Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 7)

Chapter 1

Table 1-2. Intelligence disciplines

All-source intelligence

•

All-source intelligence—Intelligence products or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of

information, most frequently including human resources intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and

signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open-source data in the production of finished intelligence (FM 1-02).

•

MOSs/AOCs associated with all-source intelligence—35F/350F, 35D.

•

For more information on all-source intelligence, see FM 2-0.

Counterintelligence

•

Counterintelligence—counters or neutralizes intelligence collection efforts through collection,

counterintelligence investigations, operations, analysis and production, and functional and technical services.

Counterintelligence includes all actions taken to detect, identify, exploit, and neutralize the multidiscipline

intelligence activities of friends, competitors, opponents, adversaries, and enemies; and is the key

intelligence community contributor to protect U.S. interests and equities (FM 2-0).

•

MOSs/AOCs associated with CI—35L/351L, 35E.

•

For more information on CI, see FM 2-22.2.

Human intelligence

•

Human intelligence—Collection by a trained human intelligence collector of foreign information from people

and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment,

personnel, and capabilities. It uses human sources and a variety of collection methods, both passively and

actively, to gather information to satisfy the commander’s intelligence requirements and cross-cue other

intelligence disciplines (FM 2-0).

•

MOSs/AOCs associated with HUMINT—35M/351M, 35F.

•

For more information on HUMINT, see FM 2-22.3.

Geospatial intelligence

•

Geospatial intelligence—The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe,

assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth.

Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information (FM 2-0).

•

MOSs/AOCs associated with GEOINT—21Y, 35G, 35H/350G, 215D, 35C.

•

For more information on GEOINT, see FM 2-0.

Imagery intelligence

•

Imagery intelligence—Intelligence derived from the exploitation of imagery collected by visual photography,

infrared, lasers, multispectral sensors, and radar. These sensors produce images of objects optically,

electronically, or digitally on film, electronic display devices, or other media (FM 2-0).

•

MOSs/AOCs associated with IMINT—35G, 35H/350G, 35C.

•

For more information on IMINT, see FM 2-0.

Measurement and signature intelligence

•

Measurement and signature intelligence—Technically derived intelligence that detects, locates, tracks,

identifies, and/or describes the specific characteristics of fixed and dynamic target objects and sources. It

also includes the additional advanced processing and exploitation of data derived from imagery intelligence

and signals intelligence collection (FM 2-0).

•

MOSs/AOCs associated with MASINT—35G, 35S/350G, 352S, 35C.

•

For more information on MASINT, see FM 2-0.

Open-source intelligence

•

Open-source intelligence—Relevant information derived from the systematic collection, processing, and

analysis of publicly available information in response to intelligence requirements (FM 2-0).

•

The Army does not have a specific MOS, AOC, additional skill identifier, or special qualification identifier for

OSINT.

•

For more information on OSINT, see FM 2-0.

Signals intelligence

•

Signals intelligence—Category of intelligence comprising individually or in combination all communications

intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted.

Signals intelligence is derived from communications, electronics, and foreign instrumentation signals (FM 2-0).

•

MOSs/AOCs associated with SIGINT—35N, 35P, 35S/352N, 352P, 352S, 35G.

•

For more information on SIGINT, see FM 2-0.

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The Intelligence Warfighting Function

Table 1-2. Intelligence disciplines (continued)

Technical intelligence

•

Technical intelligence—Intelligence derived from the collection and analysis of threat and foreign military

equipment and associated materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign

scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an adversary’s

technological advantages (FM 2-0).

•

The Army does not have a specific MOS, AOC, additional skill identifier, or special qualification identifier for

TECHINT.

•

For more information on TECHINT, see FM 2-0.

AOC—area of concentration

MOS—military occupational specialty

CI—counterintelligence

OSINT—open-source intelligence

GEOINT—geospatial intelligence

SIGINT—signals intelligence

IMINT—imagery intelligence

TECHINT—technical intelligence

MASINT—measurement and signature intelligence

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Chapter 2

Role of Intelligence in Military Decisionmaking

This chapter discusses the two processes available to develop operational planning—

the rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process

(RDSP) and the military

decisionmaking process (MDMP). The role of intelligence in each process is also

discussed. See FM 5-0 for detailed information on the MDMP.

THE RAPID DECISIONMAKING AND SYNCHRONIZATION

PROCESS

2-1. The RDSP is the operational planning process routinely employed by commanders and staff when

MDMP and troop-leading procedures are not timely enough for mission execution. This technique is used

by leaders to focus on executing rather than planning. The RDSP is based on an existing order and seeks an

acceptable solution, while the MDMP seeks an optimal solution.

2-2. Intelligence support to the RDSP focuses on experience and situational awareness in predicting

activities or events and managing assets dynamically to adapt rapidly to a changing threat environment.

RDSP facilitates continuous integration and synchronization of the warfighting functions to address the

constantly changing situations.

THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

2-3. The military decisionmaking process is a process that integrates the activities of the commander,

staff, and subordinate commanders in developing an operation plan or order. It establishes methods for

understanding the situation and analyzing a mission; developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of

action; selecting the most favorable course of action; and producing an operation plan or order (FM 5-0).

Unlike the RDSP, the MDMP is detailed, deliberate, sequential, and time consuming. It helps the

commander and staff examine the area of operations (AO) and reach logical decisions.

2-4. Commanders follow the “one-third/two-thirds rule” to allocate time available for planning and

preparation: they use one-third of the time available for their planning and allocate the remaining two-thirds

to their subordinates. However, modern information systems and parallel and collaborative planning

techniques can enable commanders to obtain more of a one-fifth/four-fifths planning ratio.

2-5. Intelligence support to MDMP is based on continuous intelligence preparation of the battlefield

(IPB), which is an integrated staff function driven by the commander. The intelligence officer must train

the intelligence section to conduct IPB and coordinate closely with other staff and warfighting function

representatives. The intelligence officer should have a thorough understanding of all the warfighting

functions to effectively integrate intelligence during planning.

2-6. The MDMP is a seven-step analytical process with each step building from the previous steps.

Within each step, the commander and staff assess the operation based on their understanding, monitoring,

and evaluation of the situation and operation. The seven steps of the MDMP are—

Receipt of mission.

Mission analysis.

Course of action (COA) development.

COA analysis (wargaming).

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Chapter 2

COA comparison.

COA approval.

Orders production.

2-7. Each step in the process has different intelligence requirements and imposes different tasks on the

supporting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) units and/or organizations at all levels. The

intelligence staff assists the commander in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations by—

Providing timely, relevant, accurate, predictive, and tailored intelligence.

Making running estimates and recommendations.

Preparing the intelligence portions of the operation plan

(OPLAN) and operation order

(OPORD).

Monitoring the execution of ISR operations.

RUNNING ESTIMATE

2-8. The MDMP is much more than simply selecting a particular COA. It results in a series of products,

including updated running estimates. A running estimate is a staff section’s continuous assessment of

current and future operations to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the

commander’s intent and if future operations are supportable (FM 6-0).

2-9. As staff members receive information, they prepare and maintain the running estimate. Table 2-1

lists staff duties and responsibilities for preparing and maintaining a running estimate.

Table 2-1. The running estimate

Running estimate

The intelligence staff’s running estimate

•

Staff members continuously consider the

•

Intelligence staff members use format in TC 2-33.4.

effect of new information and update facts,

•

The running estimate, at an absolute minimum,

assumptions, friendly force status, enemy

focuses on the threat’s most likely and dangerous

activities and capabilities, and civil

courses of action. As new information is obtained,

considerations.

the intelligence section updates and assesses the

•

Staff members include updated

following:

conclusions and recommendations in the

Facts.

running estimate.

Assumptions.

•

Staff members use running estimates to

Friendly force capabilities regarding the

form, analyze, compare, and recommend

enemy’s capabilities.

friendly COAs to help commanders make

Enemy capabilities for current operations and

decisions and establish policies.

future plans.

•

Staff members use war game results and

Terrain and weather effects on current and

running estimates to compare COAs.

future operations.

Civil considerations affecting current

operations and future plans.

Conclusions and recommendations.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

2-10. Table 2-2 describes each of the seven steps of the MDMP accompanied by an intelligence support to

the MDMP list of the G-2/S-2 section’s responsibilities.

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Role of Intelligence in Military Decisionmaking

Table 2-2. Intelligence support to the MDMP

Step 1—Receipt of mission

Intelligence support to step 1

•

The mission comes from higher head

•

Begin parallel planning and collaborate with higher

quarters or is derived from an ongoing

and lower G-2/S-2 before and during mission

mission.

receipt to facilitate the IPB process.

•

Upon receipt of a new mission, the G-3/S-3

•

Focus activities on the mission variables.

issues a WARNO to the staff.

•

Identify gaps in intelligence holdings.

•

The staff immediately prepares for mission

•

Use intelligence reach to gather updated or

analysis.

additional enemy, terrain, weather, and civil

•

The commander and staff immediately

consideration data.

perform a quick initial assessment with

•

Coordinate with the geospatial engineer and

emphasis on an initial allocation of

weather specialty teams to ensure required

available time.

products are being developed and refined.

•

The commander issues the initial guidance

•

Develop and submit initial RFIs based on gaps in

and the G-3/S-3 issues a WARNO to

intelligence.

subordinate units.

•

Continuously update the MCOO templates, and

threat situation.

•

Update intelligence running estimates.

Step 2—Mission analysis

Intelligence support to step 2

Analyze the higher headquarters’ order. (Seek

•

Identify gaps in higher headquarters ISR plan and

clarification or resolution if confused or

IPB.

opposed.)

•

Lead the staff through the IPB process.

Perform initial IPB.

•

Begin the ISR synchronization process by

Determine specified, implied, and essential

identifying specified and implied intelligence tasks

tasks. (It is important to understand specific

from the higher headquarters order.

requirements for each task.)

Intelligence and intelligence-related products:

Review available assets. (Identify additional

•

Assist in determining the AO and AOI.

resources needed to ensure the mission's

•

Initial information requirements (with staff).

success.)

•

Recommend initial PIRs to the commander.

Determine constraints normally found in the

•

Assist with initial OPSEC vulnerabilities and EEFI.

scheme of maneuver, concept of the operation,

and coordinating instructions.

MCOO and terrain—as described by observation and fields

Identify critical facts and assumptions.

of fire, AAs, key terrain obstacles, and cover and conceal

(List all appropriate assumptions from higher

ment (OAKOC) and its effects. Does the MCOO—

headquarters; state relevant conditions of

•

Identify restricted or severely restricted terrain?

which the commander has no control.)

•

Identify mobility corridors (air and ground)?

Perform risk assessment.

•

Identify infiltration lanes and landing and pickup

Determine initial CCIRs (limit to 10 or less) and

zones?

EEFI.

•

Identify key or decisive terrain?

Determine an initial ISR plan. (The resulting

•

Define defensible terrain?

ISR annex sets ISR in motion.)

Situation templates (unrefined)—Do the situation

10.

Update operational timelines. The commander

templates—

and staff refine initial plan for use of available

time.

•

Include all committed and reinforcing forces as well

as combat multipliers?

11.

Write the restated mission—who, what, when,

where, and why.

•

Focus at a minimum two levels down in detail (or as

12.

Deliver a mission analysis briefing. (Given to

command dictates) including all threat warfighting

commander and staff, this briefing is critical to

functions?

ensure a thorough understanding of planning.)

•

Identify with graphics threat characteristics,

13.

Approve the restated mission.

weaknesses and peculiarities, activities, and

14.

Develop the initial commander's intent—a clear,

capabilities for each COA?

concise statement of what the force should do

Event templates and matrices (unrefined)—Do the event

and the conditions that represent the desired

templates identify and focus on—

end state.

•

NAIs?

15.

Issue the commander's planning guidance,

•

Time phase lines?

which provides additional guidance to focus

•

Time distance analysis?

staff planning.

•

Critical actions?

16.

Issue a WARNO.

•

Threat decision plan?

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Chapter 2

Table 2-2. Intelligence support to the MDMP (continued)

Step 2—Mission analysis

Intelligence support to step 2

17.

Review facts and assumptions. When facts or

IPB products—

assumptions change, the commander and staff

• Identify facts and assumptions that assist in the

must assess their impact.

determination of likely threat COAs.

• Assist with defining threat objectives.

Prepare terrain and weather analysis products to describe

what effects will significantly impact the AO on both threat

and friendly forces.

ISR synchronization tools (initial).

• Do the initial ISR synchronization tools—

Consider the AO and the mission statement?

Consider the current event template and the

amount and location of all ISR assets?

Incorporate higher headquarters ISR

requirements?

• Are the initial ISR synchronization tools based on—

PIRs?

Information requirements?

NAIs?

Update intelligence running estimate.

These products are used to write Annex B of the OPORD or

OPLAN and as the foundation for the DST later in the MDMP.

Forward intelligence requirements that cannot be answered

by assigned ISR assets to higher headquarters as RFIs.

Start the subsequent steps of ISR synchronization to support

the initial ISR plan (at a minimum; SIRs).

The ISR plan is a coordinated staff effort that includes fire

support, casualty evacuation, and contingency plans, for

example, what the brigade does if two key scout sections are

destroyed?

The MI unit commander participates in mission analysis and

briefs the unit asset’s status and capabilities.

Step 3—COA development

Intelligence support to step 3

Analyze relative combat power. See FM 2-01.3.

•

Intelligence and intelligence-related products:

Generate options. Develop COAs for every

Situation templates (refined and prioritized).

feasible threat COA; however, the commander

Event templates and matrices (refined).

usually limits that option with guidance.

Update the intelligence running estimate.

Array initial forces. Identify number of units

•

Provide input to the EW target list (initial).

needed and operational methods. Develop a

•

Ensure the G-3/S-3 uses the IPB facts,

knowledge base for decisionmaking.

assumptions, and products developed during

Develop the concept of operations.

mission analysis and subsequently refined.

Assign headquarters, which creates the task

•

Coordinate with the staff to ensure that friendly

organization.

COAs take advantage of the AO, civil

Prepare COA statements and sketches.

considerations, and threat situation. Coordinate

The G-3/S-3 uses appropriate media to portray

with the staff to refine information requirements.

how unit will accomplish the mission, for

•

Provide input, which is critical when analyzing

example, concept of operations.

relative combat power.

Focus on threat vulnerabilities.

•

Remember to support deception planning (when

appropriate).

•

Provide critical input through continual analysis of

information provided by ongoing ISR operations.

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Role of Intelligence in Military Decisionmaking

Table 2-2. Intelligence support to the MDMP (continued)

Step 4—COA analysis (wargaming)

Intelligence support to step 4

The war game is a critical and disciplined process

•

Intelligence and intelligence-related products:

used to visualize the flow of battle.

PIRs with LTIOV (refined).

Gather the tools.

Assist with the development of HPTL from

List all friendly forces.

HVTs.

List assumptions.

Assist in confirming and/or denying the threat

List known critical events and decision points.

objectives determined during step 2.

Determine evaluation criteria.

Situation templates (final).

Select the wargaming method.

Vulnerabilities to CBRNE operations.

Select a method to record and display results.

Assist with refining the EW target list.

Wargame the battle and assess results.

Update the intelligence running estimate.

•

The commander selects the order of

•

Acting as the threat commander, project threat

comparison of threats to friendly COAs.

actions or reactions, develop decision points, and

•

The staff must evaluate the need for

project threat losses.

branches and sequels.

•

During the war game, address all relevant threat

•

When technically possible, the staff should

warfighting function capabilities.

capture as much of the war game on Army

•

As the friendly G-2/S-2, identify information

Tactical Command and Control Systems as

requirements and NAIs; refine the situation template;

possible, otherwise, use a wargaming

and participate in the targeting conference.

worksheet or intelligence synchronization

•

Ensure the G-3/S-3 honestly portrays friendly

matrix.

capabilities during the war game.

•

These wargaming results are key to

•

Coordinate with entire staff to ensure friendly COAs

developing DSTs and warfighting function

take advantage of the AO and threat situation.

synchronization matrix.

•

Ensure HPTs, AGM, and TSS support the operation.

•

Use the action, reaction, counteraction

•

The AGM is approved by the commander and

method (consider at a minimum maneuver,

addresses which targets will be attacked, how, when,

fire support, mobility, countermobility,

and the desired effects.

survivability, intelligence, and electronic

•

TSS are criteria used in deciding whether to pass

warfare).

information as a target nomination.

•

The staff should track force ratios

•

The MI company commander and ISR

throughout the war game.

synchronization managers are important participants

at the war game.

•

Refine all products as well as the ISR

synchronization tools based on the wargaming

results for the next steps (with the staff).

Step 5—COA comparison

Intelligence support to step 5

•

Conduct a COA advantage and

•

Intelligence products:

disadvantage analysis.

Update the intelligence running estimate.

•

Used to identify COA that has highest

Refine products from step 4.

probability of success.

Play a key role during this step.

•

Staff may use any technique; the decision

matrix is the most common.

•

Staff gets its criteria from the commander

(for example the principles of war or tenets

of Army operations).

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Chapter 2

Table 2-2. Intelligence support to the MDMP (continued)

Step 6—COA approval

Intelligence support to step 6

•

The staff recommends a COA, usually in a

•

Intelligence and intelligence-related products:

decision briefing. (If the commander

PIRs with LTIOV (approved).

modifies a recommended COA or gives the

Support DST development (integrated staff

staff a new COA, the staff wargames that

product).

COA.)

Assist with the warfighting function

•

The commander decides which COA to

synchronization matrix.

approve.

Intelligence synchronization matrix (final).

•

The commander issues the final planning

Event templates and matrices (final).

guidance.

ISR synchronization tools (refined, staff

•

The staff captures all the information in

effort).

verbal orders and WARNOs and produces

•

Support ISR integration (G-3/S-3) development of

a written order to follow up on any

the ISR plan.

previously issued orders.

•

Begin the subsequent ISR steps synchronization,

such as development of new SIRs and RFIs.

•

If the commander designates the staff to perform

BDA to support one of the decisions, plan the BDA

support and tie that plan into the ISR synch matrix.

Step 7—Orders production

Intelligence support to step 7

•

Orders production is based on the

•

Intelligence and intelligence-related products:

commander's decision and final guidance.

OPORD or OPLAN Annex B (Intelligence).

Assist with OPORD or OPLAN annexes.

Update intelligence running estimate.

Update the ISR synchronization matrix.

AA—avenue of approach

ISR—intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance

AGM—attack guidance matrix

LTIOV—latest time information is of value

AO—area of operations

MCOO—modified combined obstacle overlay

AOI—area of interest

MDMP—military decisionmaking process

BDA—battle damage assessment

METT-TC—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and

CBRNE—chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,

support available-time available and civil considerations

high-yield explosives

MI—military intelligence

CCIR—commander’s critical information requirement

NAI—named area of interest

COA—course of action

OPLAN—operation plan

DST—decision support template

OPORD—operation order

EEFI—essential element of friendly information

OPSEC—operations security

EW—electronic warfare

PIR—priority intelligence requirement

HPT—high-payoff target

RFI—request for information

HPTL—high-payoff target list

SIR—specific information requirement

HVT—high-value target

TSS—target selection standard

IO—information operations

WARNO—warning order

IPB—intelligence preparation of the battlefield

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Chapter 3

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is led by the G-2/S-2 with participation by

the entire staff. It is the staff planning activity undertaken to define and understand

the advantages and disadvantages presented to friendly and enemy forces. The

intelligence staff conducts effective IPB when it understands the operational

environment and produces IPB products that support the staff’s preparation of

estimates and the military decisionmaking process. (See FM 2-01.3.)

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD PROCESS

3-1. The G-2/S-2 staff element is the proponent for intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB);

however, the entire staff participates in the process. The IPB process consists of four steps that are

performed or assessed and refined continuously to ensure IPB products remain complete and relevant, and

the commander receives intelligence support during current and future operations. The four steps are—

Define the operational environment.

Describe environmental effects on operations.

Evaluate the threat.

Determine threat courses of action (COAs).

STEP 1—DEFINE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

3-2. Step 1 of the IPB process focuses the unit’s initial planning efforts and the remaining steps of the IPB

process. The G-2/S-2 leads the staff in identifying characteristics of the area of operations (AO) and area of

interest

(AOI). The AO’s and AOI’s effects on friendly and threat operations as well as the local

population, require in-depth evaluation. See table 3-1 (page 3-2) and figure 3-1 (page 3-3).

3-3. There are multiple operational environments, and the analysis of any operational environment is a

resource-intensive analytical task. The operational environment for each campaign or major operation is

different, and it evolves as each campaign or operation progresses. The operational variables (political,

military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time—PMESII-PT) and

the mission variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troop and support available, time available, and

civil considerations—METT-TC) are used across the different echelons to describe each operational

environment. The Army uses the ASCOPE (areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and

events) characteristics to describe civil considerations as part of the mission variables (METT-TC) during

IPB and mission analysis.

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Chapter 3

Table 3-1. Step 1—Define the operational environment

G-2/S-2 considerations

Task—Identify significant characteristics of the environment.

Identify for further analysis in step 2:

Enemy. Identify enemy forces anticipated during the operation—

•

Location.

•

Mobility.

•

General capabilities.

•

Weapon ranges.

Terrain. Coordinate with the geospatial engineer teams to ensure the required products are being developed and

refined regarding—

•

Hydrological data.

•

Elevation data.

•

Soil composition.

•

Vegetation.

Task—Identify significant characteristics of the environment.

Weather (terrestrial and spatial). Coordinate with the weather specialty team to ensure the required products are

being developed and refined regarding—

•

Visibility.

•

Wind velocity.

•

Precipitation.

•

Cloud cover.

•

Temperature.

•

Humidity.

•

Atmospheric pressure (as required).

Civil considerations. Six characteristics expressed in the memory aid ASCOPE (see figure 3-1):

•

Areas.

•

Structures.

•

Capabilities.

•

Organizations.

•

People.

•

Events.

Task—Identify the limitations of the command’s AO.

•

If not determined by the higher headquarters, the G-2/S-2 coordinates with the G-3/S-3 to develop a

recommendation on the AO for the commander’s approval and submission to higher headquarters.

•

The G-3/S-3, in coordination with the G-2/S-2, assigns AOs to subordinate units.

Task—Establish the limits of the area of influence and the AOI.

Area of influence—

•

Is determined by both the G-2/S-2 and the G-3/S-3.

•

Includes geographical areas where a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver

and fire support systems.

AOI—

•

Is established by the commander with input from the G-2/S-2 and G-3/S-3.

•

Is an area normally larger than the area of influence and may require more ISR assets to monitor.

•

May include staging areas.

Task—Evaluate existing databases and identify intelligence gaps.

The G-2/S-2 staff—

•

Conducts data mining via the DCGS-A to determine intelligence gaps using national, multinational, joint, and

higher echelon databases.

•

Identifies and prioritizes the gaps in the current holdings.

•

Once approved by the commander, these gaps become the commander's initial intelligence requirements.

Task—Initiate collection of information required to complete IPB.

To fill the intelligence gaps—

•

The G-2/S-2 and G-3/S-3 initiate collection.

•

The G-2/S-2 submits RFIs.

AO—area of operations

IPB—intelligence preparation of the battlefield

AOI—area of interest

ISR—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

DCGS-A—Distributed Common Ground System-Army

RFI—request for information

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Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Areas

Structures

Capabilities

Organizations

People

Events

Tribes

Cemeteries

Sewer

Tribal

Phones

Weddings

Family or clans

Religious shrines

Water

Family or clans

Speeches

Birthdays

Houses of

Face-to-face

Religious

Ethnicity

Electrical

Religious

worship

meetings

gatherings

Bars and tea

Religion

Academic

Ethnic

Media—radio

Funerals

shops

Economic

Social gathering

U.S./multinational

Media—

Major religious

Trash

districts

places

forces

television

events

Anniversaries

Smuggling

Governmental

Print shops

Medical

Media—print

of wars and

routes

agencies

battles

National

Farmers or

Visual—graffiti,

Birthdays or

Internet cafes

Security

boundaries

merchants

signs

remembrances

Social class—

Television

Market (use and

Community

Visual—videos,

Harvest of

rich, middle,

stations

controls)

organizations

DVDs

plantings

poor

Employment and

Military and militia

Audio—pirated or

Reconstruction

Political districts

Radio stations

commerce

units

illegal radio

openings

Rallies or

Town council

Military districts

Hospitals

Crime and justice

Illicit organizations

demonstrations

meetings

School districts

Banks

Basic needs

Insurgent groups

Restaurants

Elections

Road systems

Dams

Public health

Gangs

Door-to-door

Sports events

Water sources

Gas stations

Religion

Nomads

Sports

Displaced

Construction

Displaced persons

Religious

Military barracks

persons and

sites

and refugees

gatherings

refugees

Gang territory

Jails

Political voices

Volunteer groups

Parks

Safe areas and

Water pumping

Civil rights,

Intergovernmental

Family

sanctuaries

stations

individual rights

organizations

gatherings

Oil and gas

Trade routes

Political

Gas lines

pipelines

Bars and tea

Power grids

Water lines

Contractors

shops

Nongovernmental

Power lines

Food lines

organizations

Storage facilities

Labor unions

Job lines

Electric

Speaking to

Indigenous groups

substations

reporters

Figure 3-1. Examples of ASCOPE characteristics

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STEP 2—DESCRIBE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ON OPERATIONS

3-4. In this step of the IPB process, the G-2/S-2 analyzes the environmental effects with which U.S.

forces, multinational partners, threats, and local population must contend. (See table 3-2.)

