MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES (May 2010)

NATO/PFP UNCLASSIFIED

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(Edition 1)

Equivalent cover thickness = 1.0 Q^1/3

Solution: From Table 1-II and 1-III, A = 1.54, m = 1.71, B = 51, n = 0.67

−

1.71

IBD = (

)

*(Q

) = (

)

*(125,0003)¹

= 110 metres

1.54

−n

110

−0.67

Check PF = B(

)

= 51(

1/3

)

= 31 Hz > 30 Hz => Ok!

125,000

Ground Shock IBD for non-RC Structures

For non-RC structures, the allowable ground shock peak particle velocity PPV_a

criteria are given according to their foundation geology as follows:

Foundation on Soil : PPV = 60 - 200 mm/s

(Sand, gravel, clay)

Foundation on Soft Rock : PPV = 115 - 400 mm/s

(Firm moraine slate, shale stone, soft limestone)

Foundation on Hard Rock

: PPV = 230 - 800 mm/s

(Granite, gneiss, diabase, quartzite sandstone, hard limestone)

Based on the selected allowable PPV_a value, the ground shock IBD for non-RC

structures can be calculated as follows.

PPV

−

IBD = ₍

)

Where IBD = Inhabited Building Distance in metres, measured directly from the

chamber wall. The ground shock parameters, A and m, can be referred from Table

1-II based on the geological classification in Table

1-I, and the cavern design

parameters.

Example #1:

Given: Q = 125,000 kg

Loading density = 10 kg/m³

Span-length ratio = 1:4

Foundation on Hard Rock

Geology: Good Rock

Equivalent cover thickness = 1.0 Q^1/3

Solution: From Table 1-II, A = 0.75, m = 1.23

Chosen PPV_a at IBD = 0.23 m/s

−

PPV

0.23

1.23

IBD = (

)

*(Q

)= (

)

*(125,0003)¹

= 131 metres

0.75

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Example #2:

Given: Q = 125,000 kg

Loading density = 10kg/m³ Span-length ratio = 1:4

Foundation on Soil

Geology: Mixed media with Good Rock

Equivalent cover thickness = 1.0 Q1/3

Solution: From Table 1-II,

A = 1.29, m = 1.71

Chosen PPV_a at IBD = 0.06 m/s

−

PPV

0.06

1.71

IBD = (

)

*(Q

)= (

)

*(125,0003)¹= 301 metres

1.29

Validity of Range

The range of validity for the IBD equations proposed in the following cover charge

weights up to 500 tonnes, chambers of length ranging from 45 to 120 m with

maximum volume of 50,000 m³, and span to length ratio between 1:2 and 1:4. The

loading densities considered range up to 50 kg/m³ with rock cover or equivalent

cover about 1.0Q^1/3 m. Interpolations can be carried out between the recommended

values for different storage conditions.

The ground shock IBD given in this chapter is for a typical reinforced concrete

structure up to ten storeys, with span up to 5 m and inter-height up to 3 m. Little work

has been done to quantify the damage criteria for other structure types of masonry,

wooden and steel. A specific analysis should be conducted and siting decisions

should be based on the foundation type and robustness of these structures to

withstand the ground shock.

For storage sites where the rock cover or equivalent cover is less than 1.0Q^1/3, the

equations given by Table 1-II and Table 1-III should not be used to predict the

ground shock parameters for scaled range less than 1 m/kg^1/3. For cases where the

rock cover or equivalent cover is significantly more than 1.0Q^1/3, Table 1-II may

under-predict the peak particle velocities on the ground surface.

For storage sites that deviate very much from the conditions specified, further study

and analysis is recommended and detailed site specific characterisations should be

used to support the final construction and explosives safety siting decisions.

Other Hazard Divisions

For HD 1.2, a single item (or that explosives weight for the maximum number of

items to react simultaneously) can be treated as HD 1.1 for the purpose of ground

shock prediction. Otherwise, ground shock effects from HD 1.2 in bulk storage are

negligible.

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Table 1-I: Classification of Site Geology for Ground Shock Analysis

Typical Rock

Gabbro, Gneiss,

Mudstone, Siltstone,

Tuff, Chalk, Rock

Type

Granite, Norite,

Shale, Slate,

Salt, Coal,

Andesite, Dolerite,

Limestone*,

Diabase, Rhyolite,

Sandstone*

Quartzite, Dolomite,

Rock Mass

Marble, Limestone*,

Quality

Sandstone*

Good to Very good

quality rock mass with

few sets of unweathered

or slightly weathered

discontinuity sets

Good

Fair

Poor

Q > 10

RMR > 65

RQD > 75%

V_p > 4500 m/s

Fair to good quality rock

mass with several sets of

moderately weathered

discontinuities

1 < Q < 10

Fair

Poor

50 < RMR < 65

50% < RQD < 75%

3500 < V_p < 4500 m/s

Poor quality rock mass

with

numerous

weathered joints

Q < 1

Poor

RMR < 50

RQD < 50%

V_p < 3500 m/s

where

RMR = Rock Mass Rating

RQD

= Rock Quality Designation

= Rock Quality Index

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(Edition 1)

