Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8)

Glossary

NFPA

National Fire Protection Association

NH3

ammonia

NH4OH

ammonium hydroxide

NIH

National Institutes of Health

NIIMS

National Interagency Incident Management System

NIJ

National Institute of Justice

NIMS

National Incident Management System

NIOSH

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

NMC

National Military Command

NMCC

National Military Command Center

NMRI

Naval Medical Research Institute

no.

number

NOAA

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NORTHCOM

U.S. Northern Command

NOS

National Ocean Service

NPL

National Priorities List

NRC

National Research Council

NRC

National Response Center

NRCC

National Response Coordination Center

NRL

Naval Research Laboratory

NRP

National Response Plan

no standard

NSC

National Security Council

NWS

National Weather Service

OCONUS

outside the continental United States

olive drab

optional form

OJT

on-the-job training

OPCON

operational control

OPFOR

opposing force

OPLAN

operation plan

OPORD

operation order

OPREP

operations report

ops

operations

OSHA

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

ounce(s)

public affairs

PAA

peracetic acid

PACOM

U.S. Pacific Command

Pam

pamphlet

PAO

public affairs office

PAPR

powered air-purifying respirator

Glossary-8

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Glossary

PCE

protective clothing and equipment

PDDA

power-driven decontaminating apparatus

PDDE

power-driven decontaminating equipment

PDS

patient decontamination station

PEL

permissible exposure limit

PIC

pilot in charge

PID

photoionization detector

PINS

portable isotopic neutron spectroscopy

public law

PMCS

preventive maintenance checks and services

PMNSCM

product manager for nonstockpile chemical materiel

POC

point of contact

POL

petroleum, oil, and lubricants

PPE

personal protective equipment

ppm

parts per million

chloropicrin

pint(s)

PTB

position task book

diisopropyl aminoethylmethyl phosphonite

quart

RBC

red blood cell

RCRA

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

RCWM

recovered chemical warfare materiel

reference document

RDECOM

Research, Development, and Engineering Command

RDTE

research, development, test, and evaluation

REL

recommended exposure limit

REPSHIP

report of shipment

RFA

request for assistance

RG-4

Risk Group 4

regional methods

ROTA

release other than attack

RPE

respiratory protective equipment

RRCC

regional response coordination center

RRT

remediation and restoration team

response site

RSDL

reactive skin decontamination lotion

RSP

render-safe procedure

RTECS

Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances

S-2

intelligence staff officer

S-3

operations staff officer

S-4

logistics staff officer

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

Glossary-9

Glossary

arisine

SAR

supplied-air respirator

SARA

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

SCAPA

Subcommittee on Consequence Assessment and Protective Actions

SCBA

self-contained breathing apparatus

SCT

Secretariat of Communications and Transportation of Mexico

SDS

sorbent decontaminant system

sec

second(s)

SecDef

Secretary of Defense

SEI

Safety Equipment Institute

SERPACWA

skin exposure reduction paste against chemical warfare agents

SFEMG

single-fibre electromyography

SFOD

Special Forces operational detachment

SIOC

Strategic Information and Operations Center

SIRA

sampling and identification of radiological agents

SITREP

situation report

SME

subject matter expert

safety officer

SOLAS

Safety of Life at Sea

SOP

standing operating procedure

SPEC

specification

SPEGL

short-term public emergency guidance level

SPIREP

spot intelligence report

SSE

sensitive-site exploitation

SSN

social security number

SSP

site safety plan

STANAG

standardization agreement

STB

super-tropical bleach

STEL

short-term exposure limit

SUPCOM

support command

T&EO

training and evaluation outline

bis(2-[2-chloroethylthio]ethyl)ether

TAP

toxicological agent protective

technical bulletin

tuberculosis

Tbs

tablespoon(s)

TDY

temporary duty

technical escort

TEEL

temporary emergency exposure limit

temp

temperature

TEO

technical escort officer

task force

Glossary-10

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Glossary

TIC

toxic industrial chemicals

TIM

toxic industrial material

TLV

threshold limit value

TLVC

threshold limit value ceiling

team

technical manual

TNT

trinitrotoluene

theater of operation

TOMES

toxicology occupational medicines and environmental sciences

TRADOC

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

TTP

tactics, techniques, and procedures

TWA

time-weighted average

U.S.

United States

unified command

United Nations

URL

uniform resource locator

USACHPPM

U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine

USAF

U.S. Air Force

USAMRICD

U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense

USAMRIID

U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases

USC

U.S. code

USCG

U.S. Coast Guard

USDA

U.S. Department of Agriculture

USG

U.S. Government

USN

U.S. Navy

USPHS

U.S. Public Health Service

UTM

universal transverse mercator

UXO

unexploded ordnance

vulnerability assessment

VOCO

vocal order

a V series nerve agent

WARNORD

warning order

WEE

workplace environmental exposure level

WIA

wounded in action

WMD

weapons of mass destruction

WPL

worker population limit

WPN

weapon

executive officer

yard(s)

yd2

square yard(s)

year (two-digit format)

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

Glossary-11

Glossary

TERMS

area of operations

An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces. Areas of

operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but

should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their

forces. Also called AO. See also area of responsibility. (JP 3-0)

area of responsibility

The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander

has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called AOR. See also combatant command.

(JP 3-0)

assessment

1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities

during military operations. 2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an

effect, or achieving an objective. 3. Analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing

or planned intelligence activity. 4. Judgment of the motives, qualifications, and characteristics of

present or prospective employees or “agents.” (JP 3-0)

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives incidents

An emergency resulting from the deliberate or unintentional, release of nuclear, biological,

radiological, or toxic or poisonous chemical materials, or the detonation of a high-yield explosive.

Also called CBRNE incidents. (JP 3-26)

chemical warfare

All aspects of military operations involving the employment of lethal and incapacitating

munitions/agents and the warning and protective measures associated with such offensive operations.

Since riot control agents and herbicides are not considered to be chemical warfare agents, those two

items will be referred to separately or under the broader term “chemical,” which will be used to

include all types of chemical munitions/agents collectively. Also called CW. (JP 3-11)

civil defense

All those activities and measures designed or undertaken to: a. minimize the effects upon the civilian

population caused or which would be caused by an enemy attack on the United States; b. deal with the

immediate emergency conditions that would be created by any such attack; and c. effectuate

emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or

damaged by any such attack. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority)

Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code,

section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless

otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command

authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those

functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and

forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of

military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the

command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of

subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force

commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command

authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant

commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in

combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. See also operational control. (JP 0

command and control

The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and

attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed

through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures

Glossary-12

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Glossary

employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations

in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 0-2)

command post

A unit’s or subunit’s headquarters where the commander and the staff perform their activities. In

combat, a unit’s or subunit’s headquarters is often divided into echelons; the echelon in which the unit

or subunit commander is located or from which such commander operates is called a command post.

Also called CP. (JP 1-02)

concept plan

In the context of joint operation planning level 3 planning detail, an operation plan in an abbreviated

format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into a complete operation

plan or operation order. Also called CONPLAN. See also operation plan. (JP 5-0)

consequence management

Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting

from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. Also called CM.

(JP 3-26)

continental United States

United States territory, including the adjacent territorial waters,. located within North America

between Canada and Mexico. Also called CONUS. (JP 1-02)

course of action

1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A possible plan open to an

individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of the mission.

3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission. 4. A line of conduct in an engagement. 5. A

product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase and the

course-of-action determination steps of the joint operation planning process. Also called COA. (JP 5

crisis management

Measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or

resolve a threat or an act of terrorism. It is predominantly a law enforcement response, normally

executed under federal law. Also called CrM. (JP 3-26)

debarkation

The unloading of troops, equipment, or supplies from a ship or aircraft. (JP 1-02)

Department of the Army

The executive part of the Department of the Army at the seat of government and all field headquarters,

forces, Reserve Components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of

the Secretary of the Army. Also called DA. (JP 1-02)

direct support

A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to

the supported force’s request for assistance. Also called DS. (JP 3-09.1)

embarkation

The process of putting personnel and/or vehicles and their associated stores and equipment into ships

and/or aircraft. (JP 1-02)

explosive ordnance

All munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials, and biological and chemical

agents. This includes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket, and

small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes, and depth charges; demolition charges; pyrotechnics;

clusters and dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices;

clandestine and improvised explosive devices; and all similar or related items or components explosive

in nature. (JP 1-02)

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

Glossary-13

Glossary

explosive ordnance disposal

The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of

unexploded explosive ordnance. It may also include explosive ordnance which has become hazardous

by damage or deterioration. Also called EOD. (JP 1-02)

force protection

Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to

include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not

include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP.

(JP 3-0)

health service support

All services performed, provided, or arranged to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or

physical well-being of personnel. These services include, but are not limited to, the management of

health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and facilities; preventive and curative health

measures; evacuation of the wounded, injured, or sick; selection of the medically fit and disposition of

the medically unfit; blood management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat

stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, nutrition therapy, and medical

intelligence services. Also called HSS. (JP 4-02)

homeland defense

The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure

against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. Also called HD.

(JP 3-0)

homeland security

Homeland security, as defined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security, is a concerted national

effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism,

and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. The Department of Defense

contributes to homeland security through its military missions overseas, homeland defense, and

support to civil authorities. Also called HS. (JP 3-26)

host country

A nation which permits, either by written agreement or official invitation, government representatives

and/or agencies of another nation to operate, under specified conditions, within its borders. (JP 2-01.2)

improvised explosive device

A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious,

pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may

incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components. Also called IED.

(JP 3-07.2)

incident

In information operations, an assessed event of attempted entry, unauthorized entry, or an information

attack on an automated information system. It includes unauthorized probing and browsing; disruption

or denial of service; altered or destroyed input, processing, storage, or output of information; or

changes to information system hardware, firmware, or software characteristics with or without the

users’ knowledge, instruction, or intent. (JP 3-13)

incident command system

A standardized on-scene emergency management organization that reflects the complexity and

demands of single or multiple incidents, without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. The

incident command system is the combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and

communications operating with a common organizational structure, designed to aid in the management

of resources during incidents. The incident command system is used for all kinds of emergencies and

is applicable to small as well as large and complex incidents. The incident command system is used by

various jurisdictions and functional agencies, both public and private, or organized fieldlevel incident

management operations. Also called ICS. (JP 3-41)

Glossary-14

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Glossary

joint publication

A publication containing joint doctrine that is prepared under the direction and authority of the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and applies to all Armed Forces of the United States. Also called

JP. (CJCSI 5120.02A)

lead federal agency

The federal agency that leads and coordinates the overall federal response to an emergency.

Designation and responsibilities of a lead federal agency vary according to the type of emergency and

the agency’s statutory authority. Also called LFA. (JP 3-26)

materiel

All items (including ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, etc., and related spares, repair parts,

and support equipment, but excluding real property, installations, and utilities) necessary to equip,

operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction as to its application for

administrative or combat purposes. (JP 1-02)

mission-oriented protective posture

A flexible system of protection against nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination. This posture

requires personnel to wear only that protective clothing and equipment (mission-oriented protective

posture gear) appropriate to the threat level, work rate imposed by the mission, temperature, and

humidity. Also called MOPP. (JP 3-11)

on-scene commander

1. An individual in the immediate vicinity of an isolating event who temporarily assumes command of

the incident. 2. The federal officer designated to direct federal crisis and consequence management

efforts at the scene of a terrorist or weapons of mass destruction incident. Also called OSC. (JP 3-50)

operational control

Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of

combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and

may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands,

the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will

relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the

authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and

employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative

direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction

over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to

the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate

organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and

Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full

authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in

operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself,

include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal

organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. See also combatant command (command

authority). (JP 0-2)

operation plan

1. Any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in response to actual and potential

contingencies. 2. In the context of joint operation planning level 4 planning detail, a complete and

detailed joint plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to

the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment data. It identifies the specific forces, functional

support, and resources required to execute the plan and provide closure estimates for their flow into

the theater. Also called OPLAN. (JP 5-0)

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

Glossary-15

Glossary

personal protective equipment

The equipment provided to shield or isolate a person from the chemical, physical, and thermal hazards

that can be encountered at a hazardous materials incident. Personal protective quipment includes both

personal protective clothing and respiratory protection. Adequate personal protective equipment

should protect the respiratory system, skin, face, hands, feet, head, body, and hearing. Also called

PPE. (NFPA 472)

personnel

Those individuals required in either a military or civilian capacity to accomplish the assigned mission.

(JP 1-02)

preventive maintenance

The care and servicing by personnel for the purpose of maintaining equipment and facilities in

satisfactory operating condition by providing for systematic inspection, detection, and correction of

incipient failures either before they occur or before they develop into major defects. (JP 1-02)

reachback

The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or equipment, or material from

organizations that are not forward deployed. (JP 3-30)

risk assessment

The identification and assessment of hazards (first two steps of risk management process). (JP 1-02)

risk management

The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and

making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Also called RM. (JP 3-0)

security

1. Measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself against all acts designed

to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition that results from the establishment and

maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences.

3. With respect to classified matter, the condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having

access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security. (JP 1-02)

sensitive site exploitation

A related series of activities inside a captured sensitive site to exploit personnel documents, electronic

data, and material captured at the site, while neutralizing any threat posed by the site or its contents.

Also called SSE. (JP 3-31)

technical escort

An individual technically qualified and properly equipped to accompany designated material requiring

a high degree of safety or security during shipment. (JP 1-02)

toxic

Capable of producing illness, injury, or damage to humans, domestic livestock, wildlife, or other

organisms through ingestion, inhalation, or absorption through any body surface. (FM 3-110.4)

toxic industrial biological

Any biological material manufactured, used, transported, or stored by industrial, medical, or

commercial processes. For example: infectious waste and as biological samples (e.g., biopsies, disease

for research). Also called TIB. (JP 3-41)

toxic industrial chemical

Any chemical manufactured, used, transported, or stored by industrial, medical, or commercial

processes. For example: pesticides, petrochemicals, fertilizers, corrosives, poisons, etc. Also called

TIC. (JP 3-41)

Glossary-16

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Glossary

toxic industrial hazard

The hazards resulting from the release, by any means, of toxic industrial materials, resulting in

contamination or irradiation of personnel or the environment area or any particular object. Also called

TIH. See also toxic. (FM 3-100.4)

toxic industrial material

Any toxic industrial material manufactured, stored, transported, or used in industrial or commercial

processes. It includes toxic industrial chemicals, toxic industrial radiologicals, and toxic industrial

biologicals. Also called TIM. (JP 3-41)

toxic industrial radiological

Any radiological material manufactured, used, transported, or stored by industrial, medical, or

commercial processes. For example: spent fuel rods, medical sources, etc. Also called TIR. (JP 3-41)

vulnerability assessment

A Department of Defense, command, or unit-level evaluation (assessment) to determine the

vulnerability of a terrorist attack against an installation, unit, exercise, port, ship, residence, facility, or

other site. Identifies areas of improvement to withstand, mitigate, or deter acts of violence or terrorism.

Also called VA. (JP 3-07.2)

weapons of mass destruction

Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to

destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear,

biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling

the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP

1-02)

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

Glossary-17

References

SOURCES USED

3M™ Respirator Selection Guide, 3M^TM Occupational Health and Environmental Safety Division,

December 2006.

AR 11-34, The Army Respiratory Protection Program, 15 February 1990.

AR 40-5, Preventive Medicine, 25 May 2007.

AR 40-12, Quarantine Regulations of the Armed Forces, 24 January 1992.

AR 40-13, Medical Support—Nuclear/Chemical Accidents and Incidents, 1 February 1985.

AR 50-5, Nuclear Surety, 1 August 2000.

AR 50-6, Chemical Surety, 26 June 2001.

AR 75-15, Policy for Explosive Ordnance Disposal, 22 February 2005.

AR 95-27, Operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Materials, 11 November 1994.

AR 190-14, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties, 12 March 1993.

AR 190-56, The Army Civilian Police and Security Guard Program, 27 September 2006.

AR 190-59, Chemical Agent Security Program, 11 September 2006.

AR 200-2, Environmental Effects of Army Actions, 23 December 1988.

AR 360-1, The Army Public Affairs Program, 15 September 2000.

AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security Program, 29 September 2000.

AR 380-86, Classification of Former Chemical Warfare, Chemical and Biological Defense, and Nuclear,

Biological, Chemical Contamination Survivability Information, 22 June 2005.

