MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES (May 2010)

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Static electricity grounding (earthing) requirements.

Maximum and/or minimum humidities.

Clothing and foot-wear requirements.

The maximum number of personnel to be in the workshop or laboratory at any one time.

The maximum quantity of explosive items permitted in the building and/or to be worked on at any

one time.

Any additional safety precautions necessary for the ammunition being worked on.

Operations may proceed while the SOP are being printed provided a draft has been approved by the

Commanding Officer/Superintendent and is posted in the working area.

2.6.5.4.

Personnel and Explosive Limits

To reduce the risk of injury of personnel and damage to property the number of personnel employed, and the quantity of

ammunition within an explosives workshop should be kept to the minimum required to maintain the operation. Dividing

the overall quantity into separate bays or rooms, with substantial internal walls or barricades, will reduce the risk of

explosive propagation and probably reduce the effects of an explosives accident. The personnel and explosive limits vary

with each operation and should be included in the SOP.

A personnel limit is to be assessed for each building, room or area in accordance with the following principles:

The number of persons employed should be the minimum compatible with the highest standards of

safety, quantity and an even flow of work.

The personnel limit should include all persons employed including those employed on the movement

of the ammunition or other tasks in the immediate vicinity.

The limit may include up to two supervisors or inspectors even though their presence is not

continuous.

The limit should be related to the size of the building and number of exits. Irrespective of other

considerations, each person is to have ample working space and suitable evacuation routes.

A working explosive limit for each building, room or area should be assessed in accordance with the following

principles:

It should not exceed the quantity permitted by available quantity-distances.

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The limit should represent the minimum number of containers or rounds required to maintain an even

and continuous flow of work.

The working limit should include all ammunition held within the building and the immediate

vicinity. It should also include ammunition that has been processed or waiting to be processed,

whether on vehicles or on the ground.

The possibility of reducing the hazard presented both inside and outside the building by the use of

adequate internal traverses should be considered.

Signs should be conspicuously posted to provide the following information:

The nature and type of ammunition being processed.

Details of the operation i.e. re-boostering.

The compatibility group, hazard division and fire class of ammunition.

Personnel and explosive limits.

This information should be repeated as necessary for rooms or confined areas where special working conditions

are prescribed. The explosive limits may be stated in terms of NEQ and/or number of rounds or containers.

2.6.5.5.

Clean Working Areas

Clean conditions may be described as a set of precautions that are taken in explosives laboratories, workshops,

proof areas, and certain magazines, to prevent the introduction of, or the contact of explosives with, extraneous

matter such as ferrous metals, aluminium or aluminium alloys or grit which might cause an explosion through

friction or spark.

Working areas that are required to be maintained under clean conditions should be provided with a changing

lobby. The lobby should be divided by a barrier to indicate the clean area.

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2.6.5.6.

Clothing for Clean Conditions

Clothing used for wear in explosives workshops or laboratories maintained under clean conditions should be

specified by the appropriate National Authority, and will normally include items such as spark-proof conductive

footwear, fire retardant coveralls and suitable hair covering.

2.6.5.7.

Static Electricity Precautions

Ammunition workshops should be provided with conductive or anti-static flooring. Conductive flooring is

designed to provide a path of conductivity for the free movement of electrostatic charges, thereby preventing a

charge accumulation.

Anti-static flooring differs from conductive flooring in that it offers greater resistance to the passage of electrical

current.

Grounding (earthing) points should be available for equipment, tools and ammunition in explosives workshops,

to prevent a difference of electrical potential between operators and the material that they must handle.

Conductive flooring and grounding (earthing) systems should be tested for continuity in accordance with

national specifications.

Personnel working in explosives workshops should wear conductive footwear or copper chain, when conductive

flooring is present. Such safety devices should be tested frequently.

2.6.5.8.

Painting Operations

Painting and stencilling operations should only be conducted in well ventilated rooms or outdoors.

Spray painting operations, when conducted indoors, should be done in spray painting booths, except for minor

touch-up or stencilling using low pressure spray markers or aerosol containers.

Operators and helpers should wear protective masks while spray painting is in progress, unless the spray booths

are properly exhausted so as to preclude exposure of personnel to toxic atmosphere.

