares and drawn into a pitched battle against

superior forces, the insurgents lost approximately seventy of their number.

There are several lessons to be gleaned from this action. First, intelligence driven

operations allow the battlespace to be shaped. Conditions can be set in order to shape

the battlespace, thus facilitating the decisive tactical activity of striking the enemy force.

Second, intelligence driven operations can, as in this instance, enable allied forces to

operate inside the decision-making cycle of the enemy to disrupt his operations. Thirdly,

they facilitate measures of effectiveness. In this case, the intelligence that enabled this

operation came from a local villager and thus indicates some degree of support for the

central government and the coalition forces.

Source: Graeme Smith, “Canadians hammer Taliban,” The Globe and Mail, 21 August

2006, p. A1, A11 and interview with CO 1 RCR.

During Op HALO in Haiti, 2004, I Coy, 2 RCR framework patrols were tasked to develop

named areas of interest into point targets for execution. Soon after deployment, patrols

learned from locals that a local gang member, Ti Paille, had been responsible for much

of the murder and attacks against police and weapon smuggling in the area. This was

confirmed with higher sources and through CI and HUMINT sources.

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Patrols were tasked within this area of over 20,000 civilians to locate the gang leader’s

exact location and possible weapons caches, effectively creating a point target for

prosecution. It took three weeks for patrols to locate, through local contacts, an

unmarked brothel associated with the gang in question. A cordon and search operation

did not result in an immediate seizure of weapons or individuals, but did bring forth more

intelligence. A HUMINT source was able to provide a report from within the buildings

just prior to execution along with a sketch of the layout.

Exploitation of CI [counter-intelligence] and HUMINT sources over the next three weeks

indicated the gang leader’s temporary residence. A cordon and search operation in

conjunction with Haitian police forces resulted in the arrest of the gang leader and his

eventual prosecution.

This operation concluded successfully not through happenstance nor a single

intelligence source, but through directed and planned intelligence gathering by a number

of complementary sources (HUMINT, CI and framework patrols) that allowed a large NAI

to be developed into a point target for prosecution. The long term effects were an

improvement in security levels and enhanced legitimacy to both coalition forces and

local police.

Source: I Coy, 2 RCR post-deployment AAR.

SECTION 5

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

717. TACTICAL LEVEL OPERATIONS—GENERAL

Tactical level operations may be classified as offensive, defensive, stability, or enabling.

Every campaign is conducted through a balanced combination of these tactical operations and

their constituent activities, tasks and effects, as dictated in the continuum of operations

construct.¹⁵⁶ The resources and emphasis placed on each type of operation will depend upon a

number of situational factors and will reflect the nature of the campaign.

Offensive operations will be key to defeating an adversary. It must be remembered,

though, that long-term operational and strategic objectives and ultimate success may actually

depend more upon the conduct of stability operations and their effects on the psychological

plane.

718. PURPOSE OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The purpose of offensive operations is to defeat the adversary through the use of

violence. Offensive action, on both the moral and physical planes, through a combination of

physical and intellectual activities, is the decisive operation of war and ultimate success is

achieved through it.

¹⁵⁶ See Chapter 3, Section 4.

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Offensive operations defeat the adversary either by breaking his cohesion, by physical

destruction or both. The real damage to the adversary's will is caused by destroying the

coherence of his operations and fragmenting and isolating his combat power, and its moral,

conceptual and physical components. By so doing, the adversary's capability to resist is

destroyed.

Other subsidiary purposes and effects of offensive operations include:

Gaining information through reconnaissance in force activities.

Depriving the adversary of resources.

Pre-empting the adversary in order to gain the initiative.

Disrupting the adversary’s offensive action and other activities such as

command and control (C2) systems (through offensive information operations).

Dislocating the adversary’s forces through decisive engagement or deception.

Seizure of ground.

Fixing the adversary as an economy of force activity.

Influencing or changing the perceptions of commanders and other, possibly

neutral or hostile, target audiences. This may be done through physical or

intellectual activities.

719. PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

General. In offensive operations, the key to success is seizing and retaining the

initiative. In doing so, a commander maintains momentum, keeps the adversary off-balance,

and prevents him from blocking penetrations, mounting counterattacks, and reforming his

reserves. Selecting the location, target, time and direction of offensive operations seizes the

initiative.

Principles of War. The following principles of war are important considerations during

the planning and conduct of offensive operations:

Offensive Action. Offensive action aims at defeating the adversary’s will to

resist. This implies manoeuvre, speed and aggressiveness. By wresting the

initiative from the adversary, one acquires freedom of action and a distinct

psychological advantage. Exploiting success and taking advantage of

adversary’s weakness must be foremost in the minds of all commanders. This

requirement for offensive action also applies, through info ops, to both physical

and intellectual activities on the moral plane. Consequently, there is a need to

develop a proactive info ops plan that seeks to positively influence targets in

support of the operational objectives.

Concentration of Force. A commander must strive to concentrate combat

power superior to that of the adversary at a decisive time and place.

Concentration not only implies massing of forces but also massing of firepower.

The ability to concentrate is dependent upon movement, flexibility and

communications.

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Surprise. Surprise can create success out of proportion to the size of the force

used. Its elements are secrecy, concealment, deception, originality, audacity

and speed. Surprise must be exploited.

Security. Security is a condition that gives a commander sufficient freedom of

action to fulfil his aim. Security is manifested in the offence by having a firm

base for the assembly, preparation and launching of operations. It includes

securing the line of departure (LD), the flanks of an attacking force, and the lines

of communications (LOC). During counter-insurgency (COIN) operations and

certain peace support operations, forces will require a secure base from which

to operate. Once the desired effects have been created in these base areas,

the campaign can be extended, like oil spreading in water, to less secure areas.

Flexibility. Offensive operations demand a high degree of flexibility in order to

enable plans to be altered to meet changing situations, unexpected

developments, and to exploit fleeting opportunities, particularly against

unconventional enemies. Its elements are flexibility of mind and rapidity of

decision-making on the part of a commander and his subordinates, to ensure

that time and opportunities are never lost. It is achieved through simplicity of

plans, unity of effort, and maintenance of balance. Implicit in this requirement is

freedom of action for the commander.

720.

FUNDAMENTALS OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

In addition to the principles of war that merit special consideration in offensive

operations, there are several fundamentals that must be applied:

Information Gathering. Offensive operations, particularly at operational level,

must be supported by a broad knowledge base that assesses the interrelated

systems within an environment and anticipates the effects that will be created

from offensive actions, to ensure that operational objectives are met. A great

deal of information gathering at all levels is required to support this knowledge

based. At the tactical level, both desired effects and undesired effects must be

understood. Information gathering at this level will support the knowledge base,

although the fundamental element of information gathering at this level has a

more specific aim. Knowledge of the adversary’s dispositions, strengths and

intentions is vital to success in the offence. As well, commanders at all levels

need detailed information on the terrain over which their troops will fight.

Simplicity. Plans must be kept simple. Complex manoeuvres and intricate

arrangements lead to confusion and misunderstanding. A clear concept of

operations supported by a simple plan gives subordinate commanders an

opportunity to apply their own judgement and initiative in response to changes in

the local situation. Simplicity enhances agility and allows better control of

tempo. For info ops, messages to the target audience should be kept simple

and straightforward with obvious links in logic and links to operational objectives.

Simplicity of plans and linkages to desired objectives will also make assessment

through MOE easier.

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Shock Action. Shock action is achieved by the bold handling of combat forces,

be they armour, mechanized infantry, or rapidly moving light forces to break into

the adversary’s defences and drive deep into his area. Fire support is essential

and is used during all stages of the operation to reinforce the shock action.

Depth. Depth is required both in the organization of offensive forces and in the

selection of objectives. Organizing in depth contributes to shock action and

allows continual operations to occur. It permits a commander to maintain

constant pressure on the adversary and to exploit penetration. The securing of

objectives in depth breaks the framework of the adversary’s defence.

Balance. A balanced force is one that is grouped in such a way that a

commander can concentrate combat power to take advantage of a sudden

opportunity or to react to the adversary’s action at the decisive moment. In

reaching operational objectives, a balance may have to be created between

activities on the physical and moral planes in order to create complementary

effects. The initial grouping of forces and allocation of activities must ensure

that:

(1)

The covering force can cover the frontage of the area of influence if the

battlespace is organized in this manner, or may cover key NAIs.

(2)

Leading tactical elements have a suitable force mix to deal with likely

opposition.

(3)

Forward observation officers (FOOs) and forward air controllers (FACs)

are well forward to provide continuous fire support.

(4)

Requirements for engineer support are anticipated and resources are

readily available, with engineer reconnaissance parties well forward.

(5)

Reserves are constituted, maintained and normally deployed beyond the

range of most adversary artillery, so that they can be committed rapidly to

battle. In campaigns and operations short of major combat, reserves are

still required and are adjusted to the adversary and possible,

unanticipated requirements. They are often termed as a quick reaction

force (QRF).

Reserves. Reserves are required to meet the unexpected. They may be

committed to influence the battle, to exploit success, or to respond to

countermoves. Reserves provide a commander with flexibility and balance.

Once he has committed his reserves, the commander must reconstitute it as

soon as possible. Operations that lack a detailed intelligence picture, or that

may meet unanticipated situations, should hold significant forces in reserve if

possible.

721.

TYPES OF OFFENSIVE ACTIVITIES

There are a number of different types of offensive activities with specific purposes. They

are closely related and often lead from one to another. The types of offensive activities are as

follows:

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attack;

raid;

reconnaissance in force;

exploitation;

pursuit;

ambush;

breakout of encircled forces; and

feint and demonstration.

722. ATTACK

To attack is to take offensive action against a specified objective. The primary purpose

of an attack is to destroy the adversary's capability to resist. An attack may be a separate

operation or may be carried out in conjunction with other types of operations. A commander

undertaking an attack possesses the initiative, in that he decides the location, time, direction

and weight of combat power to be concentrated. Once the attack is launched, flexibility and

speed in the employment of combat power are paramount. The attack must be executed

vigorously, exploiting any favourable developments and reallocating resources to areas where

there appears to be an opportunity for success. Momentum must be maintained in order to

keep the adversary off balance, and the attack must not be delayed in order to align units or

adhere rigidly to a plan. Indeed, few attacks will develop as planned and commanders must

actively seek to turn unexpected successes to their advantage and to cope rapidly to reverses.

To be able to do this they must be well informed.

The requirement for flexibility demands simple plans, adjustable fire support, engineers

well positioned, reserves uncommitted and close at hand, and sustainment options flexible

enough to be adjusted to support the offensive operation. Each discrete attack should not be

viewed as its own entity, but as part of the continuous process to break the adversary's

cohesion. Commanders should be planning to exploit success well before they have achieved

it.

An attack is often preceded by an advance to contact and seeks to seize and maintain

the initiative. Additionally, a hasty attack may occur as a result of a meeting engagement.

