Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 3)

Military Police and Counterinsurgency Operations, Initial Impressions

Report (IIR)

Lessons / Insights:

NL has well-known and proven application within theater-level DO;

thereby proliferating its use in that mission set.

Availability and employment of NL can be widely varied based on

commander preferences and EOF / ROE restrictions and procedures, thereby

restricting and hindering NL weapons and munitions employment.

For it to be widely used and accepted, NL weapons and munitions must

be incorporated into EOF / ROE procedures across the theater of operation.

NL requisition and procurement procedures must be standardized in order

to better enable units to acquire and employ NL weapons and munitions.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: Add detailed NL weapons and munitions characteristics,

capabilities, employment, and tactics to overarching Army doctrinal manuals.

Organization: Add NL weapons authorizations to unit TOEs within the

Maneuver, Fires, and Effects field.

Training: Increase available slots / expand course capacity in the Inter-

Service Non-Lethal Individual Weapons Instructor Course (INIWIC).

Materiel: Ensure adequate quantities and types of NL weapons and

munitions are readily available for deployed units to procure and use.

Materiel: Develop NL weapons sets at the SQD level.

Leader Development and Education: Ensure OES and NCOES

courses across the Army educate officer and NCO leaders on the capabilities

and employment of NL weapons and munitions.

Personnel: Add NL Instructor/Planner Skill Identifier (SI) and Additional

Skill Identifier (ASI) to selected leader positions on the TOEs of MP units and

maneuver units.

Facilities: Ensure adequate arms room space is added for units to

secure authorized NL weapons and munitions.

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Topic 2.13: Up-Armored HMMWV (UAH) Equipment

Discussion:

Leaders emphasized the UAH improvements have been instrumental in mission

capability and force protection. The system used to defeat IEDs has a power

switch / control box that is bracketed above the visor on the team leader / squad

leader (right front seat) of the vehicle. The switches are easy to operate but the

control box hangs low enough that average to tall leaders to have to cock their

heads forward or lean their body (in a seat belt with full Individual Body Armor

(IBA) and weapon / ammo) the left so they can see out the full window. This

leaning, coupled with the already cramped positioning of the front passenger seat

have and will cause short and long term neck, leg, and back problems as the

leaders keep these positions for long periods of time.

The electronic turret and protective glass are great enhancements to the UAH

gunner‘s turret. It can rotate easily and the ballistic glass allowed the gunner to

move and see more freely while maintaining a better protection posture.

Insights / Lessons:

It may be beneficial in future iterations of the UAH to increase the inside roof

height by 2-3 inches. Leaders have adapted by either leaning to the right or

some have drilled new holes for the seat and have moved the seat back a few

inches to accommodate more room and allow for an improved angle of vision out

the front window.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Materiel: Look to raise the roof (interior height) of the UAH to allow better

visibility.

Materiel: Look to increase the passenger compartment by 3-4 inches in

length.

Personnel: Conduct a medical/physiological study of drivers, team

leaders and gunners to get a baseline of these Soldiers prior to deployment and

then have follow up studies immediately after deployment and 5, 10 and 15 years

down the road to help determine mitigating actions (exercise, stretch, materiel

solutions) that personnel can take to reduce the impact or possibility of long term

injury or damage to vertebrae or other skeletal / muscle areas.

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Topic 2.14: Integration of Host Nation Security Forces and Means

Discussion:

The MP brigade commander used one MP CPT to work Information Operations

(IO) for the brigade. The MP brigade commander re-tasked an MP Captain in

the S3 shop to work IO for the brigade and its PTT mission. With the

tremendous access to the local police and the populace, and due to the lack of

legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the populace, the IO effort was seen as key

to successful PTT.

The brigade realized the importance of a good IO effort and the requirements.

They knew IO must be connected into daily brigade operations. The brigade

commander saw the need for an IO officer to feed division but needed division

support. The efforts were paying dividends and as the division understood more

and more how it could help the brigade, cooperation increased and effectiveness

increased.

Each unit in CONUS has a ―McGruff‖ and schools DARE and other type of liaison

program. Police conduct a lot of information and public affairs operations yet in

COIN operations only sporadic emphasis has been placed on this capability.

Insights / Lessons:

An IO capability is essential when developing police and rule of law

legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

Continue to exploit and encourage positive Information Operations (IO)

within the PTT mission.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: MP Doctrine should capture this IO effort and work with

PYSOP and IO communities to expand the doctrinal application in COIN for

developing police and establishing rule of law.

Training: Integrate IO training into all USAMPS training courses to

provide an overview of how IO coincides with COIN efforts.

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Chapter 3: Police Intelligence Operations

Chapter Contents

Page

Summary

Topic 3.1: Law Enforcement Support to Maneuver Commanders

Topic 3.2: Data Warehousing and Management

Topic 3.3: Crime and Criminal Intelligence Analysis

Topic 3.4: Forensic Support to Police Intelligence Operations

100

Topic 3.5: Biometric Support to Police Intelligence Operations

106

Sub Topic 3.5.1: Predeployment Training

112

Sub Topic 3.5.2: Connectivity

114

Topic 3.6: Forensic / Evidence Collection Kits

116

Topic 3.7: Operational Security (OPSEC)

117

Summary

Leaders reported that the law enforcement skill sets were critical to adequately

support COIN operations. Police Intelligence Operations (PIO) and the

associated law enforcement skill set were identified by maneuver commanders

as being critical to the successful prosecution of all operations targeting insurgent

and terrorist groups. This chapter will focus on how PIO and law enforcement

skill sets have supported maneuver commanders and how these efforts can be

improved in order to enhance operations and protect US interests and personnel.

Until recently, Army doctrine and training regimens have prepared maneuver

commanders for traditional linear combat operations, wherein one force can

easily delineate opposing forces, and engage them on linear battlefields.

However, current and foreseeable combat operations do not, and will not likely

share these features.

Topic 3.1: Law Enforcement Support to Maneuver Commanders

Discussion:

In Iraq today, enemy forces and insurgents are not typically uniformed, lawful

combatants, but rather are persons affiliated with extremist and terrorist groups

or organized crime organizations, who easily blend into the civilian population

and employ terrorist tactics. Combating these organizations cannot be fully or

successfully accomplished using only current Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities

(KSA) of our greater force. The KSAs that are needed to augment historical

combat capabilities are most akin to and can be derived from the Law

Enforcement skill sets.

The organizational structure and design of extremist and terrorist groups are not

similar to those of military units; however, they are identical to organized crime

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groups because they are in fact such groups. Engaging these groups using

traditional military strategies merely yields the lowest level operatives, who are

typically the IED triggermen, snipers, or other individuals observed in an act of

aggression. When compared to a criminal investigative model, this is tantamount

to arresting the drug dealers on street corners day after day. Each day there are

new street level dealers, who replaced the ones removed the previous day.

In order to effectively combat this type of group, there must first be an

understanding of the group‘s intent, targets, motives, and organizational

structure. Subsequently, methodical collection and analytical processes must be

applied to exposing each layer of the organization, from the tactical operatives, to

the planners, engineers / technicians (bomb makers, etc.), recruiters, organizers,

financiers, and masterminds. The entire organization must be exposed and

eradicated in order to prevent it from re-forming and returning to operational

status. The KSAs associated with this capability are the same capabilities used

by law enforcement organizations around the world to combat organized criminal

activities.

One of the most effective collection and evidence producing tools has been the

interview and interrogation of detained persons. This can serve as a starting

point to understand and appreciate the nature of the opposing force, how it is

structured and how it can be defeated. There are several critical features to the

interview process that have to be solidified as a doctrinal practice, and expanded

as a standard of practice in a broader more effective manner than it has been in

tightly controlled and selective processes of the recent past.

One of the best practices identified to date was a combined tactical operator,

military intelligence, and military police operation. In this scenario, tactical

operators would capture high value targets (HVT), which were segregated and

interviewed or interrogated for numerous days by military intelligence assets for

battlefield intelligence information. If during the course of these interviews and

interrogations information was identified that was potentially criminal, the

detainees were referred to CID Agents who conducted follow up interviews

specifically focused on the criminal offense. In these interviews all identifiable

evidence was leveraged to as completely as possible expose the full extent of

any criminal offenses. Upon the conclusion of these interviews, the detainees

were asked to handwrite a statement pertaining to their criminal activities and

were briefly videotaped as they attested to the validity of their handwritten

statements.

Due to the immature nature of the Iraqi justice system, courts were slow to

consider any types of physical or forensic evidence; rather, they strongly favored

confessions made to Iraqi officials, and eye witness statements attested to and

affirmed before Iraqi officials. In light of the fact that courts were not inclined to

accept a confession given to foreign officials unless the accused individual

affirmed that the confession was true in their presence. It is vital that this

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affirmation process occur as soon after the confession is memorialized as

possible; before the individual can be persuaded by internal or external influence

to recant previous statements. In order to prevent such contamination, the

detainees must remain segregated from other influences until they have

appeared before an Iraqi court and affirmed their statement(s). This could be

accomplished most effectively if a night court arraignment process were

developed in order to get the detainees to an Iraqi official as quickly as possible

after making their statements, before they can be contaminated by others, or

pressured to retract their statements by other detainees.

Using the aforementioned interview / interrogation model the Iraqi courts have

been holding some criminal trials 6-8 weeks after the interviews with an

extremely high rate of convictions and severe sentences. This process

accomplished several extremely meaningful objectives:

The process helped the Iraqi judicial system establish credibility as it holds

criminal offenders accountable for their crimes.

It removed detainees from the coalition forces (CF) management

responsibility, thus reducing the number of detainees held, housed, and cared for

by CF.

It removed insurgents from the battlefield for a definitive and in many

cases prolonged or permanent period of time.

The persons being convicted in the Iraqi courts have been charged with a

multitude of offenses such as murder, terrorism, kidnapping, manufacturing or

transporting explosives, entering the country with the specific intent of engaging

in attacks against the CF or Iraqi infrastructure, supporting, planning or financing

such attacks, etc. Through the application of the Army Law Enforcement skill

sets, offenses generated Iraqi Criminal Court convictions. Because these

individuals were convicted of criminal offenses by the Iraqi judicial system, they

have been removed from CF management responsibility and the battlefield.

In one particular case, an IED was discovered. An examination of its

components identified latent fingerprint impressions, which were subsequently

matched to an individual within the CF fingerprint database. Additionally, at the

time this detainee was processed for intake, examinations revealed he had

handled explosives preceding his detention. Although the Iraqi judicial system

has not historically given much if any credibility to physical evidence as opposed

to their strong proclivity for and weight in testimonial evidence, the court

convicted this individual, who did not confess, and no other testimonial evidence

was offered. He was subsequently sentenced to death. This incident is not only

an example of the successes being realized through the application of Army Law

Enforcement skill sets, but it is also a testament to the growth capacity of the

Iraqi justice system.

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Similarly Army Law Enforcement skill sets have been applied to numerous other

IED attacks, murders, and related offenses, directed against CF and Iraqi

infrastructure. Some of these attacks include the murder of three Office of

Special Investigations (OSI) special agents, who were killed in an IED attack; and

a sniper with over 20 self confirmed kills. In both cases, the individuals

confessed to Army CID special agents, and affirmed their confessions to the Iraqi

courts. Three have been tried convicted and sentenced and the other was

pending trail as of the writing of this document. Such efforts virtually ensure

these offenders will not re-engage on the battlefield.

It was clear that the application of these law enforcement skill sets has been

tremendously successful, and should be expanded. The CID agents conducting

these interviews and interrogations related that they needed five more agents,

one more analyst, three more linguists (plus agents should be language qualified

if possible), one more administrative support Soldier, eight more dedicated

segregation cells, two more interview rooms, and four more concealed closed

circuit TV systems with dual monitoring capability in order to operate at optimal

effectiveness. It was also indicated that the command structure for this activity

had proven effective and should be made a part of the program of record (POR)

for future operational efficiency.

In developing this capability for large scale implementation within the battle

space, specific attention must be given to understanding the construct, training

and skill sets that have made previous models of this nature successful. It was

paramount to this process that the personnel conducting these exploitation

functions are highly skilled law enforcement personnel who are specifically

trained to perform in this capacity. Additionally, the construct of these

exploitation teams must be deliberately designed using the best and most

effective practices as validated by previous lessons and the best means to collect

evidence that is admissible in the host nation judicial system. The organizations

must be embedded with military intelligence efforts to exploit battlefield

intelligence and work together in an environment that creates synergy of effort,

both of which are supported by internal analytical support and access to all

available information and evidence that can guide the interview and interrogation

processes. Further, this information and evidence must be incorporated into

investigative case files when presented to the host nation judicial systems.

Perhaps the most significant component to the success of these interviews was

the immediacy of the interviews and interrogations following their capture,

followed by getting them to the Iraqi court to affirm their statements as soon as

possible after they were rendered. These systems should be designed and

overseen by the organization(s) that have effectively employed these practices at

a smaller scale in order to replicate this process at a large scale.

Based on an assessment of the skill sets required in order to provide the law

enforcement capabilities within battlefield operations, it was determined that the

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only Army personnel who possessed the full array of these high-end investigative

skills were USACIDC special agents. However, there were far too few of these

personnel within the Army inventory to provide maneuver commanders with the

capabilities sought from the law enforcement perspective and the investigative

prowess associated with seasoned criminal investigators. As there was not an

accessible Army inventory of these skill sets, a determination was made to obtain

a contracted capability via the LEP Program. Through this program, retired law

enforcement officers (predominantly from the federal investigative agencies),

now serving as contractors, were assembled and placed with maneuver

commanders.

LEP assets were amassed and fielded rapidly (OIF was the first operation these

skill sets had been placed in the maneuver commander‘s tool box). There was

little architectural or functional guidance provided with these assets. Essentially,

each LEP was provided the autonomy to embed with the supported unit and

ascertain what was important to the maneuver commander. As relationships

built, missions were defined for each LEP individually. Based on initial

assessments, maneuver commanders were generally pleased with the LEP

model. Moreover, many desired additional law enforcement assets to aid them in

disrupting and destroying enemy organizations using their expertise.

After examining what the different LEPs were doing for maneuver commanders,

some best practices were identified and should be implemented throughout the

program. Additionally, if the LEPs are to provide the value added that Army

leadership envisioned when the contract was let, consideration must be given to

formalizing the connectivity between the LEPs and other law enforcement

organizations engaged in IED defeat operations and investigating criminal

offenses committed against CF interests by insurgents. Commanders have been

using LEP personnel to perform duties spanning from intelligence focused

interviews, Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE), Criminal Intelligence Analysts,

Evidence Collection and Forensic Advisors, to that of IED Defeat Specialists.

The primary duties described by the interviewed LEPs were that of an advisor on

law enforcement perspective / insight and evidence management personnel who

train Soldiers on how collect, safeguard, and account for evidence.

It was determined through the interview process that nearly a third of the LEPs

had graduated from the military intelligence interrogator‘s course since being

hired. Many were attempting to navigate their way through ―the certification

process‖ so they could conduct interviews of detainees. It should be noted that

the certification process indicated, only requires members of the ―intelligence

community‖ to attain such certification, and law enforcement personnel do not

require such certification when conducting law enforcement interviews.

By the mere nature of their title, ―Law Enforcement Professionals‖, it would

appear that they should not be conducting intelligence interviews, but rather

criminal investigative interviews in pursuit of evidence related to the murders,

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kidnapping, or otherwise targeting CF or Iraqi interests. Further, it did not seem

logical, that LEPs should attend the military intelligence interrogator‘s course.

This assessment was based on techniques they teach, advocate, and utilize

were not the same ones practiced by law enforcement personnel. Indeed, it was

viewed by many that attending the course caused a blurring of the line between

what they were hired to do and what others perceived them as doing.

LEP interviews confirmed that none of the LEPs were analysts. A few of them

did possess some analytical skills. One of the needs brought out in the

interviews was for criminal intelligence analysts to be dedicated on looking at the

criminal nature of the threat organizations. This would include assembling the

fragmented information they have individually collected and sharing this

information in the isolated databases. Focus must be on ongoing criminal activity

associated with theater threats.

There should be centralized control of LEP activities just as there would be for

any investigative task force. Conducting individually motivated investigative

activity would be somewhat effective if the enemy was not so widespread and

conducting operations within other areas of operation. Due to the widely spread

networks and cells operating globally, it is absolutely essential that the LEPs and

any other agencies engaging in similar missions designed to seek out, disrupt,

and ultimately bring these offenders to justice, to share information seamlessly

and without delay. These assets should serve as their advisors. Many people

stated that other investigative personnel should manage collection and other

investigative actions so that synergy of effort can create a web-like effect and

attack the targeted organizations with expert proficiency.

Battalion level assets within the BCT or other maneuver units should focus on the

commander‘s intent, collecting on and following up information that identifies

criminal threats as they relate to the maneuver commanders greatest concerns.

At each level above battalion, the number of LEPs should decrease, as they will

serve to consolidate the subordinate LEP products, present them to the senior

commander, and re-focus efforts to exploit those issues the brigade through

Corps deem most important and meaningful. At the top of the chain, LEP

personnel should take their guidance from an investigative organization versed in

these types of missions and capable of managing such a large task force. The

United States Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC)-managed

Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF), would be perfectly suited for managing

such an organization.

Based primarily on input from maneuver commanders, it appeared that one of

their primary concerns was having an advisor, who could serve as a subject

matter expert relating to the collection and processing of physical / forensic

evidence. This advisor best served as their embedded subject matter expert and

primary force trainer for evidence related concerns as they applied to the

battlefield. Additionally, it was strongly stated that they needed a network

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designed to enable them to successfully disrupt and destroy asymmetric criminal

like organizations on the battlefield.

A stated recommendation was to provide commanders with an evidence advisor

and trainer and to develop a Criminalistics Technician skill set (MOS/ASI) within

the Military Police Career Management Field. Recruiting could be conducted

from anyone in the Army meeting predetermined qualifications (i.e. … GT score,

College Education, Active Federal Service (AFS), Rank at the time of entry, etc.).

Once selected for training, the Soldiers would receive extensive Crime Scene

Management Training and then undergo an internship with a large metropolitan

police department that employs Criminalistics Technicians. Subsequent to the

completion of their training, they could be assigned to USACIDC Resident

Agencies, where they would continually train special agents, respond to all crime

scenes, and direct, the identification, memorialization, preservation, collection,

and safeguarding of all physical evidence. This non-deployment utilization would

ensure they stayed current and proficient within their expertise.

If a BCT or DIV CDR required more advanced guidance within the realm of

forensics they could coordinate this assistance through the supported USACIDC

Forensic Science Officer. Evidence training to tactical Soldiers needed to be at

the most basic level. They did not require advanced training such as developing

and lifting fingerprints. They merely needed to know how to maintain the chain of

custody and collect evidence in a manner that does not destroy evidence.