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2.6.5.9.

Heat Sealing Equipment

The use of heat sealing equipment for packaging of ammunition in polyethylene is permitted under the

following conditions:

The ammunition is suited to heat sealing.

The heat sealing apparatus is approved.

It is used in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

It is properly maintained and inspected for serviceability and cleanliness before initial use and at the

beginning of each shift, and should be checked for cleanliness (absence of any spillings) before each

operation.

The sealing equipment should be restricted for use as permitted by the host country within a transit magazine or

explosives workshop in a room or segregated area apart from other activities. However, heat sealing equipment

must not be permitted in a room maintained under clean conditions.

Items to be heat sealed should be in serviceable condition and free of defects.

Detonators and heat sensitive items such as propellants or explosive samples should be suitably packaged before

heat sealing.

2.6.5.10.

Tools

Only non-sparking tools should be used in direct contact with exposed explosives or in rooms maintained under

clean conditions.

Special or locally designed tools and equipment should not be used in ammunition operations nor should

modifications or alterations to approved tools or equipment be made without prior approval.

Tools and appliances designed and provide for particular explosives operations should not be used for other

purposes without approval.

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Only those tools authorized for use by the applicable SOP for the operation being performed should be

permitted in the room or area.

2.6.5.11.

Closedown of Explosives Workshops

When an explosives workshop is vacated all electrical installations and powered equipment other than essential

services should be switched off or disconnected. At the end of each working day the building should be secured.

Ammunition remaining in the building should be subject to the following:

During temporary breaks within the course of a working day, the ammunition may be left in position

provided it is safely stowed, and the explosive is not exposed.

At the end of each working day ammunition may be left in the work area providing it is packaged,

(except for ammunition which is not normally stored in packages) and placed on the floor. Items

should be grounded (earthed) as applicable.

2.6.5.12.

Supervision

Constant supervision should be maintained by supervisory staff and all personnel should be safety conscious.

Each operator should be fully acquainted with any hazards associated with the ammunition on which he is

required to work. Before commencing an operation each operator should be familiarized with the particular task

that he will perform.

2.6.5.13.

Accident Involving Ammunition

In the event of an accident or incident involving ammunition, all operations shall cease immediately and the

situation shall be reported to the Commanding Officer/Superintendent. Nothing shall be disturbed, except in the

interest of safety or as may be necessary to give assistance to injured persons. Precautions should be taken to

prevent unauthorized personnel from entering the area.

Accidents involving ammunition shall be reported in accordance with national regulations.

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Section VI - Destruction of Ammunition and Explosives

2.6.6.1

Introduction

This section contains advice pertaining to the destruction (by open burning/open detonation) of ammunition

and explosives which has deteriorated or which has been declared surplus or obsolete. These recommendations

establish measures and procedures for minimizing the risk in destroying unwanted ammunition and explosives.

All destruction operations must be carried out in accordance with rules and regulations established by the

competent National Authority.

This section does not deal with matters pertaining to Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) emergency actions.

2.6.6.2

Selection Of Destruction Areas For Open Burning/ Open Detonation

The ideal destruction area is one with deep soil, free from loose rocks, where trenches and pits can be dug

easily and in which the risk of fire is negligible. In the selection of a permanent destruction area, the land

should be above rather than below the surrounding area, naturally drained. The destruction area must be as far

as possible from:

magazines and other buildings in the explosives area;

administration buildings and depot offices;

public or inhabited buildings;

overhead and underground cables;

land drainage systems, water mains, sewers and underground pipelines;

railway and highway cuttings, tunnels and embankments where earth shocks might undermine or cause debris

to fall on the tracks or roads;

airfields and

environmentally sensitive areas; such as areas containing wetlands, endangered species, or threatened plants.

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2.6.6.3

Explosive Limits For Destruction Areas

Explosives limits for destruction areas will vary because of local conditions. In establishing limits for items of

Hazard Division 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 involved in individual destruction operations, the maximum quantity to

be destroyed at any time must be determined carefully by the competent National Authority.