Counterattacks are also employed by a defending force to exploit opportunities to strike the

adversary at a decisive time and place in order to defeat him. Assuming that the attack has

been successful, the force will consolidate, and if possible, exploit success through continued

offensive action. Types of attack:

Hasty Attack. A hasty attack is an attack in which preparation time is traded for

speed in order to exploit an opportunity. It seeks to take advantage of the

adversary's lack of preparedness, and involves boldness, surprise and speed in

order to achieve success before the adversary has had time to improve his

defensive posture. In order to maintain momentum or retain the initiative,

minimum time is devoted to preparation, and the forces used for the attack are

those that are readily available. There will be little time for reconnaissance and

none for rehearsal. The element of surprise created by a speedy action will act

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as a force multiplier. Such attacks must, wherever possible, be mounted from

an unexpected direction and supported by the concentrated fire of every

available weapon. Commanders should issue brief orders and then position

themselves well forward to react rapidly to the development of the attack. If

momentum is lost, a deliberate attack may be necessary. Properly performed

IPB may identify areas for a hasty attack from the advance, thereby allowing

some more detailed planning before the advance.

Deliberate Attack. A deliberate attack is a type of offensive action

characterized by planned and coordinated employment of firepower and

manoeuvre to close with and destroy or capture the adversary. When a well-

prepared adversary defence must be defeated, a deliberate attack may be

required. The emphasis is on preparation at the expense of speed and time;

therefore, methods other than speed will be required in order to achieve

surprise.

Counterattack and Spoiling Attack

(1)

Counterattack. The purpose of a counterattack is to defeat an adversary

that becomes vulnerable by his own offensive action, by revealing his

main effort or creating an assailable flank. It is likely to be conducted as

part of a defensive operation by a reserve or lightly committed forward

elements, and it affords the defender the opportunity to create favourable

conditions for the commitment of combat power and a switch to offensive

action.

(2)

Spoiling Attack. The spoiling attack is similarly directed at adversary

offensive operations but with the limited aim of disruption. It attempts to

strike the adversary while he is most vulnerable or while he is on the

move prior to crossing his LD. A spoiling attack is pre-emptive in nature,

as it attacks the adversary's plans, and hence, his cohesion. When the

situation permits, however, commanders can exploit a spoiling attack like

any other attack.

Attack by Fire. To attack by fire is an action to engage an adversary with direct

fires, supported by indirect fires, without closing with him.¹⁵⁷ Attack by fire

excludes assaulting or occupying the objective. Although it is a form of an

attack, as a tactical activity, it is often used as a tactical task in support of a

larger tactical activity. It may be given as a “be prepared to” task against a

possible adversary, such as the approach of a mobile reserve.

723.

RAID

A raid is defined as: “an operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of

hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy his installations. It ends

with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.”¹⁵⁸ The wider purpose of a

¹⁵⁷ B-GL-331-002/FP-000 Staff Duties in the Field.

¹⁵⁸ NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6 (AAP-6) NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

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raid is to disrupt the adversary usually through destruction, or the capture of a vital asset or

capability. It is based upon detailed intelligence, generally involves swift movement into hostile

territory, and ends with a planned withdrawal. Because raids will often be carried out over a

short distance and time period, only a limited amount of supplies need be carried and

maintenance will be confined to minor crew repairs. Fire support systems are required to

support the raiding force so as to reduce the adversary's ability to react. Armoured

reconnaissance, airmobile, airborne and amphibious forces, and dismounted infantry,

particularly if supported by aviation fire support, are well suited to this type of attack.

724. RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

Reconnaissance in force is defined as: “an offensive operation designed to discover

and/or test the enemy's strength or to obtain other information.”¹⁵⁹ The purpose of a

reconnaissance in force is to compel the adversary to disclose the location, size, strength,

disposition or intention of his force by making him respond to offensive action. The adversary's

reaction may reveal weaknesses in his defensive system that can be attacked or strengths that

should be avoided. Commanders may conduct reconnaissance in force as a means of keeping

pressure on the defender by seizing key terrain and uncovering adversary weaknesses. They

must also be prepared to seize any opportunity to exploit tactical success.

A formation or unit may conduct its own reconnaissance in force, or do so at the

direction of a higher HQ. It must be conducted in enough strength to force the adversary to

react, though it may be necessary to place restrictions on commanders to avoid actions that

may precipitate a decisive engagement. If the force is still engaged once the actual

reconnaissance is completed, it may be tasked to fix the adversary, attack, or withdraw as

directed.

725. EXPLOITATION

Exploitation is defined as: “an offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack

and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth.”¹⁶⁰ As a tactical task, a rapid advance

against lessening resistance characterizes exploitation. The purpose is both physical and

moral. Physically, the aim is to retain the initiative by preventing the adversary from

reorganizing his defence or conducting an orderly withdrawal. The moral effect of exploitation is

to create confusion and apprehension throughout the adversary command, reducing his

capability to react and lowering his morale. This may be decisive in itself.

726. PURSUIT

A pursuit is defined as: “an offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile

force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it.”¹⁶¹ It may commence when the

adversary force is demoralized and its units are beginning to disintegrate under pressure.

Alternatively, it may originate in an operation in which the adversary loses his ability to operate

effectively and attempts to disengage.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

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727. AMBUSH

An ambush is an operation aimed at destroying or capturing by surprise an enemy

element in movement. The purpose of an ambush is to inflict damage on the adversary while

denying him an opportunity to counterattack, principally through surprise. It is often conducted

in the same manner as a raid and often within territory controlled by the adversary. Normally,

the ambushing force lies in wait for the adversary force.

728. BREAKOUT OF ENCIRCLED FORCES

In a breakout operation, an encircled force takes offensive action to link up with a main

force. The breakout should attempt to surprise the adversary, and is more likely to be

successful if it is conducted at the earliest opportunity. Other forces attempting to fix the

encircling adversary may support the breakout operation.

729. FEINT AND DEMONSTRATION

A feint and demonstration are offensive info ops¹⁶² in that they conduct physical activities

with the aim of distracting and possibly deceiving the adversary. Thus, their initial effects occur

on the moral plane, while their secondary effects will occur on the physical plane, in that they

will persuade the adversary to react in a desired fashion (e.g., move a reserve). Both may seek

to fix an adversary force and may be supported by other deceptive info ops:

Feint. A feint seeks to distract the attention and action of an adversary force by

seeking combat with it. Its intent is often to support the development of the main

effort elsewhere on the battlefield, normally by fixing an element of the

adversary. Feints must be of sufficient strength and composition to cause the

desired adversary reaction. It is most effective when it supports the adversary's

expectations, when it appears as a definite adversary to the adversary, or when

there are several feasible courses of action open to the attacker.

Demonstration. A demonstration seeks to distract the adversary’s attention

without seeking combat. It may be part of a broader deception plan.

Demonstration forces use firepower, manoeuvre and C2 warfare. It should also

be aimed at a vital sector of the adversary's defences if he is to be successfully

misled.

730. OFFENSIVE (PHYSICAL) INFORMATION OPERATIONS

In addition to the operations described above, offensive info ops are conducted to

physically destroy, attrite, disrupt or deny the use of the electromagnetic spectrum and its

supporting infrastructure. These may stem from a physical attack as described above (e.g.,

raid, attack) against a C2 system, or from an attack via the electromagnetic spectrum. The aim

is to contribute to the defeat of opposing forces by rendering them unable to accurately perceive

situations, make decisions, or direct actions in a timely manner to carry out their intentions.

¹⁶² Feint and demonstration are extant doctrine, but the concept of them as information operations is a

new addition. They use physical activities to create effects on the moral plane (e.g., deception) and thus

secondary effects on the physical plane (e.g., movement of forces, etc.).

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SECTION 6

FORMS OF MANOEUVRE

731. GENERAL

Offensive operations may be directed against the front, flank or rear of the adversary

and may be conducted from the land, air or sea. Any combination of these is possible.

Normally, the point of main effort is placed where the adversary is weakest or where the terrain

offers possibilities of breaking deep into his defensive area. This is done through the

manoeuvre of forces. Manoeuvre is defined as: “employment of forces on the battlefield

through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage

in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.”¹⁶³

The forms of manoeuvre are frontal, penetration, envelopment (which includes flank

attacks and attacks against the adversary’s rear), and turning movement. To manoeuvre is to

gain a position of advantage relative to the adversary. It often requires physical movement.

Movement against an adversary’s flanks and rear may have an impact on his morale, and

thereby, his will. It may assist in the achievement of surprise and shock if conducted at high

tempo; that is, before the adversary can react effectively. Some forms of manoeuvre, such as

single and double envelopment or a turning movement may disrupt and dislocate the defence.

The envelopment may have a more direct aim: to gain a position of advantage, which is the

desired objective. Many, if not all, of the forms of manoeuvre can apply at all levels. In general,

though, at brigade level and below the most common forms of manoeuvre are the frontal attack

and the flank attack.

732. FRONTAL

In this form of manoeuvre, the main effort is directed against the front of an adversary’s

position. It can be effective against a weak, disorganized adversary, or it may be used to

overrun and destroy him or to fix him. A frontal form of manoeuvre is often required to support a

penetration or envelopment. Unless supported by a heavy weight of fire, it may not be

successful, but if successful, it may result in an unnecessarily high number of casualties. A

commander must, therefore, consider these factors carefully before executing a frontal attack.

733. PENETRATION

Penetration is a form of offensive manoeuvre that seeks to break through the

adversary’s defence and disrupt the defensive system. Penetration seeks to reach the depths

of an adversary’s position on one or a number of narrow sectors. It will destroy the continuity of

a defensive position. The main effort is made on a relatively narrow front or on a number of

narrow fronts.

Successful penetration requires the concentration of superior combat power at the point

selected for breaking into the adversary’s defences. Such points include gaps in his defences

and boundary locations. The concentration must be such that the force can break through

quickly, widen and secure the breach, and maintain momentum while seizing the deep

objectives. It is a suitable manoeuvre when strong combat forces are available and the

adversary is over-extended or if his flanks are firmly secured.

¹⁶³ NATO AAP-6.

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It has two principal variants—deep and multiple penetrations. Both may be employed

in the same operation. The fundamental tactic is to seek the depth of an adversary’s position as

rapidly as possible, preferably without fighting. This requires adversary forces to be bypassed

by design. That creates a risk that the penetrating force may itself be attacked in its developing

flanks. The fear that this might happen may cause forces to move cautiously when boldness is

required. Personal example and determination will be required of commanders. The protection

of the flanks of the penetrating element is critical to success, although at times protection can be

afforded by the sheer speed of the penetrating force. Types of penetration:

Deep Penetration. Deep penetration aims either to seize features or to destroy

specific objectives deep in the adversary’s rear. In doing so, it perforates the

adversary’s positions, introduces a force behind the adversary, and thereby

causes fear and uncertainty. It may of itself persuade an adversary commander

that he has lost, particularly if the objective is critical to him. Such objectives

may include river crossings behind his position.

Multiple Penetrations. Multiple penetration aims to disrupt and dislocate the

cohesion of a defensive position. In doing so, it achieves simultaneity,

presenting the defender with a number of adversaries. It creates multiple

opportunities for surprise and shock. However, it risks dispersion of forces for

little overall effect if it is not generally successful and reinforced quickly.

Combination of Multiple and Deep Penetration. Multiple and deep

penetrations may be combined to produce dramatic effects against the

adversary on both the physical and moral planes.