Table 1-II: Summary of Initial Value, A and attenuation coefficient, m for

Peak Particle Velocity (PPV) Prediction Equation

A. For PPV in Single Medium Geology

A.1 Chamber with width-to-length ratio of 1:2

Loading Density, kg/m³

Geology

Good Rock

0.79

1.08

1.35

1.52

1.23

Fair Rock

1.00

1.19

1.40

1.62

1.56

Poor Rock

1.00

1.30

1.55

1.82

1.90

A.2 Chamber with width-to-length ratio of 1:4

Loading Density, kg/m³

Geology

Good Rock

0.56

0.75

1.08

1.20

1.23

Fair Rock

0.78

1.00

1.23

1.49

1.56

Poor Rock

0.78

1.01

1.39

1.64

1.90

B. For PPV in Mixed-Media Geology

B.1 Chamber with width-to-length ratio of 1:2

Loading Density, kg/m³

Geology

Good Rock

1.14

1.38

1.54

1.77

1.71

Fair Rock

1.41

1.69

2.01

2.37

2.01

Poor Rock

1.89

2.32

2.60

2.96

2.34

B.2 Chamber with width-to-length ratio of 1:4

Loading Density, kg/m³

Geology

Good Rock

1.08

1.29

1.45

1.70

1.71

Fair Rock

1.20

1.62

1.85

2.13

2.01

Poor Rock

1.78

2.10

2.47

2.77

2.34

Note:

Peak Particle Velocity, PPV = A (R/Q^1/3)^-m

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Table 1-III: Summary of initial value, B and attenuation coefficient, n for

Principal Frequency (PF) Prediction Equation

Loading Density, kg/m³

Geology

and

Chamber

Geometry

B, Hz

Single Medium Geology

Chamber with width-to-length

ratio of 1:2

0.84

Chamber with width-to-length

ratio of 1:4

Mixed Media Geology

Loading Density, kg/m³

B, Hz

Chamber with width-to-length

0.67

ratio between 1:2 and 1:4

Note:

Principal Frequency, PF = B (R/Q^1/3)^-n

Table 2-I: Classification of Building Damage

Damage

Description of Damage - High

State of Building

Index

Frequency Response

Minor

< 0.4

Small cracks in concrete.

Easily repairable

Reinforcement still in elastic

state. Overall stiffness reduction

by about 20-40%.

Moderate

0.4

- 0.6

Many small cracks occur along

Repairable

structural members. Overall

stiffness reduction by about 40-

60%

Severe

0.6

- 0.9

Many large cracks, some areas

Non-repairable

with plastic hinge formation,

reinforcement yields. Overall

stiffness reduction by 60-100%.

Collapse

> 0.9

Collapse. Complete loss of

Loss of building

stiffness.

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(Edition 1)

Section VI - Explosives Workshop Distance (EWD)

An Explosives Workshop (EW) may be either an aboveground structure or an

underground chamber with its own entrance tunnel. Except for HD

1.4

ammunition, an underground EW should not be connected

(air ducts,

passageways, etc.) to other underground storage chambers. Otherwise, an

underground ES should be sited as a storage chamber. Distances between

PES and EW are intended to provide a reasonable degree of personnel

protection within the EW from the effects of a nearby explosion (blast, flame,

debris, and ground shock).

An explosion in an underground facility produces a directional impulsive load

along the extended centerline axis of an adit. This impulsive load is

considerably more intense at a given distance than that from a comparable

above ground detonation. Little work has been done to quantify the on-axis

impulsive load as a function of distance.

3.3.6.1. Potential Crater

An Aboveground EW should be sited so it is at least outside the potential

crater of an underground explosion.

3.3.6.2. Aboveground EW Located within the Maximum Dispersal Angle

An unhardened EW should be sited at the corresponding IBD found above.

3.3.6.3. Aboveground EW Located Outside the Maximum Angle of Dispersal

An EW may be sited at 1/3 of the corresponding IBD found above. Required

distance from the tunnel adit because of airblast could be determined from

Eq. 3.3.4-6.

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Releasable to Mediterranean Dialogue Nations

[1]

AASTP-1,

“Manual of NATO Safety Principles for the Storage of Military

Ammunition and Explosives” (May 1992)

[2]

Wilfred E. Baker, Peter S. Westine, and Franklin P. Dodge, “Similarity Methods in

Engineering Dynamics, Theory and Practice of Scale Modeling”, Published by

Elsevier (1991)

[3]

LLNL Explosives Handbook, “Properties of Chemical Explosives and Explosive

Simulants, Change 2, “Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA.; Department of

Energy, Washington, DC. (NTIS Order Number: DE91006884INZ)

[4]

Swiss Federal Buildings Office/Engineering Division - Swiss-Klotz Design, Drawing

Nos. 1036.SP.2.020/025/027

[5]

US Army Corps of Engineers Drawings, "Definitive Drawings Underground

Storage Facility" (DEF 421-80-04)

[6]