When determining these limits, consideration must be given to:

the maximum radius of fragment and debris hazards;

the maximum radius of blast effects;

shock transmission through the particular ground strata (e.g. high water tables or rock formations);

the effects of overcast weather conditions; and

the effects of wind.

2.6.6.4

Destruction Area Maintenance

Fire breaks must be maintained around and within destruction areas as required.

All trees, dry grass and underground within a radius of 60 m from the destruction point must be removed.

The area should be restricted and marked as required by the competent National Authority.

2.6.6.5

Splinter-proof Shelters

Where Ammunition is being destroyed by detonation, a splinter-proof shelter should be provided as a control

point and to provide protection for personnel. Where provided, it must be located not less than 90 m from the

actual destruction point. Where a splinter-proof shelter is not provided, the Control Point should be located at

a sufficient distance from the destruction point in order to provide adequate safety to personnel.

2.6.6.6

Record Keeping

A record keeping system should be maintained that includes location of destruction, summary of items

destroyed, date of operation and other data required by the competent National Authority.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART III

CHAPTER 1 - GENERAL

Section I - Introduction

3.1.1.1. Purpose

3.1.1.2. Design Environment Criteria

3.1.1.3. Limitations

3.1.1.4. Requirements

Section II - Definitions

3.1.2.1. General

3.1.2.2. Definitions

CHAPTER 2 - BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Section I - General

3.2.1.1. Optimized Underground Ammunition Storage Site (General Description)

3.2.1.2. Explosion Effects in Underground Ammunition Storage Sites

3.2.1.3. Advantages of Underground Storage

3.2.1.4. Disadvantages of Underground Storage

3.2.1.6. Storage Limitations

Section II - Design

3.2.2.1. General

3.2.2.2. Safety Requirements

3.2.2.3. Military Requirements

3.2.2.4. Financial Aspects

Section III - Equipment

3.2.3.1. Humidity Control and Ventilation

3.2.3.2. Electric Installations and Equipment

3.2.3.3. Lightning Protection

3.2.3.4. Transport and Handling Equipment

3.2.3.5. Fire-fighting Equipment

Section IV - Explosives Hazards Mitigation Methods

3.2.4.1. Facility Layout

3.2.4.2. Exits

3.2.4.3. Branch Passageways

3.2.4.5. Expansion Chambers

3.2.4.6. Constrictions

3.2.4.7. Debris Traps within the Underground Facility

3.2.4.8. Blast Traps

3.2.4.9. Portal Barricade

CHAPTER 3 - QUANTITY-DISTANCES

Section I - General

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3.3.1.1. Types and Effects

3.3.1.2. Quantity-Distances

3.3.1.3. Net Explosives Quantity (NEQ)

3.3.1.4. Measuring Quantity-Distances

Section II - Hazard Division Material Dependence

3.3.2.1. Hazard Division 1.1, 1.3, 1.5 and 1.6 materials

3.3.2.2. Hazard Division 1.2 materials

3.3.2.3. Hazard Division 1.4 materials

Section III - Chamber Interval

3.3.3.1. Hazard Divisions 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, and 1.6

3.3.3.2. Hazard Division 1.2

3.3.3.3. Hazard Division 1.4

Section IV - Inhabited Building Distance (IBD)

3.3.4.1. Airblast [8-15]

3.3.4.2 Debris

3.3.4.3 Ground Shock

3.2

Classification of Building Damage

3.3

Prediction of Building Damage Index

Other Hazard Divisions

Section V - Public Traffic Route Distances (PTRD)

Section VI - Explosives Workshop Distance (EWD)

3.3.6.1. Potential Crater

3.3.6.2. Aboveground EW Located within the Maximum Dispersal Angle

3.3.6.3. Aboveground EW Located Outside the Maximum Angle of Dispersal

Section VII - Aboveground Earth-Covered Magazine (ECM)

Section VIII - Aboveground Magazine Distance (AGMD)

REFERENCES

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CHAPTER 1 - GENERAL

Section I - Introduction

3.1.1.1. Purpose

This part of the Manual [1]^† deals with special types of storage of ammunition

and explosives such as underground storage and storage aboveground in

circumstances other than normal for an aboveground depot. Although each chapter

contains both principles and technical details, it is necessary to refer to Part I and

Part II of the Manual for an explanation of the fundamental concepts and the

definitions of certain terms.