On the Sinai front in 1967, a total of eleven Israeli brigades, operating on up to six

separate axes, routed a force of about seven Egyptian divisions in less than four days.

The Israelis repeatedly achieved shock and surprise; they reconnoitred aggressively;

and they achieved and exploited control of the air from the opening minutes of the

campaign. The destruction of command posts and offensive electronic warfare also

contributed to the Egyptians’ panic and collapse.

From UK Army Doctrine Publication ‘Land Operations’ AC 71819

Each penetrating force will normally require at least two elements. The leading element

is tasked to penetrate to the objective or the limit of exploitation as rapidly as possible,

bypassing any opposition. The second element is tasked to follow the first in order protect its

flanks and rear. Subsequent elements are reserve or echelon forces. They are tasked to

destroy bypassed adversaries, take over the lead of the advance, or exploit beyond the

immediate objective. Penetration is unlikely to succeed against an adversary who is more agile;

that is, more mobile and flexible. Conversely, it has often succeeded against a more numerous

but less agile adversary. See Figure 7-2.

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Figure 7-2: Elements of a Penetration Manoeuvre

734. ENVELOPMENT

An envelopment is defined as: “an offensive manoeuvre in which the main attacking

force passes around or over the enemy’s principal defensive positions to secure objectives to

the enemy’s rear.”¹⁶⁴ Envelopment is a basic form of manoeuvre designed to apply force

against an adversary’s weakness, and will normally require diversionary attacks against the

adversary’s main defensive front. The main effort during envelopment is made against the

adversary’s rear or flank. Its aim is to seize objectives in the adversary’s rear, making his main

defensive position untenable. Avoiding the adversary’s strength en route to the objective, the

main attack is conducted by striking him from an unexpected direction. The forces conducting

the envelopment must have good mobility, be deployed in depth, and have secure flanks. See

Figure 7-3.

Considerable speed of movement and the identification of weak points is required if the

enveloping force is to be able to reach its objectives in depth. The envelopment may cause the

adversary to redeploy or to withdraw. It may cause disruption to his C2 or logistical systems, or

open the way to objectives that he was trying to defend. It may be undertaken in order to

outflank or trap adversary forces, possibly against a geographical feature. Airmobile or airborne

forces may be employed as part of an enveloping force. This is known as a vertical

envelopment.

An envelopment manoeuvre will take one of the following forms:

Flank Attack. This type of envelopment occurs when the main effort is directed

at the adversary’s flank; the attack seeks to strike at a more vulnerable point of

the adversary’s position where his concentrated firepower can be avoided.

Flanking attacks aim at surprising the adversary and should be the preferred

attack at brigade level and below.

¹⁶⁴ NATO AAP-6.

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Figure 7-3: Envelopment

Rear Attack. When the main effort is directed at the adversary’s rear, forces

are passed around one side, both sides (double envelopment) or over (vertical

envelopment) the adversary’s main defensive position with the aim of securing

key terrain within direct fire range of his rear. This action leads to his

destruction or makes his position untenable.

Double Envelopment. Double envelopment is an envelopment operation

mounted on two axes that is designed to outflank an adversary from both sides

with a view to forcing him to abandon of his intentions or withdraw, or as a

prelude to encirclement and destruction of the trapped forces. See Figure 7-4.

Figure 7-4: Double Envelopment

Encirclement. If the arms of a double envelopment are strong enough to meet

after trapping a force and to prevent it from breaking out, large forces may be

neutralized or destroyed with all their equipment. Large encirclements may be

costly operations in terms both of troops and the time taken to reduce the

trapped forces. Encircled forces will likely be capable of resupply only by air.

Unless an early decision to relieve them by breakout or break-in is made, then

resources may be inadequate to force a breakout or fight their way back to

rejoin the main body.

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735. TURNING MOVEMENT

In this form of manoeuvre, a force passes around or over the adversary’s main defensive

positions to secure objectives deep in his rear beyond the range of his direct fire weapons.

The aim of this manoeuvre is to compel him to abandon his position or divert major forces to

meet the adversary. A turning movement should make those forces more vulnerable to attack,

and may allow the use of an approach dominated by the abandoned positions. The force

attempts to avoid contact with the adversary en route to its objective.

The attacking force is organized into a turning force, a main body and a reserve. The

turning force’s manoeuvre causes the adversary to leave his positions. The main body may

initially distract the adversary from the turning manoeuvre. It should subsequently exploit the

success of the turning force. The turning force is normally smaller than the main body and

should be able to operate independently, beyond the supporting range of the main body. Either

the turning force or the main body may conduct the decisive operation. See Figure 7-5.

Figure 7-5: Turning Movement

736. INFILTRATION

Infiltration is penetration based upon stealth. It may be used to occupy an objective in

depth, or as a precursor to an attack mounted on an objective in depth. It may be single or

multiple. It is not the sole preserve of veteran troops: on the night of 9-10 July 1944 the Argyll

and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, a militia battalion, occupied Hill 195, a key feature on

the approaches to Falaise, through infiltration on its first night in battle.

737. INTEGRATING FORMS OF MANOEUVRE

Although individual operations or forms of manoeuvre may lead directly to the

achievement of the mission, it may be necessary to integrate them into a larger scheme of

manoeuvre. Similarly, forms of manoeuvre will often need to be divided into separate tactical

tasks. For example, encirclement will typically require at least two penetrations, exploitation into

the adversary’s depth, and a link-up operation. A defence of the outer flanks, and either an

attack or defence on the internal flanks, may follow the encirclement. Physical manoeuvre

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allows the manipulation of both the adversary and the use of force. Operations against the

flanks or the rear to bypass or to penetrate allow the creation of shock and surprise at several

levels, and hence the possibility of command paralysis and collapse. Any penetration is an

opportunity for aggressive exploitation. Manoeuvre is not limited to offensive operations—the

most skilful counterattacks have often, in effect, been turning movements. Such movements

compel an attacker to desist from his attack, and create an adversary to the rear of his forces.

738. STAGES OF THE ATTACK

An attack can be divided into a number of distinct, but closely related stages, which will

tend to merge into one another. Indeed, to the participants, the stages are unlikely to be clear-

cut, especially if they are involved in other actions in support of the offence. These stages are:

Mounting. During the mounting stage, which occurs prior to H-hour,

preparations are completed. Activities may include intelligence gathering,

rehearsing, ammunition dumping, route improving, preparing for the crossing

and breaching of obstacles, moving to assembly areas, grouping, replenishing,

firing preparatory fire, deploying, and possibly, conducting a forward passage of

lines. Concurrently, commanders complete their battle procedure. The force

may also carry out infiltration.

Assault. In this stage, the assaulting element crosses the LD, breaks into the

adversary’s defensive position, and fights through the objective to destroy the

adversary or cause his surrender.

Consolidation. Following an assault, a force must consolidate quickly so that it

is prepared to meet adversary counterattacks or undertake a new task.

Consolidation is normally done forward or to the flanks of the former adversary

position. It may be followed by exploitation.

Mounting. Attack forces should be held well back, as long as possible, to complete the

battle procedure and to assist in maintaining security. Some preliminary grouping may take

place. During mounting, a number of activities will take place, to possibly include:

Information Collection. Information is collected in accordance with the

intelligence collection plan. This activity is initiated early and continues

throughout the operation, primarily by reconnaissance forces. Active counter-

reconnaissance will also take place in order to secure friendly movement,

preparations and activities, and to achieve surprise. This input to the knowledge

base should consider not only adversary forces, but also the other elements or

systems that will be affected by this tactical offensive activity. This should lead

to risk assessment and the assessment for the possible creation of undesired

effects through such things as collateral damage.

Route Maintenance. There may be a requirement for route maintenance for

the move to assembly areas and for deployment. Security may preclude work

forward of the assembly areas early in the mounting stage, however, work may

be possible in the rear area. If so, engineers must be amongst the first troops to

move forward.

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Selection of Assembly Areas. Assembly areas are selected with regard for

concealment, grouping and tasks, and the location of the LD. Assembly areas,

attack positions, and lines of departure should be secured by protective

elements prior to their occupation by assault forces.

Move to Assembly Areas. The move to assembly areas is planned as a

tactical road move. Preferably, it should be conducted under radio silence

during periods of reduced visibility. This move should be planned to take place

as late as possible in the mounting stage to assist in maintaining security.

Obstacle Crossing and Breaching. Preparations for crossing or breaching are

completed.

Preparatory Fire. Preparatory fire may involve heavy ammunition expenditure.

Insufficient fire may jeopardize surprise, while neutralizing the adversary for only

a short time. It may be better to concentrate resources on covering fire or to

carry out brief, but intense, preparatory fire on selected targets. If a large

expenditure of ammunition is planned, a dumping programme may be required.

Infiltration. A commander must plan to move his infiltration force by stealth

from its assembly area to their attack positions in the adversary area. Infiltration

forces may be required to conduct an assault and hold their positions until a link-

up can be affected or they may be directed to assault and subsequently

disperse.

Rehearsals. If security and time permit, commanders at all levels should

reconnoitre the ground over which they will attack and conduct rehearsals,

preferably with all the elements of the force.

Deployment. Planning for deployment ensures that assault forces move from

assembly areas, deploy into formation on the move and cross the LD at H-hour.

If a deployment on the move is not possible, assault troops should pause only

briefly in the attack position to shakeout. When a forward passage of lines is

involved, the LD is usually the forward line of own troops (FLOT). The formation

adopted when crossing the LD depends upon the ground, distance to the

adversary, expected adversary resistance, and the effectiveness of the

suppression of the adversary. A short approach to the objective over open

terrain with considerable fire support, including smoke, against a relatively weak

adversary favours adopting an assault formation when crossing the LD.

Otherwise, it is adopted in an assault position just prior to closing with the

adversary.

Security. During the approach to the LD, flank security/protection and a

covering force/guard will likely have to be established. The LD should be

secured prior to the arrival of the main assault force. This can be a task for

reconnaissance forces.

Assault. The assault is conducted as follows:

Lead elements cross the lines of departure at H-hour. Tanks and infantry move

together or on different axes. The lead may change during the approach and

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final assault depending on the ground. The infantry dismount short of, on, or

beyond the objective depending on the ground, the disposition and strength of

the adversary, the number of anti-armour weapons, the extent and nature of

obstacles, and the degree of surprise achieved. The aim is to retain momentum

and protection until the infantry are required to fight through the position on foot.

At the same time, fire support resources suppress the adversary on the

objective and in depth, mask his observation, and neutralize or destroy the

adversary from deploying counter-move forces. As assaulting troops close with

the adversary, the major fire support effort is directed at the break-in points.

In order to break-in, assaulting troops should concentrate only when they come

into close contact with the adversary. Preferably supported by tanks, infantry

and engineers breach the last of the adversary forward obstacles and break into

his defensive system. At this point, close fire support shifts to the depth of the

objective and then to targets on the flanks and objectives in depth. Throughout

the break-in, momentum must be maintained so the adversary is unable to

react.

Once the break-in is made, it is vital to maintain the pressure of the attack; not

only when assaulting the adversary position to seize initial objectives, but also

when fighting through to take the objectives in depth. Sometimes, determined

action by troops in the initial assault can clear a position, thus avoiding the use

of a much larger force later on when the adversary has had a chance to recover.