When a supported BCT or maneuver element is identified to deploy, the

Criminalistics Technician would be operationally attached to the deploying unit,

and would serve as their advisor for all matters of forensics and evidence

collection and processing. Upon redeployment, the Criminalistics Technician

would be detached from the BCT or Maneuver element they were supporting and

return to the USACIDC resident Agency, where they would maintain their

proficiency. In addition to performing duties as the Criminalistics Technician, this

Soldier could be assigned duties as the evidence custodian with the USACIDC

resident agency (or MP Investigations Evidence Room) in which they are

assigned, which would ensure a full utilization of their specialized training and

skill sets.

It was also recommended that a specifically designed Criminal Investigative

Organization or Task Force be assembled to consolidate, synthesize, analyze,

develop actionable criminal intelligence, focus investigative efforts, and provide

commanders with information that will guide measures to root out and eradicate

complex organizations from top to bottom. Again, the CITF, would be the

perfectly suited and equipped organization to oversee, direct and manage this

effort. Further, as the nature of American adversaries does not appear will

transition from the currently faced asymmetric composition, this organization

should become a program of record, and be permanently adopted into the

Military Police Corps Regiment as an enduring capability in all environments.

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It was specifically articulated numerous times, that the most effective practices

currently being employed, should be expanded and adopted into doctrine for as

long as they are effective and practical. Some comments recommended more

training on how interviews should be conducted and proper use of linguists in

current and foreseeable combat operations.

One of the specific observations acknowledged that interviewers and

interrogators were only as good as their linguists. This projection was coupled

with inflection on the great reliance placed on the linguist‘s ability to operate

within this unique environment. It is important to note that there was a significant

delineation between a translator and an interpreter. Translators literally translate

one language into another; whereas, interpreters tend to capture intent of the

speaker and translate what they believe to be the speaker‘s intent into the other

language. It is vital within the interview and interrogation process that literal

translations occur as opposed to interpretations. It was also strongly suggested

that CID agents be trained as linguists to provide them with the ability to interview

and interrogate more effectively. Many stressed this would be a huge benefit

and would increase reliability and efficiency. However, even with these language

skills, translators would still be required for both their language skills and the

cultural awareness attributes that cannot be trained.

The number of linguists assigned to MP companies severely limits their capability

to train and their overall contribution to the fight. Unlike other missions such as

convoy security, route clearance, and even kinetic operations, having more

linguists would multiply the training accomplished during PTT station visits. Also,

the lack of linguists, with a clearance, makes planning missions with top HNP

leaders and maintaining OPSEC impossible and potentially endangers Soldiers.

Senior MPs interviewed recommended the MP Corps needs to increase the

number of linguists allotted per company and also to have one interpreter with a

clearance to use during priority operations.

The education and training regimens required these types of interview and

interrogation capabilities be inculcated into CID special agents at a multitude of

levels. It must be designed in a fluid educational package that allows the training

to be tailored based on current lessons learned and projected skill sets required.

This training should be conducted in an overview format at the basic agent entry

level. Then, after a couple of years of interview and interrogation experience, be

reintroduced in an advanced interview and interrogation training package, that is

designed specifically for current and projected interview and interrogation needs.

The template for current operations might include backg0round and education on

the Arabic culture, Islamic culture, shame based versus guilt based societies,

zealot or fanatical ideologies, and the requirements of the judicial process that

will be used in the prosecution of offenders. It is essential that this training

remain adaptive to an ever changing battlefield and that it is designed to be fluid

and contemporary.

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Further, personnel returning from deployments should be identified and cycled

into the United States Military Police School (USAMPS) to bring their

experiences to bear in updated training and doctrine. Care should be taken not

to solely bring instructors in from the battlespace, in that agents at home, camp

and station engage in real world application of their trade every day, and agents

from these assignments are also required to maintain a balance in training and

doctrine as well. USAMPS and the Reserve and National Guard components

would do well to consider bringing reserve personnel onto temporary active duty,

as they return from such assignments, to conduct Mobile Training Team (MTT)

events, or as adjunct faculty members, to supplement instructor strength and

experience. When developing lesson plans and Programs of Instruction, use the

title ―contemporary training‖ as a means of expediting training updates to the

most current and relevant information and practices currently employed.

In many aspects of the law enforcement capability that have proven successful in

the Global War on Terror, the CITF has been consistently the leader in attaining

progress and defining / developing the skill sets necessary to combat this

asymmetric adversary. The capabilities amassed within this organization, and its

ability to adapt rapidly will be indispensable in all future operations both while at

war and during times of peace. Strong consideration must be given as to how

this organization can be permanently adopted into the USACIDC or Department

of Defense (DoD) inventory. This organization is ideally suited for targeting

complex and widely spread criminal threats such as terrorism, narcotic

manufacturing and smuggling, gang activities, or other organized criminal

enterprises. This high level and large scale ability to fuse and follow up on

criminal intelligence will be a vital component in our nation‘s security and

capability to thwart threats of many types.

One of the key recommendations was that we go back to the very basics of the

career development cycle within the MP Corps and identify the skill sets any

police officer should possess and embed them from MP Advanced Individual

Training and Basic Officer Leadership Courses. Then identify the advanced

skills police officers should possess after a few years of police officer service and

embed them into the Basic Non-Commissioned Officer Course and the Captains

Career Course. Interviewed personnel stated this would instill law enforcement

capabilities back into the MP Corps. Also mentioned, was MP must practice their

trade at home camp and station in order to possess and retain the competencies

required in a deployed environment.

It was strongly recommended that a follow up CALL visit be conducted to collect

on growth capabilities and utilization in six months to one year.

Insights / Lessons:

Current doctrine has effectively prepared maneuver commanders to

engage in symmetric combat operations; however, current and foreseeable

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combat operations will engage asymmetric criminal networks of terrorist groups.

Commanders must have the tools available to them that will enable effective

operations designed to disrupt and destroy these groups, not merely the

individuals operating at the tactical level.

Use currently employed effective practices. Grow this capability from

current small scale operations, to much larger, more robust efforts. Include

interviews, interrogations, multi-discipline embedding, and use of host nation

judicial system to maximize effectiveness.

Connectivity of effort, data, criminal intelligence, and results must be

centralized.

Disjointed and individually managed efforts are ineffective against

complex criminal organizations.

In order to be effective, law enforcement personnel engaged in targeting

these criminal groups must have centralized management and guidance from an

experienced law enforcement body capable and versed in unveiling these types

of organizations.

Evidence training to tactical Soldiers needs to be at the most basic level.

They do not require advanced training such as developing and lifting fingerprints,

they merely need to know how to maintain the chain of custody and collect

evidence in a manner that does not destroy evidence.

Law Enforcement Professionals should not be conducting intelligence

interviews, but rather criminal investigative interviews in pursuit of evidence

related to the murders, kidnapping or otherwise targeting CF or Iraqi interests.

Further, it does not seem logical, that LEPs should attend the military intelligence

interrogator‘s course, in that the techniques they teach, advocate and utilize are

not the same techniques practices by law enforcement personnel, and by

attending the course are blurring the line between what they are hired to do, and

what others perceive them as doing

Assign a mix of personnel from recent field agent activities as well as

recent deployment operations to USAMPS to keep doctrine and training up to

date. Use contemporary training as a means of expediting training updates, and

use reserve personnel with recent experience to conduct MTT events and as

adjunct faculty members.

Return Law Enforcement Skill Set to MP Corps personnel and stop relying

on technology to fill a void created by changes in focus over the years.

DOTMLPF Implications:

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Doctrine: Update Army and MP doctrine to prepare maneuver

commanders and supporting MP Commanders to effectively combat complex

criminal organizations using law enforcement tools, personnel and skill sets.

Organization: Establish an enduring CITF; define how law enforcement

personnel can be used in support of combat operations, yet still be employed to

thwart crime at home, camp and station in support of Anti-Terrorism (AT), Police

Intelligence Operations, and Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) efforts.

Training: Send select USCIDC special Agents (31D/311A) to Arabic

Language training (or language of populace in the theater of operations)

Training: Develop detainee interview and interrogation overview training

at CID entry level and advanced interview and interrogation training directed

toward the criminal interview of detainees

Training: Develop a training program for Military Police in how to use

linguists in basic interview and collection efforts.

Leader Development and Education: Train maneuver commanders on

how to most effectively use Criminalistics Technicians within their units and how

to feed evidence and information into the PIO construct, as well as how to extract

pertinent information and intelligence from it.

Facilities: Establish mock detention and interrogation facilities to teach

the skills required for the police interrogations of detainees. Additionally,

permanent facilities for the enduring CITF model have to be acquired and

equipped.

Topic 3.2: Data Warehousing and Management

Discussion:

Leaders and law enforcement personnel stated that there is a definite need to

develop a consolidated data management and warehousing capabilities in

support of combat and stability operations. Currently, there is no centralized or

consistent database wherein police or criminal information is being warehoused.

Theater has viewed this as significantly undermining the ability of investigative

resources to share, draw from, or otherwise develop a greater picture or any true

synergy of effort. In addition to locally developed and completely isolated

databases, there were larger scale, yet still disjointed databases that contained

bits and pieces of information. Some organizations were using a web-based

data storage system by the brand name of i2G. In this system, the database can

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be tailored easily, and was akin to the primary database used by the Air Force

Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI) (variation; i2MS, server based system),

ICE and other law enforcement agencies. Data was entered into the system in

packages that are linked together in a manner that facilitates some level of

analysis within the system. It is established in such a way as to associate

information from other investigative actions to one another. Thus, it was easier

to determine links between individuals, groups, activities and evidence. The

database was searchable to a very high degree which facilitated the use of data

mining tools to ensure information can be recovered and used to develop

extremely thorough analytical products. The database proved extremely user

friendly; designed in a windows based point and click / pull down menu forum.

The database allowed documents of multiple formats to be embedded into it

where they could be searched, read, displayed and printed.

The United States Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) has been

using the ACI2 database for many years. This system will not share information,

allow for importing, exporting, or for any practical application facilitate targeted

search ability and does not lend itself to police or criminal intelligence operations.

The Military Police use the COPS database which is substantially more robust

than the ACI2 program. However, it does not facilitate the exchange of data

beyond its internal capabilities, but does allow some level of importing and

exporting. Various databases can be linked together using ―ibridges‖ that were

created through permissions and programming solution. Using this technology, a

criminal informational data warehouse can be connected to other databases to

which there is access authority which can be developed with current technologies

to create intuitive database operations and reduce the workload on analytical

personnel.

Example: If a crime with a delineable modus operandi is committed at a

particular installation, investigators or analysts could search the database for

similar offenses committed using the same or similar modus operandi throughout

the entire database. The database would be able to report any similar matches,

such as there were similar offenses identified at two other military installations,

with a particular match percentage and the details of the matches. A subsequent

search of the Defense Eligibility Enrollment Records System (DEERS) and

Defense Travel System (DTS), and Human Resources Center (HRC) databases

could be conducted using an ibridge to identify any personnel who were

assigned, previously assigned, or TDY to those areas at the times offenses were

committed. Consequently, a suspect pool could be reduced from tens of

thousands to anywhere from a handful of persons to potentially a single

individual.

Units reported whatever the solution that is decided, it must allow authorized

personnel to input access and share information with little to no redundancy of

effort. Manually checking multiple databases to glean information pertaining to a

single issue constitutes a vast waste of time and resources. In the best case

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scenario, a single database would be used, but in less desirable models, multiple

databases could be connected via ibridge technologies, and enable more

effective use of data warehousing and management efforts. This should be a

priority, because the longer it takes to resolve this issue, the more disjointed

other aspects implemented to improve the level of law enforcement support to

the commander‘s greatest concerns will be.

Additionally, it is vital that all criminal investigative elements have completely

unrestricted access to all aspects of the internet, which may require access be

granted via a separate LAN connection than that provided by DOIM. This

requirement enables investigative personnel to access sites that range from anti-

American groups, to chat rooms, drug paraphernalia, to child pornography and

other sites as required by ongoing investigative operations. Currently, site

restrictions and blocks prevented investigative personnel from accessing the

sites indicated, which detracted from holistic investigative capabilities.

In order to conduct analysis of data, it is imperative that the ability to sort through

volumes of information stored in separate databases, programs, and files. By

using a combination of data mining programs like Orion Magic, Pathfinder, M3,

and Net Owl, data can be reviewed for relevant data, which can be extrapolated,

compared and placed into the analytical cycle. Orion Magic has been one of the

most robust tools being used; however, it is primarily used to find data

correlations within internal databases. As a database can and invariably will

contain massive volumes of information, it is imperative to have tools that can

search all locations within the database and pull all matching information into one

place where links and associations can be identified and exploited. Whatever

tools are used must have the capability to search and compare a multitude of

documents simultaneously. This capability will facilitate the identification of

evidence that otherwise may never be detected. Through this process modus

operandi‘s can be searched against previously recorded data, thus identifying

links between offenders, offenses, and victims.

The primary program being employed for organizing and charting was reported

as being i2‘s Analyst Notebook. Most of the LEP personnel related that they

were not comfortable with the program and did not employ it. LEP stressed they

were not doing any type of structured analysis. They were police officers by

trade and not analysts and did not have the skill sets required to conduct these

operations. There were a few LEP that were using Analyst Notebook and were

preparing basic link charts, such as toll analysis, which were reported as being

very useful in targeting key planners and organizers of attacks. These efforts

were localized and disconnected from strategic level planners, targeting

participants, or other law enforcement efforts. Whatever the enduring program of

record is, it should be at least as robust as the Analyst Notebook program, which

allows the importation of externally warehoused data, which can be organized,

correlated, linked / associated and manipulated into a multitude of charts that

graphically represent the indentified associations. The technicians required to

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conduct these processes will no doubt have to be separate from the police officer

skill set.

Analysts should be able to produce and myriad of products, which include, but

are not limited to Intelligence Summaries, Association / Link Charts, Commodity

and Flow Charts, Event Charts, Timeline Charts, and other standard graphical

depictions, used with specific focuses on organizing and simplifying complex

organizations, focusing investigative efforts and resources, and predicting future

actions and targets of adversary forces.

There should be analytical cells developed to support and assist investigative

cells. In the most effective configuration, these cells would have limited focus,

and would work together on the specific areas of focus. For example, in support

of combat operations seeking to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations, there

should be cells of agents and analysts dedicated to one aspect of the operation,

like financiers, planners, recruiters, bomb makers, bomb placers, and trigger

pullers. In CONUS operations, these cells may focus on crimes such as narcotic

violations, gang crime, juvenile crime, crimes against persons, fraud crime, and

crimes against property.

During the interviews, it was articulated that the problems created by using so

many stove piped or isolated databases, was that there is no capability to share

data relating to any issue. One of the primary concerns articulated was that a

new database would be created for OIF that would further exacerbate the current

problem. It was recommended that any future databases be designed for

worldwide application so they would alleviate historical short comings and

increase connectivity and sharing of information on the battlefield. Interviews of

multiple S-2 personnel, LEP, and USACIDC personnel revealed they needed one

database capable of managing all criminal information and reports. This

centralized data warehousing capability would be instrumental to ongoing efforts

in rooting out networks of insurgents and other criminal elements operating within

OIF. Specifically, information pertaining to IED would not be restricted to one

localized area but would allow for analysis of incidents around the operational

theater. Similarly, data about planners, recruiters, financiers, or other players

within the criminal structure of insurgent operations would be available to

everyone who has authorized access to the database.

Insights / Lessons:

Currently, there is no centralized or consistent database wherein police or

criminal information is being warehoused.

Need a single data management and warehousing system, with ibridge

technologies that provide for intuitive operations.

Need standardized data mining capabilities and software packages.

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Need standardized analytical and charting software packages.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Training: Train personnel, who will use, input, search, or otherwise

manage data in each system acquired.

Materiel: Develop a centralized law enforcement database and the

servers dedicated to manage them. Select and acquire standardized data

mining, analysis, and charting software packages.

Topic 3.3: Crime and Criminal Intelligence Analysis

Discussion:

Police Intelligence Operations capabilities of our MP provide a very basic

capability for maneuver and MP commanders. To enhance operational success,

theater leaders recommended development and utilization of an organic

analytical capability, within the MP Corps Career Management Field (CMF).

Currently, the MP Corps Regiment does not possess an organic analytical

capability. While in a deployed environment, assistance in this mission can be

accomplished by leaning on the MI community, and their analytical personnel to

aid in the development of criminal intelligence products. However, it is important

to note that in order for criminal intelligence products to be standardized,

sharable, and meaningful, they must become a part of the MP culture. The need

to conduct police / criminal intelligence operations is a mission that has to be

conducted both in deployed environments and at home stations. Based on

observations, this organic analytical capability does not exist in Iraq.

Although MI assets can assist in this effort while focusing on non-US persons,

such as in OIF, they are not authorized to collect on, or manage data that

pertains to US persons. The vast majority of PIO during non-deployment

operations directly targets and relates to US persons. When attempting to

thwart, detect, investigate, or bring to justice criminal offenders, analytical

operations are key to the identifying patterns, focusing investigative efforts, and

predicting future criminal conduct. Consequently, an organic MP analytical

capability is absolutely necessary and will be one of the most significant

components of ensuring the MP Corps provides commanders, at all levels, with

the policing capabilities required in protecting a force as large as the US Army.

Ideally this should be an organic asset within the corps that will ultimately

become a seamless component woven throughout the MP functions and mission

that binds all other functions together. Stop-gap measures such as the LEP

Program were initiated to temporarily fill the capability gap in OIF. Unfortunately,

these personnel did not possess analyst skill sets but were retired police officers

and federal agents. An enduring solution is direly needed to ensure a long-term

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capability for the future and to prevent the capability gap from returning or

growing.

Skill Set / Capability Requirement: The PIO function requires a robust analytical

capability that offers a full array of crime and criminal intelligence analysis skills

and capabilities. The analysis required will consist of every aspect of police and

criminal intelligence. This includes traffic control, vandalism, larceny, juvenile

crime, gang activity, narcotic offenses, fraud offenses, serial offences, violent

crime, and terrorism. Most of the collection, analysis, and work product will

directly involve US persons. The MI community is restricted from doing this

unless it is done as part of a chartered law enforcement activity. The analyst will

be able to provide statistical / crime analysis, trend analysis, investigative

analysis, and predictive analysis.

Units reported these skill sets and capabilities are exactly what are required to

successfully prosecute COIN operations. However, the combination of analytical

assets with law enforcement skill sets was only being applied effectively in

isolated locations. Organizations that employed these techniques experienced

extraordinarily high levels of success in the identification and criminal prosecution

of insurgents and IED cells. Conversely, units not employing this combination of

assets experienced limited ability to identify insurgent activity and organizations,

share information, or to gain insights into the complex organizations they were

confronting.

Additionally, it was recommended that these assets remain assigned to law

enforcement parent units, where they will be employed while not in a deployed

environment, so that they maintain their skill sets, and provide constant value

added. Decision makers need to determine how this can best be accomplished,

and how these assets can best be managed.