Royal Swedish Fortifications Administration - Klotz-Test Operation Block, Report

No. 119:5, 01.05.1974

[7]

L. K. Davis and So-Young Song,

“Technical Managers Final Report,” Joint

U.S./ROK R&D Program for New Underground Ammunition Storage Technologies

TR SL-97-10 and UAST-TR-97-002 (September 1997)

[8]

NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP)IWP 6-98 dated 24 November 1998 One-dimensional Blast

Wave Propagation

[9]

NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 8-98 dated

24 November

1998 Model Tests of

Accidental Explosions in Underground Ammunition Storage, II: Blast Wave

Propagation in Tunnel Systems

[10] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP

7-98 dated

24 November

1998 Model Test of

Accidental Explosions in Underground Ammunition Storage, I: Chamber Pressure

[11] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 9-98 dated 24 November 1998 Blast Propagation

outside a Typical Underground Storage Site

[12] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP

10-98 dated

24 November

1998 Underground

Ammunition Storage Magazines, Blast Effects from Accidental Explosions.

(Norwegian Magazines Standard)

[13] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 11-98 dated 24 November 1998 Calculation of Airblast

from Underground Ammunition Storage Magazines.

(Norwegian Magazines

Standard)

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ANNEX III-A

AASTP-1

(Edition 1)

[14] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 12-98 dated 24 November 1998 Air Blast from Tubes

Meeting 27-28 October 1987

[15] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP

13-98 dated

24 November

1998 Underground

Ammunition Storage. Blast Effects from Accidental Explosions

[16] UK(ST)IWP 311 dated 3 March 1998 - AASTP- I Advice on Adit Debris Projections

from Underground Storage Sites

[17] CH(ST)UGS/AHWP IWP 007 dated 30 October 1998 - Debris Throw from Adit

Tunnels. Proposed Changes to the NATO Safety Manual AASTP- 1, Part III

Technical Background for Throw Distances

[18] CH(ST)UGS/AHWP IWP 005 dated 30 May 1998 - Debris Throw from Craters -

Proposed Changes to the NATO Safety Manual AASTP-1, Part III - Technical

Background

[19] CH(ST) UGS/AHWP IWP 006 dated 30 October 1998 - Debris Throw from

Craters - Proposal Changes to the NATO Safety Manual AASTP-1, Part III -

Proposed Wording

[20] CH(ST)UGS/AHWP IWP 008 dated 4 November 1998 - Proposed Changes to the

NATO Safety Manual AASTP- 1, Part III - Proposed Wording - Swiss Contribution

[21] CH(ST)UG/AHWP IWP 002 dated 24 September 1997 - Debris Throw from

Craters. - Pertinent Technical Reports

[22] CH(ST)UG/AHWP IWP 003 dated I October 1997. - Debris Throw from Craters.

[23] US MEMO, dated 30 July 1997 - Recommendations for Ground Shock Criteria in

NATO Documents

[24] US(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 1-98 dated 30 September 1998 - US proposal for

Ground Shock from an Underground Storage Facility

[25] US MEMO, dated 31 December 1997 - Proposal for Ground Shock Explosives

Safety Principles

[26] NO(ST)UGS/AHWP IWP 1/98 dated 11 February 1998 - AASTP- I Part II,

Inhabited Building Distance, Ground Shock

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ANNEX III-A

AASTP-1

(Edition 1)

[27] Fook-Hou Lee, Wee-Beng Koh, and Thiam-Soon Tan, "Numerical Back Analysis

of Field Measurements of Ground Vibration from Underground Explosions," 28th

DOD Explosives Safety Seminar 18-20 August 1998, Orlando, Florida

[28] Yingxin Zhou, Karen O Y Chong, and Yaokun Wu, "Small-Scale Testing on

Ground Shock Propagation in Mixed Geological Media," 28th DOD Explosives

Safety Seminar 18-20 August 1998, Orlando, Florida

[29] Yingxin Zhou, Hong Hao, and Guowei Ma, "Ground Shock Damage Criteria for

Inhabited Buildings," 28th DOD Explosives Safety Seminar 18-20 August 1998,

Orlando, Florida

[30] US(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 1-98 dated 30 September 1998 - US proposal for

Ground Shock from an Underground Storage Facility

[31] NO(ST)(UGS/AHWP) IWP 14-98 dated 15 December 1998 - Ground Shock in

Rock-Full scale Tests in Norway

[32] US MEMO, dated 16 December 1998, Minutes of Special UGS/AHWP meeting

15-16 October 1998

[33] Peter Westine, "Ground Shock from the Detonation of Buried Explosives, "Journal

of Terramechanics, Vol 15, No 2, pp 69-79 (1978)

[34] CH(ST) UG/AHWP IWP 4 dated 6 March 1998 - Debris Throw from Craters - CH

Status Report as of 6 March 1998

[35] PFP(AC_326-SG_5)(CUSTODIAN-UGAS)(NO)IWP(2006)0001

[36] PFP(AC_326-SG_5)(CUSTODIAN-UGAS)(NO)IWP(2006)0002.