Attacking forces must move as rapidly as possible between areas of adversary

resistance, particularly in a nuclear environment. When fighting through

objectives, support weapons and command posts are priority targets.

Demolition teams destroy adversary bunkers. Tanks that are not accompanying

the assault forces manoeuvre to cut-off positions to prevent the adversary from

withdrawing or being reinforced. Frequently, smoke is employed to the rear of

an objective to hamper supporting fire adjusted by the adversary’s reserve or

depth forces.

Throughout the assault, a commander seeks to reinforce success, exploit

favourable situations, and achieve maximum penetration into the adversary’s

defences. He does this primarily by committing his reserves and shifting

supporting fire. His decision to commit his reserves must be made quickly but

judiciously, as once they are committed it is difficult, if not impossible, to

disengage them or direct them to a new task. Once the reserve is irrevocably

committed, a commander must reconstitute or obtain a new reserve as quickly

as possible; otherwise he loses his major capability to influence the battle.

Consolidation. Consolidation begins immediately after the adversary has been

defeated and/or the objective has been taken. This includes: deploying protective elements and

possibly laying protective minefields; digging in, normally forward and to the flanks of the former

adversary position; bringing forward additional support weapons; altering or completing the

defensive fire plan; replenishing combat supplies, particularly ammunition; and evacuating

casualties and prisoners.

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Exploitation. An attack frequently creates short-term opportunities to maintain pressure

on the adversary. Exploitation may prevent him from mounting counterattacks, reorganizing his

defence, or conducting an orderly withdrawal. A commander should plan for exploitation and be

prepared to adjust his plan as the situation develops. If exploitation is possible, it must be

carried out quickly so as not to give respite to the adversary. It may even begin simultaneously

with consolidation to ensure that momentum is maintained and the adversary is kept under

pressure. A commander must decide whether to commit depth forces earmarked previously for

exploitation, or direct main attack forces to exploit. He bases this decision primarily on the

condition of the main attack forces, strength of the adversary, and the difficulty of moving depth

forces forward.

739. CONTROL MEASURES

General. The organization for combat should provide for coverage of the area of the

attack from well behind the LD to the objective and beyond, and should include the designation

of any measures necessary to control the attack. These will depend on how the attack is to be

mounted, and on how the commander wishes to control his forces, and may include the use of

the following control measures. Control measures should include appropriate link-up drills and

the combat identification (CID) measures deemed appropriate.

Battlespace Management Including Airspace Control Measures. Battlespace

management is the means and measures that enable the dynamic synchronization, prioritization

and de-confliction of activity across all dimensions of an assigned area of operations within the

battlespace. Note: It comprises dimensions of land, sea, air and space, electromagnetic

spectrum, information and time. Proper battlespace management will ensure the appropriate

allocation of three-dimensional space and the electromagnetic spectrum to the various

competing users. Allocations will be made on a priority basis, but it must harmonize the

requirements in a complementary and mutually supporting fashion that will avoid conflict,

confusion and fratricide. Exploitation of the airspace over the AO must take account of all

potential users—offensive air support, helicopters, air defence (AD), unmanned aerial vehicles

(UAV), and artillery. Requirements for flight routes and areas of restricted/specialized air

operations must be coordinated, usually through the combined air operations centre.

Assault Line. A control measure used to coordinate the movement of a unit or subunit

out of the assault position and into the final stage of an attack.

Assembly Areas and Approach Routes. If time permits, forces which are to be

brought together or moved up for an attack use an assembly area where they should remain

only for as long as required for their administrative preparation or regrouping. These areas

should be out of range of most of the adversary artillery and located so that the approach march

from them to the LD can be affected smoothly, quickly and using concealed routes.

Attack Position. The attack position is the last position held by the assaulting force

before crossing the LD. It is an area to which troops deploy immediately before an attack and in

which they may adopt their assault formations. It is occupied for as short a time as possible,

although final orders or briefings may be given or orientation carried out. It must be

reconnoitred and secured before the assaulting force moves in. The area chosen should be

easily recognizable, not under direct fire or observation and not a known or likely adversary

artillery target.

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Axes and Routes. Axes and routes are used to indicate the course of the movement to

be followed and the degree of freedom of manoeuvre permitted en route to the objective(s).

Axes establish only the general direction of movement. The subordinate commander is

permitted to manoeuvre freely between assigned unit boundaries. Designation of a “route”

establishes the specific direction or course which movement will follow.

Boundaries. A boundary between adjacent units will always be given in order to

facilitate coordination between the units and to establish responsibility for movement, fire,

reconnaissance and security.

Consolidation. In offensive operations, in preparation for further offensive operations,

or to repel a possible counterattack, the process of regrouping and adjusting takes place upon

the capture of an objective. A consolidation area is a zone in which consolidation takes place.

Fire Base. A fire base is in an attack, a support element that, from an assigned position,

engages the target by direct fire in support of the assault group’s advance and assault.

10.

Killing Zone. An area in which the adversary is forced to concentrate by use of natural

and/or artificial obstacles and adequate concentration of resources, so as to create the most

suitable conditions for his destruction.

11.

Limit of Exploitation. In offensive operations, a line beyond which subordinate

commanders may not exploit the success of earlier stages of an attack.

12.

Line of Departure. The LD serves to coordinate the movement of the attacking forces

at the start of the attack.

13.

Objectives. Objectives are the physical object of the action taken, for example, a

definite tactical feature, the seizure and holding of which is essential to the commander's plan.

14.

Objective Area. A defined geographical area within which is located an objective to be

captured or reached by the military forces. A competent authority defines this area for the

purposes of command and control.

SECTION 7

FORCES AND TASKS IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

740. GENERAL

In order to conduct offensive activities a commander will assign various roles,

responsibilities and tactical tasks to subordinate elements. The offensive activity is conducted

by a series of mutually supporting tactical tasks, such as “support by fire,” “block,” and “seize,”

all linked together with a purpose or desired effect.¹⁶⁵

741. ASSAULT FORCE

The strength and type of combat forces that are available to strike the adversary will be

a decisive factor in determining the task, the objectives and the task organization to be adopted

¹⁶⁵ See NATO STANAG 2287 for a complete listing of tactical tasks.

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for the operation. An assault force should include depth in order to reinforce local success or

maintain the overall momentum. It should include the appropriate balance between infantry and

direct fire support, be it armoured forces, integral fighting vehicles and other direct fire support

systems. The composition of the assault force will be determined in part by the adversary’s

make-up and the terrain involved:

Armoured Forces. Armoured forces are particularly suitable for wide-ranging

attacks, or quick, powerful counterattacks. They are capable of thrusting deep

into adversary positions particularly in rolling, lightly covered terrain. Tanks or

armoured/mechanized infantry may lead an attack depending upon the strength

and position of the adversary and the terrain. Infantry and armour will likely be

grouped together and operate in intimate support of one another, particularly in

terrain with limited fields of vision or during periods of poor visibility. In close

terrain, such as urban areas, infantry may dismount and provide local security to

the armoured vehicles that are providing intimate support. If possible, light

armour or light forces should be reinforced with armoured elements to give them

covering fire and to neutralize adversary armour. It may be necessary to adjust

the organization of the attacking force as the attack progresses.

Light Armour and Light Forces. Non-armoured forces are used most

effectively where the terrain is heavily broken or covered, although, when faced

by a similar, non-armoured adversary, they are capable of operating

successfully in more open terrain. Their value is also dependent upon the type

of operation in which they are employed. If the opportunity arises they could be

used to infiltrate through gaps in the adversary lines to engage him in the flank

or rear. They may also be employed to create conditions suitable for an attack

by armoured troops.

Armed Helicopters. By attacking the adversary and immediately exploiting any

gains, armed and attack helicopters (AH) in a manoeuvre role (air manoeuvre)

can conduct close, deep and rear operations in support of the commander's

scheme of manoeuvre. Helicopters can create favourable conditions for the

advance of ground manoeuvre forces by controlling the ground ahead through

domination by direct and indirect fire. Helicopters can be allocated their own

AO. They can be given manoeuvre missions in their own right or in concert with

ground forces. Helicopters can attack static or mobile adversary forces and are

particularly effective in exploiting gains during a pursuit operation. Helicopters

can also be given missions such as flank protection, guard force, or route and

area clearance.

Airmobile Forces. Airmobile forces can be employed to get past obstacles, to

take an important objective by surprise, or they may constitute a reserve that

can be deployed at great speed. Air mobility provides an additional dimension

for ground force manoeuvre (air manoeuvre) and may also be conducted as part

of an amphibious operation.

Airborne Forces. Airborne forces are specifically organized, equipped and

trained for delivery by airdrop or air landing into an area to seize objectives or

conduct special operations. They may, for example, be delivered ahead of an

attacking force to seize and hold an important objective, such as a piece of key

terrain, until either reinforced or relieved by other forces. In offensive activities,

they can also be used to conduct an attack on the rear of the adversary

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positions to cut off his reserves in combination with offensive action by other

ground forces, cover a flank, or to create a sense of insecurity in the adversary's

rear areas.

Amphibious Forces. Amphibious forces are employed in operations launched

from the sea by naval and landing forces against a hostile or potentially hostile

shore. They may be combined with an air manoeuvre, airmobile or airborne

operation.

742. FLANK SECURITY AND PROTECTION

Forces must be allocated to security and protection tasks that may include flank

protection and the covering of gaps between units. These elements may also be required to

provide firepower, to deal with bypassed adversary forces, or to provide protection from

adversary ground attack against support and sustainment units, particularly when areas to the

rear of attacking echelons have not been cleared.

Forces allocated security tasks are usually light or light armoured forces; hence, they

can alert the main body of an adversary threat but will be unlikely to destroy it. In order to be

allocated a protection task, forces must have enough protection and firepower to destroy,

neutralize, or at least suppress a threat until the protection force can be reinforced.

743. ECHELONED FORCE OR RESERVE

Forces must be held in reserve to deal with the unexpected and to maintain the

momentum of the attack by exploiting success when the opportunity is presented. A

commander may also need to increase the size of an assaulting force to allow it to constitute a

reserve. Once the original reserve has been committed, another one must be constituted, even

if this means a change in the task organization. Reserves should be located so that they can be

deployed swiftly in any direction, but are able to avoid becoming engaged prematurely. They

are held out of contact from the adversary until committed. An airmobile reserve may also be

maintained to provide flexibility in the exploitation and pursuit as well as for flank protection.

Care, however, must be taken to distinguish between these forces and forces specifically

designated for any subsequent phase or phases. These echelon forces can be used to prevent

the adversary from penetrating the attacking force, to secure terrain gained by the assault

forces, to protect LOC, to destroy bypassed resistance and to block adversary reinforcements

into the area of the assaulting force. Their most common use is for exploitation and pursuit.

Where there are insufficient forces to permit the commander to retain an uncommitted reserve

then some form of double earmarking may be required.

