Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 3)

Military Police and Counterinsurgency Operations, Initial Impressions

Report (IIR)

IIR Table of Contents

Page

Executive Summary

Chapter 1 - Organizing MP Operations and Support to Establishing

Rule of Law / Host Nation Police Development

Summary

Topic 1.1: Establishing the Rule of Law- Unity of Effort

Topic 1.2: Law and Order Task Force

Topic 1.3: Rule of Law Summit

Topic 1.4: Host Nation Police Development

Topic 1.5: Host Nation Police Measures of Effectiveness

Topic 1.6: Managing Host Nation Police Development

Topic 1.7: Police Transition Team Command and Control

Topic 1.8: Predeployment Training- MP Operations and

Establishing the Rule of Law

Topic 1.9: Forming the Team

Topic 1.10: Command and Control of MP Units in a Rule of

Law Environment

Topic 1.11: Aligning US Partnership Boundaries with Host

Nation Boundaries

Chapter 2 - Military Police Support to Maneuver Commanders

Summary

Topic 2.1: Military Police Mission Sets

Topic 2.2: MP C2 in Support of Maneuver Commanders

in COIN and Stability Operations

Topic 2.3: Providing Police Transition Team Support to

Maneuver Commanders

Topic 2.4: Law Enforcement Technical Skills in Support

Of Maneuver Commanders

Topic 2.5: Providing MP Support to Divisions and BCTs

Topic 2.6: MP C2 Relationships and Task Organization

Topic 2.7: MP Brigade, Battalion, and Company Capabilities

Topic 2.8: Corps and Division Provost Marshal Capabilities

Topic 2.9: MP Assets Organic to the BCT

Topic 2.10: MP Company in Support of a BCT

Topic 2.11: BCT MP Platoon Employment

Topic 2.12: Non-Lethal Weapons and Munitions Applications

Topic 2.13: HMMWV Employment

Topic 2.14: Integration of Host Nation Security Forces and Means 81

Chapter 3 - Police Intelligence Operations

Summary

Topic 3.1: Law Enforcement Support to Maneuver Commanders

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Topic 3.2: Data Warehousing and Management

Topic 3.3: Crime and Criminal Intelligence Analysis

Topic 3.4: Forensic Support to Police Intelligence Operations

100

Topic 3.5: Biometrics Support to Police Intelligence Operations

106

Sub Topic 3.5.1: Predeployment Training

112

Sub Topic 3.5.2: Connectivity

114

Topic 3.6: Forensic / Evidence Collection Kits

116

Topic 3.7: Operational Security (OPSEC)

117

Chapter 4 - Border Control and Customs Operations

Summary

119

Topic 4.1: Border Patrol Operations

120

Topic 4.2: Customs Operations in Iraq

122

Topic 4.3: Customs Operations in Kuwait

123

Chapter 5 - Military Working Dog (MWD) Program

Summary

126

Topic 5.1: Initial Training of Military Working Dog Handler

126

Topic 5.2: Military Working Dog Information

129

Topic 5.3: Basis of Issue Plan for Military Working Dogs

130

Topic 5.4: Equipment Needed for Military Working Dogs

131

Missions

Topic 5.5: Military Working Dog Kenneling

134

Topic 5.6: Military Working Dog Statistics

135

Topic 5.7: Command and Control for Military Working Dog

136

Topic 5.8: Military Working Dogs in Detainee Operations

138

Topic 5.9: Military Working Dogs Support to Health and

138

Welfare Inspections

Topic 5.10: Military Working Dog Mission Readiness Exercise

139

Chapter 6 - Foreign Security Force Building and Integration

Summary

141

Topic 6.1: Resourcing of Police Transition Teams (PTT) to

143

Conduct Host Nation Police Operations

Topic 6.2: Iraqi Police Partnership Standardization

147

Topic 6.3: Iraqi Police Advisors (IPA) Skill Sets

150

Topic 6.4: Iraqi Security Force (ISF) Synchronization

152

Topic 6.5: Training for Units Conducting PTT

154

Topic 6.6: Police Station Monthly Report (PMSR) and

158

Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA)

Topic 6.7: Materiel Requirements

159

Chapter 7 - Law and Order Operations

Summary

164

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Topic 7.1: Law Enforcement on Bases

164

Topic 7.2: Provost Marshal Office Facilities and Equipment

167

Topic 7.3: Law Enforcement Training

168

Topic 7.4: Crime Reporting Procedures

170

Topic 7.5: Support Given to the Provost Marshal Office

171

Chapter 8 - Training and Leader Development

Summary

174

Topic 8.1: MP Platoon and Squad Level Training and Leader

174

Development

Topic 8.2: MP Company and Battalion Level Training and

177

Leader Development

Topic 8.3: MP Brigade Level Training and Leader Development

183

Topic 8.4: Division Provost Marshal Office and BCT MP

186

Platoon Level Training

Topic 8.5: Predeployment Training for Police Transition Teams

189

Topic 8.6: Equipment Training Issues that MP Soldiers may

191

Face on Deployments in the COE

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Executive Summary

The Center for Army Lessons Learned recently deployed a Collection and

Analysis Team (CAAT) into Iraq to look at Military Police (MP) operations in

support of the maneuver commander in Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations

and to support a Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) requirement to look at

developing an organization whose mission it is to assist a developing country in

professionalizing its police forces and establishing rule of law. The collection

effort was across MP full spectrum operations in support of maneuver

commanders in a COIN and Stability Operations environment, required MP

organizational structure to train and professionalize indigenous police forces,

establish and implement a rule of law program, perform other law enforcement

related functions while deployed, and to determine Doctrine, Organization,

Training, Materiel, Leader Development, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF)

implications for follow-on deploying forces and institutional Army requirements.

This report highlights the MP capabilities provided to the maneuver commander

and identifies insights, observations and lessons learned reported as critical to

COIN and Stability Operations success.

A primary focus for the CAAT was to report on how best to establish an

organization with a capability to develop and professionalize a host nation police

force and establish rule of law in a developing nation and how the military police

support the maneuver commander in today‘s warfare. The team interviewed

Rule of Law (RoL) components (police, judicial, penal), maneuver commanders,

and military police Soldiers of all ranks. There has been good progress on efforts

to establish Rule of Law and efforts are underway to ensure solutions are not

stove-piped but instead, integrated and synchronized from the highest to lowest

levels of organization and effort.

Many leaders expressed that future warfare will not be too dissimilar to what

Coalition Forces (CF) are experiencing in Iraq. Recent history (Bosnia, Kosovo,

Afghanistan and Iraq) indicates that as US forces begin ground operations, they

have been confronted with enemy forces who have replaced their uniforms with

local civilian dress; criminals who have been released from prisons and jails;

populace control measures such as registration, vehicle licensing, property

registration no longer in place; government records no longer in place or systems

functioning; and organized crime, terrorists, insurgents, common criminals,

political and ethnic groups (to include tribes) all vying for populace control.

These organizations add to the complexity of the already multifaceted

environment associated with warfare.

Maneuver unit leadership reported that the MP have the basic skills necessary to

accomplish missions they have been assigned in support of COIN operations

and developing basic host nation police capabilities. The MP also has limited

and more advanced and critical skills necessary to conduct high-end criminal

investigations and laboratory analysis of evidence; these skills reside within the

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Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of the MP Corps. This CAAT effort

identified training gaps though that will help take the mission of developing police

from a basic survival level to a more necessary law enforcement basic,

intermediate and advance skill set capability that is necessary in a successful

COIN operation and in establishing a base for RoL to exist.

The maneuver commanders and division leaders interviewed typically related

that the major problem with the military police is that there are not enough on

hand for the mission. They believe the MP have the basic skills they (maneuver

commander) need and mainly pointed to enhanced investigations skills of the

basic MP as an area that could use improvement. These senior leaders also

postulated that while it may be good in combat operations to have MP forces

assigned to a Corps and providing support to subordinate maneuver divisions

and brigades, as the spectrum of conflict moves to the right toward stability and /

or COIN operations, the Army might best be served to assign MP brigades to

divisions. It is the senior level MP commanders and staffs that are lacking in

numbers in the current fight. To develop police capabilities in a nation, the effort

must include all levels of policing and all aspects of police capabilities.

