Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8)

Chapter 9

actions. The CBRN team’s support role is terminated when the IED is safely mitigated and no other

hazards requiring their assistance are present at the incident.

SAFETY AND SECURITY

9-19. The safety of personnel is the number one concern when encountering a suspected IED. The area

around the IED must be secured until trained EOD personnel arrive. After initial evaluation, the EOD team

may seek assistance from a TE battalion if it is deemed that the IED may contain CBRN material. When

encountering a suspected IED, personnel should—

Stop all movement toward the suspected IED and immediately evaluate the surrounding area for

secondary IEDs.

Not approach the suspected IED.

Not attempt to move the suspected IED.

Avoid using any communication or electronic equipment within 300 meters of the suspected

IED.

Establish a secure area around the suspected IED.

Adjust the initial exclusion area based on—

METT-TC.

Local command policy and guidance.

TTP.

SOPs.

Search the initial secure area for possible secondary explosive devices or hazards. Following an

initial attack, terrorists often plant a secondary device designed to detonate minutes or hours

after the primary device. The purpose is to wipe out the emergency responders who are at the

scene, thereby crippling the community’s ability to respond to the attack.

Identify potential enemy force observation or vantage points. All available man-made and

natural frontal and overhead cover should be searched. The establishment of a “reaction” pattern

should be avoided.

Forward all known information to higher HQ using the standard 9-line Explosive Hazard (EH)

Spot Report (see Figure 9-4 and Figure 9-5). At a minimum, the report must contain—

Who discovered the item (POC).

What the item is (type/subgroup).

Where the item is located (using an 8-digit grid).

When the item was discovered (date-time group).

Recommended priority (immediate, indirect, minor, or no threat).

Line 1: Date-time group (date-time discovered; command policy dictates local or Zulu time).

Line 2: Reporting unit/EH location (unit identification code or unit designation/8- or 10-digit grid [include

landmarks, reference points, and street addresses]).

Line 3: Contact method (radio frequency and call sign or telephone number and name).

Line 4: Type of ordnance (dropped, projected, placed, or thrown).

Line 5: CBRN contamination (yes or no, known or suspected; if yes, type of agent if known or

identified).

Line 6: Resources threatened (identification of resource and determination of criticality).

Line 7: Impact on mission (description of how the UXO affects the mission).

Line 8: Protective measures (description of measures taken).

Line 9: Recommended priority (immediate, indirect, minor, or no threat).

Figure 9-4. Standard 9-Line EH Spot Report Format

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FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Appendix A

National Response Plan

This appendix provides an overview of the NRP, the ICS, and the unified command

(UC) and outlines the strategies that can be used to reduce hazards associated with a

traditional or nontraditional CBRN incident.

GENERAL

A-1. The NRP is an all-discipline, all-hazard plan that establishes a single, comprehensive framework for

the management of domestic incidents. It provides the structure and mechanisms for coordinating federal

support with state, local, and tribal incident managers and for exercising direct federal authorities and

responsibilities. The NRP assists in the important homeland security mission of preventing terrorist attacks

within the United States, reducing the vulnerability to all natural and man-made hazards, minimizing the

damage, and assisting in the recovery from any type of incident that occurs.

ORGANIZATION

A-2. The NRP consists of the following components:

Base plan.

Appendices.

ESF annexes.

Base Plan

A-3. The base plan describes the structure and processes involved in a national approach to domestic

incident management. It is designed to integrate the efforts and resources of federal, state, local, tribal,

private-sector, and nongovernmental organizations. The base plan includes planning assumptions, roles and

responsibilities, operations concepts, incident management actions, and plan maintenance instructions.

Appendices

A-4. The appendices provide relevant, detailed supporting information, including terms, definitions,

acronyms, authorities, and a compendium of national interagency plans.

Emergency Support Function Annexes

A-5. The ESF annexes detail the missions, policies, structures, and responsibilities of federal agencies for

coordinating resource and programmatic support to states, tribes, and other federal agencies or jurisdictions

during incidents of national significance. The introduction to the ESF annexes summarizes the functions of

ESF coordinators and primary and support agencies.

ESF 1 covers transportation operations.

Federal and civil transportation support.

Transportation safety.

Restoration and recovery of transportation infrastructure.

Movement restrictions.

Damage and impact assessment.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

A-1

Appendix A

ESF 2 covers communications operations.

Coordination with telecommunications industry.

Restoration and repair of telecommunications infrastructure.

Protection, restoration, and sustainment of national cyber and information

technology resources.

ESF 3 covers public works and engineering operations.

Infrastructure protection and emergency repairs.

Infrastructure restoration.

Engineering services and construction management.

Critical infrastructure liaison operations.

ESF 4 covers firefighting operations.

Incidents on federal land.

Resource support to rural and urban firefighting efforts.

ESF 5 covers emergency management operations.

Coordination of incident management efforts.

Issuance of mission assignments.

Resource and human capital.

Incident action planning.

Financial management.

ESF 6 covers mass care, housing, and human services.

Mass care.

Disaster housing.

Human services.

ESF 7 covers resource support.

Facility space.

Office equipment and supplies.

Contracting services.

ESF 8 covers public health and medical services.

Public health.

Medical treatment.

Mental health services.

Mortuary services.

ESF 9 covers urban search-and-rescue operations.

Lifesaving assistance.

Urban search and rescue.

ESF 10 covers oil and HAZMAT response operations.

Chemical, biological, and radiological releases.

Environmental safety and short- and long-term cleanup response.

ESF 11 covers agriculture and natural resources.

Nutrition assistance.

Animal and plant diseases and pest response.

Food safety and security.

Natural and cultural resources and historic properties protection and

restoration.

A-2

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

National Response Plan

ESF 12 covers energy.

Infrastructure assessment, repairs, and restoration.

Coordination with industry utilities.

Energy forecasts.

ESF 13 covers public safety and security operations.

Facility and resource security.

Security planning and technical and resource assistance.

Safety and security support.

Access, traffic, and crowd control.

ESF 14 covers long-term community recovery and mitigation operations.

Social and economic community impact assessment.

Long-term community recovery assistance to states, local governments, and

the private sector.

Mitigation analysis and program implementation.

ESF 15 covers external affairs.

Emergency public-information and protective-action guidance.

Media and community relations.

Congressional and international affairs.

Relations with tribal and insular residents.

Support Annexes

A-6. The support annexes provide guidance and describe the functional processes and administrative

requirements necessary to ensure efficient and effective implementation of NRP incident management

objectives. The support annexes include the following:

The financial-management annex provides guidance for NRP implementation to ensure that

incident-related funds are provided expeditiously and that financial-management activities are

conducted according to established law, policies, regulations, and standards.

The international coordination annex provides guidance for carrying out responsibilities

regarding coordination in support of the federal response to domestic incidents of national

significance.

The logistic management annex describes the framework for the overall NRP logistic

management function. It also outlines logistic management responsibilities and mechanisms for

integrating federal, state, local, and tribal resource providers.

The private-sector coordination annex outlines the processes used to conduct effective incident

management coordination and integration with private-sector representatives, including

representatives from critical infrastructure

(CI) and key resource

(KR) sectors and other

industries.

The public affairs annex describes the procedures used to conduct interagency incident

communications designed to enable the coordination and dissemination of timely public

information during incidents of national significance.

The science and technology annex provides the guidance and mechanisms to ensure that all

levels of government use the nation’s science and technology resources efficiently and

effectively during incidents of national significance.

The tribal-relations annex describes the policies, responsibilities, and concept of operations

(CONOPS) for effective coordination and interaction with tribal governments and communities

during incidents of national significance.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

A-3

Appendix A

The volunteer and donations management annex provides guidance on volunteer and donations

functions related to incidents of national significance.

The worker safety and health annex details the processes for identifying responder safety and

health risks and outlines the procedures necessary to minimize or eliminate illnesses or injuries

during incident management and emergency response activities.

PURPOSE

A-7. The purpose of the NRP is to establish a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic

incident management across a spectrum of activities, including prevention, preparedness, response, and

recovery operations. The NRP, using the NIMS, establishes mechanisms to⎯

Maximize the integration of incident-related prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery

activities.

Improve the coordination and integration among federal, state, local, tribal, regional, private-

sector, and nongovernmental organization partners.

Maximize the efficient use of resources needed for effective incident management and CI and

KR protection and restoration.

Improve incident management communications and increase situational awareness across

jurisdictions and between the public and private sectors.

Facilitate emergency mutual aid and federal emergency support to state, local, and tribal

governments.

Facilitate federal-to-federal interaction and emergency support.

Provide a proactive and integrated federal response to catastrophic events.

Access links to other federal incident management and emergency response plans developed for

specific types of incidents or hazards.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A-8. A basic premise of the NRP dictates that incidents be handled at the lowest jurisdictional level

possible. Police, fire, public health, medical, emergency management, and other personnel are responsible

for incident management at the local level. In some instances, a federal agency in the local area may act as

a first responder and provide direction or assistance consistent with its specific statutory authorities and

responsibilities. In the vast majority of incidents, state and local resources and interstate mutual aid provide

first-line emergency response and incident management support.

A-9. When an incident or potential incident is of such severity, magnitude, and/or complexity that it is

considered an incident of national significance according to the criteria established in this plan, the

Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with other federal departments and agencies, initiates

actions to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the incident. These actions are taken in

conjunction with state, local, tribal, nongovernmental, and private-sector entities (as appropriate to the

threat or incident). When an emergency or disaster incident exceeds state, local, or tribal capabilities, the

DHS will coordinate supplemental federal assistance for incidents covered under the Robert T. Stafford

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (PL 93-288).

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

A-10. The national structure for incident management establishes a clear progression of coordination and

communication from the local level to the regional and national HQ levels. This structure is diagramed in

Figure A-1.

A-11. According to the NIMS process, resource and policy issues are addressed at the lowest

organizational level practicable. If the issues cannot be resolved at that level, they are forwarded to the next

level for

A-4

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Appendix A

resolution. Keeping with the NIMS construct, the NRP includes the following command and coordination

structures:

Incident command posts (ICPs) on scene using ICS and UC.

Area commands (if needed).

State, local, tribal, and private-sector EOCs.

The joint forces operations (JFO) coordination group, which is responsible for coordinating

federal assistance and supporting incident management activities locally.

A regional response coordination center (RRCC) and a homeland security operations center

(HSOC), which serve as multiagency situational awareness and operational coordination centers

at the regional and national levels.

An interagency incident management group

(IIMG), which serves as the national HQ

multiagency coordination entity for domestic incident management.

The Homeland Security Council (HSC) and other White House organizations, which serve as

the national-level multiagency coordination entities to advise and assist the President on

homeland security and other policy issues.

A-12. The NRP organizational structure addresses site-specific incident management activities and broader

regional or national issues related to the incident (such as the possible implications on other areas of the

country), the immediate regional or national actions required to avert or prepare for potential subsequent

events, and the management of multiple threats or incidents (particularly those that are not site-specific,

geographically dispersed, or could evolve over a long period of time).

A-13. Figure A-2 depicts initial incident management actions. In situations where it is apparent that an

incident of national significance may be imminent or has already occurred, the assessment and preincident

interagency coordination phase is compressed. In these instances, DHS moves quickly to coordinate

multiple federal activities, to include information sharing, interagency COAs, alert and deployment of

resources, operational coordination, and other assistance as required, in consultation and coordination with

other federal departments and agencies and the affected jurisdictions.

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

A-14. CBRN teams should plan and prepare to respond to a terrorist CBRN emergency. This response

capability could be organic or established through reach-back capabilities (as discussed in Chapter 2).

Strategic guidance for CBRN response to terrorist CBRN incidents and attacks is given in presidential and

federal directives, joint doctrinal publications, and CONOPSs.

A-15. The presidential directive that covers responses to a CBRN incident is found in HSPD-5. It indicates

that there is a single federal response to domestic incidents based on DHS guidance. HSPD-5 directs the

DHS to publish an NRP and requires federal departments and agencies to adopt the NIMS to manage

domestic incidents. The Initial National Response Plan (INRP) was released in September 2003. On

1 March 2004, DHS published the NIMS as the underlying architecture to govern the full range of U.S.

incident management efforts. The NIMS employs incident response directives using the operational

structure of the ICS and UC system. Joint guidance is governed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

(CJCS) CBRN protection policy and a number of standards that include CBRN protection, response

capabilities, prioritization criteria, management and oversight of protection and response efforts, flow of

threat information, and protection risk assessments.

A-16. Public law designates DOD responsibilities under the CBRN preparedness program. This program

provides the CONOPS, guidance, procedures, policies, and mandatory standards for protecting personnel

and critical resources from attacks and CBRN events.

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FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

National Response Plan

Figure A-2. Flow of Initial National-Level Incident Management Actions

A-17. Personnel should be protected from CBRN attacks. They should respond to attacks with trained and

equipped emergency responders. Ports and vessels should remain in operation during critical periods and

resume essential operations following an attack. Personnel should adhere to established protection

standards as follows:

Donning of the appropriate level of protection necessary to support mission continuity (essential

personnel⎯military, civilian, and contract personnel).

Compliance with the procedures and protection level necessary to safely survive an incident

(nonessential personnel or the general populace).

Implementation of the strategic guidance for protection. This is accomplished through

proficiency in and proper application of the following joint enabling tasks:

Define the parameters of the CBRN.

Detect and identify immediate CBRN incidents.

Provide information to the decision makers regarding a threat to the

populace.

Protect all people appropriately.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

A-7

Appendix A

Initiate a response through crisis responders.

Restore services and protect the infrastructure.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR

INCIDENT RESPONSE

A-18. When a CBRN incident is detected, trained personnel initiate the ICS/UC and establish an ICP for an

on-site response. The ICP is the tactical-level, on-scene incident command authority and is typically

located at or in the immediate vicinity of the incident site.

A-19. The ICP also keeps higher HQ informed. The ICP provides directive and nondirective guidance on

support and operational procedures for the CBRN response. It serves as the focal point for monitoring unit

resources and mission capabilities and coordinates support activities during a response. The location for the

site of the incident operations commander (IOC) should be based on criteria established using CBRN and

antiterrorism (AT) vulnerability assessments (VAs) Planners should also use this process to identify areas

that could serve as alternate ICP sites.

A-20. The CBRN response organizations and operational tasks can be laid across distinct time phases to

form a model of response that effectively protects lives and promotes mission accomplishment in the face

of a CBRN threat (see Figure A-3). Three phases⎯preincident, incident, and postincident⎯make up the

incident timeline.

Preincident

Incident

Postincident

Incident occurs/

ICS disestablished

ICS established

Figure A-3. CBRN Incident Timeline

A-21. Preincident tasks conducted in the first phase provide a constant process of improvement that

continues until an incident occurs and the ICS/UC is activated. The incident phase begins when an incident

occurs (or if not known, when a responder activates the ICS/UC) and ends when it is deactivated. The

postincident phase begins when the ICS/UC is deactivated and continues until the hazard is mitigated.

A-22. The model for response to a CBRN incident (Figure A-4) uses crisis responders in the preincident

phase to plan and prepare for an attack. During an incident, the team employs the ICS/UC to accomplish

incident response tasks. In the postincident phase, the IC and the federal on-scene commander (FOSC),

with federal assistance, mitigate the incident using CBRN incident management tasks and HAZMAT

remediation.

A-8

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

National Response Plan

Phase

Preincident

Incident

Postincident

Conduct

CBRN

incident

Conduct

management.

CBRN incident

Task

response

planning.

preparation.

Conduct

CBRN

HAZMAT

incident

remediation.

response.

Crisis responders (TE BN)

ICS/UC

Federal

Event

Incident occurs/

ICS disestablished

ICS established

Figure A-4. CBRN Incident Response Model

INCIDENT RESPONSE TASKS

A-23. In Figure A-4, five operational tasks illustrate the preparation, mitigation, and recovery necessary in

a CBRN incident. Those tasks are further defined below:

Conduct CBRN incident response planning (Figure A-5, page A-10). This planning task

determines the vulnerabilities and vulnerability reduction measures through the conduct of a VA

and other analyses. The CBRN response plan, including plans for all functional areas, is written

and coordinated.

Conduct CBRN incident response preparation

(Figure A-6, page A-11). This task

implements the vulnerability reduction measures determined through the VA and functional area

analyses. This task and the previous planning task are conducted in a continuous cycle to

systematically reduce the attack vulnerability.

Conduct CBRN incident response (Figure A-7, page A-12). This task, conducted after a

CBRN attack occurs, includes executing the CBRN response plan and mitigating the hazard.

Conduct CBRN incident management (Figure A-8, page A-13). This task is conducted after

an attack occurs and continues until full recovery is achieved.

Conduct HAZMAT remediation. This task, conducted after the ICS/UC is disestablished,

implements the programs needed to assist personnel and resume functions directly impacted by

the incident.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

A-9

National Response Plan

Manage CBRN

incident.

Report incident

Assemble

Warn

Conduct

to higher,

ops

personnel

avoidance

lower, and

center

of hazard.

operations.

adjacent HQ.

personnel

Perform

Conduct

protection

health and

mass care

sustainment

procedures

medical

operations.

Conduct

logistic

finance and

operations.

administrativ

e operations.

Figure A-8. CBRN Incident Management

INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM AND UNIFIED COMMAND

A-24. Federal law mandates the ICS and UC response system. The senior first responder (with the proper

training requisite) implements the ICS or UC response system. The person who assumes the role of the IC

has responsibility for directing and/or controlling resources by virtue of legal, agency, or delegated

authority.

Note. The senior first responder must meet the proper training requirements to implement an

ICS or UC response.

A-25. The IC is responsible for all aspects of a response, including developing incident objectives

and managing all incident operations. The IC sets priorities and defines the ICS organization.