744. EMPLOYMENT OF COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES

Fire Support. The success of the attack depends upon the close coordination of the fire

support from all the weapons available to the attacking forces, and the overall commander must

ensure constant coordination of fire support across the whole attack front. The weight of fire is

switched, as necessary, and concentrated in accordance with the commander's plan. The

following considerations should be borne in mind:

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If the attack is to use surprise, fire support may be withheld until adversary

resistance is encountered, unless it forms part of the deception plan.

Some adversary positions may be neutralized or masked by smoke in

accordance with the attack plan.

If the adversary position is particularly strong, preparatory fire may be

necessary. The purpose of this will be to destroy as much of the adversary

force as possible before the start of the attack.

Interdiction fire may be used to prevent movement from or into the immediate

battlespace.

Artillery. The correct use of artillery and the other elements of fire support are key to

the success of the attack. Artillery may be deployed forward during preparations for the break-

in battle, and once the attack commences, will follow the combat troops in such a way that there

is no break in the supporting fire. It is vital that the whole ISTAR system is coordinated and

directed towards the acquisition of critical targets and linked to the fire support systems able to

strike them as soon as they are located. Only by destroying key battlefield functions in the

adversary’s deployment will friendly forces be able to launch an attack with a reasonable

chance of success. During the attack, the artillery may be required to carry out a number of

specific tasks including:

Preparatory Fire. Preparatory fire may be used to:

(1)

neutralize or destroy adversary artillery;

(2)

mask adversary observation;

(3)

suppress adversary AD; and

(4)

illuminate the battlefield.

Covering Fire. Covering fire may be used to:

(1)

isolate the close battle;

(2)

neutralize the adversary at the point of breaking-in;

(3)

give fire support to combat troops as they fight through the adversary in

depth;

(4)

destruction of adversary armour; and

(5)

be on call during consolidation.

Defensive Fire. Defensive fire will seek the following effects:

(1)

neutralize threats from the flanks;

(2)

engage adversary counter attack forces; and

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(3)

block through the use of scatterable mines.

Naval Gunfire Tasks. If available, naval gunfire can contribute extensively to the

overall fire support of the operation, performing the same tasks as land based artillery.

Air. Air support is a vital component in the conduct of offensive operations. It is capable

of providing a favourable air situation for deployment and movement, and can identify, disrupt

and destroy adversary forces at long range. It achieves this through the following activities:

Air Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations. Before the

attack takes place, air intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (Air ISR)

operations should provide intelligence on the adversary, and during the attack, it

should allow the early detection of adversary countermeasures.

Counter Air Operations. Local air superiority will be essential for large-scale

offensive operations. All counter air resources should be integrated to achieve

this local superiority.

Air Interdiction. Air interdiction (AI) will support land force offensive operations

by preventing the adversary from reinforcing and strengthening his defence. AI

is defined as: “air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the

enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against

friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of

each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required.”¹⁶⁶

Close Air Support. Close air support (CAS) is an important fire support asset

for ground forces. CAS is defined as: “air action against hostile targets which

are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of

each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.”¹⁶⁷

Aviation. Helicopters may support offensive activities through air mobility to exploit

opportunities by seizing key terrain ahead of attacking forces. They may also be used for the

following:

command and control missions;

reconnaissance and surveillance of flanks and gaps;

logistic support, including casualty evacuation;

insertion and extraction of patrols and observation detachments; and

fire support from armed and attack aviation (close combat attack).

Air Defence. During the preparation stage of an attack, AD cover will be given to

assembly areas, the approach routes and assets critical to deep operations. During the attack,

the priority shifts to protecting the attacking force; however, as the attack progresses the

protection of reserves and LOC may take on increasing importance.

¹⁶⁶ NATO AAP-6.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

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Engineers. In offensive activities, engineer support will be required to maintain the

momentum of attack. Mobility support is therefore paramount. Counter-mobility tasks,

particularly the protection of flanks and rapid protection against counterattacks, are also

important. Other engineering support:

Engineers will be required to support attacking forces by any or all of the

following actions:

(1)

Breaching or opening own minefields.

(2)

Marking and breaching adversary minefields.

(3)

Providing the means of crossing dry and wet gaps (e.g., rivers) and other

obstacles.

(4)

Securing the flanks by means of minefields, demolitions and other

obstacles. These also help to shape and structure the battlespace, and

may allow commanders to use economy of force measures for force

protection.

(5)

Preparing and maintaining routes for follow-up echelons.

(6)

Supporting the consolidation on the objective with the construction of field

fortifications, laying minefields and creating obstacles.

The achievement of these functions depends upon adequate reconnaissance,

timely provision of the necessary equipment and stores, and the proper

grouping and control of engineer elements, particularly minefield breaching and

gap crossing armoured vehicles.

Electronic Warfare. In offensive activities, EW provides the commander with a means

to acquire information to prepare his estimates and plans, and a weapon to delay the

adversary's response to the attack. EW operations may be used for the following:

the detection, location and disruption of adversary surveillance and target

acquisition systems, in particular ad, counter-battery and counter-mortar radars;

the detection and location of the reserve and counterattack elements;

electronic isolation of selected adversary units or formations by disruption of

communications with their flank units, higher formations and reserves;

detection and location of adversary electronic countermeasures elements so

they may be eliminated by physical attack; and

deception, either alone or in conjunction with feints and demonstrations.

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SECTION 8

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

745. PLANNING

Planning Process. Once a commander has received his mission and analyzed it, he

will make a full estimate, consider the following factors in particular, and take account of

time/space. At the unit level, the commander assisted by his operations staff will conduct the

estimate. At command levels with staff, an extensive operational planning process (OPP) will

likely occur based upon the commander’s initial direction. In periods of severely limited time,

the commander will give more detailed direction in terms of course of action development and

the process will be shortened.

Consideration of Factors. Apart from the assigned and implied tasks, the estimate

process will consider the following factors that influence the situation:

Adversary. The layout of his defence, his capabilities and likely intentions.

Environmental Factors:

(1)

In planning for offensive activities and operations, terrain has to be

analyzed by considering cover and concealment, observation, fire

positions, obstacles, dominating ground and avenues of approach.

(2)

The place to attack is the location that offers the greatest likelihood of

success. Terrain chosen for the main effort should allow for rapid

movement into the adversary rear, although occasionally, an attack on

less suitable terrain may be necessary to achieve surprise. The effect of

terrain on the forward movement of combat support and combat service

support (CSS) elements must also be considered.

(3)

Weather must be considered in terms of its influence on mobility, visibility,

air support, troops and equipment, and the effects of chemical, biological,

radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.

Friendly Forces. The commander must consider the strength, type and

condition of available troops, the tasks required to be fulfilled by his available

troops, and any additional forces required. Implicit is a need to examine the

force ratios including combat effectiveness to ensure that they are favourable.

An examination of friendly forces also includes consideration of the CSS

requirements for the operation, and the restraints that may be imposed by a lack

of such resources.

Security. The commander must consider how he may make best use of

deception and OPSEC in order to achieve surprise and to protect both his plans

and troops. In offensive activities and operations, it is particularly important to

conceal his intentions so that the main force can manoeuvre into a position from

which to strike the adversary.

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Time. Offensive activities become harder when the defender has more time to

organize and reinforce his defence. The attacker must, however, take sufficient

time to concentrate his force in order to generate all available combat power for

the attack. Once an attack is under way, time remains critical, as the attack is

only likely to succeed if the objectives are achieved before the adversary

recovers his balance and reacts against it.

Development of Courses of Action. Consideration of the factors will have identified

tasks that must be fulfilled in order to conduct a successful offensive activity. These will include

assault, fire support, blocking, flank protection, security, depth, reserves, etc. These may be put

together in varying forms and combinations to produce a number of possible schemes of

manoeuvre or plans, known as courses of action (COAs).

Consideration of Courses of Action. The COAs are compared to one another and the

most favourable course is chosen or formulated as the decision. From this decision, the

concept of operations (CONOPS) and the detailed operation plan (OPLAN) are developed.

Plan. The plan may contain or provide for:

Task Organization. The organization of forces for the conduct of the offensive

operations.

A Concept of Operations. The CONOPS will outline the plan and include the

commander’s intent, a scheme of manoeuvre, a desired end state, and the

designation of the main effort.

Tasks. The allocation of missions and constituent tasks to subordinate

commanders.

Phasing and Control. This details the sequence the attack will follow with

particular attention to coordination.

Timings. Timings will assist the commander to control the phasing and

coordination with flanking formations.

Manoeuvre Plan. Details of the movement and manoeuvre plan may be

required for coordination and will include a bypassing policy.

Fire Support. This will include indirect fire support, aviation fire support, and

close air support.

Electronic Warfare Support.

Reserves. The possible tasks for reserves will be designated in order of

priority.

Reconnaissance. It is important that the reconnaissance effort should be

continued throughout the operation so that adversary reaction and movement

can be identified and evaluated.

Tactical Security and Protection:

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(1)

Specific measures for camouflage and concealment, deception and

electronic counter-countermeasures must be laid down.

(2)

The line of departure (LD) must be secure.

(3)

Flank protection should be provided forward of the LD.

Consolidation. Plans must detail the action once the objective has been

seized. The area must be secured against adversary counterattack and the

force reorganized for the next operation or phase.

Exploitation. The commander’s intentions for exploitation must be stated.

Combat Service Support. Details for CSS priorities and activities should

include:

(1)

Action to be taken before the attack.

(2)

Provision for continuous support of the operation.

(3)

Provision for collecting, consolidating and controlling prisoners of war

(PWs) and refugees.

CBRN Defence. The commander must specify which CBRN dress category is

to be worn for an attack, balancing the degradation in performance that will be

caused by wearing CBRN protection against the disruption that will occur if

troops have to take protective action during the course of the assault. If the

terrain is contaminated it may slow down or even stop an attack. CBRN

reconnaissance teams should, therefore, be deployed forward to give warning of

any contamination. The reorganization plan must take into account the possible

use of NBC weapons against the objective once it has gained, and when this is

possible, must include early deployment of detectors and alarms.

746.

PREPARATION

Preparation will occur during the mounting stage of any attack or other offensive activity.

The extent of preparations will depend upon the time available and the requirements calculated

during the estimate. The time required for the essential preparations is often a factor to be

considered in deciding the time of an attack. Subordinate commanders should be told as soon

as possible, normally by a warning order, how much time they have to make their own

preparations. Preparations include:

Preliminary Movement. Preliminary movement is a controlled move that

positions the forces in or near the assembly areas depending upon the timings.

Preliminary Deployment. Preliminary deployment involves the elements of the

various combat and combat support forces coming together in the task

organization for battle. To ensure they are fully combat ready, they also receive

logistic replenishment at this stage. Moreover, any CSS elements that are to

move with the attacking force join their designated formation or unit at this

stage.

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Infiltration. Infiltration can be used, under favourable conditions, for

reconnaissance, attacks in depth, the capture of specific terrain features, or the

disruption of communications. Infiltration, however, requires accurate

intelligence and is time consuming.

Preparatory Fire. If the commander has decided to use fire support prior to H-

hour, then a plan for preparatory fire will be implemented.

747. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF OFFENSIVE ACTIVITIES

General. The commander must be kept informed of the progress of the attack,

adversary reactions, and the situation confronting subordinate units. During the attack, he may

increasingly decentralize control to subordinate commanders to permit them to react more

rapidly to changes in the situation. At critical times, he may place himself at the point of the

main effort. Through the knowledge of their commander’s concept and the changing situation,

subordinate commanders implement the plan and modify it as necessary.