The relatively recent introduction of criminal investigators (CID), law enforcement

professionals (LEP), Biometrics, and Crime Laboratories have all contributed

greatly to the police intelligence and criminal analysis capabilities necessary to

attack the insurgents and other organized criminal networks. The reach back

capabilities that used to suffice, such as the US Army Criminal Investigations

Laboratory (USACIL) are now in theater and providing expedient and dedicated

criminal analysis of evidence or potential evidence. The theater is benefiting as

well from being able to reach back to the Criminal Investigation Task Force

(CITF) that was originally focused on other criminal investigation missions. The

CITF is connected to all policing agencies and provides an extensive criminal

investigation and analysis capability.

The capabilities of law enforcement personnel are increasingly being made more

available to the maneuver commander. More MP units are being activated. LEP

personnel, although initially deployed to theater to mitigate a crime analysis

capability gap in an effort to combat the IED threat through use of police methods

for attacking an organized criminal network, are providing services that range

from incident/scene analysis to police advisor to maneuver battalion and brigade

commanders. The Military Working Dog (MWD) program is growing and now

includes combat tracker dog (CTD) and specialized search dog (SSD)

capabilities that complement the extensive Patrol Narcotics, Patrol Explosive and

Mine Detector Dog capabilities already residing in the Army.

Law Enforcement, Criminal Investigations, Police Intelligence Operations,

Detention Operations, and developing host nation (HN) police capabilities are the

priority mission sets for the military police units in support of the maneuver

commander and in establishing RoL. The seams or gaps that were once wide

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between policing and security entities and capabilities across the theater and

from border to border are slowly being closed and the effects on the criminal,

insurgent and terrorist type organizations are well noticed. Border Operations,

Customs Operations, police operations, and security operations continue to be

the key elements that support establishment of a secure environment where RoL

can flourish and best serve the populace. Enhancing the law enforcement skills,

capabilities, and resources available to the MP will contribute significantly to the

success of operations in complex warfare our Army faces now and will face in the

future.

A review of current operations within Iraq indicated that the MP mission will

continue to grow in complexity, especially within a COIN environment. To

combat criminal threats will demand an appropriate MP force level, right technical

MP skill sets at all levels (enlisted and officer), specialized training and

equipment, leveraging Interagency and Intergovernmental talent, and

building/mentoring Iraqi Police (IP) capacity in terms of both quantity and quality.

Employing MP assets is never done in isolation but in support of maneuver

commander requirements. Defining and resourcing MP support to maneuver

commanders, particularly at the brigade combat team (BCT) and division levels

deserves re-evaluation to optimize effects.

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Chapter 1

Organizing MP Operations and Support to Establishing Rule of Law / Host

Nation Police Development

Chapter Contents

Page

Summary

Topic 1.1: Topic 1.1 Establishing the Rule of Law - Unity of

Effort

Topic 1.2: Law and Order Task Force

Topic 1.3: Rule of Law Summit

Topic 1.4: Host Nation Police Development

Topic 1.5: Host Nation Police Measures of Effectiveness

Topic 1.6: Managing Host Nation Police Development

Topic 1.7: Police Transition Team Command and Control

Topic 1.8: Predeployment Training- MP Operations and

Establishing Rule of Law

Topic 1.9: Forming the Team

Topic 1.10: Command and Control of the MP Units in a RoL

Environment

Topic 1.11: Aligning US partnership boundaries with Host

Nation Boundaries

Summary

Establishing Rule of Law (RoL) is a complex endeavor that, depending on the

security situation, can range from military units as the main effort to civilian and /

or international agencies as the main effort. Recent warfare has posed

significant challenges to any RoL effort. Specifically, at the onset and shortly

following the onset of ground operations, the international community finds the

host nation (HN) encumbered by organized crime networks, criminals, prisoners

released from jails and prisons, terrorists, insurgents, and political / tribal entities

and others all vying for power. Additionally, the HN infrastructure has typically

been dismantled and most, if not all, of the expertise to run government

institutions in some fashion have been replaced or are non-existent.

Establishing Rule of Law is hence a major effort among Joint and Interagency

planners and operators, an effort that complements and is complemented by

military and other international efforts to stabilize the country by providing a level

of security of which government infrastructure and policing capability can grow

and lead to local security and RoL. Within Iraq, there are numerous committees,

task forces and components of organizations that are trying to define and then

implement tenets of RoL. Police, Penal Institutions, and Judicial elements all

play a significant role in establishing RoL in developing countries. This Chapter

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will discuss the challenges of organizing Military Police operations in support of

developing host nation (HN) policing capabilities and the efforts to help establish

RoL.

While much discussion on RoL at the Interagency and Multi-National Force-Iraq

(MNF-I) level has taken place within the past year, observations and insights

collected on the recent CAAT visit to Iraq indicate that much more has to be done

to integrate and synchronize the many stove-piped efforts being worked in

theater.

Managing host nation police development was left up to the subordinate

commands, usually by maneuver commanders (BCT CDRs). Outside of

Baghdad, MP BNs did not have tactical control over subordinate MP companies;

BCTs had tactical control of MP companies. There were good and bad aspects

of having MP companies TACON out to the maneuver commanders. BCTs could

set the priorities for PTT as applicable to the tactical situation. For example,

what is priority in Kirkuk might not be the same in another battlespace.

Topic 1.1: Establishing the Rule of Law (RoL) - Unity of Effort

Discussion:

In the past, there has been little to no attention given to understanding or

applying the Iraqi Rule of Law (RoL). However, a basic grasp of the RoL is

critical to effectively mentoring, training, and advising the Host Nation Police

(HNP). A large quantity of the HNP new hires have limited experience, as well

as, limited training as police. They are former Soldiers or Sons of Iraq (SOI)

who are fully capable of manning checkpoints or guarding facilities but are not

police.

Multinational Forces Iraq (MNF-I) was leading an effort to establish, coordinate

and synchronize a RoL environment within Iraq. RoL efforts below corps

appeared to vary depending upon the goal or effect the commander was trying to

achieve within his specific area of responsibility. The level of security in each

battle space also had a direct impact on what could realistically be accomplished

for that battle space. For instance, one Police Transition Team (PTT) leader

stated to his brigade Command Judge Advocate (CJA), ―Ma‘am, we‘d like to

bring you with us, but at this point we don‘t know what you‘d be able to

accomplish.‖ Thus, within areas where the fight was still in its kinetic stages,

establishing RoL was difficult and successes were measured only in small

increments. On the other hand, where security had taken hold, RoL efforts

moved along rapidly.

Staff Judge Advocates (SJAs) were given primary responsibility for RoL

operations. Without a widespread definition of what exactly RoL is, one SJA was

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provided a definition by his commander. He stated, ―RoL is police, prisons, and

prosecutions.‖ This simple explanation is a small illustration of the complex

components of RoL and therefore the need for synchronization and flexibility

when designing and executing a RoL program.

Efforts to coordinate and establish visibility on RoL efforts across the battlespace

started at corps with the creation of a Chief, Rule of Law, Judge Advocate (JA)

position within the OSJA. Their primary responsibility was to establish metrics to

measure RoL efforts at the divisions and to monitor guidance and other RoL

activities happening at echelons above Corps (i.e., MNF-I).

Law and Order Task Force (LAOTF) is too small and cannot focus outside of

Baghdad. RoL is an enormous undertaking. PTT are not manned with the

personnel or expertise to affect the issues, nor is SJA at the division level. Local

leadership (PDoPs, District and local station chiefs, judges, MOJ, and MOI must

be brought into the process in order to be coached and mentored.

Insights / Lessons Learned:

RoL systems do not appear to be moving along quickly regardless of the

security environment.

There is no synchronization between HNP/investigators, the judicial

process and the prison systems. This is in the Iraqi system and the CF system.

The synchronization needs to be conducted first on the CF side so we can turn

mentor the appropriate individuals on the Iraqi side.