3.1.1.2. Design Environment Criteria

This part uses distances, specified by the criteria below, to achieve desired

levels of protection to personnel and property. Distances provided by the criteria do

not guarantee absolute safety. However, assuming an event, these distances do limit

the expectation of a severe injury or fatality to normally less than 1% for personnel in

the open or in a conventional building at Inhabited Building Distance (IBD).

Advisable criteria at IBD are:

Air blast overpressure:

5 kPa

Fragments and debris:

1 hazardous fragment per 56 m²

Actual particle velocity to be used at IBD for groundshock should depend on the

robustness of the structure under consideration and is discussed in page III.2.3

The criteria listed above are used in Part III, Chapter 3 to obtain required distances.

Special considerations that are not discussed in detail here are required to provide

levels of protection for historical monuments and sites, high-rise buildings, and

locations where many people are assembled.

When they are available, site-specific and configuration-specific tests and/or

analyses may be used to determine recommended distances.

^† References are in Annex III A

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When deciding distances that provide protection for personnel , the requirements of

Part II, para 2.5.5.5.d, para 2.5.5.6, Fig 5-XV, and Annex II A-D10 distance should

be considered. These are:

Airblast overpressure:

20-kPa side-on overpressure will not cause severe

injury to persons in the open.

Ground shock:

A velocity change of less than 3 m/s will not cause

severe injury to personnel.

Public Traffic Route Distance (PTRD) is normally 2/3 of IBD because moving traffic

is not continuously exposed. However, IBD should be used instead of PTRD where

there is a heavy traffic.

3.1.1.3. Limitations

Configurations of underground facilities will vary from site-to-site. Only a

limited number of possible configurations have been investigated. Site-specific tests

and analyses will be necessary if high-levels of confidence are required for the more

complex configurations.

Recommendations for underground storage are based on the best-available,

worldwide database of information. Recommendations are based on accidents or

scaled tests with non-responding steel models (1/100th to 1/20th scale) or rock

tunnels (1/8th to 1/3rd scale).

3.1.1.4. Requirements

Engineered structures and devices related to explosives safety must be designed to

90% confidence levels for collapse or failure with a given load (Part II, Para 2.3.2.2).

QD distances provided in this document are based on TNT-equivalencies for the

energetic materials that are involved. Significant differences in the TNT-equivalency

must be considered [3].

See Part I, Annex IA, Section 1, Para 2 [1] for rounding of Quantity-Distances.

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Section II - Definitions

3.1.2.1. General

The following definitions are used in connection with underground storage.

For additional definitions, see Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2 [1].

3.1.2.2. Definitions

Adit

A passage or tunnel leading into an underground storage site

Chamber Interval

The interval between the natural or artificial walls of adjacent underground

storage chambers/sites

Cover

The solid ground situated between the ceiling or the wall of an underground

chamber and the nearest exterior surface

Crack

A short, primary discontinuity, which is not pervasive and may not be visible

Crater

A hole or chasm in the cover (burden) caused by an underground explosion.

Faulting

Motions in the earth’s crust resulting in failure of the rock mass and

concentrated displacements along failure planes, for instance discontinuities (joints,

fractures)

Filled Joints

A clearly visible, pervasive discontinuity of geological origin which has a

mineral filling of loose or porous materials and which may be several tens of

millimetres thick

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Fissure

A short, hardly visible and partly irregular, secondary discontinuity, which

appears in conjunction with prepared planes, for instance a blasting fissure or a rock

pressure fissure

Joint

A term in rock mechanics for a mechanical discontinuity in rock, with a

thickness less than a few tens of millimetres. Joints (fractures, discontinuities) may

be open or filled with some material.

Single Chamber Storage Site

A chamber storage site with one chamber, which has its own entrance from

the exterior and is not connected by air ducts or passageways to any other storage

chamber

Shot Gun Type Magazine

A single chamber storage site with one exit and a direct line-of-sight from the

chamber to the outside of the underground installation.

Underground Storage

Storage, normally in solid rock, in a cavern or chamber storage

Venting

The reduction of internal pressure due to release of gases into a

passageway, other chambers, adits, and any aperture in the cover

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CHAPTER 2 - BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Section I - General

3.2.1.1. Optimized Underground Ammunition Storage Site (General Description)

Underground storage facilities may consist of a single chamber or a series of

connected chambers. The chamber(s) may be either excavated or natural

geological cavities. Figures 2-I and 2-II^† illustrate general concepts for several

possible configurations of underground facilities. Underground ammunition

storage sites should be located in sound rock. A storage site may consist of

one or more storage chambers with usually one access tunnel in each

chamber. The number of chambers depends upon prevailing topographical

and geological circumstances and safety aspects in the environment of the

storage site. Potential blockage should be considered for multi-chamber sites.

The thickness of the rock formation surrounding an underground storage site

should be designed so cratering hazards, in case of an explosion, can be

practically excluded. Then the only significant external hazards will be the

ground shock and the explosion effects coming from the adit tunnel. The

effects coming from the adit may be considerably reduced by means of

structural measures in or in front of the tunnel or even eliminated by the

installation of tunnel closing devices.

Adequate separations and tunnel closing devices should be used to prevent

the propagation of an explosion from chamber-to-chamber.

Provided the access openings are adequately hardened, underground storage

is relatively well-protected against enemy attack..

Geological aspects have a great influence on building costs and, in terms of

the construction cost alone, underground storage is often more costly than

aboveground storage. However, when estate, operating, maintenance and

lifetime costs are considered, at least for larger underground facilities, it may

be less than for comparable aboveground facilities. Generally, the most

economical are chambers measuring from 100 to 200 m in length with a

volume between 5,000 and 15,000 m³. This provides a total gross capacity

between 1000 and 2000 tonnes of ammunition. The length of the access

tunnel may be 50 to 150 m, depending on topographical conditions and the

desired rock thickness.

^† Figures are included in Text

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3.2.1.2. Explosion Effects in Underground Ammunition Storage Sites

The blast wave originating from an explosion in an underground storage

chamber will surge through the rock formation as ground shock and will

escape as blast through the access tunnel into the open air. The strong

confining effect of an underground storage site and the large amount of hot

explosion gases generated will produce a relatively constant high pressure in

the chamber. This pressure may break up the rock formation and produce a

crater. The kinetic energy (dynamic pressure impulse) of the blast in the main

passageway is very high compared to an explosion in free air. Objects like

unexploded ordnance, rock, gravel, equipment, and vehicles will be picked up

and accelerated up to velocities of several hundred metres per second before

leaving through adits. In addition, engineered features can collapse and cause

debris hazards. Break-up of the cover will cause projection of a heavy fall of

rock and earth in all directions onto the surrounding surface area.

The explosion gases will surge at a high velocity through the access tunnel

into the open air where they will burn completely. The escaping gases will

carry along ammunition, rock debris, installations, and lining onto surrounding

areas.

A disturbance near the surface of the ground will emit compression P-waves,

shear S-waves, and Rayleigh surface R-waves in a semi-infinite elastic

medium. Deeply buried disturbances will emit only P-waves and S-waves, but

in the far field, interface effects will result in R-waves being produced. For all

of these waves types, the time interval between wave front arrivals becomes

greater and the amplitude of the oscillations becomes smaller with increasing

standoff distance from the source.

The first wave to arrive is the P-wave, the second the S-wave, and the third

the R-wave. The P-wave and S-wave are minor tremors, as these waves are

followed by a much larger oscillation when the R-wave arrives. The R-wave is

the major tremor because: 1) about two-thirds of the ground shock energy at

the source goes into the R-wave, and 2) the R-wave dissipates much less

rapidly with distance than either the less energetic P-wave or S-wave. P-

waves and S-waves dissipate with distance r to a power of r^-1 to r^-2. At the

surface, P-waves and S-waves dissipate with distance as r^-2, while R-waves

dissipate with distance as r^-0,5. The greater energies being transmitted by R-

waves and the slower geometric dissipation of this energy causes R-waves to

be the major tremor, the disturbance of primary importance for all

disturbances on the surface.