Orders. The following orders are issued:

Warning orders should be issued to ensure maximum use of the time available

for preparation and concurrent activity. Written operation orders (OPORDs)

may cover in detail only the initial phase of a deliberate attack. For subsequent

stages, a commander may be able to provide only broad instructions. Orders

are written within the philosophy of mission command. Subordinates should be

told what effects and end state they are to achieve, all synchronized in a

CONOPS and its scheme of manoeuvre. The commander will make his

CONOPS clear, but leave the execution to subordinate commanders. Key will

be a clear intent for the operation to achieve.

As the situation develops, he will supplement and amend his original order with

fragmentary orders (FRAGOs). The success of the operation will depend

increasingly upon the initiative of subordinate commanders, especially in the

exploitation and pursuit.

Location of Commander. A commander will decide for himself where he is best

located at any time. Often the range and reliability of communications enable him to see the

whole picture at his principle HQ, where he has the support of his full staff and his specialist

arms and services advisers. At some crucial moments, however, he will be required forward at

critical points in order to assess the full, immediate situation and in order to spot opportunities

that will allow him to exploit the situation faster than the adversary commander. In short, it will

allow him to impose his will at the critical time and to personally influence the immediate battle.

Positioning of Headquarters. The moves of HQ must be arranged to meet the

requirements of the commander and planned in advance so that early reconnaissance can be

made and communications sites selected as far as practical. Normally, a formation HQ will

establish itself forward immediately before the attack. This makes communications easier when

the attack starts and ensures that the commander and his staff are near the assembly area at

the critical period. As the attack progresses, the command elements also move forward to

enable the commander to exercise control.

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Communications. Communications security (COMSEC) is of the greatest importance

prior to the attack. The implications of any restrictions on the use should be considered in

advance. Radio communications will be essential for effective C2 during the attack. Provision

for alternative communications should be made in case communications become unavailable or

lost for any reason.

748. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

General. Continuity of sustaining operations is vital to the success of offensive activities

and operations. Indeed, success in pursuit and exploitation may hinge upon the ability of CSS

elements to react quickly and flexibly. The commander and his staff must, therefore, carefully

consider the availability of supplies and the capability of the CSS support elements to deliver the

supplies and to provide other necessary support to units.

Specific Considerations. While all aspects of CSS must be considered in planning an

operation, the availability of ammunition, fuel and maintenance support must be given the most

emphasis:

Forward Positioning. To offset the strain on the transportation system, the

commander must consider pre-positioning supplies and support facilities well

forward. Where possible, these should be kept mobile so that they can be

deployed forward as the attack progresses.

Ammunition/Fuel Supply. Due to the large volume that must be moved and

the often-limited transportation resources available, adequate planning is

necessary to ensure an uninterrupted flow of ammunition/fuel to the front.

Maintenance. To effectively maintain the force, repairs must be carried out as

far forward as tactically feasible. This reduces the demands on the evacuation

facilities, and permits the return of combat equipment to the battle in the shortest

possible time. The forward positioning of major assemblies will greatly assist in

the battlefield repair of combat vehicles. In the main, vehicle maintenance will

consist of the replacement of complete assemblies rather than repair. There will

need to be a well-practised system in place capable of restocking the system

with assemblies.

Medical Support. When planning the medical support for an offensive

operation, the following important factors must be considered:

(1)

Medical units must be employed as far forward as the tactical situation

allows.

(2)

Plans must be flexible, since medical units are normally not held in

reserve.

Traffic Control. Control on routes will be important to ensure that the approach

march, replenishment of committed forces, evacuation of casualties, and the

deployment of reserves is not impeded. This will be particularly important at the

crossing points for breached obstacles.

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SECTION 9

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

749. PURPOSE

The purpose of defensive operations is to defeat or deter an adversary’s offensive

actions, and to hold ground. They are generally intended to provide the right conditions for

offensive action. Defensive operations alone generally do not achieve a decisive conclusion to

a campaign, which often requires offensive operations. However, defensive battles have on

occasions been decisive to the conduct of a campaign. Defensive operations include delay

operations.

Defensive operations are normally undertaken when the adversary has the initiative, to

prevent him from seizing terrain or breaking through into a defended area. In countering

manoeuvre forces, they aim to break the adversary attack, destroy his forces and stop him from

accomplishing his aim, and in so doing, to establish the conditions for maintaining the initiative

through offensive action.

While a classic defence in unlikely in the COE, the application of the fundamentals will

ensure a solid defence is undertaken when required in a fluid situation or as part of a campaign

short of major combat. Indeed, the fundamentals and considerations of a defence apply to

many other activities, such as the requirement for local security at a roadblock and check point.

750. CONCEPT OF THE DEFENCE

Offensive action is fundamental to the defence. The defence should be creative, with

every opportunity being taken to grasp the initiative and so disrupt the adversary’s cohesion.

For example, by holding terrain, or undermining the adversary’s efforts and resources in one

area, a commander may be able to establish the conditions for decisive action in another. The

object will be to force the adversary into action that narrows his options, reduces his fighting

power and exposes him to a decisive offensive action. An effective defence is therefore rarely

passive, and it is desirable to incorporate aggressive offensive action to pre-empt, dislocate or

disrupt the adversary whenever possible. This may be done by fixing the adversary by

deception and encouraging him to make inappropriate plans, luring him into situations where

one can exploit surprise, denying him information, and striking at his cohesion. Deep operations

may be conducted to fix the adversary by denying him freedom of action, and striking in order to

dislocate his potential for offensive manoeuvre, and disrupt his ability to pass orders.

Defensive operations should not be merely reactive. They aim to create the right

conditions for achieving desired effects and objectives. A key aim will generally be to limit the

adversary’s freedom of action and to develop the conditions for future offensive operations.

A defensive operation may be required to:

Destroy the adversary's offensive capability and cause his attack to fail.

Fix the adversary in order to allow friendly forces to strike elsewhere.

Gain time in order to complete the preparation for other operations including a

counter-offensive.

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Retain terrain and prevent the adversary from breaking through.

An attacker normally determines the time and location of his attack and can mass his

forces whenever he wishes. He will normally seek out centres of gravity, attempting to disrupt

the tempo of current operations and the planning and preparation of future ones.

Defensive operations will play a major role in many campaigns that do not involve a

great deal of major combat. Initial footholds and firm bases during a COIN or peace support

operation all have to be secured, and depending upon the adversary, vital points such as key

civilian infrastructure may have to be secured. The principles of the defence will still apply.

751. PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

General. A commander must consider many principles and fundamentals when

planning and conducting a defence. They are frequently in conflict with one another, and

consequently, the commander must determine the degree to which each will be stressed.

Principles of War. The following principles of war require emphasis during the planning

and conduct of defensive operations:

Concentration of Force. The commander must be able to concentrate his

force at the adversary’s point of main effort. Concentration not only implies

massing of forces but also massing of firepower. It includes such elements as

movement, flexibility, and communications. At the lowest levels, concentration

includes siting weapons and creating fire plans to mass fire effects on the

attacker. Concentration cannot be achieved by being strong everywhere.

Trading ground for time, or economy of force elsewhere, may be necessary to

obtain an advantage at a decisive point. The defender uses deception,

concealment, counter-battery fire, screening forces, and AD in order to minimize

the risks of vulnerability through concentration of force.

Offensive Action. Commanders must maintain the offensive spirit in the

defence. This implies manoeuvre, speed, and aggressiveness, the particular

characteristics of armour. Patrolling and counterattacking are also elements of

offensive action.

Security. Security is the ability to meet an attack from any direction. It is

achieved by the employment of covering forces, coordination and mutual

support at all levels, maintenance of surveillance, and the ability to concentrate

forces.

Flexibility. The defender will strive to avoid or counter the adversary’s attacks,

while preparing to seize the initiative and turn defensive operations to his

advantage. This requires an ability to develop new plans rapidly, a willingness

to shift the main effort, and a readiness to move swiftly to the offensive without

loss of tempo.

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752. FUNDAMENTALS IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

In addition to the principles there are several fundamental elements of defensive

operations that must be given specific attention:

Information Gathering. Information about the adversary is vital to the conduct

of defensive operations. It must be obtained prior to and during the battle to

give commanders the ability to judiciously concentrate their forces and firepower

at the correct place and time. Information is gathered from four sources in

defensive operations:

(1)

covering forces;

(2)

ISTAR elements, including target acquisition systems;

(3)

patrols; and

(4)

troops in contact.

Use of Terrain. The strength of a defence depends to a large extent on the

selection and use of terrain. A commander’s ability to analyze the terrain,

determine the approaches, select vital ground and key terrain, and deploy his

forces quickly determines the outcome of an operation. The selected terrain

should allow the approaches to be covered by fire. It should also offer the

defender concealment, protection and movement, while restricting the

adversary’s observation and deployment capability. Preferably, a defence area

contains natural and/or man-made barriers that can be incorporated into the

plan and reinforced by man-made obstacles. Terrain is classified as:

(1)

Open Terrain. Open terrain is relatively flat and unencumbered by

forests, built-up areas, waterways, and other natural barriers. It is

covered easily by surveillance and can be dominated by fire. Such terrain

requires the construction of barriers to restrict the movement of adversary

forces. Armoured forces and elements equipped with long-range direct

fire weapons defend these areas best.

(2)

Close Terrain. Close terrain may have considerable relief and may be

broken by extensive forests. It will include jungle and built-up areas. This

terrain restricts an attacker’s movement and provides good concealment

and protection for the defender. Natural obstacles can be improved to

further delay the attacker and canalize his movement. Forces strong in

infantry defend these areas best.

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(3)

Key Terrain and Vital Ground. Vital ground is defined as: “ground of

such importance that it must be retained or controlled for the success of

the mission.”¹⁶⁸ Key terrain is defined as: “any locality, or area, the

seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either

combatant.”¹⁶⁹ A commander must designate his vital ground, that is, that

ground which, if lost, makes the defence untenable. He then identifies

the main approaches to his vital ground and the key terrain that

dominates or blocks those approaches. Key terrain is ground that offers

the holder a marked advantage. From this assessment, he identifies the

key terrain that is to be held. He then groups and tasks his force

accordingly. This process is repeated at each lower level of formation

and leads to coordinated dispositions that fit the overall plan. Normally,

vital ground is relative to the level of command but once identified, it

remains constant for all subordinate levels of command. For example, a

brigade commander’s vital ground may only be key terrain from the

perspective of the division commander; however, in situations where the

corps vital ground is in a brigade area, the same ground is vital to both

the brigade and to the division. Regardless, if the defence within a

specified sector is to continue, the vital ground must be held, or if lost,

recaptured. A commander selects his vital ground, key terrain, and killing

zones by:

(a)

identifying obstacles in various locations, including the forward

edge of battle area (FEBA) and likely avenues of approach;

(b)

determining approaches, assessing them, and ranking them in

terms of likelihood of use;

(c)

anticipating the adversary’s objectives; and

(d)

identifying obstacles in the main defence area (MDA).