Regardless of whether other positions are assigned, an IC will always be designated.

A-26. The IC may assign deputies. The deputies must have the same qualifications as the IC and

be prepared to take over the IC position anytime.

A-27. The organization of an ICS is built around five major management functions: command, planning,

operations, logistics, and finance. These functions can be applied to any incident, large or small. The IC

retains responsibility for these functions, sometimes delegating them to another individual. A major

advantage of using the ICS organization is the flexibility of the IC to tailor the organization as needed. The

modular organization of the ICS allows responders to scale their efforts and apply sections of the structure

that best meet the specifics of the incident. In some incidents, functional elements that may be formally

established or delegated to another individual are limited. However, if there is a need to expand an

organization, additional positions exist within the ICS framework to meet virtually any need. For example,

while one incident may not require the activation of planning, logistic, or finance and administration

sections, other incidents may require that some or all sections of the ICS organization be established. There

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

A-13

Appendix A

are no hard-and-fast rules for when or how to expand the ICS organization. In addition, in responses

involving responders from a single jurisdiction, the ICS establishes an organization for comprehensive

response management. If an incident involves more than one agency or jurisdiction, the IC can expand the

ICS framework to address multijurisdictional coverage.

A-28. The roles of the ICS participants vary depending on the incident; the roles may even vary during the

same incident. Staffing considerations are always based on the needs of the incident. The number of

personnel and the organizational structure are based solely on the size and complexity of the incident.

There is no absolute standard to follow. However, large-scale incidents usually require that each

component or section be set up separately, with different staff members managing each section. A basic

operating guideline is that the IC is responsible for all activities until command authority is transferred.

A-29. Another key aspect of an ICS is the development of an incident action plan (IAP). The IC and the

planning section chief typically establish a planning cycle. The planning section develops an IAP for the

next operational period (usually 12 or 24 hours long) and submits it to the IC for approval. The creation of

a planning cycle and the development of an IAP for a particular operational period help the IC to focus

available resources on the highest priorities and incident objectives. The planning cycle, if properly

practiced, brings together everyone’s input and identifies critical shortfalls that need to be addressed to

carry out the IC’s objectives.

A-30. Agencies must be able to use the ICS on a day-to-day basis for routine situations and major

emergencies.

INCIDENT COMMANDER

A-31. The senior emergency response official responding to an incident is in charge of the site-specific

ICS. All emergency responders and their communications are coordinated and controlled through this

individual or by designated senior officials.

A-32. The senior official on site has the responsibility for controlling operations. Initially, it is the senior

officer on scene with responding emergency equipment. As more senior officers arrive (division officer,

senior law enforcement official, IC), the position is passed up the previously established line of authority.

A-33. The senior official in charge of the ICS identifies, to the extent possible, all hazardous substances

present and addresses a site analysis, the use of engineering measures, maximum exposure limits,

HAZMAT handling procedures, and the use of new technologies.

A-34. Based on the hazardous substances and/or conditions present, the senior official in charge of the ICS

implements the appropriate emergency operations and ensures that the level of PPE is appropriate for the

hazard.

A-35. Personnel exposed to hazardous substances presenting an inhalation hazard or potential inhalation

hazard must wear a positive-pressure SCBA while engaged in emergency response operations. The senior

official in charge of the ICS determines, through the use of air-monitoring equipment, the level of

respiratory protection necessary.

A-36. The senior official in charge of the ICS must limit the number of emergency response personnel in

the areas of potential or actual exposure to incident or site hazards. Only personnel actively performing

emergency operations should enter the site. Operations conducted in hazardous areas must be performed

using the buddy system (groups of two or more).

A-37. The senior official in charge of the ICS must designate a safety officer (SO) to identify and evaluate

hazards and implement safety precautions. The person must have specific knowledge of the dangers

presented at the site.

A-38. When site operations are judged by the SO to be IDLH and/or to otherwise involve imminent danger,

the SO has the authority to alter, suspend, or terminate operations. The SO must immediately inform the

senior official in charge of the ICS of any actions to be taken to reduce the hazard.

A-39. After emergency operations have terminated, the senior official in charge of the ICS implements the

appropriate decontamination procedures.

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FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

National Response Plan

A-40. An IC who assumes control of an incident scene beyond the first-responder awareness level (such as

the on-scene commander), must have completed at least 24 hours of training equivalent to the first-

responder operations level. Additionally, the IC’s supervisor must certify that he⎯

Knows how to implement the ICS.

Knows how to implement an emergency response plan.

Understands the hazards and risks associated with working in chemical-protective clothing.

Knows how to implement the local emergency response plan.

Understands the state emergency response plan and the availability of the federal regional

response team.

Understands the importance of decontamination procedures.

UNIFIED COMMAND

A-41. Although a single IC normally controls all command functions, an ICS organization may be

expanded to a UC. The UC is a structure that brings together the ICs of all major organizations involved in

the incident to coordinate an effective response, while continuing to carry out their own jurisdictional

responsibilities. The UC links the organizations responding to the incident and provides a forum for these

entities to make consensus decisions. Under a UC, responders from various jurisdictions and/or agencies

(such as the FBI, the Department of Energy [DOE], and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

[CDC]) may blend to create an integrated response team.

A-42. A UC may be initiated when multiple jurisdictions are involved in a response effort. These

jurisdictions may be represented by⎯

Geographic boundaries (such as two states).

Governmental levels (such as local, state, or federal).

Functional responsibilities (such as firefighting or nuclear releases).

Statutory responsibilities (such as responsibilities of the FBI or the DOD).

Various combinations of levels and responsibilities.

A-43. The UC makeup for a specific incident is determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account

the⎯

Specifics of the incident.

Objectives outlined in existing response plans.

Decisions reached during the initial meeting of the UC.

A-44. The makeup of a UC may change as an incident progresses and the situation transforms. The UC

requires a team effort, but the number of personnel involved must remain small to maintain simplicity and

efficiency.

A-45. The UC is not a “decision committee.” It is created to command response operations. Since time is of

the essence, the UC must develop synergy operations based on the capabilities of the various

representatives. There should be a personal acknowledgement of each representative’s unique capabilities,

a shared understanding of the situation, and agreed-upon common objectives. With different perspectives,

comes the risk of disagreements—most of which can be resolved through an understanding of the

underlying issues. Contentious issues may arise, but the UC framework provides a forum and a process to

resolve problems and find solutions. If situations arise where members of the UC cannot reach a consensus,

the UC member representing the agency with primary jurisdiction over the issue makes the final decision.

A-46. A complete list of OSHA regulations regarding the ICS and UC is located at

<http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owasrch.search_form?p_doc_type=STANDARDS&p_to

c_level=0&p_keyvalue>.

A-47. There are a number of ICS and/or UC training tools available on the Internet to prepare personnel

for an installation response. Many of the responders in the follow-on elements must be familiar with these

tools to promote a unity of effort. Some of these tools include⎯

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

A-15

Appendix A

Position task books (PTBs). PTBs⎯

Were developed for designated positions within the National Interagency

Incident Management System (NIIMS).

Include requirements for certification in ICS positions.

Include tasks for ICs (Types 1, 2, and 3 per the NRP); SOs; liaison officers;

information officers; and positions in the planning, logistic, and finance

sections.

Can be viewed at Web site

<http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/ics/

ics_tasks.html#ops>.

ICS site safety plan (SSP) worksheets. ICS SSP worksheets⎯

Include a hazard identification, evaluation, and control section; an air-

monitoring log; a site map; a PPE section; decontamination procedures; an

emergency response plan; and a 29 CFR 1910.120 site safety and health

compliance plan that includes a drum compliance checklist.

Are located at Web site <http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/ics/

pdf/ics_uscg_ssp_checklists.pdf>.

Information on the National Mutual-Aid and Resource Management System. The National

Mutual-Aid and Resource Management System is⎯

An initiative undertaken by the Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA) within the DHS to support the NIIMS.

Designed to enhance emergency readiness and response operations through

a comprehensive and integrated system. The installation IOC can use this

tool to obtain information on specific resource capabilities, locations, costs,

and support requirements to augment needed resources.

A national typing protocol. The national typing protocol is⎯

Used to assess current and required CBRN response capabilities.

Installations may use a resource management process outlined in NIMS to

identify and type resources.

Designed to inventory and manage resources. This is one of the NIMS

resource management tools designed to promote common interoperability

and a “common language” for interagency discussion and the integration of

resources.

Note. For the purposes of this FM, “typing” a resource means categorizing the resources that an

IC would need when responding to a CBRN event. The elements of the national typing protocol

include category, kind, components, metrics, and type data. These elements are defined and

discussed in Appendix B.

PLANNING

A-48. The preparation for responding to a CBRN incident includes identifying response planning

assumptions. These assumptions may include⎯

A situation where responders are overwhelmed by the extent of the response effort.

Multiple CBRN incidents.

Infrastructure (communications or transportation) damage, destruction, or contamination.

Difficulty reaching the incident scene.

Unknown hazards.

The need for additional response personnel (based on factors such as work-and-rest cycle

management for CBRN response teams).

TIM hazards.

A-16

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

National Response Plan

Note. This portion of the plan should include a CONOPS that outlines guidance and suggested

actions. A tailored CONOPS, appropriate to each, provides a template. A CONOPS should

outline—

Actions to detect, identify, and contain CBRN contamination.

Follow-on actions during recovery operations (cleanup and/or disposal of contaminated

materials).

Representation, as required, to support incident command operations.

Additional support requirements for various response capabilities.

Coordination with other support elements (surveillance, sampling, or sheltering).

Procedures for maintaining, receiving, analyzing, and forwarding status reports.

Damage assessments.

Reach-back capability for technical and operational information.

Note. Operational requirements for HAZMAT response include incident response and

postincident remediation requirements as follows:

HAZMAT emergency response requirements (according to 29 CFR 1910.120q).

Access to DA Pam 50-6 to reference the policies and procedures for a response to a

chemical accident or incident and for reference to the policies and procedures prescribed

for chemical accident or incident response and assistance (CAIRA) operations.

Access to references outlining the operational requirements for postincident CBRN

remediation, including Engineer Manual

(EM) 1110-1-502

(guidance on performing

remedial and corrective actions at HAZMAT waste sites, such as preliminary assessments,

site investigations, remedial investigations, and feasibility studies).

EOD support. The Army is responsible for providing EOD support to U.S. military

operations. Each EOD element is geographically positioned to support large regional or

national response efforts and FEMA regions.

Medical

A-49. FM 4-02.7 provides information on planning health service support in a CBRN environment. This

information may include⎯

Medical treatment.

Information on medical treatment for exposure to biological agents can be

found in FM 8-284.

Medical treatment and control measures regarding communicable diseases

can be found in FM 4-02.33. This FM identifies diseases by numeric codes

assigned according to the International Classification of Diseases.

Medical treatment requirements for operations in CBRN environments can

be found in AR 40-12 and FM 4-02.7.

Medical treatment for nuclear and radiological exposure can be found in

FM 4-02.283. This manual classifies and describes potential nuclear and

radiological threats and hazards; describes the biological aspects of blast,

thermal radiation, and ionizing radiation and their effects on the body; and

describes the procedures for administering first aid and diagnosing, treating,

and managing casualties.

FM 8-285 is a reference guide for trained members of the Armed Forces

Medical Services and other medically qualified personnel regarding the

treatment of chemical-agent casualties and conventional military chemical

injuries. This FM also provides information on first aid (self-aid, buddy aid,

and combat lifesaver [CLS] aid).

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

A-17

Appendix A

Emergency medical requirements.

FM 8-500 provides responders and hospital emergency personnel with

guidance on the proper medical management for patients exposed to

HAZMAT in a field environment. This FM organizes chemicals by groups

and protocol, taking into account the physiological effects of the agent on

the body. It also includes a protocol for radioactive compounds.

AR 40-13 outlines the procedures for medical support following a nuclear

and/or chemical accident or incident. This regulation identifies potential

chemical accidents and/or incidents and the response and assistance

requirements necessary to control the events. It describes the use of

laboratory services and lists required equipment.

Telecommunications and Information Technology

A-50. The preparation for responding to a CBRN incident includes identifying communications and

information technology (IT) planning assumptions. These assumptions may include the possibility that⎯

The initial reports outlining CBRN-related information are fragmented and present an

incomplete picture of communications capabilities.

Adverse weather conditions and other environmental factors may disrupt the use of external and

mobile communications.

The capability to acquire real-time information may be restricted or nonexistent.

The initial priority following an incident is lifesaving operations, concurrent with establishing

control of the area and restoring communications (as the situation permits).

A-51. The IT portion of the plan includes a CONOPS that outlines guidance and suggested actions. A

CONOPS should⎯

Identify the uniform emergency communications procedures to be used.

Stipulate that communications management occur on a bottom-up basis and that decisions be

made at the lowest level. Only issues requiring adjudication or additional resources are referred

to a higher level.

Require that a damage assessment be performed on the communications and IT infrastructure

and that a timeline for restoring capabilities be developed.

Prioritize the requirements and monitor the developing situation and the response.

Identify the procedures for receiving and providing information and status reports.

Identify the procedures for coordinating service provisions and restoration, as required.

Address communications interoperability with supporting response assets.

Identify reach-back capabilities for support, as required.

Outline the procedures for communicating with the ICP.

Identify communications assets (as required) within the affected areas.

Identify the training required for telecommunications and IT personnel

(awareness level

training).

Include weather information for the area of concern.

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FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

National Response Plan

Transportation

A-52. The preparation for responding to a CBRN incident includes identifying transportation planning

assumptions. These assumptions may include the possibility that the⎯

Transportation infrastructure might sustain damage or contamination, limiting access to the

incident site.

Limited transformation capacity might decrease the effectiveness of the response.

Damage and communications disruptions might delay or prevent coordination for transportation

support.

Movement of resupply or support assets might create congestion.

A-53. The transportation plan outlines procedure guidance and suggests a tailored CONOPS. The

execution of the plan may be modified based on the METT-TC. A transportation CONOPS should⎯

Provide for representation at the ICP.

Provide memorandums of understanding (MOUs) or memorandums of agreement (MOAs) to

use civilian transportation assets, as required.

Recognize state transportation policies and plans.

Provide time-phased response guidelines for required transportation resources

(additional

response teams or supplies).

Provide a list of transportation resources to facilitate the movement of personnel and goods to

and from the incident site.

Incorporate the control function for assistance in obtaining transportation assets and track the

movement of resources to the incident site.

Emphasize communication and coordination between the unit and the supporting transportation

assets.

Include situational-awareness information (such as downwind hazard areas and contaminated

areas).

Include a transportation damage assessment.

Emergency Public Information and External Communications

A-54. The preparation for responding to a CBRN incident involves the identification of emergency public

information and the planning for external communications. Plans may⎯

Ensure that authoritative information regarding the incident is disseminated to the lowest level

to squelch unsubstantiated rumors.

Ensure the dissemination of critical information to the public and outside agencies.

Provide accurate, consistent, timely, and easy-to-understand information.

A-55. The plan for emergency public information and external communications information should include

a CONOPS that outlines the operational guidance, provides suggested actions, and provides a template

appropriately tailored to each requirement. Additionally, the CONOPS should⎯

Provide for representation at the ICP, when required.

Identify training requirements.

Identify a central point for coordination and information release.

Identify the type of information to be released.

Identify specialized capabilities such as linguists, if required.

Identify procedures for monitoring news coverage to ensure the accurate dissemination of

information.

Identify the broad range of resources to be used to convey and/or correct information.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

A-19

Appendix A

A-56. DODD 5230.16 contains DOD policies, responsibilities, and procedures for releasing information to

the public during accidents and incidents involving nuclear weapons, radioactive materials, and improvised

nuclear devices.

A-57. DODD 4650.2 contains policies, responsibilities, and requirements for using the Military Affiliate

Radio System (MARS). The MARS is used as an alternate communications capability during emergency

situations.

EXECUTION

A-58. If a terrorist CBRN event occurs, personnel in the ICP immediately initiate the notification and

resource activation process. Depending on the initial assessment, the IOC may direct personnel to⎯

Activate the emergency rosters and initiate post notification and warning sirens.

Implement local MOUs/MOAs and alert local off-post or HN offices.

Request additional resources through Army, federal, and established civilian channels to

augment the response capability.

Note. A terrorist CBRN attack may overwhelm the capability of personnel to respond, detect,

assess, maintain operations, and contain the threat. The TE battalion, as with most other local,

state, or federal entities, does not have the authority or the expertise to respond unilaterally to all

aspects of terrorist CBRN threats or incidents. However, the NRP provides direction and

guidance.

A-59. Critical or disastrous situations triggering national-level interest are initially reported on an

operations report (OPREP) 3 PINNACLE level. (Refer to Figure A-9 for a visual representation of this

process.) The OPREP 3 system is used to report significant events and incidents to the highest levels of

command. According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum (CJCSM) 3150.03, the ICP

submits an OPREP 3 when national-level interest has been determined. Therefore, in the event of a terrorist

CBRN incident, the ICP sends an OPREP 3 (with the flag word PINNACLE) directly to the National

Military Command Center (NMCC). Initial voice reports should be made within 15 minutes of an incident;

message reports should be submitted within 1 hour. The initial report must not be delayed to gain

additional information. Follow-up reports can be submitted as additional information becomes available.

The IC submits⎯

Voice reports. The IC submits voice reports sequentially to the NMCC, appropriate commands,

reporting unit parent service, and intermediate superior command. Conference calls or

concurrent telephone calls may be used if no delays are encountered and security is maintained.

A telephone line between the NMCC and the IC must remain open throughout the duration of

the incident.

Communications reports. The IC submits OPREP 3 reports (with IMMEDIATE or FLASH

precedence) as soon as possible following an event or incident.