[37] NATO - Allied Ammunition Storage and Transport Publication (AASTP)

AASTP-4, "Explosives Safety Risk Analysis"

NATO AC/258 Risk Analysis Working Group (RAWG)

AC/258(ST)WP/214 / 27.02.2001 / NATO PFP unclassified

[38] Debris Throw from Adits of Underground Installations in Rock

Basics for Risk Analysis - Technical Background

Contribution to NATO - AC/258 Storage Sub Group - UGSWG

Defence Procurement Agency - General Staff, Switzerland

Bienz, Kummer & Partner AG

Kummer, P.; Willi, W.; Nussbaumer, P.

TM 174-9 // AC/258 CH(ST)IWP 024-02 / 30.03.2002

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ANNEX III-A

AASTP-1

(Edition 1)

[39] Trümmerwurf aus Zugangsstollen von Felsanlagen

TLM 75/Teil 2 - Revision technische Anhänge

Grundlagen

Generalstab - Sektion SUR

Bienz, Kummer & Partner AG

Kummer, P.; Willi, W.; Nussbaumer, P.

B 150-12 / 30.11.2001

[40] Debris Throw from Adit Tunnels

Proposed Changes to the NATO Safety Manual AASTP-1, Part III

Technical Background for Throw Distances

Contribution to NATO - AC/258 Underground Storage Ad hoc Working Party

Defence Procurement Agency, Switzerland

Bienz, Kummer & Partner AG

Kummer, P.

TM 158-9 // CH(ST)UGS/AHWP IWP 007 / 30.10.1998

[41] Debris Throw from Adit Tunnels

Proposed Changes to the NATO Safety Manual AASTP-1, Part III

Proposed Wording

Contribution to NATO - AC/258 Underground Storage Ad hoc Working Party

Defence Procurement Agency, Switzerland

Bienz, Kummer & Partner AG

Kummer, Peter

TM 158-10 // CH(ST)UGS/AHWP IWP 008 / 04.11.1998

[42] Debris Throw from Adits

Basics for Risk Analysis

Proposed Wording for AASTP-4

CH Contribution to the NATO AC/258 Storage Sub-Group - UGSWG

Defence Procurement Agency / General Staff - Switzerland

Bienz, Kummer & Partner AG

Nussbaumer, P.; Kummer, P.

AC/258 CH(ST)IWP 030-02 // TM 174-15 / 28.02.2002 / NATO PFP unclassified

NATO/PFP UNCLASSIFIED

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1 - GENERAL

IV-1-1

CHAPTER 2 - FIELD STORAGE

IV-2-1

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION

IV-2-1

SECTION II - FIELD STORAGE HISTORY

IV-2-3

SECTION III - DEFINITIONS

IV-2-8

SECTION IV - GUIDELINES FOR FIELD STORAGE

IV-2-9

SECTION V - FIREFIGHTING

IV-2-23

CHAPTER 3 - QUANTITY DISTANCE PRINCIPLES FOR MISSILE INSTALLATIONS

IV-3-1

CHAPTER 4 - reserved

IV-4-1

CHAPTER 5 - QUANTITY DISTANCE PRINCIPLES FOR AIRFIELDS USED ONLY BY MILITARY

AIRCRAFT

IV-5-1

CHAPTER 6 - SAFETY PRINCIPLES FOR THE TRANSFER OF MILITARY AMMUNTION AND

EXPLOSIVES IN NAVAL OR MILITARY PORTS

IV-6-1

SECTION I - INTRODUCTION

IV-6-1

SECTION II - GENERAL

IV-6-3

SECTION III - CALCULATION OF THE NET EXPLOSIVES QUANTITY

IV-6-4

SECTION IV - LEVELS OF PROTECTION AGAINST PROPOGATION FOR HD 1.1

IV-6-7

SECTION V - PROTECTION BETWEEN VESSELS EACH LOADED WITH MILITARY EXPLOSIVES

............................................................................................................................................................................. IV-6-8

SECTION VI - PROTECTION FROM VESSELS LOADING OR UNLOADING MILITARY

EXPLOSIVES

IV-6-10

SECTION VII - SCUTTLING AREAS

IV-6-14

ANNEX IV-A - QD TABLES FOR VESSELS

IV-6-15

ANNEX IV-B - SUMMARY OF QUANTITY-DISTANCES TO BE OBSERVED FOR SEAGOING

VESSELS LOADED WITH OR LOADING OR UNLOADING MILITARY EXPLOSIVES HD 1.1 IN

NAVAL PORTS

IV-6-16

IV-2

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(Edition 1)

CHAPTER 1 - GENERAL

4.1.0.1.

Purpose and Scope

This part of the Manual provides safety principles for use in special situations. This has previously been

defined as those cases where it is not possible, without seriously prejudicing operational effectiveness, to

apply the normal peacetime principles detailed in Parts I-III of the Manual. With the production of

AASTP-5, under the purview of SG6, that intent has been overtaken. What remains in this Part are special

situations that have yet not been moved to AASTP-5 and where there may be a reduced level of protection

due to operational requirements.