Disruption. The adversary’s offensive operations should be disrupted

throughout its conduct, so that the adversary is frustrated in his attempts to

manoeuvre and concentrate his combat power. This should be done throughout

the depth of his force. Disruption can be achieved by: defeating or blinding his

reconnaissance; attacking his cohesion and slowing his tempo through fixed

defences and aggressive counterattacks; and, destroying critical assets through

deep attack.

Coordination. All aspects of the defence require coordination, including

passage of lines by covering and counterattack forces, boundaries, liaison,

barrier plan, fire support, AD, airspace control, and CSS. Reserve forces must

conduct extensive coordination, including rehearsals, once allocated the task.

This must consider likely reinforcement options and focus on ways to avoid

fratricide. Coordination takes place during planning and throughout the conduct

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

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of an operation. It is a never-ending task to which a commander and his staff

must devote considerable effort. Coordination is particularly important during

multinational operations. Often, the adversary seeks to attack along boundaries

that may be shared by different nations. A commander achieves and maintains

coordination by:

(1)

Understanding the superior commander’s concept of operations

(CONOPS).

(2)

Understanding the tactics, methods and procedures of JIMP partners.

This is aided across military forces by using common doctrinal manuals,

such as the ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook and NATO

publications.

(3)

Selecting boundaries and lines of operation so that they do not intensify

any coordination difficulties.

(4)

Selecting coordinating points along boundaries or lines of operation.

(5)

Exchanging planning information and liaison detachments, and planning

mutual support.

(6)

Rehearsals, particularly for reserve forces.

(7)

Any other means that the commander deems appropriate and prudent for

the situation.

Mutual Support. Mutual support in the defence is achieved when the gaps

between defended positions are covered by fire, preferably direct fire, so that

the attacker cannot assault one position without being subjected to fire from at

least one other. The degree of mutual support achieved depends upon the

terrain, visibility and range of weapons. Ideally, the frontages that units must

defend are related to their ability to provide mutual support. A commander must

balance the need for mutual support with the requirements of depth, dispersion

and mobility. Mutual support increases the strength of the defence and

therefore influences the selection of boundaries and the location of battle

positions. It also gives another advantage to the defender, since an attacker

must disperse his covering fire to neutralize the supporting positions.

Depth. Defence in depth causes an attacker to execute successive stages of

his operation without detailed reconnaissance. It also helps to surprise an

attacker and draw him into committing his next echelon or reserve. It absorbs

the attacker’s momentum and thus prevents a breakthrough. It also localizes

penetration and facilitates blocking. Finally, it allows a defender time to

determine the attacker’s main thrust and to counter it. The depth of the defence

area should be proportional to the strength, mobility and firepower of the

attacker and the frontage to be defended. Depth is obtained by:

(1)

Employing protective elements well forward to cover approaches and

likely adversary areas.

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(2)

Employing long-range resources, including EW elements and tactical air

support, to engage deep in the area of influence, targets which are

important to the continuity, momentum and C2 of the attacker.

(3)

Siting battle positions and obstacles in depth throughout the area.

(4)

Positioning and moving reserves, fire support elements and CSS

elements.

Manoeuvre. Manoeuvre may be a decisive element of a defence. By

combining movement with fire, the defender can make the best use of terrain to

inflict losses on the attacker. Manoeuvre enables a commander to concentrate

sufficient combat power to achieve superiority over the adversary.

Firepower. The effectiveness of the defence is based primarily on the planned

and mutually supporting fire of all weapons. The fire of manoeuvre units,

indirect fire support, aviation, and tactical air and naval elements must be

complementary, coordinated, and applied at the right time and place. Firepower

also assists or enables a commander to concentrate sufficient combat power to

achieve superiority over the adversary.

Use of Reserves. Reserves are uncommitted forces that a commander

requires to maintain freedom of action to deal with anticipated and unexpected

developments. They provide flexibility and balance. Their main functions are to

reinforce, block, counterattack, replace other units, and protect flanks and rear

areas. Once the reserve has been committed, a new one must be constituted or

obtained. It may be necessary to reconstitute a reserve from troops in areas

least threatened, or from depth forces that are not in contact with the adversary.

Although this entails risk, it must be weighed against the requirement to retain

the ability to concentrate decisive combat power.

It must be remembered that these fundaments apply not only to defensive positions

against manoeuvre forces, but equally to the defensive aspects of other activities. For example,

coordination will be vital for the effective defence of a forward operating base during a COIN

campaign, and depth by an over-watch position will be vital for the local defence of a vehicle

checkpoint position.

753. TYPES OF DEFENSIVE ACTION

There are two principle types of defensive operation:

Defence. The purpose of defence may be to defeat an adversary force or to

hold ground. Generally, both will require a fixed element that denies the

adversary freedom of manoeuvre, and a moving element to counterattack the

adversary. The balance between these two forces depends upon the mission

and the relative capabilities of the attacker and defender.

Delay. Delaying operations are those in which a force being pressed by an

adversary trades time for space, reducing its opponent’s momentum and

inflicting damage without itself becoming decisively committed. Delay may be

conducted to slow an adversary’s advance, reduce his fighting power, gather

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information about adversary intentions, or protect friendly deployments.

Delaying operations also allow the commander to shape the battlefield, and to

create the conditions for a counterattack. A delay operation is usually closely

associated with a corresponding defensive position that is being prepared while

the delay is being fought. It is best fought with well-protected, mobile forces that

can engage the adversary at range from mutually supporting battle positions

and then withdraw quickly before becoming decisively engaged.

754. DEFENCE ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PLANE

The commander must also consider defence on the psychological plane. He must

guard his force’s sense of purpose, cohesion and morale. Although the moral component of a

force’s combat power will be established before (even years before) actual deployment,

commanders must take active measures throughout a campaign in order to ensure that this

element of his combat power is protected.

Furthermore, the commander must defend his force’s image amongst a civilian populace

and amongst the JIMP environment, and defend how others perceive the commander and his

forces. Adversary forces, particularly those involved in an insurgency, will go to great lengths to

undermine support for the campaign and to turn the public’s perception against the campaigning

forces and their justification for being involved. Part of this defence will consist of ensuring

commanders and soldiers, even down to the lowest levels, understand the need to be seen as

legitimate, effective and positive by local forces and populations. The poor conduct of a single

soldier at a vehicle checkpoint, for example, can due great harm to public support.

Many of the defensive measures taken to defend both a force’s moral component and its

image amongst the local populace and JIMP environment will be in the form of information

operations, that is, defensive influence activities, in order to reinforce the legitimacy of the

campaign, to defend against adversary propaganda, and to advertise the benefits of the

campaign to a local populace. To this end, the commander will wish to integrate his force with

other JIMP partners and clearly harmonize his force’s actions with their lines of operation.

SECTION 10

FORMS OF THE DEFENCE

755. GENERAL

There are two forms that are used in the conduct of defensive operations: area defence

and mobile defence.

756. AREA DEFENCE

The purpose of an area defence is to hold ground or deny it to an adversary. It focuses

on the retention of terrain by absorbing the adversary into an interlocked series of positions from

which he can largely be destroyed by fire.

Unlike mobile defence, a force committed to area defence does not seek the destruction

of the attacking force. Instead, it relies upon a separate but coordinated attack by other forces

to deliver tactical success. In area defence, commanders employ their forces in a framework of

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static and mutually supporting positions, supported by counterattacks at all available levels.

The balance between static and counterattack elements is largely dictated by terrain. The

closer the terrain, the greater the proportion of counterattacking forces and the lower the level at

which they should be employed.

Area defence may be conducted in varying depth depending upon the mission, the

forces available and the nature of the terrain. See Figure 7-6.

Figure 7-6: Area Defence

757. MOBILE DEFENCE

In a mobile defence a fixing force denies the adversary his freedom of action while a

striking force manoeuvres in order to defeat him. Commanders conducting a mobile defence

use terrain, obstacles, depth and deception, together with fire and manoeuvre, to encourage an

adversary to focus on the wrong objective. This renders the adversary vulnerable to attack.

Therefore, depth, time and the ability to manoeuvre are particularly important factors in the

conduct of mobile defence. Successful mobile defence requires rapidly switching between

activities, and a readiness to concede ground where appropriate.

Mobile defence focuses on the destruction of the attacking force by permitting it to

advance to a position that exposes it to counterattack and envelopment. The emphasis is on

defeating the adversary rather than retaining or retaking ground. Mobile defences employ a

combination of offensive, defensive and delaying action necessitating the forward deployment of

relatively small forces, and the use of manoeuvre supported by fire and obstacles, to wrest the

initiative from the attacker after he has entered the defended area. Consequently, the

defending force must have mobility equal to or greater than the adversary's and the ability to

form a large reserve that will conduct the decisive counterattack. See Figure 7-7.

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Figure 7-7: Mobile Defence

758. DEFENCE BY AN ENCIRCLED FORCE

An encircled force may breakout, exfiltrate towards friendly forces, attack deeper into the

adversary, or defend itself. The purpose of defending an encircled force may be to retain

ground or draw away adversary forces as part of a larger manoeuvre, or to preserve the combat

power of forces unexpectedly encircled and unable to breakout or exfiltrate. An encircled force

may conduct either an area defence, or a mobile defence if it has sufficient fuel. The key

consideration in organizing the defence of an encircled force is to anticipate how the adversary

will attempt to split the force and reduce it piecemeal.

SECTION 11

THE PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF THE DEFENCE

759. GENERAL

The planning and preparation for defensive operations will take considerable time.

Commanders ideally site positions two echelons below them. Hence, a battle group (BG)

commander will site platoon positions. However, time may not exist for such detailed planning

and preparation. Commanders should then focus on describing the effects that defensive

positions must create at subordinate levels in order to achieve the tactical objective of the

defensive operation. Subordinates will then use the available time to site their positions so that

the desired effects are created.

During the early stages of a defensive operation, the defender will usually have the

advantage of fighting from positions of his choosing. Preparation includes positioning forces in

depth, using and improving ground, conducting reconnaissance and security operations,

developing plans for counterattacks, and initiating deception measures. These should conceal

dispositions and intentions, and misdirect the adversary’s efforts.

Detailed coordination will be of utmost importance during the planning of the defensive

operation and will consume considerable time. It should include back-briefs by subordinates to

their commanders to ensure that the sited positions will create the desired effects.

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760. STAGES OF THE DEFENCE

The defence is a single battle, fought in two stages leading to an offensive operation.

These stages are:

covering force battle; and

main defence battle, including countermoves (reinforcing, blocking and

counterattacking).

761. LAYOUT OF THE DEFENSIVE AREA

The covering force area and the defence area are separated by the forward edge of the

battle area (FEBA). However, the responsibility for the conduct of operations will often change

forward of the FEBA, at the handover line.

The covering force area is the area extending forward from the FEBA as far as forces

are deployed to observe, engage, intercept, delay, disorganize and deceive the adversary

during his advance to the FEBA. It is within this area that the covering force must conduct its

tasks and responsibilities. In doing so, it may use delay tactics. The main defensive force must

be able to engage forward of the FEBA in order to help the covering force break clean from any

adversary forces pursuing the covering force’s rearward passage of lines.