Note. Actions taken in the first minutes following a terrorist attack are critical to the success of

the response.

Note. The CJCSM 3150.03 series contains specific guidance on preparing an OPREP 3.

A-20

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

National Response Plan

JCS

President

SecDef

NMC

(NSC)

National assets

LFAs

NORTHCOM

FBI

DHS

FEMA

JTF-CS

Support agencies

USA Ops

USAF Ops

USN Ops

OPREP 3

NIH

USPHS

Center

CDC

EPA

DOE

FORSCOM

AFRAT

NMRI

20th SUPCOM

CAP

NRL

(CBRNE)

Hammer ACE

CBIRF

CM BN (TE)

MAJCOM

MEDCOM

Responders

USAMRIID

USAMRICD

AMC

RDECOM

(TE) CBRN

ECBC

response

DOD resources

teams

Local agencies

(TE BN)

and authorities

Execute mutual aid agreements

Figure A-9. Notification and Resource Activation Process for Domestic CBRN Events

IMPLEMENTING A PLANNED CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL,

RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR RESPONSE

A-60. A planned CBRN response begins when an incident report is submitted in the notification chain

(emergency operators, fire or law enforcement personnel), CBRN detectors sound an alert, or observer

personnel report an event. All personnel (including noncombatants) should be trained to recognize CBRN

events and know how to notify authorities of a suspected attack. The planned CBRN response includes⎯

Initiating the response.

The IC maintains and activates the alert notification procedures. The IC

uses designated means, such as the radio net, to notify members of the ICP,

emergency responders, and other functional teams

(depending on the

severity of the incident).

The IC establishes the ICS after the area is secured and begins establishing

the parameters of the hot and warm zones. If, following hostile force

actions, the event is determined to be CBRN-related, fire suppression,

casualty evacuation, and CBRN teams enter the site to provide the IC with a

full assessment of the situation. EOD (or equivalent) personnel lead the way

into the hot zone to assess the situation for secondary devices. The initial IC

may delegate direct control of the hot zone to another designated officer.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

A-21

Appendix A

The IC provides C2 information on the entire incident scene (including the

hot, warm, and cold zones) to the IOC.

Responders approach the incident site from an upwind or crosswind

direction when directed, maintaining a safe distance from the site to

maximize individual safety. The likelihood of numerous victims is

extremely high when dealing with a terrorist attack. However, if there is

confirmation that no victims are involved, the IC may conduct detection

operations and then cordon the area to conduct decontamination operations.

Responders must treat the incident site as a potential crime scene when

safety permits. If CBRN materials are suspected or detected, the

commander ensures that the IOC accomplishes the appropriate notification

and reporting requirements.

If the FBI (or DOS if overseas) assumes jurisdiction for the investigation,

the commander must provide the initial and immediate response to isolate,

contain, and mitigate the effects of the incident. Command of military

elements remains within military channels.

The IOC activates response organizations, beginning with those requested

by the IC. Response at the incident site should be initially limited to

minimum elements until the degree of damage can be determined. The

severity of the incident may dictate that the IC remain located at a distance

(the functional area responders and the designated IC may or may not be

physically located at the incident site). The IC may request additional

elements from the various functional areas, depending on the situation.

Resources requested by the IC assemble at a predesignated staging area.

The staging area should be located a safe distance from the incident site to

prevent interference with the CBRN team and to reduce exposure to

hazards. In a CBRN environment, the IC should limit the number of

personnel responding to or near the incident site.

The ICs must ensure a smooth transition. The smooth transition between the

initial and follow-on IC depends on the transfer of accurate information.

This transition may occur when all initial emergency actions have been

completed and it is safe for the IC to move toward the incident perimeter.

The initial IC maintains control of the incident site and evaluates the site

situation to determine when it is safe and practical for other response

elements to proceed closer. This information is relayed through the IOC.

The CBRN/HAZMAT team assists the IC in determining the nature of the

incident. If the team does not possess a detection capability for a particular

hazard, it must continue to assist with operations until a team with detection

capability arrives. When follow-on forces are required, the CBRN team

remains on site to inform them of the extent and characteristics of the

incident.

The CBRN/HAZMAT team establishes the parameters of the incident site.

Due to the technical nature of detection equipment and the potential hazards

of various CBRN materials, initial response operations are likely to proceed

slowly. A large number of responders may be required to mitigate a CBRN

emergency. Personnel must use extreme caution during all known and

suspected CBRN events to ensure the safety of functional area responders.

Expect delays in identifying or mitigating the effects of CBRN material at

the site, particularly when functional area responders lack resources and

must wait for the arrival of properly trained personnel, specialized

equipment or vehicles, and support personnel.

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FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

National Response Plan

Initiating protective measures.

Responders must don the appropriate level of PPE. Most CBRN material

can penetrate ordinary clothing. Without proper PPE and individual

breathing apparatuses, personnel entering a contaminated area may become

casualties. If there are indications of a CBRN attack or evidence of

hazardous agents, PPE provides personnel protection; however, equipment

contamination may occur during rescue operations.

The IOC activates the required notification plan, contacts designated

civilian authorities, and notifies higher HQ. The commander implements

the appropriate DOD force protection condition (FPCON).

The IOC activates established mass notification measures to warn, advise,

or support persons in a potentially affected area when it is apparent that an

incident will endanger the population or the local community.

Note. The Homeland Security Advisory System does not apply to incidents involving military

installations. The FPCON is used to rate threats and set specific measures for military facilities.

Identifying the threat and taking control of the incident area.

The IC determines the cordon size based on the presence or suspected

presence of hazardous agents before responders are permitted to enter a hot

zone. Security forces then establish the cordon perimeter based on the IC’s

recommendation. The security forces control access to the site by

establishing an entry control point (ECP) to serve as the sole entrance and

exit from the incident site. Only authorized personnel are allowed to enter

the site. Additionally, the security forces establish ECP procedures by

creating authorization lists, checking identification cards, and issuing

badges. Firefighters or other designated personnel establish

decontamination lanes (separate lanes for victims and responders), which

are staffed by qualified personnel.

Emergency medical personnel treat and transport casualties, but on-site

responders perform decontamination operations in the field. The responders

provide on-site medical support (such as ensuring that personnel donning

PPE receive preentry physical screenings) and protect critical systems from

damage or additional damage. The IC establishes and maintains

communications between the incident site and the IOC to ensure that the

most up-to-date information is transmitted. As the situation allows, on-site

responders should begin stabilizing the incident to mitigate the impact.

Responders must be prepared to manage multiple incidents and be alert to

the possibility

(after arriving at the incident site and throughout the

response phase) of secondary devices deployed at each incident site. A

thorough search by trained personnel must be conducted as soon as the

situation allows.

Note. Terrorists may execute several incidents at different locations in quick succession.

A-61. Detailed information about an incident site should be formulated into an SSP. This document is

essential for advance planning and safe incident operations. Information in this plan includes—

Hazard identification worksheets

(with potential health effects, pathways of dispersion,

exposure routes, and control measures)

An air-monitoring log

A site map

A PPE log

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

A-23

Appendix A

An emergency response plan showing places of refuge and site security measures

A decontamination log that includes the location, size, and diagram of the decontamination site

The equipment used at the site

The contamination avoidance practices implemented

The decontamination steps taken.

Also, commanders must develop a sketch containing the locations and types of specific hazards. The sketch

should contain, at a minimum, the⎯

Hazard areas (cold zone, warm zone, hot zone, and minimum safe distances [MSDs]).

Site terrain.

Ingress and egress routes.

Site accessibility by vehicle and on foot.

Off-site populations or environments at risk.

Pertinent weather information

(such as the wind conditions, temperature, and predicted

forecast).

Site maps (detailed and to scale).

A-62. Trained first responders must be equipped with CBRN detection capabilities for the identification of

specific threats. These responders should be assembled at predesignated locations until called forward by

the IC. The CBRN team may be able to make presumptive CBRN identification, but if initial test results

prove to be negative or ambiguous, more sensitive CBRN detection devices or methods may be required.

Once the incident site has been established, trained detection teams gather additional information through

the employment of specialized detection equipment and methods. Biological and unknown chemical-agent

samples collected at the incident sites should be evacuated, through controlled channels, to a laboratory

facility for definitive identification. Specific chain-of-custody, packaging, and marking requirements apply

to all items removed from the scene.

A-63. Determining hazards from a low-level radiological incident includes estimating the exposure to

external ionizing radiation. To address concerns regarding potential long-term health hazards, the Army

medical community has developed ways to detect, assess, and record health risks. Procedures for Level II

radiation surveys and assessments by preventative medicine personnel have been established. These

methods require minimal resources and give a quick estimate of the dose or maximum duration of a

mission in a low-level radiation environment.

A-64. Responders should take every precaution possible to preserve evidence following a terrorist attack.

The evidence obtained and supported by a properly documented chain of custody is crucial in the

investigation, arrest, and conviction of the perpetrator(s). Preserving evidence should come second only to

individual safety and protection and the preservation of property.

A-65. To assist with the CBRN identification and warning process, the IC uses an approved software

program to prepare a hazard effects prediction. Personnel should select, institute, and train with a software

program that supports the process requirements and enhances the emergency planning capabilities for

hazard identification, vulnerability assessments, risk analyses, response capabilities assessments, and

planning development. Also, the type of hazard and the weather conditions are critical factors in the

process.

A-66. Response elements must make every effort to reduce or avoid the contamination of personnel and the

surrounding population. Using the hazard effects prediction process, the IC may be able to identify areas

requiring evacuation. Shifting winds and weather conditions may require the movement of an established

cordon and result in the evacuation of areas with potential contamination. The security force manages

evacuations authorized by the IC and provides assistance with establishing a new cordoned area.

Responders are directed to avoid the hazard area unless wearing the appropriate PPE established by the IC.

A-67. The IC establishes decontamination priorities. The decontamination of exposed personnel and

casualties is the top priority, followed by equipment, facilities, and areas. Personnel must establish, as soon

A-24

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

National Response Plan

as possible, emergency decontamination lanes to process responders, contaminated persons, and

contaminated casualties.

DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS

A-68. The IC assembles the functional area response elements in a secure staging area, upwind from the

incident site and outside the contamination control line. A staging area manager is assigned to check all

incoming resources, dispatch resources at the IC’s request, and request support at the staging area (as

required). See Figure A-10 for information on setting up the cordon perimeter, decontamination lanes, and

assembly areas and identifying the hot, warm, and cold zones.

Cordon area

Wind direction

Staging area:

follow-on response

capability

Emergency

decontamination

corridor system

Incident

Hot

site

zone

Entry/exit

lane

Warm zone

Medical treatment and

transport augmentation

elements

Figure A-10. Site Management Operations

A-69. Site management must include established procedures to rapidly account for and communicate with

functional-area response team members engaged in activities at the incident site. These procedures must

include a means to specifically identify and track the activities of all response team members entering and

leaving the hot zone and any area where individual medical survival and special PPE is required.

Additional site management operations include⎯

Maintaining incident site control. Security response elements should treat the incident site as a

potential crime scene until relieved by the applicable investigative element, such as the FBI. All

responders, including firefighting personnel, should perform crime scene maintenance and

protect potential evidence during their operations (within the limits of their response efforts to

control fires, save lives, and protect property). Physical evidence collected at the scene of an

incident site is often the most reliable evidence, and it serves a crucial role in connecting the

perpetrator to the scene. No evidence, including a confession, is uncontestable in court.

Protecting and securing classified information and material. Staff planners and security

personnel should develop plans to protect and secure classified material until it is turned over to

proper authorities. The IC, the IC’s staff, firefighters, EOD, and emergency medical services

(EMS), in conjunction with security response elements, should be trained and exercised in the

procedures for releasing information through the public affairs office (PAO) and/or the Joint

Information System (JIS). The PAO, using the JIS to encompass all public information related to

an incident, conducts information release functions. The JIS includes all federal, state, local,

private organization, and public information officers and joint information centers

(JICs)

established to support an incident. The JIC is established to provide a physical location where

public affairs professionals involved in incident management activities can come together to

perform critical emergency information and crisis communications functions. It is vital that the

JICs have the most current and accurate information regarding incident management activities.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

A-25

Appendix A

Conducting casualty management operations. Medical and fire emergency services provide

emergency medical response at the incident site, including lifesaving medical care and support

for responders. The use of CB agent pretreatment drugs, prophylaxis medication, and agent

antidotes is determined based on the type of incident and the availability of medical supplies.

Ideally, casualties and personnel in the designated cordon area should be decontaminated before

leaving the scene. However, if decontamination is incomplete or if contaminated persons leave

the scene voluntarily, the receiving medical facility (military or civilian) must be prepared to

decontaminate and treat personnel upon arrival. After the medical facility receives notice of a

CBRN incident or attack, all medical personnel engaged in the response must be informed of the

nature of the emergency and the type of suspected contamination. Medical personnel must don

PPE and be prepared to perform additional decontamination operations as necessary.

Note. Many military medical facilities only offer limited inpatient care or reduced operating

hours. Additionally, civilian medical facilities may not accept contaminated patients. These

issues must be addressed in MOUs or MOAs with the local community.

Designating decontamination facilities. The CBRN emergency response plan should designate

the procedures for identifying and operating decontamination facilities. Commanders must

ensure that⎯

Staff planners; engineers; and facility management, transportation, security,

public health, and IT offices assist the medical officer in the selection of the

appropriate locations. Although areas need not be set aside solely for

decontamination operations, planners must ensure that the appropriate

procedures are in place to prevent or minimize the spread of contamination

during an incident.

Primary and alternate facilities are clearly identified, stocked with supplies,

and staffed

(by name or position) according to the procedures for

emergencies.

Outside portable facilities such as wading pools or outdoor showers are

considered as alternatives to indoor decontamination areas, when necessary.

Wastewater from decontamination sites is contaminated and must be

contained to prevent the spread of contamination.

Bags are available to collect, identify, and retain or dispose of contaminated

clothing and personal effects. Plans and provisions must be made for

managing patients and securing their personal effects until proper disposal

methods are determined.

The decontamination plan includes measures for primary, supplementary,

and auxiliary ventilation separate from the ventilation system for the rest of

the selected facility. Real-time detection instruments should be used to

monitor the inside ambient air. Although not all chemicals are volatile

enough to produce a gas vapor, the ventilation should be turned off in a

decontamination facility without a self-contained ventilation system.

Note. Airborne contaminants can be transported via the ventilation system. Morgues with

isolated ventilation systems are often used for decontamination operations.

Preventing the spread of contamination. Responders must ensure that contamination does not

spread beyond the cordoned area. Using existing building and area notification systems,

responders should notify the area population and provide information on the proper safety

precautions to be taken. When contamination cannot be contained within the condoned area, the

local community or HN must be warned and advised to institute mutual agreements

(MOAs/MOUs). Shelter-in-place operations may be directed to ensure that ventilation systems,

doors, and windows are airtight.

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FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

National Response Plan

Ensuring the availability of reach-back support. Various organizations can provide technical

reach-back support in the form of individual expertise, plans, and material. Response plans and

procedures should include current technical reach-back contact information (with organization

names and telephone numbers) of specialized DOD support, such as EOD, WMD-civil support

team (CST), and TE battalion personnel. See Chapter 7 for more information on reach-back

support.

Providing relief-in-place support. Emergency responders (individuals or teams) are relieved of

their mission by a second shift, augmentees, or other incoming responders. Procedures must be

in place to ensure a safe and seamless transition. These procedures may include⎯

Relieving responders sequentially, simultaneously, or in a staggered

sequence. A sequential relief occurs when each team is relieved in

succession. A simultaneous relief occurs when all teams are relieved at the

same time. A staggered relief occurs when the commander relieves each

team in a sequence determined by the state of operations. Simultaneous

relief takes the least time to execute. Sequential or staggered relief can take

place over an extended period of time.

Conducting a deliberate or hasty relief operation, depending on the amount

of time available for planning, preparation, and execution. In a hasty relief,

detailed planning that describes exactly what an IC needs to accomplish a

mission results in a shorter execution time. In a deliberate relief, the ICS

and his staff need more planning time to identify, develop, and coordinate

solutions to potential problems and to ensure the availability of resources

when and where they are needed.

Implementing a UC. If federal civil authorities assume command of a scene, they must be

prepared to implement and participate in a UC.

ON-SITE CONSIDERATIONS

A-70. After arriving at the scene, the entry leader conducts a complete site-specific risk assessment. The

risk of entering a hazardous environment must be weighed against the need. The risk assessment must

include the⎯

Identification of on-site hazards.

Level of potential risk exposure to identified hazards.

Level of chemical toxicity.

Methods used to control hazard exposure.

A-71. During a chemical response operation, personnel may encounter hazardous conditions that require

them to consult with personnel in authoritative leadership roles or with personnel who have specific

knowledge or training. These hazardous conditions may include⎯

Confined spaces. A marine chemist or technician must be consulted to ensure that a confined

space is safe for entry. Refer to 29 CFR 1910.146 for additional information.

Note. The definition of a confined space (per 29 CFR 1910.146) is a space that—

Is large enough and configured in such a way that an employee can bodily enter and

perform assigned work.

Has limited or restricted means for entry or exit. For example, tanks, vessels, silos, storage

bins, hoppers, vaults, and pits are spaces that may have limited means of entry.

Is not designed for continuous employee occupancy.

Unknown hazards. An unknown hazard is any substance not confidently identified or

supported by documents (manufacturer or shipping papers) to confirm its presence. Level A

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

A-27

Appendix A

protection is required to enter areas with unknown hazards. If the safety hazard increases, the

entry leader may authorize Level B protection. Common safety hazards include⎯

Restricted access or egress areas.

Slippery conditions.

Climbing or steep elevations

Thermal limitations (frosting, freezing, heat stress on PPE or equipment).

The need to don PPE. To determine the level of PPE required, the entry leader must consider

the⎯

Chemical resistance level of the hazardous substance (including that for

temperature changes).

Durability of the PPE.

Movement limitations the PPE imposes on personnel.

Level of contamination upon site entry.

Physical state of the hazardous substance.

Note. Material safety data sheets

(MSDSs), toxicology occupational medicines and

environmental sciences (TOMES) database, and decision support tools (DSTs) must be used to

obtain specific chemical information and manufacturer recommendations when determining the

level of PPE protection required. The level and type of protection must continually be

reevaluated to ensure that it is adequate for current operations and changing conditions.

The need to don respiratory protection. The team supervisor, in coordination with the entry

leader, must determine the level and type of respiratory protection required. The respiratory

protection program must also provide guidelines for determining the appropriate level of

protection.

SITE SAFETY PLAN

A-72. Following the emergency phase of the response, the responders must develop an SSP for each

incident. The SSP⎯

Is reviewed by the hazardous-substance team supervisor and presented to the FOSC for

signature.

Is read and signed by all members of the response team (at the request of the hazardous-

substance team supervisor).

Follows the lead agency’s SSP.

HEAT STRESS HAZARDS

A-73. During a chemical response, team personnel may encounter heat stress hazards. Personnel wearing

permeable clothing with evaporative cooling should follow the manufacturer’s recommendations for

environmental heat stress monitoring and a work/rest regimen. Personnel wearing impermeable clothing

should follow the recommendations for monitoring heat stress as established by the EPA (Table A-1) and

perform the following:

Measure the air temperature (ta) using a mercury thermometer. Ensure that the bulb is shielded

from radiant heat. Estimate the percentage of sunshine by figuring the amount of time the sun is

not covered by clouds thick enough to produce a shadow (100 percent sunshine equates to no

cloud cover and a sharp, distinct shadow; 0 percent sunshine equates to no shadows).

Calculate the adjusted air temperature (ta adj) by using the equation ta adj ºF = ta ºF + 13 times

the percentage of sunshine to obtain information for a work level of 250 kilocalories/hour.

Note. A normal work ensemble consists of cotton coveralls or other cotton clothing with long

sleeves and pants.

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FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

National Response Plan

Table A-1. Suggested Frequency of Physiological Monitoring for Fit and Acclimatized Workers

Adjusted temperature

Normal work ensemble

Impermeable ensemble

90ºF (32.2ºC) or above

After each 45 min

After each 15 min

of work

87.5^o-90ºF (30.8^o-32.2ºC)

After each 60 min

After each 30 min

of work

82.5^o-87.5ºF (28.1^o-30.8ºC)

After each 90 min

After each 60 min

of work

77.5^o-82.5^oF (25.3^o-28.1ºC)

After each 120 min

After each 90 min

of work

72.5^o-77.5ºF (22.5^o-25.3ºC)

After each 150 min

After each 120 min

of work

SITE SETUP

A-74. The following requirements apply to the setup of response sites (RSs):

The entry team leader must ensure that members of the response team are assigned specific

tasks. All assignments must be noted on the RS setup checklist.

The hazardous-substance team supervisor or entry leader must use the standard three-zone

system (exclusion, contamination reduction, and support) at all chemical incidents.

The team members must ensure that the proper PPE is worn during all duties.

Team personnel must evaluate the decontamination selection, as discussed in Chapter 4. In

cases where decontamination must be performed using solutions, team personnel should follow

the minimum standard decontamination line setup as identified in Chapter 4.

The team members must calibrate and/or field-test equipment, according to the manufacturer’s

instructions, prior to initial entry. All equipment discrepancies must be reported to the entry

leader and corrected prior to equipment use.

PREENTRY PROCEDURES

A-75. Medical personnel must conduct examinations on all entry, backup, and decontamination personnel

before responders enter the exclusion zone. Follow-up medical monitoring must also be conducted at the

conclusion of each work shift. All information must be recorded. The medical personnel use the following

guidelines from the American Heart Association:

Blood pressure must not exceed 140 systolic or 100 diastolic beats per minute (bpm).

Pulse rate must not exceed 100 bpm.

Body temperature must not drop below 98ºF or rise above 99.2ºF.

Resting respiration range must be between 15 and 20 breaths per minute.

A-76. The entry leader must ensure that the backup and decontamination teams, when assigned, are at their

designated areas prior to and throughout entry operations.

A-77. The FOSC must meet with the team supervisor and/or entry leader to develop and review initial

entry objectives. The entry leader must ensure that the objectives are clearly communicated to the entry

teams.

A-78. Personnel entering into locations where the contamination levels are unknown must carry the proper

warning equipment. This equipment includes⎯

A photoionization detector (PID).

A flame ionization detector (FID).

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

A-29

Appendix A

A combustible gas indicator (CGI).

An oxygen meter.

An alarming radiation dose rate meter.

Note. The number of entry personnel and the entry objectives determine if additional

instrumentation is required.

A-79. Hazardous-substance teams responding to an incident must complete the mission with zero chemical

exposure. The following levels have been established to measure the exposure risk. These action levels

may not be exceeded unless authorized by the team commander. More stringent standards may be

established for a given site and will be set by the team supervisor or entry leader.

Flammable atmospheres must not exceed 10 percent of the lower explosive limit (LEL) for PPE

Levels A through D.

Oxygen-enriched atmospheres must not exceed a level greater than 22 percent oxygen for sea

level shipboard responses or greater than 23.5 percent oxygen for shore side responses.

Sea level atmospheres must not drop below 19.5 percent oxygen for PPE Levels C and D if all

other hazards have been eliminated.

Radiation dose rates must fall within established standards.

Concentrations of toxic chemicals must not exceed the most conservative exposure limits found

in standard HAZMAT response chemical references (NIOSH Pocket Guide, OSHA guidance,

American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists

[ACGIH] guidance, MSDSs,

TOMES database), as determined by the IC.

Sampling Plans

A-80. Sampling plans are used to establish transfer points, escort requirements, and chain-of-custody

operations. Team personnel rarely develop sampling plans on their own. These plans are normally

developed in concert with the EPA or NOAA scientific support coordinator. The SO or unit industrial

hygienist (IH) reviews any sampling plans developed by team personnel and ensures that the FOSC, team

supervisor, and entry leader receive the plans for review.

Briefings

A-81. The site team leaders must brief the entry, backup, and decontamination teams and ensure that all

personnel understand their assignments prior to entry into the exclusion zone.

A-82. The site team leaders must ensure, at a minimum, that personnel information briefings occur at the

start and end of each operational shift. Safety briefings must occur when there are significant changes in

operations or in the hazard characteristics. The SO or unit IH must ensure that the safety plan is continually

updated. The team leaders must ensure that any changes are brought to the attention of the entire response

team.

A-83. The team supervisor and/or team leader ensure that personnel know and understand the procedures

for handling emergencies within the exclusion zone.

A-84. The decontamination team supervisor and/or team leader ensure that the decontamination line and

emergency decontamination procedures are thoroughly explained to all personnel during a walk-through

demonstration.

ENTRY PROCEDURES

A-85. There are several procedures that must be observed as the team prepares to enter the exclusion zone.

Safety Considerations

A-86. The following safety procedures must be observed while the team is in the exclusion zone:

A-30

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

National Response Plan

The team supervisor or entry leader must authorize the supplied “on-air” time. The SO must

record the start time, and the entry leader must monitor the air time.

The team supervisor and entry leader must notify the command when CBRN exposure, injury,

or modifications to an action level occurs.

The entry team must monitor the wind direction at all times.

All team personnel must ensure that they have clear paths to the evacuation routes and are able

to hear emergency evacuation signals at all times.

The entry team must avoid unnecessary contact with contaminated surfaces whenever possible.

The entire entry team must proceed to the decontamination line if an SCBA low-pressure alarm

sounds on any team member.

All responders must use the buddy system. Entries must always be made with at least two

responders.

The entry team must leave the immediate area and notify the entry team leader for further

guidance when an action level is reached.

The entry leader must maintain a continuous line of sight with his team members. If this is not

practical, continuous radio communications are acceptable. Other acceptable means of

maintaining contact include the use of lifelines or staging radio repeaters at various intervals or

the use of an air horn with prearranged signals.

All unexpected hazards must be reported to the entry leader for further action.

Communications

A-87. The following communication operations must be observed while the team remains in the exclusion

zone:

The entry team must report initial entry readings, changes in readings, new hazards, and

instrument difficulties.

The entry leader must conduct a communications check every 5 minutes if a line of sight cannot

be maintained.

The only personnel authorized to use the entry team’s radio frequency are the team supervisor,

entry leader, and SO. Other personnel may use this frequency if a serious safety concern arises.

A-88. Emergency communications must be identified in the SSP and communicated to the entry leaders.

Backup measures, including standard hand signals and/or the use of an air horn must be used as outlined in

the safety plan.

Emergency Procedures

A-89. The team supervisor or entry leader must review the emergency response plan with the response

team. The following emergency procedures must be observed while the team remains in the exclusion

zone:

If a team member is injured or involved in an emergency situation, the team supervisor, entry

leader, SO, or FOSC must he notified.

The team supervisor must conduct an assessment and coordinate the emergency efforts.

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A-31

Appendix A

EGRESS PROCEDURES

A-90. The following egress procedures must be observed as the team exists the exclusion zone and begins

decontamination operations:

The decontamination team leader must be informed of all issues concerning decontamination

procedures.

The SO must observe decontamination operations to ensure contamination is removed as

thoroughly as possible. If the SO determines that a modification to the decontamination line is

needed, he notifies the decontamination team leader.

Team members should remove and properly dispose of work clothing worn under the PPE to

prevent the possible spread of contamination.

The medical team must examine all team personnel and record the amount of time spent in the

hot zone, the body temperature, and the respiration rate on a potential exposure and medical

monitoring form.

The entry team supervisor, entry team leader, SO and, if available, the replacement entry team

conduct debriefing operations with the exiting entry team. The exiting team should report

monitor readings, hazards, and physical descriptions of the exclusion zone.

The team supervisor, entry leader, SO, and/or EMT review the SSP and update it as necessary.

Site Demobilization

A-91. The following procedures must be performed as the team begins site demobilization procedures:

The team supervisor and entry leader ensure that all equipment is decontaminated and

inventoried prior to stowage.

The team supervisor and/or entry team leader meet with the IC to discuss repair or replacement

of damaged and destroyed equipment.

The team supervisor and entry team leader ensure that all consumable items are disposed of

according to applicable regulations.

All personnel complete potential exposure forms and turn them over to the EMT or SO before

leaving the site. The EMT or SO routes the forms to the team supervisor or entry team leader

Debriefing

A-92. The team supervisor and/or the entry leader meet with the FOSC or IC and conduct a final

debriefing. The discussion should focus on the pros and cons of the operation and should be documented

for use in future operations. The team supervisor and/or entry leader must also ensure that the IC signs all

cost documentation and purchase orders.

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FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Appendix B

Personal Protection

This appendix focuses primarily on levels of personal protection, the PPE currently

available, and general guidelines for selecting PPE. The amount and type of

protection required during a HAZMAT incident depends on the type of hazard that

may be encountered. Multiple types of PPE may be needed to ensure proper

protection for all potential installation CBRN/HAZMAT scenarios.

LEVELS OF PERSONAL PROTECTION

B-1. Individual protection levels have been established for protection against toxic industrial chemicals

(TIC)/TIM, and MOPP levels have been established for protection against CBRN.

INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION

B-2. OSHA has established four levels of individual skin and respiratory protection (29 CFR 1910.120,

Appendix B). The type of PPE worn is determined by the level of protection necessary for a particular

incident. The PPE must be worn in accordance with guidelines published by OSHA and the NFPA. The

use of PPE results in an increase in mental and physiological stress (heat stress, respiratory resistance),

which must be carefully monitored and evaluated through all phases of the operation. The four OSHA-

established levels of protection are—

Level D. Level D protection consists of the work uniform. Neither skin nor respiratory

protection is provided; therefore, this level should not be specified at an incident site where such

hazards exist. Military battle dress uniforms and coveralls meet Level D requirements.

Level C. The Level C ensemble consists of a chemical-resistant suit, full face piece, and air

purification device. Chemical-resistant hoods, aprons, boots, and gloves should also be worn.

Three layers of gloves may be used—an inner layer of latex gloves and middle and outer layers

of chemical-resistant gloves. Level C protection may be selected when an airborne substance has

been identified and is being monitored. All criteria for the use of air purification devices must be

met, and the proper filters for the known hazard must be available. Air monitoring must

continue throughout the operation to ensure that Level C protection remains effective. An

escape mask should be worn in case of a change in conditions that renders the air purification

device ineffective. The escape mask provides the responder with the protection necessary to

move to the decontamination line.

Level B. Level B protection consists of nonencapsulating, chemical-resistant suits—often called

splash suits or rain suits. There are several Level B configurations, but none are vapor-tight.

Depending on the configuration, an SCBA is worn inside or outside the suit. The Level B

ensemble also includes chemical-resistant outer boots and three pairs of gloves—an inner layer

of latex gloves and middle and outer layers of chemical-resistant gloves. Level B protection

should be considered when the highest level of respiratory protection is required but lower

levels of skin and eye protection are adequate. Level B is the minimum level of protection

recommended for initial site entry—prior to the identification and monitoring of all hazards.

Level A. Level A protection consists of a totally encapsulating suit with gloves and boots

attached. Respiratory protection is provided by an SCBA worn inside the suit or by a supplied-

air system. Chemical-resistant boots are worn over the boots attached to the suit. Two pairs of

gloves (inner latex gloves and outer chemical-resistant gloves) are worn under the suit gloves. A

radio may also be worn under the suit. Additional items that may be necessary include hard hats,

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

B-1

Appendix B

cooling vests, and kneepads. The Level A ensemble should be used when the highest level of

respiratory, skin, and eye protection is required.

MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE

B-3. The purpose of MOPP gear is to protect personnel against CBRN contamination. The MOPP

ensemble consists of an overgarment, protective mask, hood, overboots, and protective gloves. In addition,

personnel have mask carriers, M8/M9 detector paper, individual decontamination kits, and nerve agent

antidote kits

(NAAK). Standardized MOPP levels are used to communicate the necessary level of

protection for a specific situation. Flexibility of the system allows commanders to adjust MOPP levels to

accomplish a particular mission with the maximum protection and lowest risk possible. The standardized

MOPP levels are—

MOPP-ready. Protective masks are carried with the load-bearing equipment (LBE). Individual

MOPP gear is labeled and stored no farther back than a logistic site; it is ready to be brought

forward to the individual when needed—a process that should take no longer than 2 hours. Units

in MOPP-ready status are highly vulnerable to persistent agent attacks. Therefore, personnel are

equipped with field-expedient items (wet-weather gear) that are identified for use in the event of

an unanticipated CBRN attack or release. If it is determined that CBRN weapons have been used

or that their use is a threat, the unit automatically upgrades to MOPP0.

MOPP0. PPE is issued to individuals, who then inspect and prepare the equipment for use.

Protective masks are carried with the load-carrying equipment

(LCE). Other PPE items,

including the standard-issue overgarment, must be

“readily available.” To be considered

“readily available,” the equipment must be carried by each individual and stored within reach

(work area, vehicle, watercraft). Individuals should be capable of donning their PPE in 8 to 10

minutes. Units in MOPP0 status are highly vulnerable to persistent agent attacks and

automatically upgrade to MOPP1 if it is determined that persistent CBRN weapons have been

used or that their use is a threat. MOPP0 is primarily specified when an enemy is capable of CB

employment but there is no indication of immediate CB use.

MOPP1. When directed to MOPP1 status, personnel immediately don the overgarment. Other

PPE making up the individual MOPP gear (mask, gloves) is carried or readily available. Contact

lenses must be removed and protective-mask optical inserts used, if necessary. The M8 or M9

paper is attached to the overgarment, and the decontamination kit and NAAK are carried or kept

at hand. In hot weather, the overgarment jacket may be left open and the overgarment may be

worn directly over underwear. Leaders are responsible for monitoring hydration levels. The

MOPP1 ensemble provides a great deal of protection against persistent agents. This level is

primarily specified when a CB attack is possible.

MOPP2. Personnel wear the overgarment and footwear covers. The mask, mask carrier, and

gloves are carried. Decontamination kits, the M8 or M9 paper, and NAAK are carried or kept at

hand. Personnel wear protective-mask optical inserts, if necessary. As with MOPP1, the

overgarment jacket may be left open, but trousers must remain closed. Hydration levels must

also be maintained. MOPP2 is primarily specified when a CB attack is possible.

MOPP3. Personnel wear the overgarment and protective mask. The protective gloves are

carried. To allow for relief at MOPP3, particularly in hot weather or when the heat stress index

(HSI) is high, personnel may open the overgarment jacket and roll up the protective-mask hood

for ventilation, but the trousers must remain closed. MOPP3 is used when personnel are

operating inside areas where there are no chemical-agent contact hazards; MOPP3 is not

appropriate if a contact hazard is present.

MOPP4. Personnel completely encapsulate themselves by closing the overgarments, adjusting

all drawstrings to minimize openings, and donning the protective gloves. MOPP4 is used when

the highest degree of protection is required or when CB agents are known to be present but the

actual hazard has not been determined. MOPP4 is a level of protection similar to that of OSHA

Level C. As with the other MOPP levels, flexibility is allowed so that relief may be provided to

the individual. Once the hazard has been identified and risk assessment measures have been

employed, the overgarment may be left open.

B-2

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Personal Protection

Mask-only. The mask is worn with the long-sleeve duty uniform (for limited skin protection).