During interviews with MP, CID, and maneuver commanders two courses of

action were articulated that may provide the analytical capabilities.

The first course of action, is to embed 96B (MI All Source Analysts) in PIO Billets.

Currently, units experiencing success, as indicated above, utilized the analytical

expertise of the MI community‘s ―All Source Analysts‖ to support COIN

operations. Using this construct in a broader application as an enduring solution

would require the growth of additional analyst personnel to fill the analytical skill

set requirement at each level of PIO. Consideration would have to be given to

the fact that these personnel would be conducting analyst operations pertaining

to US persons as they relate to crime and criminal intelligence. This would

require each of these assets to serve under a chartered law enforcement position

and their focus must be directed in this realm to ensure no violations of

intelligence oversight directives are created.

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If this course of action is selected, it should be noted that the current skill sets

possessed by MI all source analysts are not independently sufficient to conduct

crime and criminal investigative analysis and additional training that focuses on

this venue would have to be provided to each assigned analyst upon each non-

consecutive law enforcement assignment.

This course of action would likely be the most expedient. Many conveyed it may

or may not be the best long-term solution. Consequently, this course of action

could be selected as an interim solution until another one is fully developed or

both as a short and long-term solution. Should this be utilized as an interim

solution, it would likely result in diminished capability as a growth in MI force

structure would not likely occur and MP units are a low fill priority for the MI

community.

This course of action would be the most expedient with the least training

development requirements for USAMPS. This course of action would capitalize

on existing skill sets to meet PIO needs. All source analysts do not possess the

specific skill sets required to conduct crime and criminal investigative analysis but

they do possess the general analytical skills that would be most easily converted

to this purpose. Additional training would be required to provide these skills and

to re-focus personnel on this venue of analysis and to redirect ingrained mental

attitudes regarding intelligence oversight restrictions. This solution would create

force structure within the MI community to meet the need; however, historically

MP organizations have had low fill priority, which would not change in the

foreseeable future. Combat and MI units would receive fills faster than MP

organizations, which may result in lacking or diminished PIO manning and

capabilities on a reoccurring basis.

Another possible course of action recommended was to create a new 311 series

MOS. Due to the relatively low number of personnel required to fulfill this

function, a low density enlisted MOS would not be practical. Soldiers in the

grades of E-1 to E-5 / 6 would be able to perform the skills for which they were

trained but NCOs in the grades of E-6 / 7 through E-9 would have to move out of

the functional aspect of the MOS for career progression purposes. In a low

density warrant officer MOS, analysts could perform analytical operations as a

technical expert in that field from W1 to CW4 and would only have to move out of

the functional aspect of the job upon selection to CW5. Candidates could be

administered an ability battery, something akin to the Highlands Ability Battery,

which would predict the applicant‘s aptitude to perform analytical operations.

Using this construct would allow a wide recruitment pool, which would allow the

recruitment from the MI analyst community, law enforcement personnel, and any

other Soldiers possessing the requisite aptitude.

This solution would provide for a fully functional and dedicated analyst, who

would be able to perform crime and criminal intelligence analysis for an entire

career. It would produce analysts who could be trained to perform this function.

They may or may not have previous analytical training to draw from; however,

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once trained in crime and criminal intelligence analysis, they would be no

transition between duty responsibilities from assignment to assignment, nor

would they be inhibited by concerns pertaining to intelligence oversight

restrictions, which have been strongly inculcated into all MI trained personnel.

This solution would present a truly organic analytical capability to the MP Corps

that eventually would be the cornerstone of PIO. This solution would produce a

low density MOS which would have multiple management considerations.

Many in the MP TOCs stated the MP Company that is actively collecting

information and pursuing intelligence in its area of operations can quickly

become overwhelmed with data and mired with endless lists of names and

locations. In the absence of a dedicated intelligence analyst, the value of some

of this information is lost or not addressed with the urgency that it sometimes

requires. Some maneuver organizations have pushed their intelligence

specialists down to the company level to process, manage, and analyze the

intelligence as it comes in. By the nature of the MP mission, the MP Company

likely gathers exponentially more information than any other organization on the

battlefield. A dedicated intelligence analyst, preferably of the appropriate MOS,

or training individuals specifically for this purpose prior to deployment would be

extremely beneficial.

Insights / Lessons:

Currently, the MP Corps does not possess an organic analytical capability.

There is a great need for this capability in both deployed and non-deployed MP

operational environments.

Although MI assets can assist in this effort while focusing on non-US

persons, such as in deployment operations, they are not authorized to collect on,

or manage data that pertains to US persons.

Ideally this should be an organic asset within the MP Corps that will

ultimately become a seamless component.

As a stop-gap in deployed environment, use MI analytical personnel to

gain this skill set.

Develop an organic MP analytical capability. Implement a new warrant

officer MOS to facilitate this capability.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Organization: Determine at what levels MP Crime and Criminal

Intelligence Analysts are required and how they will be used to support MP and

Maneuver Commanders.

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Training: USAMPS needs to develop a curriculum designed specifically

to produce Crime and Criminal Intelligence Analyst personnel.

Personnel: Add MP Crime and Criminal Intelligence Analyst personnel to

current MP inventory.

Topic 3.4: Forensic Support to Police Intelligence Operations

Discussion:

Mobile / deployable forensic laboratories are essential in attaining success in

future combat operations and have demonstrated an enduring capability

requirement. Historically, laboratory analysis in support of Operation Enduring

Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF/OEF) combat operations has been

accomplished by one of two means. Evidence was either sent back to the

CONUS based United States Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL),

or was examined via secure means by Other Government Agency (OGA)

laboratories.

Using USACIL for these examinations generally entailed long backlogs and

delays in getting results to action commanders. Frequently, these delays

precluded commanders from acting on the information obtained as a result of the

forensic examination. However, should the evidence lead to criminal charges at

some future point, the chain of custody, and results of the examination were

beyond refute, and could easily be used as evidence in a criminal trial or tribunal.

Using OGA laboratory capabilities was typically much faster than the USACIL lab

and more frequently provided Commanders with intelligence that they could act

on in a timely manner. However, should the evidence lead to criminal charges at

some future point, the chain of custody, and results of the examination were

difficult for prosecutors to establish due to classification of processes and

personnel involved. Thus, the evidence was often not used in the prosecution of

these cases, or was very cumbersome if it was.

The mobile/deployable forensic laboratories presented a new tool in theater to

rapidly evaluate and examine evidence and generate actionable intelligence that

commanders used in planning future operations. These laboratories were

managed similar to the USACIL laboratory which ensured a chain of custody,

and also provided prosecutable application. Based on feedback from supported

commanders, US Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) Special

Agents and Intelligence Organizations, the mobile labs were absolutely

imperative for all foreseeable future operations.

In order to maintain a future mobile/deployable laboratory capability, USACIL will

need to create the architecture to enable this capability. Historically, USACIL

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employed Active Duty USACIDC Special Agent laboratory examiners; however,

they were phased out of the inventory over the past two decades.

The Forward Deployed USACIDC Forensic Science Officer recommended that

the Active Duty Laboratory Examiners be added back into the USACIL inventory

as additional / supplemental examiners, who are able to deploy and stand up

mobile / deployable laboratories in forward deployed areas of operation. The

historic configuration of Active Duty examiners only allowed for 311A warrant

officer USACIDC special agent, but it is recommended that this be expanded to

allow 31D and 311A special agents who possess an accredited bachelorette

degree to apply for, be trained and employed in these billets with an Additional

Skill Identifier (ASI) or new Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) identifying this

skill set.

The mobile lab examination capabilities should at a minimum include the ability

to accomplish the following:

Nuclear DNA extraction, pattern development, and comparison.

Latent Fingerprint Development.

Input into Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS) and

conduct comparison with record fingerprints.

Ballistic comparison capabilities (both projectile and shell casing) using a

system equivalent to Integrated Ballistic Identification System (IBIS) 3D.

Digital evidence exploitation capabilities.

Those in charge of the deployable lab set stated they should remain at the

currently projected number at a minimum, but may require up to two additional

mobile labs based on Army utilization and operational tempo as the deployable

laboratory capabilities become better known by theater elements that begin to

seek their support. It was emphasized that these labs should be maintained in

future operations and should never be deactivated. Also, qualified personnel

must be maintained who are capable of performing this function along with the

required equipment required to do so.

Units recognized there was a need for the deployable lab to produce

informational bulletins designed to provide tactical units, at the lowest level, with

intelligence information that would help Soldiers on the ground to identify

potential target locations which could be reported back for action. It was

recommended these bulletins contain information pertaining to what an

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) manufacturing or similar threat sites might

look like. For example, the bulletin might provide descriptions and photographs

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of what scraps or byproducts might be generated in the production process, what

tools or machinery might be needed to manufacture or assemble such devices,

odors that might be associated with these sites, etc.

Historically, USACIDC special agents have sent all evidence collected pertaining

to criminal investigations to the main USACIL lab, but it was recommended that

USACIDC Special Agents in Charge (SAC) must be allowed to make

determinations as to whether or not there is potential for criminal prosecution.

Should it be determined that laboratory examination is warranted, but there will

not be criminal charges filed by the US or Government of Iraq (GOI), the SAC

must be allowed to use the non-accredited deployable labs for the sake of

expedience and support to the maneuver commander.

It is also important that these deployable lab capabilities be integrated within all

intelligence and criminal intelligence operations within the area of operation to

prevent the formation of seams and gaps between organizations with relation to

forensic and or biometric evidence. This integration will support a critical gap for

the maneuver commanders.

More efficient and effective evidence tracking and management systems are

required to ensure accurate chain of custody control records, and to expedite the

flow of evidence. A bar code system that is initiated by printing a bar code label

at the point of collection, which is scanned at each point of transfer, to include

within the mobile labs would be an ideal system that would meet all of the stated

requirements and reduce administrative time otherwise expended in manually

filling out chain of custody forms and signing them.

There was a stated need to ensure that there is a minimum of examiner

redundancy within each area of examinations. Additionally, it was stated that

there is an imperative need for off site data redundancy as well, which will protect

archived and comparison records from natural disasters, combat operations, and

system failures.

Further, it was recommended that a follow up Center for Army Lessons Learned

(CALL) collection be conducted, in six months to one year from the original visit,

in order to capture growth and additional lessons throughout that period.

According to the Multi National Corps - Iraq (MNC-I) Provost Marshal and

current laboratory leadership the future laboratory Officers in Charge (OIC) must

be a field grade MP Branch Officer. Ideally this officer should be a graduate of

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) National Academy, and or graduate

from the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) fellowship in conjunction

with the Master of Forensic Science Program at The George Washington

University; as well as a previous field grade assignment within the USACIDC. It

was additionally recommended that attendance by MP Branch Officers at either

of the aforementioned training venues would require a utilization assignment

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either within USACIDC or a USACIL mobile / deployable lab. It was suggested

that the deployable labs should fall under the architecture of the main USACIL

lab in order to ensure lab accreditation and certification of the examiners are

maintained. This architecture will also assist in the formation of the enduring

requirements for utilization and training.

It was identified that the deployable labs were using a 31B40 / 50 to manage

their evidence rooms when they were available; however, in some cases E-4

Soldiers were being used for this process, with no subject matter knowledge or

expertise in the area. The recommended baseline for this position is a 31D40 /

50 as these Soldiers are the Army‘s subject matter experts in evidence room

management and are familiar with strict evidence room guidelines required in

both AR 195-5 and CIDR 195-1. It was stated that an evidence room in a

deployable lab should be managed at least as effectively as an evidence room in

a USACIDC resident agency.

Both MNC-I Provost Marshal and Deployable Lab leadership articulated a need

for a temporary evidence repository that meets the minimum security standards

of AR 195-5. It was also related that there is a need for a long-term storage

warehouse, wherein, evidence indentified as potentially having future

prosecutorial value would be cataloged and stored for an indefinite period of time

until it was deemed to no longer have evidentiary value. A similar requirement

was articulated for an investigative case file repository on police intelligence

related case files that were not managed by USACIDC.

It is currently not necessary that the results obtained through this analysis meet

laboratory accreditation standards, as the need for rapid turn around to support

maneuver commanders operational needs may override the need for future

courtroom presentation as long as the results can be confirmed by the USACIL

main lab for such purposes. However, upon the conclusion of current combat

operations, the deployed laboratory equipment and examiners could be

redeployed to various locations around the world, where they could stand up

satellite USACIL labs, and could assisted by USACIL main in attaining

accreditations at that time. These labs could be filled by reactivating the active

duty agent / examiner program of record.

According to the forward deployed USACIDC Forensic Science Officer (FSO),

maneuver commanders have expressed a strong desire to have a Forensics

Advisor and consequently have adopted the LEP contract members attached to

their organizations to provide this service.

Based on a review of the LEP contract‘s Statement of Work (SOW), the LEP

personnel were hired primarily to perform a criminal intelligence analysis

function; however, have morphed into forensic and law enforcement advisors.

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According to persons associated to the LEP program, the vast majority of the

individuals hired were prior local, state, or federal law enforcement officers. Most

of these were retired from their agency prior to taking a LEP position. Hiring into

a LEP position did not require a forensic or analyst backg0round and none

observed had one.

According to the forward deployed USACIDC FSO, the combatant and multiple

maneuver commanders reported they find value added in the LEP and feel it is

beneficial to have a law enforcement advisor on staff as they conduct stability

operations. This includes seeking LEP advise on how to identify, preserve,

collect, transport, safeguard, and store evidence.

Currently, the need for criminal analytical products does not appear to be a BCT

or DIV commanders‘ primary or even secondary concern. The skill set sought in

the LEP program may have been misplaced. The crime and criminal intelligence

analysis should most likely be conducted in Provost Marshal (PM) and USACIDC

organizations, then passed to the traditional intelligence channels, where it can

be fused and used by commanders and decision makers as one combined

product.

Consequently, it would be more viable to train personnel to be assigned to these

billets with only the specific skill sets required of the advisor role. These advisors

should be trained as ―Criminalistics Technicians‖, which would give them the

forensic and evidence collection backg0round and expertise required, but would

not waste other valuable skills that are associated with USACIDC Special

Agents.

Several leaders recommended establishing the position of a Criminalistics

Technician / Forensic Advisor would most likely best be configured as a new

Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), under the MP Career Management Field

(CMF). Recruiting could be conducted from anyone in the Army meeting

predetermined qualifications (i.e. … GT score, College Education, Active Federal

Service (AFS), Rank at the time of entry, etc.). Once selected for training, the

Soldiers would receive extensive Crime Scene Management Training, and then

could undergo an internship with a large metropolitan police department that

employs Criminalistics Technicians within their inventory. Subsequent to the

completion of their training regimen, they could be assigned to USACIDC

Resident Agencies, where they would continually train special agents, respond to

all crime scenes, and direct the identification, memorialization, preservation,

collections, and safeguarding of all physical evidence. This non-deployment

utilization would ensure they stayed current and proficient within their expertise.

Theater personnel recommended that the Army should consider removing the

31D / 311A positions at division, BCT, Weapons Intelligence Teams (WIT) and

Maneuver Support Brigades (MSB) and attach these Criminalistics Technicians

to the maneuver units as METT-TC dictates.

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If a BCT or Maneuver Commander requires more advanced guidance within the

realm of forensics they could coordinate this assistance through the supported

USACIDC FSO.

When a supported BCT or maneuver element is identified to deploy, the

Criminalistics Technician would be operationally attached to the deploying unit,

and would serve as their advisor for all matters of forensics and evidence

collection and processing. Upon redeployment, the Criminalistics Technician

would be detached from the BCT or maneuver element they were supporting and

return to the USACIDC resident Agency, where they would maintain their

proficiency. In addition to performing duties as the Criminalistics Technician, this

Soldier could be assigned duties as the evidence custodian with the USACIDC

resident agency in which they are assigned. Additionally, the Criminalistics

Technicians within an MP Brigade Headquarters can support both the police

training team missions (to develop host nation police capabilities) and the crime

scene exploitation training the MP squads currently lack. This would ensure a full

utilization of their specialized training and skill sets. Units reported that

Criminalistics Technicians should only be attached to maneuver units when they

are in a deployed environment and should be employed at USACIDC resident

agencies when not deployed. This would ensure their ability to maintain and

improve skill sets and to provide constant value added to the Army. In a non-

deployed maneuver unit, these Soldiers would not have a mission, and their skills

would atrophy.

Should these Soldiers later decide to apply to become CID Special Agents, it

would be an ideal feeder MOS for USACIDC. Consequently, this would enhance

USACIDC‘s operational capabilities, rather than detract from it, as it would take

fully trained agents from the field in order to capitalize on only a portion of their

knowledge, skills and abilities.

Insights / Lessons:

Mobile labs have benefitted maneuver commanders and combat

operations immensely. Employ mobile labs in future operations to both guide

commanders in decision making process and facilitate prosecution of criminal

offenders that meet both US and host nation evidentiary standards.

Using USACIL for these examinations generally entailed long backlogs

and delays in getting results to maneuver commanders.

OGA laboratory capabilities were faster than the USACIL lab; however,

the evidence was often not used in the prosecution of cases because of security

classification requirements.

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Add Active Duty Laboratory Examiners back into the USACIL inventory as

additional / supplemental examiners, who are able to deploy and stand up

mobile/deployable laboratories in forward deployed areas of operation.

Ensure mobile labs possess minimum capabilities of: Nuclear DNA

extraction, pattern development and comparison, latent fingerprint development,

inputs into Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS), and have

ballistic comparison capabilities.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Organization: Define missions and capabilities and identify locations for

satellite laboratories.

Training: Develop laboratory training and internships for active duty

laboratory examiners.

Materiel: Include deployed laboratory equipment into USACIL inventory

and submitted as a USACIL / USACIDC Joint Urgent Operations Needs

Statement (JUONS) and as an eventual Program of Record (POR).

Personnel: Increase number of USACIL / USACIDC agents supporting

deployable laboratory operations.

Personnel: Consider ASI development (reactivating ASI) for the

laboratory examiner skill set.

Facilities: Procure new regional labs or enhance capability of existing

main USACIL lab.

Topic 3.5: Biometrics Support to Police Intelligence Operations

Discussion:

Biometrics supported commanders to achieve identity management during

operations. Over time, units in OIF have been fielded much needed biometrics

technology. Commanders now have the ability to look into the population and

assess measurable physiological and behavioral characteristics that establish an

individual‘s identity with certainty. The collection and exploitation of biometric

modalities (i.e. fingerprints, facial images, voiceprints, iris scans, gait, etc.) has

proven to be an effective and efficient tool, as well as, an evolving combat

multiplier. The most successful units viewed biometrics as another ―weapons

system.‖

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Currently, the dominant biometric collection systems employed in Operation Iraqi

Freedom (OIF) are the Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT), Handheld

Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE), Jump kit, and Biometric

Identification for System Access (BISA).

Biometrics link individuals to past identities, criminal / terrorist acts, and

information and is part of a detainee‘s individual detention records. Biometrics

collection, analysis, and identification (match) provided a valuable capability to

positively identify an individual and to place that individual within a certain

relevant context. By collecting, storing, and accessing biometric data units

shared authorized information to all levels of command and with Joint,

Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) partners.

Biometric identification has led to the immediate detention of thousands of

insurgents, terrorists, and criminals and numerous follow on detentions from

evidence collected at IED, weapons cache, and other objective locations. More

importantly, biometric collections have cumulative effects which influenced future

actionable intelligence and target folder development. No longer can individuals

claim one identity while secretly conducting activities using an alias.

Within the TIF, the keys to success were leader awareness of biometric

capabilities and system proficiency to synchronize, through the JDIC, collected

biometrics on detainees to biometrics being collected on the outside during

current operations. Interviews with Soldiers confirmed that leveraging the power

of biometrics can be the difference between detaining, retaining, or releasing an

insurgent and preventing an incident or picking up the pieces. Indeed, biometrics

has proven essential to conducting COIN operations both inside and outside the

wire.

Military Police used biometric technologies as another source to validate entries

in the Detainee Management System (DMS) and National Detainee Reporting

System (NDRS) at the TIF. The challenge here is the lack of digital connectivity

between DMS and BAT. Currently, you must manually update each system.

The systems are stove-piped and do not interface / populate each other. This

lack of connectivity and interoperability resulted in needed available data not

being accessible, migrated, or shared between systems. This migration process

was not automated which required units to manually upload and download data

between systems. Connectivity would have accelerated criminal information

reporting and intelligence sharing supporting both the MP and the maneuver

commanders who own the battlespace.

Military Police used biometrics equipment not only for DO but across the

spectrum of operations. How and how much it was used varied across the

Multinational Divisions (MND). Biometrics integration was particular effective in

enrolling personnel while on mounted and dismounted patrols, at access control /

traffic control points, and to vet candidates seeking employment in the Iraq Police

Services (IPS).

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The United States Army Criminal Investigations Lab (USACIL) established

forward deployed forensics labs and plans to set up even more in the future.

Criminal Investigations Division (CID) was fusing biometrics database information

with other intelligence and forensic collection systems at these sites in theater.

Establishing this capability has enhanced identity management and accelerated

response times to positively identify, locate, and target insurgents involved with

IED / EFP, caches, and other insurgent or criminal activity to the warfighter.

A great initiative recently organized by the corps was the distribution of BAT and

HIIDE down to subordinate tactical units (BAT down to company level and HIIDE

down to squad level). According to the cell in charge of biometrics in the corps,

providing biometrics capability to maneuver units, at company level and below,

has proven to be the single most significant action in support of maneuver

commanders to accelerate biometric match results.

Until this more composite distribution plan, biometrics remained mainly a MI and

MP tool supporting only their warfighting functions. Now a majority of units

across the force have biometrics enrollment and verification capability. Used

properly, these biometric technologies have proven effective resulting in multiple

insurgent and criminal matches. It appeared the more biometric equipment you

have out in battle space- the more enrollments and roll ups you get. Indeed,

Soldiers and NCOs get it and have produced a large number of biometric

matches. Their efforts have resulted in detaining multiple insurgents.

Many units reported their biggest complaint was the inability to access the entire

biometric repository while at the point of collection. Further, units wished they

had more biometrics equipment to support their mission. Commanders and

laboratory personnel stated an automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS)

feature needs to be embedded into handheld collection devices providing

immediate hold or release determination feedback to the collector based on

previously collected latent fingerprint collections. Consequently, it is also

imperative that the screening process during all collection efforts continue to

collect on all 10 fingerprint images.

Based on more biometric equipment capacity, units have tailored biometrics to

their mission and location. Units that have exploited biometrics include its

capabilities in mission planning, routinely use it during missions, and have

developed measures of effectiveness (MOE) / measures of performance (MOP)

to assess its utility for different kinetic/non kinetic operations.

Example missions supported by biometrics in Iraq:

Entry control point (ECP) operations at forward operating bases (FOB)- to

manage who had authorized access or been approved to work on the base.

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Population management and control operations (included census

operations) to determine who should and should not be in a given area and

overall accountability.

Local hire work programs- using HIIDE to validate workers on payday, etc.

Raids and other kinetic operations- to find and terminate or detain

predetermined targets and not unnecessarily extract others not associated with

the target folder.

Site Exploitation- to match insurgent biometrics left at blast or cache site

(latent fingerprints on IED debris, etc.).

Detainee operations supporting custody and control- supported in

processing, daily accountability, and release programs.

Actions on the objective- enrolling biometrics on personnel in event areas

(IED / EFP blast sites, etc.) when combined with analytical processes is critical in

identifying potentially involved parties.

Numerous other applications.

Moreover, units in OIF are required to conduct extensive evidence collection at

event areas. However, many have not received training on how to properly

collect and preserve evidence at a level admissible in the Iraqi court system.

Units stated they needed clear evidence collection doctrine and training.

Biometrics collection has proven to be a great tool in site exploitation operations.

Leaders stated there is also a lack of DOD, Joint, and Army biometrics doctrine

to guide units and to standardize policies, procedures, and operations.

Leaders stated there are 3 components of biometric success in theater:

Increased number of contact enrollments made by units.

Increased command post (CP) enrollment verification reports.

Increased biometrics data sharing with other intelligence and forensics

data bases (digitally or manually). Such information is used for site exploitation

and other missions- i.e. latent fingerprints into CEXI put on to watch lists in BAT

and HIIDE.

This focus and hard work by Soldiers and Marines across Iraq have resulted in

the following increase in the biometrics contribution to the warfighter:

2006: *8 major watch list matches / 66 latent IED matches.

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2007: *231 major watch list matches / 282 latent IED matches.

(Latent impression matches are currently only possible using historic collection

data in a laboratory setting)

Military Police leaders brought up the point that in order to conduct transition

operations to the Iraqi Police a decision must be made on what biometrics

collection and data base systems the Iraqis will be authorized given current

operational security (OPSEC) and communications security (COMSEC)

considerations. Currently, biometric and identity detection systems used in the

International Zone in Iraq on non-US personnel and Iraqi governmental

personnel:

Iraqi Automated Fingerprint System (IAFIS)- Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI)

system used to vet Iraqi Security Forces or other positions of trust.

Multi-Purpose Access Card (MPAC)- biometrically based badging system

involves searching of fingerprint data of Iraq enrollees against the Automated

Biometrics Identification System (ABIS) and the FBI‘s Integrated Automated

Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) and was used for identity vetting and

access control.

Personnel Identification System for Secure Evaluation Comparison

System (PISCES) Immigration control system provided by US Department of

State (DOS) to Government of Iraq (GOI) to scan passports and VISAs used for

border control and other operations.

It is clear that biometrics integration has had a significant positive impact on

operations. However, a current reality in theater is some commanders and staffs

have embraced biometric technologies and others did not exploit its utility in

operations. Commanders and staffs that knew biometrics used it routinely and

effectively. Others appeared to see it only as another piece of pushed theater

provided equipment (TPE). Equipment they had not seen before or trained with.

Although they knew what it was, they really did not know what it could do for

them. Some units sent Soldiers to conduct biometrics equipment training and

later were not the ones assigned to operate it. Leaders in the corps stated

training was and remained the biggest challenge. Provided are their comments:

No HIIDE initial or sustainment training in Iraq (recently started initial new

equipment training in Kuwait).

More leader and staff training on BAT and HIIDE would enhance

readiness- units reported most effective biometrics training occurred during

collective training events integrating biometrics equipment in mission rehearsals

and missions.

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Biometrics must be ―operationalized‖- employing it so it is clear what it can

do for commanders.

Police Transition Teams (PTT) were not using HIIDE.

Theater is conducting mission analysis to determine what biometric

equipment systems will be issued to the IA and IP and when.

Units cannot scan photographs into BAT and HIIDE.

Internment Serial Number (ISN) display field on the HIIDE is not found

easily.

Units needed more HIIDE maintenance support from the HIIDE proponent.

Insights / Lessons:

Establishing forensic labs has enhanced identity management and

accelerated response times to positively identify, locate, and target insurgents

involved with IED/EFP, caches, and other insurgent or criminal activity.

Developing biometrics leader, staff, and integration training would enable

units to more effectively employ biometric capabilities.

Units emphasized that biometrics must be ―operationalized‖ and thought of

as another ―weapons system.‖

Ensure leaders are aware of biometric capabilities in order to drive the

staff process and integrate biometrics into operations.

Senior Army leaders must determine what biometric collection and data

base systems the IP will use, when it will be fielded, and how data will be shared.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: Develop Army and Joint biometrics doctrine that emphasizes

the need to include biometrics in MDMP planning and integration into operations.

Doctrine: Develop Army battlefield evidence collection and preservation

doctrine.

Training: DOD PM Biometrics and CALL are currently developing a

Biometrics Master Gunner Course which will be vetted with both MNC-I and

CJTF-82.

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Sub Topic 3.5.1: Predeployment Training

Discussion:

Leaders indicated that the biometrics predeployment training received was

focused on the equipment while users would have preferred its focus be on how

biometrics equipment could be used in operations. Moreover, units wanted

biometrics training earlier in their predeployment training cycle. All units

interviewed emphasized that BAT and HIIDE must be taught as one complete

system to support BAT to HIIDE and HIIDE to BAT data management. This was

especially true in their concern for follow on units be taught on how best to

manage watch lists in theater. Many confirmed biometrics training is best

conducted during unit collective training events. Soldiers felt they retained more

of the biometrics instruction when they had the opportunity to immediately use

the equipment during mission training (STX / MRE, lanes training, etc.).

The majority of Military Police (MP) units who conducted operations at the TIF

received biometrics operator level training on BAT and a few received it on the

HIIDE before deploying. Priority during operator training was on learning how to

receive, transmit, and archive data; upload and download data between BAT to

HIIDE and HIIDE to BAT; and how to import and use data from system peripheral

devices (digital camera, digital fingerprints, and iris scans). Comments by

Soldiers indicated that additional biometrics training would have enhanced their

ability to employ BAT capabilities as the software applications were not always

intuitive or user friendly. This ability to establish positive identification (PID)

proved fundamental in retaining positive control especially during heightened

security operations.

However, many other MP units conducting Police Transition Training (PTT) and

law and order operations did not receive biometrics equipment training. Leaders

stated they and their staffs would have benefitted from training on ways to

include biometric capabilities in the staff process and how to best integrate these

technologies into operations.

Leaders emphasized this was not the approach at Mobilization Stations and at

the Combat Training Centers (if trained at). If it were, it would have elevated

their understanding and ability to more readily employ biometric systems in

theater. Units believed that training received was too brief, was focused mainly

on the ―widgets‖, and did not go into how to use it operationally. Based on

comments from units who had received biometrics leader, staff, and integration

training, this methodology was best and facilitated an enhanced ability to exploit

biometric capabilities.

Further, interviews confirmed a distinct perception by units there is insufficient

training on how to leverage biometric technologies with other existing detainee

reporting, intelligence collection, and Army Battle Command and Control systems

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to exploit capabilities. While not all these systems talk to each other with

automated interface, manual data work around procedures could be addressed

in the instruction. Specifically, a significant problem voiced by many Soldiers is

BAT did not have connectivity and interoperability with DIMS. These two

systems, both critical assets, are stove piped and cannot talk to each other. This

lack of connectivity and interoperability resulted in needed available data not

being accessible, migrated, or shared between systems. At minimum information

was delayed. This migration process is simply not automated yet requiring the

unit to manually save needed entries and to standardize uploading and

downloading data procedures between systems.

Insights / Lessons:

Conduct biometrics predeployment training early to maximize exposure to

new equipment.

Expand biometrics predeployment training to include leader, staff, and

biometrics integration.

Include biometrics interoperability training with other detainee, intelligence

collection, and Army Battle Command and Control (ABCS) systems.

Biometric collection, repository, and database systems should have

connectivity and interoperability with DMS to enhance detainee tracking.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: Develop DOD, Joint, and Army biometrics doctrine.

Doctrine: Develop DOD, Joint, and Army deployed forces evidence

collection doctrine.

Training: Conduct BAT and HIIDE predeployment training together as

one system and expand training to cover leader, staff, biometrics integration, and

interoperability with other detainee, intelligence collection, and Army Battle

Command and Control (ABCS) systems instruction and collective training.

Training: Develop biometrics leader, staff, and integration training

Programs of Instruction (POI) and Training Support Packages (TSP) and provide

across institutional and operational Army.

Leader Development and Education: Leaders, at all levels, should

receive biometrics training in order to exploit its Army utility.

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Sub Topic 3.5.2: Connectivity

Discussion:

Digital connectivity and interoperability between systems are fundamental to

effective and efficient operations. In Iraq, connectivity and data sharing between

biometrics equipment, although improving, remains stove piped between many

systems. Specifically, manual uploads and down loads were required between

BAT and HIIDE. To terminate this problem, there are plans in theater to field a

wireless transmission capability from HIIDE to a mobile based

receiver/transmitter (truck mounted), sending data to a BAT, then from BAT back

to the HIIDE receiver / transmitter, finally back to the HIIDE operator on the

ground.

Leaders stated connectivity between biometrics equipment and other command

and control systems had improved, but again, many remained stove piped. For

MP Internment/Resettlement (I / R) units, digital connectivity between MP

Detainee Management System (DMS) and BAT would accelerate detainee

records, criminal information, and intelligence sharing.

Provided are a few of the known biometrics program constraints and challenges

facing the Corps. It should be noted, those in the Corps Biometrics Cell were

well aware of the issues and were doing everything they could to get the

biometrics program to the next level:

Matching between theater and CONUS based servers in the Automated

Biometrics Identification System (ABIS) can be slow due to ABIS contains a large

number of high-value biometrics which is not in BAT, including latent prints,

SOCOM and FBI records, and Iraqi records.

Match results are not returned from ABIS in time to detain an enrollee. If

there is no match in BAT, the enrollee will be gone before an ABIS result comes

back indicating a derogatory match.

There is no mechanism for BAT to ingest these ―other‖ records.

Given these known constraints, corps leadership still had confidence in the

biometrics architecture and recommended maintaining ABIS as the authoritative

DoD biometrics database but to establish a duplicate ABIS forward for immediate

checks (or) to enhance the current network to enable real-time matching between

ABIS and the fiber ring in theater. Also, theater has required future systems

must have flexibility to accept other records. The corps is continually improving

biometrics connectivity or has instituted effective workarounds.

Leaders reported exploitable capability gaps are narrowing as DoD biometric

sharing strategy matures in this multinational environment. According to those

working the issue, biometric data sharing had improved significantly across Iraq‘s

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extensive battle space in the last six months and sharing is forecast to improve

further as integrated systems are developed.

Further, sharing biometrics information on insurgents outside of DoD was

beginning to improve especially amongst coalition partners in Iraq. This is an

exploitability security gap that hazards all participants in a COIN environment.

Corps was very proactive and initiated a deliberate operations security (OPSEC)

program to mitigate this potential. Long term biometric strategy in OIF will likely

involve some exchange of biometric data as we help Iraq achieve self-

sufficiency. This represents an opportunity to formalize desirable sharing

arrangement between the US and the Government of Iraq (GOI).

The most prominent message received from leaders and technicians was the

need for a single communications system and architecture design capable to

enable the flow of information from BAT and HIIDE to come across the Army

Ground Commander Communications network (AGCC) network and to have

connectivity and interoperability with Command Post of the Future (CPOF) and

FBCB2 for commander situational awareness. It is believed such an

infrastructure would best support Military Police PIO, LE, and DO, as well as, MP

support to maneuver commanders.

Insights / Lessons:

Biometrics connectivity and data sharing was stove piped and demands a

system that digitally connects all sources of information on potential insurgents.

For MP Internment/Resettlement (I / R) units, digital connectivity between

MP Detainee Management System (DMS) and BAT would accelerate detainee

records, criminal information, and intelligence sharing.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Organization: The Combatant Commander in Iraq would be well served

with the development of a single communications system and architecture design

capable to enable the flow of information from BAT and HIIDE to come across

the Army Ground Commander Communications network (AGCC) network and to

have connectivity and interoperability with Command Post of the Future (CPOF)

and FBCB2 for commander situational awareness.

Materiel: Develop ability to have wireless secure transmissions to

transfer biometrics data between BAT to HIIDE and HIIDE to BAT.

Materiel: Establish digital connectivity between DMS, NDRS, and BAT

supporting PIO and intelligence requirements for maneuver commanders.

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Topic 3.6: Forensic / Evidence Collection Kits

Discussion:

The deployed units did not have a standardized deployable evidence/forensic

collection kit. In Iraq today, units are being tasked to collect physical evidence

from a wide array of search locations supporting full spectrum combat

operations. These organizations have collected evidence the best they could,

with little expertise in the realm of evidence management, collection protocols, or

adequate collection materials.

There was not only a need for a trained evidence or crime scene technician to

advice these organizations but also for a uniform package of collection materials

containerized in an easy to transport and use kit.

It was recommended that evidence collection kits provided to MP units should

consist of the following items at a minimum:

Evidence tracking and management Bar Coding System, with the ability to

print, scan and track labels via a centralized server.

Evidence collection bag assortment.

Evidence collection canisters.

Evidence photograph identification flags.

7 megapixel digital camera with GPS imprint and video capability.

A minimum of two (2) two (2) gigabyte SD/XD or other memory expansion

cards compatible with camera.

Evidence collection kits provided to USACIDC special agents should contain all

of the items listed for military operational units, plus the following:

Soil sifting system.

Sensitive site exploitation (SSE) / mass grave excavation grid kit.

Insights / Lessons:

Evidence collection kits need to be provided to military police units for

identifying, collecting, and transporting battlefield evidence for exploitation.

These kits will enhance the MP support provided to the maneuver commander.

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DOTMLPF Implications:

Training: Develop mobile training team (MTT) to train company level and

below units in evidence collection and management during predeployment

training, i.e. home stations, Mobilization Stations, Combat Training Centers

(CTC), etc.

Materiel: Provide items listed above to each military police and CID units.

Topic 3.7: Operational Security (OPSEC)

Discussion:

Leaders stated a need for a more meaningful and focused OPSEC training

support package (TSP). Despite the vast efforts of the Department of Defense

(DoD) and the Army to educate service members of all branches on OPSEC

concerns and prevention methods, service members continue to engage in

activities that place US interests in jeopardy.

One of the recently most identified sources of OPSEC compromise stems from

service members posting data and photographs on the internet after returning

from deployment or mission; on personal and public blogs, in patriotic and

personal emails. Once the data or photographs are placed into the internet

domain, they cannot be withdrawn, revoked, or otherwise recovered, as they are

too easily forwarded, copied and stored.

In incidents wherein enemy media items were collected, they were searched for

evidence and other significant data. One of the items repetitively identified were

OIF related photographs that could only reasonably have been taken by US

service members, and were in all likelihood down loaded to the internet. Some of

these photographs depicted service members engaged in ―recreational

activities‖, others depicted wounded US personnel, Soldiers posing inside of

security checkpoints, in vehicles, and other secured areas. These photographs

and other data (stories, support forums, and other well intended releases of

information), serve US enemies in multiple ways; however, they have two

primary purposes. One is that the photographs, are used for intelligence

purposes, to identify potential security weaknesses that they would not otherwise

be able to see. Second, they are used as recruiting propaganda which presents

a difficult to quantify and mitigate threat to US interests.

Leaders have stated there is a need to develop a more effective educational

campaign that shows soldiers how damaging data and photos are to US

interests. They suggest using specific examples of how these items assist

adversaries in gaining intelligence and in their recruiting efforts. This will help get

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buy-in from soldiers to take ownership of the issue rather than to comply out of

fear of detection.

Insights / Lessons:

Service members continue to engage in activities that place US interests

in peril with regard to OPSEC complacency.

OPSEC compromise stems from service members posting data and

photographs on the internet.

Need to develop a more effective educational campaign that shows

Soldiers how damaging data and photos are to US interests.

Use specific example of how these items assist adversaries in gaining

intelligence and in their recruiting efforts.

Get buy-in from service members to take ownership of the issue rather

than to comply out of fear of detection.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Training: Develop meaningful OPSEC training that includes techniques

on how to mitigate adversary ability to use photographs and other data to gain

friendly intelligence and aide in enemy recruiting efforts.

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Chapter 4: Border Control and Customs Operations

Chapter Contents

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Summary

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Topic 4.1: Border Patrol Operations

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Topic 4.2: Customs Operations in Iraq

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Topic 4.3: Customs Operations in Kuwait

123

Summary

Border patrol and customs operations are proven important components in

protecting US Forces and vital interests. Border control operations are an

integral part in the overall success in prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism

(GWOT). Effective border control operations can and are preventing potential

Foreign Fighters (FF) from entering the battlefield and prolonging combat

operations. Customs operations are designed to prevent the transport of Iraqi

artifacts, weapons, munitions, and environmental hazards out of the Iraqi Theater

of Operations (ITO). Through the appropriate implementation of these

processes, using transition teams, training, and transitioning responsibility from

CF to the GOI will be more rapidly and efficiently attained.

MP senior leaders interviewed stated that Military Police should attend a

Customs and Border Protection training program prior to deployment, with

Customs Officers that have agency specific training such as : Anti-Terrorism;

detection of contraband; interviewing; cross-cultural communication; firearms

handling and qualification; immigration and naturalization laws; export and import

laws; defensive tactics; arrest techniques; baton techniques; examination of

cargo, bags and merchandise; border search exception; entry and control

procedures; passenger processing and officer safety and survival. These

classes should have a SBCA that has had first hand operational experience.

Reported results from theater confirmed that during two hour shifts, customs

clearance teams searched and cleared approximately twenty personnel. During

twelve hour shifts, customs clearance teams searched and cleared

approximately a Detachment or smaller sized unit. During a 2-3 day period,

customs clearance teams searched and cleared approximately a Company size

unit and a Battalion sized unit within a four to five day period.

The CAAT was reminded that all customs inspections are subject to weather

which may delay the inspection two to three days due to lack of customs

facilities. Searching of personnel and unit equipment is often very time

consuming due to the lack of x-ray technologies. Military Working Dog (MWD) is

a vital asset for facilities that lack technology support.

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Leaders stressed that MND-N is adequately staffed with SBCAs to train CBCA

personnel to conduct customs and General Officer #1 inspections to certify unit

representatives. They recommended there should be at least two qualified

personnel per BCT. MND-N has consistently used MWDs for customs

inspections. Units are tasked to provide MWDs during the customs inspections.

MWD has been a proven asset for customs operations by adding to a significant

number of GO #1, prohibited and restricted finds. Units should be given the

availability to access information for customs standard operational procedures

and / or given a customs ―read ahead‖ to prepare for customs inspections.

Personnel at MNC-I remarked that customs operations in Kuwait do not

accurately reflect customs operations conducted in Iraq. Customs operations in

Kuwait are conducted in a fully funded facility with ideal settings and equipment

that facilitates the expedition of inspections. There is not a customs facility in

MND-N, and there is no interest to fund a facility for customs inspections.

Topic 4.1: Border Patrol Operations

Discussion:

Border control operations have proven to be a significant component in

controlling and mitigating the flow of trans-regional / national insurgents,

weapons / ordnance, and illegal money coming into and going out of Iraq.

However, an identified lack of dedicated border control personnel and operations

has significantly reduced the force protection potential that should and could be

realized in the ITO. MP units reported that border enforcement must be

synchronized with other policing functions (i.e. PIO, PTT, and L&O operations) in

order to be fully effective. At the corps level, positive control of borders has both

an internal ITO and broader strategic GWOT impact. Evidence has

demonstrated multiple times, that components for IED, particularly EFP were

manufactured in neighboring countries, and were smuggled into Iraq, where they

were employed against CF and IP personnel. Effective border control operations

could have denied entry into the ITO and saved an untold number of lives.

Recently a decision was made that required BTT be conducted by US

contractors, augmented by non-military police military units, rather than trained

MP personnel. These organizations have trained and worked daily with ISF, both

IA and IPS, in conducting border control operations. However, individuals

conducting these operations reported a lack of connectivity with PIO, PTT, and

L&O operations. Without this connectivity, personnel performing border control

operations were essentially in the dark as to what to look for and how to detect it.

Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG) contractors were previously trained and employed

and employed as special agents of various US government agencies, primarily

the US Border Patrol (USBP); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire Arms

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(BATF); and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). The IAG were training

IP officers to perform border control operations in conjunction with efforts to

transfer responsibility of border control operations from the BTT to the IP.

BTTs established a 4-week border control operations training program designed

to train IP Officers using the US Border Patrol Academy TSP. In an effort to

enhance IP capabilities the BTTs employed state of the art biometrics collection

and comparison equipment such as the BAT, HIIDE, as well as other related

searching and inspection systems such as the Mobile Vehicle Cargo Inspection

System (MVACIS).

BTTs introduced the use of Military Working Dogs (MWD) and other types of

canine support provided by the Department of Homeland Security into the

training of IP officers. BTT repeatedly demonstrated the effectiveness of MWD

during vehicle searches and discovering contraband in personal belongings,

resulting in the IP adopting them as a planned capability for the future.

All Services augmented the BTTs using multiple Military Occupational Specialties

(MOS). But, commanders stated the need for MP personnel to perform this

critical function, identifying their training and experience as irreplaceable when

attempting to use conventional forces for this mission. It was specifically stated

that law enforcement skill sets clearly enhanced the overall success of BTTs to

both conduct border control operations and to train IP officers.

Senior MP leaders recommended that Military Police should attend a Customs

and Border Protection training program prior to deployment, with Customs

Officers that have agency specific training such as : Anti-Terrorism; detection of

contraband; interviewing; cross-cultural communication; firearms handling and

qualification; immigration and naturalization laws; export and import laws;

defensive tactics; and powers of arrest.

Insights / Lessons:

BTT training to IP was conducted by contractors but depended on the

augmentation of the military to establish the teams. MP were continually sought

out for the law enforcement aspect of questioning techniques, investigative skills,

evidence collection and processing, and basic law enforcement skills attributed

from their MOS.

BTTs introduced the use of MWD into the training of IP Officers,

highlighting the effectiveness and application of this asset to border patrol

operations.

DOTMLPF Implications:

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Doctrine: Border Control Operations TSP should be established and

available for units or designated individuals required to conduct Border Control

Operations.

Training: An ASI producing functional course should be established to

ensure adequate training and force management of personnel fully capable of

conducting and teaching these skill sets.

Organization: Should have both Explosive and Narcotic detection MWD

teams immediately available to every BTT established at all ports of entry or exit.

Topic 4.2: Customs Operations in Iraq

Discussion:

Customs operations have proven to be the first line of defense supporting

maneuver commanders in preventing prohibited items from illegally getting into

or out of theater (weapons, ordnance, alcohol, drugs, unauthorized artifacts, and

other contraband). Also, customs operations prevented health risks and

environmental hazards from getting in or out of theater (biological hazards that

may contain contaminants, parasites, or other health threats). If left unchecked

violations would have significant negative impact on force discipline and

readiness.

Those interviewed conveyed in order to conduct customs operations effectively

there must be sufficient personnel qualified to conduct a ―train the trainer‖

customs course within the theater of operations. This would enable timely

inspections with an adequate number of trained personnel deemed essential to

meaningful inspections that accomplish intended goals and objectives. It was

reported that there was an insufficient number of Customs Border Clearance

Agent (CBCA) trainer qualified personnel at the corps with no redundancy or

backfill capability.

Units deploying into theater are typically short of qualified SCBCA and CBCA

certified Soldiers. Those working this issue in theater stressed that prior to

redeploying units must send Soldiers TDY back to Kuwait in order to obtain the

proper certifications required for the unit to get through the customs inspections

required prior to movement.

To mitigate the lack of personnel trained and available to conduct inspections

throughout the region, corps established an 8-hour pre-inspection training

program to train Soldiers from units to conduct customs pre-inspections on their

units as an additional duty. After certification, those Soldiers also assisted the

corps inspector to conduct the formal inspections of their units. Establishing this

training course enabled units to help expedite and streamline the customs

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inspection process; however, potentially created vulnerabilities via personal

relationships within the units. All of the Soldiers who were performing CBCA

duties were unit-trained personnel with no real customs or law enforcement

expertise. It was articulated that in order to have a viable and meaningful

customs operation, law enforcement personnel with no affiliation to the units

being inspected were essential. Military Working Dogs (MWD) were not being

used for customs operations in Iraq. Many unit leaders preparing for inspection

stated using MWD proven capability would increase both effectiveness and

efficiency for customs operations.

Insights / Lessons:

Corps was inadequately staffed with CBCA personnel required to conduct

customs inspections and capable of certifying unit representatives in support of

the customs mission in Iraq. There should be at least twice as many CBCA train

the trainer qualified personnel in theater to support training / inspection

requirements and to ensure compliance with DoD policies / regulations.

MWD were not being used for customs operations in Iraq. Using MWD

proven capability would increase both effectiveness and efficiency for customs

operations.

Requesting units were encouraged to conduct a pre-inspection and were

provided a customs guideline standard to follow. Units doing this generally

expedited the formal customs inspection process.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: Add MWD to customs operations mission to enhance

effectiveness and efficiency.

Organization: At least double the current CBCA certified personnel to

minimally staff and man corps customs operations.

Training: Add (1) E-7 (Army/Navy) train the trainer-qualified

noncommissioned officer to the JMD to support customs operations.

Training: Implement the necessary customs training as an option for

units as they move through Kuwait en route to their TAA. This will save the units

time and is more cost-effective than sending Soldiers back to Kuwait when they

are better served continuing the fight in their respective battlespace.

Topic 4.3: Customs Operations in Kuwait

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Discussion:

While the CAAT went through Kuwait there was an opportunity to collect on

customs operations in Kuwait. The CAAT considered this observation critical to

looking at overall customs standards, program, and compliance in CENTCOM

AOR.

Customs operations at Ali Al Salem, Kuwait were conducted around the clock in

support of commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq areas of operation. Naval

Customs Clearance Agents (NCCA) established a thorough process to find and

confiscate items subject to General Order #1, which prohibited ammunition,

explosives, items embargoed by the US, and other contraband. During 12 hour

shifts, customs clearance teams searched and cleared approximately 80 persons

per hour.

The customs clearance process began with a 10 minute brief on prohibited items

to not bring into the United States. The briefing included the inspection process

prior to giving personnel an amnesty period to drop all items mentioned in the

brief to avoid confiscation and potential criminal culpability. The next step in the

process required 100% of bags be x-rayed. This process required a 100% layout

of items, which were individually inspected by NCCA personnel. Once the

inspections were complete, individual screenings were conducted, and personnel

were placed in a lock down area until they departed theater control. This process

was reported as being extremely thorough and efficient, and should be

considered as a model for future operations.

Customs inspectors stated that units could streamline the inspection process and

reduce the amount of time required for the inspections by:

Obtaining the comprehensive - prohibited items list from customs

inspectors prior to arrival at the customs inspection.

Conducting unit pre-inspections prior to going through the formal customs

inspection could preclude delays encountered through the discovery of prohibited

items.

Ensuring all personnel and baggage were present at the time indicated for

the inspection to begin also prevented unnecessary delays.

Ensure equipment, gear and all footwear were clean and free of soil or

other particulate matter in order to pass agricultural inspection standards prior to

arrival at the inspection site.

Ensuring no ammunition was in individual possession (including on their

person, in their weapons, magazines, and bags).

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Ensuring no classified materials were being transported without a courier

card and appropriate security requirements in place.

Unit members were not able to assist in the search as additional man-power to

expedite the process, which precluded the potential for reduced scrutiny based

on personal relationships.

Insights / Lessons:

Units conducting pre-inspections expedited the formal inspection process

by reducing the delays encountered through the identification of prohibited items.

Current prohibited and restricted items lists are vital in assisting units in

the conduct of pre-inspections. The current list is located US Army Central

Command (ARCENT) website.

MWD are essential in the conduct of all customs operations, especially

those at main points of embarkation/debarkation. The use of military working

dogs expedites inspections and substantially increases thoroughness of

searches, and must be added to the inventory of tools available at these

inspection points.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Organization: Add MWD teams to all custom inspection operation points.

Training: Ensure the distribution of available comprehensive guidelines

available for commanders to review prior to unit clearance.

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Chapter 5

Military Working Dog (MWD) Program

Chapter Contents

Page

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Topic 5.1: Initial Training of Military Working Dog Handler

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Topic 5.2: Military Working Dog Information

129

Topic 5.3: Basis of Issue Plan for Military Working Dog

130

Topic 5.4: Equipment Needed for Military Working Dog Missions

131

Topic 5.5: Military Working Dog Kenneling

134

Topic 5.6: Military Working Dog Statistics

135

Topic 5.7: Command and Control for Military Working Dogs

136

Topic 5.8: Military Working Dogs in Detainee Operations

138

Topic 5.9: Military Working Dogs Support to Health and Welfare

138

(H&W) inspections

Topic 5.10: Military Working Dog Mission Readiness Exercise

139

Summary

Military Working Dog (MWD) operations are a key component in maneuver units‘

missions and are an integral part of the overall success in prosecuting the

GWOT. Effective use of MWD teams cripple insurgent attempts through their

detection of explosives and munitions such as vehicle borne improvised

explosive devices (VBIED), house borne improvised explosive device (HBIED)

and home made explosives (HME). Additionally, the attack capability of some of

the MWD is key in alerting as to insurgents that are hiding in wait as well as

attacking these enemies on command and providing an effective psychological

deterrent. Through the appropriate and educated use of these teams, insurgent

activities can be neutralized.

Theater is beginning to see BCTs deploy with their own organic MWD assets

with non-MP handlers. MP leaders in Iraq have viewed this with some concern

and have raised the issue to MWD program manager at USAMPS.

Topic 5.1: Initial Training of Military Working Dog Handler

Discussion:

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The MWD courses that the MPs attend were taught at the 341^st TRS at Lackland

Air Force Base (LAFB), San Antonio, Texas. Currently there are three courses

there that MPs may attend. The MWD handler course is a base course that is

approximately eleven weeks and results in awarding of the additional skill

identifier (ASI) Z6 and allows Soldier to handle patrol / explosive detector dogs

(PEDD) and patrol / narcotic detector dogs (PNDD). Another course is the

kennel master course, which is a four-week course that teaches the

administrative aspects of kennel management. This course in particular lends

itself to a very strong Air Force flavor since the Air Force is the executive agent

for all MWDs. The last course that is taught at LAFB is the specialized search

dog (SSD) course. It‘s approximately 18 weeks and results in the awarding of a

project development skill identifier (PDSI) of E8B. This MWD is not yet a

program of record.

Dog handlers in theater stated the MWD handler course at LAFB should have a

review curriculum board to ensure that the latest TTPs from the field are shared

with the student load going through the course. Many handlers, when

interviewed, felt that the course provided them with a very basic skill level 1

knowledge base that, while relatively successful in garrison operations, lacked

any contingency-type mission focus.

PEDD and PNDD handlers routinely conducted missions supporting the

maneuver commander. These missions varied from cordon and search to open

area searches. The PEDD handlers also conducted cache searches, route

clearances, and raids. During raids PEDDs were used in a patrol capacity. In the

school environment handlers did not wear ACH or IBA and they said that there

was a considerable challenge when conducting missions in theater and getting

the MWD used to the environment.

Another point to consider is that many of the PEDD finds in theater were

subsurface. This is something not addressed or discussed at LAFB. While on

mission supporting maneuver commanders, many PEDD teams were tasked to

an open area search. While this is taught at LAFB, it‘s taught using lot-sized

elements as opposed to theater, where a team can be tasked with searching an

area several kilometers wide.

During the MWD handler course, Soldiers were not taught how to immediately

switch from employment in a patrol capacity to a detection capacity. This is

important to identify since current theater operations can cause a handler to

readily employ his dog in an attack capacity and once the threat has been

neutralized, immediately command his dog to then start detecting for explosives.

Handlers said there needed to be a stronger emphasis placed on tactics and

techniques as opposed to the pseudo-cop like ―methodologies‖ that were taught.

The SSD course at LAFB taught handlers how to employ their dogs off leash and

at greater distances away from the handler while searching for explosives. One

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of the important things noted when interviewing SSD handlers was most said

they were confident deploying into theater and knowing that they were trained

and prepared for the missions they encountered. Many echoed the same

sentiment as PEDD and PNDD handlers that some distracters wouldn‘t be

practical to mimic in a training environment such as stray animals.

The SSD course varied considerably from the MWD course but it was explained

to handlers why and how they were doing certain things in the course and how it

would enhance their dog‘s performance. The MWD course taught handlers how

to maintain a trained animal and offered little explanation of training. The SSD

course culminated with a two-week exercise, a mission readiness exercise

(MRX) of sorts at Yuma Proving Grounds (YPG), Arizona. While there, the SSD

teams encountered training problems that were mirrored after actual missions

that had been performed in theater. Currently, the MWD course does not

conduct any type of MRX prior to graduation.

While enrolled in the MWD handler course, particular attention was placed on not

allowing a dog to void in a problem. While this was definitely understood for

building searches and the desire not to have furniture soiled, this attitude

prevailed in open area searches as well. In theater some of the biggest

distracters that MWD teams had to overcome and learn to work through were

trash, scat, and stray animals. Introducing some of these distracters at the

school level may be beneficial so those handlers learn to work around it.