Where a reduced level of protection, below that detailed in Parts I-III of the Manual, has been used in this part,

consequences as detailed in Part I, Chapter 3, Section VII have been accepted. This must be borne in mind by

all those using the recommendations contained in Part IV.

4.1.0.2.

Basis for this Part of the Manual

In preparing this part of the Manual the following principles have been followed:

In peacetime the recommendations in Part IV must not reduce the normal level of protection

afforded to the general public as detailed in Parts I-III.

The recommendations in Part IV may reduce the normal peacetime level of protection afforded to

the personnel responsible for military operations, where this is essential in the interests of

operational effectiveness, bearing in mind the nature of the operation, and the consequences (see

subparagraph 4.1.0.1.b)).

4.1.0.3.

Use of Principles

The decision whether to use the principles contained in this part or to use those in Parts I-III must be made

by National Authorities.

4.1.0.4.

Updating

The Group of Experts that forms the CNAD Ammunition Safety Group (AC/326) and specifically Sub-

group 6, as custodian of this Manual, intends to maintain its value by publishing corrigenda from time to time.

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(Edition 1)

4.1.0.5

Conditions of Release :

The NATO Manual on Safety Principles for Storage of Military Ammunition and Explosives (AASTP-

1) is a NATO Document involving NATO property rights. The understanding and conditions agreed for the release

of the Manual are that it is released for technical defence purposes and for the use by the defence services only of

the country concerned. This understanding requires that the release of the whole, or any part, of the Manual must

not be undertaken without reference to, and written approval of, NATO.

4.1.0.6.

Inquiries

Any questions or requirements for further information should be addressed to the Secretary of the AC/258

Group at NATO Headquarters, B-1110 Brussels, Belgium.

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CHAPTER 2 - FIELD STORAGE

Section I - Introduction

4.2.1.1.

Scope

The principles in this chapter apply to the storage of ammunition in the theatre of operations

(communications zone and combat zone) in Field Storage Areas where the principles for storage in

permanent depots cannot be applied and greater risks must be accepted. The principles are most important

with respect to safety and protection of ammunition when stored under field conditions. The principles

apply also to the parking of vehicles loaded with ammunition in the theatre of operations. Each vehicle or

container is treated as a Field Stack Module.

In Field Storage, all potentialities must be used to

keep the ammunition serviceable

avoid ammunition losses.

Protection of personnel, material, installations, and buildings should be considered

4.2.1.2.

Exclusions

The following factors must also be considered but are outside the scope of this Manual and are left to the

discretion of the National Authorities.

Dispersion against attack.

Ground pattern.

Camouflage.

Isolation.

Communications.

Expansion.

Improvement.

Security.

Sabotage.

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The principles do not deal with ammunition depots established in peacetime to meet the need for holding

war reserves, even though the depot may be under field conditions. The normal principles for storage apply

to such situations.

The principles do not apply to the holding of ammunition in battery positions or in readiness areas.

4.2.1.3.

Selection of Sites

Sites should be carefully selected taking account of the following requirements:

The ground must be firm to carry the heavy weight of ammunition stacks and laden vehicles.

The ground should be level, dry and pervious to water.

The site should be easily accessible, preferably on both sides of by-roads. Loading and unloading of

vehicles should be capable of being accomplished away from main roads so that traffic is not hindered.

The site should be located sufficiently far from trees, telegraph poles, pylons etc. so that a lightning strike

to a tree etc. would not cause damage to the ammunition.

A water supply should be available for fire-fighting.

Variations in terrain or a dense forest should be exploited to provide natural barricades.

Firebreaks of sufficient width should be planned and maintained to prevent a potential spread of fire.

Roads of corresponding width are considered as fire-breaks.

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Section II - Field Storage History

4.2.2.1.

Introduction

Since the acquaintance of UN Logistics Directive 312 “Ammunition and Explosives” (dated 1992) there

have been a lot of discussion in NATO AC/258 AHTWP if NATO could provide better advice for storage of

ammunition and explosives during operations out-of-area. This discussion led to a NATO AC/258 STSG Field

Storage Workshop held on 4th November 1997 where national methodologies, procedures and experiences

regarding field storage were presented. The Storage Sub-Group noted the following conclusions from this first

workshop:

Field Commanders needed tools as well as, but not instead of, rules;

tools/rules users needed to be educated in concepts;

overall risk strategy and its consequences needed to be determined;

guidance developed by AC/258 should be set at a level suitable for people who understand the concepts

and not for the completely uninitiated.

4.2.2.2.

The workshop was succeeded with the establishment of the NATO Expert Working Group on Field

Storage (EWG/FS), which had its first meeting in Alexandria, VA, USA on 23-24 March 1998. The objective of the

EWG/FS is to develop changes to be made to the field storage advice in the NATO publication AASTP-1 based on

the information already available to AC/258.

4.2.2.3.

The NL MOD and UK MOD tasked TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory to write a Draft IWP with a proposal

of NATO advice on this subject on the basis of the following IWPs:

NL(ST)IWP/2-97;

US(ST)IWP/103-98;

GE(ST)(EWG/FS)IWP1-98;

GE(ST)(EWG/FS)IWP2-98;

GE(ST)(EWG/FS)IWP3-98.