The defence area extends rearwards from the FEBA; it is that area in which it is planned

to fight the decisive defensive battle.

The rear areas extend from the rear boundaries of formation/unit areas to their

subordinate formation/unit rear boundaries. It is here that the reserve forces of the

formation/unit are normally located. In addition, some long-range fire support units, organic and

attached combat support, and CSS units will often be found in this area. In the allocation of

deployment areas, consideration must be given to the areas needed for the overall concept of

defence as well as areas required for CSS troops and installations. See Figure 7-8.

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Figure 7-8: Corps Defence Area of Operations (with the Covering Force under Corps Control)

Note: This diagram illustrates a corps defence area of operations in very basic outline. It should

be remembered that within a non-linear and/or non-contiguous battlespace the lines will not

always be straight and there may be large gaps between one corps or division area and

another.

762. COVERING FORCE BATTLE

General. A covering force fights a battle of movement and there will seldom be time to

prepare battle positions. Maximum destruction is inflicted on the adversary so that he arrives at

the main defence area (MDA) disrupted and disorganized. Although the task of the covering

force is very demanding, casualties and delay can be imposed on the adversary out of all

proportion to the size of the covering force if it is handled skilfully and makes use of favourable

ground. In so doing, the covering force can deceive the adversary as to the location of the MDA

and even lead him to give away his intentions.

Planning Considerations. A formation, even down to brigade level, may have to

provide its own covering force. It may alternatively be part of a higher formation’s defence plan

acting as the covering force itself, or as part of the main defence force with another formation or

unit acting in this role. Similarly, a brigade can act as the covering force for a division or a

corps. In any case, there will be only one designated covering force beyond the handover line

as this negates the need for multiple handovers between successive levels. This, however, still

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provides a commander the option of employing his own “covering force” in the main defensive

area up to the handover line with his superior formation. When a formation is responsible for

the covering force battle, it must understand how it is related to the main defence battle and the

impact that the conduct may have on the higher commander's intent and CONOPS in the main

defence area. Planning must incorporate contingencies to account for unexpected results or

difficulties of the covering force battle.

Tasks. The commander will normally establish a covering force to form the first echelon

of a defence in depth. A commander avoids assigning conflicting tasks to a covering force. The

primary tasks may be:

gaining information on the location, direction and weight of the adversary attack

(its main effort);

gaining time;

attrition—inflicting casualties on the adversary;

providing security;

counter-reconnaissance; and

disruption—causing damage to the adversary's cohesion.

Size and Composition. The size and composition of the covering force will depend

upon the mission, adversary, terrain and available forces. Wherever possible, the forces used

as a covering force should not be required immediately in the MDA. The covering force should

be an all-arms grouping that is self-contained in all respects. These factors take on added

significance and complexity depending upon the course of action chosen by the adversary, the

depth and width of the area available for the covering force battle, and the time required to

prepare the positions in the MDA. It must have enough mobility and firepower that it can avoid

decisive engagement and break contact from the adversary using its integral resources. The

conduct of the covering force battle will depend upon the assigned tasks. If it must gain time to

support the completion of the MDA, then it may be conducted as a delay battle.

Battle Handover. Forces in the MDA assume responsibility for the battle at the

handover line. In planning and conducting the handover of a battle, a number of issues must be

considered:

As the covering force approaches the handover line, it may become necessary

to increase the intensity of the fire support from the defence area to allow the

covering force to disengage. Both direct and indirect fire assets from the main

defence force will provide support to cover the redeployment of the covering

force and to cover lanes in the obstacle barriers. This rearward passage of lines

through the forward positions in the MDA must be carefully planned and

coordinated, particularly if the covering force is to break clean and if friendly fire

incidents are to be avoided.

The covering force passes through the MDA forces as quickly as possible to

minimize their vulnerability to adversary fire. Combat support and CSS

resources of the covering force should move to the rear as early as possible to

avoid hampering the movement of the combat forces.

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In non-contiguous AOs, commanders must consider the partial redeployment of

the covering force. Ground should only be yielded under pressure, and the

requirement for information may dictate that elements of the covering force

remain forward of the MDA.

763. MAIN DEFENSIVE BATTLE

General. The main defensive battle is fought in the MDA. Here, the effects of deep

operations and covering forces, coupled with the efforts of rear operations, are combined with

those of the main defence force to defeat the adversary. The aim of the main defence battle is

to stop the adversary’s advance by a combination of firmly held battle positions within the MDA,

together with the use of obstacles and reserves. Tactics in the MDA will vary and there can be

no set course of action. Much of what occurs will depend upon a flexible plan incorporating the

principles of mobile and/or area defence.

Counter-reconnaissance. Common to all defensive operations is the requirement to

destroy or neutralize (e.g., by deception and the use of EW) adversary reconnaissance. Plans

must be made for its early destruction in all sectors of the battlefield, but these plans must not

result in the premature disclosure of key elements of the defence. Success against adversary

reconnaissance will help maintain the security of reserves, achieve surprise in offensive action,

and retain the integrity of fire support systems and command and logistic infrastructures.

Measures that can be taken against adversary reconnaissance include:

Use of the covering force to destroy or neutralize it as early as possible so that

the dispositions in the MDA are not disclosed. This requires the coordination of

surveillance and target acquisition systems with direct and indirect weapon

systems.

Protection of friendly dispositions through camouflage, concealment and

defensive C2 warfare in order to deny information to the adversary. This is

particularly important once adversary reconnaissance has penetrated the

covering force. Adversary reconnaissance should be engaged within a

framework of patrols and ambushes, forward of and between battle positions.

The use of aviation may be considered if sufficient assets are available,

although targets are likely to be dispersed and exposed only for short periods.

Indirect fire can be effective in terms of neutralization and destruction, but it is

more likely to be committed to larger and higher priority targets. Assets are

likely to be limited and “unmasking” will jeopardize security. Special care needs

to be taken to protect the security of reserves and high value targets (HVTs).

Camouflage and deception measures should be employed, but critical reserves

may require forces assigned to them specifically for protection against adversary

reconnaissance.

In the rear areas, there is a requirement to be diligent in seeking out and

destroying reconnaissance elements. Reconnaissance and reserves may be

used if they are not committed to other tasks.

When adversary reconnaissance forces adopt unconventional tactics and blend

with local populations, measures must be taken to counter this adversary.

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Troops conducting static defence or framework patrols must watch for

suspicious activities, monitor those with cellular telephones and conduct shadow

patrols. Suspected individuals should be stopped and investigated, keeping in

mind the need to avoid alienation of the local populace.

Battle Handover. Gaps or lanes in barriers that have been left for the redeployment of

the covering force must be guarded and arrangements must be made to close them. Once the

covering force has completed its handover of the battle to the main defence force, the

commander must consider the subsequent employment of the covering force. He may decide

to employ it immediately as his reserve, which will allow him to release his initial reserve for

other tasks. It may be some time, however, before the covering force is ready for commitment.

A more likely option, therefore, is to designate it as the formation reserve once it has been

reconstituted. Much will depend upon how the main defence battle is progressing.

Initial Actions. Once the adversary has reached the MDA, he will try to find weak

points and attempt to force a passage, possibly by a series of small-scale attacks. As the

adversary attack begins to develop, the forward units will engage the adversary. As the battle

progresses, the adversary advance may be slowed and he may become concentrated by the

barriers and the battle positions, thus presenting good targets for defensive fire and offensive air

support. The maximum weight of fire must be brought to bear at this stage of the battle.

Conduct of the Battle. The battle will be fought by the formation's subordinate units

using direct fire, indirect fire and manoeuvre against the assaulting adversary forces. The

commitment of reserves must be controlled. The conduct of deep operations against echeloned

adversary forces must be coordinated. The employment of engineers and of sustainment

resources must be clearly defined.

Penetration. Undefended areas may be unavoidable between battle positions, but they

must not be left where the probable main adversary effort is expected. They must be kept

under surveillance, covered by fire, or where possible, blocked by barriers. These

responsibilities must be clearly defined. If the adversary succeeds in penetrating the MDA, the

defender must block the penetration immediately and destroy this adversary force as soon as

possible, hence the need for reserves with battlefield mobility. Action may be extended in depth

in order to counter adversary penetrations that cannot be stopped further forward. In a mobile

defence the commander may allow penetration in a selected area in order to launch his striking

force at the appropriate time and place. Any decision to redeploy must take into account the

situation prevailing in adjacent defence areas.

764. EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVES

General. Commanders must earmark mobile forces as reserves for offensive tasks,

which are an integral part of the defence concept. If it becomes apparent in the course of the

battle that the cohesion of the defence cannot be maintained, the next higher commander may

assign additional reinforcing, blocking or counterattack forces from his own resources. Once a

reserve force is committed, it must be reconstituted from other forces not in contact. The

movement of reserves will be a priority target for the adversary and thus protection will be vital.

Where the adversary air threat is particularly high, there will be a requirement for AD assets to

be assigned to the security of reserves.

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Purpose. The primary purpose of a reserve is to preserve the commander's freedom of

action. The reserve is an uncommitted force, at least initially. It may have a series of

contingencies, although a commander will not commit his reserve until he has a reasonable

understanding of the adversary’s intentions. If the commander must commit his reserve in order

to counter an unexpected adversary action, then he must advise his superior commander who

must than reconsider the employment of his reserve and the impact this will have on his

superior commander's intent. Reserves are commonly used for:

Counter-moves:

(1)

Reinforcement. Forces that are engaged in combat are provided with

additional combat power from the designated reserve unit or formation, or

from any uncommitted forces.

(2)

Blocking. Blocking is the deployment of forces to stop the attacking

force that has broken through the forward positions. The timing of the

deployment of a blocking force will depend upon the way the adversary

action develops, with particular regard to his strength, speed and direction

of advance. This must be analyzed and related to the location and size of

the blocking force available, its reaction time, and the time available to

prepare blocking positions. Often, it is only by blocking that the adversary

can be halted in preparation for a counterattack. Airmobile forces are

often particularly suited to this role allowing an armoured reserve to be

retained for the counterattack.

(3)

Counterattack. The counterattack exploits opportunities to strike the

adversary at a decisive time and place in order to defeat him. The

opportunity to launch a counterattack will be fleeting and therefore a

commander and his forces must be mentally and physically prepared for

the task. Its planning is a basic and essential part of the defence and it

must be updated as the situation develops. Possible options in a

counterattack include the cutting off or destruction of adversary units,

recovery of lost ground, or any other action that seeks to restore a

situation. Once the commander has decided that a counterattack can be

mounted, he will launch it with the full force of all available resources

necessary to ensure success.

Spoiling Attacks. A reserve may be employed in carrying out a spoiling attack

with the intention of preventing or delaying adversary attacks. They are

normally launched against adversary forces that are forming or assembling for

an attack. Spoiling attacks are usually conducted against opportunity targets

with the objective of destroying adversary personnel and equipment, not to

secure terrain. The following basic considerations affect the use of the spoiling

attack:

(1)

The commander should designate the size of the force to be employed

and the acceptable risks.

(2)

Spoiling attacks should not be conducted if the loss or destruction of the

force jeopardizes the ability of the reserve to accomplish its primary

mission.

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