Operational efforts in establishing the RoL will be localized and based

upon commander‘s intent and battlefield conditions.

There needs to be more cross talk between the lawyers conducting RoL

programs and the G3 ISF Cell. The two are almost completely disjointed. The

lawyer should be integrated into the G3 ISF team.

RoL development in the HNP will only take hold if the other societal

institutions that support RoL are developed in a parallel fashion, i.e. the prisons

and the courts. Staffs must begin to work this synchronization immediately.

Difficulty in coordinating RoL efforts may be exacerbated by varying

security conditions within the battlespace.

DOTMLPF Implications:

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Doctrine: Publishing in depth doctrine that is more than broad guidance

may be counterproductive. The Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)

change at a rate at which any publication will not be able to keep up.

Doctrine: Army, USAMPS, and TJAGSA doctrine must be developed for

Rule of Law.

Organization: Reservists bring a unique skill set to all aspects of Military

Police operations within the COIN environment. They can assist in a variety of

areas within the Iraqi Police System (IPS), such as: Corrections Officers to

assist with D-Cell operations, Detectives with investigations, Lawyers to assist

with the application and teaching of law, Accountants to partner with

District/Provincial financial offices. The possibilities are limitless and Reservists

and National Guard members can be more influential in those areas.

Topic 1.2: The Law and Order Task Force

Discussion:

The RoL should become part of MP doctrine. Doctrine is designated to generally

apply to all Military Police functions. Such a doctrine would be a significant

investment of dollars, time, and energy that would only apply to one battlefield.

Army doctrine (Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency) describes that

―sustainment requirements often drive insurgents into relationships with

organized crime or into criminal activities themselves. Reaping windfall profits

and avoiding the costs and difficulties involved in securing external support

makes illegal activity attractive to insurgents….State failure precipitated by

violent regime change further encourages criminal activity because of the

collapse of law enforcement, the courts, and penal systems.‖

The Law and Order Task Force (LAOTF) was established to develop essential

host nation (HN) capacity for independent, evidence-based, transparent, and

impartial investigation and trial of major and other crimes before the central

criminal court of the host nation. Many senior leaders in theater believe the idea

of having a LAOTF is a good idea and that it should be attached to a division.

One large team at the division level and smaller teams at the BCT levels. These

teams need to be a part of the ISF cells at the BCT level. This will create a unity

of effort and allow for maneuver commanders to establish short and long term

objectives.

The LAOTF, a separate stove-pipe organization, reported to the Civilian Police

Assistance Training Team (CPATT) and was not in a direct line of operation /

command to the maneuver, tactical or operational commander. The LAOTF was

established with the mission to address this issue—specifically to ―build essential

HNP capacity for independent, evidence-based, transparent, and impartial

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investigation and trial of major and other crimes before the central criminal court

of the HN.‖ The Task Force consisted of coalition force investigators, military

intelligence, and attorneys / paralegals that assisted HN criminal investigators,

police, and members of the judiciary to strengthen and expand the RoL. Host

Nation (HN) buy-in is absolutely imperative to mission success.

MPs are extremely capable of performing the function of HN police development.

As with working the PTT mission, patience is also key. Maneuver commanders

would often become impatient with the slow bureaucratic process in Iraq and

either rush into bad decision or try to take shortcuts that ending up costing time in

the long run. MPs have the patience and experience required to deal with and

train the Iraqi Police properly.

Major objectives included stemming major criminal activity (undefined) where

operationally feasible; assist in the investigation and prosecution of insurgents

and major criminals (undefined); increase capacity of HN law enforcement

agents to conduct complex criminal investigations; and protect judges from

physical threats, sectarian influence and corruption. The LAOTF synergistic

model involved identifying criminal practices (done in cooperation with

intelligence cell, targeting individuals for prosecution, and obtaining buy-in from

Iraqi investigators and courts), coordinating with coalition forces (CF) and HN

counterparts, developing evidence, obtaining seizure authority, interview

detainee / criminal for intelligence/evidence and then apprehension and detention

for adjudication in a court of law. These steps are necessary for establishing

RoL.

The TF Commander was an SF Colonel, Reservist, who had over 25 years

experience as a prosecutor for a criminal investigations task force. The TF was

not a known commodity to the corps staff or to the MP brigade operating in the

priority area of operation.

Many Military Police senior leaders interviewed stated that a lot of ―insurgent

activity‖ did not fit a model for terrorism; it fits a model for organized crime.

Dealing with organized crime and training HNP to identify and respond to it must

be part of the way ahead. The MP Law Enforcement competency needs to

encompass organized crime rings as that is a significant problem we are now

encountering and is a likely result of any violent regime change (our most likely

future operations). Leaders in the MP Corps need training on how to curb

organized crime activities and how to penetrate a ring in order to be able to train

our HNP counterparts to do the same.

Insights / Lessons:

There are RoL prosecutors from the DOJ who are on Provincial

Reconstruction Teams (PRT). The relationship between these RoL experts (who

often have more criminal law expertise than SJA) and the Provincial PTT are ad

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hoc at best. More of an effort should be made to synchronize RoL initiatives from

the PRT with the initiatives from P/PTT. These efforts must go hand in hand.

Although the Task Force existed, it was not connected to any operational

or tactical element and therefore was having trouble getting recognition, support,

and resources.

Commands should define roles and responsibilities in a complex

environment. When terms and measures of effectiveness are left undefined, in a

force that includes all services and representatives from many different local,

state and federal agencies, the utilization of these commands / units is hampered

significantly.

Utilizing Reservists in their civilian skill sets was of tremendous value.

Although not working his Career Management Field, this SF Colonel was being

used in his civilian skill capacity which allowed him to bring a law enforcement

solution to a law enforcement problem.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: Rule of Law efforts are currently lawyer / judicial-centric and

must be reassessed and fully defined across the spectrum of elements that

comprise a respected criminal justice system (RoL environment). USAMPS

should develop LOATF doctrine in a new MP support to counterinsurgency

manual or in a new chapter of their current operations manuals.

Doctrine: Army should develop a RoL Manual that addresses all aspects

of the criminal justice system. Recommend sending a doctrine team in country to

gather all the emerging doctrine and best practices and quickly publish an interim

doctrinal publication for field use.

Materiel: In order to enhance effectiveness of Rule of Law, the common

systems and data bases used by MP Law enforcement and corrections, and SJA

must be available in our tactical formations and equipment and be able to

interface with our Army tactical communications and data systems.

Organization: USAMPS and SJA should look to establish RoL modular

elements that deploy in support of maneuver elements or MP elements in RoL

and COIN environments / mission sets. Currently, our go-to-war structure does

not meet the significant demands a COIN environment bestows on our forces.

Topic 1.3: Rule of Law Summit

Discussion:

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Any RoL Summit must include PTT and address the necessity of parallel

development of the HNPS, the penal system, and the judiciary.

The Rule of Law Summit was established to synchronize coalition efforts in Rule

of Law actions. The panel was typically led by the Commanding General,

CPATT. The summit met periodically and brought together lawyers, the MP

brigade commander responsible for detention operations, and a representative

from the Iraqi Police Advisors (IPA). There were other participants in the summit,

but the priority of discussion centered on the three pillars of penal, police, and

judicial efforts.

The concept of a summit or a conference can be very beneficial. It allows for

cross talk between different organizations and leaders. It can also be a venue to

present and discuss short and long term objectives (i.e. 5-year plan).

Observations included: the discussions were Baghdad-centric; there was no

representation of the HN government and no one at the meeting from any of the

other coalition partners or multi-national divisions (MND-B); Multi-National Corps-

Iraq (MNC-I) had one representative, a lawyer; Interagency key players; and

there was no one representing MND-Baghdad or the Military Police Brigade

supporting MND-B, which was the corps‘ main effort.

One lawyer very familiar with the RoL efforts, related that while the intent is

noteworthy and the efforts of all noble, the lack of involving the Government of

Iraq (GoI) and lack of inclusion of all the key players have limited the

effectiveness of the efforts. The judicial efforts were the main discussions—with

little emphasis on the other pillars. Members who reported on their topic areas

did so in a stove-pipe fashion, with little integration and synchronization of other

efforts.