This task resulted in a first draft version with guidelines [11]. This original version was discussed by UK-,

GE- and NL-MOD delegates during an interim meeting on January 12^th, 1999 at TNO. Comments of UK-, GE-,

NL- and DK-MOD [12] were included in a second draft version [13] which was discussed during the 3^rd NATO

AC/258 FSWG meeting on June 7^th, 1999 in Brussels. Comments on this second draft version [13] are implemented

in this final IWP.

The report starts giving short abstracts of the IWPs mentioned above. Topics of these IWPs are then

selected and combined into common NATO advice. The proposed guidelines for field storage are presented in

Annex A of the report. Annex B presents a proposal for the re-division of the current Part IV of NATO publication

AASTP-1.

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4.2.2.4.

Abstract of IWPs

NL approach

On behalf of the RNLA and RNLAF, TNO-PML proposed guidelines for field storage of ammunition and

explosives which are based on a modular storage concept by analogy with Part IV of the NATO

publication AASTP-1. While the AASTP-1 gives Q-Ds for relatively large storage sites (maximum 200 t

gross weight) and storage areas (maximum 5000 t gross weight), the proposed field storage concept is

based on much smaller quantities of ammunition and explosives specifically for battalion or company size.

In this concept a basic module is defined as 5000 kg NEQ of ammunition and explosives stored in any

storage facility or open stack. In general, this NEQ matches the amount of ammunition and explosives in a

vehicle or 20 ft container during transport. A storage module consists of one to five basic modules.

Therefore, the maximum credible event is determined by the number of basic modules in a storage module

(5 t, 10 t, 15 t, 20 t or 25 t NEQ). Several storage modules together are defined as a storage site.

Internal safety refers to explosion safety precautions inside a storage site. Intermodule Q-Ds are defined to

prevent sympathetic reactions of adjacent basic modules or storage modules. External safety is related to

exterior exposed sites which are subdivided into military exposed sites inside a military compound and

civil exposed sites. Military exposed sites are redefined, e.g. unprotected, semi-protected, and protected

personnel.

In practice, situations may arise in which the standard minimum quantity-distances cannot be observed.

Therefore, for some well-documented exposed sites, like unprotected people and people in buildings, the

resulting consequences are assessed and presented in Hazard Diagrams. Although these hazard diagrams

give no absolute figures, they have the objective of making field commanders aware of the increased level

of risk when the standard Q-Ds cannot be observed.

The Hazard Diagrams include all (primary, secondary and tertiary) detonation effects in one graph and are

drawn up with the TNO-PML computer program RISKANAL [7].

US approach

The U.S. established a Working Group of DDESB members. This working group was tasked to propose an

update of Chapter 10 of the U.S. manual DoD6055.9-STD entitled “Theater of Operations”. This resulted

in the document US(ST)IWP/103-98 which is a draft version of Chapter 10.

The U.S. IWP is complete and detailed and written from the U.S. point of view and requirements. U.S.

makes distinction between Field Storage and Handling Areas (large amounts of NEQ: > 500 kg) and

BLAHAs (small amounts of NEQ: 5 up to 4000 kg). The corresponding Q-Ds are based approximately

upon the same damage/injury criteria (low consequences).

It is proposed to replace the current Chapter IV of Part IV of AASTP-1 entitled

“Q-Ds for BLAHAs” by the updated section on BLAHAs of Chapter 10 of the U.S. manual DoD6055.9-

STD.

The draft Chapter 10 cites Risk Analysis as a tool to underpin waivers and exemptions to standard Q-D

criteria. The steps of a risk analysis procedure are mentioned but not discussed in detail in this report.

However, the developments of the risk-analysis concept of U.S. MoD is and will be extensively presented

and discussed in the NATO AC/258 RAWG. Any proposed risk assessment technique needs to be simple

enough for field commanders to understand.

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GE approach

The GE MOD formulated a draft directive on field storage of ammunition during out-of-area missions for

the German Forces. The directive includes preliminary protective and safety regulations for field storage of

ammunition and explosives. Q-Ds are given for three categories of exposed sites within a field camp. These

categories are more or less compatible with the categories as proposed by NL MOD, e.g. unprotected-,

semi-protected-, and protected personnel. Q-Ds are given for NEQs ranging from 500 kg to 20,000 kg.

The German Ernst Mach Institute was tasked to develop field storage advice for waivers and exemptions to

standard Q-D criteria. They came up with:

Risk Score Diagrams (give a qualitative description of risk).

Hazard Diagrams (lethality/injury as a function of stand-off distance and NEQ for people

endangered by blast, projections and building collapse).

Hazard Formula (gives hazard potential and shows what parameters have an influence on the

level of risk).

Tolerable activities (distance vs. acceptable activity for MCE of a detonation of 4,000 kg

ammunition in a container enclosed by barricades).

4.2.2.5.

