Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 7)

Appendix B

Table B-4. Disseminate (continued)

Database management

Database managers address database development, management, and maintenance; data sources; information

redundancy; import and export standards; data management; update and backup procedures; and data mining, query,

and search protocols.

•

Establishing new databases. Have SOPs for establishing new databases to ensure all unit databases

conform to minimum standards established by unit automation personnel. Establishing new databases

prevents storage duplicate data and mixing of information to be stored at different classification levels and

with different security or access requirements.

•

Data entry. Have SOPs for data entry standards that include specific formats and standardized naming

conventions and fields (based on the category of information entered into the database). For example,

standardizing data entry on an IED with a primary field of “IED” and a secondary field specifying IED “type”

(such as VBIED, remote-controlled IED, or explosively formed projectile) allows the analyst to conduct an

organized search for information and intelligence.

•

Security protocols. Establish protocols:

Ensure authorized personnel can access the network, system, or database.

Prevent the import or export of data, based on accesses or classification levels, to unauthorized

networks, systems, or databases.

•

Associated applications. Ensure the appropriate software applications are legally installed on their systems

so that relevant databases can be created and accessed and that the data can be appropriately manipulated

in order to support the unit’s mission.

•

Data sources.

As early as possible, identify data sources required during the mission to ensure required

communications and security authorizations are appropriately coordinated.

May require different computer systems to access all the necessary data sources required for the

mission.

•

Database normalization. Have SOPs for database normalization to minimize data redundancy in a

database.

•

Import and export standards. A standardization of import and export protocols ensures transferred

databases are accessible immediately upon transfer. The DCGS-A enterprise open architecture should

assist in importing and exporting databases.

•

Update and backup procedures. Have a plan for updating software on networks and systems. Have

procedures in place to backup the data on networks and systems to prevent a loss if hardware or software

fails. Establish a system of archiving data.

CCIR—commander’s critical information requirement

PIR—priority intelligence requirement

DCGS-A—Distributed Common Ground System-Army

RFI—request for information

ISR—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

SCI—sensitive compartmented information

LTIOV—latest time information is of value

SIR—specific information requirement

MI—military intelligence

SOP—standing operating procedure

OPORD—operation order

VIED-vehicle-borne improvised explosive device

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Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Synchronization

ASSESS INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS

B-20. Assessment of ISR operations allows the staff to determine if the system is satisfying all

requirements. Table B-5 describes the subordinate

“Assess ISR Operations” activities and lists

considerations.

Table B-5. Assess ISR operations

Monitor operations

Through coordination with the G-2/S-2, the staff knows when and what critical information is missing from the

commander's estimate of the situation.

The staff uses the ISR synchronization matrix and ISR plan to ensure synchronization with the overall operation and

scheme of maneuver.

DST is the staff’s other critical tool for the staff, which has a complete copy of the DST to ensure the ISR

synchronization matrix does not miss collection requirements.

The intelligence officer—

•

Tracks the flow of the operation against the requirements and ISR synchronization matrices.

•

As necessary, prompts subordinate commanders and collectors to keep their reporting synchronized with the

operation and the commander’s needs.

•

Establishes a system to evaluate all reports, including reports going directly from the collector to the user.

•

Establishes a system that allows the intelligence section to monitor synchronization and evaluates if the

intelligence system meets requirements without delaying intelligence dissemination.

Correlate reports to requirements

•

The staff tracks ISR tasks and the PIRs from which they originate to ensure the collected information was

provided to the original requester.

•

The tracking allows the staff to determine quickly which asset is available for retasking.

Screen reports

The G-2/S-2 staff screens each report received for the following criteria:

•

Relevance. Does the information actually address the tasked ISR task? If not, can the information satisfy

other requirements?

•

Completeness. Is essential information missing? (Refer to the original ISR task.)

•

Timeliness. Has the collector reported by the LTIOV established in the original ISR task?

•

Opportunities for cueing. Can this system or another system take advantage of the new information to

increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the overall ISR effort? If the report suggests an opportunity to

cue other assets, take immediate action to do so and record any new requirements into the ISR plan and

audit trail.

If the report satisfies the ISR task, make the appropriate entry in the tracking log or register of intelligence requirements

and disseminate the final intelligence to the requestor. Coordinate with the requestor to ensure the requestor also

considers the requirements satisfied.

If the report only partially satisfies the ISR task, annotate in the audit trail or register what was accomplished and what

remains to be done.

Provide feedback

The staff—

•

Provides essential feedback to all the ISR assets—usually provided through the unit’s C2 element.

•

May provide additional information on its collection or analysis if the G-2/S-2 indicates what is needed.

C2—command and control

LTIOV—latest time information is of value

DST—decision support template

PIR—priority intelligence requirement

ISR—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

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Appendix B

UPDATE INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS

B-21. Updating ISR operations is the adjustment of the overall ISR plan to maintain ISR synchronized,

collection, and exploitation capabilities optimized as the current situation changes. As SIRs and,

subsequently, PIRs are answered, the G-3/S-3, in coordination with the G-2/S-2 and staff, updates the ISR

plan and refocuses assets to answer other or new ISR tasks within the constraints of the mission variables—

mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and civil considerations

(METT-TC). Simultaneously, the higher headquarters is going through the same process and may answer

subordinate unit PIRs or intelligence requirements. Thus, the requirements are linked to the headquarters

requirements process, and the staff updates the ISR plan in a dynamic environment. Table B-6 describes the

subordinate “Update ISR Operations” activities and lists considerations.

Table B-6. Update ISR operations

Maintain ISR synchronization

The intelligence staff stays alert to changes in the ISR plan resulting from changes to the LTIOV or other changes. If

the branches and sequels were considered in the original plan adjustments, minor variances can be adjusted

automatically by the staff.

Unanticipated situations—such as a friendly force aircraft crash or shoot down, loss of a UAS asset to enemy fire,

mechanical failure, or loss of signal—may require dynamic or ad-hoc tasking of additional ISR assets.

Cue assets to other collection opportunities

Cueing opportunities, whether prompted through combat information or analysis, allow intelligence officers to satisfy

requirements more efficiently than previously planned.

Eliminate satisfied requirements

Once a requirement is satisfied or irrelevant, it should be eliminated. Requirements require continuous coordination

with the agency that generated the original requirement.

When higher headquarters declares a requirement satisfied, the requirement should be eliminated from the ISR

synchronization matrix and the ISR plan, and other logs and records should be updated.

Develop and add new requirements

As the operation unfolds and the threat situation develops, commanders generate new requirements that lead to—

•

Updating the ISR synchronization tools.

•

Prioritizing the new requirements against the remaining requirements.

•

Consolidating the new requirements with the existing requirements.

•

Reprioritizing the requirements.

•

Evaluating resources based on newly developed requirements and priorities.

•

Making appropriate recommendations to the commander and the operations officer.

Recommend redirecting assets to unsatisfied requirements

Retasking is assigning an ISR asset a new task and purpose to ensure intelligence and operational synchronization.

After eliminating satisfied requirements from the ISR plan, reevaluate each ISR asset based on its capability.

Operations officers with input from the intelligence officers redirect ISR assets and units within the AO.

Focus the ISR asset on the most important unsatisfied requirements.

Redirecting an ISR asset does not change the asset’s mission; instead, it updates or corrects the focus of the

collection that allows the asset to more effectively execute that mission. When redirecting assets, consider—

•

New requirements from higher headquarters received before the completion of redirected missions.

•

The priority of new requirements relative to the remaining unsatisfied requirements.

•

The command or support relationship.

•

The ability of available ISR assets to respond to new missions while working on redirected missions.

•

Necessary responses to second- and third-order effects (see appendix E for further discussion on second-

and third-order effects), branches, and sequels.

Transition to next operation

A transition occurs when the commander decides to change focus from one type of military operation to another

(FM 3-90). Updating ISR operations can result in focus change for several ISR assets.

ISR assets, as with any other unit, may require rest and refit, or employment lead-time to effectively transition from one

mission or operation to another.

AO—area of operations

LTIOV—latest time information is of value

FM—field manual

UAS—unmanned aircraft system

ISR—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

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Appendix C

Briefing and Debriefing Program

The commander establishes, supports, and allocates appropriate resources for a

premission briefing and debriefing program. Battle updates and after-action reviews

are distinct and separate tasks from the premission briefing and debriefing program.

The G-2/S-2 develops a premission intelligence briefing plan and complementary

debriefing plan to support the commander’s program. The intelligence premission

briefing and debriefing generally follow the mission-briefing format, including a

review of the patrol route, mission patrol collection objectives, and methods

employed.

PREMISSION INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

C-1. The purpose of the premission intelligence briefing is to ensure all personnel conducting tactical

operations, tactical movements, nontactical movements, and operational liaisons are sensitized to specific

information and reporting requirements, intelligence gaps, and unique mission requirements. (For more

information on operational liaison, see FM 2-91.6.)

C-2. Premission intelligence briefings may be an updated intelligence assessment or a detailed intelligence

brief, depending on the nature of the mission. Missions that occur routinely, like convoy operations or

presence patrols, are preceded by an updated intelligence assessment, including indicators of activity

related to the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). Tactical operations, such as planned

raids, combat patrols, or patrols that can result in site exploitation, are preceded by a more detailed

intelligence briefing specific to the mission. This briefing has indicators related to the CCIRs and

instructions on handling captured enemy documents and materiel. Premission briefings include reporting

guidance for observed information. See FM 3-90.15 for more information on site exploitation.

KEY PREMISSION INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING POINTS

C-3. Patrols, tactical movements, and nontactical movements receive a premission intelligence briefing

containing—

Terrain impact updates.

Civil considerations (areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events [ASCOPE])

updates.

Weather effects update.

Threat updates.

Route updates.

Focus areas for observation.

Collection requirements.

Reporting requirements for unusual activity or lack of activity by the local population.

Requirements for handling and disposing collected documents.

Requirements for the handling and disposition of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), detainees, and

captured enemy materiel.

Requirements for digital photography use.

C-4. A premission intelligence briefing provides criteria for immediate reporting requirements and

nonpriority reporting requirements.

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Appendix C

MISSION RESPONSIBILITIES

C-5. Every mission entails personnel responsibilities for the mission’s success. Table C-1 provides a list

of mission personnel responsibilities.

Table C-1. Mission responsibilities

Battalion S-2 and S-3 sections—

•

Provide tasking and guidance on topic areas for tactical questioning based on unit PIRs.

•

Provide unit-focused intelligence and information, including open-source information, to help Soldiers

improve their cultural knowledge and awareness of the current situation to conduct tactical questioning.

•

Establish a program patrols, checkpoints or roadblocks, and convoys are debriefed.

•

Establish procedures for immediate information reporting of critical tactical value, for example, spot report in

SALUTE format.

•

Establish procedures for proper handling of captured equipment or media, such as cell phones, documents,

or computers.

•

Coordinate HUMINT collection teams and other intelligence support as appropriate.

Unit commanders—

•

Provide tasking and guidance to subordinate leaders on topic areas for tactical questioning based on unit

tasking and guidance.

•

Review IPB products and disseminate information to personnel within the G-2/S-2 section to improve their

knowledge of the AO.

•

Support the unit G-2/S-2 debriefing program and ensure that all patrols, traffic control points or roadblocks,

and convoy Soldiers participate in the debriefing.

•

Reinforce the importance of the procedures for immediate information reporting of critical tactical value.

•

Are cautious about information reported by patrols and HUMINT collection teams.

Note. Single-source, unanalyzed information can be misleading. When used, it should be fused with all-source

analyzed intelligence or other corroborating information.

Platoon leaders—

•

Provide tasking and guidance to squads, sections, patrols, checkpoints or roadblocks, and convoy leaders

on topic areas for tactical questioning based on unit tasking and guidance.

•

Support the unit G-2/S-2 debriefing program and ensure all patrols, checkpoints or roadblocks, and convoy

Soldiers participate in the debriefing.

•

Reinforce the importance of the procedures for immediate reporting of information of critical tactical value.

Squad/section/patrol/traffic control point/roadblock/convoy leaders—

•

Train and integrate specific tactical questioning in the planning, preparation, and execution of patrols,

checkpoints or roadblocks, and convoys based on unit tasking and guidance.

•

Prepare for and participate in the unit S-2’s debriefing program (if necessary, demand the debriefing) after all

patrols, traffic control points or roadblocks, and convoys.

•

Report information based on visual observations and tactical questioning in preparation for the debriefing or

immediate reporting of information of critical tactical value.

•

Carefully carry out EPW/detainee and document handling during patrols, checkpoints or roadblocks, and

convoys.

•

Conduct captured enemy materiel handling in accordance with local SOPs or OPORDs.

AO—area of operations

OPORD—operation order

EPW—enemy prisoner of war

PIR—priority intelligence requirement

HUMINT—human intelligence

SALUTE—size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment

IPB—intelligence preparation of the battlefield

SOP—standing operating procedure

POSTMISSION DEBRIEFING

C-6. Debriefing is the systematic questioning of cooperating human sources to satisfy intelligence

requirements consistent with applicable law. The source is usually not in custody and is usually willing to

cooperate. Debriefing may be conducted at all echelons and in all operational environments (FM 2-0).

Friendly force debriefing operations are the systematic debriefing of U.S. forces to answer intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) tasks. Predictive intelligence is enhanced by analyzing what is

occurring within an area of operations (AO). Debriefing also facilitates situational understanding of the

AO.

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Briefing and Debriefing Program

C-7. The purpose of debriefing is to identify and record data pertaining to assigned specific information

requirements (SIRs) and ISR tasks, and any additional information and observations concerning the AO,

and to collect any fliers, pamphlets, media, or pictures the patrol found or obtained.

C-8. Debriefing participants should include—

All leaders returning from operational liaison or meetings.

Returning patrols.

Human intelligence (HUMINT) collection teams (HCTs).

Helicopter pilots.

Convoy personnel.

Others who may have obtained information of intelligence value.

C-9. The intelligence section—

Debriefs personnel.

Writes and submits reports.

Reports information verbally, as appropriate.

C-10. Table C-2 provides key debriefing points that assist the intelligence staff or command debriefing

team in the debriefing process.

Table C-2. Key debriefing points

•

The requirement for a debriefing by the intelligence section following each mission should be a part of the

intelligence premission briefing.

•

Leaders should not consider the mission complete or release mission personnel until reporting and

debriefings are completed.

•

Once the element (leader, patrol, convoy) returns from the mission, the intelligence staff or command

debriefing team conducts a thorough debriefing.

•

Debriefing should include all patrol members—the leader, unit members, and any attached personnel. In the

event that the returning patrol splits into different locations, the intelligence staff should visit each location to

debrief all patrol members.

•

When company, platoon, or smaller elements deploy to remote locations, intelligence staff debriefings may

be impossible. Platoon and company leaders conduct debriefings in accordance with standing operating

procedures to ensure reports are available to the intelligence section and staff. Expeditious reporting

ensures that patrol debriefing reports and additional notes are available for timely intelligence analysis.

•

Like the mission briefing, the debriefing intelligence staff should review the route traveled, collection

objectives of the patrol, and methods employed.

•

After the debriefing, the intelligence staff should have received the patrol report, which will streamline the

intelligence staff debriefing process. This allows the intelligence staff to concentrate on filling in gaps and

following up on reported information.

•

A practical method of debriefing is reviewing all patrol or mission actions chronologically.

•

A detailed sketch provides a visual reference of debriefed patrol areas. Recalling and recording information

is simplified when the information is divided into segments that flow logically. For example—

Use a map to determine segments of the route traveled.

Coordination points, checkpoints, phase lines, or significant events may divide segments.

Start at the beginning of the patrol route and let the patrol leader demonstrates—using the map—the

route traveled.

Ask the patrol leader, “From Checkpoint 1 to Checkpoint 2, what did you observe?” The goal is to

extract information of intelligence value.

Avoid requesting priority intelligence requirements only. This limits the patrol leader’s answers and

increases the likelihood of missing significant information. Instead, let the patrol leader provide the

information obtained while on that segment of the trip.

Use follow-up questions to obtain complete information. Always ask, “What else?” or “What other?”

before closing a topic.

If the patrol used digital cameras, it is helpful to use their pictures during the debriefing.

•

Once a travel segment has been fully exploited, continue to the next segment. Question the patrol leader

from Checkpoint 2 to Checkpoint 3—continuing the process until the entire route has been exploited.