AR 385-10, The Army Safety Program, 23 August 2007.

AR 385-61, The Army Chemical Agents Safety Program, 12 October 2001.

AR 385-69, Biological Defense Safety Program, 31 December 1993.

CFR, Title 9, Section 122, Organisms and Vectors, 1 January 2007.

CFR, Title 32, Section 626, Biological Defense Safety Program, 1 July 2006.

CFR, Title 29, Section 1910, Occupational Safety and Health Standards, 1 July 2006.

CFR, Title

32, Section

627, The Biological Defense Safety Program, Technical Safety Requirements,

(DA Pam 385-69), 1 July 2006.

CFR, Title 40, Sections 260-279, Environmental Protection Agency, 1 July 2006.

CFR, Title 40, Section 300, National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 1 July 2006.

CFR, Title 42, Section 72, Interstate Shipment of Etiologic Agents, 1 October 2006.

CFR, Title 49, Transportation, 1 October 2006.

CJCSM 3150.03B, Joint Reporting Structure Event and Incident Reports, 28 July 2003.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and

on Their Destruction, 29 April 1997.

DA Pam 40-8, Occupational Health Guidelines for the Evaluation and Control of Occupational Exposure to

Nerve Agents GA, GB, GD, and VX, 4 December 1990.

DA Pam 40-173, Occupational Health Guidelines for the Evaluation and Control of Occupational Exposure to

Mustard Agents H, HD, and HT, 3 June 2003.

DA Pam 50-6, Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations, 26 March 2003.

DA Pam 385-61, Toxic Chemical Agent Safety Standards, 27 March 2002.

DA Pam 385-69, Biological Defense Safety Program, 31 December 1993.

DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 87-116, NIOSH Guide to Industrial Respiratory Protection, September 1987.

DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 90-109, A Guide for Evaluating the Performance of Chemical Protective

Clothing, June 1990.

DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 96-101, NIOSH Guide to the Selection and Use of Particulate Respirators,

January 1996.

DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 99-143, TB Respiratory Protection Program in Health Care Facilities—

Administrator’s Guide, September 1999.

DLAM 1000.2, Occupational and Environmental Health Respiratory Protection Program, February 1982.

DOD 3150.8-M, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP), February 2005.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

References-1

References

DOD 4500.9-R, Defense Transportation Regulation, date varies per part.

DODD 3150.5, DOD Response to Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents, 24 March 1987.

DODD 3150.8, DOD Response to Radiological Accidents, 13 June 1996.

DODD 4650.2, Military Affiliate Radio System (MARS), 26 January 1998.

DODD 5230.16, Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs (PA) Guidance, 20 December 1993.

DOD-NIOSH-OSHA-Sponsored Chemical and Biological Respiratory Protection Workshop Report, National

Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, February 2000.

EA-C-1704, Carbon, Activated, Impregnated, Copper-Silver-Zinc-Molybdenum-Triethylenediamine (ASZM-

TEDA), U.S. Army Edgewood Research, Development, and Engineer Center (ERDEC), January 1992.

EM 1110-1-502, Engineering and Design—Technical Guidelines for Hazardous and Toxic Waste Treatment

and Cleanup Activities, 30 April 1994.

Emergency Response Planning Guidelines, American Industrial Hygiene Association, 2006

Extremely Hazardous Substances Chemical Profiles and Emergency First Aid Guides, Environmental

Protection Agency, April 2003.

Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Federal Emergency Mangement Agency, 1 May 1996.

FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, 21 September 2004.

FM 3-11.3, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and

Nuclear Contamination Avoidance, 2 February 2006.

FM 3-11.4, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)

Protection, 2 June 2003.

FM 3-11.5, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and

Nuclear Decontamination, 4 April 2006.

FM 3-11.19, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

Reconnaissance, 30 July 2004.

FM 3-11.21, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects

of Consequence Management, 12 December 2001.

FM 3-11.22, Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures,

6 June 2003.

FM 3-11.86, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Biological Surveillance, 4 October 2004.

FM 3-19.30, Physical Security, 8 January 2001.

FM 3-100.4, Environmental Considerations in Military Operations, 15 June 2000.

FM 3-100.12, Risk Management for Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 15 February 2001.

FM 4-02, Force Health Protection in a Global Environment, 13 February 2003.

FM 4-02.1, Combat Health Logistics, 28 September 2001.

FM 4-02.4, Medical Platoon Leaders' Handbook, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 24 August 2001.

FM 4-02.6, The Medical Company, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 1 August 2002.

FM 4-02.7, Health Service Support in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment, Tactics, Techniques

and Procedures, 1 October 2002.

FM 4-02.10, Theater Hospitalization, 3 January 2005.

FM 4-02.17, Preventive Medicine Services, 28 August 2000.

FM 4-02.18, Veterinary Services Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 30 December 2004.

FM 4-02.24, Area Support Medical Battalion, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 28 August 2000.

FM 4-02.33, Control of Communicable Diseases Manual (18th Edition), 1 June 2005.

FM 4-02.283, Treatment of Nuclear and Radiological Casualties, 20 December 2001.

FM 8-284, Treatment of Biological Warfare Agent Casualties, 17 July 2000.

FM 8-285, Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries,

22 December 1995.

FM 8-55, Planning for Health Service Support, 19 September 1994.

FM 8-500, Hazardous Materials Injuries: A Manual for Pre-Hospital Care (Fourth Edition), 17 January 1997.

FM 34-54, Technical Intelligence, 30 January 1998.

FM 100-14, Risk Management, 23 April 1998.

FM 101-5-2, U.S. Army Report and Message Formats, 29 June 1999.

FR, Volume 68, pages 58348-58351, Final Recommendations for Protecting Human Health From Potential

Adverse Effects of Exposure to Agents GA (Tabun), GB (Sarin), and VX, 9 October 2003.

High Production Volume Voluntary Challenge Chemical List, Environmental Protection Agency, undated.

References-2

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

References

HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, 28 February 2003.

Initial National Response Plan, Department of Homeland Security, September 2003.

International Classification of Diseases, World Health Organization, 1990.

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 74, 1 November 1974.

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001.

JP 3-26, Homeland Security, 2 August 2005.

Managing Hazardous Material Incidents(Volumes I, II, and III), Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease

Registry, 2001.

MARPOL 73/78, Marine Pollution Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships, 1973, as modified

by Protocol of 1978.

MIL-SPEC-C-51560, Canister, Chemical—Biological Mask: C2A1, 29 September 2005.

MIL-SPEC-C-51251, Cloth, Coated; CBR Protective, 8 February 1989.

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NFPA 1006, Standard for Rescue Technician Professional Qualifications, 2003.

NFPA 1991, Standard on Vapor-Protective Ensembles for Hazardous Materials Emergencies, 2005.

NFPA 1992, Standard on Liquid Splash-Protective Ensembles and Clothing for Hazardous Materials

Emergencies, 2005.

NFPA 1994, Standard on Protective Ensembles for First Responders to CBRN Terrorism Incidents, 2007.

NIJ Guide 102-00, Guide for the Selection of Personal Protective Equipment for Emergency First Responders

(Volumes I, IIa, IIb, and IIc), November 2002.

NIOSH Publication No. 2005-149, Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, September 2005.

North American Emergency Response Guidebook, U.S. Department of Transportation, Transport Canada, and

Secretariate of Transport and Communications (Mexico), 2004.

PL 93-288, Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (as codified at 42 USC 68),

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PL 94-580, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (as codified at 42 USC 6901-6992k), 21 October 1976.

PL 96-510, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (as codified at

42 USC 9601-9675), 11 December 1980.

PL 99-499, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

(as codified at

42 USC 9601-9675) and

Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act

(as codified at

42 USC 110011-11005),

17 October 1986.

PL 101-549, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (as codified at 42 USC 7401-7671), 15 November 1990.

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STANAG 2195, Handling of Captured Personnel, Equipment, and Documents, 28 February 2002.

STANAG 4359, NATO Handbook for the Sampling and Identification o f Chemical Warfare Agents, 29

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STANAG 4590, Sampling and Identification of Radiological Agents (SIRA), 15 January 2004.

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The National Strategy for Homeland Security, Office of Homeland Security, July 2002.

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TM 38-250, Preparing Hazardous Materials for Military Air Shipments, 12 October 2004.

TM 60A-1-1-11, Chemical/Biological (CB) Agents and Released Materials: Characteristics, Leak Sealing,

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USC, Title 10, Section 3012, Department of the Army: Seal, updated 2000.

USC, Title 18, Section 1385, Posse Comitatus Act, updated 2000.

USC, Title 42, Chapter 68, Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, updated 2000.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

References-3

References

USC, Title 42, Sections 6901-6992k, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, updated 2000.

USC, Title 42, Sections 7401-7671, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 2000.

USC, Title 50, Sections 1512-1517, War and National Defense, updated 2000.

USC, Title 42, Sections 9601-9675, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

and Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, updated 2000.

USC, Title 42, Sections 11001-11005, Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, updated 2000.

Web Sites:

Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Hazardous Substance Release and Health Effects

Database, <http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/hazdat.html >, accessed on 16 May 2007.

Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Managing Hazardous Material Incidents,

<http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/MHMI/ >, accessed on 18 May 2007.

Army Knowledge Online, <https://www.us.army.mil >, accessed on 15 May 2007.

Army Training Information Architecture, <http://www.train.army.mil >, accessed on 15 May 2007.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Web site with links to information about respirators,

<http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/respinfo.html >, accessed on 18 May 2007.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear; Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus; National Institute

for Occupational Safety and Health Approved Respirators, <http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npptl/topics/

respirators/cbrnapproved/scba/default.html>, accessed on 18 May 2007.

DOD-NIOSH-OSHA-Sponsored Chemical and Biological Respiratory Protection Workshop Report,

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Homeland Security, Standards and Guidelines, <http://www.dhs.gov/xfrstresp/standards >, accessed on

18 May 2007.

Incident Command System Site Safety Plan, <http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/ics/pdf/ics_uscg_ssp_

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National Fire Protection Association, Codes and Standards, <http://www.nfpa.org/aboutthecodes/list_of_

codes_and_standards.asp>, accessed on 17 May 2007.

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, A Guide for Evaluating the Performance of

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National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards,

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National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Documentation for Immediately Dangerous to Life

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National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Guide to Industrial Respiratory Protection,

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National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Guide to the Selection and Use of Particulate

Respirators, <http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/userguid.html >, accessed on 18 May 2007.

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Recommendations for Chemical Protective Clothing

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National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, TB Respiratory Protection Program in Health Care

Facilities—Administrator’s Guide, <http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/99-143.html >, accessed on 18 May

2007.

National Institute of Justice, Guide for the Selection of Personal Protective Equipment for Emergency First

Responders, <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/191518.htm >, accessed on 18 May 2007.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), <http://www.noaa.gov/ >, accessed on

17 May 2007.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Emergency Preparedness and Response,

<http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/emergencyresponse/index.html >, accessed on 18 May 2007.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Hospitals and Community Emergency Response—What

You Need to Know, <http://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3152/osha3152.html >, accessed on

18 May 2007.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Incident Command System, <http://www.osha.gov/

SLTC/etools/ics/ics_tasks.html#ops>, accessed on 17 May 2007.

References-4

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

References

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Regulations (Standards—Title 19, Code of Federal

Regulations), Personal Protective Equipment Requirements, <http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/

owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9777>, accessed on 18 May 2007.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Regulations (Standards—Title 29, Code of Federal

Regulations), <http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owasrch.search_form?p_doc_type=STANDARDS&p_

toc_level=0&p_keyvalue=>, accessed on 17 May 2007.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Safety and Health Topics—Bloodborne Pathogens and

Needlestick Prevention, <http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/bloodbornepathogens/index.html >, accessed on

18 May 2007.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Safety and Health Topics—Personal Protective Equipment,

<http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/personalprotectiveequipment/index.html >, accessed on 18 May 2007.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Safety and Health Topics—Respiratory Protection,

<http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/respiratoryprotection/index.html >, accessed on 17 May 2007.

Safety Equipment Institute, Certified Product List, <http://www.seinet.org/CPL/contents.htm >, accessed on

17 May 2007.

U.S. Army Chemical School Knowledge Network, <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/409522 >, accessed

on 19 June 2007.

U.S. Department of Transportation, Chemical Hazards Response Information System,

<http://www.chrismanual.com >, accessed on 16 May 2007.

U.S. Department of Transportation, Transport Canada, and the Secretariat of Communications and

Transportation of Mexico, North American Emergency Response Guidebook,

http://hazmat.dot.gov/pubs/

erg/gydebook.htm>, accessed 18 May 2007.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Extremely Hazardous Substance Chemical Profiles and Emergency

First Aid Guides, <http://www.epa.gov/swercepp/ehs/ehslist.html >, accessed on 16 May 2007.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, High Production Volume Challenge Program, <http://www.

epa.gov/opptintr/chemrtk/index.htm>, accessed on 16 May 2007.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Integrated Risk Information System, <http://www.epa.gov/

iris/index.html>, accessed 16 May 2007.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Regional Methods Program, <http://epa.gov/osp/regions/

rm.htm>, accessed 16 May 2007.

U.S. National Institutes of Health, Hazardous Substances Data Bank Fact Sheet,

<http://www.nlm.nih.gov/pubs/factsheets/hsdbfs.html >, accessed on 16 May 2007.

REQUIRED DOCUMENTS

DA Form 1594, Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log.

DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document.

DD Form 626, Motor Vehicle Inspection (Transporting Hazardous Materials).

DD Form 1149, Requisition and Invoice/Shipping Document.

DD Form 1911, Materiel Courier Receipt.

DD Form 2795, Predeployment Health Assessment.

DD Form 2890, DOD Multimodal Dangerous Goods Declaration.

DD Form 2890C, DOD Multimodal Dangerous Goods Declaration (Continuation Sheet).

OF 346, U.S. Government Motor Vehicle Operator’s Identification Card.

RECOMMENDED READING

AFMAN 91-201, Explosives Safety Standards, 18 October 2001.

AR 11-9, The Army Radiation Safety Program, 28 May 1999.

AR 40-61, Medical Logistics Policies, 28 January 2005.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

References-5

References

AR 55-80, DOD Transportation Engineering Program, 17 November 2003.

AR 55-162, Permits for Oversize, Overweight, or Other Special Military Movements on Public Highways in the

United States, 1 January 1979.

AR 59-9, Special Assignment Airlift Mission Requirements, 5 March 1985.

AR 200-1, Environmental Protection and Enhancement, 21 February 1997.

AR 385-64, U.S. Army Explosives Safety Program, 1 February 2000.

AR 525-13, Antiterrorism, 4 January 2002.

AR 700-141, Hazardous Materials Information Resource System, 28 May 2004.

AR 700-143, Packaging of Hazardous Material, 14 January 2000.

AR 710-2, Supply Policy Below the National Level, 8 July 2005.

CFR, Title 10, Energy, updated 1 January 2007.

CFR, Title 14, Aeronautics and Space, updated 1 January 2007.

CFR, Title 23, Highways, updated 1 April 2007.

CFR, Title 32, National Defense, updated 1 July 2006.

CFR, Title 33, Navigation and Navigable Waters, updated 1 July 2006.

CFR, Title 41, Public Contracts and Property Management, updated 1 July 2006.

CFR, Title 46, Shipping, updated 1 October 2006.

DA Pam 385-64, Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards, 15 December 1999.

DOD Roles and Missions in Homeland Security, Volume II-A: Supporting Reports, Department of Defense,

May 2004.

DODD 5210.56, Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by DOD Personnel Engaged in Law

Enforcement and Security Duties, 1 November 2001.

Fire Protection Guide to Hazardous Materials, National Fire Protection Association, 2001.

FM 3-6, Field Behavior of NBC Agents (Including Smoke and Incendiaries), 3 November 1986.

FM 3-11, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense

Operations, 10 March 2003.

FM 3-11.9, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, 10 January 2005.

FM 3-11.14, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

Vulnerability Assessment, 28 December 2004.

FM 3-11.34, Multiservice Procedures for Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Defense of Theater Fixed

Sites, Ports and Airfields, 29 September 2000.

FM 4-25.11, First Aid, 23 December 2002.

FM 5-250, Explosives and Demolitions, 30 July 1998.

FM 8-9, NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations AMedP-6(B), 1 February

1996.

Implementation Guidance Policy for New Airborne Exposures Limits for GB, GA, GD, GF, VX, H, HD, and

HT, Department of the Army memorandum, 18 June 2004.

Installation Environmental Program Management Guide, U. S. Army Environmental Center, March 2002.

JAR 75-14, Interservice Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal, 14 February 1992.

JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, 8 July 2004.

National Incident Management System, Department of Homeland Security, 1 March 2004.

NAVORD OP5, Ammunition and Explosives Ashore Safety Regulation for Handling, Storing, Production,

Renovation, and Shipping, August 1990.

PL 93-579, Privacy Act of 1974 (as codified at 5 USC 552a), 31 December 1974.

PL 91-121, Military Procurement Authorization Act of 1970, 1970.

PL 91-141, DOD Military Procurement Act of 1971, 1971.

Reference Document (RD) 230, Chemical Exposure Guidelines for Deployed Military Personnel (Version 1.3),

U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, updated May 2003.

SB 3-30, Chemical Materiel (Other Than Class V) Storage Serviceability Standard, February 1974.

Special Permit 868 (no title; Coast Guard).

Special Permit 21.36 (no title; Coast Guard).

STANAG 2002, Warning Signs for the Marking of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Contaminations,

28 March 2006.

STANAG 2047, Emergency Alarms of Hazard or Attack (NBC and Air Attack Only), 24 July 1998.

References-6

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

References

STANAG 2103, Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical Attacks, and Predicting and

Warning of Associated Hazards and Hazard Areas (Operator’s Manual), 01 December 2005.

STANAG 2112, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance, 12 September 2005.

STANAG 2133, Vulnerability Analysis of Chemical and Biological Hazards, 9 March 2004.

STANAG 2143, Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance/Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOR/EOD),

16 September 2005.

STANAG 2353, Evaluation of NBC Defence Capability, 6 March 2000.

STANAG 2389, Minimum Standards of Proficiency for Trained Explosive Ordnance Disposal Personnel,

4 December 1987.

STANAG 2984, Graduated Levels of NBC Threat and Associated Protection, 19 March 2001.

STANAG 3400, Restraint of Cargo in Fixed-Wing Aircraft, 17 June 1983.

STANAG 3854, Policies and Procedures Governing the Air Transportation of Dangerous Cargo,

February 1988.

TC 3-11-55, Joint Services Lightweight Integrated-Suit Technology (JSLIST), 1 July 2001.

TC 3-15, Nuclear Accident and Incident Response and Assistance (NAIRA), 27 December 1988.

TC 3-34.489, The Soldier and the Environment, 8 May 2001.

TM 3-4240-346-10, Operator’s Manual for Chemical-Biological Mask: Field, M40A1; Chemical-Biological

Mask: Combat Vehicle, M42A2, 1 August 1998.

TM 3-6665-268-10, Operator’s Manual for Sampling Kit, CBR Agent M34, 6 September 1968.

TM 3-6665-343-10, Operator’s Manual for Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM), 13 February 2004.

TM 3-6665-356-12, Operator’s and Unit Maintenance Manual for Detector Kit, Chemical, 15 October 1999.

TM 5-315, Firefighting and Rescue Procedures in Theaters of Operations, 20 April 1971.

TM 9-1300-214, Military Explosives, 20 September 1984.

TM 9-1300-275/1, Technical Escort Movement Procedures, 2 January 1971.

TM 9-1300-275/2, Technical Escort Information on Chemical Agents and Decontaminating Procedures,

2 January 1971.

TM 9-1300-275/3, Technical Escort Containment Procedures, 2 January 1971.

TM 10-8415-209-10, Operator’s Manual for Individual Chemical Protective Clothing, 31 March 1993.

TM 10-8415-220-10, Operator Manual for Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST)

Chemical Protective Ensemble, 1 September 1998.

TM 38-410, Storage and Handling of Hazardous Materials, 13 January 1999.

TM 55-315, Transportability Guidance for Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, 23 June 1989.

USC, Title 5, Section 552a, Privacy Act of 1974, updated 2000.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

References-7

Index

exposure limit,

7-1,

7-7, A-14,

B-2, B-4, B-13, B-15, B-16,

A-30, B-14, B-18, C-1, C-2,

B-17, C-6, C-10, E-16, E-17,

AAR, 2-10, 4-11, E-40

C-3, C-5, C-6, C-10

E-18, E-19

after-action report. See AAR.

MOPP, 2-12, B-1, B-2, B-3

AO, 2-5, 2-8 2-12, 3-2, 3-5, 7-1,

munitions assessment, 1-2, 2-2,

7-2

2-6, 7-1

force protection. See FP.

AOR, 2-8, 3-3, 3-5

FP, 3-3, 3-7, A-23, E-4

area of operation. See AO.

area of responsibility. See AOR.

National Response Plan. See

NRP.

ground escort, 6-3

NRP, 2-1, 2-8, 4-1, 8-2, A-1, A-4,

A-6

biological warfare. See BW.

BW, 5-1, 5-4, B-7, B-14, B-15,

hazard characterization, 4-1, 4-7

B-16, B-17

organization, 2-1, 2-8, 3-1, 3-2,

HD, 1-1, 1-3, 2-9, 8-1, 8-2

4-1,

5-2,

7-4,

7-5,

8-1, A-1,

homeland defense. See HD.

A-4, A-6, A-9, A-13, A-14,

A-15, A-22, A-25, A-26, E-30

chemical warfare. See CW.

civil support. See CS.

ICS, 2-7, 4-1, 4-3, A-1, A-8, A-9,

command and support, 2-1, 2-12

A-12, A-13, A-14, A-15, A-16,

personal protective equipment.

confined space, 2-7, 4-10, A-27,

See PPE.

A-21, A-22, A-26

B-17

personnel training, 2-6, 2-11, 4-8

IED, 8-2, 8-3, 9-1, 9-2, 9-3, 9-4,

planning,

1-1,

2-1,

2-10,

2-11,

contamination control,

4-8,

4-9,

9-5, 9-6

2-12, 2-13, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4,

A-24

improvised explosive device.

3-5, 3-7, 4-3, 4-6, 4-10, 4-12,

CS, 3-7, 9-5, A-22, C-2

See IED.

6-1,

7-2,

7-3,

7-4, A-1, A-9,

CW, 2-8, 5-1, B-7, B-12, B-13,

A-13, A-14, A-16, A-17, A-18,

incident command system. See

C-1, C-6

A-19, A-23, A-24, A-26, B-13,

ICS.

C-3, E-1, E-24, E-30,

PPE, 2-2,

2-7,

2-12,

4-5,

4-6,

4-8,

4-9,

6-5,

6-6,

7-1,

7-5,

decontaminants,

1-2,

2-2,

2-5,

A-14, A-16, A-23, A-24, A-25,

limitations, 1-2, 2-12, A-28, B-4

A-27, A-28, A-29, A-30, A-32,

2-6,

2-7,

2-12, 3-1, 4-2, 4-5,

B-1, B-2, B-7, B-10, B-13,

4-6,

4-7,

4-8,

6-6,

7-1,

7-5,

B-14, B-15, B-16, B-17, B-18,

8-2,

8-3, A-15, A-16, A-22,

B-19, C-1, C-7, C-8

A-23, A-25, B-11, D-1, D-4,

mission, 1-1, 1-2, 2-1, 2-2, 2-5,

PPE selection, 4-7, B-18, C-1

D-5, D-6, D-7, D-8, D-10,

2-6, 2-7, 2-9, 2-10, 2-11, 2-12,

D-11, D-12, D-13, D-14, D-15,

2-13, 3-1,

3-2,

3-3,

4-1,

4-8,

D-16, D-18, D-20, E-15

4-9,

4-10, 5-4,

6-1,

6-3,

6-5,

disablement, 1-1, 1-2, 2-2, 2-6,

7-1,

7-2,

7-3,

7-4,

7-5,

8-1,

2-11, 7-2

8-2,

8-3,

9-6,

9-7, A-1, A-7,

reach-back, 1-1, 2-2, 2-11, 7-5,

A-8, A-9, A-24, A-26, A-30,

7-6, 8-3, A-6, A-17, A-18, A-26

B-2, C-8, E-1, E-2, E-30

request for support, 1-3, 2-1, 2-7,

mission-oriented

protective

7-6

elimination,

1-1,

1-2,

2-2,

2-6,

posture. See MOPP.

response, 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 2-1, 2-5,

2-11, 7-2

mitigation, 1-2, 2-2, 2-5, 2-6, 4-4,

2-6, 2-7, 2-8, 2-9, 2-10, 2-12,

environmental

considerations,

5-4, 8-1, A-3, A-9

2-13, 4-1,

4-2,

4-3,

4-4,

4-5,

2-12, 4-9, 4-10

4-6, 4-7, 4-12, 4-13, 5-1, 5-2,

monitoring,

1-1,

1-2,

2-2,

2-5,

escort,

2-5,

2-7,

2-8,

5-3,

6-1,

5-4,

6-5,

7-2,

7-3,

7-5,

7-6,

3-1,

3-6,

4-4,

4-5,

4-7,

4-8,

6-2,

6-3,

6-4,

6-5,

6-6,

7-1,

7-7,

7-8,

8-1,

8-2,

8-3,

9-1,

4-10, 5-1,

5-4,

6-2,

7-1,

7-2,

9-5, A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-6,

A-30, E-1, E-2

A-8, A-14, A-16, A-18, A-19,

A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10, A-13,

A-23, A-28, A-29, A-32, B-1,

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

Index-1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

*FM 2-91.4

Field Manual

Headquarters

Department of the Army

No. 2-91.4

Washington, DC, (Draft)

Intelligence Support to Urban Operations

Contents

Page

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1

INTELLIGENCE AND THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

1-1

Civil Considerations (ASCOPE)

1-1

Terrain and Weather

1-2

Society (Socio-Cultural)

1-18

Infrastructure

1-25

Chapter 2

THE THREAT IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

2-1

Conventional Military and Paramilitary Forces

2-1

Insurgents or Guerrillas

2-3

Terrorists

2-4

Crime and Criminal Organizations

2-5

Information Operations

2-6

Health Issues

2-8

Other Urban Concerns

2-9

Chapter 3

INFORMATION SOURCES IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

3-1

Scouts, Snipers, Reconnaissance

3-1

Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only because it requires

protection in accordance with AR 380-5 and as specified by DCS G-3 Message DTG 091913Z Mar 04. This

determination was made on

7 January

2007. Contractor and other requests must be referred to

ATTN: ATZS-CDI-D, US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7017, or via email at

ATZS-

FDC-D@conus.army.mil.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE--Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or

reconstruction of the document.

*This publication supersedes FMI 2-91.4, March 2005.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Contents

Special Operations Forces

3-2

Engineers

3-2

Medical

3-2

Aviation

3-3

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

3-4

Air Defense Artillery

3-4

Civil Affairs

3-4

Psychological Operations Teams

3-4

Military Police

3-5

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

3-5

Transportation And Logistics

3-5

Civilian Linguists And Local Hires

3-6

Joint/DOD

3-6

Multinational

3-7

International and Intergovernmental Organizations

3-7

Non-Governmental Organizations

3-8

Local National Authorities

3-8

Chapter 4

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION DISCIPLINES IN THE URBAN

ENVIRONMENT

4-1

Human Intelligence

4-1

Imagery Intelligence

4-2

Signals Intelligence

4-3

Measurement and Signature Intelligence

4-3

Counterintelligence

4-4

Geospatial Intelligence

4-5

Technical Intelligence

4-6

Open-Source Intelligence

4-6

Geospatial Information

4-8

Chapter 5

OPERATIONS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

5-1

Plan

5-1

Prepare

5-3

Execute

5-3

Assess

5-4

Appendix A

URBAN INTELIGENCE TOOLS AND PRODUCTS

A-1

Appendix B

NON-US SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS EFFECTS IN THE

URBAN ENVIRONMENT

B-1

GLOSSARY

Glossary-1

REFERENCES

References-1

INDEX

Index-1

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Contents

Figures

Figure 1-1. Keys to understanding the urban environment

1-2

Figure 1-2. Urban layout patterns

1-5

Figure 1-3. Funnel-fan effect

1-7

Figure 1-4. The multidimensional urban battlefield

1-10

Figure A-1. Example pattern analysis plot sheet

A-2

Figure A-2. Example link diagram

A-3

Figure A-3. Example association matrix

A-4

Figure A-4. Example relationship matrix

A-6

Figure A-5. Example activities matrix

A-7

Figure A-6. Example time event chart

A-8

Figure A-7. Perception assessment matrix

A-11

Figure A-8. Population status overlay

A-31

Figure A-9. Example roof cover overlay

A-33

Figure A-10. Combined UTOG/UTFO (simplified example)

A-34

Figure A-11. Example of imagery and urban models

A-36

Tables

Table 1-1. Urban pattern effects

1-6

Table 1-2. Street patterns and effects

1-9

Table 1-3. Some key urban structural types

1-15

Table 1-4. Example information requirements for individual buildings

1-16

Table 1-5. Example information requirements for populations

1-21

Table 1-6. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure

1-28

Table 1-7. Example information requirements for communications infrastructure

1-36

Table 1-8. Example intelligence requirements for energy infrastructure

1-38

Table 1-9. Example information requirements for water and

waste disposal infrastructure

1-40

Table 1-10. Example information requirements for resources and

material production infrastructure

1-41

Table 1-11. Example information requirements for food distribution infrastructure

1-41

Table 1-12. Example information requirements for medical infrastructure

1-42

Table 1-13. Example of information requirements for law enforcement

and firefighting instructions

1-43

Table 1-14. Example information requirements for crisis management

and civil defense infrastructure

1-44

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Table 1-15. Example information requirements

for subterranean infrastructure

1-44

Table 2-1. Example information requirements for conventional

military and paramilitary forces

2-2

Table 2-2. Example information requirements for insurgent and guerrilla forces

2-4

Table 2-3. Example information requirements for terrorist threats

2-5

Table 2-4. Example information requirements for criminal threats

2-6

Table 2-5. Example information requirements for information operations threats

2-8

Table 5-1. Basic intelligence consideration factors in the urban environment

5-2

Table A-1. Example civil affairs assessment

A-12

Table B-1. Rifles, machine, and submachine guns

B-2

Table B-2. Grenade launchers

B-3

Table B-3. Antitank guided missiles

B-4

Table B-4. Antitank grenade launchers (RPGs)

B-5

Table B-5. Artillery

B-6

Table B-6. Antiaircraft

B-7

Table B-7. Weapons systems on helicopters

B-8

Table B-8. Acronyms used in the tables

B-8

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Preface

This Field Manual (FM)⎯

• Expands and clarifies the doctrinal foundation found in FM 3-06 and JP 3-06 for Intelligence

Support to Operations in the Urban Environment.

• Incorporates intelligence and operational doctrine and terminology from FM

3-06 and

FM 3-06.11.

• Provides intelligence professionals a basic framework within which to focus on providing

commanders with effective intelligence support for their operations in the urban environment.

This manual is designed primarily for the intelligence staffs and soldiers of units conducting intelligence

support to operations in the urban environment. It can also be used by commanders, staffs, and intelligence

personnel at all echelons, and applies equally to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National

Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

US Training and Doctrine Command is the proponent for this publication. The preparing agency is the US

Army Intelligence Center and School. We welcome your command and recommended changes. Please email

them directly to the proponent at ATZS-FDC-D@conus.army.mil, or mail them to: Commander, ATTN:

ATZS-CDI-D, US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, 550 Cibeque Street, Fort Huachuca, AZ

85613-7017.

This publication does not contain copyrighted material.

Unless otherwise stated, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

January 2008 (Draft)

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Introduction

With the continuing growth in the world’s urban areas and increasing population concentrations in urban

areas, the probability that the US Army will conduct full spectrum operations in urban environments is ever

more likely. As urbanization has changed the demographic landscape, potential enemies recognize the

inherent danger and complexity of this environment to the attacker, and may view it as their best chance to

negate the technological and firepower advantages of modernized opponents. Given the global population

trends and the likely strategies and tactics of future threats, Army forces will likely conduct operations in,

around, and over urban areas—not as a matter of fate, but as a deliberate choice linked to national security

objectives and strategy. Stability operations--where keeping the social structure, economic structure, and

political support institutions intact and functioning or having to almost simultaneously provide the services

associated with those structures and institutions is the primary mission--may dominate urban operations.

This requires specific and timely intelligence support, placing a tremendous demand on the Intelligence

warfighting functions for operations, short-term planning, and long-term planning.

Providing intelligence support to operations in the complex urban environment can be quite challenging

and may at first seem overwhelming. The amount of detail required for operations in urban environments,

along with the large amounts of varied information required to provide intelligence support to these

operations, can be daunting. Intelligence professionals must be flexible and adaptive in applying doctrine

and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and

support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC).

As with operations in any environment, a key to providing good intelligence support in the urban

environment lies in identifying and focusing on the critical information required for each specific mission.

The complexity of the urban environment requires focused intelligence, and a comprehensive framework

must be established to support the commander’s requirements while managing the vast amount of

information and intelligence required for urban operations. By addressing the issues and considerations

listed in this manual, the commander, G-2/S-2, and intelligence analyst will be able to address most of the

critical aspects of the urban environment and identify both the gaps in the intelligence collection effort and

those systems and procedures that may answer them. This will assist the commander in correctly

identifying enemy actions so that US forces can focus on the enemy and seize the initiative while

maintaining an understanding of the overall situation.

FM 3-06.11 and FM 3-06 provide supporting material relevant to this FM.

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Intelligence and the Urban Environment

1-1. The special considerations that must be taken into account in any operation in an urban environment

go well beyond the uniqueness of the urban terrain. JP 3-06 identifies three distinguishing characteristics of

the urban environment: physical terrain, population, and infrastructure. Also, FM 3-06 identifies three key

overlapping and interdependent components of the urban environment: terrain (natural and manmade),

society, and the supporting infrastructure.

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS (ASCOPE)

1-2. Normally the factors used in the planning and execution of tactical military missions are evaluated as

METT-TC. Due to the importance of civil considerations (the letter “C” in METT-TC) in urban operations,

those factors are discussed first in this manual. Civil considerations comprise the influence of manmade

infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and

organizations within an area of operation (AO) on the conduct of military operations. They are a factor in

all types of military operations: offense, defense, stability, and civil support. If the military’s mission is to

support civil authorities, civil considerations define the mission.

1-3. An appreciation of civil considerations and the ability to analyze their impact on operations enhances

several aspects of urban operations--among them, the selection of objectives; location, movement, and

control of forces; use of weapons; and force protection (FP) measures. Civil considerations comprise six

characteristics, expressed in the mnemonic ASCOPE:

Areas.

Structures.

Capabilities.

Organizations.

People.

Events.

1-4. ASCOPE factors, in conjunction with the components of the urban environment, provide a useful

structure for intelligence personnel to begin to focus their intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)

and organize the huge undertaking of providing intelligence to operations in the urban environment. They

should not be considered as separate entities but rather as interdependent. Understanding this

interrelationship of systems provides focus for the intelligence analyst and allows the commander a greater

understanding of the urban area in question. (See Figure 1-1.)

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Figure 1-1. Keys to understanding the urban environment

TERRAIN AND WEATHER

TERRAIN

1-5. Terrain in the urban environment is complex and challenging. It possesses all the characteristics of

the natural landscape, coupled with manmade construction, resulting in a complicated and fluid

environment that influences the conduct of military operations in unique ways. Urban areas, the populace

within them, their expectations and perceptions, and the activities performed within their boundaries form

the economic, political, and cultural focus for the surrounding areas. What military planners must consider

for “urban” areas may range from a few dozen dwellings surrounded by farmland to major metropolitan

cities.

1-6. Prior to conducting operations in urban areas, it is critical to understand the terrain. Much of the

difficulty and confusion with planning and conducting operations in the urban environment results from a

basic lack of understanding of the common characteristics of urban terrain. Order does exist in the urban

environment and characteristics can be quantified, or at least described sufficiently, to enable planning.

1-7. Density of construction and population, street patterns, compartmentalization, affluent and poor

sections, modernization, and presence of utility systems characterize all cities of the world. The differences

in urban areas are in size, level of development, and style.

1-8. Due to the historical impact of colonization over centuries, most major cities throughout the world

have European characteristics. They have combination street patterns, distinct economic and ethnic

sections, and areas known as shantytowns--all of which present potential obstacles, or at least challenges,

to operations.

1-9. Variations in cities are caused mainly by differences in economic development, government policies,

and cultural needs. Some urban trends include high-rise apartments, reinforced concrete construction,

1-2

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truck- related industrial storage, shopping centers, detached buildings, suburbs at outer edges, apartment

complexes, and major subterranean infrastructure that support the city.

1-10. Urban topography is an elaborate combination of horizontal, vertical, interior, and exterior forms

superimposed on a landscape’s natural relief, drainage, and vegetation. Urban areas may range from a few

dozen dwellings to major metropolitan areas. A city may be technologically advanced or developing. Most

cities feature many construction styles and building materials, each with its own texture and strength.

Concrete and steel high-rise structures may stand alongside tin or wooden shacks. Additionally, lines of

communication (LOCs) often consist of a confusing array of roads, alleys, bridges, elevated roadways,

subway tunnels, rail systems, drainage canals, and sewer networks.

1-11. In the close confines of urban areas, small arms and light weapons (such as rocket-propelled

grenades) can have a dramatic effect. Urban operations can radically alter the physical nature of the terrain.

For example, the walls and roofs may collapse on some buildings, or whole city blocks may be destroyed

or burned down, leaving only piles of rubble. These effects can be tactically significant, as some key

terrain features completely disappear and fields of fire open and close.

1-12. Buildings affect wave propagation, thus degrading friendly command and control (C2) and some

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) efforts. While streets provide the means for rapid

advance or withdrawal, military vehicles moving along streets are often channeled by buildings and have

little space for maneuver. Because they are more difficult to bypass, obstacles on streets in urbanized areas

are usually more effective than those on roads in open terrain. Forced to maneuver through congested city

streets, US forces must account for the volume of vehicle and pedestrian traffic. Operating forces should

expect noncombatants to inadvertently or intentionally constrain fire and movement.

1-13. Small teams of enemy combatants can rapidly assimilate themselves within the urban population. In

order to limit the possibility of excessive collateral damage in relation to the direct military advantage

anticipated, US forces may use conservative collateral estimation methodologies and fire control measures

which may limit some lethal options and require more detailed planning and coordination, as well as

authorization from higher levels of command.

1-14. Urban areas are usually regional centers of finance, politics, transportation, industry, and culture.

They have population concentrations ranging from several thousand up to millions of people. The larger

the city, the greater its regional influence. Because of their psychological, political, and/or logistical value,

control of regionally important cities has often led to pitched battle scenes. In the last 40 years, many cities

have expanded dramatically, losing their well-defined boundaries as they extend into the countryside.

Transportation systems (highways, canals, and railroads) are built to connect population centers. Industries

grow along these connectors, creating "strip areas." Rural areas, although retaining much of their farm-like

character, are connected to towns by a network of secondary roads. Not all connecting roads are paved, let

alone depicted on maps.

1-15. Urban terrain is a unique environment that provides both attacker and defender with numerous

avenues of approach (AAs) and fields of fire. Urban terrain is divided into four basic levels. Operations

can be conducted from all of these levels, and most operations will include actions on all levels

simultaneously.

Air.

Supersurface.

Surface.

Subsurface.

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Chapter 1

Urban Areas

1-16. As defined in FM 3-06, urban areas are generally classified as--

Megalopolis - (population over 10 million).

Metropolis - (population between 1 to 10 million).

City - (population 100,000 to 1 million).

Town or small city - (population 3,000 to 100,000).

Village - (population < 3,000).

Urban Patterns

1-17. Manmade terrain in the urban environment is overlaid on the natural terrain of the area, and

manmade patterns are affected by the underlying natural terrain. It can be useful to keep the underlying

natural terrain in mind when analyzing the manmade patterns of the urban environment. For example,

roads will often follow the contours of the underlying terrain and parks may be built in areas unsuitable to

building construction such as flood plains. Four major urban patterns can influence operations in the urban

environment. (See Figure 1-2.)

1-18. Hub and Satellite Patterns.

Central to two of the patterns (satellite and network) is the hub, or dominant urban area or

pattern, around which outlying urban areas or patterns radiate.

(A segmented urban area,

because it tends to be a larger urban area, can often be a hub.) In offensive and defensive

operations, the hub serves as a pivot or strong point; as such, it often becomes a major obstacle

to an attacker. If the attacker chooses to bypass the urban area (hub) located along his axis of

advance without first isolating the area, he may expose his flank to attack from the hub as well

as dependent urban areas or subordinate satellite patterns. Because the focus of stability

operations and civil support operations is on people, commanders understand the value and

influence of the hub to the economic, political, or cultural well being of the surrounding area.

Whether or not a hub, commanders must remember that urban areas are not islands; all are

connected to the surrounding rural

(and other urban) areas through fluid and permeable

boundaries and LOCs.

The satellite pattern consists of a central hub surrounded by smaller, dependent urban areas.

LOCs tend to converge on the hub. The natural terrain throughout this pattern is relatively

homogenous. Outlying areas often support the principal urban area at the hub with means of

reinforcement, resupply, and evacuation. In some instances, they may serve as mutually

supporting battle positions. Commanders should consider the effects of the outlying urban AOs

within the hub and, conversely, the effects of operations within the hub on outlying urban areas.

Information operations (IO), for example, targeted primarily at the hub of a satellite pattern may

subsequently influence outlying urban areas and achieve necessary effects without having to

commit specific resources to these areas.

1-4

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Figure 1-2. Urban layout patterns

1-19. Network Pattern. The network pattern represents the interlocking of the primary hubs of subordinate

satellite patterns. Its elements are more self-sufficient and less supportive of each other, although a

dominant hub may exist. Major LOCs in a network extend more than in a satellite pattern and take more of

a rectangular rather than a convergent form. Its natural terrain may vary more than in a single satellite

array. Operations in one area may or may not easily influence, or be influenced by, other urban areas in the

pattern.

1-20. Linear Pattern. Potentially a sub-element of the network and satellite patterns, the linear pattern may

form one ray of the satellite pattern or be found along connecting links between the hubs of a network.

Most frequently, this pattern results from the stringing of minor urban areas along a confined natural

terrain corridor, such as an elongated valley, a body of water, or a manmade communications route. In

offensive and defensive operations, this latter form of the linear pattern facilitates developing a series of

strong defensive positions in depth, effectively blocking or delaying an attacking force moving along the

canalized terrain.

1-21. Segment Pattern. When dominant natural terrain (such as a river) divides an urban area, it creates a

segmented pattern. This pattern often makes it easier for commanders to assign AOs to subordinate

commanders. However, this pattern may fragment operations and increase risk to an operation requiring

mutual support between subordinate units. The segmented urban areas may allow commanders to isolate

threats more easily in these areas and focus operations within segments that contain their decisive points.

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Although an integral part of the whole (the urban area), each segment may develop distinct social,

economic, cultural, and political characteristics. This social segmenting may benefit commanders faced

with limited assets to influence or control the urban populace. A thorough analysis of the society may

allow the intelligence analyst to help the commander focus IO and populace and resources control

measures against only specific segments that affect decisive operations. Analysts should consider how

isolating segments or just monitoring segments for any significant changes in the attitudes, beliefs, or

actions of the civilians located there may aid in mission accomplishment.

Pattern Effects

1-22. There are three major urban pattern effects: blocking, funnel, and funnel-fans. (See Table 1-1.) The

consequences of maneuvering military units within the urban patterns identified in Table

1-1 will

significantly effect combat operations. In addition to the basic blocking action caused by the hub

phenomenon, other effects can be associated with urban patterns. See Figure 1-3 for an example of the

funnel-fan effect.

Table 1-1. Urban pattern effects

1-6

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Intelligence and the Urban Environment

Figure 1-3. Funnel-fan effect

Urban Functional Zones

1-23. To provide an accurate depiction of an urban area, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of its

numerous physical subdivisions or zones. These zones are functional in nature and reflect “where”

something routinely occurs within the urban area. The structure of these zones will vary from country to

country. For example, a country book may describe Yongin, South Korea, “as a typical Korean city with

cities within a city, a city core, urban sprawl, and outlying industry.” Another country book might describe

Cologne, Germany, as “a typical German city with narrow streets, circular configuration, and low terrain."

Both definitions are accurate but provide little practical use to the analyst. What is required is a more

substantial definition of these urban zones as well as employment of standardized terminology. (Refer to

FM 3-06 for a more detailed discussion of the zones.) The following defines the urban functional zones:

Core: The core is the heart of the urban area, the downtown or central business district. It is

relatively small and compact, but contains a larger percentage of the urban area’s shops, offices,

and public institutions. It will also normally house the highest density of multi-story buildings

and subterranean features.

Core Periphery: This area is located at the edges of the core. Generally, it has undergone less

change than the core resulting in buildings of uniform height (generally two to three stories in

towns and five to ten stories in larger cities).

Industrial Area: Industrial areas often developed on the outskirts of the urban areas where

commercial transportation is easiest (along airfields and major sea, river, rail, and highway

routes). The dispersed pattern of the buildings provides sufficient space for large cargoes,

trucks, and material-handling equipment. These areas may provide ideal sites for logistic bases

and maintenance sites. Multi-story structures usually have reinforced concrete floors and

ceilings. Additionally, the industrial area may include large storage areas of chemicals,

petroleum products, fertilizers, and other toxic materials. In the more advanced states many of

these areas have been abandoned or have undergone change to another type of zone as the

industrial areas have moved.

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High-Rise Area: High-rise areas consist of multi-storied apartments, commercial offices, and

businesses separated by large open areas such as parking lots, parks, sports arenas, and smaller

single-story structures. High-rise buildings are framed, light-clad construction, with thin walls of

brick, lightweight concrete, or glass.

Residential Area: Residential areas can be found dispersed throughout the urban area; however,

large suburban areas (or sprawl) normally form on the outskirts of the city proper. Residential

areas often consist of row houses or single-family dwellings set in a grid or ringed pattern within

a planned development project. It may also include many of the urban area’s supporting

infrastructure (power, water, communications).

Commercial Ribbon Area: Commercial ribbon areas include rows of stores, shops, and

restaurants built along both sides of major streets that run through and between urban areas and

often serve to connect one urban area to another. Structures here are usually smaller than those

found in the industrial and high-rise areas but larger than those found in residential areas (three

to five stories).

Military Areas: Fortifications and military installations are found everywhere in the world and

should be given special consideration because they have been specifically built for military

purposes. Permanent-type fortifications can be made of earth, wood, rock, brick, concrete, steel-

reinforced concrete, or any combination of the above. Some of the latest variants have been built

underground and employ heavy tank or warship armor, major caliber and other weapons,

internal communications, service facilities, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

(CBRN) overpressure systems. Many of the Baltic States possess long coastlines relative to their

overall size. To meet their defensive needs, they have developed coast defense works that

include extensive subterranean facilities, many contiguous to urban areas. Other nations share

borders with potentially hostile neighbors. North Korea is a prime example, with numerous

hardened artillery, missile, and C2 facilities along both of its coasts as well as along the

demilitarized zone. The analyst should also realize that even if depicted as “inactive,” these

fortifications might be rapidly modified to their original role and even if not activated they may

still serve as choke points and obstacles. Finally, even if hardened fortifications are not present,

many cities include large military garrisons. Examples of cities with large military garrisons

include Capetown, South Africa (Table Mountain), and Seoul, South Korea.

Street Patterns

1-24. The development of street patterns within a given urban environment can be attributed to an

architect’s deliberate design, natural features, and manmade structures that serve in various capacities.

Geographers have identified at least eight major street patterns with any number of variations. Table 1-2

shows these major street patterns.

1-25. These patterns exist for trafficability in daily life but also can be significant during military

operations. The core areas of both Paris and Washington, DC, were originally laid out in a rayed pattern to

maximize the defensibility of the government buildings. These were later modified to radial and radial-ring

patterns. During Russian operations in Grozny, the Chechnyans used the city’s street patterns to maximize

their ability to strike at Russian armor while at the same time minimizing the Russians’ ability to return

massed fires.

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1-27. FM 3-06 addresses the multidimensional battlefield and identifies the dimensions that must be

considered as air, supersurface, surface, and subsurface. Although spatially separated, each dimension is

interrelated and may be used as an AA or mobility corridor, LOC, or engagement area. The elements of the

multidimensional urban battlefield are depicted in Figure 1-4. [For analytical purposes, the “air” dimension

can be grouped into the supersurface dimension.]

Figure 1-4. The multidimensional urban battlefield

1-28. Supersurface. For analytical purposes, the supersurface consists of all areas above the surface level

in an urban environment. These areas include the internal floors or levels (intrasurface areas), external

roofs or tops of buildings, stadiums, towers, or other vertical structures, and the airspace. They can provide

cover and concealment; limit or enhance observation and fields of fire; and restrict, canalize, or block

movement. However, forces can move within and between intrasurface areas creating additional, although

normally secondary, AAs. Buildings--

Provide cover and concealment.

Limit or increase observation and fields of fire.

Canalize, restrict, or slow movement of forces, especially mechanized forces.

Can adversely affect the employment of Special Operations Forces

(SOF) and airmobile

insertion of infantry due to the number of powerlines, clotheslines, antennas, and other

obstructions that may exist, especially on rooftops.

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1-29. Provide optimal locations (via roofs and intrasurface areas) with excellent cover and concealment for

snipers, lightweight, handheld antitank weapons, and Manportable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS),

enabling top-down attacks against the weakest points of armored vehicles and unsuspecting aircraft.

1-30. Engineers must provide an analysis of buildings for their structural integrity and obstacles. Such

obstacles include electrical wires, antennas, and enemy emplaced mines (although personnel may be

inserted by jumping, rappelling, or fast roping from a hovering helicopter and extracted by hoist

mechanisms). Rooftops may offer ideal locations for landing helicopters for employment of anti-helicopter

mines. Some rooftops are designed as helipads. Overall, elevated firing positions reduce the value of any

cover in surrounding open areas and permit engagement at close range without risk of immediate close

assault. The supersurface and subsurface dimensions require commanders to think, plan, and execute

ground operations vertically as well as horizontally. The complex terrain aspects of urban operations share

strong similarities with mountain operations. (See FM 3-97.6.)

1-31. Aircraft and aerial munitions use the airspace as rapid AAs in urbanized areas. Forces can use

aviation assets for observation and reconnaissance, aerial attack, or high-speed insertion and extraction of

soldiers, supplies, and equipment. Some surface obstacles, such as rubble, do not affect aviation assets.

However, buildings of varying height and the increased density of towers, signs, power lines, and other

urban constructions create obstacles to flight and the trajectory of many munitions (masking). These

obstacles can limit low-altitude maneuverability in the urban airspace. Excellent cover and concealment

afforded enemy gunners in an urban area increase aviation vulnerability to small arms and MANPADS,

particularly when supporting ground forces.

1-32. Surface. FM 3-06 defines surface areas as exterior ground level areas such as parking lots, airfields,

highways, streets, sidewalks, fields, and parks. For purposes of analysis, the ground floor of buildings

should also be considered as part of the surface dimension. Because ground vehicles can directly access a

structure’s ground floor, analysts must consider them part of the surface dimension. Analysts must also

consider the surface of waterways as part of the surface dimension.

1-33. Streets often provide primary AAs and the means for rapid advance. However, buildings and other

structures often canalize forces moving along them. As such, obstacles on urban surface areas usually have

more effect than those in open terrain since bypass often requires entering and transiting buildings or

radical changes to selected routes. Where urban areas abut the ocean or sea, large lakes, and major rivers,

the surface of these bodies of water may provide key friendly and threat AAs or essential LOCs and,

therefore, may be a significant consideration for Army commanders. As such, amphibious and river-

crossing operations may be an integral part of the overall urban operation.

1-34. Larger open areas--such as stadiums, sports fields, school playgrounds, and parking lots--are often

critical areas during urban operations. They can provide locations for displaced civilians, interrogation

centers, and enemy prisoner of war (EPW) holding facilities, and detainee holding areas (DHAs). These

areas also can afford suitable aircraft landing zones (LZs) and pickup zones (PZs) and artillery firing

locations. They can provide logistic support areas and aerial resupply possibilities because they are often

centrally located.

1-35. Subsurface. These areas are below surface level. This dimension includes areas both below the

ground and below water. (For example the Han River is a major AA in Seoul and can be infiltrated at the

surface level or subsurface level.) These areas may serve as secondary and, in fewer instances, primary

AAs at lower tactical levels. When thoroughly reconnoitered and controlled, they offer excellent covered

and concealed LOCs for moving supplies and evacuating casualties. These areas may also provide sites for

caching and stockpiling supplies.

1-36. Subsurface areas include the subways, tunnels, sewers, drainage systems, cellars, civil defense

shelters, and other various underground utility systems. In older cities, they may include ancient hand-dug

tunnels and catacombs. Both attacker and defender can use subsurface areas to gain surprise and maneuver

against the rear and flanks of a threat and to conduct ambushes. However, these areas are often the most

restrictive and easiest to defend or block. Their effectiveness depends on superior knowledge of their

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existence and overall design. Army commanders and analysts may need to consider potential AAs afforded

by the subsurface areas of rivers and major bodies of water that border urban areas. This particularly

applies when operating as part of a joint task force (JTF) task organized with SOF or when opposing a

threat with similar capabilities.

Mobility Corridors

1-37. Each element of the urban environment’s multidimensional battlefield identified in Figure 1-4 may

be used as AAs, mobility corridors, and LOCs. They are predominantly used as mobility corridors within a

larger AA. The mobility corridors

(supersurface

[to include air], surface, and subsurface) are used

individually, in any combination, or simultaneously. In the urban environment, multiple vertical mobility

corridors can combine in a horizontal AA. Finally, their use as mobility corridors, either in offensive or

defensive roles, can trigger other battlefield effects

(either lethal or non-lethal) across any or all

dimensions. For example, soldiers may move from the roof of one building to that of another. Depending

on the exact location of the soldiers involved, they may acquire an extended line of sight, be subjected to

increased dead spaces, or just the opposite, be able to establish an engagement area. This situation is

enhanced if multiple mobility corridors are opened (for example, simultaneous attacks from rooftops,

through interior walls, along the street, and through access tunnels).

During Israeli operations against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the

summer of 2002, Israel Defense Force (IDF) commanders found that casualties were

reduced and operations conducted more efficiently if soldiers breached the outer

walls of structures and entered buildings on their interior floors. This is an example of

reducing an obstacle and creating a mobility corridor.

Avenues of Approach

1-38. FM 1-02 states that an AA is “an air or ground route of an attacking force of a given size leading to

its objective or to key terrain in its path.” Within a single urban AA, there may literally be hundreds of

mobility corridors. This level of complexity will require analysts to develop (through extensive analysis) a

thorough understanding of the size, pattern, and types of maneuver space available in their AOI.

Lines of Communication

1-39. All key LOCs bordering on or within the urban environment must be identified. Analysts must

consider obstacles and rubble that may reduce mobility within a given LOC. LOCs include all routes (land,

water, and air) that connect an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies

and military forces move. The advent of digital communications has further expanded this definition to

reflect telegraph and telephone lines, cell phones, radio (all types), television, digital satellite links, the

Internet, data passed to and from other satellite systems

(signals intelligence

[SIGINT] and global

positioning system [GPS]), and laser communications.

1-40. In the larger cities, manmade LOCs may include hundreds of streets, alleys, rail lines, subways,

tunnels, and even canals. Analysts must prioritize their effort by focusing on those LOCs most critical to

mission success. They must identify key LOCs as they apply to friendly, enemy, and the civilian

population.

1-41. LOCs often cross terrain that is relatively impractical for off-road vehicular traffic and as such are

heavily dependent on bridges, ramps, and overpasses. If these support systems (choke points) can be

destroyed, damaged, or blocked, the LOCs may become useless. LOC trafficability estimates must consider

information from all available sources to include reconnaissance reports, imagery, and combat assessments.

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Engagement Areas

1-42. An engagement area is “an area where the commander intends to contain and destroy an enemy

force with the massed effects of all available weapons and supporting systems.” (FM 1-02) In the

multidimensional urban environment, defenders can position forces in protected and mutually supportive

positions. This allows defending forces to maximize the effects of their combat power in the complex

terrain.

1-43. Engagement areas can be located almost anywhere in the urban environment from narrow streets,

turns in a road, “T” intersections in roads, bridges, tunnels, split-level roads, open-city squares or plazas,

rubbled areas, individual buildings, or even individual floors in buildings. Engagement areas can also be

created in less obvious locations by using demolitions or mines or other obstacles which can shape an

engagement area by creating impassable (countermobility) obstacles in urban canyons as well as clearing

fields of fire that may not otherwise be available.

1-44. Urban combat is often characterized by very short ranges and denser and smaller engagement areas.

Relatively few well-positioned defenders can generate significant combat power. Without the positional

advantage and the corresponding protective effects of the terrain, attacking forces often must mass

numbers to achieve necessary combat power.

Line of Sight

1-45. Digital or analog communications LOCs have important line-of-sight issues. Depending on the

situation, LOCs may or may not be affected by line-of-sight limitations. This may mean that because of an

obstacle (hill or building) between two points, it may be impossible to acquire line of sight on a target or

communications emitter. Failure to anticipate interference with line of sight can have catastrophic results.

This occurred at Grozny where Russian forces were trapped among the city’s taller buildings and lost their

line of sight. Subsequently, they lost or experienced degraded communications with their supporting units.

Line of sight also impacts observation and fields of fire. Finally, line-of-sight constraints within the urban

environment are not one but three-dimensional (3D) and must be addressed from all directions, both

vertically and horizontally.

1-46. Unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) can prove instrumental in overcoming many of the ground-based

line-of-sight restrictions. During Israel’s incursion into Lebanon in 1983, the IDF employed unmanned

aerial vehicles as digital retransmission platforms, among other roles.

1-47. The use of satellite and landline communications may mitigate many line-of-sight problems. Satellite

phones, such as International Maritime Satellite phones, tend to provide more consistent communications

in urban areas. Additionally, “suitcase” digital, satellite, and burst transmission systems have proven

effective in the urban environment. Some of these systems have the added capability of allowing real-time

imagery of selected targets to be passed to the user.

Structural Types

1-48. While the city’s structures serve as the focal point of the inhabitant’s work and living areas, religious

or cultural facilities, and sports arenas, they may also be significant to military operations conducted there.

Some of the most important structures and their importance are identified in Table 1-3.

1-49. Today, especially in many third-world nations, the mix of new and old structures could create

problems for any military force operating there. Ancient temples and fortifications may stand back-to-back

with modern skyscrapers and high rise apartments. Port facilities, unique themselves, may stand next to the

remnants of huge defensive walls that in turn may encircle all or part of the city.

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Signal degradation is proportional to structural density, the height of the buildings,

and other urban terrain factors. For purposes of audio and video line of sight

(FM/UHF), the linear distances are less important than the structural density and

disruption of the line of sight between given points. This means it is difficult to

maintain consistent communications

(for example, in the heart of a major

metropolitan area) Even when the situation does not involve armed conflict, effective

use of FM/UHF radios may be impaired by interference from trolley and other

electrical lines. Some of these systems can generate up to 300 times the interference

over normal atmospheric interference on the UHF band. Russian experience in

Grozny showed that it was better to dedicate one radio to communicate with each

separate subunit rather than to try communicating over a net. As for the use of wire-

based systems, they are as they have always been, effective but susceptible to

intrusion, damage, or destruction, especially in a large city where “digging them in” is

not an option.

1-50. Structural composition is also important. Tank rounds fired into rooms occupied by snipers may pass

all the way through buildings without exploding but in the process killing and wounding noncombatants in

other rooms.

1-51. As another example, some of the ancient churches and other structures in the area, made of thick

stone blocks, proved resistant to even heavy machine gun fire while the walls of more modern business and

apartment complexes were easily penetrated by rifle fire and shrapnel.

1-52. Finally, there are differences in floor plans. Many structures, especially older ones, have intricate

passageways, underground tunnels, exceptionally low or high ceilings, and other features not common in

the United States. Local nationals--especially individuals that work in the buildings

(for example,

maintenance personnel), individuals involved in city planning, individuals having access to building plans,

assistance from Combat Engineers, and other means--may prove valuable when obtaining information and

conducting intelligence analysis on key structures.

1-53. Detailed information is usually required when planning and conducting operations on individual

buildings. The degree of detail needed in such missions is reflected in Table

1-4. The design and

construction of buildings within a particular urban area are influenced by numerous factors to include

climate, materials available, function, and cultural development of the region. Combat Engineers can

usually provide information on the key characteristics of a building. Some of these key characteristics may

be--

Relative protective value offered by building construction materials. (Appendix C provides a

general evaluation of small arms and light weapons effects against some common urban

construction materials.)

Level of force required to breach a building’s external and internal walls, roof, or floors.

Availability of internal LOCs.

Potential fire hazards.

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Table 1-3. Some key urban structural types

Structural Type

Importance

Churches, hospitals, medical facilities,

These are protected places under the Geneva Conventions

and cemeteries.

and usually declared “No-Fire Areas.” However, intelligence

which indicates the misuse of these and other protected

places may make them lawful targets. Additionally, the

location of hospitals is important planning information for

both civilian and military casualties.

Sewer systems, subways,

Underground systems can provide infiltration routes.

underground water systems, elevated

Elevated systems and mass transit routes provide exposed

railways, utilities, mass transportation

LOCs between city sectors while also offering points for

routes.

good observation and fields for fire. Utility facilities are key

targets for insurgents, terrorists, and others; their destruction

can hinder the capabilities of defending forces, destabilize

an area and affect the civilian population.

Stadiums, sports fields, playgrounds

Provides excellent DHAs. Can be used as helipads,

sheltered petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL), and

ammunition storage areas.

Public baths, swimming pools,

Serves as an alternate water source in case public water

cisterns and reservoirs

supplies break down. Allows water for washing and other

sanitary needs.

Construction sites, lumber yards,

Can serve as machine repair, obstacle construction facilities

other commercial operations

and material, and supports general engineer operations.

Hazardous material, industrial

Presents a hazard to both sides in an operation and must be

manufacturing and storage facilities,

accounted for. Dams, dikes, levies, and nuclear or electrical

and other work and installations

generating stations need to be protected from attack. The

containing dangerous forces.

attack or destruction of these facilities can cause excessive

civilian injury or damage by the release of dangerous forces.

Purpose-built fortifications

Can range from fortresses built by the Crusaders through

modern underground facilities built to survive the Cold War’s

nuclear scare. The build of these, however, will be of the

period 1870-1914. They may include both missiles and

heavy caliber weapons and may pose a variety of threats to

any military force.

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Table 1-4. Example information requirements for individual buildings

General Building Information

Identify basements/cellars.

Provide general building information.

Location of entrance.

Location.

Staircase location.

Type.

Dimensions.

Number of stories.

Use.

Date of construction.

Identify attic spaces.

Type of building construction.

Location.

Ownership.

Location of staircase.

Occupants.

Dimensions.

Obtain building blueprints or documents.

Use.

Obtain photographs or other imagery of the

Field of view from the attic.

outside of the building and surrounding area.

Identify ventilation system.

Identify individuals with knowledge of the

Location.

building interior (building engineer, building

Exhaust fans.

maintenance personnel, other.).

Pipes.

Note the general proximity to other structures.

Chimney.

- Location.

Identify Building Specifications

- Dimension.

Identify building dimensions.

- Composition.

Identify the external and internal doors.

- Opening inside.

Location.

Identify stairwells.

Dimensions.

Location.

Type of material.

Type.

Composition.

Identify roof.

Windows.

Size.

Location of hinges.

Material.

Method of opening (do the doors open

Access to interior.

outwards or inwards?)

Obstructions.

Locks.

Identify elevators.

Identify windows.

Location.

Locations.

Dimensions.

Type of construction materials.

Location of control box.

Dimensions.

Mechanism for opening elevator inside

Method of locking.

shaft.

Do the windows open in, out to the side, or

Maintenance access routes.

up and down?

Describe the subterranean spaces.

Mouse-holes.

Sewers.

- Location.

Subways.

- Dimensions.

Basements/cellars.

Identify hallways.

Other utility tunnels

Location.

Examine the building’s utility and communication

Width.

systems.

Length.

Determine types of utilities used in the building.

Number of doors.

Determine whether utilities can be regulated

Overhead openings.

from outside the building.

Areas the hallway connects.

Locate the utility control box or switches.

Identify closet spaces.

Identify the building’s telephones.

Location.

Dimensions.

Number.

Method of opening.

Type.

Identify crawl spaces.

Describe other means of communication.

Location.

Radios.

Dimensions.

Internet.

Openings.

Cell phones.

Description.

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Table 1-4. Example information requirements for individual buildings (continued)

Examine building construction.

- Whether walls are reinforced.

Pattern of construction.

Support structure.

Composition of the outer wall (whether small

Insulation used in the walls (whether it is

arms will penetrate).

flammable).

Composition of inner walls.

- Whether small arms will

penetrate.

1-54. Non-US Small Arms and Light Weapons Effects in the Urban Environment. Understanding the

potential effects of threat (non-US) small arms and light weapons on structures and materials commonly

found in the urban environment can be extremely important for planning purposes. Appendix C lists some

common structural materials found in urban environments and the relative amount of protection that

structures made of these materials will provide soldiers being fired upon by select threat weapons systems.

WEATHER

1-55. Terrain analysis and weather analysis are inseparable in most situations. Operations in the urban

environment, however, present some unique concerns. Inclement weather can affect the availability of food

supplies. Mass demonstrations use good weather to get maximum turnout. Bad weather further degrades

poor road networks. Rain and heavy winds may disrupt or stop a psychological operation (PSYOP) such as

a leaflet drop. Some common considerations include--

Winds. Wind patterns and effects are important concerns in nearly all environments; however,

the larger urban areas offer some unique challenges that may otherwise be found only in rugged

mountain areas. Depending on weather conditions, when compared with unrestricted terrain, the

wind may be blocked, reduced, or enhanced in areas bordered by large structures. These in turn

may cause a buildup of smog (or lethal chemicals if present), enhance the fire threat, restrict the

use of helicopters (swirling winds), and others. These factors will make downwind predictions

for CBRN and toxic industrial materials (TIMs) difficult. (See the Health Issues section in

Chapter 2). Finally, there may be radical temperature changes associated with the combination

of wind, precipitation, and structures (tunnels, high rises). Urban operations during cold and wet

periods may be significantly affected by the wind chill factor.

Precipitation. City engineers and urban sanitation workers are well aware of the artificial

changes manmade structures make on the topography. Rain or melting snow often floods

basements, underpasses, tunnels, sewers, and subway systems; streets become impassable with

water, snow, or ice; and exposed or weathered electrical systems may short out. Chemical agents

and TIM are washed into underground systems by precipitation. Some areas may in fact become

impassable or “toxic corridors,” and drinking water supplies may be affected. As a result, these

systems may contain toxic concentrations higher than surface areas and become contaminated

“hot spots.” These effects become more pronounced as chemical agents and TIM are absorbed

by brick or unsealed concrete sewer walls. Chemical detection and decontamination crews will

be required when operating in these areas.

Visibility. Visibility is critical at any time but even more so during operations in urban

environments. Traditionally, night and periods of reduced visibility favor surprise, infiltration,

detailed reconnaissance, attacks across open areas, seizure of defended strong points, and

reduction of defended obstacles. There may be some areas where the tremendous amount of

artificial and backg3round light created in even the smallest urban areas puts unobserved

movement at risk. The urban area’s numerous structures, easily identifiable during the day, may

not be so visible at night and enhance the problem of disorientation. Here technology

enhancements may not only be desired but also be a necessity (night vision devices [NVDs] or

GPS) for soldiers operating there. Additionally, many urban areas are located along canals or

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rivers which often create a potential for fog in low-lying areas. Industrial and transportation

areas are the most affected by fog due to their usual proximity to waterways. In heavy industrial

areas, smog can also limit visibility under all light conditions. Both fog and smog can affect

ground operations by limiting illumination and reflective heating as well as degrading many

target acquisition systems and limiting the use of infrared-guided artillery rounds and general

aviation.

Cloud Cover. In the urban environment, cloud cover can have some significant tactical effects.

In addition to visibility effects as stated above, cloud cover above an urban area may combine

with shadows from buildings to affect observation. Intermittent cloud cover may cause shadows

on the ground which could confuse observers. Low cloud cover over urban areas can restrict air

operations due to the numerous vertical manmade obstructions in these areas.

Temperature and Humidity. Air inversion layers are common over cities, especially cities

located in low-lying "bowls" or river valleys. Inversion layers may trap dust, pollutants, or even

chemical agents and reduce visibility. These layers can also create a greenhouse effect which

may cause a rise in ground and air temperature. The heating of buildings during the winter and

the reflection and absorption of summer heat make built-up areas warmer than surrounding open

areas during both summer and winter. This difference can be as great as 10 to 20 degrees and

may significantly add to the problems faced in urban operations. Summer heat, combined with

the very physical requirement of urban combat, can cause severe heat exhaustion problems and

in the winter soldiers may fall victim to exposure in nominally protected areas such as tunnels or

causeways. Changes in temperature as a result of air inversions can also affect thermal sights

during crossover periods of warm to cold and vice versa. Air inversions can also trap pollution,

smoke from fires, or gases (such as tear gas) closer to the ground. This period should be

identified, as it may differ from urban area to urban area. Extremely cold temperatures and

heavily constructed buildings many affect target identification for thermal sights. For example,

thick walls may make combat vehicle identification difficult by distorting hotspots, and

increased use of heaters and warming fires may clutter thermal sights with numerous hotspots.

1-56. Before soldiers are sent into an urban area, especially those with an urban center composed of

numerous large structures, staff planners must have a good understanding of the weather and the effects of

the weather in the urban environment. The staff weather officer (SWO) provides the basic weather

forecasts for planning purposes.

SOCIETY (SOCIO-CULTURAL)

1-57. When local support is necessary for success, as is often the case in operations in the urban

environment, the population is central to accomplishing the mission. The center of gravity (COG) of

operations in urban environments is often human. To effectively operate among an urban population and

maintain their goodwill, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the society and its culture,

to include values, needs, history, religion, customs, and social structure.

1-58. US forces can avoid losing local support for the mission and anticipate local reaction to friendly

courses of action (COAs) by understanding, respecting, and following local customs when possible. The

history of a people often explains why the urban population behaves the way it does. For example, US

forces might forestall a violent demonstration by understanding the significance of the anniversary of a

local hero’s death.

1-59. Accommodating the social norms of a population is potentially the most influential factor in the

conduct of urban operations. Unfortunately, this is often neglected. Social factors have greater impact in

urban operations than in any other environment. The density of the local populations and the constant

interaction between them and US forces greatly increase the importance of social considerations. The

fastest way to damage the legitimacy of an operation is to ignore or violate social mores or precepts of a

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particular population. Groups develop norms and adamantly believe in them all of their lives. The step

most often neglected is understanding and respecting these differences.

1-60. The interaction of different cultures during operations in the urban environment may demand greater

recognition than in other environments. This greater need for understanding comes from the increased

interaction with the civilian populace. Norms and values could involve such diverse areas as food, sleep

patterns, casual and close relationships, manners, and cleanliness. Understanding these differences is only a

start in developing cultural awareness.

1-61. Religious beliefs and practices are among the most important, yet least understood, aspects of the

cultures of other peoples. In many parts of the world, religious norms are a matter of life and death. In

many religious wars, it is not uncommon to find suicidal acts in the name of their god. In those situations,

religious beliefs are considered more important than life itself.

1-62. Failure to recognize, respect, understand, and incorporate an understanding of the cultural and

religious aspects of the society with which US forces are interacting could rapidly lead to an erosion of the

legitimacy of the US or coalition mission. When assessing events, intelligence professionals must consider

the norms of the local culture or society. For example, while bribery is not an accepted norm in our society,

it may be a totally acceptable practice in another society. If US intelligence professionals assess an

incidence of this nature using our own societal norms and values as a reference, it is highly likely that the

significance of the event will be misinterpreted.

1-63. Some US military missions will require US forces to operate in support of the local government.

While it is important to articulate US contributions to a given mission, it is also important to highlight the

accomplishments of the local national government for long-term success. US military planners must

identify key government officials early in the operation. These individuals can provide valuable

information needed for successful completion of the operations to include city infrastructure, locations of

enemy concentration, and a common picture of cultural norms.

1-64. Many developing country governments are characterized by nepotism, favor trading, sabotage, and

indifference. Corruption is pervasive and institutionalized as a practical way to manage excess demand for

city services. The power of officials is often primarily based on family and personal connections,

economic, political or military power bases and age, and only after that on education, training, and

competence.

1-65. A local government's breakdown from its previous level of effectiveness will quickly exacerbate

problems of public health and mobility. Attempts to get the local-level bureaucracy to function along US

lines will produce further breakdown or passive indifference. Any unintentional or intentional threat to the

privileges of ranking local officials or to members of their families will be stubbornly resisted. Avoiding

such threats and assessing the importance of particular officials requires knowledge of family ties.

1-66. US military planners must also recognize that the urban populace will behave according to their own

self-interest. The urban populace will focus on the different interests at work: those of US/coalition forces,

those of elements hostile to US/coalition forces, those of international/non-governmental organizations

(NGOs) that may be present; those of local national “opportunities” and those of the general population.

Friendly forces must be constantly aware of these interests and how the local national population perceives

them.

1-67. Another significant cultural problem is the presence of displaced persons within an urban area. Rural

immigrants, who may have different cultural norms, when combined with city residents displaced by urban

conflict, can create a significant strategic problem. Noncombatants and refugees without hostile intent can

stop an advancing unit or inadvertently complicate an operation. Additionally, there may be enemy troops,

criminal gangs, vigilantes, paramilitary factions, and factions within those groups hiding in the waves of

the displaced.

1-68. The enemy knows that it will be hard to identify the threat among neutral or disinterested parties.

Local combat situations can change rapidly as the seeming neutrals become the threat within close quarters

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and friendly forces find themselves suddenly in an indefensible position. Chechen rebels and the Hezbollah

effectively used the cover of refugees to attack occupying forces and counted on heavy civilian casualties

in the counterattack to gain support with the local population. The goal is to place incalculable stresses on

the soldiers in order to break down discipline and operational integrity. From Belfast to Lebanon, the

constant pressure of identifying the threat amongst nonbelligerent or disinterested parties taxed and

sometimes undermined rules of engagement (ROE), and in some cases, entire missions.

1-69. Defining the structure of the social hierarchy is often critical to understanding the population.

Identifying those in positions of authority is important as well. These city officials, village elders, or tribal

chieftains are often the critical nodes of the society and influence the actions of the population at large. In

many societies, nominal titles do not equal power--influence does. Many “leaders” are figureheads, and

the true authority lies elsewhere.

1-70. Some areas around the world are not governed by the rule of law, but instead rely upon tradition.

Often, ethnic loyalty, religious affiliation, and tribal membership provide societal cohesion and the sense of

proper behavior and ethics in dealing with outsiders, such as the US and/or coalition partners. It is

important to understand the complicated inner workings of a society rife with internal conflict, although to

do so is difficult and requires a thorough examination of a society’s culture and history.

1-71. Every city has discrete and discernible patterns of daily activity. The time of rush hour activity along

an LOC is one case in point. Business transactions, market sales, religious practices, governmental

functions, and criminal activity are other examples of daily behavior that can be analyzed for consistencies.

Disruptions or irregularities in these patterns serve as a warning that something is amiss in the city.

Identifying and understanding trends and patterns of activity provide critical information for intelligence

analysts and mission planners.

1-72. While certain patterns do exist, most urban centers are normally composed of a multitude of different

peoples, each with their own standards of conduct. Individuals act independently and in their own best

interest, which will not always coincide with friendly objectives. The presence or actions of the different

population components of an urban area cannot be ignored when conducting mission planning. Treating

the urban population as a homogenous entity can lead to false assumptions, cultural misunderstandings,

and poor situational understanding.

POPULATION

1-73. A population of significant size and density inhabits, works in, and uses the manmade and natural

terrain in the urban environment. Civilians remaining in an urban environment may be significant as a

threat, an obstacle, a logistics support problem (to include medical support), or a source of support and

information. The most significant problem regarding the local population is the fact each person is a

potential threat and can participate in an insurgency, terrorism, or other disruptive activity.

1-74. One of the most violent examples in US military history was the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong laid

mines and demolitions, conducted ambushes and sniping, performed information collection missions for

Hanoi, and even participated in force-on-force engagements, primarily during the Tet Offensive in 1968.

The difficulty for the US and allied forces operating there lay in the fact that the Viet Cong looked like

their neighbors, often held jobs, and raised families in pro-government neighborhoods, and, in some cases,

even served in the South Vietnamese Army.

1-75. Another consideration when dealing with the local population is their ability to hinder military

operations. Regardless of causes or political affiliations, civilian casualties are often the focal point of press

coverage, often to the point of ignoring or denigrating any previous accomplishments. Within the

operational continuum, and especially during the conduct of urban operations, commanders can expect to

encounter restrictions on their use of firepower and challenges in their ability to conduct combat support

and combat service support missions. In the current operational environment, it is unacceptable to our

leaders and the American population to inflict large numbers of civilian casualties.

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1-76. Another issue is the local population’s requirement for logistical and/or medical support. US troops

deployed to Somalia and the Balkans immediately had to deal with providing logistic support to starving

populations until local and international organizations could take over those functions. Disease and wounds

were also a problem among the local population, most notably in Somalia, Haiti (disease), and Bosnia and

Kosovo (wounds). The burden of caring for the locals was initially placed on the deployed commanders

until local national and international organizations could establish treatment facilities.

1-77. From an intelligence standpoint, the local population can be a valuable information source. This was

especially effective during US operations in Bosnia and Kosovo when locals told of minefields, weapon

caches, infiltration routes, mass burials, and other proof of war crimes.

1-78. Some of the key requirements to identify when analyzing the local population in an urban

environment are shown in Table 1-5.

Table 1-5. Example information requirements for populations

General Information

Extremists.

Identify the values of the urban population.

The media.

Family relations.

Evaluate the city by geographic locations.

Religious values.

Slums/shantytowns.

Political views.

Areas where criminal gangs operate.

Ethnic tribal ties.

Areas of the city where US/coalition forces

Nationalism.

are likely unwelcome.

Identify the current issues/problems facing the

Areas in the city where demonstrations/riots

urban population.

typically occur.

Economics.

Identify the social aspects/traits of the urban

Politics.

population.

Religious conflict.

Family structure.

Crime.

Role of elders.

Drug/alcohol addiction.

Role of men.

Ethnic strife.

Role of women.

Housing.

Role of children.

Assess the history of conflict in the state.

Opposite sex interaction.

Internal and external.

Same sex interaction.

Recent conflicts.

Significance of pets and animals.

Describe the significance of the urban area.

Eating habits.

International.

Sanitary practices.

National.

Alcohol/drug use.

Religious.

Firearm ownership.

Military.

Identify the influence of the media.

Economic.

By form (print, radio, television).

Historical.

By origin (local, national, international).

Identify key figures in the society.

Media bias.

Government leaders.

Group(s) or individuals that control the

Religious leaders.

media.

Military leaders.

Key media personnel.

Opposition leaders.

Identify taboos or insulting social actions.

Tribal chiefs/elders.

Verbal.

Crime/drug figures.

Non-verbal (body gestures/manner of dress).

Other.

Identify significant dates.

Identify the extent (if any) of anti-American

Importance.

sentiment in each of the following:

Dates or holidays significant to one portion of

Individuals.

populace but offensive to another

Society’s privileged.

Effect on city.

Lower class.

Violence.

Government.

Demonstrations.

Military.

Types of celebrations.

Number of participants.

January 2008 (Draft)

FM 2-91.4

1-21

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Chapter 1

Table 1-5. Example information requirements for populations (continued)

Identify cultural landmarks and structures.

Identify the population of the rural areas

Location.

surrounding the urban area.

Type.

Numbers.

Religious.

Location and distance from urban area.

Historical.

Relationship to/with urban population.

Stadiums.

Travel.

Shopping centers.

Employment.

Other.

Interdependence

Role in conflict (if any).

Demographics

Assess the urban area’s demographics.

Social Structure

Ethnicity.

Identify the ethnic structure.

Race.

Percent of population by ethnic group.

Religion.

Physical boundaries of influence.

Economic status.

Dominant ethnic group (if any).

Political affiliation.

Reason for dominance.

Other.

Biases of the groups.

Identify languages spoken.

Role of ethnicity in conflict (past and

Official.

present).

Social.

Key personnel and location.

Business.

Identify the racial structure.

Dialects.

Percentage of population by race.

Slang.

Dominant racial group (if any).

Identify the urban population/population density.

Reason for dominance.

Total.

Physical boundaries of influence.

By city area.

Biases of the races.

Center city.

Role in conflict.

Residential.

Key personnel and location.

Slum/shantytown.

Identify the religious structure.

Area of operations.

Beliefs.

Identify the age structure.

Percentage of population.

Males and females age 0-14.

Importance/influence in society.

Males and females age 15-64.

Practices.

Males and females age 65 and older.

Physical boundaries of influence.

Males age 15-49 (potential military age).

Biases.

Identify the trends in migration.

Dominant religious group (if any).

Number of migrants.

Reason for dominance.

Cause(s) of migration.

Role of religion in conflict.

Average age of migrants.

Key personnel and location.

Refugee situation.

Identify the tribal/clan structure.

Origin of the refugees.

Basis of affiliation.

Size of the refugee population.

Percentage of population.

Size of the original population.

Physical boundaries of influence.

Describe the relationship between refugees and

Dominant tribe/clan (if any).

the city populace.

Reason for dominance.

Supporting.

Biases of the tribes/clans.

Hostile.

Role in conflict.

Indifferent.

Key personnel and location.

Identify segments of the population that fled the

Identify the economic class structure.

city.

Distribution of wealth.

Cause.

Per capita income.

Region of resettlement.

Percentage of population by economic

Circumstances that will afford their return.

sector (industry, service, other.).

Percentage of population living in poverty.

1-22

FM 2-91.4

January 2008 (Draft)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Chapter 1

Table 1-5. Example information requirements for populations (continued)

Popular support for US/coalition military

Government service.

forces.

Military.

- Active/passive.

Driver’s license.

- Violent/nonviolent.

Professional/trade/union.

- If coalition, posture by country.

Photo IDs.

- Factors that would change local

- Requirements.

support.

- Offices and locations

Actions US forces could

where issued.

take to gain maximum local

- Forgeries in use.

support.

Evaluate air/sea/land customs procedures.

Actions to avoid.

Enforcement.

Examine local law enforcement capabilities to

Susceptibility to bribery.

include the ability to accomplish the following:

Evaluate border crossing procedures.

Enforce export laws.

- Checkpoints.

Protect persons/property/environment.

- Foot/vehicle patrols.

Interdict illegal aliens.

- Aircraft.

Enforce immigration laws.

- Searches.

Maintain arms control.

- Documents.

Prevent narcotics traffic and use.

- Security.

Prevent terrorism.

- Other.

Identify types of identification required or used in

the urban area.

National.

Passport/visa.

Local.

POPULATION IMPACTS ON THE MISSION

1-79. Although the population is not a part of the terrain, the populace can impact the mission in both

positive and negative ways. Individuals or groups in the population can be co-opted by one side or another

to perform a surveillance and reconnaissance function, performing as moving reconnaissance to collect

information. City residents have intimate knowledge of the city. Their observations can provide

information and insights about intelligence gaps and other activities that help reach an understanding of the

environment. For instance, residents often know about shortcuts through town. They might also be able to

observe and report on a demonstration or meeting that occurs in their area.

1-80. Unarmed combatants operating within the populace or noncombatants might provide intelligence to

armed combatants engaged in a confrontation. This was readily apparent in Mogadishu, where unarmed

combatants with the ability to observe friendly force activities without the threat of being engaged

instructed hidden threat forces on where to fire.

1-81. The presence of noncombatants in a combat zone can lead to restrictive ROE which may impact the

way in which a unit accomplishes its mission. The population, groups or individuals or sectors within an

urban area can be the target audience of information operations. Specific individuals may provide a means

to approach a specific target audience when acting as a mouthpiece for an information operation.

1-82. Populations present during urban operations can physically restrict movement and maneuver by

limiting or changing the width of routes. People may assist movement if a group can be used as human

barrier between one combatant group and another. Refugee flows, for example, can provide covert

infiltration or exfiltration routes for members of a force. There may also be unintended restrictions to

routes due to normal urban activities which can impact military operations. For example, movement may

be impeded by normally heavy traffic during rush hours as people head to work or return home. Another

example would be a route that goes through a market in town that is closed to traffic only on market days,

but otherwise normally open to unimpeded traffic flow.

1-24

FM 2-91.4

January 2008 (Draft)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Intelligence and the Urban Environment

1-83. One of the largest challenges to friendly operations is the portion of the population that supports the

adversary. Even people conducting their daily activities may inadvertently “get in the way” of any type of

operation. For example, curiosity-driven crowds in Haiti often affected patrols by inadvertently forcing

units into the middle of the street or pushing them into a single file. While no harm was inflicted, the unit

was made more vulnerable to sniper and grenade attacks.

1-84. Captured combatants or a well-informed noncombatant can provide valuable intelligence about the

enemy. These individuals can be extremely important to the success of military operations. Information

from these sources, however, must be evaluated for accuracy and reliability before being acted upon. The

person providing the information may be intentionally providing disinformation in order to negatively

impact friendly operations or even simply be intended to manipulate friendly forces into conducting

operations that are aimed at a personal grudge rather than influencing the military situation.

1-85. Strategically, the world audience, as well as its local contingent, can create political, cultural, and

ideological impediments to a mission. Friendly forces must evaluate the local population and its potential

effects on operations based on an understanding of the local culture, norms and behaviors—not on the

accepted standards of the home countries of the friendly forces. Friendly forces can then tailor their

activities to achieve the desired effects while avoiding unintended consequences that could even result in

mission failure.

1-86. The American audience watching events unfold in Vietnam could have been perceived as an

impediment to the US government’s strategy of pursuing its strategic objectives. The cultural differences

apparent when US forces were deployed for Operation Desert Storm could have been an impediment if not

adequately addressed. For instance, a PSYOP flier produced to encourage a sense of unity among the Arab

populations included pictures of two men holding hands—a sight not common in Western cultures. A flier

designed in accordance with Western standards might not have been as effective.

1-87. Civilian populations can also provide infiltration or exfiltration routes for non-uniformed forces.

These forces operating in any urban terrain can instantly blend into any type of crowd or activity. Threat

forces can be protected from firepower by operating within a neutral group. For example, during the

December 1999 World Trade Organization demonstrations in Seattle, organized, unruly, and dangerous

protestors “hid behind peaceful demonstrators, creating a situation where if [the Seattle police] were to be

successful in countering their tactics, a larger number of people likely would have been hurt.”

(Kim Murphy, “Anarchists Deployed New Tactics in Violent Seattle Demonstrations,” Los Angeles Times,

December 16, 1999.)

INFRASTRUCTURE

1-88. The infrastructure of an urban environment consists of the basic resources, support systems,

communications, and industries upon which the population depends. The key elements that allow an urban

area to function are also significant to operations, especially stability operations and civil support

operations. The force that controls the water, electricity, telecommunications, natural gas, food production

and distribution, and medical facilities will virtually control the urban area. These facilities may not be

located within the city’s boundaries. The infrastructure upon which an urban area depends may also

provide human services and cultural and political structures that are critical beyond that urban area,

perhaps for the entire nation.

1-89. A city’s infrastructure is its foundation. It includes buildings, bridges, roads, airfields, ports,

subways, sewers, power plants, industrial sectors, communications, and similar physical structures.

Infrastructure varies from city to city. In developed countries, the infrastructure and service sectors are

highly sophisticated and well integrated. In developing cities, even basic infrastructure may be lacking. To

understand how the infrastructure of a city supports the population, it needs to be viewed as a system of

systems. Each component affects the population, the normal operation of the city, and the potential long-

term success of military operations conducted there.

January 2008 (Draft)

FM 2-91.4

1-25

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Chapter 1

1-90. Military planners must understand the functions and interrelationships of these components to assess

how disruption or restoration of the infrastructure affects the population and ultimately the mission. By

determining the critical nodes and vulnerabilities of a city, allied forces can delineate specific locations

within the urban area that are vital to overall operations. Additionally, military planners must initially

regard these structures as civilian places or objects, and plan accordingly, until reliable information

indicates they are being used for a military purpose.

1-91. Much of the analysis conducted for terrain and society can apply when assessing the urban

infrastructure. For example, commanders, staffs, and analysts could not effectively assess the urban

economic and commercial infrastructure without simultaneously considering labor. All aspects of the

society relate and can be used to further analyze the urban work force since they are a sub-element of the

urban society. Similarly, the OAKOC aspects used to evaluate terrain may also apply to the urban

infrastructure, especially considerations of key terrain.

1-92. A city’s infrastructure can directly support the military mission. Local airfields or ports are vital for

sustained operations. Host country medical facilities can become vital when allied casualties are greater

than organic medical capabilities can handle. Their continued functioning can also play a role in

maintaining the good will of the local population. During stability operations and civil support operations,

the maintenance of law and order (to include prisons) becomes vital to the welfare of the general

population. Success in ensuring that law and order is maintained or reestablishing law and order will

directly affect the general population’s perceptions and possible support for US operations.

TRANSPORTATION

1-93. The transportation network is a critical component of a city’s day-to-day activity. It facilitates the

movement of material and personnel around the city. This network includes roads, railways, subways, bus

systems, airports, and harbors. In modern cities, the transportation network supports rapid international

travel, often via several avenues.

1-94. Developing cities often have little means of public transportation. Foot traffic, livestock, and

bicycles represent main sources of travel in underdeveloped cities and compete for road space with more

modern forms of transportation. Care must be taken not to disrupt the transportation system of a city.

Securing air and seaports is imperative for follow-on forces and supplies, but there are many possible

repercussions of securing all the transportation nodes and stopping all inter- and intra-city movement.

While the US mission may be immediately facilitated, critical needs of the noncombatant populace could

go unmet. (See

Table 1-6.)

1-26

FM 2-91.4

January 2008 (Draft)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Intelligence and the Urban Environment

Table 1-6. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure

Airfields

End clear zones (length, maximum slope).

General Airfield Information

Approach zones (length, width, glide slope,

Provide airfield location.

obstacles).

Provide airfield size.

Condition (ability to support aircraft weight).

Identify airfield type.

Eight-digit grid coordinate for each end of

Civilian.

runway.

Military.

Evaluate taxiways.

Joint.

Identification.

Identify principal use.

Azimuth.

Describe the construction.

Length and width.

Assess security.

Grade.

Evaluate access.

Surface, base, sub-base (thickness).

Provide status of the airfield.

Bearing capacity (pounds per square inch).

Operational.

Shoulder and clear area (width, transverse

Non-operational.

grade, surface, obstacles).

Auxiliary.

Turn radii.

Identify the controlling authority.

Condition (ability to support aircraft weight).

Determine the effect that the suspension of

Evaluate parking and warm-up aprons.

flight activities of the airfield would have on the

Number and location.

urban area and urban population.

Total area and individual area.

Identify key terrain.

Description.

Locate blueprints of the airfield and its facilities.

Total capacity.

Assess the airfield specifications/layout.

Identify hardstands.

Airfield elevation.

Number and location.

Runways.

Aircraft capacity.

Identification.

Description.

Azimuth.

Identify hangars.

Length and width.

Number and location.

Surface, base, sub-base (material, thickness,

Type and material.

condition).

Condition.

Longitudinal grade.

Size.

Transverse grade.

Door descriptions.

Shoulders, clear areas, overruns (width,

Locate terminals.

transverse, grade and surface material).

Identify control tower and ground control

Lateral safety zones (width, transverse slope,

approach (location and eight-digit

obstacles.

coordinate).

January 2008 (Draft)

FM 2-91.4

1-27

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Chapter 1

Table 1-6. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure

Evaluate navigational aids.

Lubricants, manifolds, and filters.

Condition.

Pipelines.

Eight-digit grid coordinate.

Above and below ground storage and

Identify lighting aids.

capacity.

Runways.

Pumps.

Flight-line.

Fuel trucks.

Taxiway.

Identify munitions storage areas.

Terminal building.

Location.

Assess underground drainage system.

Type.

Location.

Condition.

Security.

Evaluate the airfield utility system.

Explosives that can be handled.

Electrical power source.

Aircraft loading procedures.

- Master switch.

Identify emergency facilities.

- Current characteristics.

Location.

- Availability of emergency

Type.

power.

Equipment.

- Location of transformers.

Capabilities/limitations.

Natural gas source.

Identify maintenance facilities.

Jet starting units or auxiliary power units

Identify meteorological support facilities.

Outline the enemy air defense assets (if any).

Identify administration buildings.

Type.

Identify housing facilities.

Location.

Type, location, and number.

Capabilities/limitations

Capability and condition.

Determine how the airfield is tied into the national

Construction materials.

or regional integrated air defense system.

Airfield Security

Type of node.

Assess ground security forces.

- Sector operations center.

Military.

- Intercept operations center

Civilian.

- Fighter airfield.

Determine whether surveillance devices/means

- Auxiliary airfield.

are deployed.

Assess the airfield’s daily operating procedures.

Types and locations.

Normal operating hours of the airfield.

Field of coverage and monitoring locations.

Most commonly used approach path.

Operating times and frequencies.

Control procedures.

Physical Security Measures.

Primary language used by air traffic control

Security Lighting.

personnel, ground support personnel, back-

Checkpoints.

up personnel.

Perimeter fences.

Flight schedules of airlines using the airfield.

Internal fences.

Airfield Support Facilities

Other physical security obstructions.

Identify communications facilities.

Other Considerations

Location.

Describe new construction at the airfield.

Type.

Locate obstructions to flight.

Equipment.

Vertical obstructions, not contained in

Capabilities/limitations.

published data, which pose a threat to

Identify fuel storage facilities.

helicopters or other aircraft at/under 50 feet

Location.

above ground level (AGL).

Jet fuel.

Other obstacles to flight within 5 and 10

Aviation gas.

kilometers of the airfield.

Jet oil.

Identify radar systems and associated equipment.

Aviation oil.

1-28

FM 2-91.4

January 2008 (Draft)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Intelligence and the Urban Environment

Table 1-6. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure (continued)

Helicopter Landing Zones (HLZs)

- Antiaircraft artillery

Assess the LZ characteristics.

(mobile/fixed).

Location.

Obstacles.

Dimensions

Roadways

Landing points.

Identify the routes in the urban area.

Capacity by type of aircraft.

Highways.

Surface material.

Streets.

Soil trafficability.

Alleys.

Obstacles (existing, reinforcing).

Trails.

Slope (direction, degree).

Bike paths.

Lighting conditions.

Pedestrian paths.

Prevailing winds.

Identify street patterns.

Seasonal variations.

Rectangular or chessboard.

Thermal/updrafts.

Rayed.

Altitude above sea level.

Radial or radial-ring.

Determine the characteristics of the

Contour forming.

approach and retirement lanes.

Irregular pattern.

Altitude and heading.

Combined pattern.

Check and control points.

Linear pattern.

Obstacles.

Determine the effect of roadway shut down.

Enemy dispositions.

Evaluate roadway use.

Determine the characteristics of the adjacent

Traffic patterns.

terrain and exits.

Rush hour times.

Dominant buildings and terrain.

Types.

Routes of ingress/egress.

Importance to economy.

Relief and drainage.

Possible rerouting.

Obstacles (existing, reinforcing).

Method of traffic control.

Identify landmarks that can be used as

Verify that the maps correspond with the routes.

navigation aids.

Analyze critical roadways.

Roadway characteristics.

Determine the distance and direction from

- Width.

the designated objectives.

- Surface material.

Identify escape and evasion routes.

- Base course.

Pickup points.

- Subgrade material.

Routes to friendly areas.

- Maximum wheel load.

Landmarks.

- Crown.

Determine whether the urban area canalizes

- Maximum elevation.

movement to the LZ.

- Drainage.

Identify buildings with rooftops that can be

Length.

used for HLZs.

- Kilometers.

Location.

- Miles.

Dimensions.

Grades.

Landing points.

- Location of grades exceeding 7 percent.

Capacity by type.

- Maximum grade in percent.

Obstacles.

Shoulders.

Building entrances (location, quantity).

- Material.

Identify the threats in the vicinity of the HLZ.

- Width.

- Slope.

Antiair threat.

- Condition.

- Small arms.

Curves.

- RPGs.

- Location.

- MANPADS.

- Radius.

- SAMs (mobile/fixed).

- Slope.

- Antihelicopter mines.

January 2008 (Draft)

FM 2-91.4

1-29

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Chapter 1

Table 1-6. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure (continued)

Bridges.

Locate key/critical points.

- Total number of segments.

Type.

- Load bearing capacity.

Location.

- Width.

Choke points.

Culverts.

Vulnerabilities.

- Location.

Locate and describe fixed installations.

- Type and number.

Classification yards.

- Construction material.

Service yards.

Ditches.

Freight/loading yards.

- Depth.

Passenger stations.

- Width.

Freight stations.

- Side slope.

Analyze the track specifications and railway

- Condition.

layout.

Median strips or dividers.

- Material.

Total length.

- Width.

- Urban.

- Height.

- Rural.

- Obstructions.

Type.

- Vegetation.

- Gauge.

Fords and ferries.

- Rails.

- Location.

- Roadway.

- Dimensions.

- Width.

Tunnels, underpasses, and snowsheds.

- Spacing.

- Location.

Axle load limit.

- Dimensions.

Minimum clearances.

Road parking areas.

- Horizontal.

- Location.

- Vertical.

- Vehicle capacity.

Maximum grades.

- Facilities.

- Direction of travel.

- Surface materials.

- Location.

Junctions or grade crossings.

Radius of the tightest curve.

- Identification.

- Location.

Checkpoints and obstacles.

- Radius measurement.

- Location.

Roadbed.

- Determine whether location

- Material.

is favorable for ambush.

- Total width.

- Width of shoulders.

Railroads

Ballast/sub-ballast.

General Railway Information

- Material.

Identify the number of trains that run

- Size.

daily.

- Condition

Type.

- Thickness.

- Passenger.

Railheads.

- Freight.

- Supply transfer points.

Fuel.

- Characteristics (spurs,

Direction of travel.

sidings, piles of material,

Destinations.

wagons, tents, huts,

Cargo and capacity.

guards, supply handlers).

Rolling stock.

End points.

Types of railcars and carrying capacity.

- System.

Schedules.

- Route.

- Segment.

Special equipment.

Determine the effect of railway service

interruption.

1-30

FM 2-91.4

January 2008 (Draft)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Intelligence and the Urban Environment

Table 1-6. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure (continued)

- Reason for end (change in

- Cranes (number, type, and capacity).

number of tracks, change in

Repair shops/locomotive terminals.

gauge, crossing point,

- Location.

construction type and load

- Engine house and turntable.

bearing capacity,

Manpower.

international borders).

Service facilities.

Ties.

Fuel facilities.

- Material.

- Location.

- Length.

- Type of fuel.

- Width.

- Storage and capacity.

- Depth.

- Quantity of fuel on hand.

- Spacing.

- Method of loading.

Ditches.

Electrical facilities.

- Depth.

- End point of electrified sections.

- Width.

- Power feed.

- Side slope.

- Current characteristics.

- Lining.

- Source of power.

- Conditions.

Command and control.

- Cross sections.

Water facilities.

- Structures.

- Location.

Stations.

- Service.

- Location.

- Type of storage.

- Functions.

Evaluate track maintenance.

- Facilities.

Maintenance and construction standards.

- Command and control.

Maintenance schedule

- Security.

Sections in need of repair.

Bridges.

- Location.

- Dimensions.

- Nature of repair.

- Characteristics.

- Effort required to repair.

Culverts.

Planned extensions or improvements.

- Characteristics.

- Type.

- Dimensions.

- Location.

Ferries.

- Characteristics.

- Dimensions.

Identify signals and train control.

- Characteristics.

Location.

Tunnels, underpasses, and snowsheds.

Type.

- Characteristics.

Determine whether the railroad follows any terrain

- Dimensions.

features.

- Mainline junctions.

Roadways.

- Location.

Waterways.

- Identification of connecting lines.

Terrain.

- Switch type.

Assess the safety and security features of the

Crossovers.

railroad.

- Location.

- Type switch.

Bridges

Evaluate the railway support facilities.

Identify general characteristics of the bridge.

Freight handling facilities.

Location.

- Location.

Name and military designation.

- Side loading platforms.

Structural type.

- End loading bays.

General condition.

- Sidings with access roads.

Obstacle crossed.

- Freight sheds.

Significance.

- Turntables (number and

diameter/transfer table length).

January 2008 (Draft)

FM 2-91.4

1-31

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Chapter 1

Table 1-6. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure (continued)

Bridge specifications.

Describe rails.

- Length and width.

Dimensions.

- Capacity.

Construction.

- Military load classifications.

Describe trains.

- Under bridge clearance.

Type.

- Horizontal and vertical

Speed.

clearance

Size and capacity of cars.

Determine the result should the bridge be

Describe rail bed.

destroyed or blocked.

Grade.

Evaluate alternate routes.

Subgrade.

Determine the effort required to rebuild the bridge

Rail embedding: crossover sections/location.

if destroyed.

Location of controls.

Analyze the bridge layout.

Turn and corner locations.

Approaches.

Manhole locations.

Banks.

Electric source location.

Bypasses.

Evaluate traffic patterns.

Abutments/piers.

Daily number of passengers.

Spans.

- Weekday.

Suspension system.

- Weekend.

Intermediate supports.

- Holiday.

Walkways.

- Rush hour.

Number of spans.

Stations that receive the most traffic.

- Type of control (mechanical,

Evaluate the subway construction.

electronic).

Type.

- Time required to move.

- Typical subway near surface with flat

Characteristics of any movable spans.

roof and I-beams for roof and sides,

Safety and security features.

supported between tracks with steel

Traffic control markings.

bulb-angle columns.

- Flat-roof subway of reinforced

Subways

concrete construction supported

Assess the general layout of the subway system.

between tracks by steel bulb-angle

Determine how the disruption of subway service

columns, used for short distances.

would affect the urban area and urban

- Concrete-lined tunnel of open

population.

cutwork and rock tunnel work.

Evaluate the general condition of the subway

- Elevated track on steel via duct.

system.

- Cast iron tubes used under water.

Maintenance.

Layers of the inner subway construction.

Safety.

Construction of beams and shafts.

Security.

Reinforcements that are part of the

Identify the train schedule.

construction to add support and

Provide maps of the system.

waterproofing (such as hard burned brick laid

Actual tracks.

in hot asphalt).

Altered renditions of the lines and stations.

Soil, rock, or compound that the tunnels are

Copies of subway blueprints.

cut through.

Determine how the subway is operated and

Ventilation system.

managed.

How demolition in the subway would affect

Evaluate the subway specifications.

the urban area (surface structure,

Entrances and exits to the system.

subterranean features).

Pedestrian traffic routes.

Examine the subway security system.

Stairs, escalators, elevators.

Type of security.

Security obstructions (gates, turnstiles).

Threats.

Maintenance and utility tunnels.

Vagrant population (if any) in the subway

Drains.

system.

Terminals.

- Approximate numbers.

Tunnels: dimensions and construction.

1-32

FM 2-91.4

January 2008 (Draft)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Intelligence and the Urban Environment

Table 1-6. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure (continued)

- Primary locations/concentrations.

Overhead clearance.

- Emergency response.

Susceptibility to silting.

- Evacuation plan.

Identify turning basins.

Evaluate the decibel level around the trains.

Locations.

Dimensions.

Ports and Harbors

Controlling depth.

General Information

Identify anchorages and free-swinging moors.

Identify the local name and military designation.

Locations.

Identify the port/harbor type.

Depth range.

Assess the general condition of the port/harbor.

Holding ground.

Determine the importance of the port/harbor.

Protection afforded.

Identify operating data.

Type and number of berths.

Average tonnage.

Identify fixed mooring berths.

Administration.

Locations.

Labor resources.

Numbers.

Provide the total harbor area in acres.

Types.

Provide pilotage data.

Buoys.

Evaluate the importance of the port to the urban

General commercial berths.

area.

Tanker berths.

Effect of a port shutdown.

Naval berths.

Economic.

Identify obstructions.

Military.

Overhead obstructions.

Assess the adjacent terrain.

Surface obstructions.

Assess port specifications/layout. Port capacity in

Underwater obstructions.

metric tons per day.

Identify navigational aids.

Civil/commercial.

Location.

Military.

Type.

Determine the largest vessel that can be

Condition.

accommodated.

Approaches (depth and width).

Physical/Hydrographic Conditions

Alongside berths.

Identify the tides.

Anchorage.

Identify tidal ranges.

Free swinging berths.

Identify currents.

Vertical clearance.

Identify water bioluminescence.

Identify breakwaters, moles, jetties, or sea walls.

Harbor Characteristics

Evaluate unusual geophysical conditions.

Identify approaches and entrances to the harbor.

Location.

Type.

Width.

Determine the meteorological considerations.

Depth.

Evaluate the debris in the water.

Vertical clearance.

Type.

Identify harbor divisions.

Volume.

Designation.

Location.

Freight Handling Facilities/Equipment

Dimensions.

Identify the principal wharf.

Principal use.

Identification.

Characteristics.

Location.

Controlling depth.

Normal use.

Identify harbor fairways.

Type and construction.

Location.

Berth length.

Alignment.

Depth.

Radius of tightest turn.

Depth alongside.

Shortest tangent.

Height of deck.

Controlling depth.

Width.

January 2008 (Draft)

FM 2-91.4

1-33

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Chapter 1

Table 1-6. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure (continued)

Total length.

Refrigerated structure.

Standard berth class.

Open storage areas.

Transit sheds.

Individual open storage areas.

Fueling sheds.

Bulk cargo storage.

Cargo handling sheds.

Dry products storage.

Specialized handling equipment.

Coal storage.

Clearance.

Petroleum products storage.

Utilities.

Provide miscellaneous information.

Identify cargo handling cranes.

Clearance facilities.

Specialized handling equipment.

Railroads.

Clearance.

Roads.

Utilities.

Inland waterways.

Identify general cargo wharves.

Pipelines.

Location.

Ship Building and Repair Facilities

Number.

Identify ship building and repair facilities.

Linear meters.

Location.

Identify bulk cargo wharves.

Capabilities.

Type.

Category.

Location.

Identify dry-docks.

Use.

Location.

Numbers.

Type.

Linear meters.

Condition.

Identify supplementary wharves.

Type of dock.

Type.

Crane service.

Location.

Power required.

Normal use.

Identify floating dry-docks.

Number.

Location.

Linear meters.

Dimensions.

Identify offshore pipeline berths.

Crane service.

Location.

Owner.

Number.

Identify ship building ways.

Identify mooring and berth facilities.

Location.

Maximum safe draft.

Type.

Hard and unimproved sites usable for cargo.

Condition.

Identification.

Length.

Location.

Width.

Length.

Identify machine shops.

Width.

Location.

Surface composition.

Capacity.

Identify stevedore gear (gear used for unloading

Normal activity.

and loading cargo).

Owner.

Type.

Identify foundries.

Location.

Quantity.

Capacity.

Condition.

Normal activity.

Identify cranes.

Condition.

Type.

Owner.

Locations.

Other Considerations

Number.

Assess any improvements planned

Normal use.

or underway.

Owner.

Identify the port’s defenses.

Motive power.

Identify the protective works of the harbor.

Size.

Type.

Identify storage facilities.

Location.

General cargo storage.

Alignment.

Individual covered storage structures.

1-34

FM 2-91.4

January 2008 (Draft)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Intelligence and the Urban Environment

Table 1-6. Example information requirements for transportation infrastructure (continued)

Dimensions.

Electricity source.

Construction design.

- Location.

Identify the fire protection.

- Current characteristics.

Fire boats (type, power, location, number,

- Substations.

pumping capacity, condition).

Source of fuel.

Shore fire-fighting equipment (location, type,

- Type.

number, condition).

- Storage.

Water supply (source, adequacy, distribution

Evaluate the port’s support facilities.

system).

Communication facilities.

Evaluate harbor security.

Military transportation facilities.

Evaluate harbor maintenance.

Marine railroads.

Routine maintenance.

- Location.

Equipment available.

- Owner.

Dredging requirements.

- Type.

Rehabilitation requirements.

- Track length.

Evaluate the port’s utilities.

- Gauge.

Water supply.

- Hauling capacity.

- Location.

- Power system.

- Potability.

Handling equipment (general condition).

- Distribution.

Ordnance facilities.

- Capacity.

- Adequacy.

- Storage (location, type, capacity).

COMMUNICATIONS

1-95. Communication facilities in modern cities are expansive and highly developed. Complicated

networks of landlines, radio relay stations, fiber optics, cellular service, and the Internet provide a vast web

of communication capabilities. This communication redundancy allows for the constant flow of

information.

1-96. National and local engineers and architects may have developed a communication infrastructure

more effective and robust than it might first appear. Additionally, the use of cellular phones, computer

networking, and fiber-optic cable may significantly supplement or even replace the need for using

FM/UHF radios.

1-97. Developing countries may have little in the way of communication infrastructure. Information flow

can depend on less sophisticated means—couriers, graffiti, rumors/gossiping and local printed media. Even

in countries with little communication infrastructure, radios, cell phones, and satellite communications may

be readily available to pass information. Understanding communication infrastructure of a city is important

because it ultimately controls the flow of information to the population and the enemy. (See Table 1-7.)

January 2008 (Draft)

FM 2-91.4

1-35

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Chapter 1

Table 1-7. Example information requirements for communications infrastructure

Communications

- Terminal and operation equipment

Determine the status of the communication

(type, dimension, power requirements,

facilities.

technical characteristics, land

Location.

line connections).

Type (radio, television).

Regional computer networks.

Primary use.

- Types of computers and locations.

Importance.

- Types of networks and control centers.

Controlling authority.

Operator requirements.

- Agency involved.

Operator status.

- Function.

Maximum reliable range.

- Location.

Power source requirements.

- Relationship to military.

Transmitter specifications.

Evaluate each facility’s layout.

Receiver specifications.

Transmitting receiving equipment.

Antennae.

- Location.

Schematics or blueprints of the facility.

- Type.

Connectivity to regional/national

- Frequency range.

communication networks.

Control buildings.

Examine the region’s entire communications

- Location.

network.

- Power source.

Military communications establishment.

- Type.

- Background.

- Voltage.

- Staff control.

- Transformer requirement.

- Type.

Auxiliary power source.

- Other facilities under military.

- Type.

- Source.

- Voltage.

- Key personnel.

- Duration of usage.

- Training.

Antenna fields.

- Equipment.

- Location.

- Production facilities.

- Dimensions.

Research and development centers.

- Feed systems.

- Installation.

- Use.

- Projects (type, location,

- Polarization.

purpose).

- Mounting structure.

- Performance.

- Radiation pattern.

- Progress.

- Support areas.

- Foreign contributions.

Radio relay stations (location).

Intercept and direction finding stations.

Repair center.

- Location.

- Line of communication.

- Status.

- Type of shelter.

- Number and proficiency of

- Antenna layout.

technicians.

- Rotating antenna (type, number,

- Technical details.

description, pattern).

Equipment identification.

Telephone and telegraph facilities.

- Frequency range.

- Line routes.

- Poles (materials, treatment,

- Construction.

spacing, number of cross-

- Exchanges and offices.

arms).

- Repair facilities.

- Underground and underwater

- Interconnection of system.

cables (method, type, location).

- Construction line.

- Submarine cable facilities (if

- Open wire line (material, spacing,

any).

treatment, conductor).

- Cable (type, location,

Cellular phones.

description).

- Cellular tower locations.

- Cellular tower coverage.

1-36

FM 2-91.4

January 2008 (Draft)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Intelligence and the Urban Environment

Table 1-7. Example information requirements for communications infrastructure (continued)

Print media.

Satellite earth stations (locations).

- Newspapers, periodicals, and

Electromagnetic (EM) activity that could

pamphlets.

hamper friendly communications.

- Billboards.

High voltage/EM radiation hazard areas.

- Postal facilities.

Determine key media organizations and reports.

Local.

Police, fire, and rescue communications

International.

systems.

US.

Emergency Broadcast Systems.

Determine the data transmission capability through

Low-technology media (car horns, drums,

satellite communications.

graffiti, burning tires).

Local and regional television coverage.

- Number of channels.

- Station locations.

ENERGY

1-98. All societies require energy (such as wood, coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear, and solar) for basic

heating, cooking, and electricity. Energy is needed for industrial production and is therefore vital to the

economy. In fact, every sector of a city’s infrastructure relies on energy to some degree. Violence may

result from energy scarcity. From a tactical and operational perspective, protecting an urban area’s energy

supplies prevents unnecessary hardship to the civilian population and, therefore, facilitates mission

accomplishment. Power plants, refineries, and pipelines that provide energy resources for the urban area

may not be located within the urban area. Energy facilities are potential targets in an urban conflict.

Combatant forces may target these facilities to erode support for the local authorities or to deny these

facilities to their enemies.

1-99. Electricity is vital to city populations. Electric companies provide a basic service that provides heat,

power, and lighting. Because electricity cannot be stored in any sizable amount, damage to any portion of

this utility will immediately affect the population. Electrical services are not always available or reliable in

the developing world.

1-100. Interruptions in service are common occurrences in many cities due to a variety of factors.

Decayed infrastructure, sabotage, riots, military operations, and other forms of conflict can disrupt

electrical service. As a critical node of the overall city service sector, the electrical facilities are potential

targets in an urban conflict. Enemy forces may target these facilities to erode support for the local

authorities or friendly forces. (See Table 1-8.)

January 2008 (Draft)

FM 2-91.4

1-37

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8) - page 25