Another discussion revealed that the Government of Iraq (GoI) Minister of Interior

(MoI) had a five year plan and the observation was that to some, ―the five year

plan starts at year one every year‖. In the RoL Summit, mention was made of

the five-year plan but nothing was mentioned in terms of how the RoL summit

would move to support implementation of that five year plan. These statements

from various leaders familiar with the RoL effort were not made as indictments

against the efforts of the military and Interagency, but rather a statement of the

complexity that must be understood and addressed in any effort to use RoL

efforts as a tool to enable local security and HN government legitimacy.

Insights / Lessons:

Embed RoL (SJA or Paralegal NCO) in the Provincial PTT. The lawyers

working RoL must get out from behind the desks and start working engagements

with judges, investigative judges, and linkages with these officials to the PDoPs.

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RoL is a complex undertaking that demands the integrated and

synchronized efforts of all parties, coalition and host nation, to best effect change

and bring about local security and legitimacy of the government.

Military Police conducting PTT play a key role in establishing RoL. MPs in

some areas serve as the bridge between kinetic operations and RoL with the

maneuver commander. In Samarra Iraq, judges were not present from mid-2005

until April 2008. This made establishing proper RoL very difficult. It also

hampered the PTT ability to establish a link between investigations and

convictions. The level of security in an area had a direct correlation to the

establishment of RoL. The security situation in Samarrra was by far the worst in

the province of Salahadin. This caused friction between the PRT and other

agencies establishing RoL in the province and the maneuver commander. On

several visits the PRT would criticize the maneuver commander on not following

certain Iraqi procedures; procedures that were realistic in an area as secure as

Tikrit and Balad but unrealistic for Samarra which was under martial law.

Although Baghdad is the main effort of PTT operations at the present time,

there are a plethora of other cities/provinces that require immediate attention. By

being geographically separated from the assets readily available in Baghdad,

such as MOI. There are also many communication gaps between MOI and

outlying Provincial HQs. Such meetings as the summit need to include Provincial

PTT team leaders and their respective PDoPs to assess and solve ongoing

police development issues.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: Army should lead an interagency effort to develop joint doctrine

on establishing Rule of Law.

Topic 1.4: HN Police Development

Discussion:

The 18^th Military Police Brigade was charged with developing the Iraqi Police

within Baghdad and providing technical and ADCON support to other U.S. Army

MP units with the same mission in support of other divisions. As the senior MP

command providing this RoL effort in support of maneuver commanders, the

corps, force, and other elements looked to the brigade as the subject matter

expert in developing HN police capabilities. The brigade developed two lines of

operation in their plan to increase the effectiveness of the host nation police

(HNP) and within these lines of operations, units were able to more effectively

link their activities and better support overarching police transition and training

efforts.

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Iraqi Police (IP) were trained to become more operationally successful in their

policing efforts. One area that the brigade noticed that the IP needed enhanced

training on was investigating and interrogating a crime scene. Leaders stated the

IP could not adequately search, collect, and preserve evidence in a manner that

could be beneficial to the judges in prosecution of the particular case. It was also

reported that the judges were skeptical of the police, and police were skeptical of

the judges. Additionally, the judges, who historically rely on testimony witnessed

by two or more parties, were now being challenged with understanding evidence

based prosecution and the value of forensic and other criminal investigation

techniques to prove or disprove actions of the accused. Often, the police to

judge relationship seemed a bit awkward and this strained relationship caused

issues with the collection of evidence and effective prosecution that further

challenged police trainers. The more coalition forces seemed to understand this

dynamic, the more they were able to help the IP in presenting cases and working

through the challenges.

Leaders stated that the Host Nation (HN) police need more assistance from their

government to standup. PTT can not get MOI or HNPS to move quickly. It is up

to the police leaders to ensure the MOI and HNP are aware of the issues that are

of great concern. Pay issues, logistics, and new hires seem to stall once they

leave the HNP DHQ. In many areas of Iraq, we are not yet to the point to be as

concerned about Judges when the basic framework for police to execute their

duties has not yet been established. HN police in some areas may know the

Iraqi rule of law, but if you go down to the LPS level, in some districts, they have

little if no insight on what that means.

While conducting PTT, it has been very difficult to advise the Chiefs and District

Investigators on how to move cases forward and what the standards for cases

are because there is no one in an advisory role with the Judges at the Provincial

level. There is also no one designated to partner with judges at the District

levels. To ignore the judges ignores a key element of the RoL.

Those interviewed shared that another topic that should be addressed in HN

police development is the dynamic of militias being embedded throughout the

policing system and ways to combat this infiltration. They believe this is one of

the critical factors that hinder HN police throughout Iraq. It would be a safe

assumption that this would be a factor in other HN police development as well.

The depth and breadth of which an officer would need to understand this topic

and be able to apply it in sector would be a full time job. It is an unrealistic

expectation to have our leaders, who should be generalist by craft, be experts at

another country‘s judicial system (particularly when keeping in mind that the

majority of HNP do not know or understand it themselves). Senior leaders in

MNC-I stated if such doctrine and training are to be developed, this should be a

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separate forum / training course designed to target perhaps a specific staff officer

or rule of law team member, not in our mainstream officer leadership courses.

MOI has a 5-year plan; however, it appears it is a five year plan that is more or

less restarted every year. No one has produced a supporting coalition plan that

supported the MoI 5-year plan so the team could not crosswalk the two efforts.

CF planning is tied to solving specific problems. There appears to be no

unifying plan that transcends unit rotations by laying out long-term goals. Any

planning we do must have HN buy-in to be successful.

Efforts must be synchronized with other ISF units laterally and with the civil

government. Evaluating police effectiveness without considering adjacent

military units, the stability of the economy, availability of healthcare and food, etc.

is misleading and possibly detrimental because it fails to guide the HNP to plan

properly to meet the population‘s security needs.

To assist in mitigating the challenges associated with rotating units and new IP

leaders, some units began leaving station books with biographies of leaders,

copies of old Police Station Monthly Reports (PSMRs), information on the

station‘s area of operations, information on the supported maneuver unit, and

information on the local jail population and operations. These ―pass on‖ or

transfer-of-authority books, at the station level, have been excellent tools for

incoming units.

HNPA (Host Nation Police Advisors) are embedded in MP Companies in order to

overcome the training gap at the company level. The HNPA are also supposed

to serve as the continuity between incoming and outgoing units. The issue is that

the IPAs report to DYNA Corps / State Department not to maneuver

commanders, which undermines unity of effort. Maneuver commanders have to

be able to establish the objectives and way ahead for the IPs. If the IPAs are not

on the same page it may do more harm than good. Those interviewed stress

that a way to synchronize the IPAs with MP units is to send an IPA contact team

to deploying unit‘s home stations. The contact team needs to operate in the AO

that the unit is deploying to.

The IPAs then could be a part of the unit‘s train up for deployment and company

commanders could be trained on how to use their IPAs effectively.

There were many initiatives and programs by several agencies and within

CPATT that attempted to develop HN police capabilities. Most, if not all, are

independent solutions aimed to solve specific capability gaps. Commanders

related that there is not seemingly a comprehensive police development

campaign plan that addresses training, administration, and operations with

operations being not only how to manage a police headquarters but the

effectiveness measures of actual policing, solving crime, and proactively

engaging the population to help reduce the crime rates. There is no doctrine that

describes how MP should best support stability operations and developing police

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or establishing Rule of Law. Currently, effectiveness is measured by how many

tasks are subjectively assessed to be ―green‖ and if more greens occur then the

assessment is green. Many feel that the current programs evaluate police

effectiveness in a vacuum. When the Host Nation was a key player in the

development of a plan, they had ownership and the plan was generally

successful. The HN likewise must be involved in the plan to develop the police

and RoL capabilities of the police, judicial system, and penal system.