Units reported the odors available for training outside of theater differs from the

odors teams are finding on missions. All scent kits used in training, regardless of

service, are not the same across the board. In theater, MWD teams find consist

of home made explosives (HME) and foreign grade explosives. Subsurface

training is not conducted at Lackland Air Force Base for PEDD teams. All odors

are placed at the surface level or higher which also differs from missions

conducted in theater.

MWD training scent kits should be uniform across the services. They should

include odors that are being found in the theater of operations. This will allow

MWD teams to train up on these odors before coming in to theater. Also,

subsurface plants should be trained on from initial to advanced training.

Insights / Lessons Learned:

A curriculum review would benefit the MWD handler course to ensure the

latest TTPs are being taught to Soldiers going through the course.

Introducing distracters (trash, scat, and stray animals) at the school level

may better prepare handlers to deal with this reality in theater and to think about

work arounds.

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DOTMLPF Implications:

Training: Current MWD handler course (producing ASI Z6) needs to

have a situational training exercise or mission readiness exercise prior to

graduation in order to better assess the training capabilities and prepare Soldiers

for operational missions.

Training: Curriculum review is needed to ensure latest TTPs are being

taught to students as well as introducing students to the ―how and why‖ of

manipulating and shaping behaviors within the MWD. This last step is especially

important as DOD does not have any course that teaches Soldiers how to train

MWDs, only how to handle a trained MWD.

Topic 5.2: Military Working Dog Information

Discussion:

Most maneuver commanders learn about the use of MWD teams through fellow

maneuver commanders and what those fellow commanders used MWD teams

for. Since the majority of health and welfare (H&W) inspection requests call for

patrol/narcotic detector dogs (PNDD), commanders tend to know that these dogs

have been trained to detect the odor of illicit narcotic substances. Most

commanders also tend to know that patrol / explosive detector dogs (PEDD) are

used to respond to bomb threats in garrison. Some maneuver commanders

within the Engineer branch are also familiar with specialized search dogs (SSD)

only because this is a dog that is handled by both military police and engineer

handlers.

Through the success of demonstrations, information papers and handler brief

validation reports (HBVR), more maneuver commanders were becoming familiar

with the different capabilities that MWDs have and how they can assist

commanders with mission accomplishment.

Most divisions supporting MWD Managers believed that if there was a baseline

GTA tri-fold type card that explained the Army‘s entire MWD inventory and

capabilities, it would definitely aid in information dissemination. Currently there is

a GTA pamphlet that has a small diagram with a short explanation of the PEDD,

SSD, and PNDD. Another point that was raised was of the feasibility of

instructing maneuver leaders on the different uses for MWD in NCOES or OES.

Insights / Lessons:

Instruction on MWD capabilities should be a staple of NCOES and OES.

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MWD GTA would assist maneuver leaders by providing a quick run down

of the different capabilities and applications of dog teams to assist in mission

accomplishment.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Training: Develop a GTA that provides a summary of all types of MWD

and how they can assist the maneuver commander. USAMPS should work with

the Center for Army Lessons Learned to publish them.

Leader Development and Education: Embed a block of training at all

levels of NCOES and OES to make leaders aware of how MWD can aid in

mission success.

Topic 5.3: Basis of Issue Plan for Military Working Dog

Discussion:

Currently there exists no basis of issue plan (BOIP) for MWDs to facilitate needs

of maneuver commanders. In the regulatory guidance for MWDs, AR 190-12,

there is something called a ―law enforcement yardstick‖ that gives loose guidance

on how many PNDD and PEDD that are needed per X amount of population

given on a respective installation. Specialized Search Dogs (SSD) aren‘t

mentioned within this yardstick due to this program is still considered as a

―concept.‖ This yardstick has remained a constant from prior publications of the

regulatory guidance and is used for the garrison environment. However, it does

not address current contingency operations requirements. Revision of this

regulation and / or BOIP should be considered to ensure correct numbers of

MWDs are available to support maneuver commanders in forward operations.

As requests for forces (RFF) have grown and increased the numbers of the

MWD inventory in theater, corps has had the added challenge of accommodating

the maneuver commanders‘ needs through successful staging of the varied

specialties of MWDs throughout the different areas of responsibility (AOR).

It was apparent that the corps had effectively managed the different MWD assets

(PEDD, PNDD, and SSD) and placed them under the various Division Provost

Marshal (PM) in theater. Division PMs managed their inventory of MWDs by

tasking them to various maneuver commanders within their battlespace. This

proved particularly advantageous since it allowed the MWD Manager, at the

Division PM, to reallocate MWD assets to best support maneuver commanders

and the priority effort.

Insights / Lessons:

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BOIP should be reviewed to ensure correct numbers of MWDs are

available to support maneuver commanders in forward operations.

Allowing the MWD Manager, at the Division PMO, to reallocate MWD

assets ensured best support to maneuver commanders and their priority of effort.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: Update doctrine to reflect the current utilizations of each of the

MWD assets

Organization: Review MWD BOIP and adjust organizational documents

to meet requirements of COIN and stability operations.

Topic 5.4: Equipment Needed for Military Working Dog Missions

Discussion:

Army Military Police MWD teams operating in theater made up the majority of the

joint inventory of MWDs (the rest of the inventory is made up of teams from the

Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy). Those MP teams deployed to theater from a

variety of different Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands

(ASCC), and Direct Reporting Units (DRU). This array is important to

acknowledge due to the uniqueness of the various MWD teams deploying under

worldwide individual augmentee system (WIAS) taskers. What was found

throughout the interviews was collectively the MWD teams that were deployed

from Forces Command (FORSCOM) had the majority of their needed individual

equipment, i.e. NVGs and complete IBA system with DAPS. MWD teams that

deployed from other Army / ASCC / DRU commands tended to lack necessary

individual equipment such as NVGs.

MWD teams conducting missions outside the wire (upwards of 80-85% of entire

inventory in theater) required reflexive sights (M68) on their weapons but did not

have them. Also, most MWD teams lacked required communications sets

(Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio IMBITR-headphone w/speakers). Additionally,

MWD Soldiers had M16s as opposed to M4. The explanation given was they

were instructed by home station commands that the team would be issued M4s

at CRC, Fort Benning. Interestingly, the CRC had only M16s to issue out. As

well, not all Soldiers arrived in theater with baseline Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI)

equipment such as fire-resistant gloves.

It should be noted, leaders within the Division PMO were proactive in obtaining

necessary equipment for MWD handlers. It became commonly understood that

overall equipment issue problem came from the Soldier‘s home station.

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With regards to team and kennel equipment needed, most handlers arrived in

theater by way of CRC, Fort Benning and had weight and amount restrictions on

their luggage. The weight restrictions were important since typically the handler‘s

MWD crate, a 90 day supply of dog food, first aid kit for MWD, two sets of

equipment, and a bite suit for training weighed over 300 lbs. This figure does not

include adding the Soldier‘s individual packing list or the weight of the MWD.

Many handlers and kennel masters brought up concerns on the lack of certain

equipment items currently not in the inventory. Supporting this, many maneuver

commanders have made queries as to the feasibility of the MWD having a

―camera vest‖ mounted on its back with a remote screen so that the handler

could send the dog into an area (i.e. home, tunnel) without the handler. Leaders

on the ground believed this would help mitigate risk to the team should the dog

alert to something such as a house borne improvised explosive device (HBIED).

Maneuver commanders also asked for a communication system for the MWD to

both enable the MWD to better respond to events and provide commanders the

ability to direct an emergency recall. It is noteworthy to realize how effectively

MWD handlers have learned to adapt with whatever equipment was available in

theater.

An example of this is the ability of MWD handlers to keep their weapons at the

ready while maintaining positive control of their dog. What some PEDD and

PNDD handlers have done is keeping their dogs on a heavy-duty retractable lead

that was connected to their IBA with a d-ring. They trained their dog to walk on

this lead as opposed to a traditional six foot lead while dismounted and not

involved in actual searches for its specialty (narcotics or explosives) or when

employed in an attack capability. Additionally, during night operations, all

handlers and kennel masters agreed that having an IR strobe for the MWD was

essential for mission accomplishment as well as for keeping light discipline.

The Division MWD Managers expressed a strong desire for mandated packing

lists for handlers and for kennels. Although the various TOE have tactical vehicle

and communication requirements and authorizations, with all MWD team assets

deployed as WIAS taskers, none of the larger equipment was sent with the

teams when they deployed to support the multiple RFF or unit required fill (URF).

Bite suits (heavily padded suit that is comprised of a top and bottom, weighing

approximately 40 pounds) are essential and necessary to maintain the training of

those MWD that are attack trained. Since the MWD assets do not deploy

collectively, the only way to have access to bite suits in theater was through a

handler signing for one from home station and bringing it with them or through

private donation. The Division PMO could not purchase these suits using the

internet due to IMPAC restrictions. Further, the suits or bite sleeves (heavily

padded device fitting over the arm or leg of an individual to facilitate attack

training) could not be ordered through normal supply channels because these

items are not in the Army inventory.

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Division MWD Managers were able to purchase dog food on IMPAC card by

ordering through the PX system. Special diet food, however, could not be

procured through the PX system. This resulted in should a veterinarian place a

dog on special diet food, the Division MWD Manager had to coordinate with the

individual handler‘s home station S4 and have the food mailed through the

military mail system.

The Division PMO suggested the possibility of identified handlers loading a

connex with needed kennel items and once done, shipping the container into

theater so that it‘s there once the handler goes through CRC prior to deployment.

Insights / Lessons:

Standardized baseline packing list is needed for handlers as well as a

separate packing list for kennel operations.

Review of current and future equipment needs for MWD needs to be

considered since maneuver commanders are requiring equipment capabilities

currently not in the inventory.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: Doctrine needs to be reviewed and adjusted to showcase how

PEDD teams are being used in extended leash operations. One of the many

ways that handlers are doing this is through the use of a D-ring attached to the

IBA. On this D-ring is a heavy duty, 15-20 feet long retractable lead. Retractable

lead allows Soldier to affect positive weapon control while still maintaining

positive control of MWD.

Doctrine: Review methods of search during contingency operations to

showcase the MWD forward of the handler during detection operations. This

technique is currently used in OIF.

Training: The Executive Agency for MWD for the DoD is the Air Force.

Curriculum review is essential to introduce extended leash operations during the

MWD courses taught at Lackland Air Force Base.

Training: Introduce camera pack operations during MWD utilization.

Materiel: Develop a MWD kennel kit that would have larger items needed

for a multiple dog operation (example 5+ dogs). This kit should include a bite suit

for patrol trained MWD, first aid kits, additional kennel maintaining equipment and

items for MWDs.

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Materiel: Develop an individual MWD packing set that includes the

IMBITR communications device, MWD vest-mounted camera device, as well as,

a leash-friendly flashlight device that is small and fits over the hand while still

allowing the handler the freedom of manipulating both leash and weapon.

Topic 5.5: Military Working Dog Kenneling

Discussion:

MWD kenneling varied widely based on support, size, and mission load of

respective kennel. A distinct challenge with kenneling is that the regulatory

guidance governing MWD, AR 190-12, does not address kennel requirements in

contingency operations. It references only a hard site (permanent structure) and

states this needs to be in place if the facility will be in place in excess of a year.

As FOBs shifted and changed, it was difficult to brief a hard site solution for the

MWDs when the FOB was projected to shift in the upcoming months or years.

Some enduring FOBs did have hard site kennels.

Several MWD kennels at various FOBs were not kennels at all. They were rather

a series of trailers created into a small compound where the handlers billeted

with their assigned MWD in their room. When they left without their dog for any

reason (showering, DFAC, mailroom, etc.) the MWD was placed in its airline

crate and kept in the room. They also passed this information on to the kennel

master or a fellow handler so that they could monitor the dog.

Another challenge was that when a division would allocate the resources to build

and improve upon existing kennel structure, the veterinarian would inspect the

improved facility against the regulatory guidance, which listed garrison

requirements and did not address contingency operations. It appeared that while

the improved kennel facility was considerably better than what had previously

existed, the regulatory guidance was such that the veterinarian still deemed the

new structure as unsuitable to be a kennel facility. Division PM personnel were

very motivated to research portable kennel facilities that could meet the enduring

need of current operations. However, they knew the kennels needed to be more

mobile than current portable MWD kennels that exceeded several thousand

pounds. This weight in itself created a unique logistical challenge when

attempting to shift them throughout the different FOBs that required MWD

support.

Education proved essential when it came to identifying the reasons behind

needing both space and resources for MWDs. Knowing that the MWD teams

almost exclusively support maneuver commanders and that proper conditioning

and exercise were key in keeping the animals at peak performance, most mayor

cells and senior leaders were more inclined to shift areas to extend existing

space for MWD kennels.

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Insights / Lessons:

Regulatory guidance needs to be revised to address kennel facility

requirements for contingency operations.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Materiel: Procure a lightweight, durable, and mobile kenneling solution

for MWD. Current single dog ―portable‖ structures for MWD exceed 3,500

pounds, which has created an undue logistical challenge when needing to be

moved.

Leader Development and Education: Leaders need to know the

importance of kenneling, exercise space for MWDs, and long term billeting of

MWDs with their Soldiers- all these factors elevates risk assessments and health

concerns.

Facilities: Mayor Cells need to look at space availability for MWDs in

contingency operations. The demands for increased and different MWD

capabilities supporting contingency operations have created a unique challenge

for many garrison kennels. Many garrison kennel facilities are ―hot-seating‖

kennel space due to not having total space for all MWDs that are assigned to that

installation. This is important to note since the typical cost of a kennel, with 18-

24 MWDs, is approximately $1.5-1.75 million.

Topic 5.6: Military Working Dog Statistics

Discussion:

MWD training and utilization was continually tracked and reported systematically.

The MNC-I PMO established an effective reporting process to battle track MWD

assets. The Kennel Master tasked respective PEDD, SSD, and PNDD based on

requests received directly from maneuver commanders through the Division

PMO MWD Manager.

When an MWD handler was tasked for a mission, the Soldier attended the

requesting unit‘s mission brief as well as conducted rehearsals with the unit. The

requesting maneuver commander also received a handler brief validation report

(HBVR) which outlined support the requested MWD team will provide to the unit.

The report also stipulated the support the unit was required to provide to the

MWD team, such as transportation and a security element for the MWD team

while it‘s conducting mission. The handler, in turn, briefed the maneuver

commander, mission leader, and Soldiers involved on the MWD mission,

capabilities, and limitations. This brief consisted of everything from how the team

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searches for its specialty (narcotics or explosives) to the actions required of the

mission element should the MWD (PEDD or PNDD) be released in an attack

capacity.

Once the mission was completed, the MWD team reported back to the kennel

master and that information was collected and consolidated with other missions

that have been executed to the Division MWD Manager. The Division MWD

Manager in turn collected all information on missions from the various kennel

masters and forwarded it to the Corps MWD Manager. Once at corps, it was

briefed to the Corps PM and the statistics were forwarded monthly to the DA

Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG).

In theater, the collection was typically sent weekly. One of the few changes to

the reporting system is if the MWD team had a positive find or bite. Should this

occur, the handler reported it as soon as possible to the kennel master. The

kennel master would report it to the Division MWD Manager, who would report it

to the MNC-I MWD Manager. All MWD statistics were reported weekly at each

respective level.

It‘s important to note that the PMO at both division and corps have set up this

effective reporting system even though this type of structure does not exist in the

garrison. In garrison, MWD teams are assigned to a MP Detachment.

Insights / Lessons:

MWD reporting structure has proven effective and efficient. Although this

type of reporting structure may be unorthodox in the garrison, MWD team

missions are captured and reported in theater through an effective chain of

information sharing from user level to corps.

HBVR is essential in establishing what logistics the maneuver commander

needs to provide to the MWD team in order to receive mission support.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Organization: Develop more defined C2 relationship on how missions

are battle tracked and reported from handler up to corps.

Topic 5.7: Command and Control for Military Working Dog

Discussion:

All MWD teams that were currently in contingency operations were all on

temporary change of stations (TCS) orders and arrived in theater as single

augmentees. MWD teams left CRC, Fort Benning and arrived to MNC-K and on

to MNC-I. Once MNC-I was tracking the team upon arrival into Iraq, they

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assigned the team appropriately based on specialty and where a replacement

was needed.

Attaching PNDD, PEDD, and SSD teams to the Division PMO was critical to

mission success. In division there is a Division Manager, normally a Sergeant

First Class (SFC) that had kennel master experience. This Soldier received the

inbound MWD teams and based on replacement and mission needs, would

assign the team appropriately. Once the team was assigned to a FOB, within

that division AOR that Soldier then became part of the MWD ―section.‖ The

senior handler at the FOB also had the additional duty of being kennel master for

the group and collecting, monitoring, and reporting all missions to the Division

MWD Manager. The only time that gender was a deciding factor in MWD

stationing was when there was a request from SOF for MWD support. Those

requests came in specifically for a male Soldier and his dog.

The Division PMO believed one of the successes to attaching MWD to division,

as opposed to a BCT, was it gave more latitude to shift MWD assets across

battlespace to facilitate maneuver commanders‘ mission requirements. An

example that was given was that one BCT requested MWD support three times

in a one week period as opposed to another BCT requested MWD support

eleven times in one week. Knowing this, the Division MWD Manager was able to

shift MWD teams from FOB X to FOB Y to assist that maneuver commander.

Interviewed personnel stated the contracted civilian human remains detector dog

(HRD) teams in theater were attached at corps for several reasons. First, as the

only contracted handlers solicited by corps, C2 was best maintained at that level

for this limited quantity of skill set. Secondly, attaching HRD teams at corps

allowed for the latitude to accommodate requests from maneuver commanders

that spanned the entire battlespace.

Outside of the C2 maintained through the PMO cells, almost all missions

completed by MWD teams were exclusively with non-MP units as they had a

higher priority and different mission set than the MP battalions and brigades.

What few PEDD teams were occasionally requested by MP units were for VIP or

President of the United States (POTUS)-type missions when needed.

Insights / Lessons:

Attaching MWDs to division gave more latitude to shift MWD assets

across the battlespace to facilitate maneuver commanders mission.

A SFC that has kennel master experience should fill the Division MWD

Manager position.

DOTMLPF Implications:

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Doctrine: Doctrine should reflect that MWDs, when not aligned with MP

organizations, should be assigned at Division Provost Marshal level to ensure

capability to cross level the skills of this limited asset to meet the varying needs

of maneuver commanders.

Organization: Assign E7 Kennel Masters to Division and Corps Provost

Marshal Sections MTOEs.

Personnel: Additional E7 Kennel Master and Program manager positions

should be reviewed to support needs at the Division and MP Brigade levels.