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Small-Scale Model Tests and Validity of Scaling Laws

A portion of the blast energy from an underground detonation is used

to compress the surrounding geological media. This allocation of

energy should be considered when evaluating the experimental results

of underground tests.

Small-scale, modeling tests that are constructed of non-responding

materials do not exhibit the non-linear energy loss effects typical of an

underground explosion. Therefore, air blast results from non-

responding models tend to be safety conservative for predicting

hazards that would occur in an actual underground event. In spite of

this, small-scale model tests are still of value for design purposes.

3.2.1.3. Advantages of Underground Storage

Advantages of underground storage are:

A smaller total land area is required than for an aboveground storage.

A high degree of protection is afforded against bombing or terrorist

attack.

The area is easier to camouflage and to guard than an aboveground

area.

In case of an incident in an underground chamber, damage to

ammunition in other chambers is preventable. Damage to ammunition

in aboveground buildings, other than earth-covered magazines, is

usually more extensive.

The temperature in underground storage sites is almost constant. The

deleterious aging effects on munitions and explosives caused by

extreme temperatures and temperature cycling is mitigated.

Effects of sand, snow, and ice, which may cause difficulties in

aboveground storage, may be avoided.

Inherent protection may be afforded against external fire.

Estate costs, as well as maintenance and operation may be less costly

as for an aboveground storage site, thus more than offsetting the

construction costs.

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3.2.1.4. Disadvantages of Underground Storage

Disadvantages of underground storage may be:

The choice of localities is restricted.

The costs of the original excavation or the modification of an existing

excavation and the installation and maintenance of special equipment

may increase the initial costs of underground storage over that of

aboveground.

Extra handling equipment may be required.

3.2.1.5. Work Prohibited in Underground Storage Sites

The opening of packages or the removal of components from unpacked

ammunition or similar operations should be prohibited in the storage chamber, but

could be done in the loading/unloading dock or in a separate chamber if suitable

measures are taken to prevent a propagation into the storage chambers.

3.2.1.6. Storage Limitations

Limitations on underground storage are:

Ammunition containing Flammable Liquids or Gels

Ammunition containing flammable liquids is only permitted in

underground storage sites if proper protection against fuel leakage is

established. The possible energy release of a stochiometric

combustion should be considered as part of the total energy release.

Multi-chamber sites should be arranged and/or sealed in such a way

that fuel-fire or gas explosion should not increase the likelihood of

reaction in neighbouring chambers more than established through

interior distances to prevent detonation transfer.

Ammunition containing Toxic Agents

Because of the difficulties of decontamination underground,

ammunition containing toxic agents should only be stored under

special provisions.

Suspect Ammunition and Explosives

Suspect ammunition and explosives should not be stored.

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Ammunition containing Pyrotechnics

Ammunition containing pyrotechnics, such as illuminating, smoke and

signal ammunition, could in some cases be more vulnerable to

mishaps or self ignition, and thereby increase the likelihood of an

accident. The decision to store ammunition that contains pyrotechnics

underground must be made on a site-specific basis and provisions

must be taken to mitigate the peculiar hazards of pyrotechnic materials.

Ammunition containing Depleted Uranium

Before ammunition containing depleted uranium is permitted in

underground sites, the slight radioactivity and chemical toxicity that

would result from an accidental fire or explosion should be assessed

and accepted.

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Section II - Design

3.2.2.1. General

Planning of new underground storage facilities must account for site

conditions, storage requirements, and operational needs. Only when these are

established can the design be developed. An optimal compromise between the

sometimes-contradictory demands for planning, construction and operation of

storage sites must consider safety, military and cost requirements.

3.2.2.2. Safety Requirements

Operational procedures should be planned and conducted so that, to the

best extent possible, explosives mishaps are prevented. Facility configurations are to

be designed so that, if an explosives mishap should occur, its hazards are mitigated

to acceptable levels. Safety efforts that are essential for ammunition storage sites

include:

Surveillance and maintenance to ensure that only safe ammunition is

stored

Well-designed and environmentally controlled chambers and facilities

to protect the ammunition against unintended events

Suitable structural designs and operating procedures

(doors and

guards, for example) to protect the ammunition against deliberate

action by third parties

Structural designs and operating procedures to

mitigate explosion propagation outside the area of initial

occurrence, and

provide desired levels of personnel, facility, and asset protection

The construction and operation of ammunition storage sites should

only be entrusted to qualified and trained personnel who have clearly

defined responsibilities.