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Appendix C

Table C-2. Key debriefing points (continued)

•

Written report information should include—

Use a map to determine segments of the route traveled.

Size and composition of the unit conducting the patrol.

Mission (type, location, and purpose).

Departure and return date-time groups.

Routes. Use checkpoints and grid coordinates for each leg or include an overlay or detailed sketch.

Detailed description of identified terrain and threat positions.

Results of any contact with the local population or the threat (activities and demeanor or attitude).

Unit status at the conclusion of the mission, including the disposition of dead or wounded Soldiers.

Description of collected materiel, such as fliers, pamphlets, media, or pictures the patrol found or

obtained.

•

Conclusions or recommendations.

C-11. See table C-3 for more debriefing considerations.

Table C-3. Debriefing considerations

Sight

Hearing

Touch

Smell

•

Threat personnel,

•

Running engines or

•

Warmth of

•

Vehicle

vehicles, and

track sounds.

coals and

exhaust.

aircraft.

•

Voices.

materials from

•

Burning

•

Sudden or unusual

•

Metallic sounds.

fires.

petroleum

movement.

•

Gunfire (by

•

Freshness of

products.

•

New local

weapon type).

tracks.

•

Cooking

inhabitants.

•

Unusual calm or

•

Age of food or

food.

•

Smoke or dust.

silence.

trash.

•

Age of food

•

Unusual movement

•

Dismounted

or trash.

of farm or wild

movement.

•

Human

animals.

•

Aircraft.

waste.

•

Unusual activity or

Other considerations

lack of activity by

•

Armed elements: Location of factional forces, minefields, and potential

local inhabitants,

threats.

especially at times

•

Homes and buildings: Condition of the roofs, doors, windows, lights,

and places that are

normally inactive or

power lines, water, sanitation, roads, bridges, crops, and livestock.

active.

•

Infrastructure: Presence of functioning stores, service stations, other.

•

Vehicle or

•

People: Numbers, sex, age, residence or status of dislocated civilians,

personnel tracks.

visible health, clothing, daily activities, and leaders.

•

Movement of local

•

Contrast: Has anything changed? For example, are there new locks on

inhabitants along

buildings? Are windows boarded up or previously boarded-up windows

uncleared areas,

now open, indicating a change of use of a building? Have buildings been

routes, or paths.

defaced with graffiti?

•

Signs or evidence

of threat occupation

or threat trends.

•

Recently cut foliage

or vegetation.

•

Muzzle flashes,

lights, fires, or

reflections.

•

Amount and type of

trash.

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Appendix D

Graphic Intelligence Reports

Intelligence personnel use a variety of formats to request, report, and disseminate

information. (See TC 2-33.4.) The formats assimilate information into automated

intelligence support systems, such as the Distributed Common Ground System-Army

(DCGS-A). This appendix concentrates on the graphic intelligence summary

(INTSUM) and the use of storyboards.

GRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY AND STORYBOARD

D-1. The graphic INTSUM is used by units at all echelons to convey threat situation dynamics. It is a

current depiction of significant threat dispositions, activities, strengths, and weaknesses and an assessment

of the most probable threat courses of action (COAs). A current, complete graphic INTSUM provides

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) efficiency and enables the commander to exploit

fleeting threat vulnerabilities.

D-2. A storyboard tells a story using bulleted points, charts, and graphs. However, it should be regarded as

the story summary—containing only pertinent data. It should communicate the who, what, where, when,

and why/how. Storyboards are typically used to convey significant actions to the commander.

D-3. There is not a specific format for a graphic INTSUM or storyboard. The formats for each are

determined by the user of the information—namely, the commander.

GRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY—OFFENSIVE AND

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

D-4. At a minimum the graphic INTSUM should contain the following information for offensive/

defensive operations. (See figure D-1 [page D-2].)

Legend and margin information.

Area orientation.

Threat unit locations and mission activities.

Threat mission capabilities assessment.

Threat boundaries and front-line trace.

Threat objectives.

Threat air activity.

Threat weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

Threat strengths and capabilities.

Threat intentions assessment.

Friendly commander’s intent and priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).

Predicted future threat activity.

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Graphic Intelligence Reports

Issuing headquarters.

As of Date. Use either local or Zulu time—this is critical since predicted threat activity is

depicted based on the As of Date in addition to a given number of hours.

AREA ORIENTATION

D-6. Selected geographic features are highlighted on the overlay to orient the user to the displayed area.

The features selected depend on the specific area of operations (AO) and the friendly unit’s mission type.

D-7. Common features may include cities, rivers, and major relief features. Selected features for some

stability operations are highlighted on a smaller scale. Highlighted features may include airports, fuel

stations, housing areas, and other features that play prominently in the operation. A graphic INTSUM

should provide only those features necessary for orientation.

THREAT UNIT LOCATIONS AND MISSION ACTIVITIES

D-8. Depict committed threat unit locations with a bracket followed by the identification. The bracket

size indicates the frontage occupied by the unit. The unit’s mission is depicted graphically. (See figure D-2.)

Figure D-2. Threat unit locations and mission activities (committed)

D-9. Depict uncommitted threat units with the symbology shown in figure D-3.

Figure D-3. Threat unit locations and mission activities (uncommitted)

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Appendix D

THREAT MISSION CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENT

D-10. Use combat effectiveness graphics to assess and display a threat unit’s capability to perform its

mission. Consider all factors, tangible and intangible, in making the assessment. Include unit strength,

sustainment status, maintenance and readiness status, morale, mission, terrain, and weather. Place selected

symbols in the vicinity of the identified unit. (See figure D-4.)

Figure D-4. Threat mission capabilities assessment

D-11. A diminished threat mission capability is usually due to one or more specific problem areas—

damaged or destroyed weapons systems, a lack of ammunition, petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL), or

replacement personnel. Graphically depict the problem areas for each unit adjacent to the threat mission

capabilities assessment symbol. The friendly commander can then exploit what is possibly crucial, but

fleeting threat vulnerability.

D-12. Indicate specific problem areas by blackening the appropriate quadrant of the circle. The problem

area categories are not static; other problem areas can be displayed on the symbol if the selection is clearly

explained in the graphic. Figure D-5 shows a sample problem area symbol and an example of a problem

area symbol used in conjunction with the threat mission capabilities assessment symbol.

Figure D-5. Threat problem area symbology

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Graphic Intelligence Reports

THREAT BOUNDARIES AND FRONT-LINE TRACE

D-13. In conventional military operations, threat boundaries are depicted two echelons below the friendly

unit. For example, at the brigade combat team (BCT) level, boundary lines for the threat battalion and

company elements are depicted. Depicting threat boundaries beyond two echelons lower is difficult to

delineate and clutters the graphic INTSUM. In some irregular warfare operations, such as support to

insurgency and counterinsurgency, smaller units are the rule and constantly accounted for on the graphic

INTSUM.

D-14. The front-line trace is not shown on the graphic INTSUM. The brackets depicting the threat unit, in

contact, frontages is sufficient for an effective front-line trace. Addition of a front-line trace is easily

confused with depicting predicted threat activity.

THREAT OBJECTIVES

D-15. If threat objectives are discernable, they will be placed on the graphic INTSUM.

THREAT AIR ACTIVITY

D-16. Depict threat air activity on the graphic INTSUM. Use an aircraft symbol with the direction of travel

and total number of sorties in parentheses. Some units may opt to break down the sortie count by category,

such as fighter (F), bomber (B), and reconnaissance (R). For example, a total sortie count of 12 could be

depicted as (12). The same sortie count could also be depicted as (4F/6B/2R). The sortie breakdown should

be used only if it does not clutter the graphic INTSUM. Include sortie breakdown symbols, such as F, B,

and R. (See figure D-6.)

Figure D-6. Threat air activity symbology

THREAT WEAKNESSES AND VULNERABILITIES

D-17. Show specific weaknesses or vulnerabilities by using a numbered circle on the graphic INTSUM.

(See figure D-1 [page D-2].) A supporting message could list threat weaknesses and vulnerabilities in

narrative form.

THREAT STRENGTHS AND CAPABILITIES

D-18. Show threat strengths and capabilities by using numbered squares. (See figure D-1 [page D-2].)

THREAT INTENTIONS ASSESSMENT

D-19. Write an assessment of threat intentions and most probable COA in a concise narrative format;

graphically key it to the graphic INTSUM when possible.

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Appendix D

FRIENDLY COMMANDER’S INTENT AND PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

D-20. List the friendly commander’s intent and PIRs in narrative format on the graphic INTSUM.

Graphically key these statements to the overlay.

PREDICTED FUTURE THREAT ACTIVITY

D-21. Draw predicted lines of threat advance or withdrawal and link them to a timeline to convey

information about possible future threat activity. (See figure D-7.) Predicted lines of advance or withdrawal

are based on the “AS OF” time located in the legend and margin information.

Note. Predicted lines are only an aid to planners. Current threat situations must be continuously

monitored to update the predictions.

Figure D-7. Predicted threat activity timelines

GRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY—COUNTERINSURGENCY

OPERATIONS

D-22. The graphic INTSUM may contain the following information for counterinsurgency operations:

Legend and margin information.

Weather.

Significant activity (SIGACT) in the AO.

AO executive summary.

Indications and warning (I&W).

Battle damage assessment (BDA) rollup.

Special assessments, as required.

Significant dates.

Current threat situation template.

Predicted threat activity—next 24 to 48-hours.

Current commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs)/changes to CCIRs.

High-payoff target list (HPTL).

High-value target list (HVTL).

Be on the look-out (BOLO) list.

ISR plan.

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Graphic Intelligence Reports

LEGEND AND MARGIN INFORMATION

D-23. Legend and margin content information may include—

Classification of the graphic INTSUM—posted on top and bottom—including a “Classified by”

line and declassification instructions.

Title of document.

Issuing headquarters.

Note. Appropriate classification markings must be on every slide or page (top and bottom).

WEATHER

D-24. Weather contents may include—

A near term weather forecast and at least a 5-day forecast for the AO, as required.

The effects of the weather on threat and friendly operations.

A legend if using color-coding system.

See appendix G, for an example.

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

D-25. SIGACTs content may include—

Summary of SIGACTs for the AO—with analyst assessment. (See figure D-8 [page D-8].)

Storyboard with a detailed summary of SIGACTs. (See figure D-9 [page D-9]):

Location—Zone/Neighborhood with grid (Where).

Date-time group (DTG) of the activity (When).

Unit reporting the SIGACT and the intelligence sources (Who).

Description of the activity (What).

Assessment—near term analysis of threat intent and activity (Why).

Summaries of SIGACTs over time, such as improvised explosive device (IED) incidents in the

last 24 hours. (See figures D-10 [page D-10] and D-11 [page D-11].)

Map or imagery with callouts or symbols that depict where the SIGACT occurred and the type of

activity.

Grouping by unit, activity, timeframe, or operation (situation dependent).

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Appendix D

Related PIRs.

Map, imagery, or photograph.

Analyst assessment or comments detailing the affect the incident or activity will have on future

operations.

SIGNIFICANT DATES

D-30. Contents (see figure D-14) may include—

Date.

Event.

Popular significance, such as special prayers, fasting, visiting holy shrines, processions.

Level of impact on the AO—the “so what” factor.

UNCLASSIFIED

For Official Use Only

Upcoming Significant Dates

Probable impact

Date

Event

Popular significance

on the AO

Special prayers, fasting, larger

Laylat al-Bara’ah

No/Low

8 September

processions around the shrines,

(Night of absolution)

Level of impact

chanting

Birth of the 12th Iman

Visiting the holy shrines, processions,

Low

8 September

(Shia)

chanting

Level of impact

Low

22 September

Iran-Iraq war begins (1980)

Level of impact

UNCLASSIFIED

For Official Use Only

Figure D-14. Significant dates

THREAT CURRENT SITUATION TEMPLATE

D-31. Threat current situation template contents may include—

Threat locations.

Threat task and purpose.

Threat capabilities assessment.

Threat AOs.

Threat weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

Threat strengths and capabilities.

Threat intentions assessment.

PREDICTED THREAT ACTIVITY—NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

D-32. Contents (see figure D-15) may include—

Continuous threats in the AOI.

Threats expected in the next 24 to 48 hours.

Description of activity expected.

DTG or hours activity is expected.

Map or imagery of AOI with threat activity depicted.

D-14

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Appendix D

UNCLASSIFIED

For Official Use Only

High-Value Target List

Target #

Execution

Version 045, 06Jul07

Status/photo

unit

criteria

Sheik Samee—

•

Is anti-Iraqi force cell leader and Imam of

the neighborhood mosque.

•

Receives logistic support from Jeff

BCT

PID

regularly.

•

Is associated with Sheik Tamir

Source

(Cavalry)

(detained), Sabir (detained), and Sheik

Location

No photo available

Sabir.

Trigger

TVA #

•

Used the mosque to screen, torture, and

kill Sunni Muslims in the area. Use of

Evidence

mosque as a torture facility can be

verified by several HUMINT reports and

accounts of a kidnapped Iraqi released

due to Shia status.

Kadeer (last name unknown)—

•

Is anti-Iraqi force cell leader and

facilitator living in Muhallah ### in a city

PID

BCT

neighborhood.

Source

•

Acquired possible IEDs (some are

(Infantry)

operational), as indicated by reports.

Location

No photo available

•

Has an extensive network of informants

Trigger

TVA #

who warn of operations conducted

Evidence

against cell members.

•

Is involved in weapons trafficking,

assassinations, IEDs, and kidnappings.

Shayikh Walid—

PID

BCT

•

Is anti-Iraqi force cell leader under

Shayikh Mansur.

Source

•

Is responsible for the protection of all

(Cavalry)

Location

No photo available

personnel at the mosque.

Trigger

•

Is in charge of cells responsible for

TVA #

various insurgent activities in the area.

Evidence

•

Meets with Shayikh Merwan daily.

Shayikh Mustafa—

•

Is high-level anti-Iraqi force cell leader in

PID

the area.

Source

BCT

•

Is quite involved with the detention and

execution of dozens of Sunnis in

Location

No photo available

TVA #

surrounding areas.

Trigger

•

Manages the mosque in the area.

Evidence

•

Is associated with Hassaan, Haashim,

Rami, and Malik.

BCT—brigade combat team

PID—positive identification

HUMINT—human intelligence

TVA—target value analysis

IED—improvised explosive device

UNCLASSIFIED

For Official Use Only

Figure D-16. Sample high-value target list

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Graphic Intelligence Reports

BE ON THE LOOK-OUT LIST

D-36. BOLO list contents (see figure D-17) may include—

Date.

Description of vehicle.

Level of threat.

Date

Vehicle

Threat

Anti-Iraqi force planned to detonate a VBIED at

Acura Legend 1991 model, dark blue, Baghdad

5 July 2008

0730 hours in a neighborhood targeting coalition

plate number 127557.

forces.

Dodge Ram 2004 model, black, Baghdad plate

VBIED may be located in a city neighborhood—

3 July 2008

number 39341.

to be used against a target within the city.

Toyota Matrix 2004 model, red, Baghdad plate

An unspecified number of VBIEDs entered the

3 July 2008

number 39341.

city planning to attack police Army checkpoints.

Vehicle description and license plate number, if

The vehicle may be a VBIED.

2 July 2008

possible.

Anti-Iraqi forces execute attacks against

Vehicle description and license plate number, if

2 July 2008

unspecified objectives in the AOI. The mentioned

possible.

cell should be in possession of rockets.

Extremist group elements supposedly planned

hostile actions in the city in the direction of

2 July 2008

objectives not yet defined. The extremist cell

should be in possession of three vehicles

allegedly built as VBIEB.

AOI—area of interest

VBIED—vehicle-borne improvised explosive device

Figure D-17. Be on the look-out list example

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE PLAN

D-37. ISR plan contents may include—

ISR overlay.

PIRs—with changes highlighted.

ISR synchronization matrix.

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Appendix E

Intelligence Support to Targeting

A target is an entity or object considered for possible engagement or action (JP 3-60). It

may be an area, complex, installation, force, equipment, capability, function,

individual, group, system, entity, or behavior identified for possible action to support

the commander’s objectives, guidance, and intent. Targets are categorized as planned

and immediate.

TARGETING PROCESS

E-1. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to

them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). Targeting is based on the enemy’s

assets, which provide an advantage, friendly scheme of maneuver, and tactical plans. Therefore, its purpose

is to disrupt, delay, or limit threat interference with friendly courses of action (COAs). Targeting options

can be lethal or nonlethal. It requires coordinated interaction between the fires cell’s operations,

intelligence, information engagement, information operations

(IO), and plans cells. Based on the

commander’s guidance and targeting objectives, the staff determines what targets to attack and how and

where to attack them. Targets should be assigned to the best systems to achieve the desired effects, which

can also be thought of as conditions that support achieving an associated objective.

E-2. Direct effects are immediate, first-order consequences of a military action, unaltered by intervening

events or mechanisms. Indirect effects are the delayed and/or displaced second-, third-, and higher-order

consequences of action, created through intermediate events or mechanisms. (See JP 3-60.)

E-3. In stability operations, target development and targeting are difficult because of the greater emphasis

on the effects of combat operations on the local government, Army, police, and the civilian population—

second- and third-order effects are considered.

E-4. For more information on targeting, see FM 6-20-10 and JP 3-60.

Second- and Third-Order Effects Example

In Iraq, separating anti-Iraqi forces from the Iraqi population avoids the possibility of

further combat. For example, Friendly forces conduct a successful cordon and search

by finding a room full of IEDs. They do not address and mitigate the civilians’

concerns over the damage caused by the cordon and search (second-order effect).

Consequently, the friendly forces will deal with civilian demonstrations or uprisings

that will deplete combat power needed for other operations. If the population’s

security and facility needs are not addressed, the anti-Iraqi forces personnel and

weapons will resume threat activities (third-order effects).

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Appendix E

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO TARGETING

E-5. Providing intelligence support to targeting is one of the four primary intelligence tasks on the Army

Universal Task List (AUTL), which provides the commander information and intelligence support to

targeting through lethal and nonlethal actions. It includes intelligence support to the planning (target

development) and execution of direct and indirect fires, command and control (C2) engagement, and

information engagement as well as assessing the effects of those operations. The intelligence officer also

ensures the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan supports the finalized targeting plan.

Table E-1 lists the functions of intelligence support to targeting.

Table E-1. Functions of intelligence support to targeting

•

Commander’s intent.

•

HPTs.

•

Attack criteria.

Receive guidance on—

•

Lead time between decision points and TAIs.

•

ROE.

•

Conditions to establish combat assessment requirements.

•

MCOO.

Develop—

•

Situation and event templates.

•

HVTs.

•

Threat COA as part of wargaming based on friendly COA, refine event

Explain—

template, assist in developing the HPLT, TSS matrix, and sensor or

attack systems matrix.

Produce—

•

ISR synchronization tools.

Brief—

(Ensure all analysts and ISR

•

Intelligence analyst sections (threat COA, HPTL, TSS, and AGM).

asset managers understand the

commander’s intent.)

Collect—

•

Information for nomination, validation, and combat assessment.

•

HPT related information and intelligence to the fires cell immediately.

Disseminate—

•

Pertinent information and BDA per SOPs and TTP.

Ensure—

•

Information collection and intelligence production support all FRAGOs.

AGM—attack guidance matrix

ISR—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

BDA—battle damage assessment

MCOO—modified combined obstacle overlay

COA—course of action

ROE—rules of engagement

FRAGO—fragmentary order

SOP—standing operating procedure

HPT—high-payoff target

TOI—targets of interest

HPTL—high-payoff target list

TSS—target selection standard

HVT—high-value target

TTP—tactics, techniques, and procedures

E-2

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Appendix E

Table E-2. Targeting methodology

Decide

Detect

Deliver

Assess

•

Target

•

Target detection

•

Attack.

•

Tactical level.

development.

means.

•

Planned targets.

•

Operational

•

TVA.

•

Detection

•

Targets of

level.

•

HPTs and HVTs.

procedures.

opportunity.

•

Restrike.

•

TSS.

•

Target tracking.

•

Desired effects.

•

Feedback.

•

Attack options.

•

Attack systems.

•

Attack guidance.

Note. Tracking the target is applicable during all steps.

HPT—high-payoff target

TSS—target selection standard

HVT—high-value target

TVA—target value analysis

Table E-3. Targeting considerations

Decide: Conduct during the planning phase of the operation. Who or what to attack? Is the target worth

engaging with available assets?

Are the commander’s planning guidance and intent detailed enough to enable the targeting team to determine—

•

HVTs to nominate as HPTs?

•

Desired effects on each HPT?

•

When to attack each HPT?

•

Any restrictions or constraints?

•

Which HPTs require BDA?

What targeting assets (organic, attached, or supporting) are available to detect and attack HPTs?

What detect, deliver, and assess support is needed from higher headquarters?

When are requests to higher headquarters submitted to obtain the support when required?

Have target-tracking responsibilities been established?

Are systems in place to handoff the detected targets to assets that are capable of tracking them?

What detect, deliver, and assess support is required from subordinate units, and when is it required?

What detect, deliver, and assess support requests were received from subordinate units, and what was done with

them?

Has the AGM been synchronized with the decision support matrix and the maneuver and fire support plans?

Are all commands using a common datum for locations? If not, are there procedures to correct differences in data?

Detect: Conduct mainly during the preparation and execution phases of the operation. How to acquire the

Do ISR synchronization tools focus on the appropriate PIRs?

What accuracy, timeliness, and validity standards, such as, TSSs, are in effect for detection and delivery systems?

Are all target acquisition systems fully employed?

Have backup target acquisition systems been identified for HPTs?

Have responsibilities been assigned to the appropriate unit or agency for detecting each HPT?

Are HPTs being tracked?

Have verification procedures using backup systems been established where necessary?

Are target acquisition and BDA requirements distributed properly among systems that can accomplish both?

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Intelligence Support to Targeting

Table E-3. Targeting considerations (continued)

Deliver: Execute the mission to achieve the desired results. Execute attacks on selected targets IAW the FRAGO and

the target synchronization matrix. This includes lethal and nonlethal operations.

Have communications links been established between detection systems, the decisionmaker, and delivery systems?

Have responsibilities been assigned to the appropriate unit or agency for attacking each HPT?

Has a backup attack system been identified for each critical HPT? (The primary system may not be available when the

HPT is verified.)

Have fire support coordination measures or AGM and clearance procedures been established to facilitate target

engagement?

Have on-order fire support coordination measures or AGMs been established to facilitate future and transition

operations?

Have potential fratricide situations been identified? Have procedures been established to positively control each

situation?

Have responsibilities been assigned to the appropriate unit or agency for tracking specific HPTs and providing BDA on

specified HPTs?

What are the procedures to update the HPTL and synchronize the AGM and decision support template if it becomes

necessary to change the maneuver scheme and fire support as the situation changes?

Assess: Occurs mostly during the execution phase of the operations, but also occurs in all phases. How to verify

targeting effectiveness. Were desired effects achieved?

Are the ISR assets linked to specific HPTs still available?

Have the ISR asset managers been notified of the attack to a target requiring assessment?

Have assessment asset managers been updated on the actual target’s location?

Has all the coordination for the assessment mission, particularly airborne assets, been accomplished?

What is the status of BDA collection?

Has the information from the mission been delivered to the appropriate agency for evaluation?

AGM—attack guidance matrix

HVT—high-value target

BDA—battle damage assessment

IAW—in accordance with

FRAGO—fragmentary order

ISR—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

HPT—high-payoff target

PIR—priority intelligence requirement

HPTL—high-payoff target list

TSS—target selection standard

DECIDE

E-7. Decide provides the overall focus and sets priorities for ISR and attack planning (figure E-1 [page

E-3]). Targeting priorities are addressed for each phase or critical event of an operation. The decisions

made are reflected in visual products as follows:

High-payoff target list (HPTL) is a prioritized list of HPTs. Their loss to the enemy contributes

to the success of the friendly COA.

ISR plan focuses the collection effort to answer the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs),

including high-payoff targets (HPTs) designated as PIRs. The plan, within the availability of

additional ISR assets, supports the acquisition of more HPTs. (See FM 2-0 and FMI 2-01.)

Target selection standards (TSS) matrices address accuracy or other specific criteria requiring

compliance before targets can be attacked.

Attack guidance matrix (AGM), approved by the commander, addresses which targets will be

attacked, how, when, and the desired effects.

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Appendix E

Intelligence Support to Target Development

E-8. Target development is the systematic evaluation of potential target systems and their components. It

is used to determine which elements of military action should, or could, be sued against the targets to

achieve the stated objectives. (See FM 6-20-10.)

A high-value target (HVT) is a target the enemy commander requires for the successful

completion of the mission. The loss of high-value targets would be expected to seriously degrade

important enemy functions throughout the friendly commander’s area of interest (AOI) (JP 3-09).

(See figure E-2.)

A high-payoff target is a target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the

success of the friendly course of action. High-payoff targets are those high-value targets that

must be acquired and successfully attacked for the success of the friendly commander’s mission

(JP 3-60). High-payoff targets are developed from high-value targets when the various courses of

action are wargamed.

Warfighting function

Examples of HVTs for offense, defense, and stability operations

Movement and

Maneuver.

maneuver

Terrorist cells, criminals, VBIED.

RSTA/ISR.

Intelligence

Reconnaissance teams, surveillance personnel, informant.

Fires cell.

Fires

Mortar systems (82, 60 mm), rockets.

Engineer.

IEDs (preparation team, emplacer, executor, bomb maker).

Bulk fuels (Class III POL).

Gas station.

Maintenance and repair units (Class IX maintenance).

Sustainment

Garage.

Ammunition storage sites and distribution points (Class V ammunition).

Weapons black marketing, caches, smugglers.

Lift.

Enemy transport systems.

CBRN.

Chemical IEDs.

Protection

Air and missile defense.

SA-7s, SA-16s.

Command, control, communications

Cell C2 node, financiers, planners, ideologues.

Radio electronic combat.

Radio communications, cell phones.

Lines of communications.

Couriers, meetings, dead drops.

C2—command and control

mm—millimeter

CBRN—chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear

POL—petroleum, oil, lubricants

HVT—high-value target

RSTA—reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition

IED—improvised explosive device

VBIED—vehicle-borne improvised explosive device

ISR—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

Figure E-2. Examples of high-value targets

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and Mission Analysis

E-9. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is a continuous process and starts in the preparation

phase. It provides updated and new products and supports the targeting process. The intelligence running

estimate provides key support to target development. Modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO), threat,

situation, event, and decision support templates (DSTs) help identify threat COAs, named areas of interest

(NAIs), target areas of interest (TAIs), and HVTs.

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Intelligence Support to Targeting

Target Value Analysis and Wargaming

E-10. Target value analysis (TVA) yields HVTs for a specific threat COA. Target spreadsheets identify the

HVTs in relation to a type of operation, and target sheets offer detailed targeting information for each HVT.

(See FM 6-20-10, appendix A.) This information is used during the IPB and the wargaming processes. Both

tools are developed by the G-2/S-2 analysis section.

E-11. TVA, a detailed analysis of the threat in selected COAs, focuses on the following threat

characteristics:

Composition.

Disposition.

Tactics.

Training.

Logistics.

Operational effectiveness.

Communications.

Intelligence.

Recruitment.

Support.

Reach.

National agencies.

Law enforcement agencies.

International agencies and nongovernmental organizations.

Personality.

Other threats.

E-12. For more information about threat characteristics, see TC 2-33.4.

E-13. TVA methodology supports a relative ranking of target sets or categories. The methodology begins

when target analysts in the G-2/S-2 assume the position of enemy commander. The target analyst, in

coordination with other staff members, wargames the operation.

E-14. During the war game, alternate friendly COAs are analyzed based on their affect to enemy operations

and likely responses. Attacked enemy battlefield functions that force the enemy response are identified.

The commander and staff analyze the criticality of friendly battlefield functions on a specific COA. TAIs

are considered the best locations to attack HPTs. Commanders and staff use decision points or time phase

lines to ensure the decision to engage or not to engage occurs at the right time. The war game prioritizes

identified HVTs that are critical for the enemy mission to succeed. It also identifies HVT subsets, which are

HPTs acquired and attacked for the friendly mission to succeed. Selected HPTs are recorded on the DST, at

which time the commander and staff analyze the second- and third-order effects.

E-15. ISR managers evaluate HVTs to determine asset detection capability. HPTs receive priority in the

allocation of assets. The fires cell determines friendly weapons systems capable of attacking HVTs with

lethal fires, and the electronic warfare officer (EWO) nominates and coordinates to provide nonlethal fires.

E-16. Using the capabilities of the system to attack the targets, the G-2/S-2 analyzes and synthesizes the

threat’s response to each attack. Targets should be assigned priorities based on description, signature,

degradation, and graphic representation. If targets have the same relative importance, a targeting team

prioritizes the targets by seeking advice from the fires cell’s targeting analyst and the field artillery

intelligence officer (FAIO).

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Appendix E

High-Payoff Target List

E-17. Once prioritized, targets are placed on an HPTL. (See table E-4.) After the HPTL is approved, the G-2/S-2

uses the list to develop the ISR synchronization tools.

Table E-4. High-payoff target list example

Event or phase

Priority

Category

Target

Desired effect

fire support

AA5001

suppress

air defense

AA5002

neutralize

Target Selection Standards

E-18. TSS are criteria, determined by the commander, applied to enemy activity

(acquisitions and

battlefield information) and used to decide whether the activity is a target. There are two TSS categories—

targets that meet accuracy and timeliness requirements for attack, and suspected targets that require

confirmation before any attack. TSS are comprised of the following essential elements:

High-payoff target. Designated HPTs the ISR synchronization manager is tasked to acquire.

Timeliness. Valid targets are reported to attack systems within the designated timeliness criteria.

Accuracy. Valid targets are reported to the attack system complying with the required target

location error

(TLE) criteria. The criterion is the least restrictive TLE considering the

capabilities of available attack systems.

E-19. Different TSS may exist for a given enemy activity based on different attack systems. For example,

an enemy artillery battery may have a 150-meter TLE requirement for attack by cannon artillery and a

1-kilometer requirement for attack helicopters. TSS are developed by the fires cells in conjunction with the

intelligence cell. Intelligence analysts use TSS to quickly determine targets from battlefield information

and pass the targets to the fires cell.

E-20. Attack system managers, such as fires cell, fire control elements, or fire direction centers, use TSS to

identify targets for attack. Commands can develop TSS based on anticipated threat characteristics and

doctrine equivalent to the available attack systems.

E-21. The G-2/S-2 knows the accuracy of acquisition systems, associated TLE, and the expected enemy

target dwell times. The G-2/S-2 can specify whether information reported to the attack system manager is a

target or a suspected target. Certain situations require the system to identify friendly and neutral from

enemy before approval to fire. HPTs that comply with the criteria are tracked until they are attacked in

accordance with the AGM. Target locations that do not comply with TSS are confirmed before attacked.

The TSS can be depicted in a TSS matrix. (See figures E-3 and E-4.)

E-22. The matrix lists each system that forwards targets directly to the fires cell or fire direction center. The

effects of terrain and weather on the ISR assets and on enemy equipment are considered. TSS are keyed to

the situation. However, the greatest emphasis is on the enemy situation considering deception and the

reliability of the source or agency that is reporting.

High-payoff target

Timeliness

Accuracy

2S3

30 minutes

500 meter

M-46

30 minutes

500 meter

Air and missile defense

15 minutes

500 meter

Command posts

3 hour

500 meter

Ammunition

6 hour

1 kilometer

Maneuver

1 hour

150 meter

Figure E-3. Example of target selection standards matrix

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Intelligence Support to Targeting

Execution criteria

Status

Definitions

A picture identified by a source as the targeted individual or a source willing to

Green

identify the target on the objective.

Positive

A picture that has not been identified by a source, a source willing to identify after

identification

Amber

the target has been removed from the object (in person or from a detainee

photo), or a detailed description of the target.

Red

No knowledge of target’s description or a general description only.

Reporting from at least two different sources with at least three reports on the

Green

Corroborate

targeted individual.

sources

Amber

Single source with multiple reports or two sources with only two reports.

(source)

Red

Single source, single report.

A 10-digit grid or muhalla (neighborhood), street, or house address with

Green

knowledge of when the target will be at the location; generally triggers action.

Location

A 10-digit grid or muhalla (neighborhood), street, house address with no

Amber

knowledge of target movement patterns.

Red

No known location for target.

Capturing or killing the target minimally affects the ability to collect on the

Green

network.

Intelligence cost

Amber

Capturing or killing the target degrades the ability to collect on the network.

Red

Capturing or killing the target negates the ability to collect on the network.

Green

At least two sworn statements from two different individuals or physical evidence.

Evidence

(used for detention

Amber

One sworn statement.

and legal conviction)

Red

No sworn statements or evidence.

Figure E-4. Example of target selection standards matrix used in OIF

Attack Guidance Matrix

E-23. Knowledge of target vulnerabilities and the effect an attack will have on enemy operations allows a

staff to propose the most efficient available attack option. Key guidance is whether the commander wishes

to disrupt, delay, limit damage, or destroy the enemy. During wargaming, decision points linked to events,

areas (NAIs and TAIs), or points on the battlefield are developed. These decision points cue command

decisions and staff actions where tactical decisions are needed.

E-24. Based on the commander’s guidance, the targeting team recommends target engagement in terms of

the effects of fire and attack options. Effects of fire can be—harass, suppress, neutralize, or destroy the

target. Subjectively, the commander ensures the targeting team understands the commander’s use of these

terms. Applying fires support automation system default values further complicates this understanding.

Harassing Fire

E-25. Harassing fire is designed to disturb enemy troops, to curtail movement, and—by threat of losses—

lower morale. The decision to employ harassing fires requires careful consideration, since harassing fires

have little real effect on the enemy, subject gun crews to an additional workload, and increase the threat of

counterfire. Rules of engagement (ROE) or the potential for adverse public opinion may prohibit its use.

However, harassing fires may be a combat multiplier in some situations. Consider using harassing fires in

stability operations, delaying actions, and economy of force operations.

Suppressive Fire

E-26. Suppressive fire, on or about a weapon system degrades, the system’s performance below the level

required to fulfill its mission objectives. Suppression lasts as long as the fires continue—the duration is

specified in the call for fire or established by standing operating procedures (SOPs). Suppression use

prevents effective fire on friendly forces. Usually, suppression is used to support a specified movement of

forces. The fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) asks or calculates the when and how long questions.

6 January 2010

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Appendix E

Neutralization Fire

E-27. Neutralization fire renders a target temporarily ineffective or unusable. It leaves enemy personnel or

materiel incapable of interfering with an operation or COA. The FSCOORD asks when and for how long

the commander wants a target to be neutralized. Most planned missions are neutralization fires.

Destruction Fire

E-28. Destruction fire’s sole purpose is the destruction of materiel objects. It physically renders a target

permanently combat-ineffective unless the target is restored, reconstituted, or rebuilt. Setting automated fire

support default values, for 30-percent destruction, does not guarantee achievement of the commander’s

intent. The remaining 70 percent may still influence the operation. Destruction missions are expensive time

and materiel wise, therefore, consider whether neutralization or suppression is more efficient.

Deciding on Attack Systems

E-29. Deciding on which attack system to use occurs simultaneously as deciding when to acquire and

attack the target. When deciding to attack by two different means, such as electronic warfare (EW) and

combat air operations, coordination is required. Coordination requirements are recorded during the

wargaming process. In stability operations, the attack system may be using IO and civil affairs operations

to engage and cause a division between the local populace and the insurgents.

E-30. Commanders approve AGMs, which detail—

Prioritized HPTLs.

When, how, and the desired effects of attack.

Special instructions.

HPTs requiring a battle damage assessment (BDA).

E-31. This information is developed during the war game. Attack guidance—

Applies to planned targets and targets of opportunity.

May address specific or general target descriptions.

Is provided to attack system managers through the AGM.

May change as the operation progresses.

E-32. The AGM is updated during staff planning meetings and when the enemy situation changes. (See

figure E-5.) Consider separate AGMs for each phase of an operation.

Phase/Event: Attack through the security zone

High-payoff target list

When

How

Effect

Remarks

Command observation

Fires brigade

Plan in initial preparation

posts

Reconnaissance and

Fires brigade

Plan in initial preparation

surveillance

Target acquisition

Fires brigade

Plan in initial preparation

2S1 and 2S3

Multiple Launch Rocket System

Plan in initial preparation

2S6, SA9, and SA13

Fires brigade

SEAD for aviation operations

Regimental command post

MLRS

Intent to attack reserve

Reserve battalion

Combat aviation brigade

battalion in each HOT

Note.

¹This is only an example of an attack guidance matrix. Actual matrices are developed based on the situation.

²An "H" for harassing fires may be included in the Effect column during stability operations.

A—as acquired

I—immediate

P—planned

SEAD—suppression of

D—destroy

N—neutralize

S—suppress

enemy air defense

Figure E-5. Example attack guidance matrix

E-33. High-payoff target list shows the prioritized HPTs identified during wargaming. They have priority

for engagement.

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E-34. When. Timing the target attacks is critical to maximizing effects. During wargaming, the optimum

time is identified and reflected in the when column:

A “P” indicates the target should not be engaged; rather, it should be planned for future firing—

for example, a preparation, a suppression of enemy air defense

(SEAD) program, or a

countermobility program—or simply put on file.

An “A” indicates targets should be engaged as acquired by the headquarters, in the priority

noted on the HPTL.

An “I” indicates an immediate attack in special cases. This designation should be limited to a

small percentage and only for the most critical types of targets—too many immediate targets are

disruptive and lower the efficiency of attack systems. Immediate attacks take precedence over

all other attacks and are conducted whether attack systems are diverted from attacks in progress.

Examples of immediate targets include—

Missile systems capable of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive

(CBRNE) attacks.

Division headquarters.

CBRNE weapons storage and support facilities.

The Multiple Launch Rocket System

(MLRS) may be considered for immediate attack

depending on its effectiveness against friendly forces and tactical employment. The G-3/S-3 and

FSCOORD or fires cell officer establishes procedures within the tactical operation center that

allow for immediate target attack.

E-35. How does the attack system link to the HPT? Identify a primary and backup attack system for HPT

attacks.

E-36. Effect refers to the target attack criteria. The targeting team specifies attack criteria as per the

commander’s guidance. Target attack criteria should be quantifiable, for example, percentage of casualties

or destroyed elements, time, ordnance, and allocation or application of assets. Effect can be viewed as the

number of battery or battalion volleys.

E-37. Remarks. Note which targets should not be attacked in certain tactical situations, for example, if the

enemy is withdrawing. Examples of how to use this column:

Accuracy or time constraints.

Coordination requirements.

Amount or type of ammunition limitations.

Requirement for BDA.

DETECT

E-38. The G-2/S-2 directs the effort to detect identified HPTs. To identify who, what, when, and how for

TA, the G-2/S-2 coordinates with the—

Intelligence all-source analysis section.

FAIO.

Targeting officer and fires cell analyst.

IO officer.

Higher, lower, and adjacent G-2s/S-2s.

Special operations forces (as applicable).

National agency support teams (as applicable).

E-39. This process determines accurate, identifiable, and timely requirements for ISR systems. The

analysis section ensures ISR system managers understand these requirements.

E-40. Target detection and action requirements are expressed as PIRs and information requirements. Their

priority depends on the importance of the target to the friendly COA and tracking requirements. PIRs and

information requirements that support HPT detection are incorporated into the overall unit ISR plan.

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E-41. The maximum use of all available ISR assets detects targets. The G-2/S-2 focuses the intelligence

acquisition efforts on designated HPTs and PIRs. Situation development information, through detection and

tracking, accumulates as ISR assets satisfy PIRs and information requirements. The ISR requirements

manager—

Considers ISR assets’ capabilities and availability within the echelon, and those assets available

to subordinate, higher, and adjacent units.

Considers joint or combined force assets.

Translates the PIRs and information requirements into specific information requirements (SIRs)

and recommended ISR tasks and request for information (RFIs).

Arranges direct dissemination of targeting information, from the ISR asset to the targeting cell or

targeting intelligence, to the fires cell if possible.

Detection in Counterinsurgency Operations

E-42. Targeting in counterinsurgency operations requires a detailed understanding of social networks,

insurgent networks, actions, and civil considerations. A target can be any aspect of the populace; a person,

place, or thing considered vital to defeat or deny threat activities. The target can be successful civic

initiatives or new businesses in the IO strategy. Therefore, in a counterinsurgency environment, the detect

phase often precedes the decide phase because it is difficult to decide who to target without knowing who

or what are the targets.

Detection Procedures

E-43. The following procedures assist in the target detection process:

Use all TA assets effectively and efficiently.

Avoid effort duplication among available ISR assets unless confirmation of target information is

required. The intelligence officer ensures there are no gaps in planned coverage, which allows

timely collection of combat information to answer the commander’s intelligence and TA

requirements.

To detect HPTs, give clear and concise taskings to those TA systems capable of detecting a

given target. This information allows analysts to develop the enemy situation and identify

targets. (See table E-5.)

E-44. Fires cell personnel provide the G-2/S-2 with the degree of located accuracy:

Accuracy requirements are matched to the TLE of the ISR asset, which allows the G-2/S-2 to

develop more detailed TSS.

Identified NAIs and TAIs are matched with the most capable detection system available. If the

target type and its associated signatures—for example, electronic, visual, thermal—are known,

the most capable ISR asset can be directed against the target. The asset can be positioned based

on when and where estimations of the enemy target’s location.

E-45. Information needed to detect targets is expressed in PIRs and information requirements, which are

incorporated into the ISR synchronization tools. The ISR synchronization manager—

Translates the PIRs and information requirements into SIRs.

Considers the availability of all ISR assets at all echelons.

E-46. When a target is detected, the information is quickly delivered to FAIOs if they are located in the

analysis and control element (ACE) and have communications with the fires cell. The FAIOs—

Determine if the target is an HPT, its priority, and if it complies with the TSS.

If the target is an HPT, coordinate with their respective G-2s/S-2s and deliver the target directly

to the fires cell.

If the commander approves the target, transfer it to a firing unit.

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Note. Mobile HPTs are detected and tracked to maintain a current target location. Target

tracking is inherent to detection.

Table E-5. Warfighting function detection capabilities

Warfighting function

Target acquisition means

Movement and maneuver

Engineer units, patrols, scouts, units in contact, air or ground cavalry or air units.

Intelligence

SIGINT, IMINT, TECHINT, MASINT systems; HUMINT and CI personnel.

Fires

TA battery, AN/TPQ-36/37 radars, forward observers, combat observation laser teams.

Sustainment

Truck drivers, base cluster reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance patrols.

MIJI reports.

Air and missile defense scouts, air and missile defense system’s acquisition radars, and

Protection

CBRN reconnaissance.

Other Services

USAF

JSTARS and the Airborne Warning and Control System.

U.S. Navy

EP-3.

C2—command and control

MASINT—measurement and signature intelligence

CBRN—chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear

MIJI—meaconing , interference, jamming, and intrusion

CI—counterintelligence

SIGINT—signals intelligence

HUMINT—human intelligence

TA—target acquisition

IMINT—imagery intelligence

TECHINT—technical intelligence

JSTARTS—Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar

USAF—United States Air Force

System

E-47. As the assets collect information for target development, the information is forwarded to the all-

source intelligence analysts. The all-source intelligence analyst—

Uses the information to perform situation and target development.

Delivers it to the fires cell after identification of a target specified for attack. The fires cell

executes the attack guidance against the target.

Note. Coordination between the intelligence staff and the fires cell is essential to ensure the

targets are delivered to an attack system that will engage the target.

E-48. The FAIOs coordinate with the G-2/S-2 and fires cell to deliver HPTs and other targets directly to

the fire control element at the fires brigade, or, if approved, through the maneuver commander directly to a

firing unit. The results are efficient targets designated in advance for attack.

E-49. When the FAIOs obtain intelligence information that warrants attack, the fires cell is notified. This

allows the FAIO to focus on intelligence analysis and the fires cell to manage the control of fires. The

targeting officer, at the maneuver brigade, and the S-2, at the battalion, perform FAIO functions.

E-50. Tracking priorities are based on the commander’s concept of the operation and targeting priorities.

Tracking is executed through the ISR plan. Although every target is not tracked, critical targets move

frequently, therefore, require tracking.

DELIVER

E-51. Deliver executes the target attack guidance and supports the commander’s plan once the HPTs have

been located and identified. (See table E-6 [page E-14].)

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Table E-6. Deliver functions and responsibilities

•

Satisfy attack guidance developed in decide function.

Target attacks should—

•

Require two categories of decisions—tactical and technical.

•

Desired effects, degree of damage, or both.

•

Attack system to be used.

•

Attack time based on in the type of target—planned target or target of

opportunity.

Tactical decisions

•

Planned target:

determine—

Some targets will not appear as anticipated.

Target attack takes place only when the forecasted enemy activity

occurs in projected time or place. Detection and tracking of activities

associated with a target triggers a target attack.

Targeting team

•

Verify enemy activity as the planned target to attack.

G-2/S-2 responsibilities

•

Validate target by conducting final reliability check of target source and

accuracy (time and location). Deliver target to the fires cell.

•

Current operations officer—check target legality in terms of ROE.

•

Determine planned attack system availability. Verify as the appropriate

system for attack.

•

Coordinate with higher, lower, or adjacent units; other Services; and

multinational and host-nation forces (important where potential fratricide

Fires cell

situations are identified).

responsibilities

•

Issue fire mission request to appropriate executing units.

•

Inform G-2/S-2 of target attack. G-2/S-2 alerts appropriate system

responsible for BDA (when applicable).

•

Targets of opportunity are processed as are planned HPTs. Evaluate

those not on HPTLs for their attack potentiality.

•

Decision to attack follows attack guidance and is based on—

Target activity.

Dwell time.

Target payoff compared to other targets processed for engagement.

Fires cell

o If the decision to attack is immediate, process the target further.

o Assess attack availability and attack system capabilities to

responsibilities

engage targets.

o If target exceeds availability or capabilities, send target to higher

headquarters for immediate attack.

o If deferring the attack, continue tracking, determine attack

decision points, and modify ISR tasks as appropriate.

•

Precise delivery means.

•

Munitions number and type.

•

Unit conducting the attack.

•

Attacking unit response time.

Technical decisions

•

Results in the physical attack of targets by lethal or nonlethal means. The

(based on tactical

fires cell directs attack systems to attack a target once tactical decisions are

decisions)

made.

•

Fires cell provides attack system manager with—

Selected attack time.

Desired effects IAW the previous discussion.

Special restraints or requests for particular munitions.

Targeting team

•

Attack system managers—such as, FSCOORDs, air LNOs, aviation brigade

LNOs, naval gunfire LNOs, maneuver units—determine whether the system

Technical decisions

complies with requirements. If not, they notify the targeting cell. Some

reasons for noncompliance include—

(based on tactical

System or assets unavailable at specified time.

decisions)

Required munitions unavailable.

Target out of range.

•

Targeting cell decides whether selected system attacks under different

criteria or whether to use a different system.

Targets of opportunity

•

The target’s activity.

are attacked based on—

•

Estimated assembly area activity.

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Table E-6. Deliver functions and responsibilities (continued)

•

Planned targets:

Verify threat activity as that planned to be attacked.

Desired effects:

Reaffirm decision to attack.

Disrupt

Issue the fire mission request (through the fires cell) to appropriate

Delay

executing units.

•

Targets of opportunity:

Limit

Targeting team decides payoff and availability of attack systems and

munitions.

•

Planned targets:

Decision made during the decide function.

Attack system

Determine system availability and capability.

Targeting team determines the best system available to attack target

if system unavailable or capable.

•

Targets of Opportunity:

Targeting team determines attack system, subject to maneuver

commander’s approval.

Consider all available attack systems.

Attacking targets should optimize capabilities of—

o Light and heavy ground forces.

o Attack helicopters.

o Field artillery.

o Mortars.

o Naval gunfire.

o Combat air operations (CAS and air interdiction).

Attack system

o Offensive EW.

Consider availability and capabilities of each resource using—

o Desired effects on the target.

o Payoff of the target.

o Degree of risk to use asset against target.

o Impact on friendly operations.

o Impact on populace (second and third order effects).

Target attack should be coordinated among two or more attack

systems.

Engaging a target by lethal means, along with jamming or monitoring,

may be more beneficial than simply firing at the target.

BDA—battle damage assessment

HPTL—high-payoff target list

CAS—close air support

IAW—in accordance with

EW—electronic warfare

ISR—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

FSCOORD—fire support coordinator

LNO—liaison officer

HPT—high-payoff target

ROE—rules of engagement

COMBAT ASSESSMENT

E-52. Combat assessment is the determination of the effectiveness of force employment during military

operations (JP 3-60). It is composed of three elements:

Battle damage assessment is timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the

application of lethal or nonlethal military force against a target (JP 3-0).

Munitions effects assessment is an assessment of the military force in terms of the weapon

system and munitions effectiveness (JP 2-01).

Reattack recommendation.

E-53. Together, BDA and MEA inform the commander of effects against targets and target sets. The

threat’s ability to make and sustain war is estimated continually. During the effects review of the targets,

restrike recommendations are proposed or executed. BDA pertains to the results of attacks on targets

designated by the commander. Producing BDA is primarily an intelligence responsibility, but requires

coordination with operational elements. BDA requirements are translated into PIRs. BDA—

Is used, at the tactical level, by commanders to obtain a series of timely and accurate snapshots

of their effect on the enemy. BDA provides commanders an estimate of the enemy’s combat

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effectiveness, capabilities, and intentions. From this information, commanders determine when

or whether their targeting effort accomplishes their objectives.

Helps determine if restrike is necessary. Commanders use BDA to allocate or redirect attack

systems to make use of available combat power.

Munitions Effects Assessment

E-54. The G-3/S-3, through the targeting team, conducts MEA concurrently and interactively with BDA as

a function of combat assessment. From the MEA, changes are recommended to increase effectiveness in—

Methodology.

Tactics.

Weapon systems.

Munitions.

Weapon delivery parameters.

E-55. Munitions effect on targets is calculated by obtaining rounds fired on specific targets divided by

artillery assets. The targeting team may generate modified commander’s guidance concerning—

Unit, base load.

Required supply rate.

Controlled supply rate.

Battle Damage Assessment

E-56. BDA for specific HPTs is determined during the decide function. BDA is recorded on the AGM and

the ISR synchronization matrix. The resources used for BDA are the same resources used for target

development and TA. An asset used for BDA may be unavailable for target development and TA. The ACE

receives, processes, and disseminates, to the targeting team, attack results, analyzed in terms of desired

effects.

E-57. The targeting team should consider the following BDA principles:

BDA should measure what is important to commanders, not make important what is easily

measurable.

BDA should be objective. When a G-2/S-2 receives a BDA product from another echelon, the

conclusions should be verified (time permitting). G-2s/S-2s at all echelons strive to identify and

resolve discrepancies among the BDA analysts at different headquarters.

The assessment’s degree of reliability and credibility relies largely on ISR resources. The

quantity and quality of ISR assets influence whether the assessment is highly reliable (concrete,

quantifiable, and precise) or has low reliability (an estimation). Effective BDAs use more than

one intelligence discipline to verify each conclusion.

E-58. Each BDA has three assessment components. (See table E-7.) Each requires different sensors,

analytical elements, and timeliness—not necessarily subcomponents of each BDA report. (See FM 6-20

10.)

E-59. BDA is more than determining the number of casualties or the amount of equipment destroyed. The

targeting team can use other information, such as—

Whether the targets are moving or hardening in response to the attack.

Changes in deception efforts and techniques.

Increased communication efforts due to jamming.

Whether the damage achieved is affecting the enemy’s combat effectiveness as expected.

E-60. BDA may simply be compiled information about a particular target or area, for example, the area’s

cessation of fires. If BDA is developed, the targeting team gives intelligence acquisition systems adequate

warning to direct sensors at the target at the right time. BDA outcomes may result in changed plans and

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earlier decisions. The targeting team periodically updates earlier decisions during the decide function

concerning—

IPB products.

HPTLs.

TSS.

AGMs.

ISR synchronization tools.

OPLANs.

Table E-7. Battle damage assessment functions

Components

Description

Physical damage

•

Quantitative physical damage from munitions blast, fragmentation, or fire.

assessment

•

Based on observed or interpreted damage.

•

Estimates the effects on the target’s capability to perform its mission.

•

Assessment based on all-source intelligence.

Functional damage

•

Includes a time estimate required to reconstitute or replace the target.

assessment

•

Temporary assessment—compared to a target system assessment—used

for specific missions.

•

The overall affect of the full spectrum of operations on an entire target

system’s capability.

Target system assessment

•

Applicable against an adversary’s combat effectiveness.

•

May address significant subdivisions of a target.

•

A more permanent assessment.

E-61. From the BDA and MEA, the G-2/S-2 or G-3/S-3 considers the achievement of operational

objectives and makes recommendations to the commander. Reattack and other recommendations address

operational objectives relative to the—

Target.

Target critical elements.

Target systems.

Enemy combat force strengths.

E-62. BDA key players include the commander, operations officer, FSCOORD, Army aviation officer, air

liaison officer

(LNO), and G-2/S-2. The G-2/S-2 integrates intelligence and operational data. In

coordination with the G-3/S-3, the G-2/S-2—

Recommends HPTs.

Develops and recommends information requirements, including those for targeting and BDA.

Some requirements become PIRs.

Coordinates with the G-3/S-3, aviation officer, and the fires cell to develop a fully coordinated

targeting and BDA plan.

Develops ISR synchronization tools to answer the commander’s information requirements and

tracks and maintains BDA charts and files.

Tasks or requests ISR support from the appropriate unit or agency to collect information

required to satisfy the commander’s targeting objectives and BDA reporting requirements.

Establishes procedures to ensure reports from forward observers, scouts, troops in contact, and

pilots are available for BDA analysis.

Matches BDA reporting requirements against the commander’s objectives to determine targeting

effort drain; develops and maintains historical BDA databases, and disseminates hard and soft

copy intelligence and BDA results.

Uses the results of BDA and combat assessment to determine further threat COA development:

Determines priority for ISR assets between the targeting effort and the BDA supporting

requirements.

Determines and updates enemy capabilities based on targeting effort results.

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TARGETING IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

E-63. Although the principles of the targeting process apply, in stability operations consider the following:

ROE are restrictive compared to conventional combat situations.

Targeting personnel understand the targeting process and the ROE.

Targeting personnel have a detailed understanding of social networks, insurgent networks,

actions, and community atmospherics.

A target is any aspect of the populace—a person, place, or thing deemed necessary or vital to

defeat or deny threat activities—including successful civic initiatives, or new businesses in the

IO strategy.

The detect function often precedes the decide function because it is difficult to decide who to

target without knowing who or what are the targets.

HVT, threat intention, threat location, and weapons systems identification are slowly developed;

therefore, targeting personnel may be unable to act on them when fully developed.

The nature of a threat—such as a relatively small, unconventional enemy that constitutes a

significant threat to U.S. forces—makes it difficult to ascertain an HVT—specifically, what

constitutes an HVT—which makes it difficult to develop precise time, location, and march rates

for a threat force.

Targets that blend into the population, are often less visible than conventional targets.

When targets are identified, reaction and decision times decrease.

Host-nation population considerations require targeting precision and the correct weapons

system selection.

Interaction and coordination with nontraditional elements and agencies—such as the private

sector,

indigenous populations and institutions, intergovernmental organizations,

nongovernmental organizations, interagency partners, multinational forces, and host-nation

forces—may be required.

An attack system can be using IO and civil affairs operations to engage and form a wedge

between the local populace and the insurgents.

PERSONALITY TARGETING—FIND, FIX, FINISH, EXPLOIT,

ANALYZE, AND DISSEMINATE

E-64. Find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate (F3EAD) is a subset of the D3A targeting

process used to engage selected high-value individuals (HVIs)—sometimes referred to as personality

targets. (See figure E-6.) F3EAD, an aggressive targeting model, features massed, persistent ISR cued to a

powerful and decentralized all-source intelligence apparatus.

E-65. The goal of F3EAD is to find and fix an HVI’s precise location amid civilian clutter. This precise

location enables surgical finish operations (lethal or nonlethal) that emphasize the speedy capture of a

fleeting target—which removes the target from the battlefield, and affords an opportunity to gain

information on and from the target. The exploit and analyze steps are often the “main effort” of F3EAD

because they provide insight into the threat’s network and may offer new lines of operations. The

information collected during the exploit and analyze steps restarts the cycle by providing leads to an

observable and traceable network.

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E-67. The following is a brief description of each of the elements of F3EAD:

Find. Determine area of operations (AO) or AOI for target. Refine through ISR synchronization

tools. Information can be derived from but are not limited to—

Analytical SIGINT.

Analyst driven interrogations.

Imagery intelligence (IMINT).

Human intelligence (HUMINT).

Fix. Use NAI’s and TAI’s to acquire information to trigger decision points for action, ability to

track targets in real time or near real time. Sources include—

SIGINT or EW assets to geolocate target.

ISR assets that provide an “unblinking eye” on objectives such as unmanned aircraft

systems (UASs).

Finish. Deliberate operations to kill, capture, or influence individuals. These operations may be—

Unilateral.

Bilateral.

Multinational.

Indigenous.

Exploit. Exploit begins with tactical site assessment and transitions to people and objects

exploitation. Thoroughly review all information pertaining to the objective received from

HUMINT collection teams (HCTs).

Technical exploitation.

Document and media exploitation (DOMEX).

Analyze. Analysis is ongoing throughout the F3EAD process. It assists in confirming

assumptions, gaining awareness, identifying linkages and intelligence gaps. Analyze includes—

Assessing postdetention intelligence.

Expanding the network picture.

Developing future targets.

Disseminate. The findings and results must be disseminated to adjacent, higher, and lower units

and key communicators in the local AO.

E-68. Measurements of success with F3EAD include—

Changes in local attitudes (friendliness towards U.S. and host-nation personnel).

Changes in public perceptions.

Changes in the quality or quantity of information provided by individuals or groups.

Changes in the economic or political situation of an area.

Changes in insurgent patterns.

Captured and killed insurgents.

Captured equipment and documents.

CARVER TECHNIQUE

E-69. Army special operations forces

(SOF) use CARVER (criticality, accessibility, recuperability,

vulnerability, effect, and recognizability) factors to assess mission, validity, and requirements. CARVER is

also used in technical appreciation and target analysis. (See table E-8.)

E-70. The CARVER selection factors assist in selecting the best targets or components to attack. As the

factors are considered, they are assigned a numerical value, which represents the desirability to attack the

target. The values are recorded, in numerical order, on a decision matrix. After assigning CARVER values

to each target or component, the sum of the values indicates the highest value target or component to be

attacked within the limits of the statement of requirements and commander’s intent.

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Table E-8. CARVER technique

C—Criticality

Decision

Factors

Criteria and values*

Scale

• Target value means.

• Time—how rapidly will the

• Immediate halt; target

9 to 10

• Primary consideration in

target attack affect

cannot function

targeting.

operations?

without it.

• Target is critical when its

• Quality—what percentage of

• Halt within one day, or

7 to 8

destruction or damage has

output, production, or service

66 percent.

impacted military, political, or

will be curtailed by target

• Halt within one week,

5 to 6

economic operations.

damage?

or 33 percent.

• Consider targets within a

• Surrogates—what will be the

• Halt within 10 days, or

3 to 4

system relative to other ele

affect on output, production,

ments of the target system.

and service?

10 percent.

• Target value changes as

• Relativity—how many

• No significant affect.

1 to 2

situation develops.

targets? What are their

positions? How is their

• Target requires time-sensitive

relative value determined?

methods that respond to

What will be affected in the

changing situations.

system or complex stream?

• Example: When there are few

locomotives, railroad bridges

Note. * Refers to time or

may be less critical as tar

percentage; curtailment in

gets; however, safeguarding

output, production, or

bridges may be critical to

service.

maneuvering conventional

forces requiring use of such

bridges.

• High-value individuals—where

does the target fit into the net

work (cell leader, financier)?

A—Accessibility

Decision

Factors

Criteria and values*

Scale

• Target is accessible when

•

Active and passive early

•

Easily accessible,

9 to 10

operations element reaches

warning system.

standoff weapons can

the target with sufficient

•

Detection devices.

be employed.

personnel and equipment to

•

Air defense capabilities within

•

Inside a perimeter

7 to 8

accomplish mission.

target area.

fence but outdoors.

• Identifying and studying critical

•

Road and rail transportation

•

Inside a building but on

5 to 6

paths by the operational

systems.

ground floor.

element to achieve objectives

•

Terrain type and its use.

and measuring what aids or

•

Inside a building but on

3 to 4

•

Concealment and cover.

impedes access.

second floor or in a

•

Population density.

• Reach target AND remain

basement; climbing or

stationary for extended

•

Other natural or synthetic

lowering is required.

periods.

obstacles and barriers.

•

Not accessible or

1 to 2

• Basic steps to identify

•

Current and climatic weather

inaccessible without

accessibility:

conditions.

extreme difficulty.

Infiltration from staging

•

Analysis, along each critical

base to target.

path to target, measures time

Movement from entry

for action element to bypass,

point to target or

neutralize, or penetrate

objective.

barriers or obstacles.

Movement to target's

•

Measured by ease or

critical element.

difficulty of movement of

Exfiltration.

operational element and

High-value individuals—

likelihood of detection.

what intelligence gives

Consider using standoff

access to the target?

weapons in such evaluations.

HUMINT—expresses

reliability, credibility, and

degree of separation.

SIGINT—reporting on the

target’s pattern of life.

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Appendix E

Table E-8. CARVER technique (continued)

R—Recuperability

Decision

Factors

Criteria and values

Scale

• Measured in time—how long

• On-hand equipment, such as

Replacement, repair, or

will it take to replace, repair, or

railroad cranes, dry docks,

substitution requires—

bypass destruction of or

and cannibalization.

•

1 month or more.

9 to 10

damage to the target?

• Restoration and substitution

•

1 week to 1 month.

7 to 8

• Varies with sources and type

through redundancies.

of targeted components and

• On-hand spares.

•

72 hours to 1 week.

5 to 6

availability of spare parts

• Equivalent threat

•

24 to 72 hours.

3 to 4

availability.

characteristics equipment

• Same day replacement,

1 to 2

• High-value individuals—what

sets that back up critical

repair, or substitution.

is the ability of the cell or

equipment or components;

network associated with the

effects of economic

target to rebound,

embargoes and labor unrest.

reconstitute, or assign a

replacement?

What intelligence gives

access to the target?

Who is accessed to be the

replacement?

V—Vulnerability

Decision

Factors

Criteria and values

Scale

• Target is vulnerable if

Depends on—

• Vulnerable to long-

9 to 10

operational element has

• Nature and construction of

range laser target

means and expertise to attack

the target.

designation, small arms

the target successfully.

fire, or charges of 5 lbs

• Amount of damage required.

• Scale of critical component

or less.

• Assets available, such as

should be compared to

personnel, expertise,

• Vulnerable to light

7 to 8

capability of attacking element

motivation, weapons,

antiarmor weapons fire

to destroy or damage it.

explosives, and equipment.

or charges of 5 to 10

• Attacking element may—

lbs.

Choose special

• Vulnerable to medium

5 to 6

components.

antiarmor weapons fire,

Do permanent damage.

bulk charges of 10 to

Maximize effects through

30 lbs, or very careful

use of on-site materials.

placement of smaller

Cause the target to self-

charges.

destruct.

• Vulnerable to heavy

3 to 4

• High-value individuals—what

antiarmor fire, bulk

prosecutorial evidence can

charges of 30 to 50 lbs,

ensure long-term detention?

or requires special

If the evidence is lacking,

weapons.

who can be targeted to

establish the necessary

• Not vulnerable to all but

1 to 2

evidence to make the

the most extreme

primary target vulnerable?

targeting measures.

lbs—pounds

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Table E-8. CARVER technique (continued)

E—Effect

Decision

Factors

Criteria and values

Scale

•

Measure of possible military,

•

Primary effect—of destruction

•

Overwhelmingly

9 to 10

political, economic,

of two adjacent long-range

positive effects; no

psychological and sociological

radar sites in early warning

significant negative

impacts at target and beyond.

system—may be to open a

effects.

•

Closely related to the

hole in a system of sufficient

•

Moderately positive

7 to 8

measure of target criticality.

size and duration to permit

effects; few significant

attacker to launch a

•

Type and magnitude of given

negative effects.

successful air or missile

effects desired will help

nuclear strike against

•

No significant effects;

5 to 6

planners select targets and

defender.

neutral.

target components.

•

Can include—

•

Moderately negative

3 to 4

•

Addresses all significant

Countermeasures

effects; few significant

effects, whether desired or

triggers.

positive effects.

not, that may result once

selected target component is

Supporting the negation

•

Overwhelmingly

1 to 2

attacked.

of psychological

negative effects; no

operations themes.

•

Traditionally, this element

significant positive

Unemployment.

addressed effect on local

effects.

Reprisals against the

population; now there are

civilian populace.

broader considerations.

Collateral damage to

•

Frequently neutral at tactical

other targets.

level.

•

Possible effects can be

•

High-value individuals—what

speculative, therefore, should

are the anticipated effects

be labeled.

associated with an operation

•

Effects of same attack may

against this target?

be different at tactical,

•

How are desired second- and

operational and strategic

third-order effects derived

levels.

through various options lethal

•

Example: Destruction of a

and nonlethal?

substation may not affect

local power but cuts off power

to adjacent region.

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Appendix E

Table E-8. CARVER technique (continued)

R—Recognizability

Decision

Factors

Criteria and values

Scale

• Target’s recognizability is the

• Site and complexity of target.

• Target is clearly

9 to 10

degree it can be recognized by

• Existence of distinctive target

recognizable under all

an operational element or ISR

signatures.

conditions and from a

assets under varying conditions.

distance; requires little

• Presence of masking or

• Weather affects visibility.

camouflage.

or no training.

• Rain, snow, and ground fog may

• Technical sophistication and

• Target is easily

7 to 8

obscure observation.

training of attackers.

recognizable at small-

• Road segments with sparse

arms range and

vegetation and adjacent high

requires small amount

ground provide excellent

of training.

conditions for good observation.

• Target is difficult to

5 to 6

• Consider distance, light, and

recognize at night or in

season.

bad weather, or might

• High-value individuals—can the

be confused with other

target be positively identified?

targets or components;

• Is there a photograph of the

requires some training.

target or are there any

• Target is difficult to

3 to 4

characteristics that will

recognize at night or in

distinguish the target from other

bad weather, even

detainees?

within small-arms

range; it is easily

confused with other

targets or components;

requires extensive

training.

• Target cannot be

1 to 2

recognized under any

conditions, except by

experts.

E-71. CARVER factors and their assigned values are used to construct a CARVER matrix. Table E-9 is a

tool for rating the desirability of potential targets and allocating attack resources.

List the potential targets in the left column.

For strategic level analysis, list the enemy’s systems or subsystems (electric power supply, rail

system).

For tactical level analysis, list the complexes or components of the subsystems or complexes

selected for attack by higher headquarters.

As each potential target is evaluated for each CARVER factor, enter the appropriate value into

the matrix.

Once all the potential targets are evaluated, add the values for each potential target.

Each sum represents the relative desirability of each potential target; this constitutes a prioritized

list of targets.

Attack the targets with the highest totals first.

If additional men or munitions are available as resources, allocate them to the remaining

potential targets in descending numerical order.

This allocation scheme maximizes the use of limited resources.

E-72. The G-2/S-2 can present the CARVER matrix, with a variety of attack options to operation planners,

and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each COA against the target. Because of this the rigorous

evaluation process, the G-2/S-2 can comfortably defend conclusions.

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Table E-9. Bulk electric power supply

Potential

Total

targets

Fuel tanks

Fuel pumps

Boilers

Turbines

Generators

Condenser

Feed pumps

Water pumps

Generator step up

transformer

E-73. Some OIF units have added three additional CARVER factors—CARVERSHP. Analyzing the

symbolism, historical significance, and political significance of an HVI has proven effective while fighting

in a counterinsurgency environment.

Symbolism. How the population accepts relations with the counterinsurgents.

Will the general population be indifferent to, support, or oppose a relationship with the

group?

If a relationship is generally accepted by the local population, will there be factions

opposing the relationship? If yes, how will they disrupt the relationship?

Historical significance. How long have relations with the counterinsurgents existed?

What other external groups, agencies, or ideologies have formed alliances with the

counterinsurgents?

Did U.S. or other forces have established relationships with this group?

Did these relationships occur rarely or regularly?

Does this group establish relationships with others when there is a common interest?

Will relations with this group set a historical precedence?

Political significance. How important are relations with the group on the international political

scene?

What is the political advantage or disadvantage?

Will relations with the group have any political significance—locally, regionally, nationally,

or internationally? If yes, what significance?

TARGETING MEETING

E-74. The targeting meeting allows the staff to—

Focus and synchronize the unit’s efforts based on the current enemy situation, current unit

success, and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) from higher echelons.

Assess the current lethal and nonlethal effects to determine if a change to the current plan is

needed.

E-75. The end state of a targeting meeting is a FRAGO to the subordinate staffs that decides what to target,

how to detect it, how to deliver combat power against the target, and how to assess operation results. The

FRAGO should address both lethal and nonlethal tasks.

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Appendix E

PRETARGETING MEETING

E-76. The G-2/S-2 offers inputs during the pretargeting meeting:

Light, weather forecast, and terrain data.

BDA and TSM assessments.

Proposed HVTL and link or pattern analysis (D, D+1/2/3).

Current and proposed PIRs.

Enemy COA and event template (D, D+1/2/3).

Current ISR synchronization tools and proposed changes.

E-77. At the conclusion of the pretargeting meeting, the staff should have developed a TSM with baseline

data sufficient to begin developing resources, synchronizing engagements, and other preparatory work

necessary to conduct the targeting meeting. At a minimum, the decision column, and desired effect should

be completed.

TARGETING MEETING

E-78. The G-2/S-2 offers input during the targeting meeting:

Light, weather forecast, and terrain data.

Current enemy situation template, incident overlay, pattern and link analysis.

Status of ISR synchronization tools—NAIs tasked, gaps in coverage, significant reports,

required synchronization.)

Status of ISR assets available.

BDA of attacked targets—in the past 12-24 hours—highlighting changes in enemy capabilities.

Current or proposed PIRs and HVTs.

Enemy COA for the targeting period.

THE HIGH-VALUE INDIVIDUAL TARGET PACKET

E-79. The target packet is a folder, hardcopy or electronic, that contains intelligence, operational, and

related materials for the purpose of planning and executing action against a specific target. The G-2/S-2

produces a most of the target packet as an all-source product with vetted, validated information to support

the designated desired effect. Table E-10 shows considerations used in OIF to build the intelligence portion

of a target packet on an HVI.

Table E-10. Target packet intelligence considerations

Task

Name of HVI.

Suspected location of HVI.

Collection overview. Map with objective locations (grid coordinate) of target, target’s known pattern of activity,

intelligence sources (HUMINT detainee, SIGINT report, IMINT such as national imagery or UAS).

Photo of HVI.

Intelligence gaps—positive identification.

Physical description

•

Age. Unless know accurately, should be bracketed.

•

Build. Thin, medium, well built.

•

Clothes. Dish dash or western style trousers and shirt.

•

Distinguishing features. Scars, tattoos, missing limbs, small head.

•

Height/Weight. xxx inches/xxx lbs.

•

Eyes. Blue, green.

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Table E-10. Target packet intelligence considerations (continued)

Physical description

•

Face. Round, slim, gaunt, fat, jowls, double chin, big nose.

•

Gait. The walk, upright, slouched, any limp.

•

Hair. Color, length, and style. Does the individual wear a hat?

•

License plate numbers. For all vehicles used by HVI.

•

Vehicles. All vehicles used by HVI.

•

Aliases. All known aliases for primary target.

Background. Key bullets on the individual’s backg1round—family, education, past events, or experiences known by

the reviewer to determine the individual’s character, leadership potential, or past roles.

•

Category. To which major category does the individual belong (for example, Jihadist)?

•

Affiliation. To which group is the individual affiliated (for example, 1920 Revolutionary Group)?

•

Connections with government, military, or police?

•

Role. List functions the individual provides (for example, leader, facilitator, enabler, financier).

•

AO. Where does the individual operate (for example, Baghdad, Iraq, trans-national)?

•

Religious affiliation. Sunni, Shia?

•

Province from.

•

Civilian education. Associate’s, bachelor’s, or master’s degree or doctorate.

•

Military education. MI, War College.

•

Known disabilities. Uses a cane.

•

Health status. Heart disease.

•

Travel. Locations outside of country the HVI travels.

•

Previously detained. Where, when, why, by who?

•

Military or insurgency experience. IED maker, sniper, VBIED maker or combatant in Afghanistan.

•

Expected actions. Will surrender. Will fight until captured or killed.

Responsibilities. List key events or actions for which the individual is responsible or involved. Summary of few

specific key events that depict what the individual has done to support the insurgency.

HVI associates. List the top five associates (secondary targets) that might be on objective. Associates attitude and

capabilities. Insert pictures and description if available.

•

Photo of HVI associates.

•

Associates description.

•

Connections with government, military, or police.

•

Previously detained. Where, when, why, by who?

•

Military or insurgency experience. IED maker, sniper, VBIED maker, combatant in Afghanistan.

•

Expected actions. Will surrender. Will fight until captured or killed.

•

Aliases. List all known aliases for secondary targets.

HVI family. List all family members that might be on objective with HVI. Family attitude and capabilities. Insert

pictures and description.

•

Photo of HVI family.

•

Family backg1round and descriptions.

•

Family member’s locations. List locations with grid for each family members.

•

Connections with government, military, or police.

•

Previously detained. Where, when, why, by who?

•

Military or insurgency experience. IED maker, sniper, VBIED maker, combatant in Afghanistan.

•

Expected actions. Will surrender. Will fight until captured or killed.

•

Aliases. List all known aliases for family members.

Intelligence products

•

HUMINT.

Assessment of HUMINT source. Assess the source as it applies to the suspected location of the target

(report type and number). Develop this information for each objective—source description and rating, who

vetted the source?

Note. Keep information at the NOFORN level.

Summary of HUMINT reports. Gist of reports and how they tie the target to the objective.

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Appendix E

Table E-10. Target packet intelligence considerations (continued)

Intelligence products

•

HUMINT.

HUMINT RFIs for source handler.

Grid of HVI family or meeting location.

Map with location of HVI.

Map to HVI with routes.

Sketch of HVI location.

Photo of HVI location.

Photo of HVI and family.

HUMINT—is source available to perform these tasks?

GPS—use waypoint to develop route to site or pattern of life.

Drive by HVI location and give signal to UAS.

Drive by HVI family location and give signal to UAS.

Go to HVI location and leave a marker—infrared or beacon.

Go to HVI family location and leave a marker—infrared or beacon.

Drive by meeting place and give signal to UAS.

Drive by meeting place and leave a marker—infrared or beacon.

Pinpoint spider holes or weapons storage sites at HVI location.

Pinpoint security positions or vehicles.

Details of security forces weapons and emplacements.

Ride to site with unit taking action.

•

IMINT.

Imagery products pertaining to the objective. Example: With a view from the cardinal—directions,

security positions, vehicles, roads, trails, activity on objective, activity around objective (national-level

imagery, UAS).

IMINT PIRs example.

Trails around structure—to spider holes or weapons storage sites.

Roads, alleys, or trails.

Terrain, ditches, walls, fences, abandoned vehicles, makeshift barriers or any other obstacles that will stop

or slow a vehicle.

Utility access points—sewer manholes, ingress and egress points.

Obstacles around structure—vegetation, antenna towers, power lines, or any other obstacles that will restrict

the use of aircraft on objective.

Structures that can be used as observation points next to site.

All smaller structures on site—tool sheds, garages, boathouses, or dog houses.

Security positions.

Fighting positions including trails to fighting positions.

Vehicles on objective.

Pattern of life.

•

SIGINT.

SIGINT products or PIRs. Assessment of the objective, including communication devices, scanners or

jammers at objective.

•

MASINT.

MASINT products or RFIs. Trails, spider holes, fighting positions directions, security positions, vehicles,

roads, trails, activity on objective, activity around objective.

Objective summary

•

Collective assessment of the intelligence.

•

Pattern of activity. Dates and times at locations, lights on or off, meeting times, vehicle traffic.

•

Include details from collections. Security element signature, posture and attitude, special weapons or

equipment, numbers, enemy situation in area, possible booby traps.

•

Attitude and capabilities of surrounding population. (Surrounding population support of insurgency,

surrounding populations support for individual, is this a heavily populated area?)

•

Potential triggers. Identify any recommended or available triggers for the operations, including source

trigger, SIGINT trigger, or other intelligence trigger.

•

History of objective. Previous missions conducted against objective, has objective been previously

prosecuted?

•

Alternate locations. Alternate locations, in vicinity of primary objective, to which target may flee or occupy

as an alternate site.

•

All known persons that are part of security. Neighbors acting as lookouts or other security forces.

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Table E-10. Target packet intelligence considerations (continued)

Objective details

•

Provide tactical information on structure.

Construction type.

New or old structure.

Floor plan.

Number of stories.

Number of exits in building.

Structure configuration.

Walls or fences.

Vegetation around structure.

Details of roads or alleyways surrounding the structure.

Condition or width.

Openings in walls, fences.

Window locations in structure.

Type or direction of opening.

Hardware.

Door locations in structure.

Type or direction of opening.

Hardware.

Possible routes of ingress and egress.

External lights on and around structure.

What utilities are connected?

Electronic burglar alarm.

Animals.

Blind spots, dead spaces, tallest building providing view of structure in area.

Details of electronic equipment at site.

Special terrain features—roads (name or number for all major roads in area), rivers, major power lines,

tunnels, mines.

Overall lighting in area.

Checkpoints, bottlenecks, bridges on roads to objective.

Overall assessment of the surrounding terrain for traffic purposes.

•

Personnel at objective. Details of personnel—groundskeepers, housekeepers—at structure.

Gender.

Age.

Willingness to fight or surrender.

•

Route to objective. Map with detailed annotations for best route to objective, the objective with grid.

•

Alternate objective summaries.

All known alternate locations with grids.

Safe houses.

Houses, offices, meeting places.

Primary residence.

Secondary residence.

Note. Develop HUMINT and IMINT objective folders for each location.

•

Provide intelligence to support the IO strategy as required.

AO—area of operations

MI—military intelligence

GPS—Global Positioning System

NOFORN—not releasable to foreign nationals

HUMINT—human intelligence

PIR—priority intelligence requirement

HVI—high-value individual

RFI—request for information

IED—improvised explosive device

SIGINT—signals intelligence

IMINT—imagery intelligence

UAS—unmanned aircraft system

IO—information operations

VBIED—vehicle-borne improvised explosive device

MASINT—measurement and signature intelligence

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Appendix F

Weather Elements and Support

Weather is critical to Army operations. The command’s intelligence officer is

responsible for providing information on enemy, terrain, weather, and civil

considerations to the commander and staff. Weather information is a part of

intelligence as are threat and terrain data. Weather affects every aspect of Army

operations.

RESPONSIBILITIES

F-1. The intelligence officer is responsible for weather intelligence. The G-2/S-2 is supported by a U.S.

Air Force staff weather officer (SWO), who provides a staff weather specialty team to support the unit. The

intelligence officer, the terrain analysis technician of the topographic support team, and the SWO comprise

“the integrated weather support team.” (See table F-1.)

Table F-1. Weather intelligence officer responsibilities

The intelligence officer—

•

Interprets, in coordination with the terrain analysis technician, weather effects on Army weapon systems and

tactics.

•

Interprets threat potential to exploit the use of weather and weather modification through tactics and

operations.

•

Knows where to obtain weather data or information and the types of weather products available.

•

Coordinates with the staff weather officer to ensure correct analysis of weather information affecting

intelligence.

•

Coordinates and consolidates the commander’s requirements for weather support.

•

Coordinates with the staff weather officer and artillery commander to arrange for the timely exchange of

meteorological information.

•

Disseminates processed weather information and intelligence to appropriate command elements.

•

Coordinates weather training requirements of Army personnel with the G-3/S-3 and the commander.

•

Assists the staff weather officer in special or general staff relations.

•

Informs subordinate Army units of weather observations requested by the staff weather officer. The G-2/S-2

instructs subordinate units on required information—where and when it is required, and how it will be

forwarded.

•

Receives required information from the staff weather officer and disseminates weather intelligence through

electrical means, briefings, and written studies.

•

Integrates weather intelligence into the advance planning to ensure the incorporation of weather into future

operations.

•

Receives from the chemical staff officer interpretations of fallout prediction and travel of fallout clouds based

on data provided by artillery meteorological sections and the weather teams.

The staff weather officer—

•

Coordinates, supervises, and oversees all weather support for the designated Army units.

•

Incorporates and coordinates weather support services from higher echelons and centralized weather

facilities into the overall weather support structure.

•

Develops weather observation collection strategies, forecast support, and dissemination procedures for the

supported unit, and, as required, any associated lower echelon units without dedicated direct or host

support.

•

Supervises weather activities, performs weather intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), and uses

automated weather data processing systems, as available.

•

Evaluates, interprets, analyzes, coordinates, supervises, and oversees the production of all weather support

products to support Department of Defense and combatant commanders’ requirements.

•

Advises the commander and subordinate units on weather considerations for operations.

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Appendix F

INTEGRATED METEOROLOGICAL SYSTEM

F-2. The Integrated Meteorological System

(IMETS) is a mobile, tactical automated weather data

receiving, processing, and dissemination system designed to provide timely weather and decision aid

information to multiple command elements and their subordinate commands. IMETS can be a vehicle-

mounted system or a laptop. The laptop configuration is referred to as IMETS-Light. IMETS is deployed to

Army Service component command (ASCC), corps, division, special operations, aviation brigades, and

brigade combat team (BCT) units. (See table F-2.)

Note. The IMETS is a program of record and part of the Distributed Common Ground System-

Army (DCGS-A) (see MIHB 2-50). Their capabilities will be replaced in a series of system

fieldings, culminating in DCGS-A weather services.

Table F-2. Integrated meteorological system capabilities

•

Receives weather data from USAF strategic and theater centers. (In DCGS-A the weather service will host the joint

environmental toolkit that provides the same capability.)

•

Receives, processes, tailors, stores, and disseminates weather data.

•

Hosts the weather running estimate mesoscale weather forecast model.

•

Displays and loops, on client machines, geostationary weather satellite imagery.

•

Displays and processes local weather observations from the AN/TMQ-53 or the IMETS Meteorological Station

Group.

•

Provides weather situation portion of the COP.

•

Provides weather and effects or impacts on Army missions, displayed on the COP.

•

Provides weather messages.

•

IMETS hosts a Web page that allows sharing weather graphics and text products to a variety of users, using Web-

based technology.

•

Products are available by Army functional area.

•

Web-page generator graphical user interface assists the weather team in the production of Web-page graphics

products.

COP—common operational picture

IMETS—Integrated Meteorological System

DCGS-A—Distributed Common Ground System-Army

USAF—U.S. Air Force

WEATHER IMPACTS ON MILITARY OPERATIONS

F-3. Virtually all forces that comprise the military capability are influenced by the weather—warfighting

more often adapts to the weather rather than surmounts it, as it adapts to terrain and sea conditions.

Weather exerts a constant influence on the readiness, morale, and effectiveness of military forces, the

choice of military strategy and tactics, and the performance and useful life of military weapons systems.

Advanced, high-cost weapon systems are also affected by the aerospace environment. Therefore,

accounting for weather conditions should be incorporated into every facet of military force planning,

deployment, employment, and system design and evaluation.

F-4. Weather impacts military forces and subsequent operations. Each forces type responds differently to

the impact—dictating the types of forces that can be employed effectively. Weather data is part of the

intelligence information required by commanders and staffs to plan and conduct combat operations. The

results—from analyzing weather data, identifying weather effects, and assessing the impact of weather on

systems, tactics, and operations—provide vital information for commanders to optimally employ their

forces.

WEATHER CONDITIONS EFFECT ON MILITARY OPERATIONS

F-5. Weather significantly impacts friendly and threat operations. The military aspects of weather include

visibility, wind aloft, precipitation, cloud cover, and temperature and humidity. Weather factor overlays are

integrated with terrain overlays to predict areas where maneuver is possible. Table F-3 provides a

description of weather conditions that affect the successful deployment of a broad spectrum of U.S.

weapons systems—from ships to tanks to fighter planes.

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Weather Elements and Support

Table F-3. Effects of weather conditions on military operations

Temperature

High temperatures—

•

Reduce aircraft lift capability and decrease the time personnel can remain in armored vehicles.

•

Cause gun tube droop, shimmers, and mirages.

•

Make vehicle exteriors too hot to touch.

•

Increase water consumption by troops.

Humidity

•

Coupled with high temperatures, humidity further decreases crew effectiveness in closed armored vehicles

and aircraft lift.

•

Humidity reduces a Soldier’s ability to work and fight.

•

High humidity occurs in several potential battlegrounds. Failure to consider the effects on Soldiers,

machines, and the area of operations (AO) can cause costly military mistakes.

•

Low humidity can stress Soldiers, machines, and the AO, as does high humidity. Low humidity is difficult for

some automated sensors to measure. One effect of low humidity is static electricity generation around

sensitive electronic boards. Low humidity allows for efficient infrared energy transmission through the

atmosphere, allowing for target detection at further distances by infrared sensors.

Barometric pressure

Barometric pressure affects gunnery computations and ballistic performance.

Density

The combination of the temperature, humidity, and barometric pressure determines the air density.

Wind

Strong winds, especially crosswinds and high crosswinds—

•

Affect aircraft control near the ground during take-offs and landings.

•

Affect ground speed for low-level flights.

•

Affect trajectory projections and first-round capabilities for armored vehicles.

•

In the desert, produce dust storms that can last for hours or days.

Note. Wind speed and direction are critical when predicting the airborne speed of chemical, biological, radiological,

and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.

Visibility

Bad visibility affects—

•

Landings and takeoffs.

•

Visual reconnaissance.

•

Target acquisition and designation.

•

Terminally guided munitions.

•

The ability to scatter mines.

Cloud coverage

Clouds are always a major consideration for air operations:

•

Low overcast clouds limit the effectiveness of aerial illumination devices.

•

Overcast skies tend to limit heating of inactive targets and lower target detection range for thermal sights.

•

Clouds blocking ambient light from the moon or the stars limit night vision devices.

•

Low clouds degrade combat air support and aerial resupply missions.

Precipitation

•

Rain affects visibility and the safety of flight crews and aircrafts.

•

Precipitation can cause predetonation of munitions.

•

Water droplets in the air disrupt electro-optical transmissions.

•

In infrared systems, rain cools objects differently in imagery, causing objects to appear differently.

Aircraft icing

•

Under certain atmospheric conditions, aircraft structural icing becomes a serious, even deadly problem:

•

It places added weight and drag on an aircraft and can change the aerodynamic shape of the wings,

reducing lift and maneuverability.

•

Chunks of ice can break off the airfoil, get sucked in into the jet intake, and destroy the engine.

•

Ice seriously affects radar reflective measurements at frequencies of major interest to military equipment

designers.

•

Ice crystals have different shapes, and with temperatures hovering around the freezing point, they change

form as they melt and refreeze. This effect can cause poor performance of equipment, such as mine

detectors.

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Appendix F

Table F-3. Weather conditions effect on military operations (continued)

Thunderstorms and lightning

•

Extreme weather that includes thunderstorms and lightning is hazardous to in-flight operations, refueling,

and rearming operations.

•

Severe weather can affect Navy vessels.

•

Small vessels, in particular, are susceptible to bad weather, which impairs their ability to transit or conduct

operations.

•

Because a typical lightning strike involves millions of volts and amperes, not only does it destroy by direct hit,

lightning can also destroy by induced potentials on networks of wires nearby.

Turbulence

•

Severe weather and clear air turbulence is a critical condition affecting all aviation assets and missions.

•

Turbulence can cause aircraft structural damage or crashes on takeoffs and landings.

•

Severe turbulence may cancel all operations.

Space weather

•

Space weather affects military communications, especially in the high-frequency spectrum.

•

Space weather has become an important facet in the satellite communication age. Although it is impossible

to prevent phenomena, produced by the sun, from affecting communications and navigation systems,

learning new methods to predict weather-event occurrences can minimize their effects.

SOLAR ACTIVITY DISTURBANCES

F-6. Solar activity causes three main disturbances:

Radio blackout. Solar flares disturb the ionosphere with X-ray transmission, which impedes

high frequency radio and navigation systems, often causing total communication loss.

Geomagnetic storms. Disturbances in the geomagnetic field due to gusts in the solar wind that

blow by Earth. Coronal mass ejections, closely associated with solar flares, cause geomagnetic

storms, which affect power systems, spacecraft operations, and radio propagation and

navigation.

Solar radiation storms. Solar flares greatly increase the radiation count, which creates a

radiation hazard to astronauts, high-flying planes, satellite operations, and communications

systems. (See figure F-1.)

Figure F-1. Solar radiation

F-4

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Weather Elements and Support

F-7. Because solar radiation increases the density of the ionosphere with energized particles, Global

Positioning System (GPS) operations are adversely affected. GPS receivers depend on radio signals from

several orbiting satellites. When these signals pass through the ionosphere, the various density changes

affect the speed at which the signals travel, causing a “propagation delay” in the GPS signal resulting in

range errors.

WEATHER EXPLOITATION

F-8. Weather exploitation is the deliberate use of knowledge about friendly and threat operations

capabilities under given natural environmental conditions to set the terms of battle, resulting in optimal

performance of the friendly force and reduced effectiveness of the threat force. Using this definition, one

can examine and assess three aspects of weather exploitation:

Military force capability in terms of personnel, equipment, and doctrine—as a whole, a

nation’s military capability is largely independent of the natural environment. However,

individual engagements, missions, or even major operations can be significantly affected by the

natural environment.

Effect of relevant observed weather on military operations—requires the most improvement

in terms of learning the vulnerabilities of both sides and incorporating that intelligence into the

air and space strategy.

Prediction accuracy of relevant observed weather—important in the planning phase because

forces and weapons mixes and strategy decisions, such as target selection and route of attack, are

determined. Modern air and space forces improve how to incorporate weather predictions into

the planning cycle, especially with the advent of new and faster ways to access and visualize

relevant, real-time weather information.

WEATHER EFFECTS ON STABILITY AND CIVIL SUPPORT

OPERATIONS

F-9. Terrain and weather analysis occur simultaneously, in most instances. However, operations in an

urban environment present some unique concerns. Inclement weather affects the availability of food

supplies. Mass demonstrations use good weather for maximum turnout. Bad weather further degrades poor

road networks. Rain and heavy winds disrupt or stop a PSYOP such as a leaflet drop. Common concerns

include—

Wind.

Precipitation.

Visibility.

Cloud cover.

Temperature and humidity.

WIND

F-10. Wind patterns and effects are important concerns in most environments; however, larger urban areas

have unique challenges that, otherwise, usually occur in rugged mountain areas. Depending on weather

conditions, when compared to unrestricted terrain, the wind may be blocked, reduced, or enhanced in areas

surrounded by large structures, which can cause a buildup of smog (or lethal chemicals, if present), enhance

the fire threat, restrict helicopter use (swirling winds), and other factors. These factors make downwind

predictions for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) difficult. Radical temperature changes

associated with the combination of wind, precipitation, and structures, such as tunnels or high rises,

significantly affect urban operations, especially during cold and wet periods, which affect the wind chill

factor.

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Appendix F

PRECIPITATION

F-11. City engineers and urban sanitation workers are aware of artificial changes to the topography caused

by manmade structures. Rain or melting snow often floods basements, underpasses, tunnels, sewers, and

subway systems; streets become impassable due to water, snow, or ice; and exposed or weathered electrical

systems may short-circuit. Precipitation washes CBRN agents into underground systems. Some areas

become impassable contaminated “hot spots” that affect drinking water supplies. As CBRN agents are

absorbed by brick or unsealed concrete sewer walls, the effects are pronounced, and CBRN detection and

decontamination crews will be required when operating in these areas.

VISIBILITY

F-12. Although visibility is critical at any given time, it is more so during operations in urban

environments. Traditionally, night and periods of reduced visibility favor surprise, infiltration, detailed

reconnaissance, attacks across open areas, seizure of defended strong points, and reduction of defended

obstacles. Areas, regardless of size, with considerable amounts of artificial and backg1round light, put

unobserved movement at risk. The urban area’s numerous structures, easily identified during the day, may

not be so visible at night, which increases disorientation. Technology enhancements become a necessity

(night vision devices or GPS) for Soldiers operating in the area.

F-13. Many urban areas are located along canals or rivers, which creates a potential for fog in low-lying

areas. Industrial and transportation areas are the most affected by fog due to their usual proximity to

waterways. In heavy industrial areas, smog can limit visibility regardless of light conditions. Fog and smog

can ground operations by limiting illumination and reflective heating as well as by degrading many target

acquisition (TA) systems and limiting the use of infrared-guided artillery rounds and general aviation.

CLOUD COVER

F-14. In an urban environment, cloud cover has significant tactical effects. In addition to visibility effects,

cloud cover above an urban area can combine with building shadows to affect observation. Intermittent

cloud cover may cause shadows on the ground, which could confuse observers. Low cloud cover over

urban areas can restrict air operations due to the numerous vertical manmade obstructions in these areas.

TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY

F-15. Lower atmospheric inversions are common over cities, especially cities located in low-lying “bowls”

or river valleys. Inversion layers may trap dust, pollutants, or chemical agents and reduce visibility. The

atmospheric conditions that create inversions cause higher than normal air temperature. The heating of

buildings during the winter and the reflection and absorption of summer heat make built-up areas warmer

than surrounding open areas during both summer and winter. The temperature difference ranges from 10 to

20 degrees, which adds significantly to the problems faced in urban operations. Summer heat, combined

with the physical requirement of urban combat, can cause severe heat exhaustion. In the winter, Soldiers

fall victim to exposure in nominally protected areas such as tunnels or causeways.

F-16. Temperature variances, due to air inversions, also affect thermal sights during crossover periods of

warm to cold and vice versa. Air inversions trap pollution, smoke from fires, or gases (such as tear gas)

closer to the ground. This crossover period should be identified, since it may differ from urban area to

urban area. Extremely cold temperatures and heavily constructed buildings affect target identification for

thermal sights. For example, thick walls may make combat vehicle identification difficult by distorting

hotspots, and increased use of heaters and warming fires may clutter thermal sights with numerous

hotspots.

F-17. Before Soldiers are sent into an urban area, especially those comprised of numerous large structures,

staff planners have a good understanding of the weather and the weather effects in the urban environment.

The SWO provides the basic weather forecasts for planning purposes.

F-6

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Weather Elements and Support

LIGHT DATA

F-18. Although light data is not weather data, like weather factors, it affects visibility. Light data describes

astronomical event, such as—

Sunrise and sunset.

Associated twilight periods.

Moonrise and moonset.

Illumination amounts.

RISE, SET

F-19. Sunrise and sunset refer to the times when the upper edge of the Sun’s disk is on the horizon—

considered unobstructed relative to the location of interest. Moonrise and moonset times are computed for

the same circumstances as for sunrise and sunset. However, moonrise and moonset occurs at any time

during a 24-hour period.

TWILIGHT

F-20. Before sunrise and again after sunset, there are intervals of time—twilight—when there is natural

light provided by the upper atmosphere, which does receive direct sunlight and reflects part of its light

toward the Earth’s surface. Some outdoor activities are conducted without artificial illumination during

these intervals—it is useful to have means to set limits beyond which a certain activity should be assisted

by artificial lighting. What mostly determines the amount of natural light during twilight are the state of the

atmosphere and local weather conditions.

CIVIL TWILIGHT

F-21. Civil twilight begins in the morning and ends in the evening when the Sun’s center is geometrically

six degrees below the horizon. This is the limit at which twilight illumination is sufficient, in good weather

conditions, for terrestrial objects to be distinguishable.

NAUTICAL TWILIGHT

F-22. Nautical twilight begins in the morning and ends in the evening when the Sun’s center is

geometrically 12 degrees below the horizon. At the beginning or end of nautical twilight, under good

atmospheric conditions and in the absence of other illumination, general outlines of ground objects are

distinguishable, but detailed outdoor operations are impossible, and the horizon is indistinct. (See table F-4.)

Table F-4. Light data visibility

Period of time

Location of Sun’s center in degrees below the horizon

Beginning morning nautical twilight (BMNT)

12 degrees

Beginning morning civil twilight (BMCT)

6 degrees

End evening civil twilight (EECT)

6 degrees

End evening nautical twilight (EENT)

12 degrees

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Appendix F

F-23. Under ideal conditions, the period when there is adequate visibility for large-scale operations is

between beginning morning civil twilight (BMCT) and end evening civil twilight (EECT). Generally,

visibility at beginning morning nautical twilight (BMNT) is about 400 meters—enough light for close

coordination between personnel. Halfway between BMNT and BMCT (or EECT and end evening nautical

twilight [EENT]), there is enough light for visual ground adjustment of close-in artillery fire and air strikes.

WEATHER PRODUCTS

F-24. The G-2/S-2 provides weather and weather effects information to the commander and supported or

subordinate units. Methods may vary among units and echelons. Figure F-2 depicts how the weather

elements and parameters in the forecast might be displayed.

Weather forecast

valid for 121200Z to 131200Z

Pungsan

24-hour forecast

Skies

Clear morning and night, partly cloudy in the afternoon, bases 3,000 feet.

Visibility

Unlimited, occasionally 1 to 2 miles in blowing snow during afternoon.

Winds

North to northwest, 10 to 15 knots, occasional gusts to 25 knots in afternoon.

Temperatures

Maximum: 10°F Minimum: -20°F.

Cloudy skies, snow flurries during afternoon hours lowering visibility to 2 to 4 miles.

72-hour outlook

Temperatures: Maximum: 20°F Minimum: -5°F.

BMNT: 1247Z

Sunset: 0820Z

Moonset: 0819Z

Light data

BMCT: 2221Z

EECT: 0851Z

Night-vision goggles use

Sunrise: 2251Z

Moonrise: 1924Z

BMCT—beginning morning civil twilight

EECT—end evening civil twilight

Z—Zulu time

BMNT—beginning morning nautical twilight

NVG—night-vision goggles

Figure F-2. Example of a weather forecast chart

F-25. A weather effects forecast matrix uses color codes as one way to display potential weather impacts

on operations, systems, and unit personnel. (See figure 3-4 [page 3-9].) The words “moderate” and “severe”

can be used, also. Do not list all equipment or systems, but have the list available to answer commander or

staff questions. Emphasize critical systems.

F-26. If weather conditions change significantly during the period covered by the SWO’s forecast, update

the weather effects chart. Because a brigade or battalion’s area of interest (AOI) is small, the SWO’s

forecast is likely to be uniform across the AOI.

F-8

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Weather Elements and Support

WEATHER TOOLS

F-27. Figures F-3 and F-4 (page F-10) and tables F-5 through F-11 (pages F-10 though F-13) depict

weather tools that assist in ascertaining conditions during military operations.

Unfavorable

Weather

Favorable

Marginal

Mission

(severely

element

(unrestricted)

(restricted)

restricted)

Maneuver: mobility

Visibility

>1.5 km

0.8 to 1.5 km

<0.8 km

(track vehicles, day)

Rainfall

<0.1 in per h

0.1 to 0.5 in per h

>0.5 in per h

Snow depth

<12 in

12 to 20 in

>20 in

Maneuver: mobility

Visibility

>0.2 km

0.1 to 0.2 km

<0.1 km

(track vehicles, night

Rainfall

<0.1 in per h

0.1 to 0.5 in per h

>0.5 in per h

with PVS-5 NVG)

Snow depth

>12 in

12 to 20 in

>20 in

Visibility

>0.3 km

0.1 to 0.3 km

<0.1 km

Rainfall

<0.1 in per h

0.1 to 0.5 in per h

>0.5 in per h

Maneuver: mobility

Snow depth

<3 in

3 to 6 in

>6 in

(dismounted infantry)

Temperature

<32 C

>32 C

--------------

Wind chill

>0 C

0 C to -30 C

<-30 C

temperature

Maneuver: weapons

Visibility

>3.0 km

0.5 to 3.0 km

<0.5 km

positioning (antiarmor

Temperature

>18 C

<-18 C

-----------

direct fire)

Visibility

>5.0 km

1.5 to 5.0 km

<1.5 km

Ceiling

>800 ft

500 to 800 ft

<500 ft

Fire support (155 mm)

Surface wind

< 35 knots

35 to 50 knots

>50 knots

Snow depth

<4.0 in

4.0 to 6.0 in

>6 in

Visibility

>8.0 km

5.0 to 8.0 km

<5.0 km

Fire support (CAS A-10)

Ceiling

>3,000 ft

500 to 3,000 ft

<500 ft

Intelligence (fixed-wing

Visibility

>5.0 km

3.0 to 5.0 km

<3.0 km

visual reconnaissance)

Ceiling

<3/8 clouds

3/8 to 5/8 clouds

>5/8 clouds

Air defense artillery

Visibility

>5.0 km

3.0 to 5.0 km

<3.0 km

(Vulcan, Chaparral,

Ceiling

>5,000 ft

3,000 to 5,000 ft

<3,000 ft

Stinger)

Rainfall

<0.5 in per h

0.5 to 1.0 in per h

>1.0 in per h

Wind below 16 m

<5 knots

5 to 7 knots

<7 knots

CBRN (chemical,

Stability

Stable

Neutral

Unstable (lapse)

artillery delivery)

Temperature

>21 C

4 to 21 C

<4 C

Humidity

>60 percent

40 to 60 percent

<40 percent

Smoke

Precipitation

None

Light

Moderate or heavy

Visibility

>5.0 km

1.0 to 5.0 km

<1.0 km

Ceiling

>500 ft

300 to 500 ft

<300 ft

Airborne (C-130 to C-17)

Surface wind

<10 knots

10 to 13 knots

>13 knots

Precipitation

None

Light

Freezing rain or hail

Visibility

>1.5 km

0.4 to 1.5 km

<0.4 km

Ceiling

> 500 ft

300 to 500 ft

<300 ft

Aviation (rotary wing)

Surface wind

<20 knots

20 to 30 knots

>30 knots

Precipitation

None

Light

Freezing rain or hail

C—Celsius

ft—foot/feet

mm—millimeter(s)

CAS—close-air support

h—hour(s)

m—meter

CBRN—chemical, biological,

in—inch(es)

NVG—night vision goggles

radiological, nuclear

km—kilometer(s)

Figure F-3. Sample weather effects critical values

6 January 2010

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Appendix F

Figure F-4. National weather service wind chill chart

Table F-5. Extreme weather conditions

Distance covered in one day

Maximum snow

March rates in extreme cold

of marching

depths

Infantry—12 to 24 km

Wet snow

Infantry (snow < 30 cm deep)

3 to 4 km/h

Ski unit—32 to 40 km

Personnel—12 to 18 in

Tracked vehicles—96 to 112 km

Wheeled vehicles

Infantry (snow > 30 cm deep)

1 to 2 km/h

(with chains)—18 in

Thickness of ice required for

Tracked vehicles—30 in

Soldier on skis

6 to 8 km/h

passage

Tracked vehicles

10 to 24 km/h

Tanks and APCs in—

Dry snow

Snow < 50 cm—employed as usual

Personnel—18 to 24 in

Infantry—10 cm

Snow 50 to 75 cm—short moves

Wheeled vehicles (with

Medium tanks—70 cm

Snow > 75 cm—restricted to roads or cleared

chains)—24 in

routes

Tracked vehicles—48 in

APC—armored personnel carrier

h—hour(s)

km—kilometer(s)

> —more than

cm—centimeter(s)

in—inch(es)

< —less than

Table F-6. Estimating wind speed

Knots

Observation

Smoke, vapor from breath, or dust raised by vehicles or personnel—rises vertically. No leaf movement.

Direction of wind shown from smoke, vapor from breath, or dust raised by vehicles or personnel. Slight

1 to 3

intermittent movement of leaves.

4 to 6

Wind slightly felt on face. Leaves rustle.

7 to 10

Leaves and small twigs in constant motion.

11 to 16

Wind raises dust from ground. Loose paper and small branches move.

17 to 21

Small trees with leaves sway. Coastal wavelets form on inland waters.

22 to 27

Large branches on trees in motion. Whistle heard in telephone or fence wires.

28 to 33

Whole trees in motion. Inconvenience felt walking against wind.

One knot = 1 to 15 miles per hour

F-10

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Weather Elements and Support

Table F-7. Load-bearing capacity on fresh water ice

Minimum ice thickness

Minimum distance between load

Load

(cm)

(m)

Soldier on foot

Soldier on skis or snowshoes

Vehicles

¼-ton truck

¾-ton truck

1 ¼-ton truck

2 ¼-ton truck

2 ½-ton truck

5-ton truck

5-ton tanker

5-ton tractor with loaded trailer

M561 Cargo Carrier

Main battle tank

M88 Recovery Vehicle

M108 Howitzer, Self-propelled, 105 mm

M109 Howitzer, Self-propelled, 155 mm

M110 Howitzer, Self-propelled, 8 inch

M113 APC

M548 Cargo Carrier

M577 Command Post Carrier

M578 Recovery Vehicle

BV209 Small Unit Support Vehicle

APC—armored personnel carrier

cm—centimeter(s)

m—meter(s)

mm—millimeter(s)

Table F-8. Weather effects on courses of action

Temperature

Humidity

Wind (knots)

Precipitation

Ceiling (feet)

1,500

Cold

Med

Hot

Low

High

<13

>30

Rain

Snow

Fog

<1,5000

>3,000

3,000

Attack

-1

Defend

-2

Reinforce

+/-3

Withdraw

+/-3

Artillery

Airmobility

Airborne

CAS

Chemical

Intel collect

EW/Commo

Smoke

+/-

+/-1

+ Favors.

CAS—close-air support

collect—collection

Disfavors.

commo—communication(s)

+/- May favor or disfavor, depending on circumstances.

EW—electronic warfare

0 Neither favors or degrades.

Intel—intelligence

X Strongly disfavors.

UW—unconventional warfare

1 Does not favor any military operations; favors attack relative to defense.

< —less than

> —more than

2 Does not favor most military operations; favors defense relative to attack.

3 Hinders mobility but increases concealment.

Note. Weather effects depend on tactical situations. Use chart as a general guide only. Effects on attack and defense are

shown in isolation, rather than as relative to each other.

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Appendix F

Table F-9. Precipitation terms

Term

Specifications

Reduction in visibility

Scattered drops or flakes that do not

None

Very light

completely wet an exposed surface

regardless of duration.

A trace of 0.10 of an inch of

Visibility 5/8 statute mile or more.

Light

precipitation per hour; maximum 0.01

of an inch in six minutes.

1.11 to 0.30 of an inch per hour;

Visibility less than 5/8 statute mile,

Moderate

between 0.01 and 0.03 of an inch in

but not less than 5/16 statute mile.

six minutes.

More than 0.30 of an inch per hour;

Visibility less than 5/16 statute mile.

Heavy

more than 0.03 inches in six minutes.

Table F-10. Beaufort wind scale

No.

Miles per hour

Knots

Description

Sea condition

Specifications

Glassy-smooth,

Calm; smoke rises

0-1.7

0-1

Calm

Mirror-like.

vertically.

Direction of wind shown

1.8-4.0

1-3

Light air

Scale-like ripples.

by smoke drift, but not by

wind vanes.

Wind felt on face, leaves

Small, short wavelets

4.1-7.4

4-6

Light breeze

rustle, ordinary vane

with glassy crests.

moved by wind.

Large wavelets, crests

Leaves and small twigs in

7.5-12.0

7-10

Gentle breeze

begin to break,

constant motion, wind

occasional foam.

extends light flag.

Small waves, some

Raises dust and loose

12.1-18.9

11-16

Moderate breeze

white caps, more

paper; small branches

frequent foam.

are moved.

Moderate longer waves,

Small trees begin to

better formed, many

sway; crested wavelets

19.0-24.7

17-21

Fresh breeze

white caps, much foam,

begin to form on inland

some spray.

waters.

Large branches in

Large waves form,

motion, whistling heard in

many whitecaps, foam

24.8-31.6

22-27

Strong breeze

telegraph wires,

everywhere, more

umbrellas used with

spray.

difficulty.

Sea heaps up; streaks

Whole trees in motion,

31.7-38.5

28-33

Moderate

of foam, spindrift

inconvenience felt in

begins.

walking against wind.

Moderately high, long

Breaks twigs off trees,

waves, crests into

28.6-46.6

34-40

Fresh gale

generally impedes

spindrift, well-marked

progress.

streaks of foam.

High waves, sea rolls,

Slight structural damage

46.7-53.9

41-47

Strong gale

dense streaks, spray

occurs (chimney pots and

affects visibility.

slates removed).

Trees uprooted,

54-63

48-55

Whole gale

considerable structural

damage occurs.

64-72

56-63

Storm

Widespread damage.

73-82

64-71

Hurricane

Conversion:

Wind (knots) = 0.868391 wind (miles per hour)

Wind (miles per hour) = 1.15155 wind (knots)

F-12

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Weather Elements and Support

Table F-11. Conversion factors

To convert

Use

Temperature

Degrees Fahrenheit (°F)

°C

°C = 5/9 (°F - 32)

Degrees Celsius (°C)

°F

°F = (9/5 °C) + 32)

Distance

Kilometers

Miles

0.62

Kilometers

Nautical miles

0.54

Kilometers

Feet

3,280.80

Miles

Kilometers

1.61

Miles

Nautical miles

0.87

Miles

Yards

1,760.00

Miles

Feet

5,280.00

Nautical miles

Kilometers

1.85

Nautical miles

Miles

1.15

Meters

Feet

3.28

Yards

Feet

3.00

Speed

Kilometers/hour

Miles/hour

0.62

Kilometers/hour

Knots (nautical miles/hour)

0.54

Miles/hour

Kilometers/hour

1.61

Miles/hour

Knots

0.87

Miles/hour

Feet/second

1.467

Knots

Kilometers/hour

1.85

Knots

Miles/hour

1.15

Meters/second

Feet/second

3.281

Meters/second

Miles/hour

2.237

Pressure

Inches of mercury (Hg)

Millibar

33.86395

Millibar (Mb)

Inches of mercury

0.295299

Length

Feet

Meters

0.3048

Feet

Centimeters

30.48

Inches

Meters

0.0254

Inches

Centimeters

2.54

Meters

Yards

1.094

Yards

Meters

0.9144

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Appendix G

Intelligence Resources

There are numerous resources available to the intelligence professional to assist in

conducting intelligence operations. Knowing where to start when looking for specific

information can be the biggest obstacle to overcome when conducting these

operations. This appendix lists some starting points for obtaining

information/intelligence and contains some of the most commonly used analyst aids.

For a more comprehensive list of resources used for intelligence reach operations, see

FM 2-33.5.

MILITARY PUBLICATIONS

G-1. The references mentioned in this manual can be found at the following Web sites:

Army publications. Army Publication Directorate Web portal: http://www.apd.army.mil/.

Joint publications. Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System

(JDEIS) Web portal: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TRAINING PUBLICATIONS

G-2. Military intelligence

(MI) approved and draft individual and collective training manuals

(for

example, Soldier training plans [STPs] and MI Gunnery) are also available for downloading and viewing

on the Intelligence Knowledge Network (IKN), at https://icon.army.mil/.

PERSONNEL SECURITY RESOURCE

G-3. Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS), at

https://www.dss.mil/portal/ShowBinary/BEA%20Repository/new_dss_internet/diss/jpas/jpas.html , is the

Department of Defense (DOD) personnel security migration system for—

The virtual consolidation of the DOD central adjudication facilities.

Use by nonsensitive compartmented information (non-SCI) security program managers and

special security officers.

Special access program managers.

DOD contractor security officers.

G-4. JPAS automates both core and central adjudication facility-unique functionality and provides “real

time” information about clearance, access, and investigative status to authorized DOD security personnel

and other interfacing organizations, such as Defense Security Service, Defense Manpower Data Center,

Defense Civilian Personnel Management System, Office of Personnel Management, and U.S. Air Force

Personnel Center.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OPEN-SOURCE RESOURCES

G-5. Intelligence Knowledge Network (IKN), at https://icon.army.mil/ , is a knowledge management tool

that enables intelligence Soldiers worldwide to communicate, collaborate, and investigate. IKN—

Hosts discussion forums.

Serves as a single point of entry to get to U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

(USAICoE) and other intelligence community Web sites.

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Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 7) - page 19