In the assessment of the brigade commander, the brigade or battalion

commander may be capable of operating in this complex environment but most if

not all of the staff are operating at echelons above their training and

understanding. This causes the senior commanders to spend more time

teaching, coaching, and being closely involved with the staff processes than what

one would normally expect. The feeling is that company commanders are also in

above their heads in many areas---some of which training and experience can

mitigate but most of the gaps are related to years of experience typically only

achieved by battalion and brigade command level officers.

Having patience was essential to maintaining balance in the approach to improve

the security and police effectiveness in an area of operations. HN buy-in to a

program was also critical. Time and again, the brigade staff and those who have

been on multiple deployments indicated we seem to be reinventing the wheel

with each couple of rotations. Whether badging, hiring processes, pay

processing, and higher-technical police development—all take time and

understanding of the bureaucratic process and laying the groundwork for

success with training and management of the HN development process—doing

so in a partnership with the HN. There were several anecdotal stories where HN

police would wait and allow the coalition to the work for them, because we would.

Having patience was also imperative to maintaining balance in the approach to

improve the security and police effectiveness in an area of operations. Non-MPs

seem to rush into decisions or get frustrated with slow and HN bureaucratic

processes and these rushed decisions in the end do more harm than good.

Leaders spoke on the need for the Army to relook the size and structure of the

MP Corps emphasizing the need for senior Military Police officers to be

commanding at higher levels in the current organizations, i.e., TF-134 and

CPATT. In order to effect change at the lower levels, we need to have that

experience and focus at the top. Many interviewed stated that a Military Police

Officer is better suited to command CPATT than a combat arms officer simply

based on previous experience and police backg0round.

Insights / Lessons:

Pass-on-books or battle books passed on from unit to unit during TOA

were the key to mitigating some of the training gaps our junior leaders come into

theater with concerning police station operations and managing policing efforts.

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When entering a combat or stability operation, included in the campaign

plan must be a detailed and all-encompassing annex that addresses police

legitimacy and effectiveness. Effectiveness cannot just be measured in

weapons, vehicles and people, but must also include a measure of effectiveness

in the capabilities to solve crimes, control populations, and CF ability to influence

RoL and law and order. This effort must include the HN in the planning process.

The brigade and battalion commanders cannot assume that their junior

leaders are comfortable with the complexity of operating in a stability operation

environment. More attention to detail and training must take place to mitigate the

training gap of the subordinate leaders.

MOI TT must do a better job of digging into the processes that underlie the

functioning of the Ministry. Given the incessant rotations of MOI, TT personnel

on individual rotations, it is a must that they continue to update and validate

slides that depict MOI processes and they must better organize their share-drive

to make information easier to get.

Senior leaders pointed out that it takes the U.S. Department of Defense

some times up to six months to get a hiring action approved and a person ―on

board.‖ Yet, we are inpatient with an Iraqi process that takes longer than a few

weeks—a few weeks to vet, hire, and train several thousand employees.

Understanding the dynamics of the mission and having patience are necessary in

a COIN environment and planning future COIN missions.

The judges need to be partnered with CF in order to fully address ROL

deficiencies and build a stable system. In general, the MP Corps needs to

address the method for partnering with key players who do not have a CF partner

whether the policy is simply to do it ourselves or to request higher assistance.

HN stations partnered with Military Police will progress far more quickly

than those that are not. The question is in defining the word ―partnered.‖ An MP

squad responsible for more than one HNP station is conducting over watch; not a

partnership. The MP mission has grown beyond our ability to truly conduct

partnerships. Clearly, over time, the CF mission focus has narrowed but

somehow the requirements continued to expand. The CF continued to identify or

opened more and more stations within our areas of responsibility. The solution is

perhaps in the ORA rating; identifying districts with the lowest ORA, focusing our

efforts there through 1:1 partnerships and then transitioning to other areas as the

ORA ratings improve.

Long-lasting change will only come with intensive CF presence and

feedback on station operations and eliminating corrupt HNP who otherwise

continue to fester and spread like disease through the force.

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DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: Army Doctrine should include information on how to develop

Host Nation Police training programs and how to develop (in general terms)

police development campaign plans.

Doctrine: The complexity of establishing Rule of Law and police

capabilities in developing nations is such that USAMPS should consider

developing doctrine concerning MP Support to Stability Operations.

Doctrine: Stability Operations doctrine should capture HN police

development to include guidance on establishing police legitimacy and

effectiveness. Effectiveness cannot just be measured in pistols, vehicles and

people, but must also include a measure of effectiveness in the capabilities to

solve crimes, control populations, and effect rule of law and law and order.

Doctrine: Effectiveness in assessing HN police operations is difficult to

define at the station and District levels. Implementing certain quantifiable goals

can better assist in the development and planning for improvement at each PTT

level.

Training: The training that the PTT gets in evidence collection must be

on the same level as the investigative judges and judges. There should be a

RoL officer on the P/PTT who is at the BCT level, instead of at the DIV level.

Training: Leaders should be trained in evidence collection and

preservation and crime scene investigations in order for them to more adequately

lead training efforts and effectiveness efforts of local police they are training.

Leader Development and Education: USAMPS CCC and PCC should

incorporate training on Iraq laws and Iraqi ―judicial‖ system in order to better

support the police development.

Leader Development and Education: RIP/TOA preparations along with

successful and complete battlefield handovers are critical for Police Transition

Teams. Constructing Station/District/Provincial databases with relevant

personnel, training, logistical issues are paramount.

Topic 1.5: HN Police Measures of Effectiveness

Discussion:

The Corps Provost Marshal (PM) produced a host nation police development

program that aimed to identify and use internationally recognized performance

measures for the HN police and the Iraqi Police Advisors to develop a rule of law

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and enduring processes and systems in a democratic style of law enforcement.

The PM used performance measures and associated metrics found in the

Civilian Law Enforcement Association (CLEA) and the Judicial Standards review

committee. They adjusted the performance measures to fit the operating

environment. The intent was to use recognized international and national

standards as a baseline for developing a ―measures of effectiveness‖ way ahead.

MP units need to teach and mentor the HNP on basic police operations. In

MND-N, units are still trying to get HNP hired, trained, a station to work out of

and to leave the station to patrol. Both maneuver commanders and MPs stated it

does no good to try to teach them higher level investigations until units can get

them to get out of the station and engage the community.

The Iraqi Police advisors missions included field training at the local police

stations, on-the-job training as part of the PTT during patrol operations,

administrative duties (undefined) associated with developing local police,

teaching coaching and mentoring local police, assisting local police in teaching,

coaching, and mentoring local police during checkpoint operations / missions;

assisting local police in management systems: firing, vetting, maintenance, and

platform instruction to include SWAT, Investigation, Combat Lifesaving,

combatives, etc.

Short Term objectives for the PTT program include integration of multi-sectarian

police operations; provide safe and secure environment—hire local police from

local areas; establish five law enforcement competencies (Apprehend, process,

investigate, adjudicate and incarcerate); and meet holistic station management

objectives, to include administration, maintenance, logistics, force protection, and

station refurbishment.

Those in command positions stated that the Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities

(KSA) of HNPA must be considered. HNPA must possess the KSAs required to

perform their jobs. The DOD must hire HNPA that are proficient in RoL,

investigations, and overall management otherwise, the HNP stations that are

currently ORA 2s and 3s will continue to stagnate.

Training programs at times were ahead of the integration and synchronization

capabilities of the Iraqi Police or the transition teams. Establishing training

programs for investigations is essential but effects are stymied when the

operational capabilities of the police forces have not kept pace. Simply put,

training personnel to do high end investigations is good but if the equipment,

leadership, and structure is also not matured to the same level of capability, then

the training becomes ―wasted‖ somewhat. Several leaders recognized this and

have begun working to understand the training conducted and its application to

future development efforts / initiatives.

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Constant and sporadic HNP leadership and principle staff changes created

instability at stations. Currently, in theater we have massed IP leadership at

Provincial HQs and all Districts. The problem is that IPs generally do not leave

continuity books behind when they leave because they do not want to leave that

knowledge behind and help their successor. CF are continuing to work with the

IPs on establishing continuity books and systems development, to include;

training IPs on how to use a computer and computer programs such as excel and

word.

The battle rhythm for the police transition teams was difficult and included:

weekly ―way ahead‖ meetings with each of the BCTs, divisions and major units;

monthly Police Summits; monthly senior steering committee; weekly meetings

with the Baghdad Operations Center, the Iraqi Forces Committee on National

Reconciliation, Division, Corps, and Multinational Security Transition Command

Iraq (MNSTC-I) and weekly bureau commanders briefing that focused on Iraqi

Police Advisor Issues. Other meetings and reports included counter-Improvised

Explosive Device (COIC) meetings, reconciliation planning meetings, battle

updates, planners meetings (three times per week), base management working

group, and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) meeting (focus on National Police, Military

and Border Police Transition team issues). Not all the players were the same so

efforts have begun to emplace a mechanism that will synchronize all these efforts

under a campaign plan.

Several units and most leaders (squad and platoon level) complained that the

effort to complete their station observation and status reports was enormous and

took from their training and other missions. The PTT program leaders were

aware of this and made attempts to reduce the number of entries and complexity

of the police station monthly reports.

Reportedly a key measure of effectiveness for the PTT is the station ratio.

Not only are PTT required to manage their time based off of a list of meetings

and reports but by adding additional stations to their partnership. This

responsibility results in very little time actually being spent with the individual

stations. It was further reported that much of this is caused by the fact that MP

companies are controlled by the BCTs and those BCTs set the priority of work

for the units in their battlespace.

Insights / Lessons:

The PTT program is a complex endeavor that is affected by and affects

many other programs. Synchronization is key to effective police development.

Training programs must complement policing initiatives in order to be most

successful.

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Developing a comprehensive campaign plan that synchronizes training

programs with operational procedures and materiel capabilities will go a long way

toward enhancing Iraqi Police capabilities.

Keep station reports simple and the measures of effectiveness briefly and

distinctly defined.

PSMR timelines should be every 3 months instead of every month. Also

they should be in three staggered groups so that there is a manageable flow of

PSMR data coming each month. Many reported stated the reports are too time

consuming to be done monthly and CF are at a stage of Iraqi Police development

in which progress occurs more slowly. Their main argument was they believe at

the current rate there is too much PSMR data to analyze accurately when the

reports are done monthly.

Within the scope of short term objectives for PTT operations, some of the

goals are difficult to reach due to expectations of PTT. Rather than attempt to

adapt HN rules of law and police operations to PTT; mold and shape HN police

operations and adapt PTT operations in order to improve on their procedures and

methods. HN may have alternate measures of success within police operations.

Transition teams need to assess those successes and work towards improving

those rather than revamping and changing to meet transition team expectations.

Short-term goals such as ―hire local police from local areas‖ can be

hindered by the multi-sectarian local populace. Often, when Iraqi leadership is

reviewing potential candidates for hire, they will disregard some individuals due

to personal bias or tribal differences. Referring back to geographical

complications, outlying Provinces from Baghdad have had difficulties

communicating and working towards positive solutions to these issues.

Reporting requirements are essential in identifying problem areas as it

relates to PTT and COIN. However, such reports must be consolidated and

direct to prevent interference in the mission. Clearly define short-term and long-

term HN goals, qualitative and quantitative.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: MP Doctrine in support of COIN should capture the insights and

lessons learned in this observation and related observations. The key is to

describe a comprehensive police development plan in our MP and Army doctrine.

Materiel: MP LE materiel / solutions must be placed in our tactical MP

sets so the MP have a capability to immediately train and immediately

synchronize training efforts with operational capabilities and requirements. By

not putting our garrison LE capabilities into tactical configurations, our MP will not

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be able to enhance the level of training (through doing) that is necessary to

establish an effective HN policing capability and streamline efforts towards it.

Topic 1.6: Managing Host Nation Police Development

Discussion:

The 18^th MP Brigade, Corps Provost Marshal and CPATT worked together to

develop a plan to manage the development of HN policing capability. Together,

they managed the collective efforts of supporting units, subordinate units, and

several HN government level organizations to develop the model for managing

host nation police development. The focus was on logistics, maintenance,

human resources, and fiscal capabilities (budget development). Measuring or

managing operational effectiveness of enforcing law was not in any

measurement or management tool in use that the team observed but in the

Corps and MP Brigade plans, this measure of effectiveness was listed.

There were many stove-pipe coalition organizations attempting to ―help‖ the

police but other than a central reporting station (Corps Provost Marshal), there

was no centralized location or entity within the corps responsible for planning and

managing rule of law, nor for planning joint (with Iraqi Police) law enforcement

related operations. Each subordinate command was left this responsibility to

overwatch policing and police effectiveness in its own manner.

The personnel (Human Resources) system being tracked included progress

reports on hiring requests, completion and submission of hiring packets, issuing

hiring orders, and issuing pay. CPATT and the MP Brigade tracked application

process, security screening, and screening established by host nation to ensure

that former Party members (Baath) denounced their party affiliation, an entrance

examination, a physical fitness form, medical history report and medical

examiners report (Physician‘s report) all were part of the application packet.

Utilizing local businesses for logistic support was paramount in MND-N. Right

now if a PHQ requires equipment or supplies they have to go to Baghdad and go

get it. This is very difficult for Mosul, Kirkuk, and SaD. All the PHQ do not have

transportation assets organically available in order transport large amounts of

supplies and equipment. Moreover, the security environment does not support

safe travel from Mosul to Baghdad so it is very difficult for PTT to persuade the

Iraqis to go and pick up equipment when they are afraid of being killed.

The key materiel capabilities tracked included the vehicles (patrol and security

vehicles), pistols, rifles, light machine guns, body armor, base station radios,

vehicle radios, and police hand held radios. Key logistics requirements funded

by the Minister level included all fuels (Petroleum, oils, preservatives, coolants,

liquids, and gases), weapons and ammunition (to include cleaning kits), vehicles

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(to include armored vehicles, fire trucks, water and fuel trucks / tankers, sedans,

utility vehicles, pickup trucks, and motorcycles), and repair parts.

Many stated that the MND-N provinces are struggling to get supplies through the

centralized MOI warehouse- even items that are supposed to be provided to

them by MOI (such as vehicle parts) according to MOI source documents. Either

the MOI needs to increase its ability to contract for more items or the provinces

need to be given greater latitude (read bigger budgets) to spend their money and

buy the items they need.

Key items / supplies the ministry would not provide directly were subsistence

(pay for food, barracks space etc.); construction materials (for self help type

projects); medical supplies (purchase from minister of health); emergency good

will supplies (come from the station / unit budget), and personal property

(uniforms, law enforcement equipment outside of their pistol and uniform issue

from the academy).

The more a unit or PTT understood the logistics, maintenance, budget and

personnel processes, the better they were able to provide support to the police

entities they were partnering with. Initially, attempts were made to establish a

national maintenance and repair parts system for the police. The coalition

leadership is now realizing that the best way to enhance local relationships and

support local businesses is for the police leadership to engage local business to

provide maintenance and basic supplies for the police in their area (paid for from

the police budget). This relationship is being explored and developed but

appears to be in the right direction. Just like most police departments, when a

vehicle breaks down, there are local vendors for parts and local businesses to

repair / maintain the vehicles.

Opening new stations is difficult in Iraq. Those responsible for the Samarra AOR

stated that in Samarra the police force template was to operate with 1200 IPs

spread over 7 to 8 stations. In the spring of 2008, Samarra had approximately

300 IPs on hand spread over 3 stations (the DHQ, ERB and 1 LPS). The IPs

were rapidly hiring up to 750. Thus, station expansion became a huge priority.

The Samarra IPs chose to rent buildings to use as IPs stations. This proved to

work as building permanent locations took a great deal of time. These rented

stations helped fill the gap until permanent stations could be built.

To build new police stations, some maneuver commanders dictated where the

police station was to be built but there was little to no interaction with the

government or local police to determine if the station was necessary or in the

right location. Many times, the police did not support the new stations and in all

cases, there was little/no consideration for where the leaders would come from to

manage / lead the station, equip the station, and maintain the station. There was

also little understanding of how the land acquisition process worked so many

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times the land that a police station was to be built was not owned by the

government.

The command and control of MP Companies supporting host nation development

is an issue of synchronization. Both maneuver and MP leaders stated the

relationship that makes the MP Company TACON to the BCT landowner and

ADCON to the Military Police Battalion works well. They also stated, however,

that a lack of communication and synchronization between the BCT PMO and

MP BN can create confusion, slow progress, and leaves the MP Company stuck

in the middle with conflicting guidance and the burden of multiple reporting

requirements. All agreed the command and control relationship must be

streamlined and clarified.

It should be noted that there must absolutely be HN buy-in when it comes to

building expedient stations. There were many cases in Baghdad of the PDoP not

wanting to sign for IP expedient stations because of shoddy construction,

location issues, spite, etc.

Insights / Lessons:

There are two web sites built to help personnel understand the

government‘s procurement regulations—http://www.pac-iraq.org/en/default and a

quick start contracting guide at http://www.pac-

The more the transition teams or other commanders engaged in

establishing HN capabilities understand the system the HN has used, the more

leverage in the development and coaching and teaching domains.

Coalition efforts that incorporated IP input early in the process were more

successful.

ADCON, TACON, OPCON C2 relationships need to be clearly defined

with battlespace owners as units RIP in and out of theater. All BCT commanders

have different ideas on how to utilize MPs and what PTTs are. Furthermore,

there is no clear delineation of responsibilities established between landowning

units and MP units when it comes to dealing with IPs. At times, too many

different CF patrols visiting IP stations increase frustration between HNP and CF

and between MP and non-MP units. BCTs need to understand that HNP are not

part of a militia and should not be treated as such; showing up at HNP stations

without de-conflicting with MP patrols that may already be out at the station, and

demanding HNP support for kinetic operations. This type of activity further

hampers our ability to develop the HNP and set the conditions for the transition to

law enforcement operations.

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Need to establish a ―priority of work‖ for tasks to be accomplished at a

police station that is tied to the security situation. MP Companies need to focus

the efforts of their PTT.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: Capture these lessons learned in MP doctrine.

Doctrine: Each area of the HN can be completely different from another.

In that regard, transition teams should seek solutions to their area‘s needs within

that direct region. Universal solutions rarely exist and can deter from each unit‘s

current mission priority.

Organization: Human resources within the Iraqi Police System is an

enduring issue. Although requests are submitted for additional HN personnel

and assets, issues remain with funding and availability. In order to deter

overload of requests, set clear agendas and priority of HN assets to allow areas

that are of low importance to continue their current mission focus. Blanketed

personnel and resource requirements deter some units from their mission

priorities and force them to focus on issues that are unable to be solved at that

time, i.e. hiring packets.

Training: Ensure PME courses and our TSPs for COIN address the

systems that are in place to develop HN Police. PME should include training on

PTT concepts and on understanding how the HN policing management aspects

of our mission work. Leaders need to know what the Iraqi system is in order to

put enough pressure in the right place to keep the mission successful.

Topic 1.7: Police Transition Team Command and Control

Discussion:

In support of establishing Rule of Law, the PTT mission was assigned to

maneuver units (Divisions) and sub-tasked to supporting Military Police units to

conduct PTT, typically in a Tactical Control (TACON) relationship to the brigade

and below maneuver units. BLUF—there appears to be positive strides in the

overall capabilities of the Iraqi Police and the efforts of all those involved are

noticeable to those who have come back to Iraq for a second or third rotation.

Having said that, there are several points that have been identified by those who

worked in the Police Transition Team mission (PTT) that present valuable

lessons to be learned.

The Police Transition Team mission is extremely complex. The policing function,

in and of itself, is complex and must be a synchronized and integrated effort in

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order to achieve acceptable results. Additionally, once a nation is granted

sovereignty, the policing functions move from a military centric to a police centric

function. Sovereign nations do not typically accept military martial law; the police

are the arm that enforces the law. This is a dynamic that the MP brigade and

others struggled with—allowing sovereignty to stand alone when the police arm

was incapable of upholding its requirements. Its own government and the

international community expect it to uphold as a sovereign nation. To date, the

military police have been able to walk the line between their military role and their

police role and many times have been successful at moving the HN police in a

certain direction when other efforts seemingly could not do so.

Leaders emphasized the current C2 of the MP BN and MP Companies in MND-N

makes it very difficult to synchronize efforts. The four partnered provinces within

MND-N are very different and posses different security environments. Senior

MPs stated it would be easier to synchronize IPS development efforts if the MP

BN was OPCON to the DIV and all the MP Companies and the Provincial Police

Transition Teams were assigned to the MP BN. The MP BN (if filled to MTOE

authorized strength) could then properly source a P-PTT team at each of the

BCTs in order to ensure IPS development was synchronized with BCT

operations. It would also allow each of the provinces to work at their own pace

and have different objectives and goals, but still have the same overarching

objectives.

There were many discussions on how best to command and control the Police

Transition Team mission—each involved renewed discussions on how the

transition team could balance command and control requirements of the

supported unit with the dynamics of working the sovereignty issues just

discussed above. These discussions, over the course of the war, have included

at least the following recommendations:

o Assign the PTT mission to MP brigade / battalions who then operate in

a support relationship to the maneuver units.

o Assign PTT Mission to the BCT / Division and OPCON MP assets to

the BCT / Division.

o Assign the PTT mission to the BCT/Divisions and assign / attach MP

elements to these units.

o Assign the PTT mission to the Iraq Assistance Group (IAG), who

manage military transition teams (MiTTs), and elements assigned to the IAG

would be further placed OPCON or attached to the PTT.

Leaders almost unanimously stated that the C2 relationship was not as important

as ensuring the policing efforts were lined up with the local police boundaries and

that the policing efforts were synchronized across the area of operations. Failure

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to synchronize police development efforts would allow criminal enterprises

(organized crime type networks) freedom of operation within the seams.

Many agreed that the CF need an overarching HNPS development campaign

plan. Five years is a good amount of time. It worked for MOI and MAO.

There are many agencies and task forces who have a hand in the police

transition team and mission efforts: Military Police squads, platoons, companies,

battalions, and brigade (battalion and brigade staffs are a critical piece to Iraqi

Police Headquarters training), Criminal Investigation Division (CID); Law

Enforcement Professional (LEP) initially sponsored by JIEDDO; Crime

Laboratories; Civilian Police Assistance and Training Team (CPATT); BCTs,

Divisions, Corps; Rule of Law Task Force; Law and Order Task Force; FBI, DEA,

and ATF and SOF either operating alone or under the coordinating efforts of

CPATT; International Training and Advisors-Police (ICITAP) in coordination with

the State Department; National Police Transition Teams (NPTT) and Border

Enforcement Training Teams (BETT) under the management of the IAG, PTT

(outside provided by organic MP units) working directly for maneuver units when

not enough MP units are available; and Iraqi Police Advisors (IPA) monitored /

over-watched by CPATT.

The overarching training efforts did not appear to be linked, especially when

crossing skill sets (investigators, basic police skills, border enforcement). There

was no evidence of an overarching campaign plan for police development

although the Ministry of Interior (MoI) Five Year Plan was cited as an overarching

policing strategy for the Iraqi police. Because there was not an overarching plan

known by all, police training and special skills training were varied.

The latest Iraqi Police training initiative was to hire over 12,000 Iraqi Police and

put them through an initial police training program of two weeks. The skills

taught were not police skills; the topics taught were basic COIN survival and

force protection skills. Many commented this methodology for getting security

was used before. It was called checkpoint police and this failed because the

checkpoint police were not vetted by anyone, illiterate, and poorly paid.

Additionally, the two weeks training was not followed by other training for the

police nor were there complementary training and hiring of police leaders to

manage this population.

HNPAs have the potential to play a critical role in the PTT mission. However,

most IPAs do not have the experience in developing a Middle Eastern police

force as mentioned previously. In some areas, HNPA do not report to the MP

company that they work with, they report to their ―headquarters.‖ This was the

case in Samarra Iraq in spring of 2008. IPAs made it clear that they did not work

for the MP Company and stated they reported directly to Tikrit. This created

overlapping of efforts on behalf of the MPs and IPAs. The MP companies‘

priorities for PTT (as agreed with by the MP BN and maneuver commander) were

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IP force generation (this involved the CLC-IP process), station expansion, motor

pool operations, rule of law, and investigations. IPAs focused on RoL and that

tied only to investigations. Both IPAs and MPs sent up daily station reports

(DSRs) to higher headquarters. Many viewed this as a duplication of work that

results from lack of unity of effort. At some point IPAs needed to be placed under

the control of the local MP Company Commander and reports needed to be

combined.

Anecdotally, MP units reported that maneuver units complained that military

police come with a ―mother-may-I card.‖ When discussed with leaders of

maneuver units, there were some orders that were published that did tell

commanders what MP could or could not be used for. They also acknowledged

that senior maneuver commanders (not MP commanders) make decisions

concerning C2 alignments / task organization in an operations order or

fragmentary order. The typical reason these task organizations and

accompanying orders / coordinating tasks are specified is to ensure efforts of the

shortage branches such as MP are weighted and used IAW established

priorities.

Several MP commanders expressed they did not feel they could have direct

influence on how their ADCON subordinate units were operating nor as senior

MP commanders, could they weight the effort in policing by aligning quickly more

police assets into a certain area to affect a security level. This was especially the

case with Division Provost Marshals and BCT Provost Marshals. They did not

have access to their subordinate MP elements to ensure the methods they were

using to support their maneuver commanders was synchronized across the area

of responsibility and in concert with effective MP doctrine. To many leaders, it

appeared that some non-MP commanders thought they knew more about

policing and disregarded MP advice. As the CAAT talked to some maneuver

commanders and staff, they did not get the impression that the MP advice was

not heeded, but that there were misconceptions in how operations were

conducted because of disconnects with the MPs in how the BCT commander

wanted to do business. Regardless, the underlying theme is that the more the

MP senior leaders were engaged with the supported commander and his staff,

the less this was an issue.

Discussed with several leaders was the methodology for developing Iraqi Police

capabilities and by default, effectiveness. Specifically, there was a great deal of

emphasis on training, and minimal emphasis on operational effectiveness. More

recently, the Corps Provost Marshal Office and the military police brigade have

both started looking at measures of effectiveness that include training and

operational effectiveness. This is a positive step. Those who are on their

second or third tour, point to June 2004, and the Declaration of Sovereignty as

creating a mindset of training vice training and operational effectiveness. There

are a few organizations that were not only training Iraqi Police (such as their

major crimes unit investigators) but also worked to assist in police investigation

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improvements. The majority of PTT efforts though focused only on training and

station / district management (logistics, personnel, maintenance) and not on

crime solve rates, patrol distribution plans, effective community policing, etc.

The development of the Host Nation Police force must be tasked to the

maneuver commander who is ultimately responsible for overall security

development. Military Police should be the lead for executing the HN police

development mission; however, it must be nested across the board with the

maneuver commander‘s LOO and campaign plan.

Pushing training to the HNP is a must. Many appear too comfortable right now

sitting at the CP or inside the LPS. Training Centers should be the starting point

for developing the training programs of HN development rather than the end

state. It is one of the few methods to synchronize performance expectations

across the board. Basic police skills must be developed before the HNP gets to

the stations rather than ‗learn as we go‘. HNP do not need training on how to

conduct an investigation before they know how to draw their pistol. The HNP

needs to patrol, respond to a crime, secure the scene, and then allow

experienced trained HNP officers to take over. Investigative training is almost

another type of PTT altogether.

Insights / Lessons:

C2 challenges were mitigated or overcome by detailed coordination and

full understanding of the role / missions of supporting and supported

commanders.

Training local police is essential to COIN success but operational

effectiveness must be addressed because training alone will not lead to the level

of success necessary to make quick and substantial process.

Quickly increasing the numbers of personnel trained in police skills must

be accompanied by a leadership structure increase as well. There must also be

a corresponding increase in the quantities of special skills. A comprehensive

strategy for training and operational effectiveness will yield great success than

other methodologies.

Measuring effectiveness using metrics like crime solve rates is tricky

because it is difficult to get this information since the HNP don‘t always keep the

best statistics.

Increasing the size of the HNP Force must be accompanied by more

training in order to professionalize the force. This must be addressed in the

campaign plan.

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The main issue with developing an operational effectiveness assessment

is that there is currently no definable and measureable metric to base those

findings. Reports and validations must be based off definable data.

Quantitative goals must be defined in order to ascertain what OE‘s are

progressing and which are lacking.

Qualitative goals must also be clearly defined to provide transition

teams a measure to base their mission priorities in order to continue the

development of the HN forces. These findings / reports will serve as the primary

tool for the MP command in determining appropriate allocation of units to varying

areas.

There must be continuing coordination of effort within transition team

operations. MP COs and MP BNs must provide accurate and timely reporting on

required data in order for the command to consolidate and analyze common

issues. Training, logistics, patrolling procedures and frequency, personnel,

finance, IP work ethic / motivational tools, etc. All contribute to the overall

effectiveness of each Station / District / Province. Gathering this information will

allow the MP command to offer solutions from differing areas to other transition

teams resulting in unity of effort.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: MP and COIN doctrine should reflect a campaign strategy for

developing police skills and operational effectiveness.

Doctrine: Army Doctrine should explore the direct support and

OPCON/TACON C2 relationships and ensure they best meet the current

dynamics of COIN and can best accommodate actions in relation to sovereignty

and HN policing capabilities. Failure to discuss the complications of the COIN

mission set in police development and establishment of Rule of Law will lead to

disconnections among C2 efforts and development efforts which will allow

criminal organizations to find seams in capabilities and coverage.

Doctrine: Military Police units are a viable and well-equipped battlefield

entity. With the Police Transition Team mission, MPs are constantly circulating

the battlefield, meeting with HN officials and locals, and are extremely

knowledgeable and integrated into the communities. Furthermore, they have

developed unique relationships with local police forces and are able to influence

positive change. Therefore, transition teams can be effectively utilized by

maneuver commands in kinetic operations given their intricate knowledge of their

OE.

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Organization: Assign PTT mission to MP BDE / BN who then operate in

a support relationship to the maneuver units. MP BDEs are the subject matter

experts on Police Transition Team operations. They should in turn have the

freedom of movement to execute their priorities and maneuver MP units across

the battlefield. Control of MP BNs by the BDE would allow unity of command.

By analyzing each OE and the issues contained therein, the MP BDE can

prioritize efforts and functions across the BNs and ensure those priorities are

being executed and completed before moving to the next.

Training: Training institutions should teach classes on command and

control and the necessity to ensure C2 does not get complicated to the point

missions are jeopardized. Training on how to support BCTs and Divisions would

go a long way to helping mitigate challenges brought out in this observation.

Topic 1.8: Predeployment Training- MP Operations and Establishing Rule

of Law

Discussion:

The Police Transition Team (PTT) training conducted by the US Army Military

Police (USAMPS) was beneficial to the units preparing for deployment. The

training was geared at the squad and platoon leader levels for the specific

mission of developing Iraqi Police.

Many reported the PTT training at USAMPS was very worth while for the most

part. However, some stated it did not cover some needed topics like working

with the tribal leaders, city council, and how they influence the HNP system. A

few of the interviewed personnel stated it would be more beneficial if it was

broken into two types. Squad leaders should get their PTT training focusing on

the LPS level and PLT Leaders should get PTT training on the DHQ level. Also,

when a unit is tagged to deploy and goes to NTC or JRTC, someone from

USAMPS should ensure that the MP is afforded the opportunity to execute the

PTT mission during their cycle as well as ensuring that the OCs understand the

PTT mission that they should be evaluating.

Key leaders at MNC-I stressed that the Military Police need to update its

predeployment training criteria. Currently, MP companies conduct multiple LFXs

and MRXs in preparation for deployment. