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Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8) - page 5

Phase I: Planning

Figure 1-3. The military decision making process

1-18. The PSYOP planner helps the staff execute the MDMP with the focus on developing COAs that

PSYOP can support. For example, in task 5 of step 2 of the MDMP (Figure 1-3) the PSYOP planner helps

the unit’s staff identify constraints. The PSYOP planner contributes to the list of constraints from a PSYOP

perspective. If, for example, the PSYOP planner wants to develop a leaflet as part of a series to

communicate surrender appeals to isolated threat units, but the threat has successfully employed shoulder-

fired ground-to-air missiles against coalition aircraft, this could cause the air component commander to

impose a minimum flying altitude of several thousand feet over the AO. This constraint would restrict

leaflet drops below the minimum altitude. Dropping a leaflet by way of helicopter or C-130 aircraft using

leaflet boxes would become impossible. In this example, a PSYOP planner would identify the minimum

flying altitude as a constraint. During COA development, the PSYOP planner would then recommend

using a leaflet bomb delivered by an aircraft to the targeted area while flying at a safe and authorized

altitude.

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Phase I: Planning

Political

• Perception of the new government as a puppet regime.

• Belief that only tribal members represent their respective interests.

Distrust of foreigners and high

• High value placed on tribal affiliation.

credibility attributed to face-to-face

communication by local population

Military/Security

groups dictates use of key

• Belief that local security forces are ineffectual.

communicators to convey PSYOP

• Perception that joining the provisional military is traitorous.

messages to the wider population.

• Coalition raids result in demonstrations.

Economic

• Insurgents offer money to population for planting improvised

explosive devices (IEDs).

• Unemployment rate up to 30% for some groups.

• Belief that Blue Tribe is taking all good-paying jobs.

Social

• Population generally distrustful of foreigners.

• Disputes resolved through community elders, not police or

judicial system.

• Long history of ethnic tension among tribes.

Information

• Local media is generally procoalition.

• Media coverage reaches 68% of population.

• Face-to-face communication is considered most credible by

External

population.

information

External

• External (foreign) media is generally anticoalition.

flow/influence

information

flow/influence

Infrastructure and Technology

• Texting increasing in popularity as cellular networks develop.

• Internet access offered primarily in urban areas through

third-party providers.

• Information flow to rural areas parallels ground lines of

communication.

Environmental/Physical

Legend:

•

2-year drought resulting in famine and discontent with

government.

Road

• Poor sanitation in urban areas resulted in disease outbreak.

Communications Cable

• Belief that poor water sources are from sabotage by rival tribes.

Figure 1-4. PSYOP characteristics overlay example

Step 3: Evaluate the Threat

1-26. In step 3 of the IPB process, the PSYOP planner, in coordination with the G-2/S-2 staff, analyzes the

threat to determine how the threat will most likely conduct operations to include the employment of

propaganda. Other important information includes the determination of the threat’s psychological mindset,

biases, and political or strategic objectives. One technique for evaluating the threat is center of gravity

(COG) analysis. COG analysis is a method that links a threat’s COG (a military force, organization, or

other entity’s source of power to act) to critical requirements (CRs) and associated critical vulnerabilities

(CVs). The PSYOP planner and POTF G-2/S-2 view the threat from a systems perspective using

information (political, military/security, economic, social, information, infrastructure and technology, and

environmental/physical characteristics of the AO) from steps 1 and 2 of the IPB. (Figure 1-5, page 1-14, is

an example of the threat viewed from a systems perspective.)

1-27. For the PSYOP planner, threat COG analysis serves to identify aspects of the threat exploitable by

PSYOP. COG analysis is not a replacement for in-depth TAA, but does provide a significant amount of

general information from which initial TAA of the threat is derived. Although the supported unit G-2/S-2

is primarily responsible for conducting threat COG analysis, the PSYOP planner, TAA section, and the

POTF G-2/S-2 assist on those aspects of analysis relevant to PSYOP as needed. (JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, has more information on

COG analysis.) There are four steps in analyzing a threat’s COG. Each of these is discussed below.