Table 3-2. Step 2—Describe environmental effects on operations

G-2/S-2 considerations

Task—Analyze the environment.

The G-2/S-2—

•

Analyzes the effects of the terrain, weather, and civil considerations with which U.S. forces, multinational

partners, threats, and noncombatants have to contend.

•

Identifies the limitations and opportunities the environment offers to potential operations of friendly and threat

forces as well as the local population.

•

Focuses the analytic effort on the general capabilities of each force until COAs are developed in later steps

of the IPB process.

Task—Describe the environmental effects on threat and friendly capabilities and COAs.

Working with the geospatial engineer team and weather specialty teams, the G-2/S-2 section produces the following

noninclusive list of products during step 2 of the IPB process. (See paragraphs following table 3-3 [page 3-7].):

•

Integrated products such as the MCOO.

•

Overlays that depict the military aspects and effects of terrain include—

LOCs.

Line of sight.

Imagery.

Urban terrain.

Key infrastructure.

Congregation and mass assembly points overlays.

•

Weather analysis matrices and graphic displays.

•

Population status overlays.

COA—course of action

LOC—line of communication

IPB—intelligence preparation of the battlefield

MCOO—modified combined obstacle overlay

3-5. To achieve desired step 2 results, develop the following products as appropriate to the situation:

Modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO).

Line of communications overlay.

Line of sight overlay.

Imagery overlay.

Urban terrain overlay.

Key infrastructure overlay.

Weather analysis matrices and graphic displays.

Congregation and mass assembly points overlay.

Population status overlays.

MODIFIED COMBINED OBSTACLE OVERLAY

3-6. Figure 3-2 depicts an example MCOO. The MCOO fuses the—

Combined obstacle overlay.

Avenue of approach (AA) overlay with mobility corridors.

Operational graphics.

Key terrain.

Known threat objectives into a comprehensive terrain product.

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Figure 3-2. Example modified combined obstacle overlay

LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS OVERLAY

3-7. The line of communications (LOC) overlay depicts major LOCs within and around an AO. The LOC

overlay—

Includes roads, airfields, mountain passes, waterways, and footpaths.

Includes pertinent data, such as road widths, their load capacity, sharp turns, potential ambush

positions, potential sniper positions, and overhanging obstacles.

Provides mobility information to assist planners and operators determine what personnel and

equipment can move along the mobility corridors.

In urban operations, depicts normal traffic conditions that help the unit determine the best times

to operate and provide an indicator of an unusual event.

With local water systems can list important items, such as the width and depth of the waterway,

key crossing sites (depending on the size of the waterway), and key uses of that waterway (for

example, commerce, water source for crops, drinking water source for the local population).

LINE OF SIGHT OVERLAY

3-8. The line of sight overlay is particularly important in complex terrain. This overlay—

Can help define AAs to an objective.

Can help pinpoint potential observation or sniper positions along each relevant AA based on the

best possible locations given line of sight, elevation, exposure, and other pertinent

considerations.

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Note. Reverse line-of sight overlays, which show the friendly AAs from the enemy standpoint,

are just as important as line of sight overlays. The enemy can be expected to try to cover dead

space from the objective area with other positions or devices such as mines or improvised

explosive devices (IEDs). If the enemy on the objective simply wants to flee, dead spaces may

simply be covered by some type of early warning system.

IMAGERY OVERLAY

3-9. Imagery is important in the analysis of any situation. Imagery products include both aerial

photography and satellite imagery. In many cases, tasked aerial reconnaissance platforms, such as

unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), respond directly to the commander, ensuring timely and focused data

collection. Because of technical limitations or priorities established at the higher echelons, space-based and

other national collection assets may not be available to the commander and staff. Additionally, as each

collection system has its own unique capabilities, traditional black and white or infrared imagery may offer

the best view of the target in a given situation.

3-10. Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) provides the G-2/S-2 access to tactical,

theater, and national imagery systems as well as the Image Processing Library. Data collected from such

sources is transferred in digital format that can be manipulated to address specific requirements.

3-11. Advanced geospatial intelligence

(GEOINT) products are produced using any combination of

imaging platforms: visible, infrared, radar, or spectral depending on the requestor’s needs. Due to the

versatility of these products, they have a wide range of applications. Combining imagery with digital terrain

elevation data presents an oblique perspective. Spectral imagery accomplishes discovery and identification

of manmade and indigenous activity from patterns of heat distribution and determination of changes in a

scene imaged at various times. Other uses include facility analysis, structural analysis, target detection, soil

analysis, and damage assessment.

URBAN TERRAIN OVERLAY

3-12. Urban terrain overlays depict specific aspects of terrain unique to the urban environment, for

example—

Details of a single building, a group of buildings, a section of an urban area, or even an entire

urban area.

Different terrain zones apparent in an urban area. Different types of terrain can be indicated

using hatch marks or other indicators on a map or aerial photograph. Zone types may be defined

as close, orderly block, or dense random construction (see FM 3-06.11), or by any other

designated characteristics required by the mission, such as zones of threat occupation or zones

divided by the types of predicted weapons effects.

A building type overlay that depicts particular types of buildings, such as industrial, government,

and military buildings, residential areas, businesses, warehouses or storage buildings, religious

centers, or media locations. Each building can be numbered or otherwise identified depending on

the needs of the commander and the commander’s staff.

Entire sections of a city can be marked depending on the customary type of construction in a

particular area. For example, an area of dense construction or a shantytown can be identified by

appropriately labeling it on an overlay or directly onto an aerial photograph.

Shantytowns may require highlighting because they may be areas with notable food shortages

and disease and pollution are most prevalent. They may lack public utility infrastructure (for

example, plumbing and electricity). Buildings are often constructed from miscellaneous

materials, and there is no consistent pattern of streets or corridors, which can complicate military

operations. These types of conditions result in a generally dissatisfied population—a potential

source of unrest.

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Unoccupied locations or buildings should be identified, since these locations or buildings can be

used as shelter for troops (friendly or threat) or as locations for friendly forces to demonstrate

firepower if necessary. The latter utility was demonstrated in Kosovo when a tank round was

shot into an unoccupied building to quell an increasingly worrisome civil disturbance.

Additionally, unoccupied locations or buildings could be storage or meeting sites for threat

forces.

Depicting street widths in terms of major weapons systems can help identify formations or

routes that are most advisable for an area. Streets that allow two Abrams tanks to advance, side

by side, enable the vehicles to better cover upper floors on opposite sides of the street, thereby

providing security for each other. In addition, depicting buildings that exceed the depression or

elevation capabilities of vehicle weapons systems can identify areas of concern and potential

enemy ambush positions. Routes with such “dead spaces” may enable convoys with additional

or alternative weapons systems to eliminate this vulnerability.

KEY INFRASTRUCTURE OVERLAY

3-13. The key infrastructure overlay is a group of products rather than a single product. (See table 3-3.)

These overlays can be produced by using—

A map.

Aerial photography.

A graphic design that is appropriately marked with a numbering or color-coded system that

indicates the type of asset as well as its specific attributes.

Table 3-3. Key infrastructure overlay

Critical infrastructure. Anything that, if harmed, can affect the living conditions of the population.

•

Electricity generation plants.

•

Government buildings.

•

Hydroelectric dams.

•

Oil pumping stations.

•

Police stations.

•

Public markets.

•

Pumping stations.

•

Sewage treatment plants.

•

Water purification plants.

Protected urban terrain. Areas that should not be destroyed, attacked, or occupied, or that have

other use restrictions based on international treaties, rules of engagement, and common sense.

•

Schools.

•

Hospitals.

•

Areas with large amounts of

•

Buildings with many stories.

phone and/or electrical

wiring.

Example: Medical facilities may be depicted on their own key infrastructure overlay. Medical facilities are generally no-

fire areas for friendly forces and should be protected from damage or destruction so that they can continue to take care

of the local population once friendly forces have secured the urban area. Inadequate health care for the local

population can lead to both a negative perception of friendly forces and an uncontrolled increase in disease, which can

affect friendly forces personnel working in the urban environment directly.

Media facilities include locations of—

•

Transmission stations.

•

Transmission antennas.

•

Newspaper production.

•

Distribution sites.

•

Television stations.

•

Radio stations.

Transportation facilities include locations of—

•

Rail hubs.

•

Major bus connection sites.

•

Freeways.

•

Subway lines.

•

Major thoroughfares and intersections that are significant to the operation.

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Table 3-3. Key infrastructure overlay (continued)

Resource sites. The resources and infrastructure used to support the critical resource needs of a

population such as—

•

Building material locations.

•

Car lots.

•

Appliance warehouses.

•

Petroleum and natural gas processing plants.

Culturally significant structures such as—

•

Places of religious worship (for example, churches, temples, mosques).

•

All relevant government and internationally significant buildings (for example, embassies, consulates).

•

War memorials.

Dangerous facilities

•

Structures with known chemical, biological, or incendiary features.

•

Toxic industrial material sites such as pharmaceutical plants, oil refineries, or fertilizer plants.

•

Ammunition storage sites.

Key subterranean infrastructure

•

Underground railways.

•

Any other underground feature of significance for the operation.

•

Sewer systems.

•

Underground electrical wiring.

WEATHER ANALYSIS MATRICES AND GRAPHIC DISPLAYS

3-14. An integral element within the IPB process is weather analysis. Weather data pertaining to IPB is

either climatological information or current forecasts. This climatological data is fused with terrain

information to produce collaborative weather and terrain products. The G-2/S-2 should collaborate with the

weather specialty team to develop weather products that depict weather effects—

On friendly operations.

On enemy operations.

That are common to both friendly and enemy operations.

3-15. Figure 3-3 exemplifies a weather effects matrix and figure 3-4 exemplifies a weather impact chart.

Weather Effects

Operation

06-09

09-12

12-15

15-18

18-21

21-24

00-03

03-06

Comments

EAC reconnaissance

Tactical

y Transitional

reconnaissance

period between

UAS—Hunter

northeast and

UAS—Predator

southwest

Ground

monsoons.

reconnaissance

y Northeast

Armor maneuverability

monsoons

Infantry

provide favorable

maneuverability

weather for

operations with

Helicopter, CAS (A-10),

decreased rain

C-130 (non-AWADS)

and

CAS (Non-A-10)

thunderstorms.

C-130 (AWADS)

y During the

Artillery

transitional

Air defense

period tropical

cyclone

Engineers

frequency

Laser or thermal

increases.

operations

MOPP IV

F—moderate degradation T—temperature

V—visibility

C—ceiling

F—severe degradation

W—wind

P—perception

Figure 3-3. Example weather effects forecast matrix

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Next 24 Hours

Area of Operations Forecast Overview

September

Alexandria

• Next 72 hours: 20% chance of

thunderstorms in the vicinity of

Rotary

Partly

Alexandria and Baton Rouge.

Cloudy

Convoy

71/95

• Tropical Storm Ophelia.

Communications

New Orleans

• Average rainfall expected to be 6 - 10

New Orleans

inches.

APOD

•

70 mph winds.

Rotary

Partly

Cloudy

• Widespread flooding not expected.

Convoy

71/95

Communications

Troops

Baton Rouge

APOD

Sunny

Rotary

70/95

Convoy

Communications

Date

13 September

14 September

15 September

16 September

Forecast

Sunny

Partly cloudy

Low/High

69/91

71/91

71/90

Wind

Direction

Speed

V 0 - 5 mph

SW 0 - 5 mph

V 0 - 5 mph

APOD—aerial port of debarkation

SW—southwest

V—visibility

F—flooding

T—temperature

W—wind

mph—miles per hour

TS—thunderstorm

Figure 3-4. Example weather impact chart for civil support operations

CONGREGATION AND MASS ASSEMBLY POINTS OVERLAY

3-16. Congregation and mass assembly point overlays depict the numbers, types, and locations of sites

where a large number of people can be gathered for demonstrations, protection, or feeding in the event of a

disaster. If normally used for large gatherings of people, these locations can also be coded with information

on the population group that frequents them, days and hours of operation, and type of activity that occurs.

These sites include—

Places of religious worship.

Parks.

Schools.

Restaurants.

Town squares.

Recreational centers.

Sports facilities.

Entertainment centers.

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POPULATION STATUS OVERLAYS

3-17. Population status overlays are a group of products rather than a single product. These products depict

how the population of a designated area is divided based on a single characteristic (see figure 3-5) such as—

Age.

Religion.

Ethnicity.

Tribal affiliation.

Income.

Population dispersal variances (day versus night)—identifying possibly restrictive operating

conditions or revealing times that are most conducive for the completion of a given mission.

Figure 3-5. Example population status overlay

3-18. Some of the benefits of population status overlays—

Help determine possible sources of friction (that can exist between groups).

Identify the population or location in greatest need of a certain activity or asset.

3-19. Methods of constructing population status overlays include—

Color-coding sections of an AO-based on the area’s populations.

Dividing the AO into specific areas such as the same service or political boundaries used by

local authorities--local police precincts, municipal districts, or counties--that can help clarify

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the situation and aid in coordination efforts with the local authorities. Inserting pie charts for

each AO shows each group and numbers or percentages.

STEP 3—EVALUATE THE THREAT

3-20. In step 3, the G-2/S-2 and staff analyze the command’s intelligence holdings, which they identified

in step 1, to determine how the threat normally conducts operations under similar circumstances. When

operating against a new or less-defined threat, the G-2/S-2 may need to develop or expand intelligence

databases and threat models concurrently. To accomplish this, the G-2/S-2 should conduct threat

characteristic (previously order of battle [OB] factors) analysis for each group identified in step 1. See table

3-4 for threat characteristic examples and table 3-5 (page 3-12) for G-2/S-2 considerations for step 3 of the

IPB process.

Table 3-4. Threat characteristics

Threat characteristic

Considerations

Regular Army

Militia

Unit designation

Composition

Unit history

Uniforms

Insignia

Type of unit

Disposition

Historic

Current

Proposed future

Method of operations

Intent

Propaganda

Tactics

Conventional

Unconventional

Asymmetrical

Terrorism

Individual

Team

Unit

Training

Source of training

Uniforms

Insignia

Specialized training

Food

Transportation

Fuel

Sustainment

Spare parts

Water

Ammunition

Maintenance status

Strength

Goals

Personnel

Operational effectiveness

Morale

Weapons

Leadership

Equipment

Chain of command

Loyalty

Written

Internet

Signal

Communications

Verbal and live drops

Emitter type

Frequency range

Electronic

Surveillance

Countersurveillance

Intelligence

Deception

Reconnaissance

EW capability

Local

National

Regional

Recruitment

International

Coercion

Volunteers

Motivation

Financial

Media

Local

Support

National

Regional

Religious

International

Popular

Tribal/Ethnic

Databases

Assets

Connectivity

Reach

Architecture

Access

Informal networks

Loyalties

Agenda

National agencies

Leadership

Capabilities

Relationships

Loyalties

Agenda

Law enforcement agencies

Leadership

Capabilities

Relationships

Loyalties

Agenda

Leadership

IAs and NGOs

Capabilities

Relationships

Personality

Key leaders

Education level

Idiosyncrasies

Natural diseases

Radiological

Biohazards

Other aspects

Chemical hazards

Toxic industrial

Wildlife

Criminal activity

material

AO—area of operations

IA—international agency

EW—electronic warfare

NGO—nongovernmental organization

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Table 3-5. Step 3—Evaluate the threat

G-2/S-2 considerations

Task: Update or create threat models

Analyze the unit’s intelligence database to determine how the threat normally organizes for combat and conducts

operations under similar circumstances.

•

When facing a well-known threat, the G-2/S-2 can rely on historical databases and well-developed threat

models.

•

When operating against a new or less well-known threat, the G-2/S-2 may need to develop intelligence

databases and threat models concurrently.

Convert threat doctrine or patterns of operations into graphics such as—

•

Threat templates. (See figures 3-6 through 3-9 [pages 3-13 through 3-15].)

•

Incident overlays. (See figure 3-10 [page 3-16].)

•

Pattern analysis plot charts. (See figure 3-11 [page 3-16].)

•

Time event charts. (See figure 3-12 [page 3-17].)

•

Association, relationship, and activities matrices. (See figures 3-13 through 3-16 [pages 3-18 through 3-21].)

Describe the threat’s tactics and options.

Identify HVTs and HPTs.

Task: Identify threat capabilities

Define the capabilities with the use of statements. The following are examples of capability statements:

•

“The threat has the capability to attack with up to eight divisions supported by 150 daily sorties of fixed-wing

aircraft.”

•

“The criminal organization has the ability to pay off local law enforcement agencies.”

•

“The terrorists have the capability to send destructive viruses over the Internet, which can destroy computer

files and archives.”

•

“The threat can establish a prepared defense by 14 May.”

•

“The terrorists have the capability to use CBRNE.”

•

“The drug smugglers have the ability to conduct three drug-smuggling operations simultaneously.”

•

“The terrorists have the ability to conduct multiple car bombings simultaneously.”

•

“The threat has the ability to target friendly convoys along main supply routes using remotely detonated

IEDs.”

Other capabilities include supporting COAs (attack, defend, reinforce, retrograde), specific types of operations, or

operations that allow the threat force to use a COA that is usually unavailable or would be severely hindered if the

supporting operations were not conducted. Examples of these types of operations include--

•

Use of CBRNE weapons.

•

Intelligence collection.

•

EW operations.

•

Use of air assets (fixed and rotary).

•

Engineering operations.

•

Air assault or airborne operations.

•

Amphibious operations.

•

River operations.

•

Propaganda.

•

Deception operations.

•

Car bombings, bomb scares, and suicide bombers.

•

Raids on weapon storage facilities.

•

Carjacking or hijacking of vehicles used in transporting personnel, weapons, and drugs.

•

Theft of chemicals related to drug manufacturing.

•

Threat to IO.

CBRNE—chemical, biological, radiological,

HPT—high-payoff target

nuclear, high-yield explosives

HVT—high-value target

COA—course of action

IED—improvised explosive device

EW—electronic warfare

IO—information operations

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3-21. To achieve desired step 3 results, develop the following key products as appropriate to the situation:

Threat template.

Incident overlay.

Pattern analysis plot sheet.

Time event chart.

Association matrix.

Relationship matrix.

Activities matrix.

Link diagram.

Cultural comparison chart.

Perception assessment matrix.

THREAT TEMPLATE

3-22. Threat templates (see figures 3-6 through 3-9 [pages 3-13 through 3-15]) are tailored to the needs of

the unit or staff section creating them, for example:

Some threat templates consider the threat forces as a whole.

Others focus on a single warfighting function, such as intelligence or fires, while other products

depict pattern analysis, time event charts, and association matrices.

Figure 3-6. Example offensive threat template

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TIME EVENT CHART

3-25. Time event charts are chronological records of individual or group activities designed to store and

display large amounts of information in a small space. (See figure 3-12.) The time event chart helps analyze

larger-scale patterns of activity and relationships. Characteristics of time event charts include—

Triangles representing the beginning and end of the activity.

Rectangles representing other events.

“Xs” through noteworthy events.

Triangles and rectangles, each with a sequence number and date.

Brief descriptions of each event below each rectangle.

Arrows representing time flow from the left to the right, for each row employed.

Figure 3-12. Example time event chart—Southwest Asia

ASSOCIATION MATRIX

3-26. The association matrix (see figure 3-13 [page 3-18])—

Is used to establish the existence of an association, known or suspected, between individuals.

Depicts

“direct connections,” for example, face-to-face meetings or confirmed telephonic

conversations.

Can be used to identify those personalities and associations needing a more in-depth analysis to

determine the degree of relationship, contacts, or knowledge between the individuals.

Helps form the structure of the threat organization as connections between personalities are

made.

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Figure 3-13. Example association matrix

RELATIONSHIP MATRIX

3-27. Relationship matrices depict the nature of relationships between elements of the AO. The nature of

the relationship between two or more components includes measures of contention, collusion, or

dependency. This tool demonstrates graphically how each component of the city interacts with the others

and whether these interactions promote or degrade the likelihood of mission success. The elements can

include—

Members from the noncombatant population.

The friendly force.

International organizations.

Adversarial groups.

Utility infrastructure.

Significant buildings.

Media.

3-28. Figure 3-14 depicts the relationships among a representative compilation of population groups. This

example is an extremely simple version of what might be used during an operation with many actors and

other population elements. For instance, the section marked “Population” might include considerably more

population subgroups than the two included in figure 3-14. When used during a deployment, it is important

for the analysts to realize what groups, subgroups, and other elements should be represented in the matrix,

which could also be used to depict the perceived differences in relationships. For example, in figure 3-14,

“Political Group

3” has a dependent relationship with

“Economic Group 1.” The complementary

relationship (a similar mark in the corresponding box linking Political Group 3 and Economic Group 1) is

not indicated because it might not exist.

3-29. To illustrate the usefulness of the matrix, consider the relationship of the “Government” with the

Infrastructure. In this case, the relationship is “friendly,” perhaps because the Government is in control of

the Infrastructure without contest from the owners or suppliers of the infrastructure.

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Example

As an example, consider communist leaders who control the electricity supply. These

leaders use the infrastructure at their disposal to supply electricity to the population,

but intermittently threatened to deny the service in order to maintain control over a

possibly hostile population. How can this information be used by the commander and

the staff? Perhaps by understanding the nature of two elements of the AO, the link

between the two elements can either be eliminated or leveraged in order to suit the

needs of the friendly unit.

3-30. Figure 3-14 depicts a possible collusion relationship between the Government and Political Group 3,

and a friendly relationship between the Government and the Media. Listed are questions an intelligence

analyst might ask when reviewing this information:

How can the Government use the Media to its advantage?

Will the Government seek to discredit Political Group 3 using the Media?

Will the Population view the Media’s reporting as credible?

Does the Population see the Government as willfully using the Media to suit its own ends?

Figure 3-14. Example relationship matrix

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ACTIVITIES MATRIX

3-31. Activities matrices—

Help connect individuals

(such as those in association matrices) to organizations, events,

entities, addresses, and activities—anything other than people.

When combined with information from association matrices, assists in linking personalities as

well.

3-32. The activities matrix is constructed as a rectangle with rows and columns tailored to the needs of the

analyst exemplifying the problem at hand. (See figure 3-15.)

Figure 3-15. Example activities matrix

LINK DIAGRAM

3-33. A link diagram—

Combines the association, relationship, and activities matrices into a single graphic.

Depicts how individuals and their functional groups are related.

When analyzed, helps determine intelligence gaps.

3-34. Figure 3-16 depicts a link diagram with a timeline of a train bombing in Madrid, Spain.

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Figure 3-16. Example link diagram

CULTURAL COMPARISON CHART

3-35. A cultural comparison chart (see table 3-6):

Is used to deter the idea that only one perspective exists. It may be helpful to clearly point out

the differences between local ideology, politics, predominant religion, acceptable standards of

living, regional populace interests, and U.S. norms.

Can be a stand-alone tool—listing the characteristics of the culture in question—or it can be

comparative—assessing the host country population relative to known and familiar conditions.

Table 3-6. Cultural comparison chart

Value

Western

Middle Eastern

Individualist and collectivist societies:

Individualist

Collectivist

•

Individualists hold that the individual is the primary unit of

Self-sufficient.

Team work (family).

reality and the ultimate standard of value.

Independent.

Reliance/Patronage.

•

Collectivists believe everyone belongs to a certain group.

Personal

Family honor.

The group protects its “members” and expects their loyalty in

achievement.

return.

Universalism and particularism:

Universalist

Particularist

•

Universalists are more likely to apply absolutes regardless

Right is right and

Right and wrong are

of circumstances or situations. The same rules apply to

wrong is wrong.

situation dependent.

everyone in similar situations.

Treat everyone

Life is not fair.

•

Particularists believe one’s behavior, in any given situation,

alike.

Exceptions are made

depends on specific circumstances.

Everyone has the

for certain people.

same rights.

Achieved status

Ascribed status

Achieved and ascribed status

Earn status

Status through birth,

•

How different cultures deal with different levels of status.

through work.

age, or seniority.

Uncertainty avoidance

High-uncertainty

Low-uncertainty

•

The ability of people in a specific culture to adapt to changes

avoidance

or the unknown.

Unknown is

Curious of unknown.

•

Those with high-uncertainty avoidance do not like change

frustrating.

and, to some extent, fear the unknown.

•

People with low-uncertainty avoidance do not feel very

threatened or anxious about uncertainty and are curious

rather than frightened of the unknown.

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Chapter 3

PERCEPTION ASSESSMENT MATRIX

3-36. Friendly force activities intended as benign or benevolent might have negative consequences if a

population’s perceptions are ignored, yet assessed or measured. Perceptions--more than reality--drive

decisionmaking and consequently could influence the reactions of entire populations.

3-37. Perception assessment matrices—

Are often used by psychological operations (PSYOP) personnel.

Can be a valuable tool for intelligence analysts once completed by trained PSYOP personnel.

Provide some measure of effectiveness for the unit’s ability to reach an effect (for example,

maintain legitimacy) during an operation. The matrix can also be used to directly measure the

effectiveness of the unit’s civil affairs, public affairs, and PSYOP efforts.

Example

One proposed PSYOP program developed for Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti

illustrates why perception assessment is necessary. Before deployment, published

leaflets informed the Haitian populace of U.S. intentions. The original leaflet was

published in French—the language of the Haitian elite. The leaflet actually used for

the PSYOP program was published in Creole—the official language of Haiti—

because an astute PSYOP team member realized the need to publish to a wider

audience. If the French leaflet had been dropped on Port-au-Prince, it could have

undermined the U.S. mission in many ways. The majority of the population would

have been unable to read the leaflet. The subsequent deployment of U.S. forces into

the Haiti could have been perceived as hostile. The mission, which was intended, in

part, to restore equity within the Haiti’s social structure, could have backfired if the

Haitians viewed the French leaflet as an indication of U.S. favoritism to the Haitian

elite.

3-38. Perceptions can counter operational objectives; therefore, they should be assessed before and

throughout an operation. Although it is impossible to read the minds of the local population, there are

several means to measure the perceptions:

Demographic analysis and cultural intelligence are key components of perception analysis.

Understanding a population’s history can help predict expectations and reactions.

Human intelligence (HUMINT) can provide information on population perceptions.

Reactions and key activities can be observed to decipher whether people behave based on real

conditions or perceived conditions.

Editorial and opinion pieces of relevant newspapers can be monitored for changes in tone or

opinion shifts that can steer or may be reacting to the opinions of a population group.

3-39. Perception assessment matrices aim to measure the disparities between friendly force actions and

population groups’ perceptions.

(See figure

3-17.) In addition to assessing each population group’s

perceptions, it might benefit the unit to assess its own perceptions of its activities. The unit should address

the following questions to scrutinize its view of an operation:

Are members of the unit exhibiting decidedly Western or American values that are not

appreciated by the host-nation population?

Are embedded U.S. beliefs preventing the unit from understanding the host-nation population or

its multinational partners?

Are the intelligence and command staffs’ perceptions of the AO valid?

Does the population believe what the unit believes?

Can the population’s (or a subgroup’s) perception be detrimental to the unit?

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Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Government

Condition

Food

Use of guns

structure

All men carry

Cultural norm

Rice

Tribal

weapons

All weapons

Alternative proposed by friendly forces

Meat and potatoes

Hierarchical

confiscated

Tolerable if needs

Inadequate or

Population’s perception

Unfair

are fulfilled by group

inconsiderate

in charge

Acceptable difference in perception?

Yes

Culturally accepted

norms; no known

Root of difference

Culture

History

physically detrimental

effects

No, logistically

Possible to change perception?

No, Soldier safety

restricted

PSYOP activities,

Just offer potatoes;

Proposed solution

weapons turn-in

Bargain

seek exchange for rice

program

Possible consequences of changed

Starvation, rioting

Armed backlash

Unknown

perception

Figure 3-17. Example perception assessment matrix

STEP 4—DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION

3-40. The intelligence analyst describes the threat’s intentions verbally, graphically, and in writing. An

effective understanding and presentation of the threat’s COA may be accomplished by developing a

doctrinal narrative. Narratives describe the tasks the threat will accomplish during operations, and describe

other factors that will affect the threat’s intentions during operations. Narratives answer the questions—

“What is the threat doing now?” and “What does the threat want to do?” The best technique for developing

a doctrinal narrative is analyzing the threat through warfighting functions—movement and maneuver,

intelligence, fires, sustainment, command and control (C2), and protection. See table 3-7 for G-2/S-2

considerations during step 4 of the IPB process.

Table 3-7. Step 4—Determine threat courses of action

G-2/S-2 considerations

Task: Identify the threat’s likely objectives and desired end state

The G-2/S-2 depicts the threat based on the commander’s guidance (for example, echelon or cell).

Every staff officer possesses specific information the G-2/S-2 can use to piece together the IPB.

Staff input to enemy COA development, enemy situation template and event template development are listed below.

Staff

Responsibility

•

Evaluate likely air corridors.

•

Determine likely timing of air fires, air assault, or airborne operations.

Air and

•

Determine likely targets and objectives of enemy air operations.

missile

•

Evaluate how the enemy air defense artillery is organized to protect its forces.

defense

•

Evaluate whether the enemy will use air defense in a reconnaissance or a

counterreconnaissance role.

•

Determine where the enemy will deploy mortars or artillery.

Fire support

•

Recommend HVTs (developed into HPTs during wargaming).

•

Anticipate the depth of range of the threat’s indirect fires.

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Chapter 3

Table 3-7. Step 4—Determine threat courses of action (continued)

•

Determine where the enemy is most likely to emplace conventional (for example, mines)

and unconventional (for example, IED) obstacles.

•

Determine the time--

To emplace each type of obstacle.

Engineer

To breach or neutralize obstacles.

For an enemy to establish a given level of defensive preparedness.

•

Determine ability to bridge different river and stream sizes and the time required for each.

•

Make an initial assessment of effort required for stability assessments, such as building

construction.

•

Determine types of delivery systems, including minimum and maximum ranges.

•

Appraise threat CBRN protection capabilities.

CBRN

•

Provide preparation indicators to employ CBRN weapons.

•

Predict friendly assets the enemy is likely to consider as HPTs for CBRN targeting.

•

Analyze existing contaminated areas that may indicate COAs adopted by the enemy.

•

Determine the threat’s ability to locate or intercept friendly systems.

•

Predict the speed at which the enemy can collect, process, and target communications

Signals

and C2 sites.

•

Evaluate the threat’s ability to link collection systems to indirect or direct fires.

•

Estimate the deployment patterns of SIGINT collection systems.

•

Analyze the political and economic situation in the AO.

•

Determine what factions are friendly, neutral, or threatening.

•

Determine who the key leaders are.

Civil affairs

•

Provide the cultural indicators that identify the populace (such as friendly, neutral, anti- or

pro-United States).

•

Predict areas where civilians gather to protest or demonstrate.

•

Determine from whom or where to obtain information about particular AOs.

Task: Identify the full set of COAs available to the threat

The staff considers—

•

The COAs that the threat believes are appropriate to the current situation, and the identification of the

threat’s likely objectives. This requires an understanding of the threat’s decisionmaking process, as well as

an understanding of the threat’s perception of the current situation.

•

The threat COAs that could significantly influence the unit’s mission—for example, diverting combat power to

cover increasing protection requirements.

•

The COAs that may go beyond the boundaries of known threat doctrine or TTP, especially if the known

threat is an individual terrorist, a terrorist cell, or a terrorist group.

•

The threat COAs indicated by recent activities and events. To avoid surprise from an unanticipated COA,

consider all possible explanations for the threat’s activity with an emphasis on ethnic bias, groupthink, and

misunderstanding the threat’s logic.

Task: Evaluate and prioritize COAs

The staff evaluates each threat COA and prioritizes each based on the threat’s likelihood to adopt that COA.

•

Analyze each COA to identify threat strengths, weaknesses, decision points, and objectives.

•

Evaluate how well each COA meets the criteria—suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distinguishability, and

completeness—of threat doctrine, their previous operation, and threat TTP.

•

Evaluate how well each COA takes advantage of the operational environment. How does the operational

environment encourage or discourage COA selection?

•

Analyze the threat’s recent activity to determine if a COA has been adopted.

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Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Table 3-7. Step 4—Determine threat courses of action (continued)

G-2/S-2 considerations

Task: Develop each COA in detail

Each COA answers the following six basic questions:

Who: The threat and its makeup—a conventional force, terrorist organization (group or cell), insurgency, or criminal

(gang, group, cartel).

What: The type of operation—such as attack, defend, bank robbery, or suicide bombing. In stability operations, the

what factors are target types, target selection, and objectives.

When: The time of the action—when usually refers to the earliest time the threat can adopt the COA under

consideration. In an operational environment, consider the following factors:

•

Capability.

•

Intent.

•

History.

•

Activity.

•

Target environment.

•

Personalities.

Where: The location of the objective or objectives in the AO.

How: The method the threat may use to employ their assets, such as dispositions, location of main effort, scheme of

maneuver, or time and place of a terrorist attack and how it may be supported.

Why: The objective or end state the threat intends to accomplish. The objective or end state of an asymmetrical threat

would factor in the vision or mission of that type of threat (for example, purify Islam through violence; overthrow the

secular government and replace it with an Islamic state).

Each developed threat COA has three key products:

•

Situation templates.

•

Threat COAs and options.

•

HVTs.

Task: Identify initial ISR requirements

Identify initial ISR requirements using threat COA key products:

•

Event template.

•

Event matrix.

•

ISR plan.

AO—area of operations

IED—improvised explosive device

C2—command and control

IPB—intelligence preparation of the battlefield

CBRN—chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear

ISR—intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance

COA—course of actions

SIGINT—signals intelligence

HPT—high-payoff target

TTP—tactics, techniques, and procedures

HVT—high-value target

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Chapter 3

DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE

3-45. The DST is used to depict current and predicted threat locations—designated as NAIs on the DST.

Once identified, NAIs can then be used to confirm or deny a threat’s activities or adoption of a particular

COA. Additionally, threat decision points or decision phase lines, target areas of interest (TAIs), and high-

payoff targets (HPTs) are identified. (See figure 3-21.)

Figure 3-21. Decision support template

HIGH-VALUE TARGET LIST

3-46. A HVTL is a list of targets the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of a

mission. The loss of an HVT could seriously degrade important enemy functions throughout the friendly

commander’s AO. Figure 3-22 shows an example of a HVTL.

High-

Top secret document custodian.

•

Information systems security officer.

Understand current division policy on CONUS and OCONUS transport of classified material.

•

Conduct inventory of classified materials.

•

Learn destruction and verification methods.

•

Review destruction and transfer SOPs.

Develop and implement a detailed internal security inspection program that covers intelligence areas within the unit.

AO—area of operations

JPAS—Joint Personnel Adjudication System

AR—Army regulation

METL—mission-essential task list

BDA—battle damage assessment

MI—military intelligence

BSB—brigade support battalion

MP—military police

C2—command and control

MTT—mobile training team

CALL—Center for Army Lessons Learned

NGA—National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

CBRN—chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear

OCONUS—outside the continental United States

CI—counterintelligence

OPLAN—operation plan

CONUS—continental United States

OPORD—operation order

CTC—combat training center

PIR—priority intelligence requirement

EWO—electronic warfare officer

SCI—sensitive compartmented information

IO—information operations

SOP—standing operating procedure

ISR—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

TA—target acquisition

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Intelligence Readiness Training

TRAIN/READY

A-4. Units in the train/ready force pool continue mission-specific collective training and are eligible for

sourcing, if necessary, to meet joint requirements. (See table A-2.) Their collective training focuses on its

directed METL, such as intelligence support to stability operations.

A-5. For the S-2 section, train/ready expands on the knowledge gained during reset. It consists of the same

basic intelligence functions, but in more detail and culminates with a rotation at a combat training center

(CTC).

Table A-2. Intelligence factors for train/ready

S-2 section (may be modified for intelligence officers and their sections at any echelon)

Understand the S-2’s functions at the unit’s tactical operations center and how they drive other tactical operations

centers’ functions.

Review threat characteristics holdings and files. Update material as required.

Determine available intelligence databases and "work the system" to obtain data to support a contingency plan. Brief

results to the commander.

Identify information gaps in battle books, threat characteristics holdings and files, and intelligence annexes. Submit

RFIs to satisfy intelligence requirements. The S-2 can access numerous products developed at the national level

through the DGCS-A. Examples of these products include⎯

•

Daily INTSUMs and briefings.

•

Global security forecasts.

•

Battlefield development plans.

•

Automated and hardcopy databases.

•

Arms proliferation and military power studies related to weapons acquisition strategies and the overall

military power and potential of selected foreign military forces.

•

TECHINT and user bulletins.

•

CIA World Fact Book and the DIA country studies.

•

JIOC assessments.

•

Open-source studies and articles.

•

JIOC threat characteristics database.

•

DIA intelligence support plans.

•

DIA contingency support studies and contingency support packages.

•

Other services.

Evaluate intelligence training and provide written results to the unit and commander.

Evaluate the unit Soldiers’ knowledge of intelligence training tasks and provide a written report to the commander.

Develop an internal S-2 section intelligence cross-training program. Have section Soldiers teach the classes.

Become familiar with and teach a class on doctrine, tactics, and equipment of a contingency-plan threat.

Act as threat commander during the wargaming process and rehearsals.

Successfully deploy section and perform S-2 operations during a combat training center rotation.

Accurately predict threat actions during CTC rotation using IPB and all intelligence assets.

Successfully integrate with higher echelon G-2/S-2 during combat training center rotation.

Continually review and update intelligence running estimate and products.

Determine if all automated data processing systems are accredited. Brief the commander on steps required to correct

any problems.

Determine the unit’s security posture during field training exercises and CTC rotations. Recommend corrective actions

to the commander.

Continually review clearance requirements, applications, and updates.

CIA—Central Intelligence Agency

IPB—intelligence preparation of the battlefield

CTC—combat training center

JIOC—joint intelligence operations center

DCGS-A—Distributed Common Ground System-Army

RFI—request for information

DIA—Defense Intelligence Agency

TECHINT—technical intelligence

INTSUM—intelligence summary

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Appendix A

AVAILABLE

A-6. Units in the available force pool are in their planned deployment windows and fully trained,

equipped, and resourced to meet operational requirements and conduct full spectrum operations. (See table A-3.)

A-7. Available takes the S-2, who has mastered the intelligence fundamentals through the first year, at

which time the unit participated in the full annual training program and deployment process.

Table A-3. Intelligence factors for available

S-2 section (may be modified for intelligence officers and their sections at any echelon)

Qualify on all unit weapon systems.

Continually review clearance requirements, applications, and updates.

Continually review and update intelligence running estimate and products.

Successfully integrate with higher echelon G-2/S-2.

Determine all theater provided equipment or assets that may support the unit’s ISR effort.

Conduct theater-specific individual, leader, and collective training.

Conduct mission-specific predeployment training and operations.

Successfully deploy section and perform S-2 RIP/TOA.

TOA—transfer of authority

INTELLIGENCE TRAINING RESOURCES

A-8. Some of the primary training resources used for intelligence Soldiers and units include—

Noncommissioned officer education system (NCOES).

Officer education system (OES).

MI functional courses.

New Systems Training and Integration Office.

Language training.

Cultural awareness training.

Soldiers training plans (STPs).

Joint Intelligence Combat Training Center.

Foundry Program.

MI Gunnery.

NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM AND OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

A-9. NCOES and OES train individual basic and advanced tasks. Both are managed by the U.S. Army

Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) at Fort Huachuca, AZ. For more information, log onto the

Intelligence Knowledge Network (IKN) Web site at https://icon.army.mil/.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONAL COURSES

A-10. MI functional courses train individual basic and advanced tasks. The courses are managed by

USAICoE. Courses available include—

Tactical Electronic Warfare (EW) Operations.

F121 Sun Server Workstation Maintenance.

F123 Highcastle Maintenance.

F28 U.S. Air Force (USAF) Tactical Receive.

Foreign Disclosure Certification.

Information Systems Security Monitoring.

Intelligence Master Analyst.

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Intelligence Readiness Training

TROJAN SPIRIT II V3/TROJAN LITE V3.

J1 Basic Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT).

MI Precommand.

T6 Tactical Exploitation System (TES) Analyst.

A-11. For more information on MI functional courses, visit the University of MI Web site at

http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/functional_courses/default.asp.

NEW SYSTEMS TRAINING AND INTEGRATION OFFICE

A-12. The New Systems Training and Integration Office at Fort Huachuca, AZ manages training

development for new and product improved intelligence systems and capabilities, and the development of

systems and nonsystems training devices. For more information and points of contact, log onto the IKN

Web site (https://icon.army.mil ). Click “IKN Web sites.”

LANGUAGE TRAINING

A-13. Language training involves training individual tasks. Funding for language training is available

through the Total Army Language Program. Resources include—

The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC). As the proponent for

the Defense Foreign Language Program, DLIFLC assists commanders in developing a unit

command language program, as well as the maintenance and local evaluation of the program.

Visit the DLIFLC Web site at http://fieldsupport.lingnet.org/.

G-2 Language team (Training and Language Technology and Contracting). Visit the Language

team Web site at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/179065.

Army e-Learning—with access to Rosetta Stone® courses in the 30 languages listed in table A-4.

Visit http://usarmy.rosettastone.com/index.htm to obtain information about the Rosetta Stone®

language training tool.

Table A-4. Rosetta Stone® language courses

Military Arabic

German

Latin

Swedish

Chinese (Mandarin)

Greek

Pashto

Tagalog

Danish

Hebrew

Polish

Thai

Dutch

Hindi

Portuguese

Turkish

English (United

Indonesian

Russian

Vietnamese

Kingdom)

Italian

Spanish (Latin America)

Welsh

English (U.S.)

Japanese

Spanish (Spain)

Farsi (Persian)

Korean

Swahili

French

CULTURAL AWARENESS TRAINING

A-14. Cultural awareness training. The Professional Military Education Cultural Awareness Training

Support Package contains four levels of training—initial military training to a captain’s career course. The

package offers lessons in defining culture, discussions of American and personal culture to determine areas

of conflict and biases, the cultures of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the affect of culture on military operations

through multiple practical exercises and situational training exercises. Materials available include—

Presentations, levels 1 through 4.

Training support package, levels 1 through 4.

Lane training, levels 1 through 4.

A-15. Visit http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/tcc/cultural/default.asp for more information on

cultural awareness training.

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Appendix A

SOLDIER TRAINING PLANS

A-16. Soldiers training plans (STPs) provide training materials and information on individual military

occupational specialties (MOSs) and warrior tasks. STPs are listed on the Army Knowledge Online (AKO)

Web site.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMBAT TRAINING CENTER

A-17. The Joint Intelligence Combat Training Center trains individual and collective tasks in a simulated

AO. The center uses realistic scenarios based on real-world operations and applies recent lessons learned

from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). This two-week

course can be modified for a unit’s mission. USAICoE manages the course. For more information, visit the

IKN Web site at https://icon.army.mil/.

FOUNDRY PROGRAM

A-18. The Foundry Program trains individual and collective tasks. Led by the Department of the Army

(DA) G-2, the training is an advanced skill, live environment certification program. Ultimately, the

program assists tactical commanders and G-2s with a single point of entry for intelligence training

coordination and opportunities that are otherwise unavailable. The Foundry Program handbook and

quarterly training request worksheets are available on AKO and Secure Internet Protocol Router Network

(SIPRNET). Training offered under the Foundry Program includes—

MTTs sponsored through the Army Intelligence and Security Command, (INSCOM), Training

and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC), the National Reconnaissance Office, the Defense

Intelligence Agency (DIA), and other joint and national activities.

Formal classroom training events.

Live environment training—usually 30 to 60 days in length.

Funding for travel and per diem to attend MI training events sponsored by other units.

Sponsoring short-duration (30 to 60 days) dialect training events to support operational missions.

For example, Foundry Opportunity #019 (a basic Iraqi dialect course) to support OIF and

Foundry Opportunity # 75 (Intermediate Pashtu) to support OEF.

Note. The Foundry Program does not sustain foreign language skills. Total Army Language

Program funds are used for this.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GUNNERY

A-19. MI Gunnery trains and certifies individual and collective tasks. The MI Gunnery tables enable MI

and unit commanders determine whether the MI Soldier and unit are prepared for their wartime mission.

MI Gunnery tables are roughly modeled after Tank Gunnery tables—as a “crawl, walk, run” methodology

of training and certifying Soldiers, teams, sections, platoons, and the unit in individual and collective tasks

necessary to accomplish the unit’s primary mission. MI Gunnery tables are organized as follows:

First section:

STP individual tasks. Unit leaders ensure Soldiers are trained and certified as proficient in

these tasks, as a part of the unit’s combat readiness.

Annual common tactical tasks. Training directed by Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)

for units deploying to support OIF/OEF. Soldiers are proficient in the 40 warrior individual tasks

before deploying to a theater of operations.

MI individual tasks (by section). To provide intelligence support to operations, Soldiers are

proficient in these tasks.

A table of instructions and guidance for leaders to certify MI element Soldiers in the

aforementioned individual tasks.

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Intelligence Readiness Training

Second section:

Collective tasks and drill tasks. Teams, sections, and platoons are proficient and certified in

these tasks before proceeding to company level training events.

Nine collective warrior battle drills. Teams, sections, and platoons are certified as proficient

in these drills as a matter of tactical protection.

Collective tasks and crew drill tasks. MI teams, sections, and platoons are proficient in

these tasks to perform their missions in a specific AO.

Company level collective tasks. The MI company performs these tasks, as a whole, to

successfully conduct intelligence operations.

Third section:

Home-station training event or exercise. Conducted and used by parent units to externally

evaluate and certify the MI unit as proficient in all individual and collective tasks before a CTC

or mission readiness exercise and deployment to a theater of operations.

Deployment to a CTC training exercise or mission readiness exercise. The entire brigade

combat team (BCT) is externally evaluated based on the conduct of the training exercise. There

is a robust opposing force designed to depict a tough, competent threat.

A-20. Information on MI Gunnery is available on AKO.

TRAINING BY SECTION INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINE

A-21. Table A-5 is list of training opportunities available to intelligence Soldiers. These training

opportunities, combined with tactical overwatch of the assigned area of interest (AOI), ensure intelligence

Soldiers can provide the commander with the intelligence required to plan, prepare, execute, and assess

operations.

Table A-5. Training by section/intelligence discipline

Intelligence warfighting function personnel

NCOES/OES (as required)—(managed by USAICoE).

New equipment fielding and training.

Individual language and cultural awareness training.

Tactical questioning—(USAICoE).

DCGS-A MTT—(DCGS-A Program Manager).

Intelligence in Combating Terrorism—(USAICoE).

Individual and collective training certified (based on METL and IAW standards).

MI Gunnery.

Weapons qualification.

Vehicle licensing program.

Convoy staff exercise and live fire exercise.

Leader training program.

CP exercise.

CTC preparation.

CTC deployment.

CTC recovery.

CIED training.

Counterinsurgency seminar—(FORSCOM/TRADOC).

Theater-specific individual readiness training—(FORSCOM).

Deployment preparations.

Deploy.

If assuming an ongoing mission from another U.S. or multinational force conduct—

•

Theater briefings.

•

Theater reception, staging, onward movement, and integration training.

•

RIP/TOA.

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Appendix A

Table A-5. Training by section/intelligence discipline (continued)

S-2 section

BCT S-2 course—(USAICoE).

G-2X/S-2X course—(USAICoE).

Special Security Officer/Special Security Representative course—(coordinate with higher special security officer).

Foreign Disclosure Officer course—(USAICoE).

NGIC All-Source Briefing—(NGIC).

MI Gunnery—(evaluated by the S-2 or the S-2 NCOIC).

JICTC—(USAICoE).

Section collective training.

Conduct tactical overwatch—(Target folders).

Lessons Learned Conference—(USAICoE) (If assuming an ongoing mission from another U.S. or multinational force).

All-source analysts/ISR synchronization managers

Collection Management Officer course—(DIA)/ISR Synchronization MTT—(USAICoE).

Intelligence Master Analyst course—(USAICoE).

National Intelligence Familiarization course—(DIA).

Joint Targeting course—(U.S. Joint Forces Command).

Joint Analyst-Interrogator Collaboration course—(USAICoE).

Computer forensics training—(Defense Cyber Investigation Training Academy).

All-source MI Gunnery.

JICTC—(USAICoE).

TROJAN SPIRIT training—(USAICoE).

Biometrics MTT—(Battlefield Forensics Course).

NGIC visit/briefing—(NGIC).

CI Special Agent course—(DIA, HT-JCOE at Fort Huachuca).

CI and HUMINT Operations Management (S-2X/G-2X) course—(USAICoE).

Source Operations course—(DIA, HT-JCOE at Fort Huachuca).

Advanced Source Operations course—(DIA, HT-JCOE at Fort Huachuca).

DOMEX MTT—(NGIC).

Special capability equipment MTT—(USAICoE).

Biometrics MTT—(Battlefield Forensics Course).

Tactical overwatch—(Target folders).

Language immersion training—(Army G-2 Language Team, DLIFLC).

DOD Strategic Debriefing course—(DIA, HT-JCOE at Fort Huachuca).

CI and HUMINT Operations Management (S-2X/G-2X) course—(USAICoE).

Source Operations course—(DIA, HT-JCOE at Fort Huachuca).

Joint Analyst-Interrogator Collaboration course—(USAICoE).

Advanced Source Operations course—(DIA, HT-JCOE at Fort Huachuca).

HCT MTT—(USAICoE).

DOMEX MTT—(NGIC).

Special capability equipment MTT—(USAICoE).

Biometrics MTT—(Battlefield Forensics Course).

Tactical overwatch—(Target folders).

Language immersion training—(Army G-2 Language Team, DLIFLC).

Intermediate IMINT Analysis course—(Foundry-NGA).

TES course—(USAICoE).

Shadow flight training—(USAICoE/Unit).

IMINT live environment training—(Foundry-3d MI Center).

Imagery workstation training—(Army Space Program Office/3d MI Center).

JSTARS MTT—(Foundry).

JSTARS sustainment training—(Foundry).

Advanced IMINT Analysis course—(Foundry-3d MI Center).

Global Broadcast System training—(Foundry-3d MI Center).

GEOINT training cell—(USAICoE).

JSTARS Outreach—(Foundry-3d MI Center).

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Intelligence Readiness Training

Table A-5. Training by section/intelligence discipline (continued)

MASINT and advanced GEOINT

MASINT fundamentals and equipment—(Foundry).

MASINT MTT—(Foundry).

Advanced GEOINT Analysis course—(Foundry).

UGS MTT—(USAICoE, New Systems Training and Integration Office).

MASINT QRC sensor training—(Foundry).

MASINT operations/immersion—(Foundry).

OSINT

OSINT Research and Analysis course—(Fort Leavenworth).

Open-Source Academy—(USAICoE).

DAIIS—(Foundry and MTT).

Nonattributable Internet access—(JIVU).

Untangling the Web—(JIVU).

Advanced Googling—(JIVU).

SIGINT

SIGINT Leaders course—(ATCAE, Fort Meade, MD).

Reporting guidance—(ATCAE).

Prerequisite computer based training for Deployer 2000—(ATCAE).

Deployer 2000/U.S. SIGINT Directives 18/Annex P—(ATCAE).

PROPHET team training/special collection and exploitation capability equipment training—(ATCAE, Army Cryptologic

Operations-USAICoE).

ONEROOF operations training—(ATCAE/Army Cryptologic Operations-USAICoE).

Analyst Notebook training—(ATCAE-USAICoE).

Security identifier on the NSA’s secure network—(ATCAE).

ArcView/target package development—(ATCAE-USAICoE).

TES course—(USAICoE).

Tactical EW Operations course—(USAICoE).

TROJAN SPIRIT training—(USAICoE).

SIGINT MI Gunnery.

Combat Operations Support—(Foundry).

Analysis and reporting—(Foundry).

SIGINT Tactical Overwatch—(Foundry).

Target familiarization and packets.

Language immersion training—(Army G-2 Language Team, DLIFLC).

ATCAE—Army Technical Control and Analysis Element

JSTARS—Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

BCT—brigade combat team

MASINT—measurement and signature intelligence

CI—counterintelligence

METL—mission-essential task list

CIED—counterimprovised explosive device

MI—military intelligence

CP—command post

IMINT—imagery intelligence

CTC—combat training center

JICTC—Joint Intelligence Combat Training Center

DAIIS—Department of the Army Intelligence Information

MTT—mobile training team

Service

NCOES—noncommissioned officer education system

DCGS-A—Distributed Common Ground System-Army

NCOIC—noncommissioned officer in charge

DIA—Defense Intelligence Agency

NGA—National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

DLIFLC—Defense Language Institute Foreign Language

NGIC—National Ground Intelligence Center

Center

NSA—National Security Agency

DOD—Department of Defense

OES—officer education system

DOMEX—document and media exploitation

OSINT—open-source intelligence

EW—electronic warfare

QRC—quick reaction capability

FORSCOM—U.S. Army Forces Command

RIP—relief in place

GEOINT—geospatial intelligence

SIGINT—signals intelligence

HCT—HUMINT collection team

TES—Tactical Exploitation System

HT-JCOE—HUMINT Team Joint Center of Excellence

TOA—transfer of authority

HUMINT—human intelligence

TRADOC—U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

IAW—in accordance with

USAICoE—U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence

JIVU—Joint Intelligence Virtual University

UGS—unattended ground sensor

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Appendix B

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Synchronization

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is an activity that synchronizes and

integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation,

and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is

an integrated intelligence and operations function. For Army forces, this activity is a

combined arms operation that focuses on priority intelligence requirements, while

answering the commander’s critical information requirements (FM 3-0).

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

B-1. Through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), commanders and staffs continually

plan, task, and employ collection assets and forces. They collect, process, and disseminate timely and

accurate combat information and intelligence to satisfy the commander’s critical information requirements

(CCIRs) and other intelligence requirements. When necessary, ISR assets may focus on special

requirements, such as information required for personnel recovery operations.

B-2. ISR is fundamental to information superiority and the support of friendly operations through the four

ISR tasks:

ISR synchronization.

ISR integration.

Surveillance.

Reconnaissance.

ISR SYNCHRONIZATION

B-3. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance synchronization is the task that accomplishes the

following: analyzes information requirements and intelligence gaps; evaluates available assets internal and

external to the organization; determines gaps in the use of those assets; recommends intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance assets controlled by the organization to collect on the commander’s

critical information requirements; and submits requests for information for adjacent and higher collection

support (FM 3-0).

ISR INTEGRATION

B-4. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance integration is the task of assigning and controlling a

unit’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets (in terms of space, time, and purpose) to collect

and report information as a concerted and integrated portion of operation plans and orders (FM 3-0).

Integrating ISR into an operation ensures assignment of the best ISR assets (internal and external, including

joint assets) through a deliberate and coordinated effort of the entire staff across all warfighting functions.

SURVEILLANCE

B-5. Surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons,

or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means

(JP

3-0). Surveillance involves

observing an area to collect information.

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RECONNAISSANCE

B-6. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods,

information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the

meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area (JP 2-0).

RELATED MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

B-7. Within the context of the intelligence warfighting function, ISR related missions and operations are

the activities and tasks associated with support to the conduct of ISR operations or providing ISR support to

specialized missions. This task has four subtasks:

Establish a mission intelligence briefing and debriefing program.

Conduct intelligence coordination.

Support sensitive site exploitation.

Intelligence support to personnel recovery.

B-8. Related missions and operations are described, in detail, in FM 2-0.

COMMANDER’S CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

B-9. The commander decides what information is critical based on experience, the mission, input from the

staff, the higher commander’s intent, and the staff’s estimate of the situation. CCIRs are based on events or

activities linked directly to the current and future situation. CCIRs consist of priority intelligence

requirements (PIRs) and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs), which assist the commander in

controlling the flow of critical information.

B-10. Although essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs) are not part of the CCIRs, they may be a

priority if the commander so deems. Essential elements of friendly information are the critical aspects of a

friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit

success of the operation, and therefore, must be protected from threat detection (FM 3-0).

B-11. Figure B-1 depicts the relationship of information requirements, including CCIR (PIR and FFIR) and

EEFI.

Figure B-1. Relationship of information requirements

THE ISR SYNCHRONIZATION PROCESS

B-12. The ISR synchronization process involves six continuous activities, as depicted in figure B-2. These

activities and subordinate activities are not necessarily sequential and often overlap. The ISR

synchronization process supports the staff planning and operations processes throughout the full spectrum

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Table B-1. Develop requirements

Anticipate

•

Identify new or refine existing requirements and present them to commanders for approval.

•

Recognize when and where to recommend a collection shift to the G-3/S-3.

Analyze

Separate. Categorize intelligence gaps answered through—

•

Organic asset collection.

•

Intelligence reach. Although not as responsive as a unit’s own assets, intelligence reach may be the only

way to answer a PIR.

•

RFIs for collection to higher and lateral echelons.

Record.

•

Record requirements from higher, adjacent, and subordinate units along with the requirements produced

during mission planning.

•

Track each requirement from its receipt to its eventual satisfaction, merger, or elimination.

•

Record using a spreadsheet, database, or other mechanism prescribed by unit SOPs.

Validate. Consider the following:

•

Necessity. Is this requirement necessary or valid? If yes, has it been satisfied? Check databases to

determine whether the intelligence was produced or the information was collected. If a product that satisfies

the requirement already exists, refer the requestor to the producing agency. If the requestor does not have

access to that agency’s database, obtain and provide the product to the requestor. Refer requests for

production to the appropriate agency.

Note. In some cases, the intelligence already exists, but not in the format requested. One example is a unit that

requests a demographics map put together from existing data.

•

Feasibility. Does the unit have the assets with the capabilities to execute the mission on time and with the

detail required to support a decision? If not, can the unit submit an RFI to the echelon owning the ISR

capability, with a reasonable expectation of receiving a timely response?

•

Completeness. All requirements should specify—

Who (needs the results).

When (time that the indicator is expected to occur and the LTIOV).

What (activity or indicator).

Where (geolocation, NAI, or TAI).

Why (justification).

Other (specific instructions or information).

Consolidate. Simplify the collection effort by merging similar requirements. Exercise caution when merging

requirements to ensure—

•

The intent of the original requirements is not lost.

•

The accountability is maintained through accurate recordkeeping.

•

Dissemination is made to every requesting headquarters whenever a requirement is satisfied or eliminated.

Prioritize. Prioritize each intelligence requirement based on its importance to support the commander’s intent and

decisions. Consider the importance of the requirement above its generating echelon. Throughout the operation,

intelligence officers prioritizing requirements should consider the ability to meet the requirement as well as justification,

specificity, significance, and time phasing of the requirements.

•

Justification. Requirements are justified by their linkage to decisions.

•

Specificity. Requirements are narrowed and refined to the most specific what, when, and where questions

possible. The why is the justification.

•

Significance. The relative significance of the activity to the commander’s intent.

•

Time phasing. Time phasing influences prioritization. Time phasing of intelligence requirements, such as

synchronization, is a continuous process. The operation may progress slower or faster during staff

wargaming. Monitor the conduct of the operation and remain alert to changes in the LTIOV, based on shifts

in the operational timeline.

Develop indicators

Indicator is an item of information that reflects the intention or capability of an adversary to adopt or reject a COA (JP 2-0).

In Army intelligence, indicators—

•

May result from previous actions or from threat failure to take action.

•

Are the bases for situation development.

•

Are positive or negative evidence of threat, other activity, or AO characteristic that points toward capabilities,

vulnerabilities, or intentions.

•

Show the adoption or rejection by the threat of a particular COA that may influence the commander’s COA.

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Table B-1. Develop requirements (continued)

Develop SIRs

SIRs describe the information required and should include the location and the time the information can be collected.

•

Develop SIR sets while the operations officers develop the collection strategy for each requirement and the

general scheme of maneuver.

•

Make each indicator more specific by identifying the collection location—tying it to a point in the AO, such as

a specific NAI.

•

Specify the collection time. Use the situation templates depicting the enemy COA and the graphics depicting

the friendly scheme of maneuver to establish collection timelines for the NAI.

•

Identify the specific (detailed) information that supports the indicator. For example, specific information that

supports the indicator “artillery deployed in NAI 12” might include the—

Presence of M-1978 (KOKSAN) self-propelled gun.

Presence of fire direction control equipment or vehicles.

Presence of the digital data signal equipment.

Presence of artillery ammunition carriers.

•

Label each SIR with an identifier to trace it back to the original intelligence requirement.

•

A final SIR might be written as, “Are there digital data signals active in NAI 12 between 041200 and 060200

March? LTIOV: 060400 March.”

AO—area of operations

PIR—priority intelligence requirement

COA—course of action

RFI—request for information

ISR—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

SIR—specific information requirement

LTIOV—latest time information is of value

SOP—standing operating procedure

NAI—named area of interest

TAI—target area of interest

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Appendix B

DEVELOP INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE SYNCHRONIZATION

TOOLS

B-14. Intelligence officers use ISR synchronization tools with staff input to synchronize the entire

collection effort, including all assets the commander controls, assets of lateral units and higher echelon

units and organizations, and intelligence reach to answer CCIRs. Table B-2 describes the subordinate

“Develop ISR Synchronization Tools” activities and lists the G-2/S-2’s responsibilities and products.

Figure B-3 (page B-8) is an example of an ISR synchronization matrix.

Table B-2. Develop ISR synchronization tools

Evaluate resources

Note. See MIHB 2-50 for asset capabilities and limitations.

The intelligence officer and staff take the prioritized requirements and match them with suitable ISR assets using the

following criteria.

Availability.

•

Know the collectors and processors available at the unit’s echelon, at echelons above and below, and know

how to access the ISR assets.

•

Determine higher echelon and other Service asset availability by reviewing various scheduling and tracking

mechanisms.

•

HUMINT assets are not linked to traditional schedules; their availability is linked to geographic access,

support relationships, and workload.

Capability. Capability includes—

•

Range. What is the asset’s ability to move and maneuver, including travel and support times? If the best

asset is a UAS, what are its transit and dwell times?

•

Day and night effectiveness. Consider factors such as available optics and thermal crossover.

•

Technical characteristics. Can the system see through fog or smoke? Can it continue despite hostile EW?

Each asset has time factors for task accomplishment to be considered.

•

Reporting timeliness.

•

Geolocation accuracy.

•

Durability. Can the aircraft launch in high winds or limited visibility? Can the prime mover go across

restricted terrain?

Evaluate resources

Sustainability.

•

Consider the collection asset’s sustainability for extended duration operations.

•

The longer the collection period on the ISR synchronization matrix, the more difficult it is to find assets for

continuous activity.

•

Weather can significantly affect sustainability of certain ISR assets.

•

Redundancy is one solution to the sustainability problem.

Vulnerability.

•

Evaluate the threat’s ability to locate, identify, and destroy ISR assets.

•

Evaluate the collector’s vulnerability to threat forces in the target area and along the entire travel route.

Performance history.

•

Which ISR assets are relied on to meet the commander’s intelligence requirements?

•

Consider readiness rates, responsiveness, and accuracy over time.

Develop ISR synchronization matrix and overlay (See figure B-3 [page B-8].)

Consider the following factors:

Redundancy.

•

Use of same type assets to cover the same NAI.

•

Use of redundant tasking when the probability of success by any one system is low.

•

Use of redundancy improves the chance of accurate geolocation.

Mix.

•

Complementary coverage by a combination of assets from multiple units.

•

Sensor mix increases the probability of collection, reduces the risk of successful threat deception, facilitates

cueing, and provides more complete reporting.

Cue.

•

Use of one or more sensor systems to provide data that directs collection by other systems.

•

Cueing maximizes the efficient use of finite ISR assets to support multiple, often competing, intelligence

collection priorities.

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Table B-2. Develop ISR synchronization tools (continued)

Develop ISR tasks, RFIs, and requests for collection or support

ISR task.

•

Intelligence and operations officers work to convert the SIRs into ISR tasks using organic ISR assets—these

tasks are published in Annex L of the OPORD or FRAGO.

•

Tailor the reporting criteria to the capabilities of the tasked ISR asset. For example—

SIR: Will more than 20 insurgents, subordinate to the Mahdi Army or Muqtada Al-Sadr, pass through

NAI 8 between 041800 and 052000 March?

ISR task: Report the presence of Mahdi Army personnel in NAI 8 between 041800 and 052000

March. Specify direction of movement, numbers, and types of vehicles. LTIOV: 060400 March.

SIR: Is there normal activity in the city of Fallujah, NAI 10 on 21 June?

ISR task: Report the presence of threat counterreconnaissance activity in NAI 10 between 210900

and 211800 June. LTIOV: 211800 June.

Develop ISR tasks, RFIs, and requests for collection or support

•

Prioritize ISR tasks for the ISR assets. Be specific. However, avoid overly restrictive reporting guidelines.

•

Include instructions for direct dissemination of combat or targeting information to the original requestor.

•

Tailor the ISR task to the selected collection system or organization. For example—

Some imaging systems require a basic encyclopedia number rather than a geographic or universal

transverse Mercator coordinate for target location.

USAF airborne collection platforms recognize geographic coordinates only.

HUMINT collectors require specific timeliness, reporting, and dissemination guidance.

RFI.

•

Used when unable to satisfy a collection requirement through organic assets.

•

Submitted to the next higher echelon (or lateral units) for integration within that unit’s ISR plan.

•

At each echelon, the requirement is validated and a determination made as to whether or not that echelon

can satisfy the requirement. If no, the requirement is passed to the next higher echelon. This process

continues until the requirement is satisfied, the intelligence is no longer needed, or it is determined that the

requirement cannot be satisfied.

•

Alert the submitting organization of the RFI’s status—accepted for action, passed to another organization for

action, returned without action (invalid or infeasible request), or closed (satisfied).

•

Track all production requirements, particularly those transmitted to higher echelons.

•

When a requirement is satisfied or overcome by events, notify the higher headquarters that the requirement

is closed.

Develop and synchronize production requirements

•

G-2/S-2 coordinates and plans intelligence analysis and production activities to provide timely and relevant

intelligence products to commanders, staff, and subordinate forces.

•

Use the ISR synchronization matrix to plan production activities and timelines to answer CCIRs.

•

Intelligence production involves analyzing information and intelligence and presenting intelligence products,

assessments, conclusions, or projections regarding the AO and threat forces in a format that assists the

commander in achieving situational understanding.

•

Continuously evaluate the success of production based on commanders’ and staffs’ satisfaction.

AO—area of operations

MIHB—military intelligence handbook

CCIR—commander’s critical information requirement

NAI—named area of interest

EW—electronic warfare

OPORD—operation order

FRAGO—fragmentary order

RFI—request for information

HUMINT—human intelligence

USAF—U.S. Air Force

ISR—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

UAS—unmanned aircraft system

LTIOV—latest time information is of value

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BCT—brigade combat team

HUMINT—human intelligence

BSB—brigade support battalion

IMINT—imagery intelligence

CAB—combat aviation brigade

ISR—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

CI—counterintelligence

LRS—long-range surveillance

CO—company

MI—military intelligence

COLT—combat observation and lasing team

MTI—moving target indicator

COMINT—communications intelligence

PLT—platoon

DTG—date-time group

RECON—reconnaissance

EAB—echelons above brigade

SF—Special Forces

ELINT—electronic intelligence

SQDRN—squadron

EQ—equipment

SURV—surveillance

FA—field artillery

TRP—troop

FLT—flight

UAS—unmanned aircraft system

HCT—HUMINT collection team

Figure B-3. Example ISR synchronization matrix

B-15. The ISR synchronization matrix does not provide details regarding technical channels of the ISR

effort. In OIF, S-2s use a working matrix to assist in managing this effort and to help analysts. Figure B-4 is

an example of a working matrix. As a tool, the working matrix—

Links PIRs to the commander’s decision points.

Links collection requirements to NAIs and TAIs.

Provides the task and purpose for the collection task.

Provides detailed collection and reporting requirements.

Is formatted as a spreadsheet and comprised of individual worksheets for the brigade and the

subordinate battalions.

Is posted to the unit’s Web page and updated as needed by the G-2/S-2 at each echelon.

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Is not a tasking document and is not published as part of the base order.

Is a working aid that assists the intelligence staff in synchronizing internal operations across

echelons.

BCT—brigade combat team

LTIOV—latest time information is of value

BN—battalion

NAI—named area of interest

BSB—brigade support battalion

PIR—priority intelligence requirement

CA—civil affairs

PSYOP—psychological operations

CAB—combat aviation brigade

R&S—reconnaissance and surveillance

DP—decision point

RECON—reconnaissance

EEFI—essential element of friendly information

SIGINT—signals intelligence

FA—field artillery

SIR—specific information requirement

HCT—HUMINT collection team

SQDRN—squadron

HUMINT—human intelligence

TAI—target area of interest

IMINT—imagery intelligence

Figure B-4. Example working matrix

SUPPORT INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE INTEGRATION

B-16. During ISR integration, responsibility for ISR planning transitions from the G-2/S-2 to the G-3/S-3.

ISR synchronization and ISR integration result in a fused effort focused on answering the commander’s

requirements through ISR tasks translated into orders. (See table B-3 [page B-10].)

B-17. The key to successful reconnaissance and surveillance is an ISR plan that—

Is developed from well-reasoned enemy situation overlays, course of action (COA) statements,

and event templates and matrices.

Is driven by the CCIRs and focused on command directed tasks.

Is linked to the commander’s decisions points.

Facilitates the commander’s visualization of the AO.

Is prepared jointly by the G-3/S-3, G-2/S-2, and their staff.

Remains synchronized with the scheme of maneuver.

Is issued and updated as part of the orders process.

Assigns appropriate collection tasks to subordinate units.

Requests intelligence support as needed from higher and adjacent units.

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Appendix B

Table B-3. Support ISR integration

Develop the ISR plan

•

The G-3/S-3 assigns tasks based on LTIOV and limitations of available ISR assets.

•

The G-2/S-2 assists the G-3/S-3 in ensuring intelligence requirements are identified, prioritized, and

validated.

•

The G-2/S-2 also assists the G-3/S-3 in ensuring an ISR plan is developed and synchronized with the overall

operation.

•

The G-2/S-2 coordinates with the staff and the ISR assets’ commander. For example, the MI company

commander coordinates sustainment of ISR assets on the battlefield.

Issue the WARNO, OPORD, FRAGO

The basis of all R&S missions is the ISR plan published in Annex L of the OPORD and continually modified through

FRAGOs. There are many supporting documents developed by the G-3/S-3 and G-2/S-2 then submitted to the

commander for approval:

Base OPORD

•

Paragraph 3a(3), R&S (Commander’s Intent).

•

Paragraph 3a(4), Intelligence (Commander’s Intent).

•

Paragraph 3b, Tasks to Maneuver Units (Collection Tasks).

•

Paragraph 3c, Tasks to Subordinate Units (Collection Tasks).

•

Paragraph 3d(2), CCIR (PIR/FFIR).

•

Paragraph 3d(7), Limit of Reconnaissance.

•

Paragraph 3d(8), AOs (for the intelligence warfighting function).

Annex B (Intelligence)

•

Paragraph 2, Mission.

•

Paragraph 3a, Scheme of Intelligence.

•

Paragraph 3b, Tasks to Subordinate Units.

•

Paragraph 3d(2), RFIs.

•

Paragraph 3d(5), Distribution of Intelligence Products.

•

Appendix 2, ISR Synchronization Matrix.

•

Appendix 2: Tab A, ISR Overlay.

Annex L (ISR)

AO—area of operations

MI—military intelligence

CCIR—commander’s critical information requirement

OPORD—operation order

FFIR—friendly force information requirement

PIR—priority intelligence requirement

FRAGO—fragmentary order

R&S—reconnaissance and surveillance

ISR—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

RFI—request for information

LTIOV—latest time information is of value

WARNO—warning order

DISSEMINATE INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

B-18. Dissemination includes intelligence sharing and granting access to databases, information,

intelligence for others to conduct intelligence reach. It also encompasses posting information to unit Web

pages and the intelligence and ISR data required to update the common operational picture (COP). Table B

4 describes the subordinate “Disseminate” activities and lists the G-2/S-2’s responsibilities.

B-19. There are three channels through which commanders and their staffs communicate:

Command channel. The command channel is the direct chain-of-command link that

commanders, or authorized staff officers, use for command-related activities. Command

channels include command radio nets, video teleconferences, and the Maneuver Control System.

Staff channel. The staff channel is the staff-to-staff link within and between headquarters. The

staff uses the staff channel for control-related activities. Through the staff channel, the staff

coordinates and transmits intelligence, controlling instructions, planning information, and

provides early warning information and other information to support command and control (C2).

Examples of staff channels include the operations and intelligence radio net, telephone, the staff

huddle, video teleconference, and the warfighting function-specific components of DCGS-A to

provide information and intelligence to the rest of the intelligence architecture.

Technical channel. Staffs typically use technical channels to control specific activities. These

activities include fire direction and the technical support and SCI reporting channels of

intelligence and ISR operations. The SIGINT tasking and reporting radio net, intelligence

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broadcast communications, and the wide area networks supporting single intelligence discipline

collection, processing, and production are examples of technical channels.

Table B-4. Disseminate

Arrange for direct dissemination

•

Have ISR assets report directly to the unit requiring the information for decisions.

•

This dissemination method is written into the ISR task or RFI if the G-2/S-2, with the commander’s approval,

requires the unit to execute it. Include the required coordinating information, such as call signs, frequencies,

and routing addresses.

•

If the G-2/S-2 allows the asset to report directly to the requesting unit, the intelligence staff provides the

G-2/S-2 with a copy of the information to update the ISR synchronization tools.

•

Direct dissemination is commonly used for fires and air defense units, and the target nomination process.

Determine perishability

•

Determine what information will bypass intelligence processing functions and delivered directly to the

commander for decisionmaking based on LTIOV.

•

Set alarms for critical intelligence using DCGS-A tools to alert analysts of the information’s arrival.

Determine quantity

•

Provide precise amounts of information to commanders and staffs to support their decisionmaking while

avoiding overwhelming them with unnecessary detail or compromising security techniques, means, and

sources.

•

Evaluate each element of reported information against the decisions, requirements, and supporting SIRs and

ISR tasks for the identified consumer.

•

Ensure that SCI is not disseminated to unauthorized users.

•

Legal restrictions may prohibit information dissemination to multinational forces.

Determine dissemination methods

Dissemination methods are unique to each unit and usually specified by SOPs.

•

At a minimum, plan for primary and alternate dissemination methods (redundant means and pathways) for

intelligence or reporting that supports CCIRs and decisionmaking.

•

Coordinate with operations and signals staff to determine the available dissemination methods.

•

Continuously monitor the status of the dissemination means.

Identify dissemination media

Choose the correct dissemination media to ensure timely delivery of mission-critical and time-sensitive information:

•

Voice. Most useful when speed in the transmission of small amounts of information is critical.

•

Graphics and text dissemination. Use graphics for information on disposition, composition, and strength;

use text for the other threat characteristics.

•

Messenger with a hardcopy. Least desirable; however, if the messenger is well briefed, this technique is

effective for user understanding.

Identify dissemination media

When disseminating information, the intelligence officers ensure the staff—

•

Uses the precedence coding system (FLASH, PRIORITY)—careful not to deflate the value of the highest

precedence codes.

•

Is proficient at operating automated systems and familiar with message formats.

•

Answers questions about accuracy, source, and completeness.

•

Disseminates essential information to all appropriate commanders and staff sections and informs them of

what is available.

Note. The act of posting intelligence reports on a Web page or uploading a new database is not dissemination.

Develop audit trail

Coordinate with the signals officer to develop audit trails to ensure all appropriate commanders and staff sections

receive each report only once.

Audit trail techniques include—

•

Providing columns on the ISR plan to record messages received that satisfy an ISR task and where

messages were sent.

•

Developing a matrix separate from the ISR plan, with “time received” and “sent to” on one axis and “ISR

tasks” on the other axis.

•

Annotating the dissemination list directly into a message’s remarks section.

Note. A collection and dissemination journal is a simple method for tracking who sent what messages. Automation is

especially useful—relational databases and automated journals allow complete and thorough cross-indexing, which solves many

of the problems intelligence officers usually experience when relating requirements to reports and tracking dissemination.

6 January 2010

TC 2-50.5

B-11

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 7) - page 18