The mask-only command may be issued in situations where riot control agents are employed

and no CB threat exists or where there is a downwind vapor hazard from a nonpersistent CB

agent. However, mask-only is not normally appropriate when blister or nerve agents are

involved.

B-4. MOPP gear is designed to protect personnel from CBRN agents in a contaminated environment; it

provides only limited protection from some TIM. Therefore, personnel equipped with standard MOPP gear

must not remain in a TIM environment; they must seek a clean area as soon as possible. Operations that

take place in a suspected TIM environment may require the use of a higher level of protection than

standard MOPP.

PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

B-5. Various types of PPE, including respiratory equipment and protective ensembles, are used to protect

personnel from exposure to toxic agents.

Note. This discussion does not include a comprehensive list of all CBRN defense equipment.

Furthermore, the products described in this section may not necessarily be available as standard

equipment for all CBRN crisis responders.

RESPIRATORY PROTECTION

B-6. The respiratory system is the most direct and generally the most critical exposure route. Therefore,

respiratory protection is the primary personal-protection concern.

Definitions

B-7. The following definitions pertaining to respiratory protection are included in 29 CFR 1910.134 (the

OSHA Respiratory Standard):

Canister or cartridge refers to a container that houses a filter, sorbent, or catalyst

(or a

combination of these items) and is designed to remove specific contaminants from the air which

passes through.

Escape-only respirator refers to a respirator which is intended to be used only for emergency

exit.

High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter refers to a filter that is at least 99.97 percent

efficient in removing monodisperse particles of 0.3 micrometers in diameter from the air.

Powered air-purifying respirator (PAPR) refers to an air purification device that uses a blower

to force ambient air through air-purifying elements to the air inlet covering.

SCBA refers to a particular type of atmosphere-supplying device for which the breathing-air

source is designed to be carried by the user.

Supplied-air respirator (SAR) or airline respirator refers to a particular type of atmosphere-

supplying device for which the breathing-air source is not designed to be carried by the user.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration Requirements

B-8.

29 CFR 1910.134, which is available at <http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/respiratoryprotection/index.

html>, specifies that an effective respiratory protection program include a written program document that,

at a minimum, addresses the following elements:

Procedures for the selection of respirators.

Medical evaluations of personnel required to wear respirators.

Procedures for the fit-testing of respirators.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

B-3

Appendix B

Procedures for the proper use of respirators in routine and emergency situations.

Procedures to ensure adequate air quality, quantity, and (for SARs) flow.

Training on respiratory hazards and the proper use, maintenance, and limitations of respirators.

Identification of filters, cartridges, and canisters.

Procedures for maintaining pertinent records (medical evaluations, fit tests).

Procedures and schedules for cleaning, disinfecting, maintaining, repairing, storing, inspecting,

and discarding respirators.

Procedures for evaluating program effectiveness.

The Army Respiratory Program

B-9. According to AR 11-34, when required by the job, the ability to use respiratory protective equipment

(RPE) is a condition of employment. Therefore, personnel who are assigned duties that involve access to

chemical surety materiel must be capable of wearing protective clothing and equipment (PCE) (AR 50-6,

paragraphs 3-13 a [3] and 6-3 g). In addition, prior to being assigned to tasks that require the use of a

respirator, personnel must undergo a medical evaluation. The requirements of this evaluation are listed in

AR 40-5, Technical Bulletin (TB) Medical (MED) 502/Defense Logistics Agency Manual (DLAM) 1000.2,

and TB MED 509. The medical status of respirator users is reviewed at least annually by the installation

medical authority (IMA).

Types of Respiratory Protection

B-10. Respiratory protection may be provided by either air purification or atmosphere-supplying devices.

Air Purification Devices

B-11. Air purification devices are respirators or filtration devices that remove particulate matter, gases, or

vapors from the atmosphere. There is no separate source of air; air purification devices use ambient air,

which is then purified or filtered before inhalation. These devices range from half-mask, face piece-

mounted cartridges with no eye protection to full face piece, dual-cartridge masks with eye protection.

Particle-removing respirators have a mechanical filter that separates contaminants from the air. Air

purification devices used for gases or vapors are commonly equipped with a cartridge which contains

sorbent material that absorbs or reacts with the hazardous gas or vapor. The cartridge appropriate for the

expected contaminant(s) (acid gas, organic vapor) must be selected.

B-12. There are limitations to the use of air purification devices. They—

Should never be used in the presence or potential presence of unidentified contaminants.

Should never be used in IDLH or oxygen-deficient atmospheres containing less than 19.5

percent oxygen.

Must be used in conjunction with the constant monitoring of contaminant and oxygen levels.

Protect only against specific chemicals and only at specific concentrations. Their effectiveness

against two or more chemicals simultaneously is highly questionable.

Have relatively short protection durations. Once they have been opened, the sorbent canisters

begin to absorb humidity and air contaminants—whether they have actually been put into use or

not. As a result, the efficiency and service life of the air purification device dramatically

decrease.

B-13. The limitations of air purification devices make their use in emergency response situations

challenging. Air purification devices should not be used at nontraditional release sites unless qualified

personnel (IHs) have monitored the surrounding environment and determined that such devices may be

safety used.

B-4

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Personal Protection

Atmosphere-Supplying Devices

B-14. An atmosphere-supplying device is a respiratory protection device that supplies a source of air.

These devices provide the highest level of protection available against airborne contaminants, and they

may be used when operating in IDLH and oxygen-deficient atmospheres.

B-15. There are two types of atmosphere-supplying devices—SCBA and SARs. Although SCBA is the

most commonly used type, SARs, or airline respirators (which supply air from a remote source, through an

airline hose, to the user), may be used when extended working times are required—such as during

decontamination or remedial operations. Dual-flow SCBAs, which receive air supplies from either an

SCBA or an airline, may provide additional flexibility for both entry and decontamination operations.

B-16. Only positive-pressure devices, which maintain positive pressure in the face piece during both

inhalation and exhalation, should be used during nontraditional CBRN or HAZMAT response operations.

Respiratory Products

B-17. Government-approved COTS supplies and equipment are used for personal protection. The results of

ongoing, government-conducted testing and evaluation programs enable the continuing addition of items to

the list of government-approved COTS supplies and equipment. Information on approved COTS items may

be obtained through the chain of command or from the AMC logistics assistance representative.

Note. The mention of trade names does not constitute official or commercial endorsement of

particular products.

B-18. Examples of specific products designed for respiratory protection include—

MSA 4500 SCBA rebreather with rebreather bottles. The MSA 4500 (Figure B-1) is a

rugged SCBA that connects to a portable air supply. It has a unique “heads-up” display that

shows low air-pressure warnings. This SCBA, which is flame- and heat-resistant, should be

worn during the most demanding CBRN activities. The MSA 4500 is available in three sizes for

optimum fit.

Figure B-1. MSA 4500 SCBA Rebreather

3M™ 6000 DIN air purification device and FR 64 respirator. The 3M 6000 DIN air

purification device and FR 64 respirator provide respiratory protection against all known TIM

and CWAs and many biological agents. Air purification devices are certified for use only when

the types of contaminants are known, contamination is below IDLH levels, and sufficient

oxygen is present. Protection times for air purification devices vary based on the type of hazard

present, the fitness level of the individual, and the level of physical activity that must be

sustained during operations. When mated with the FR 64 single DIN-threaded cartridge, the air

purification device is capable of filtering CWAs. It is also NIOSH-approved for use against

organic vapors, chlorine, hydrogen chloride, sulfur dioxide, hydrogen fluoride, chlorine dioxide,

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

B-5

Appendix B

hydrogen sulfide (escape), ammonia, methylamine, formaldehyde, and all known TIM. When

exposed to moisture, the FR 64 canister does lose some of its protective capability; therefore, it

is hermitically sealed in a pouch to minimize contact with the environment. The manufacturer-

supplied user’s guide provides further guidance on the use of the equipment and a more

complete list of TIM.

3M PAPR with FR 64 cartridges. The PAPR (Figure B-2) is a motorized system which uses a

filter to clean ambient air before the air is delivered to the breathing cavity in the mask. Each

PAPR system includes a headpiece, blower, breathing tube, and battery. Due to the clean,

forced-air supply, PAPRs allow for easier breathing and generally provide some relief against

heat stress. The PAPR is usually included in Level B protective equipment when there is a wide

array of unknown dusty agents, mists, fumes or radionuclides. Although FR 64 cartridges are

acceptable for a wide array of agents, filter cartridge selection may need to be reassessed once

specific agents are positively identified. The

3M™ Respirator Selection Guide should be

consulted for further information on filter selection.

Figure B-2. 3M Power-Flow PAPR With FR 64 Cartridge

3M full face piece respirator, FR-M40. The 3M FR-M40 full face piece respirator has

been NIOSH-approved for use with 3M cartridge FR-C2A1 or 3M cartridge FR 64 for acid

gases (including chlorine), chloroacetophenone (CN), 2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile (CS), and

P100 particulate filters. A single FR-C2A1-DIN threaded cartridge may be mounted on either

the right or left side of the respirator. The FR-C2A1 cartridge meets military specifications

Military Specification (MIL-SPEC)-C-51560 and EA-C-1704. The respirator has several unique

design features. For example, silicone creates a perfect face seal, allowing for maximum comfort

and increased confidence in fit-testing results, while an optional butyl rubber second skin

protects the face piece, increasing respirator life and decreasing decontamination costs. In

addition, a butyl-coated nylon hood, which covers the head and neck, is easily donned to add

additional protection against chemical agents. The hood meets MIL-SPEC-C-51251. An integral

drinking device permits the user to replenish fluids without removing the mask. A dual-eyepiece

format permits a simple interface between the respirator and the optics and allows for the

equipment to be folded for storage. FR-M40 accessories include clear and gray eyepiece

outserts, spectacle kits, and butyl rubber second skins. The FR-M40 fits into a storage

bag/carrying pouch with a strap and has been used for years by U.S. armed forces all around the

world.

PROTECTIVE ENSEMBLES

B-19. Acceptable types of chemical-protective clothing include totally encapsulating and nonencapsulating

ensembles, which offer specific levels of liquid and/or vapor hazard threat protection.

B-6

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Personal Protection

National Fire Protection Agency Standards

B-20. The NFPA has established three standards for hazardous materials protective ensembles.

Commercial protective ensembles should be certified to meet these NFPA standards. The NFPA standards

are—

NFPA 1991 Standard on Vapor-Protective Ensembles for Hazardous Materials Emergencies.

This standard is equivalent to that of the OSHA Level A protective ensemble. It includes

protective garments, gloves, and footwear; respiratory protection is not addressed as part of this

standard.

NFPA 1992 Standard on Liquid Splash-Protective Ensembles and Clothing for Hazardous

Materials Emergencies. This standard is equivalent to that of the OSHA Level B protective

ensemble. It includes protective garments, gloves, and footwear; respiratory protection is not

addressed as part of this standard.

NFPA 1994 Standard on Protective Ensembles for First Responders to CBRN Terrorism

Incidents. This standard applies to garments, gloves, and footwear designed to protect against

TIC, chemical warfare agents (CWAs), and biological warfare agents (BWAs). It does not apply

to respiratory protection or to ensembles designed for firefighting or protecting against

radioactive materials. It also does not apply to protective ensembles that were manufactured

before 2 August 2001 and intended for use in chemical/biological terrorism incidents.

Note. The NFPA 1994 standard and other relevant NFPA standards/supplements are available at

<http://www.nfpa.org/aboutthecodes/list_of_codes_and_standards.asp >.

Note. A list of PPE which has been certified by the Safety Equipment Institute (SEI) to meet

specific standards, such as those outlined in NFPA 1991, NFPA 1992, and NFPA 1994, is

available at <http://www.seinet.org/CPL/contents.htm >.

Products

B-21. Examples of specific protective ensembles include—

Joint service lightweight integrated suit technology

(JSLIST) ensemble. The current

standard DOD protective ensemble is the JSLIST ensemble (Figure B-3, page B-8). This

ensemble consists of a two-piece, front-opening suit (jacket with hood and trousers); adjustable

suspenders; a pair of multipurpose over boots (MULO) (effective for rain/snow/CB); and

gloves. The suit liner has a nonwoven front that is laminated to activate carbon spheres and is

bonded to a knitted back that absorbs chemical agents. The JSLIST ensemble provides 24 hours

of continuous protection against CWAs, BWAs, and radiological (alpha and beta) particles. In

an uncontaminated environment, the ensemble may be worn for 45 days with up to six

launderings or over

120 days with no launderings. The JSLIST ensemble should be the

protective ensemble of choice during fair-weather CBRN counterterrorism operations in which

personnel are likely to encounter a suspect agent but are not expected to be immersed in water.

Under the direction of combatant commanders, personnel may be required to carry and wear the

JSLIST ensemble. At just under 6 pounds, the new JSLIST suit is about half the weight of the

battledress overgarment. It is available in a four-color woodland or three-color desert

camouflage pattern.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

B-7

Appendix B

Figure B-3. JSLIST Ensemble

Disposable Toxicological Agent Protective System (DTAPS)®. The Level A DTAPS (Figure

B-4) was specifically designed for use in domestic preparedness, CBRN, and WMD

environments. The suit is constructed of low-visibility fabric that consists of a multilayer

composite chemical barrier laminated to a strong, nonwoven substrate. It features a vapor-tight

zipper with double splash flaps and an expanded, three-layer visor for improved field of vision.

The system protects against industrial chemicals and chemical and biological warfare agents.

Figure B-4. DTAPS

Level B TYCHEM® suit. Level B protection requires that the operator wear a hooded, one- or

two-piece, chemical-resistant

(splash-proof) suit and an SCBA. Level B TYCHEM suits

(Figure B-5) are constructed of high-strength, nonwoven materials containing nonhalogenated

films on either side. The seams are taped or double-taped. The suit was specifically developed

for protection against toxic and corrosive gases, liquids, and solid chemicals. It has been tested

against more than 280 substances; in 260 of these cases, there was no permeation observed after

8 hours of continuous contact. Level B TYCHEM suits are used by the chemical and

petrochemical industries, emergency HAZMAT teams, and hazardous materials/waste cleanup

crews. The suits are lime-yellow in color (for high visibility) and are available in a variety of

styles—from aprons and coveralls to Level A gas-protective ensembles.

B-8

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Personal Protection

Figure B-5. Level B TYCHEM Suit

TYVEK® F suit. The TYVEK F suit (Figure B-6, page B-10) is a lightweight, impermeable,

coverall-type suit with an inherent hood and booties to reduce the number of

enclosures/fasteners necessary. The hood and the wrist and ankle openings have close-fitting

elastic seals. The front closure, near the chest area, has double-baffled zippers. All enclosure

areas (front chest zipper, wrist to glove, boot to leg, hood to mask) must be duct-taped to ensure

a proper “air-tight” seal. Although all impermeable membranes do break down at some point

(depending on the contact hazards present and the amount of time the suit is exposed to these

hazards), the TYVEK F suit provides excellent protection against almost all known TIM,

CWAs, biological agents, and radiological particulates (alpha and beta). The suit is designed as

a one-time-use overgarment for emergency personnel when dermal protection is necessary and

evacuation from a site is expected to take an extended period of time. The suit must not be used

to continue inspections or to perform rescue response activities. TYVEK F suits may pose a

significant health concern to the user due to a lack of material “breathability,” which quickly

results in increases in core temperatures of the body—especially during periods of intense

physical activity. Therefore, team members must be continually monitored during escape

operations. Suit size is not critical, except that the suit must be large enough to fit comfortably.

Additional TYVEK F protective slip-over boots are available and should be worn over any

footwear and duct-taped to the suit for additional protection.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

B-9

Appendix B

Figure B-6. TYVEK F Suit

Kleenguard® coveralls (recycled Kleenguard extra suits). Kleenguard coveralls (recycled

Kleenguard extra suits) (Figure B-7) are constructed of a patented Microforce™ barrier fabric.

The fabric is three layers thick—the first and third layers are spun and bonded, and the second

layer is melted. This arrangement results in excellent breathability and particulate holdout. The

coverall suits have zippered fronts with 1-inch flaps and elastic backs, wrists, and ankles. They

are relatively well-fitted, due to the Reflex® garment design. The Kleenguard suit is worn

during general cleanup, maintenance, and shutdown operations; in environments containing dust

or other fine particles, such as fiberglass; when working with oil or grease; or while processing

food or performing mold remediation.

Figure B-7. Kleenguard Coveralls (Recycled Kleenguard Extra Suits)

ADDITIONAL ITEMS

B-22. In addition to respiratory equipment and chemical ensembles, there are other PPE items that may be

used to protect against toxic agents.

Chemical-Protective Undergarment

B-23. The chemical-protective undergarment (CPU) (Figure B-8) consists of a hooded or nonhooded

jacket, pants, booties and gloves. CPUs are constructed of a durable composite fabric containing

polymerically encapsulated carbon for the absorption of CWAs. These undergarments offer an additional

barrier against liquid or vapor incursions into the outer layer of protective garments. The polymerically

encapsulated carbon reduces sweat poisoning (skin pruning). The fabric also possesses unique stretch

characteristics, providing enhanced comfort.

B-10

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Personal Protection

Figure B-8. CPU

Multipurpose Over Boots

B-24. The MULO is created by injection-molding an elastomer blend that has been compounded to provide

the necessary chemical and environmental protection. MULOs, which incorporate two quick-release side

buckles, are designed to be worn over standard-issue footwear. They provide protection against water’

snow; mud; and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL). They are also flame-resistant. MULOs can be

decontaminated to an operationally safe level using standard decontaminants. They provide 60 days of

durability and 24 hours of protection against liquid chemical agents.