Synthesis of IWPs

Twofold approach

During the first Field Storage Workshop [9] it was concluded that NATO advice in the form of standard

Q-Ds only, based on peace time acceptance criteria, is not enough to cope with all peace keeping, peace

enforcing and combat situations. Although standard Q-Ds are not easily observed in out-of-area conditions,

they still form a good basis for explosives safety.

From this starting point, a twofold approach is suggested for implementation in Part IV of the NATO

publication AASTP-1:

give advice in the form of standard Q-Ds;

give advice with the help of consequence analysis tools.

In the following sections both approaches are further defined using the information given in the considered

IWPs of the NL-, US- and GE MOD. The proposed changes to AASTP-1 are presented in Annex A and

Annex B of this report.

Standard Q-Ds for field storage

It is proposed to adopt the Modular Storage Concept by NL MOD. The NEQ per module is variable to

cover differing field situations. However, it is strongly recommended to limit the NEQ of a module to 1000

kg. The proposed amendments to NATO manual AASTP-1 regarding HD1.2 items are included [10].

Besides this basic information, it is proposed to include the German example of acceptable activities in the

case of field storage of 4,000 kg NEQ in the NATO advice [3]. This amount of NEQ is the exact turning

point between both concepts.

Advice based on consequence-analysis tools

The Hazard Formula as proposed by the German Ernst Mach Institute can be an ideal tool for Field

Commanders. With the Hazard Formula in- and outputs, a Field Commander can see if the risk of a

specific established field storage is acceptable or not and what parameters affect this risk. In the first draft

version of this report [11], some Hazard Diagrams of NL MOD were included to make Field Commanders

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aware to what extent the risk increases when the advised minimum quantity-distances cannot be observed.

In this second draft report these diagrams are reduced to one general ‘risk’ curve which is produced by the

TNO-PML risk model RISKANAL [7].

The general Hazard Diagram in combination with the Hazard Formula should give a Field Commander

enough basic information to make well considered decisions. For detailed information on risk assessment

and -analysis methodologies the proposed guidelines refer to the upcoming NATO ‘Risk manual’ AASTP-

4.2.2.6.

Conclusions

A dual approach for NATO advice has been proposed:

implementation of standard Q-Ds which are adapted for field storage conditions;

implementation of consequence-analysis tools to quantify and control risk when standard QDs can not be

observed.

Ad 1. The modular storage concept of NL MOD is adopted in which the NEQ per module is variable. It is

strongly recommended to limit the NEQ per basic module to 1,000 kg. However, a list with acceptable activities for

basic modules with 4,000 kg NEQ (on the basis of GE IWP) is included.

Ad 2. Two types of information are proposed for implementation in AASTP-1:

presentation of the so-called Hazard Formula (proposal of GE). This qualitative tool shows a user what

parameters have a major influence.

Presentation of a general Hazard Diagram which give information about the increase of risk (expressed as

probability of lethality) when standard Q-Ds cannot be observed.

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REFERENCES

[1]

TNO-PML fax 98D2/1158F, dated 23 June 1998, with proposed topics for draft IWP on field storage of

ammunition and explosives.

[2]

AC/258 GE(ST)(EWG/FS)IWP/1-98, dated 2 March 1998.

“Draft” Directive on Field storage of ammunition during out-of-area missions

for the German Armed

Forces.

[3]

AC/258 GE(ST)(EWG/FS)IWP/2-98, dated 3 March 1998.

Hazards arising with field storage of ammunition. Charts and Hazard

Formula. Report E 20/97 by G. Gürke (Ernst Mach Institute).

[4]

AC/258 GE(ST)(EWG/FS)IWP/3-98, dated 4 March 1998.

Field storage of ammunition. Risk score analysis and tolerable activities.

Report W/98 by G. Gürke (Ernst Mach Institute).

[5]

US(ST)IWP/103-98, dated 2 March 1998.

Draft Chapter 10 of U.S. DoD 6055.9-STD manual.

[6]

AC/258-NL(ST)IWP/2-97, dated 4 February 1997.

Guidelines for field storage of ammunition and explosives.

[7]

R.J.M. van Amelsfort

Risk calculations involved in storing explosives.

TNO-report PML 1992-123, dated November 1992.

[8]

AASTP-1

Manual of NATO safety principles for the storage of military ammunition

and explosives. May 1992.

[9]

Decision sheet AC/258(ST)DS/59, dated 11 December 1997.

[10]

UK(ST)IWP 312 (Revised) D/ESTC/6/3/2

Proposed amendments to NATO manual AASTP-1 for the inclusion of

revised Hazard Division 1.2 Quantity Distance rules.

[11]

AC/258-NL(ST)IWP/2-98

Proposed NATO advice for field storage of ammunition and explosives.

TNO draft report, July 1998.

[12]

AC/258 DA(ST)(FSWG) IWP 1/98

Comments on the concept for field storage. 30 December 1998.

[13]

AC/258-NL(ST)IWP/4-99, dated May 1999.

Proposed NATO advice for field storage of ammunition and explosives.

TNO report 1999-C20.

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Section IV-Guidelines for Field Storage

4.2.4.1.