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Chapter 1

Figure 1-5. The threat viewed from a systems perspective

1-28. Identify critical capabilities (CCs). CCs are what a COG can do—the COG is the source of power

for CCs. For example, an organization establishes a goal. The CC is the means to achieve that goal. The

COG is the source of power or the possessor of that CC. A CC is found by identifying general functions of

the threat within the framework of the operational environment (information identified during steps 1 and 2

of the IPB process) and the friendly mission. (Figure 1-6, page 1-15, is an example of identifying

functions, or CCs, of a threat.) A CC is a threat function rather than a tangible object and only valid if its

primary ability is directly related to the COG.

1-29. Identify threat centers of gravity. After determining threat CCs, the PSYOP planner identifies the

CC’s source of power, which is the threat’s COG. To do this, the PSYOP planner visualizes the threat as a

system of functional components. Based upon how the threat organizes, fights, makes decisions, and its

physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses, the PSYOP planner selects the threat’s primary

source of power to act. (Figure 1-7, page 1-16, is an example of identifying the source of power of the

threat’s CCs.) Strategic COGs are an economic/industrial capability or a military/security capability.

Operational COGs protect strategic COGs and are often military forces or capabilities. Tactical COGs may

include a system, individual units, and unconventional forces. Typical COGs often include—

Economic/industrial sources of power.

Military/security

(joint forces, nuclear forces, land/sea/air power, special purpose forces,

unconventional forces [terrorists, insurgents], state security forces, and specific units) sources of

power.

Critical factors often mistaken for COGs include—

The will of the people (this might be a CR—if the will creates a force, the force could be a

COG).

Leadership/key personality (this is a potential CR).

Air or sea ports of debarkation.

Transportation nodes.

Strategic mobility.

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Phase I: Planning

Lines of communication.

C2 systems.

Resources (by themselves, resources are not COGs—this is another potential CR).

Time (this is a potential CR).

Media (Media and propaganda may be used to influence the will of the people and key leaders,

which is only a requirement).

Coalition/alliances (coalition partners or allies might bring or add COGs [military or economic

might]).

Figure 1-6. Identifying CCs of the threat

1-30. To identify valid COGs and distinguish them from CRs or CVs, the PSYOP planner applies

“does/uses” criteria. “Does” identifies the source, agent, or thing that carries out a particular task and is the

source of power that generates the force or CC. “Uses” identifies a factor that the source, agent, or thing

uses to perform a particular task and is a CR. Table 1-1, pages 1-16 and 1-17, is an example of determining

valid COGs with “does/uses” criteria.

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Chapter 1

Figure 1-7. Typical COGs and critical factors mistaken for COGs

Table 1-1. Example of determining valid COGs with “does/uses” criteria

Item

“Does/Uses”

Explanation

Political and economic strife do nothing by themselves. These

Political and Economic

No/Yes

conditions are needed for insurgent cells to foment discontent

Strife

among the population (and enable operations). This is a CR.

Intelligence

Yes/No

Intelligence is a function (CC) of the insurgent cell.

Leadership is critical, but leadership by itself cannot conduct

Leadership

No/Yes

attacks. This is a CR.

External support, such as funding and personnel, enable

External Support

No/Yes

insurgent operations and is a CR.

Propaganda

Yes/No

Propaganda is a function of the insurgent cell. This is a CC.

Weapons are not actors and cannot do anything by

Weapons

No/Yes

themselves. Weapons are used by the insurgent cell to carry

out attacks. This is a CR.

Populace cooperation enables the insurgent cell to conduct

Populace Cooperation

No/Yes

successful operations. This is a CR.

Communication Systems

No/Yes

Communication systems facilitate C2. This is a CR.

Insurgent operations are a function of the insurgent cell. This is

Insurgent Operations

Yes/No

a CC.

Command and Control

Yes/No

C2 is a function of the insurgent cell. This is a CC.

Ineffectual Government

Ineffectual security forces contribute to conditions favorable to

No/Yes

Security Forces

insurgent operations. This is a CR.

Mobility

Yes/No

Mobility is a function of the insurgent cell. This is a CC.

Logistics

Yes/No

Logistics are a function of the insurgent cell. This is a CC.

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Phase I: Planning

Table 1-1. Example of determining valid COGs with “does/uses” criteria (continued)

Item

“Does/Uses”

Explanation

The insurgent cell has the inherent ability to “do” the identified

Insurgent Cell

Yes/Yes

CCs and makes the cell a threat COG. Also, the insurgent cell

uses the above CRs to conduct operations.