Vinyl Overshoes

B-25. The green vinyl overshoe (GVO) is a plain, olive-drab (OD) green, vinyl overshoe with elastic

fasteners. The black vinyl overshoe (BVO) is very similar to the GVO—except for the color and enlarged

tabs on each elastic fastener. Personnel may wear GVOs or BVOs over their combat boots to protect their

feet from contamination by all known agents, vectors, and radiological particles (alpha and beta). As long

as GVOs/BVOs remain uncontaminated and serviceable, protection may continue for a maximum of 60

days. Following exposure to any known CB agent, GVOs/BVOs worn with combat boots provide 24 hours

of protection. GVOs/BVOs may be decontaminated with a 5 percent high-test hypochlorite (HTH solution

or a 5 percent household bleach solution. If signs of deterioration are evident following decontamination,

the overshoe should be replaced.

Gloves

B-26. Personnel operating in a CBRN environment should wear chemical-protective gloves. The thicker

the glove, the greater the degree of protection, but also the greater the loss of manual dexterity.

B-27. Heavy gloves may make it difficult for medical personnel to provide advanced medical care. Other

potential health issues regarding gloves include meeting Food and Drug Administration

(FDA)

requirements for examination gloves, maintaining sterility, and changing gloves after touching each

patient.

B-28. There are several types of chemical-protective gloves available, including—

Outer butyl rubber/inner nitrile gloves. An outer butyl rubber glove may be worn over an

inner, disposable, nitrile glove. Butyl rubber gloves are available in varying thicknesses (7, 14,

17, 25, and 30 mils). A minimum thickness of 14 mils is recommended for the outer glove. Inner

nitrile gloves, which are comparatively thin, are available in 4 and 5 mils.

JSB1GU gloves. JSB1GU gloves (Figure B-9, page B-12) consist of an outer glove and a thin,

inner, impermeable liner. They provide protection from liquid, vapor, and aerosol CB hazards.

The JSB1GU fulfilled an urgent U.S. Special Operations Command requirement for a glove

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

B-11

Appendix B

with increased tactility and dexterity. The glove is durable for up to 14 days and offers 24 hours

of protection in a contaminated environment.

Figure B-9. JSB1GU Gloves

Chemical-protective glove set. As long as chemical-protective glove sets remain serviceable,

they protect against CB agents and alpha and beta radioactive particles. The glove sets are

available in three thicknesses—7, 14, and 25 mils. Personnel whose tasks require extreme

tactility and/or sensitivity and who will not be exposing the gloves to harsh treatment generally

use the 7-mil glove set. Personnel (aviators, vehicle mechanics, and members of weapons crews)

whose tasks require tactility and sensitivity and who will not be exposing the gloves to harsh

treatment use the 14-mil glove set. Personnel who perform close combat tasks and other types of

heavy labor use the more durable 25-mil glove set. In the event that 14- or 25-mil glove sets

become contaminated with liquid chemical agents, they should be decontaminated or replaced

within 24 hours of exposure. In the event that a 7-mil glove set becomes contaminated, it should

be replaced or decontaminated within 6 hours of exposure. Gloves may be decontaminated with

a 5 percent chlorine solution or a 5 percent HTH solution. Members of all services use the

chemical-protective glove sets.

Skin Exposure Reduction Paste Against Chemical Warfare Agents

B-29. Skin exposure reduction paste against chemical warfare agents (SERPACWA) is a topical skin

protectant. Imprecise taping or natural folds of material at the neck, wrist, ankle, or any other closure site

may cause the skin immediately under these areas to be vulnerable to CWA exposure. The simple

application of SERPACWA (Figure B-10) to the skin at these closure sites can provide significant

protection against the threat of dermal contact with chemical agents and offers personnel yet another option

for enhancing individual protection and survivability.

Chemical-Protective Helmet Cover

B-30. The chemical-protective helmet cover is a one-piece configuration constructed of butyl-coated nylon

cloth, which is gathered at the opening by elastic webbing enclosed in the hem. The helmet cover protects

the helmet from CB contamination and radioactive alpha and beta particles. It is OD green in color and is

available in only one size. U.S. Army and Marine Corps units are the primary users of the chemical-

protective helmet cover.

B-12

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Personal Protection

Figure B-10. Label for SERPACWA

GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR SELECTING PERSONAL

PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

B-31. The level and type of PPE required for a specific CBRN incident depends on the threat analysis,

hazard assessment, and exposure estimates conducted for the particular situation. For instance, a threat

analysis might indicate that there is a reasonably high probability of exposure to a certain TIM; thus, the

use of a particular type of air purification device cartridge or a specific type of glove may be necessary.

Likewise, CBRN and TIM hazard assessments and exposure estimates conducted for the CBRN incident

might indicate that the level of PPE needs to be upgraded or may be permitted to be downgraded. Based on

the professional judgment of properly trained and certified personnel, the commander determines the level

and type of PPE to be worn in any given situation. It is, however, possible to make some general

recommendations regarding the selection of PPE; such recommendations are presented in this section.

FIRST RESPONSE

B-32. Personnel who respond during the initial phase of a CBRN event or incident, when the agent or

airborne concentration is unknown, usually wear Level A or Level B PPE. A lesser level of protection is

generally not deemed acceptable, unless or until air monitoring or a hazard analysis indicates otherwise.

B-33. The NAERG, which serves as a reference for first responders during the initial phase of a TIM or

release other than attack (ROTA) incident, provides information regarding initial isolation and minimum

protective action distances, as well as PPE. The NAERG provides a quick cross-reference index for

identification numbers, guide numbers, and an alphabetical listing of names of materials that are then

incorporated into a table of initial isolation and minimum protective action distances to the 90th percentile

(90 percent probability that the hazard will not exceed these distances). Like FM 3-11.3, the NAERG is

primarily designed for use during the initial phases of an incident; therefore, it may have limited

applicability at fixed locations. The NAERG is available at

<http://hazmat.dot.gov/pubs/erg/

gydebook.htm>.

B-34. The American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA) Emergency Response Planning Guidelines

(ERPGs) consist of 1-hour contact duration planning guidelines to protect workers and the general public

from the consequences of accidental chemical releases. The ERPGs should also be considered in instances

of terrorism involving TIC.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

B-13

Appendix B

FOLLOW-ON RESPONSE

B-35. The area surrounding a CBRN incident is divided into three concentric zones—a hot zone, a

decontamination zone, and a support zone. The PPE selected for a particular individual depends on which

zone(s) that individual is expected to enter.

Hot Zone

B-36. The hot zone (or exclusion area) is the area immediately surrounding the chemical release; it is

presumed to pose an immediate health risk to all persons, including rescuers. The following general PPE

recommendations apply to personnel operating in the hot zone:

Worst-case possibilities concerning toxicity must be assumed when an unidentified chemical is

present. Depending on the situation, Level A PPE (including pressure-demand SCBA) must be

worn.

SARs (airline respirators) should not be used because the air hose may be degraded by

chemicals or heat or the hose may become tangled. In addition, the use of SARs is impractical

during emergency operations.

Air purification devices are rarely appropriate for responding to CBRN incidents, since most of

these incidents involve at least one of the following conditions which would preclude the use of

an air purification device: an unidentified contaminant, an unknown concentration of

contaminant, a concentration of contaminant above the NIOSH IDLH value, an oxygen-

deficient atmosphere (less than 19.5 percent O²), or high relative humidity.

Toxic Industrial Chemical Environment

B-37. When selecting respirators to be used at a TIC incident site, the following exposure limits should be

considered:

IDLH concentrations, as published by the NIOSH. Atmosphere-supplying devices are the only

types of respirators considered acceptable for use in an IDLH atmosphere. Air purification

devices are not allowed in IDLH atmospheres, as permanent adverse health effects or even death

may result.

PELs, as published by OSHA.

Threshold limit values (TLVs), as published by the ACGIH.

Workplace environmental exposure levels (WEELs), as published by the AIHA.

The appropriate respirator must be selected when the IDLH, PELs, TLVs, or WEELs concentrations are

exceeded.

Biological Warfare Agent Environment

B-38. When inhaled, BWAs may cause infection and disease. The risk of exposure to infectious aerosols

may be reduced through the use of respiratory protection. The selection of respiratory protection against

BWAs should consider the—

Severity of the disease (lethality rate).

Probability of infection. The probability of acquiring an infection via inhalation is based on the

dose inhaled, the infectious dose of the agent (which depends on the particle size and the

individual’s immune system, vaccination status, nutritional status, stress level, and age), where

the agent is deposited in the respiratory tract, and the respirator-assigned protection factor.

Availability and use of an effective vaccine or other prophylaxis.

Historical/epidemiological record with regard to the ability of specific PPE to prevent secondary

transmission.

B-39. Although respiratory protection reduces the risk of exposure to infectious aerosols, it may not

eliminate the risk altogether. Some leakage into the mask may occur—either through the filter media or

between the user’s face and the face piece seal. However, even in the event that leakage does occur, the

B-14

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Personal Protection

dose inhaled is reduced, and the probability of infection subsequently decreases. If the dose inhaled as a

result of respirator leakage is lower than the infectious dose, the risk is effectively eliminated.

B-40. Some efforts have been made to develop risk-based methods for the selection of respiratory

protection against infectious aerosols. The probability of infection is calculated based on the estimated dose

inhaled, the infectious dose of the BWA, and the type of respirator used (and the associated leakage and

protection factor). Risk-based methods for respiratory protection against infectious aerosols in general are

under development by the AIHA and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). Though risk-

based methods may theoretically be ideal for selecting respiratory protection against BWA, they may not

currently be practical or realistic

B-41. A tight-fitting, Class N-95 particulate, half face piece air purification device is the minimum level of

respiratory protection required for infectious aerosols. The use of a more protective respirator may lower

the risk of infection even more. For instance, general rules of thumb are as follows:

A tight-fitting, full face piece air purification device provides more protection than a half face

piece air purification device.

A tight-fitting, full face piece PAPR provides more protection than a nonpowered, full face

piece air purification device.

An atmosphere-supplying device (SCBA, airline) provides more protection than a tight-fitting,

full face piece PAPR.

B-42. Regarding the air-purifying, particulate-filter media currently used in respirators, Class

100

particulate filters provide a higher level of filtration efficiency than Class 99 and Class 95 particulate filters

and Class 99 filters provide a higher level of filtration than Class 95 filters.

Decontamination Zone

B-43. The decontamination (or warm) zone surrounds the hot zone. Primary contamination is not expected;

however, to avoid chemical exposure from contaminated victims, personnel working in the

decontamination zone must make use of protective clothing and equipment. The following

recommendations apply to personnel operating in the decontamination zone:

B-44. Generally, the level of PPE worn in the decontamination zone is the same as that worn in the hot

zone unless air monitoring or professional judgment indicates that a lower level of PPE is safe. For

example, if a Level A encapsulating (NFPA vapor-protective) suit is required in the hot zone, but the risk

of secondary contamination is low, a Level B nonencapsulating (NFPA splash-protective) suit may be

acceptable for the decontamination zone. Likewise, if the risk of inhaling off-gassing vapors is low (the

chemical is not highly volatile or the decontamination area is established in an outdoor location with good

natural ventilation), a lower level of respiratory protection may be acceptable. However, air contaminants

should be identified and their concentrations measured prior to recommending a lower level of respiratory

protection.

B-45. If the agents of concern are CWAs or TIM, personnel working in primary triage direct potentially

contaminated patients to the ambulatory

(nonmedical) or nonambulatory

(medical) decontamination

station. If necessary, lifesaving procedures are performed at the nonambulatory decontamination station.

Those performing decontamination or assisting in the decontamination must wear PPE. Once patients leave

decontamination stations, they are considered clean and proceed to secondary triage.

B-46. If the agents of concern are BWAs or radioactive materials, a minimum of Level C PPE is

recommended. This includes TYVEK (or equivalent) garments, a hood, rubber gloves, boot covers, and a

full face piece air purification device equipped with a P-100 or HEPA filter. However, if available, a PAPR

is preferred for respiratory protection.

B-47. It is difficult for medical personnel wearing respirators and heavy gloves to provide advanced

medical care in the decontamination zone. Furthermore, it may not be safe to operate electronic equipment

(cardiac monitors) in the decontamination zone and it may also be difficult to decontaminate such

equipment. Therefore, electronic equipment is not usually taken into the decontamination zone. For these

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

B-15

Appendix B

reasons, advanced medical care is generally not administered until after the victim has been transferred out

of the decontamination zone into the surrounding support zone.

Support Zone

B-48. The support (or cold) zone is the area surrounding the decontamination zone. There is expected to be

no risk of exposure in the support zone.

Table B-1 contains additional information regarding the type of PPE appropriate for various

categories of agents that may be encountered in the hot, decontamination, and support zones.

CONFINED-SPACE OPERATIONS

B-49. Confined spaces increase the hazards associated with toxic, flammable, and explosive materials or

atmospheres and oxygen-depleted or enriched atmospheres. Personnel operating in confined spaces may

experience fires, explosions, injury, illness, or death. Therefore, confined spaces are considered unsafe for

entry or work until testing has been conducted and conditions have been determined to be acceptable.

Personnel who operate in confined spaces must be appropriately trained and certified according to

applicable regulatory guidance, and they must wear the appropriate PPE.

Special Safety Requirements

B-50. Confined-space operations are considered hazardous. The following restrictions apply:

Supervisors of personnel required to enter or work in a confined space must ensure the use of

appropriate PPE for the operation, exposure, and expected hazards. PPE shall be available when

needed, maintained in good condition, and cleaned daily following contact with irritants,

caustics or toxic materials (fuels, sludge).

When toxic materials or atmospheres are present or may be introduced into a confined space,

personnel must, regardless of ventilation, wear approved respiratory-protective equipment in

addition to any other required PPE.

When operating in oxygen-enriched atmospheres or when flammable or explosive materials,

gases, or vapors are present or may be introduced into the confined space, only approved,

intrinsically safe, spark-proof or explosive-proof equipment may be used. All other potential

ignition sources must be controlled, and adequate fire protection must be provided.

Respiratory Protection

B-51. All exposures or potential exposures within a confined space must be carefully evaluated prior to the

selection of the appropriate respiratory protective devices. Only approved respirators may be used for

confined-space operations. At a minimum, evaluations shall consider—

The atmosphere in general.

Whether the confined space is IDLH.

The oxygen level.

The types of contaminants present or likely to be present or generated (vapors, mists, fumes).

Concentrations of contaminants.

Appropriate exposure limits of contaminants (TLV, PEL, threshold limit value ceiling [TLVC]).

B-16

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Personal Protection

Table B-1. PPE Recommendations

CWA

TIM

BWA

Radiological/nuclear

Level A (initially)

Level A or B

Level A or Level B

Short-duration

with NIOSH-

(initially) with

(with NIOSH-

exposure: Level C

certified SCBA.

NIOSH-certified

certified SCBA) or

with a NIOSH-

The PPE level may

SCBA—the level

Level C (either with

certified full face

be lowered if air

depends on the

NIOSH-certified

piece, nonpowered

monitoring

chemical or

PAPR equipped

air purification

indicates it is safe

situation. The

with HEPA filters or

device equipped with

to do so.

PPE level may

with NIOSH-certified

a combination P-100

be lowered if air

full face piece air

filter and organic

monitoring

purification device

vapor and acid gas

indicates it is

equipped with a P

cartridges/

safe to do so.

100 filter, depending

canister (acceptable)

on the situation).

or a PAPR equipped

with a combination

HEPA or

P-100 filter and

organic vapor and

acid gas

cartridges/canister

(preferred); gloves;

TYVEK or equivalent

garments; hood; and

boot covers.

Extended-duration

exposure (days,

weeks, months):

Level B or Level C

with a PAPR

equipped with a

HEPA or P-100 filter

and organic vapor

and acid gas

cartridges/canister,

depending on the

situation; gloves;

TYVEK or equivalent

garments; hood; and

boot covers.

Same PPE level as

Same PPE level

One PPE level

Same PPE level as

that used in the hot

as that used in

lower than that used

that used during

zone or one PPE

the hot zone or

in the hot zone.

short-duration

level lower than

one PPE level

exposure in the hot

that used in the hot

lower than that

zone.

zone if professional

used in the hot

judgment or air

zone if

monitoring

professional

indicates it is safe.

judgment or air

monitoring

indicates it is

safe.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

B-17

Appendix B

Table B-1. PPE Recommendations (continued)

CWA

TIM

BWA

Radiological/nuclear

Standard

precautionary PPE

precautionary

precautionary PPE

PPE

Note. When responding to fires or entering buildings on fire, structural firefighting gear should be worn—including

helmet, SCBA, and turnout gear (thermally insulated coat, pants, and boots).

Note. For T-2 mycotoxins, the PPE to be used is the same as that described for CWAs and TIM.

B-52. Breathable air is to be provided during confined-space operations. Compressed breathable air

supplied to respiratory protective devices, such as SCBA, shall, at a minimum, meet the ANSI

requirements for Grade D (compressor source) breathable air. The requirements for Grade D breathable air

are presented in Table B-2.

Table B-2. ANSI Requirements for Breathable Air

Component

Grade D (compressor source) breathable air

Oxygen (by volume)

19.5-23.5%

Carbon dioxide (by volume)

1,000 ppm (maximum)

Carbon monoxide (by volume)

10 ppm (maximum)

Oil (mist and vapor) and particulate

5 mg/m3 (maximum)

matter

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

B-53. Other resources that provide further guidance regarding the selection of PPE are shown below.

Guide for the Selection of Personal Protective Equipment for Emergency First Responders

B-54. The Guide for the Selection of Personal Protective Equipment for Emergency First Responders

(National Institute of Justice [NIJ] Guide 102-00, Volumes I, IIa, IIb, and IIc) contains an overview of

types of respirators and other PPE, an explanation of the factors to be considered in PPE selection, and an

evaluation of the ability of manufacturers’ PPE to protect against CWA, TIM, and BWA. The guide is

available at <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/191518.htm >.

Managing Hazardous Material Incidents

B-55. There are three volumes contained in the ATSDR guide entitled Managing Hazardous Material

Incidents (MHMIs). Volume I covers emergency medical services, Volume II addresses hospital emergency

departments, and Volume III deals with medical management guidelines for acute chemical exposures to

CWAs, TIC, and other chemicals. Each of these volumes is available at <http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/mhmi/ >.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration Personal Protective Equipment Requirements

B-56. The basic OSHA requirements for a PPE program are covered under 29 CFR 1910.132, with specific

pieces of protective equipment addressed in subsequent parts of the regulation. The requirements can be

accessed at

<http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STAND-

ARDS&p_id=9777>.

B-18

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Personal Protection

NIOSH Guide to Industrial Respiratory Protection

B-57. The NIOSH Guide to Industrial Respiratory Protection (DHHS [NIOSH] Publication No. 87-116) is

available at <http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/87-116.html >.

NIOSH Guide to the Selection and Use of Particulate Respirators

B-58. The NIOSH Guide to the Selection and Use of Particulate Respirators (DHHS [NIOSH] Publication

No. 96-101) is available at <http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/userguid.html >.

TB Respiratory Protection Program in Health Care Facilities—Administrator’s Guide

B-59. The TB Respiratory Protection Program in Health Care Facilities—Administrator’s Guide (DHHS

[NIOSH] Publication No. 99-143) is available at <http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/99-143.html >.

Recommendations for Chemical Protective Clothing (A Companion to the NIOSH Pocket Guide to

Chemical Hazards)

B-60. Recommendations for Chemical Protective Clothing (A Companion to the NIOSH Pocket Guide to

Chemical Hazards) is available at <http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ncpc1.html >.

A Guide for Evaluating the Performance of Chemical Protective Clothing

B-61. A Guide for Evaluating the Performance of Chemical Protective Clothing

(DHHS [NIOSH]

Publication No. 90-109) is available at <http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/90-109.html >.

Miscellaneous Web Sites

B-62. The following Web sites provide additional information regarding the selection of PPE:

Standards for personal protective gear for first responders may be found at

<http://www.dhs.gov/xfrstresp/standards/ >.

Emergency response guidance is available at

<http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/

emergencyresponse/index.html>.

Guidance regarding hospital emergency response may be accessed at

<http://www.osha.gov/

Publications/OSHA3152/osha3152.html>.

A list of PPE which has been certified by the Safety Equipment Institute (SEI) as meeting

certain standards, such as those of the NFPA, ANSI, and American Society for Testing and

Materials (ASTM), is available at <http://www.seinet.org/CPL/contents.htm >.

Guidance on the selection of PPE is available at <http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/

personalprotectiveequipment/index.html>.

The following link for NIOSH-approved CBRN SCBA respirators is sponsored by the CDC and

the NIOSH:

<http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npptl/topics/respirators/cbrnapproved/scba/default.

html>.

OSHA guidance regarding respiratory protection may be found at <http://www.osha.gov/

SLTC/respiratoryprotection/index.html>.

The following site has links to various other Web sites which contain information about

respirators: <http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/respinfo.html >.

Information about protecting against blood-borne pathogens can be found at

<http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/bloodbornepathogens/index.html >.

The DOD-NIOSH-OSHA-Sponsored Chemical and Biological Respiratory Protection Workshop

Report is available at <http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/pdfs/2000-122.pdf >.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

B-19

Appendix C

Chemical Warfare Agent Threshold Values

This appendix provides exposure guidance to be used for military and domestic

support operations. Included are TLVs, worker population limits (WPLs), PELs,

IDLH levels, ERPGs, short-term public emergency guidance levels (SPEGLs), acute

exposure guideline levels (AEGLs), airborne exposure limits (AELs), short-term

exposure limits (STELs), and air military exposure guideline limits (MEGs) for

selected CWAs.

Note. This appendix contains a comprehensive—but not all-inclusive—list of low-level

protective limits. Commanders should not rely on this information as the sole source for search

and survey, PPE selection, extraction, decontamination, medical support, or any other operation

conducted in a chemical warfare environment.

HEALTH EFFECTS AND EXPOSURE LIMITS

C-1. Health effects and exposure limits depend on the toxicity and carcinogenicity of the CWA.

TOXICITY

C-2. Toxicity is a measure of the degree to which a substance is considered poisonous (capable of causing

injury, illness, or death). The toxicity of a CWA is determined by its effects on the target (organism, organ,

tissue). There are many factors which affect the toxicity of a substance—its physical form (solid, liquid,

gas), the concentration, the pathway of administration (ingestion, inhalation, dermal contact, injection), the

duration and frequency of exposure, and the genetic makeup and overall health of the individual.

C-3. For noncarcinogenic CWAs, it is presumed that there is a threshold concentration below which

exposure to the CWA will not result in adverse health effects. However, because individuals typically

respond differently to identical doses of a toxin, a population level measure of toxicity, which relates the

probability of an outcome for a given individual in a population, is often used to determine exposure limits.

Threshold levels used as occupational exposure limits (chemical concentrations to which workers may be

exposed without experiencing adverse health effects) are defined in Table C-1, page C-2. Threshold levels

used as general population exposure limits in emergency situations are defined in Table C-2, page C-3.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

C-1

Appendix C

Table C-1. Occupational Exposure Limits

Threshold level

Definition

TLV¹

Refers to airborne concentrations of

substances and represents conditions

under which it is believed that nearly all

workers may be repeatedly exposed, day

after day, without adverse effects.

TLV-TWA¹

The TWA concentration for a normal 8-hr

work day and 40-hr work week to which

nearly all workers may be repeatedly

exposed, day after day, without adverse

effects.

TLV-STEL¹

The concentration to which workers may

be continuously exposed for a short

period of time without suffering from (1)

irritation, (2) chronic or irreversible tissue

damage, or (3) narcosis of a sufficient

degree to increase the likelihood of

accidental injury, to impair self-rescue, or

to materially reduce work efficiency,

provided that the daily TLV-TWA is not

exceeded.

TLV ceiling¹

The concentration that should never be

exceeded during working exposure.

WPL

The TWA concentration for a normal 8-hr

work day and 40-hr work week to which

nearly all workers may be repeatedly

exposed, day after day, without adverse

effects.

PEL²

The TWA concentration for a normal 8-hr

work day and 40-hr work week to which

nearly all workers may be repeatedly

exposed, day after day, without adverse

effects.

IDLH²

A maximum airborne concentration from

which one could escape without any

irreversible health effects within 30 min.

¹ACGIH

²OSHA

Note. Of the levels listed, only those defined by OSHA constitute actual regulatory limits;

the ACGIH-defined levels serve only as guidance.

C-2

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Chemical Warfare Agent Threshold Values

Table C-2. General Population Exposure Limits

Threshold level

Definition

ERPG¹

The maximum concentration in air below which it is

believed nearly all individuals could be exposed for up

to 1 hour without (1) experiencing other than mild,

transient adverse health effects or perceiving a clearly

defined objectionable odor (ERPG-1), (2) experiencing

or developing irreversible or other serious health effects

or symptoms that could impair their abilities to take

protective action (ERPG-2), or (3) experiencing or

developing life-threatening health effects (ERPG-3).

SPEGL²

An acceptable concentration for unpredicted, single,

short-term exposure of the general public in emergency

situations. May be developed for different exposure

periods (1, 2, 4, 8, 16, or 24 hr).

AEGL (EPA NAC/AEGL)³

Proposed short-term threshold or ceiling exposure value

intended for the protection of the general public,

including susceptible or sensitive individuals, but not

those who are hypersusceptible or hypersensitive.

Represents the airborne concentration of a substance at

or above which it is predicted that the general

population (as defined above) could experience (1)

notable discomfort (AEGL-1), (2) irreversible or other

serious, long-lasting effects or impaired ability to escape

(AEGL-2), or (3) life-threatening health effects or death

(AEGL-3). Developed for four exposure periods—

30 min and 1, 4, and 8 hr.

¹ERPGs, which are used during emergency planning and response operations, are intended to protect

most, but not all, individuals in the general population (AIHA 2002). All populations include hypersensitive

individuals who experience adverse effects at concentrations below these guidelines.

²SPEGLs (defined by the NRC, 1986b) and AEGL-1 levels are equivalent.

³AEGLs are synonymous with CEELs.

Note. The DOE SCAPA has published TEELs for about 680 chemicals. TEELs are based on the levels set

forth by the AIHA and are designed to serve as interim ERPGs until final ERPG values can be established.

TEELs, which range from TEEL-0 to TEEL-3, are based on the correlation between acute data and existing

values (TLVs, IDLHs, and STELs).

C-4. Actual threshold concentration values for selected CWAs are presented in Tables C-3 to C-5.

Table C-3, page C-4, lists AELs for unprotected personnel exposed to the G series nerve agents

tabun (GA), sarin (GB), soman (GD), and cyclosarin (GF); the V-series nerve agent VX; and the

sulfur mustard gas blister agents HD, H, and HT.

Table C-4, page C-5, lists AELs for protected personnel exposed to GA, GB, GD, GF, VX, HD,

H, HT, the blister agent lewisite (L), the sulfur mustard gas blister agent HL, and the nitrogen

mustard gas blister agents HN-1 and HN-3.

Table C-5, page C-6, lists exposure limits for other industrial chemicals that may be used as

CWAs (blood, choking, vomiting, and incapacitating agents). The exposure limits presented in

these tables are useful only if appropriate instrumentation and trained personnel are available to

measure agent concentrations at the site.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

C-3

Appendix C

Table C-3. AELs for Unprotected Personnel

Agent

WPL (8-hr)

STEL

IDLH

GPL

(mg/m3)

(mg/m3)^1&2

(mg/m3)

GA¹, GB¹

0.000030

0.00010

0.100

0.0000010

GD¹, GF¹

0.000030

0.00020

0.050

0.0000010

VX²

0.000001

0.00001

0.003

0.0000006

HD², H²

0.000400

0.00300

0.700

0.0000200

(includes HT)

¹For GA, GB, GD, and GF, a worker may be exposed to the STEL concentration no

more than four times per day, with a time lapse of at least 60 min between successive

exposures.

²For VX, HD, H, and HT exposures, a worker may be exposed only once per day at the

STEL.

Note. AELs are listed in AR 385-61 and 68 FR 58348-58351.

Note. All AELs are concentration and time values, as opposed to concentration-only

values. While administrative controls may be used to limit the duration of potential

exposure to workers, they cannot be used to limit potential public exposure. Therefore,

administrative controls significantly affect only the WPL protective action level.

C-4

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Chemical Warfare Agent Threshold Values

Table C-4. AELs for Protected Workers

Agent and level

12-hr

8-hr

4-hr

2-hr

15-min STEL

of protection

(mg/m3)

(mg/m3)¹

GA, GB

APR

0.00100

0.00150

0.0030

0.0050

SAR²

0.02000

0.03000

0.0600

0.1000

SCBA/SAR³

0.20000

0.30000

0.6000

1.0000

GD, GF

APR

0.0015

0.00150

0.0015

SAR²

0.0300

0.03000

0.0300

SCBA/SAR³

0.3000

0.30000

0.3000

APR

0.00003

0.00005

0.0001

0.0002

0.0005

SAR²/SAR³

0.00060

0.00100

0.0020

0.0040

0.0100

SCBA

0.00600

0.01000

0.0200

0.0400

0.1000

HD⁴, H, HT

SAR²

0.27000

0.40000

0.8000

1.6000

3.0000

SCBA/SAR³

0.00200

4.00000

8.0000

16.0000

30.0000

L⁴, HL

SAR²

3.00000

3.0000

SCBA/SAR³

30.00000

30.0000

HN-1⁴, HN-3

SAR²

3.00000

3.0000

SCBA/SAR³

30.00000

30.0000

¹Exposures at the STEL shall not occur more than once per day.

²SAR without an escape bottle.

³SAR with an escape bottle.

⁴For mustard agents, APRs are to be used for escape only.

Note. AELs are listed in AR 385-61 and 68 FR 58348-58351.

Note. All AELs are concentration and time values, as opposed to concentration-only values. While

administrative controls may be used to limit the duration of potential exposure to workers, they

cannot be used to limit potential public exposure. Therefore, administrative controls significantly

affect only the WPL protective action level.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

C-5

Appendix C

Table C-5. Exposure Limits for Industrial Chemicals Used as CWAs

Chemical or

PEL as 8-hr TWA

IDLH

agent

(or 15-min STEL)

mg/m3

ppm¹

mg/m3

ppm¹

0.600

0.30

11.000

10.00

55.0

50.0

SA²

0.200

0.05

3.0

CG²

0.400

0.10

8.1

2.0

DP³

0.004

0.2

0.5

Chlorine

(2.900)

(1.00)

29.0

10.0

0.008

0.030

0.9

HF²

2.500

0.700

0.10

13.4

2.0

Chloroform

9.700

2.00

500.0

DM, DA, DC

No air monitoring required⁴

¹Parts per million (ppm) is by volume at 20°C and 1 atmosphere.

²From the NIOSH Pocket Guide.

³Monitored as phosgene.

⁴Appropriate engineering/process controls shall be used to minimize

exposure.

Note. “No standard (NS)” means there is data available; however, no

OSHA or Army standard has been established. Commanders shall be

notified prior to operations involving these chemicals/agents, and

monitoring/exposure levels are to be determined on a case-by-case

basis.

Note. “- - “ means there is no data available.

C-6

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Chemical Warfare Agent Threshold Values

CARCINOGENICITY

C-5. Carcinogens are substances that promote cancer by altering cellular metabolism or by directly

damaging cellular deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), thereby interfering with normal biological processes. The

EPA has developed the following scheme for categorizing chemicals according to their carcinogenic

potential:

Cancer A. Chemicals in this category are known human carcinogens. Epidemiological studies

have indicated that there is sufficient evidence to support a causal association between exposure

to the chemical and the occurrence of cancer.

Cancer B. These chemicals are probable human carcinogens. There is limited evidence from

epidemiological studies and/or sufficient evidence from animal studies to indicate that there is

an association between exposure to the chemical and the occurrence of cancer.

Cancer C. Cancer C chemicals are possible human carcinogens. There is limited evidence from

animal studies, but inadequate evidence or a lack of data from epidemiological studies to

indicate that there is an association between exposure to the chemical and the occurrence of

cancer.

Cancer D. These chemicals are nonclassifiable. There is inadequate or no human or animal

evidence of association with carcinogenicity.

Cancer E. There is no evidence that these chemicals are associated with human carcinogenicity.

There is no evidence of carcinogenicity in adequate epidemiological or animal studies.

C-6. It is presumed that exposure to carcinogenic CWAs results in adverse health effects, regardless of

the dose. Because the risk of exposure to cancer-causing chemicals cannot be completely eliminated, health

guidelines are traditionally established based on predetermined “acceptable” increased risks of cancer. The

EPA often identifies a range of 1 in 10,000 (or 1 x 10^-4) to 1 in 1,000,000 (or 1 x 10^-6) increased risk of

cancer cases from involuntary exposure to environmental chemicals as acceptable over the course of a

lifetime. An excess cancer risk of 1 x 10^-6, which represents the more conservative end of the spectrum, is

the number most frequently used in decisions regarding the protection of large sectors of the general

civilian population in cases where the population has no choice in exposure. (For example, the FDA limits

carcinogenic food additives to levels that present no greater than a 1 x 10^-6 excess cancer risk.) In contrast,

many industrial standards for the work environment offer protection only to the level of 1 x 10^-3 increased

cancer risk or lower. (For example, the protection level could be as low as an increased risk of 1 x 10^-2[1 in

100 or 1 percent].) This increased cancer risk is sometimes considered “acceptable” in the workplace

because of the “voluntary” nature of the exposure and because it is often not technologically and/or

financially feasible to control exposures to even lower levels in the work environment. The U.S. Supreme

Court has upheld the industry basis for such standards.

MILITARY APPLICATION

C-7. Because they may be called upon to render assistance to civil authorities, military response personnel

should be familiar with the threshold concentration values presented in Tables C-3 to C-5 (pages C-4 to

C-6). However, these threshold values were developed for settings that differ considerably from those

associated with uncontrolled spill sites. Therefore, the use of these values by military personnel responding

to a CWA incident is somewhat limited. At best, published TLV, PEL, and IDLH values may be used as

benchmarks for assessing the relative toxicity of agents and, possibly, as aids for selecting appropriate

levels of PPE. Alternate threshold levels are required for military personnel operating in a CWA

environment.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

C-7

Appendix C

EXPOSURE ASSUMPTIONS

C-8. Military personnel may be exposed to CWAs through ingestion, inhalation, dermal contact, or

injection. The first indication that exposure has occurred is likely to be the onset of noticeable health

effects. The severity of these effects depends on the physical form of the agent (solid, liquid, or gas), its

concentration, the pathway of administration, the duration and frequency of exposure, and the genetic

makeup and overall health of the individual. For example, a short-duration or low-frequency exposure to a

CWA may result only in minimal adverse effects (mild irritation), whereas a longer-duration or higher-

frequency exposure may produce more severe effects (immediate, significant, and/or prolonged medical

symptoms), which could interfere with the mission function—or even result in death. Sensitive individuals

are especially vulnerable to the effects of CWAs.

C-9. In general, deployed military populations consist of relatively healthy, fit, male and nonpregnant

female adults, usually 18 to 55 years of age, with an average weight of about 70 kilograms (approximately

154 pounds); exposure guidelines are generally developed accordingly. While it is common to assume that

military personnel, who must meet and maintain basic health and fitness requirements, have no

predisposing physical or mental factors that could exacerbate exposure to environmental chemicals, such

assumptions are not entirely supported by scientific evidence. An assessment of factors that may lead to

chemical-specific susceptibilities suggests that many predisposing factors—such as illness

(asthma),

physical and emotional stressors, lifestyle choices (smoking, alcohol use), and genetic traits—exist within

the deployed military population (which includes active duty, reserve, and National Guard personnel).

Therefore, the possibility of heightened sensitivity may need to be considered when establishing certain

protective measures—even for military personnel. For example, although only a minority of the U.S.

population is genetically predisposed to anticholinesterase depression, it is not a condition for which

military personnel are screened. Therefore, the greater sensitivity of individuals who are affected by this

condition is taken into account when establishing nerve-agent guidelines.

C-10. The risk of exposure must be assessed and integrated into overall military operational risk

management. One of the goals of the military is to limit exposure so that it is as low as reasonably

achievable

(ALARA). As a result, MEGs have been developed for several CWAs. In addition,

commanders must ensure that all personnel—including military, civilians, and contractors—use

appropriate PPE when participating in operations involving detected or suspected CWAs.

MILITARY EXPOSURE GUIDELINES

C-11. Due to the breadth of military operations, several “representative” conditions were considered for the

development of MEGs for CWAs. The selected exposure scenarios were based on reasonable anticipations

of deployment conditions and durations; however, actual exposure conditions are rarely identical to those

assumed during guidance development. Therefore, the use of assumed exposure conditions results in

varying degrees of certainty with regard to the level of protection provided by the MEGs. The MEGs that

should be applied in any particular situation are those that were developed using exposure scenarios which

most closely approximate the actual conditions encountered.

C-12. For military operations, the level of acceptable risk varies depending on the mission. In some

situations—particularly those involving adversarial or hostile environments—high levels of exposure to

relatively potent CWAs are considered acceptable given the alternative hazards faced. However, MEG

values were developed so that—taking sensitivity into account—exposures at levels below the MEGs are

not expected to result in the adverse health effects associated with a particular agent, while exposures at

levels above the MEGs may or may not result in the adverse health effects. The inability to attribute

adverse health effects to exposures above MEGs indicates that the guidelines should not be used for the

retrospective assessment of health effects and cannot be used to determine specific numbers of casualties.

C-13. Although AEGLs were established for use with the general population and are applicable mainly to

domestic accident/terrorist scenarios, they include federally endorsed health criteria and, in spite of their

C-8

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Chemical Warfare Agent Threshold Values

conservatism, are also considered appropriate for military application. MEGs, therefore, consist largely of

AEGLs. Where AEGLs were not available, ERPGs were used.

1-Hour Air Military Exposure Guidelines

C-14. The

1-hour air MEGs were developed for three general levels of health effects—minimal,

significant, and severe. These three levels of 1-hour air MEGs are defined as follows:

Minimal. The 1-hour, minimal-effects air MEG is the airborne concentration above which

continuous exposure for 1 hour could begin to produce mild, nondisabling, transient, reversible

effects, if any. Such effects should not impair performance. An increase in concentration or

duration of exposure could result in performance degradation—especially for tasks requiring

extreme mental/visual acuity or physical dexterity/strength.

Significant. The 1-hour, significant-effects air MEG is the airborne concentration above which

continuous exposure for 1 hour could begin to produce irreversible, permanent, or serious health

effects that may result in performance degradation and incapacitate a small portion of

individuals. An increase in concentration and/or duration of exposure increases the incidence

and severity of effects.

Severe. The

1-hour, severe-effects air MEG is the airborne concentration above which

continuous exposure for 1 hour could begin to produce life-threatening or lethal effects in a

small portion of individuals. An increase in concentration or duration of exposure increases the

incidence of lethality and severity of nonlethal effects.

8-Hour and 14-Day Air Military Exposure Guidelines

C-15. The 8-hour and 14-day air MEG values have been established for continuous, 8-hour to 14-day

exposures representative of brief deployments. The potential variation in the circumstances for exposure

and properties of health effects for many substances can be significant for exposures of this duration range.

The 8-hour and 14-day air MEGs are defined as follows:

8-hour air MEGs. The 8-hour air MEG is the airborne concentration above which continuous

exposure for 8 hours could begin to produce mild, nondisabling, transient, reversible effects, if

any. Such effects should not impair performance. An increase in concentration or duration of

exposure could result in performance degradation—especially for tasks requiring extreme

mental/visual acuity or physical dexterity/strength.

14-day air MEGs. The 14-day air MEG is the airborne concentration below which continuous

exposure (24 hours per day) for up to 14 days should not impair performance; significant,

noncarcinogenic threats should not be an issue. An increase in concentration or duration of

exposure could result in the degradation of performance or an increase in the potential for

delayed/permanent disease.

C-16. Although it was not possible to delineate three separate levels of health effects for exposures of

14 days, the levels established for 8-hour exposures can be considered intermediate guidance for exposure

levels between the 1-hour minimal effects air MEGs and the 14-day air MEGs.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

C-9

Appendix C

Military Exposure Guideline Limits

C-17. Actual MEG limits for G series nerve agents (GA, GB, GD, and GF), nerve agent VX, and sulfur

mustard (blister agent HD) are presented in Table C-6, page C-11. For each of these CWAs, health effects

have been categorized into three levels (minimal, significant, and severe) for 10-minute, 1-hour, 8-hour,

and 24-hour exposure intervals. These three health effect levels, which directly correspond to AEGL

Levels 1 through 3, are described as follows:

Minimal health effect level

(AEGL-1). A minimal health effect level is the airborne

concentration at or above which it is predicted that the general population, including

“susceptible” individuals, could experience notable discomfort; irritation; or certain

asymptomatic, nonsensory effects. However, the effects are transient, are not disabling, and are

reversible upon cessation of exposure.

Significant health effect level (AEGL-2). A significant health effect level is the airborne

concentration at or above which it is predicted that the general population, including

“susceptible” individuals, could experience an impaired ability to escape or irreversible or other

serious, long-lasting health effects.

Severe health effect level (AEGL-3). A severe health effect level is the airborne concentration

at or above which it is predicted that the general population, including “susceptible” individuals,

could experience life-threatening health effects or death.

C-18. The information contained in Table C-6 is intended to be used as guidance when conducting military

operations involving CWAs. Because environmental monitoring may indicate variations in actual

concentrations of a CWA over time, MEG limits should be selected based on the most representative

exposure durations listed in Table C-6.

EMERGENCY EXPOSURE GUIDANCE LEVELS

C-19. The National Research Council (NRC)/Committee on Toxicology (COT) has developed emergency

exposure guidance levels (EEGLs) for military personnel operating in emergency situations. An EEGL is

defined as “a concentration of a substance in air that may be judged by DOD to be acceptable for the

performance of specific tasks during rare emergency conditions.” EEGLs may allow for more substantial

effects than do the primary levels cited as MEGs; therefore, EEGLs should not be considered to be

“hygienic” or “safe.”

PUBLIC EXPOSURE GUIDELINES

C-20. If an incident occurs near a population center, military response personnel may be required to render

assistance to civil authorities. It is, therefore, necessary that military responders be familiar with public

exposure limits. When military personnel are involved in assisting civil authorities, public guidelines must

be followed in accordance with 68 Federal Register (FR) 58348-58351.

C-10

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Chemical Warfare Agent Threshold Values

Table C-6. MEG Limits

Chemical

Air MEG

Potential symptoms

and target

CAS no.

Health

10-min

1-hr

8-hr

24-hr

organs/systems

effect level

mg/m3

[ppm]

Minimal

0.0069

0.00280

0.00100

0.00030

Runny nose, tightness

[0.0010]

[0.00042]

[0.00015]

[0.00005]

of chest, miosis,

77-81-6

dimness of vision,

Significant

0.0870

0.03500

0.01300

0.00400

difficulty breathing,

[0.0130]

[0.00530]

[0.00200]

[0.00067]

drooling, excessive

Severe

0.7600

0.26000

0.10000

0.03000

sweating, nausea,

[0.1100]

[0.03900]

[0.01500]

[0.00500]

vomiting, and CNS

effects.

Local effects to pupils,

respiratory system,

and CNS.

Note. This information is based on the relative potency from GB (NRC 2003).

Note. The 24-hr MEG is derived from the 8-hr AEGL by straight-line extrapolation of the 8-hr AEGL Ct.

Note. The IDLH is 0.1 mg/m3 (DA Pam 40-173).

Minimal

0.0069

0.00280

0.00100

0.000300

Runny nose, tightness

107-44-8

[0.0012]

[0.00048]

[0.00017]

[0.000057]

of chest, miosis,

dimness of vision,

Significant

0.0870

0.03500

0.01300

0.004000

difficulty breathing,

[0.0150]

[0.00600]

[0.00220]

[0.000730]

drooling, excessive

Severe

0.3800

0.13000

0.05100

0.020000

sweating, nausea,

[0.0640]

[0.02200]

[0.00870]

[0.002900]

vomiting, cramps,

involuntary defecation

or urination, twitching,

jerking, staggering,

headache, confusion,

and drowsiness.

Coma and convulsion,

at high exposures,

leading to cessation of

breathing and death.

Local effects to pupils,

respiratory system,

CNS, and

gastrointestinal

system.

Note. At the minimal level, symptoms include reversible miosis, headache, eye pain, rhinorrhea, tightness in the chest, cramps,

nausea, and malaise. Performance limitations are possible for night operations and aircrews and for tasks involving distance or

spatial judgment. At the significant level, symptoms include reversible miosis, dyspnea, red blood cell (RBC)-ChE inhibition,

and single fibre electromyography (SFEMG) changes. Performance limitations are possible for night operations and aircrews

and for tasks involving distance or spatial judgment. Symptoms at the severe level are based on GB vapor experimental

Sprague-Dawley rat lethality data (LC01, LC50).

Note. The IDLH is 0.1 mg/m3 (DA Pam 40-173).

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

C-11

Appendix C

Table C-6. MEG Limits (continued)

Chemical

Air MEG

Potential symptoms

and target

CAS no.

Health

10-min

1-hr

8-hr

24-hr

organs/systems

effect level

mg/m3

[ppm]

Minimal

0.00350

0.00140

0.000500

0.000200

Runny nose,

96-64-0

[0.00046]

[0.00018]

[0.000065]

[0.000022]

tightness of chest,

miosis, dimness of

Significant

0.04400

0.01800

0.006500

0.002000

vision, difficulty

[0.00570]

[0.00220]

[0.000850]

[0.000280]

breathing, drooling,

Severe

0.38000

0.13000

0.051000

0.020000

excessive sweating,

[0.04900]

[0.01700]

[0.006600]

[0.002200]

nausea, vomiting,

cramps, involuntary

defecation or

urination, twitching,

jerking, staggering,

headache, confusion,

and drowsiness.

Coma and convulsion

at high exposures,

leading to cessation

of breathing and

death.

Local effects to

pupils, respiratory

system, CNS, and

gastrointestinal

system.

Note. This information is based on the relative potency from GB (NRC 2003).

Note. The 24-hr MEG is derived from the 8-hr AEGL by straight-line extrapolation of the 8-hour AEGL Ct.

Note. The IDLH is 0.05 mg/m3 (DA Pam 40-173).

C-12

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Chemical Warfare Agent Threshold Values

Table C-6. MEG Limits (continued)

Chemical

Air MEG

Potential symptoms

and target

CAS no.

Health

10-min

1-hr

8-hr

24-hr

organs/systems

effect level

mg/m3

[ppm]

Minimal

0.00350

0.0014

0.000500

0.000200

Runny nose,

329-99-7

[0.00049]

[0.00020]

[0.000070]

[0.000023]

tightness of chest,

miosis, dimness of

Significant

0.04400

0.018

0.006500

0.002000

vision, difficulty

[0.00620]

[0.0024]

[0.000910]

[0.000300]

breathing, drooling,

Severe

0.38000

0.13

0.051000

0.020000

excessive sweating,

[0.05300]

[0.018]

[0.007100]

[0.002400]

nausea, vomiting,

cramps, involuntary

defecation or

urination, twitching,

jerking, staggering,

headache, confusion,

and drowsiness.

Coma and

convulsion, at high

exposures, leading to

cessation of breathing

and death.

Local effects to

pupils, respiratory

system, CNS, and

gastrointestinal

system.

Note. This information is based on the relative potency from GB (NRC 2003).

Note. The 24-hr MEG is derived from the 8-hr AEGL by straight-line extrapolation of the 8-hr AEGL Ct.

Note. The IDLH is 0.05 mg/m3 (DA Pam 40-173).

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

C-13

Appendix C

Table C-6. MEG Limits (continued)

Chemical

Air MEG

Potential

symptoms and

CAS no.

Health

10-min

1-hr mg/m3

8-hr

24-hr

target

effect

mg/m3

[ppm]

mg/m3

organs/systems

level

[ppm]

Minimal

0.000570

0.000170

0.0000710

0.0000240

AChE inhibitor.

50782-69-9

[0.000052]

[0.000016]

[0.0000065]

[0.0000022]

Headache, runny

Significant

0.007200

0.002900

0.0010000

0.0003300

nose, nasal

[0.000650]

[0.000270]

[0.0000950]

[0.0000320]

congestion, nausea,

vomiting, giddiness,

Severe

0.029000

0.010000

0.0038000

0.0013000

anxiety, difficulty

[0.002700]

[0.000910]

[0.0003500]

[0.0001200]

sleeping/thinking,

muscle twitching,

weakness,

abdominal cramps,

and CNS effects.

Local effects to

pupils, respiratory

system, CNS, and

gastrointestinal

system.

Note. Symptoms at the minimal and significant levels are derived by relative potency from the study of multiple

minimal or transient effects in human volunteers exposed to agent GB. Performance limitations are possible for

night operations and aircrews and for and tasks involving distance or spatial judgment. Symptoms at the severe

level are derived by relative potency from the study of GB vapor experimental Sprague-Dawley rat lethality data

(LC01, LC50) (NRC 2003).

Note. The IDLH is 0.01 mg/m3 (DA Pam 40-173).

Minimal

0.40

0.067

0.008

0.00300

Potent alkylating

505-60-2

[0.06]

[0.010]

0.001

[0.00033]

agent; mutagenic.

Significant

0.60

0.100

0.013

0.00400

Delayed eye and

[0.09]

[0.020]

[0.002]

[0.00067]

mucous membrane

irritation,

Severe

3.90

2.100

0.270

0.09000

conjunctivitis,

[0.59]

[0.320]

[0.040]

[0.01300]

blindness, edema of

the eyelids, necrosis

of the respiratory

tract and exposed

skin, nausea, and

vomiting.

Note. The 24-hr MEG estimate is derived from the 8-hr AEGL by straight-line extrapolation of the 8-hr AEGL Ct.

Note. The IDLH is 2 mg/m3 (DA Pam 40-8).

C-14

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Appendix D

Standard Decontaminants

This appendix contains an overview of the various types of military standard

decontaminants, standard expedient decontaminants, and natural decontaminants. It

does not, however, include a complete listing of all substances that may be used as

decontaminants. Numerous substances are currently undergoing testing to determine

their potential for use as decontaminants. Existing military utility assessment test data

should be sought and caution should be exercised when considering the use of

nonstandard decontaminants.

MILITARY STANDARD DECONTAMINANTS

D-1. Military standard decontaminants are those decontaminants that have undergone sufficient testing to

allow for accurate predictions of outcome when they are used in decontamination operations. These

decontaminants are endorsed by the military and are available through the military supply system. There

are several types of military standard decontaminants.

DECONTAMINATING AGENT, SUPER-TROPICAL BLEACH

D-2. Decontaminating agent, super-tropical bleach (STB) is a mixture of chlorinated lime and calcium

oxide in white powder form. It is suitable for use against most CWAs. Upon manufacture, STB contains

30-35 percent available chlorine. Due to this high chlorine content, protective masks and gloves are

required for handling. Packaged STB is very stable and, under normal storage conditions, decomposes

slowly. However, when stored in high-temperature environments, STB loses about

1 percent of its

available chlorine content each month. Therefore, STB should be stored in a cool, dry place and discarded

after the expiration date—which is subject to extension based on random testing.

D-3. STB is particularly effective against G and V series nerve agents, lewisite, and most biological

agents. However, vapors—which could be toxic—are generated during decontamination operations

involving these agents. While STB is also effective against liquid mustard agents, strong exothermic

reactions may occur. The severity of these reactions depends on numerous variables (such as the purity of

the liquid mustard). Some reactions may be severe enough to result in flash fires or damage to the

decontaminated surface itself. Therefore, if liquid mustard is present, STB should be used only in

exceptional circumstances—and then only when special consideration has been given and measures have

been taken to mitigate the effects of the toxic vapors expected to be emitted. For example, the mixing of

STB with water or earth not only facilitates its distribution, but also diminishes the severity of the

exothermic reaction.

D-4. To reduce the severity of exothermic reactions resulting from the use of STB on surfaces

contaminated with liquid mustard, the STB may be mixed with water to form a “slurry” or “paste” or with

earth to form a “dry mix.”

Slurry or paste. There are two types of slurry or paste—one for manual application and another

for application with the M12A1 power-driven decontaminating apparatus (PDDA).

For manual application with swabs, brushes, or brooms, the most effective

slurry consists of approximately equal parts (by weight) of STB and water,

prepared by mixing 50 pounds of bleach with 6 gallons of water.

For application with the PDDA, 1,300 pounds (or approximately 26 50

pound cans) of STB, 225 gallons of water, and both antiseize and anti

foam compounds are combined and continuously agitated.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

D-1

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8) - page 23