Standard Q-Ds

Site planning principles

The function of a proper layout of an ammunition and explosives storage site is dual:

Internal safety must be guaranteed. The basic modules should be positioned in such a way that

the probability of a sympathetic reaction of adjacent modules is minimised. Barricades around

modules should always be used, since they considerably reduce minimum intermodule quantity-

distances necessary to prevent sympathetic detonations. Barricades function by stopping

ammunition fragments and to protect the stored ammunition against external threats, like enemy

fire.

If barricades are not available, the corresponding larger minimum intermodule quantity-distance

should be observed. If the prescribed minimum intermodule distances can not be observed, the

net explosive quantity to calculate interior- and exterior quantity-distances is the sum of all net

explosive quantities of the Potential Explosion Sites (PESs). As a result, interior- and exterior

quantity-distances will be considerably larger. If these interior and exterior minimum quantity-

distances can not be observed, the safety of the troops and civilians inside these distances is

compromised (see section 2: Consequence-analysis tools).

External safety must be optimal. Complying with the advised minimum quantity-distances to

military- and civil exposed sites results in an acceptable level of risk for military personnel and

civilians. The exterior quantity-distances for military and civil exposed sites result in a layout of

the total compound in which the most vulnerable Exposed Sites (ESs), like unprotected lodging

or administrative accommodations, are positioned further away from the PES than less

vulnerable exposed sites, for instance protective shelters.

General principles

The amount of ammunition and explosives in the field camp must be limited to the minimum

consistent with safe and efficient operations. “No ammunition in the field camp that does not

support the mission”.

Store the main amount of ammunition and explosives in a field storage site separated from the

field camp. Transfer only the minimum ammunition and explosives to the field camp.

Modular storage of ammunition and explosives is mandatory in the field camp to limit the MCE

(Maximum Credible Event) to one basic module. Modular storage refers to a barricaded area

comprised of a series of cells separated from each other by barricades.

The NEQ per module should be kept as low as practically possible, consistent with the mission

and the available separation distances.

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Mixing of HDs and CGs

The UN international system of hazard classification with definitions of hazard divisions and storage

compatibility groups is effective. Normally, a storage module should contain ammunition of one hazard

division only. When this is not possible, the following principles should apply:

When ammunition of HD1.2 and HD1.3 are stored together in the same storage module, the

quantity-distances for each hazard division is assessed independently and the larger distance

must be observed.

When ammunition of HD1.2 and/or HD1.3 is stored in the same module as ammunition of

HD1.1, then the whole storage module must be regarded as HD1.1 with regard of quantity-

distances.

Different compatibility groups should be stored in a separate storage module as well, except that:

Items of compatibility groups C, D and E may occupy the same storage module.

Items of compatibility group S may occupy the same module as any other items except those in

compatibility group L.

Fuzes may be stored in the same module as the projectiles to which they belong.

The following types of ammunition must be stored in separated storage modules:

Ammunition in compatibility group B.

Ammunition in compatibility group F.

Ammunition in compatibility group G.

Ammunition in compatibility group H.

Ammunition in compatibility group K.

Ammunition in compatibility group L (within this group, different types of ammunition should

be stored separately).

This indicates that in general several storage modules are necessary.

Storage conditioning

In order to keep the ammunition and explosives operational, the storage modules should give adequate

protection against all weather conditions including lightning. A variety of equipment to achieve internal

conditioning of the facility is available. The use of pallets to stack the ammunition and explosives is

strongly advised to keep the stored goods free from the floor and thus dirt and mud and to obtain maximum

air circulation and ventilation.

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4.2.4.2

Q-Ds

Intermodule Quantity-Distances

Minimum intermodule quantity-distances for ammunition and explosives of HD1.1, HD1.2 and HD1.3

necessary to prevent adjacent modules sympathetically detonating are given in the following tables as a

function of Hazard Division and Maximum Credible Event. These distances do not cover assets

preservation.

The use of effective barricades is highly recommended, because they:

protect the ammunition from external threats, like enemy fire;

minimise explosion effects in case of an accidental explosion (barricades stop ammunition

fragments);

prevent sympathetic detonation of adjacent modules.

As a result, the application of effective barricades around storage modules will reduce the required surface

area for a storage site considerably. Effective barricade designs are described in Part II, Chapter III, Section

III.

Instead of conventional earth embankments which have certain slopes and which are therefore space

consuming,

‘big bags’ or concertainers can be used

(e.g. Hesco Bastion Concertainers). These

concertainers must be filled with a material (like sand) that stops ammunition fragments and that does not

contribute to debris throw.

Figure 1.2.1.a Example of field barricades (ref. AC/258 DA(ST)IWP1-99).

In case of storage of HD1.2 and HD1.3 articles it is recommended that an effective roof constructions be

applied. The roof will protect the stored ammunition for external threats and minimise explosion effects (like

ammunition fragments, lobbed ammunition, heat radiation), especially during the first minutes after alarm

when evacuation of personnel will take place. Proposed effective roof constructions for out-of-area

circumstances are, for instance, earth covered plates of steel or concrete prefab slabs.

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