Topic 5.8: Military Working Dog (MWD) in Detainee Operations

Discussion:

Of the entire inventory of MWD employed in contingency operations, a small

number were assigned for duty within the TIF. Most MWD teams that performed

duties within the TIF were PNDD teams. The predominant mission of those

MWD was perimeter patrol and to provide a psychological deterrent to the

detainees. It was clearly understood that the MWD were not to be used to

facilitate interrogations. Although only a small number of MWDs were committed

to these missions, MWDs continued to provide a solid psychological deterrent.

Insights / Lessons:

Despite a small number of total inventory in theater, MWDs continue to

provide a strong psychological deterrent for use in TIFs.

Topic 5.9: Military Working Dog (MWD) Support to Health and Welfare

(H&W) Inspections

Discussion:

While the predominant number of MWD in theater detects explosives, a small

number of the total theater inventory was PNDD. The PNDD were trained to

detect a myriad of narcotics and are also trained in handler protection and

attacking on command. These PNDD teams, in addition to their regular duties,

were available to maneuver commanders for H&W inspections. The

commanders were able to request these inspections through the Division PMO

MWD Manager (this position is found in the S3) or through the Kennel Master

(kennel master is the senior NCO in the kennel). Once the request was

submitted, the commander received a brief that outlined the capabilities of the

PNDD teams to include their projected actions upon a positive alert (such as

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when the dog indicated to the odor of an illicit narcotic substance). The brief

further explained to the commander the support that they needed to provide,

such as senior NCOs securing exit areas and handling of suspected evidence if it

was found. Additionally, the brief discussed safety precautions that were needed

in the execution of the inspection since the PNDD were attack trained and non-

MWD trained Soldiers may be in close proximity to the animals.

Observations revealed there was no set or established battle rhythm for

projected H&W missions. Anecdotally, there seemed to be a trend that once one

maneuver commander identified a problem in his command, fellow commanders

followed suit and likewise requested an H&W as a preventive measure despite

not having an overtly identified problem.

The PNDD teams were almost exclusively used for H&W missions. If a

maneuver commander were to request PEDD or SSD, it would be explained that

the amounts of residue from Soldiers handling weapons and munitions may

increase the positive responses given by these two types of MWD in alerting to

the odor of an explosive substance.

Insights / Lessons:

PNDD were an enabler available to the maneuver commander to promote

good order and discipline in their unit.

PNDD were almost exclusively used for H&W inspections versus the

PEDD or SSD due to explosive residual that tends to be prevalent due to

Soldiers handling of weapons and munitions.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Training: Train leaders on the capabilities of each of the MWDs

employed.

Topic 5.10: Military Working Dog (MWD) Mission Readiness Exercise

(MRX)

Discussion:

All deploying units were required to conduct a mission readiness exercise (MRX)

to validate their training and ensure that they were prepared to deploy. MWD

deployed as individual units and were not required to undergo an MRX. The only

MWD teams that attended an assessment of any kind were SSD teams that went

through a two-week assessment at the end of their course at Lackland Air Force

Base (LAFB), San Antonio, Texas. During this assessment, the SSD team was

in full gear (ACH, full IBA, weapon, etc.) and conducted several missions daily

that were scenario driven and based on the latest in theater TTPs. During this

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assessment, teams encountered a variety of scenarios that also had distracters

(trash, scat, wild animals, mortar round simulators, small arms fire simulator,

etc.). SSD handlers said that attending the assessment at Yuma Proving

Grounds (YPG), Arizona contributed immensely to their mission success.

All PEDD and PNDD handlers that were interviewed collectively agreed that if

they had attended an MRX, they would have been better prepared to accomplish

their mission once deployed. Most said they relied on the shared experience of

other handlers past deployment experiences, as well as, their own to train at their

home station prior to going to CRC en route to theater. At CRC, the handler

received basic individual tasks training while the dog stayed at the Fort Benning

kennel and received no mission specific training. All questioned stated this was

unacceptable.

Several leaders discussed that MWD MRX would benefit maneuver

commanders, as well as, the individual teams if coordination could be made to

have MWD teams attend rotations at NTC, JRTC, and CMTC. These leaders

stressed maneuver commanders should be more aware of MWD capabilities and

its potential to help them accomplish their mission.

Hearing the consistent requests for a CTC like experience for dog handlers, by

both kennel personnel and supported commanders, the Office of the Provost

Marshal General (PMG) is looking at mandatory attendance for MWD handlers to

a similar course that the USMC runs at Yuma.

Insights / Lessons:

A standardized MWD MRX needed to ensure that MWD teams are

prepared for missions that may be encountered during contingency operations.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Training: USAMPS / CENTCOM should develop a standard desert

phase training program, for MWD teams, such as the training provided at Yuma

for SSD. This would ensure a CTC like experience for all MWD teams and would

better prepare them to immediately and more effectively support maneuver

commanders in theater.

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Chapter 6

Foreign Security Force Building and Integration

Chapter Contents

Page

Summary

141

Topic 6.1: Resourcing of PTT to conduct HN Police Operations

143

Topic 6.2: Iraqi Police (IP) Partnership Standardization

147

Topic 6.3: Iraqi Police Advisors (IPA) Skill Sets

150

Topic 6.4: Iraqi Security Force (ISF) synchronization

152

Topic 6.5: Training for units conducting (PTT)

154

Topic 6.6: Police Station Monthly Report (PSMR) and Operational

158

Readiness Assessment (ORA)

Topic 6.7: Materiel Requirements

159

Summary

Establishing Rule of Law and a self-sustaining police force, while operating in a

COIN environment is a complex and challenging task for MP conducting the PTT

mission. MP conducting PTT operations support maneuver commander‘s

mission of ISF development and reform. This operation has shown that it is

essential to assign the personnel with the correct skills against the PTT mission.

Both MP and Iraqi Police Advisors (IPA) must have the technical expertise and

training to achieve success in this mission. Commanders at all levels realized

the way ahead for PTT is a parallel focus at each IP headquarter level operations

and to ensure system development is synchronized. Leaders also identified

several training requirements and capability gaps while conducting simultaneous

and complex operations. This chapter addresses those issues and challenges

associated with developing Host Nation (HN) Police. It will outline the functions

and capabilities required to reach end state for IP becoming a quality and

enduring police force capable of apprehending, processing and supporting

investigations, adjudicating and incarcerating criminals in accordance with the

Rule of Law, and providing civil order while sustaining public confidence and

trust.

Unit leaders made a comparison to illustrate challenges of dealing with any

foreign security force. They reminded CAAT team members that before efforts in

Iraq, Egypt was the only country from the Middle East that has successfully

implemented a western style police force. Most other Middle East police forces

are paramilitary organizations. Therefore, continued attempts to develop the

HNP into a western style police force will remain futile and extremely challenging;

it is like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole. HNP systems are not similar

to western style police systems; specifically, power in Middle Eastern

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organizations (the IP is no exception) is centralized at the top. Currently, CPATT

employs IPA (Iraqi Police Advisors) to assist the military police in PTT. IPAs are

civilian police who are hired to train the IP on law enforcement skills. These

individuals have a difficult time training the IP and establishing western style

police policies and procedures into the Iraqi Police. From 2003 to 2007, new IP

recruits were afforded the opportunity to train at the Jordan Police Academy as

the program of instruction (POI) was similar to Iraqi Police Academies. This

notion in itself shows that it may be feasible to have experts on Middle Eastern

style of policing train the IPs. Having IPAs augmented by individuals from other

Middle Eastern countries that understand the police style and culture would be

extremely valuable at all levels of PTT. Not only could these individuals provide

necessary expertise on Middle Eastern Policing policies and procedures but they

could also help teach these cultural differences in policing to all PTTs making

them more effective.

Host Nation Police Advisors (HNPA) and the Police Transition Teams (PTT) need

to have the same objectives at the end of the day. MNC-I used the 728^th MP BN

as an example. At the 728^th Military Police Battalion, the IPAs and battalion staff

share an office space and work for a common goal. However, that is not the case

at the company level.

Station Budget is a reoccurring issue for PTT. The HNP budget consists of fuel

money and nothing else. The money that stations do receive is not even close to

the amount needed to keep vehicles running for the month. In addition to not

receiving enough money for fuel, it is very difficult for maintenance of vehicles,

maintenance of stations, and administrative supplies without taking money directly

from the HN Police officer on pay day. Budgeting is a technique that needs to be

taught to be successful. Often times, neither the Iraqis nor the PTT understand the

importance of receiving and maintaining receipts to be able to build a proper

budget analysis.

The PTT needs to be providing RoL training. The HNP have asked PTT if they

could provide RoL training in which they cannot. PTT has attempted on numerous

occasions to coordinate to receive training from both the Coalition Forces and the

HN side with no results. For the HNP to fully understand how to be proactive in

community policing they need to better understand of their rights and

responsibilities. PTT can teach the responsibilities, however, it is difficult to teach

the HNP their rights when neither the PTT nor HNP understands the RoL. PTT

has coordinated for the local judge to provide training to both the PTT and the HNP

on the RoL. This judge has provided several hours of training, but not

withstanding, this training has been just to a hand full of HNP who still do not

understand their own RoL.

Unit MP leaders recommend that the provincial headquarters provide the district

headquarters a staff assistance visit (SAV) consisting of members from training,

operations, logistics, and administration sections. These individuals could then

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provide the guidance and the needed mentorship to be able to facilitate better

communication and reasoning for different aspects of their responsibilities to their

district counterparts. Once this visit occurs, it would be the responsibility of the

district section chiefs to conduct a similar visit to their local police stations ensuring

their counterparts understand their role and responsibilities. This would also

provide the PTTs a better understanding of how they can contribute to the overall

readiness of these stations and districts because they themselves would

participate in these SAVs.

Topic 6.1: Resourcing of PTT to Conduct HN Police Operations

Discussion:

Coalition Forces continue to apply western police training / tactics in a country

that has never operated in a western manner, and likely never will. There have

been some cultural factors which have played into not being able to impose a

Western style of policing on the HNP. One example of a troubling trend is a

widespread resistance to putting rules and laws into writing. The HNP do not

know what actual Iraqi Law is (and there are cases where no IP in an entire

district have a copy of an Iraqi Law Book) and they are selective in what they

make arrests for and prosecute. An example is a refusal to make an arrest for a

case of domestic violence, or a refusal to prosecute a murder if the murderer

belongs to an influential tribe able to pay off the victim‘s family.

Senior leaders advocate we should be cautious in where we draw the line

between respecting a different culture and condoning undemocratic policing.

Likewise, bringing other Middle Eastern countries in as trainers will open us up to

international criticism for potential non-democratic practices. Cultural differences

are worthy of respect, but we were also given a mission to instruct democratic

policing standards and should be wary of departing from that. Operations in Iraq

continue to show that the U.S. DoD does not have the organic capability to

effectively establish RoL and associated authorities; lack the required technical

expertise to effectively ―partner‖ with IP leaders and assist them in establishing

functioning police operations; and are not resourced to partner with the

administrative and logistics function of the Police Transition mission.

ORA levels can be improved and maintained through the use of proper

application of available PTT, MTT, and IPAs to bridge the relationship between

the Iraqi Police, the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi National Police. All in their own right

are independently not fully trusted within their own societies. Unity of effort and

mission in respect to the RoL will fuse intent and will provide economy of force /

logistics.

Key comments from senior leaders stressed we have missed the mark with

resourcing the Provincial level PTT teams. The Army has done a great job of

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resourcing and training MiTT teams, pulling the necessary skill sets, sending

them to school, and then providing them to their associated Iraqi unit. However,

with Provincial PTTs, we have required BCTs to pull those teams out of hide. In

many cases, this has caused BCTs to man those teams with their BCT PMs and

a few NCOs, with little to no training ahead of time. As CF attempted to drill

down into the myriad of issues associated with Iraqi Police across the provinces

many issues surfaced: budget, logistics, hiring, and training. The Provincial PTT

are ill-prepared to be able to do these functions today. Many recommend a

relook on how we are manning these teams, using the MiTT model, and provide

the proper training and resourcing at that level.

The station level PTTs are very effective at training the IP on 10/20 level tasks,

conducting patrols, and providing oversight, yet in the Iraqi system of centralized,

top down management, it is the provincial level that must be resourced in order

to train, coach, and mentor their Iraqi counterparts at the level that is required.

Many senior MP leaders conveyed that today‘s MP Soldier does have the basic

skills training to conduct L&O. But it is a valid point that most MP units that

deploy stop working the road months prior to deployment if they work the road at

all. It is the PMO Soldiers and NCOs that PCS every year to a non-deployable

unit that have the L&O experience for the most part. Some Soldiers don‘t even

get the chance to work the road before they deploy. Officers and NCOs, at the

platoon level, learn how the HN police force work when they arrive at the

stations.

There was no formal training for the platoons observed on HN police before

deployment. Even the partnership that the MPs have with the HNPA doesn‘t

start until the MP unit hits the ground. HNPA have the skills necessary to help

the HN police force infrastructure because they are civilian cops that work law

enforcement everyday. But MPs on the ground confirm that the HNPA don‘t

have a specific mission or do not understand what it is that they need to do at the

stations. MP units should have the opportunity to meet with and train with those

HNPA that will be attached to them prior to deployment. It may take outside

Middle East Police agencies to also take part in the training of the HN police.

They have similar laws and police management skills.

Leaders interviewed feel that MP Soldiers are capable of providing basic

elements of police operations and training effectiveness. Leaders also

mentioned that, generally, military officers are capable of training police station

and / or police district chiefs on how to be effective leaders (read platoon leaders

and / or company commanders), but do not have the technical experience

necessary to train their IP counterpart on how to serve as an effective police

chief.

One MP leader provided the following vignette and took it one step further, and

addressed the administrative functions of an IP Station. A (CF) human resource

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(HR) specialist, may understand CF military processes for HR actions, but has

very limited, if any, knowledge on how Iraqi HR divisions function. Another

interviewee said it is important to have a civilian who understands the dynamics

of logistics and requirements for a civilian police force, and have them work these

admin / log issues for the IP, than having a CF (CPT / MAJ) logistician attempt to

work through this.

Many leaders interviewed believe to get beyond this; additional ―plugs‖ are

required to transition the policing of Iraq solely to the IP.

For example, leaders interviewed recommend these additional ―plugs‖ must have

the requisite skill sets and experience with managing and operating police

stations and leadership expertise. The skill sets required for oversight of such a

large police operation should, at a minimum, be a team that consists of several

members of a large Middle Eastern Metropolitan City (or Government) Police

Agency.

MP leaders consistently stated that the way-ahead for transitioning the policing

mission over to the Iraqis was to incorporate a Middle Eastern Arabic country

police forces evaluation system and trainers into the PTT evaluation program.

Law and Order Training:

MP leaders, across the board, felt that the operational tempo severely limited MP

exposure to the garrison law enforcement mission prior to deployment. Leaders

also felt additional L&O training would increase MP ability to accomplish the

mission of HN Police Partnership while deployed ISO OIF.

MP NCOs mentioned the need for additional MP squads to meet the PSD / PTT

requirement for the BDE and BN staff.

Insights / Lessons:

CF must determine the correct, organic, civilian ―plugs‖ and authorities

required to conduct HN police building operations.

CPATT and MP must continue to work at mitigating the lack of technical

expertise to affect the business management processes and systems required of

an effective police department in a COIN environment.

Ensure all units conducting the PTT mission receive training / additional

training on Iraqi Law - these units must also understand Iraqi culture and get

past the ―western bias‖ of how we do things.

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Incorporate a Middle Eastern Arabic country police forces evaluation

system and trainers into the PTT evaluation program. (Jordan, Saudi Arabia,

Kuwait, etc.)

If a Middle Eastern country, such as Jordan is able to provide a police

assistance team to the MOI that could teach policing with a Middle Eastern

approach, this would be the best approach in establishing an effective HN Police

Training Team.

Incorporate the appropriate personnel ―plugs‖ that have experience with

managing and operating police stations. Retired police chiefs from a large police

force have proven successful in the past due to their managerial and leadership

expertise.

MP must conduct law and order operations while in Garrison. Additionally,

an internship / training with local police departments are essential during pre-

deployment training. This training should focus on police station operations.

Conduct a thorough review of Military Police MTOE to ensure MP units

have the correct organizational structure to accomplish their mission (current and

future operations), including looking at the need for the following:

o Secure cell phones would have helped as MPs traveled several hours

outside of radio range from any other CF element and had difficulty with FIPR.

o MP retrains equipment has been used in several places and has

helped to cover dead spots.

o MP have used the X-Spray kits before but those are something that

should be considered to field to the HNP. They are a relatively inexpensive way

for them to narrow down suspects after a blast occurs and to begin learning to

collect and preserve evidence.

o EOF equipment was useful, but standard, hand-held lasers were hard

to come by.

o Some MP units had one experimental robot which the assigned Squad

used many times to confirm IEDs. A simple surveillance robot can be

manufactured at a low cost and the MP Corps should field more.

o An unsecure, local cell phone to talk to local leaders would enhance

operations. This was one of the most important pieces of equipment when

conducting PTT and it took most MP units many months to get authorization.

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o PTT at the Provincial level must have an acute awareness of the

budget and budgeting process. Budget planning and budget execution drive

much of the success or failure of the Provincial PHQ in terms of a ―holistic station

management.‖ IPAs that work in these positions should be familiar with the

issues that are faced by metropolitan police forces. The civilians that assist CF

with mentoring the HNP, at the provincial level, don‘t necessarily need to have

been police. Civilians who were public sector comptrollers, logistic experts, or

HR managers might be more useful than civilians with a law enforcement

backg0round to this mission. HNPA with law enforcement experience are more

useful at the district level in order to assess progress towards HNP

professionalization.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: Develop an MP doctrinal manual that provides specific

guidance on how MP units will conduct / support HN police building and

establishing Rule of Law.

Organization: Conduct analysis to determine the correct ROA for MP

Command, Combat Support (CS) MP BDE, CS MP BN, and CS MP CO.

Training: Add or enhance Law Enforcement Training in MP OES and

NCOES to increase the technical proficiency of MP leaders.

Training: Expose PTT to as much law enforcement training as possible

prior to deploying.

Training: PTT require both MP specialty skills and survivability skills.

Often PTT focus has been on force protection.

Training: Incorporate other Middle Eastern methods into the PTT

program to further enhance and learn about their processes and procedures. IP

could potentially see their neighboring countries‘ methods and attempt to mirror

them.

Materiel: Continue fielding equipment that significantly contributes to the

mission. Every leader needs a local cell phone in order to talk to their

counterparts quickly following a significant event.

Leader Development and Education: Develop Interagency and police

station internships for senior NCOs / Junior Officers to broaden their experience

level with civilian agencies.

Personnel: Determine what additional civilian ―plugs‖ and authorities are

required to effectively establish Rule of Law.

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Topic 6.2: Iraqi Police (IP) Partnership Standardization

Discussion:

The strategy for IP was focused much more on ―tactical‖ level matters such as

force generation, equipping, and station operations rather than a parallel

approach that captures functions and responsibilities at the district / directorate

and provincial levels.