Evaluate a suitable location for the installation taking into account the

site-specific use of surrounding (inhabited buildings, roads, etc.).

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3.2.2.3. Military Requirements

Functional requirements that dictate the geographical location of a storage

site or its storage and transfer capacity, may sometimes run counter to desirable

safety considerations, thereby requiring innovative designs to provide required levels

of explosives safety. Military requirements often involve protection against enemy

weapons, intruder protection, etc.

3.2.2.4. Financial Aspects

The lifetime cost of a storage facility

(construction, operation, and

maintenance) should be considered during the planning phase. Where possible,

designs should be selected that minimize total cost while providing required safety

and operational capabilities.

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Section III - Equipment

3.2.3.1. Humidity Control and Ventilation

High humidity may be a problem in underground sites. Dehumidifying

equipment may then be necessary to control relative humidity to 60%. Certain

types of ammunition may require lower relative humidity

(50%).

The

chambers may be lined with concrete or coated fabric to better control

humidity. The roof lining should be strong enough to withstand minor rock

falls.

The type of transportation equipment used may govern ventilation

requirements. Ventilation shafts to the exterior should be designed to prevent

trespass and sabotage.

3.2.3.2. Electric Installations and Equipment

Electric installations and equipment for underground storage sites should

conform to the national standards of the host nation.

An emergency lighting system should be installed. Otherwise transportable

battery operated lights of an appropriate standard should be provided and

kept at suitable points.

A portion of the personnel employed underground should be equipped with

hand lamps of an appropriate standard.

3.2.3.3. Lightning Protection

An underground storage site does not normally require a system of

protection against lightning. Metal and structural parts of the site which have less

than 0.6 m cover should be protected as for an aboveground site, see Part II,

Chapter

3, Section IV. However, each underground storage site should be

considered individually to take account of possible conducting faults in the cover.

3.2.3.4. Transport and Handling Equipment

Rail vehicles, road vehicles, mobile lifting or stacking appliances and cranes

of the fixed or gantry type, when operated electrically or by diesel engine, may be

permitted in underground storage sites subject to the following conditions:

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Electrical equipment should conform to the national standards of the

host nation for underground storage sites.

Diesel operated equipment should be fitted with an effective means of

preventing sparks or flames from exhaust outlets. Any portion of the

exhaust system or exposed parts of the engine, which may develop a

surface temperature exceeding 100^o C, should be suitably screened to

ensure that all exposed surfaces are below that temperature. If the

engine is to be kept running during loading and unloading within the

storage site, it should conform to the host nation standards for

underground (confined space) operations.

The flash point of the fuel oil for diesel engines should be not less than

55^o C. Fuel tanks should be filled only at authorized places and no

spare fuel should be carried.

Where fuel oil filling stations are authorized in the underground area,

the fuel should be taken underground in strong closed containers in

quantities not exceeding that required for one working day. The filling

station should have a concrete floor with a sill of sufficient height to

contain the quantity of fuel authorized to be stored there.

3.2.3.5. Fire-fighting Equipment

Equipment should conform to the national standards of the host country with

particular consideration given to the following:

Reduce the probability that a small fire will escalate by installing an

automatic smoke-detecting and fire-extinguishing system.

Consideration should be given to protecting reserve water tanks from

potential explosives effects.

An alarm system should be provided to operate throughout the whole

area, both above and below ground.

In air-conditioned sites or in sites provided with forced ventilation, the

need to shut these down on an outbreak of fire must be considered.

Fire-fighting equipment retained underground should be positioned for

accessibility and potential use.

For large underground areas, detector devices, to specify the location

of a fire, and communication capabilities, to issue instruction

throughout the underground facility, should be installed.

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MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES (May 2010) - page 15