1-31. Identify critical requirements. Each CC is analyzed to determine what conditions, resources, or

means exist that enable threat functions or missions. CRs are usually tangible elements, such as

communications means, weapons systems, or even geographical areas and terrain features. (Figure 1-8 is

an example of identifying a threat COG’s CRs.) The CR is valid if its absence or loss disables the threat’s

CC and the threat considers the identified CR as critical. U.S. systems and capabilities are not a mirror

image of those of the threat.

Figure 1-8. Identifying CRs of the threat

1-32. Identify critical vulnerabilities. Each CC is analyzed to determine which CRs are vulnerable to

neutralization, interdiction, or attack. CVs may be tangible structures or equipment, or an intangible

perception, populace belief, or susceptibility. (Figure 1-9, page 1-18, is an example of identifying threat

CRs [and components of CRs] vulnerable to attack.) The CV is valid if its exploitation disables the

associated CR and the friendly force has the resources to affect the identified CV.

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Chapter 1

Figure 1-9. CRs (and components of CRs) vulnerable to attack

Figure V-1, page 1-19, illustrates a COG analysis of the threat. The PSYOP planner

and POTF G-2 analyzed the threat from a systems perspective using information

(political, military/security, economic, social information, infrastructure and technology,

and environmental/physical characteristics of the AO) from steps 1 and 2 of the IPB.

From this analysis, the planner and G-2 determined CCs of the threat included

intelligence, logistics, mobility, C2, propaganda, and insurgent operations.

Using “’does/uses” criteria, the planner and G-2 concluded that the insurgent cell was

the source of power for these CCs, identifying the insurgent cell as a threat COG.

The insurgent cell is a COG because only it has the capability to perform the

functions of the identified CCs. Concentrating on the “insurgent operations” CC, the

PSYOP planner and G-2 determined that populace cooperation, leadership, external

support, ineffectual government security forces, communication systems, weapons,

and political/economic strife were CRs for insurgent operations.

The PSYOP planner and G-2 concluded that of these CRs, “populace cooperation”

and its related components of retribution by insurgents, threats/coercion by

insurgents, monetary rewards paid by insurgents, distrust of foreigners, perception of

the government as a puppet regime, and will to resist against the government were

most vulnerable to attack, or influence, by PSYOP activities.

The POTF G-2 and PSYOP planner will later prioritize CVs to rate their desirability as

potential targets for PSYOP using the criticality, accessibility, recuperability,

vulnerability, effect, recognizability (CARVER) targeting methodology during step 3 of

the MDMP, COA development.

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Phase I: Planning

Figure V-1. Example of completed COG analysis of the threat

Step 4: Determine Threat Courses of Action

1-33. Step 4 integrates the results of the previous tasks into a meaningful conclusion. Given what the threat

normally prefers to do and the effects of the significant characteristics of the information environment on

threat propaganda, PSYOP planners determine the threat’s likely propaganda objectives and COAs. After

the first three steps, PSYOP planners have defined the information environment, conducted initial research

for TAA, and analyzed competing information. This information, taken together, allows the PSYOP

planner to propose PSYOP activities that seek to modify behavior and counter other competing or hostile

information to achieve the desired behavior change and, ultimately, the supported commander’s objectives.

During this task, the G-2/S-2 determines possible threat COAs and displays this information on a situation

template, a graphic depiction of expected threat force dispositions for a specific COA. Ideally, propaganda

information is depicted on the G-2/S-2’s situation template similar to any other relevant threat information.

If needed, the PSYOP planner and POTF G-2/S-2 produce a separate propaganda situation template to

provide clarity for the commander and his staff. The propaganda situation template depicts where, when,

and why the threat will employ propaganda means. The propaganda situation template is developed to

support the G-2/S-2’s selected threat COAs and considers likely propaganda concept and objectives (why),

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Chapter 1

the location of primary propaganda assets (where), and a prediction of when in the operation propaganda

assets will be employed

(when). The PSYOP planner develops an overall concept and supporting

objectives for threat propaganda activities for each COA developed by the G-2/S-2 and is integrated into

the G-2/S-2’s products. (Figure 1-10 is an example of a propaganda situation template.)

Face-to-Face

Threat Propaganda Objectives

• Primary method of dissemination; identifies insurgents with the

population through shared language and religion.

1. Decrease support for the national

• Considered the most credible form of communication in the AO.

government.

2. Isolate coalition forces from the

Propaganda Actions

population.

• Instill fear in the population via retribution for coalition and national

3. Demonstrate insurgent success

government cooperation.

against coalition forces.

• Provide basic medical and food needs to rural areas with limited

4. Inform global audiences of

national government presence.

coalition casualties and failures.

Radio, TV, Satellite Broadcasts

• Capitalize on alleged atrocities committed by coalition forces to a

global audience to reduce national membership in coalition.

Internet

• Primary venue for recruitment of foreign fighters and soliciting

external funding.

W

• TTPs include posting of successful insurgent attacks against

coalition forces.

P

DC

TV

R

W

W

W

W

Legend:

Road

Communications Cable

Figure 1-10. Propaganda situation template example

Step 2: Mission Analysis (Continued)

1-34. After the first two tasks of step 2 of the MDMP are completed, the following tasks are done:

Task 3: Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks. While conducting mission analysis

with the staff, the PSYOP planner establishes what PSYOP must do to support the mission. He

studies the higher HQ OPORD, keying on his specific areas of concern. He must identify

specified and implied PSYOP tasks that are in the OPORD as well as essential tasks when

planning COAs with the G-3:

Specified tasks are tasks specifically assigned to a unit by its higher HQ.

Implied tasks are tasks that must be performed to accomplish a specified task or the

mission, but are not stated in the higher HQ order. Implied tasks are derived from a detailed

analysis of the higher HQ order, the threat situation, COAs, and the terrain.

Essential tasks are specified or implied tasks that must be executed to accomplish the

mission. Essential tasks are always included in the unit’s mission statement.

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Phase I: Planning

POPULACE COOPERATION (Critical Requirement)

TARGET COMPONENT

C

A

R

V

E

R

TOTAL

(Critical Vulnerability)

Threats and Coercion by Insurgents

8

10

7

8

9

6

48

Insurgent Retribution Toward Populace for

8

10

7

10

10

3

48

Coalition Cooperation

Insurgent Monetary Rewards for Populace

5

5

3

1

3

4

21

Cooperation

Populace Distrust of Foreigners

10

4

2

2

8

9

35

Perception of the Government as a Puppet

9

2

1

1

7

1

21

Regime

Legend:

10 - High desirability for attacking the target.

5 - Average desirability for attacking the target.

1 - Low desirability for attacking the target.

Figure 1-12. Example of CARVER matrix developed for PSYOP

1-39. One CARVER matrix is produced for each threat CR that is vulnerable to attack. The CARVER

matrix provides PSYOP planners a basis for developing POs, SPOs, PSYOP series, the potential target

audience list (PTAL), and guidance for potential propaganda response and counteraction. These actions are

done during step

7 of the MDMP, orders production, and Phase II

(TAA) and Phase III (Series

Development) of the PSYOP process. In Figure 1-12 above, a POTF PSYOP planner would most likely

develop the PSYOP objective “decrease effectiveness of opposition forces” to attack the insurgent cell’s

CR of “populace cooperation.” The planner would then develop SPOs to address some or all of the

components (CVs) of the insurgent cell’s CR of “populace cooperation,” based on their respective value

rating in the CARVER matrix.

STEP 4: COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS

1-40. COA analysis (war gaming) is a process that includes rules and steps that help commanders and

staffs visualize the flow of a battle. COA analysis considers friendly dispositions, strengths, and

weaknesses; threat assets and probable COAs; characteristics of the AO; a feasibility check; war gaming;

risk assessment; and evaluation of war-game results for each COA. The war game of the COA is critical

for the commander and staff to ensure all elements, including PSYOP, are fully integrated and

synchronized. An early decision to limit the number of COAs war-gamed, or to develop only one COA,

saves the greatest amount of time. Prior to the war game, PSYOP planners select criteria by which to

evaluate the results of the war gaming of each COA. Alternative COAs are evaluated after the war game

based on how well they meet these same criteria, thereby driving a staff recommendation. Each COA must

be suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete.

STEP 5: COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON

1-41. The COA comparison starts with all staff members analyzing and evaluating the advantages and

disadvantages of each COA from their perspectives. Staff members each present their findings for the

others’ consideration. Using the evaluation criteria developed before the war game, the staff outlines each

COA, highlighting its advantages and disadvantages. Comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the

COAs identifies their advantages and disadvantages with respect to one another. The staff compares

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