Many units commented that the HNP DHQ and local police stations need to

synchronize their efforts. They stated that sometimes the LPS commanders

don‘t have a clue what the DHQ commanders are doing, at their level, and they

don‘t care. They see PTT and want and expect to go through them to get what

they need. More pointedly, interviewed personnel stated the MOI needs to be

quicker with responding to IP DHQ requests so that the LPS commanders can

see progress and trust in their DHQ. That will be the only way LPS commanders

begin to have faith in their own Iraqi system.

PTT Way Ahead:

MP leaders believed that to effectively hand the policing mission over to the

Government of Iraq, there must be a deliberate plan that synchronizes efforts of

Iraqi policing at all levels.

Additionally, both MP Leaders and PTT identified that turning the IP training

mission over to the Iraqis requires a parallel focus at the stations / Shurta and at

Provincial Director of Police / District level and development of international

performance measures, to include measures for assessing law enforcement

effectiveness (i.e. crime reduction).

Leaders at Multi National Corps - Iraq (MNC-I), Multi National Division (MND),

and the MP Brigade developed their own assessments of IP management

systems for the levels they were partnered with. Each had a different set of

metrics, and most interviewees agree that it would be difficult if not impossible to

compare, track, or manage common concerns in any large scale or significant

way.

Some of the leaders interviewed felt there appeared to be a lack of deliberate

synchronization, between MNC-I and Multi National Security Transition Corps -

Iraq (MNSTC-I), in order to attain any future level of standardization.

Most leaders stated that MNC-I had the ability to establish standards for all units

executing PTT operations at the HQ level and MNSTC-I possessed the insight

into what processes that IP provincial HQs were required to execute.

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However, most leaders also stated the Iraqi police lack a way-ahead for

themselves (or are unable to articulate one) resulting in CF creating the way

ahead for them. A few specifically remarked that the CF repeatedly makes this

mistake and we continue to attempt to force a solution that simply will not work

for the HN. Many in theater stressed the way-ahead needs to start with allowing

the HNP to determine what the HN police force should look like and then helping

them get there. This process of standardizing operations and systems should

start at MOI and filter down to the individual station. However, when the flow of

information through the HN system is hazy even to CF (despite our partnerships

and multiple means of communication via phones, internet, and radios) it is hard

to imagine how standards and guidance are relayed to the HNP station

commander.

The training of a local police force should be individualized by location. This

emphasis on localized efforts based upon Commander‘s intent and battlefield

conditions grants local Commanders the discretion they need to be effective.

This should continue to be encouraged. The local community leadership must be

engaged for select locations of new HNP stations or the community will not

support them, and may even target them. This goes hand and hand with

synchronizing PTT with local stations boundaries and areas of responsibilities.

Insights / Lessons:

Future planning should include development of a synchronized plan for IP

station / Headquarters which is essential to transitioning this mission over to the

HN government.

Synchronize and communicate IP efforts at all levels, and ensure all police

operations and management systems are nested with higher headquarters

requirements.

Develop forums, such as at the MNSTC-I level, is key to sharing Ministry

of Interior (MOI), Iraq processes with Provincial PTTs. These forums should

focus on specific systems and development of assessment metrics (i.e. a forum

that focuses on 2008-2009 budget execution and development processes).

Determine and publish through operational orders what data MOI

require in order to provide the Provincial PTTs the specific tasks / requirements

they should mentor their respective Provincial IP chiefs and comptrollers on.

There must be orders generated by the DIV HQ‘s to the BCT‘s in each

province to pull information on demand to include analysis of supplies needed by

the PTTs as well as on budget priorities in order to help the Iraqis plan at the MOI

level. There must be a concerted effort on the part of CF to use its chain of

command to help synchronize IPS planning on the part of the MOI.

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Parallel focus and coordination of effort is vital to PTT success in

developing and expanding the Iraqi Police force. Provincial Directors from all

over Iraq need to meet in a summit forum regularly to discuss issues pertinent to

their areas and allow maximum exposure to MOI and CPATT authorities.

Topic 6.3: Iraqi Police Advisors (IPA) Skill Sets

Discussion:

The IP training program was designed to provide a basic police academy that

introduced the knowledge, skill, and abilities of international policing standards.

It strived to introduce and improve acquisition of human rights knowledge,

democratic policing principles, modern policing techniques, applicable Iraqi

criminal laws and procedures, laws of arrest and detention, and firearms

proficiency.

MP leaders interviewed agreed that a vast majority of the IPAs did not have the

required skill sets to teach and / or train IP at levels above the basic ―beat-cop‖.

Additionally, those interviewed believe that too many IPAs lack the administrative

and leadership skills necessary to operate an effective police station, and they do

not have experience in managing people and resources. Additionally, MP

leaders (from the MP SL to Corps level) consistently agreed if MP were

technically trained, we would not need IPAs and share concern with the limited

in-depth training IPAs receive on the Iraqi culture.

Some in key MP leadership positions stated either the HNPA program needs to

provide better oversight of the HNPA and the MP and HNPA visions need to be

integrated by a higher authority, or the MP Commander needs more access to

counseling and firing of sub-standard HNPA. Standards also need to be higher.

Most of the HNPA have little experience as a police person at all, and very few of

them bring any special skill set to the table. The HNPA should continue to serve

as a continuity tool between local IP leadership and RIP units.

While conceptually the HN police advisors provide a useful tool for improving

basic policing skills and station operations they do not have the skill set

necessary to do so in this fight. Many MP Officers and NCOs stated the HNPA is

best leveraged at the basic recruit academies where they can best focus on

ensuring that critical police skills and civilian techniques are taught properly.

Those interviewed had strong opinions on HNPA hiring. They stated it should be

geared to those with more experience and education. Raise the salaries and hire

those with the most applicable management skill sets and metropolitan police

experience. At the same time cut their numbers. Less is more. Also, look at

hiring civilians with public sector management experience (Budgeting, HR, and

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Logistics) to assist with HNPS development at the Provincial and Ministerial

Levels.

On the contrary, the Law Enforcement Professionals (LEPs) seem to be vastly

more experienced and specialize in forensics and investigations are proving far

more valuable in theater. Perhaps, this is because it is an area in which most

MP do not have a great deal of personal experience to draw from.

Many interviewees believe to increase success requires assigning the right

person with the right skill sets to this mission. For example, leaders

recommended re-looking the KSAs for the IPAs. This would ensure the

applicants possessed the requisite skill sets commensurate to the position they

were applying for. PTT leaders said this would ensure IPAs hired would have

more than 2 years of experience as a patrolman at a small town police station.

PTTs leaders at the MP CO and MP BN level said the some of their IPAs were

great, and some were not. Interviewees also stated that a more specific hiring

process would help ensure the right people were brought on board.

MP leaders stated IPAs normally have anywhere from two to 25+ years of state-

side police training / experience and that most IPAs are skilled in one or two

specialties of police work. Those interviewed also stated that those IPAs with

fewer skills had limited abilities to effectively train HN police and those with

greater experience and education were tailored to partner at district, directorate,

and even the provincial level.

MP Leaders all agree that Provincial level IPAs must have a higher level of

systems education and have experience from large metropolitan departments or

state level policing agencies.

MP Leaders at the MND level leverage their organic personnel to increase IPA

effectiveness. For example, one technique used to increase IPA effectiveness is

aligning one MP CPT and one IPA per province to handle all issues and serve as

the single point of information flow between BCTs and the division. To do this,

the IPA would require mid-level organizational management experience. This

arrangement also sets the conditions for IPA led teams at the district and

provincial levels, as well as, providing systems development and synchronization

expertise when these capabilities become the priority as the security situation

stabilizes.

MP Senior leaders consistently cited the need for incorporating other Middle

Eastern Arabic country police trainers into the PTT program.

Although challenging, MP leaders agree, there is a need to integrate IPAs at the

MP CO prior to deployment. Those interviewed also recommended a single IPA

chain of command under the senior MP Commander for a given area.

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Insights / Lessons:

Ensure IPAs have experience with managing and operating police

stations. Seek out retired police chiefs for managerial and leadership expertise

(avoid those who wish to teach the IP only special weapons and tactics

techniques).

Re-look the KSAs for the IPA contract and ensure IPAs possess the

required skill sets to conduct the specific police training mission they will be

assigned against.

Expand the search from just the US to other Middle Eastern Arabic

country police trainers into the PTT program.

Ensure IPAs receive extensive training on Iraqi Law, and ensure IPAs

understand Iraqi culture and get past the ―western bias‖ of how we do things.

HNPA do not have the skills to help with the infrastructure of HNP local

police stations.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Training: Add and / or enhance blocks of instruction to MP OES and

NCOES courses to ensure that MP leaders can function as a part of a Multi-

National or Interagency Team building / establishing Host Nation Police (Rule of

Law).

Training: Evaluate skill sets of IPAs and assign them to PTTs based on

their proficiency and expertise. IPAs should be a strong force multiplier and an

asset to each PTT. The more specialized, the more productive they can be in

advising HN police forces.

Training: Moving IPAs away from the ―western mindset‖ involving police

procedures is extremely important. Prior to deployment, ensure they receive

maximum exposure to HN culture.

Leader Development and Education: Continue to improve current

leader courses (PTT) to prepare officer and NCO leaders to assume duties within

a Host Nation building team.

Topic 6.4: Iraqi Security Force (ISF) Synchronization

Discussion:

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COIN operations must evolve to the point where the IA can transition from

controlling areas of the city to their role in defense of the borders and the IP and

MOI are looked upon by the Government of Iraq as the primary agency providing

security in Baghdad.

MP Leaders also indicated that in order to be successful in the COIN operation,

the HN government must progress to the point where the MOI can properly

resource and sustain the IP without CF assistance. If properly resourced, the IP

can focus on conducting law enforcement operations. The IA must ensure the

area is secure so that the IP can operate without fear of exposure to IEDs, RPG,

and other forms of attack they are not equipped to defend themselves against.

Some MP leaders believe there is a rush to move the IP to the front, before they

are capable of a leading role in COIN, while the Army migrates back to their

primary mission of national defense. There is concern that with many police only

have eight weeks of police training and others receiving only two weeks of police

related training, that the IP will fail. The push to put IP out front is a good goal as

it will portray the country as being capable of establishing security with its own

police forces and not with the Army.

MP Leaders also stated that as long as the security situation remains volatile, IP

will have limited capability to police. Such is the current situation that the IA and

NP in some areas have restricted the IP from patrolling.

MP senior leaders stipulated that coordination between the IP, IA, and the NP

are fractured, at best, and when this limited coordination did take place between

the three members of the ISF it occurred at a local Joint Security Station (JSS).

MP Leaders at the BCT and division level stated the IA and NP were linked

operationally, however, those interviewed believed that, beyond that, there was

no connection between the IP and the rest of the ISF as the IP were not

recognized as a viable professional public service.

One BCT MP leader stated, in their AO, a Joint Operations Center (JOC) was

established and led by IA and NP Brigades. The synchronization of the security

and intelligence within their AOR took place at these command posts (JOC and

JSS) but in reality, the IP remained on the outside looking in while efforts to

synchronize security and law enforcement operations were taking place.

Insights / Lessons:

CF must leverage MiTTs, NPTTs and PTTs to build and foster a better

relationship between the IA, NP, and IP and not allow the IP to be subjugated to

a standby or secondary role in the security and Rule of Law efforts.

Link the BCT PM / DIV PM with the ISF cell to ensure information /

synchronization with the IA BN / BDE and NP.

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MOI must take ownership of the JOC in order to synchronize ISF. This

synchronization must come from the Iraqis themselves. There must also be local

government buy-in as to how the ISF are structured in each province / district.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: Establish standardized guidance for MP / PM cells regarding

duties, responsibilities, and functions in JSS / JOC.

Topic 6.5: Training for units conducting (PTT)

Discussion:

The Iraqi Police (IP) are frequently viewed as subordinate to the Iraqi Army and

National Police. This is perpetuated by Iraqi Army leadership influence within the

community and lack of coordination of effort on the part of ISF as a whole.

BCTs and BNs must integrate and synch efforts with MiTTs, NPTTs, and PTTs to

foster improved relationships to all HN security forces. Corps recommends that

units develop COAs to allow for more MiTT and PTT coordination of efforts.

MP received the basics in PTT training prior to deployment. The leaders

indicated that more could be done in training to better enhance mission success.

While predeployment training cannot fully replicate the daily engagements

required with senior IP officials to develop policies and procedures, a MRX or

CTC rotation can replicate the constant coordination required between MP

assets and supported combat units. The more that can be focused at squad

level the more the predeployment training will be beneficial as much of the

success of the PTT mission was dependent on the MP to influence IP

counterparts and coordinated with parent and supported units in the conduct of

their mission.

In order to assist MP units partner and train HNP at station operations, we need

to first train our leaders (down to the squad leader) on HN Law Enforcement

standards. The garrison law enforcement training and or hands on experience

that MP Soldiers receive at most bases does not prepare them to serve as a

police officer or set up police operations in the U.S. much less in Iraq.

Key Mp leaders emphasized that the MP Corps needs to quit setting our junior

leaders up for failure and train them properly. Stating that we need to utilize

current established relationships with Jordan and Saudi Arabia in order to find

individuals in this Law Enforcement community to come and assist us with

establishing effective training programs for our leaders (similar to the cultural

awareness program). One of those interviewed most pointed comments was if

units could get Jordanian or Saudi Arabians to come to the U.S. and teach junior

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leaders cultural awareness and engagement training prior to deploying our MP

units would be more successful.

Consistently, MP leaders stated that training for units conducting the PTT

mission must include engagement training- specifically how to get police to

engage with the populace, the role of police in an Arab culture, the IP functions in

pre-OIF Iraq, current Iraqi law, and police operations in neighboring Middle

Eastern countries. Senior NCOs absolutely agreed that a greater level of cultural

awareness is required for predeployment training. They offered as an example:

trainers should expand the current Arabic culture overview and look to see what

other Arab countries have done in terms of policing their populace (Jordan, Saudi

Arabia, and Egypt).

Leaders stressed Soldiers also needed to familiarize themselves with other

aspects of police operations and management systems to better prepare

themselves for meeting the challenges of the police development efforts.

The OPTEMPO has been particularly high the past seven years. Conducting law

enforcement or policing operations is a skill and experience based profession,

current MP must rely more on skills or classroom training and less on experience

because they are not getting enough time in policing duties back at home station.

All leaders interviewed stipulated that with the limited amount of law enforcement

training our leaders receive, and even less garrison L&O missions our leaders

(SL, PSG, PL, and commanders) have limited technical expertise to establish,

operate and validate civilian police stations systems.

BCT MP leaders added that they had limited training on detention operations

which typically was over 70% of their mission (operating a Division Collection

Point). Two of the major skills and experience based missions the MP Corps

conducts are the two areas the MPs are having less time to train on and less

opportunities to get experience based skills and training.

MP Leaders unanimously agree that the following list is required predeployment

training:

Engagement Training. Leaders understand the importance of

positive interaction with the HN leaders (Sheiks, Mullahs, and IP Commanders).

To ensure our leaders understand and are comfortable conducting this mission, a

deliberate Engagement Training plan is essential. Unfortunately, many units did

not conduct / receive any engagement training prior to deployment. Units

recognize this shortfall and some have been collecting lessons learned and will

incorporate engagement training into squad lanes.

Integrate MP Companies with supported maneuver units at CTCs. It is

not as important to train with the unit they will support in theater as it is to train

with maneuver units in a CTC setting. This training provides the opportunity to

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work through systems and issues associated with supporting a maneuver

commander in a COIN operation.

Continue to update the PTT Leader Course and at a minimum, primary

staff officers and squad leaders should attend the PTT course prior to

deployment (in a perfect world, send an MTT to the unit missioned with PTT).

All Battle Staff (BDE and BN level) attend Command Post of the Future

(CPoF) and Blue Force Tracker (BFT) training. It would benefit the Army if

these two blocks of instruction were included in NCOES and OES as well.

PSMR training - For all squad leaders, platoon leaders,

Operations NCOs and company commanders (keep the PTT TSP updated).

Insights / Lessons:

To improve pre-deployment training for PTT for DIV IPS development the

staff there needs to have in depth training on the systems that drive MOI.

Focus predeployment training on the tasks that support the mission while

deployed (PTT = L/O, and I / R = Detention Operations training). Also, train on

the survivability tasks inherent with deploying in a combat environment.

With the current mission set (PTT Operations) MP units desperately need

to conduct training with civilian law enforcement prior to deploying and conduct

garrison style L&O while at home station.

Capture the two week, introduction to Iraq, training MiTTs and NPTTs

receive and provide to deploying MP units.

Capture the five-day COIN class BCT leaders go through and have MP

CO Commanders thru MP BDE Commanders attend.

MP leadership interviewed considers the following as necessary elements

of a PTT and the right skill sets required to effectively conduct PTT operations.

This team should consist of a minimum:

(1)

1 NCOIC (SSG) for security

(2)

4 Drivers qualified to operate HMMWV / MRAP / ASV

(3)

4 Gunners qualified to operate .50 cal / M240 / MK19

(4) PTT Chief (LT or CPT for District and SSG or above for

Substations)

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(5)

1 Logistics SME (Trained on Iraqi Logistics system - Army or

Civilian)

(6)

1 Investigations Trainer (Trained on Iraqi Investigative techniques

– Army or Civilian)

(7)

1 Eastern Culture Policing SME

(8)

3 Interpreters

(9)

1 Medic

DOTMLPF Implications:

Training: Add or enhance blocks of instruction on Engagement Training

in OES, NCOES, and OSUT to familiarize Soldiers with interacting with HN

leaders.

Training: Incorporate law enforcement training / operations into the

company training plan while MP units are in garrison. Include MP duty Officer

(MPDO) for senior NCOs and officers.

Training: Add and / or enhance blocks of instruction to MP OES and

NCOES courses to ensure that MP leaders can function as productive members.

Training: Incorporate CPoF and BFT training into NCOES.

Training: PTT training in OSUT should be familiarization only. Privates

are not (or at least should not be) conducting engagements. They are providing

force protection for the NCOs and officers who are conducting the engagements.

Training: During predeployment phases, PTT leaders and subordinates

need additional training on how to engage HN authorities. This will allow them to

immediately impact their Iraqi Police counterparts and have enhanced situational

awareness prior to entering the theater of operations.

Training: Continue to update and provide trainers to the PTT course at

USAMPS. Require at a minimum, the PTT NCOIC / OIC, squad leaders, and

platoon leaders to attend the course prior to deploying for the PTT mission.

Training: Ensure PTT leadership is proficient in completing the PSMR

and Commander Comment requirements. These are the two tools that are used

to assess the progress of each District / Directorate / Provincial HQs and the

leadership must be knowledgeable on their use prior to deployment.

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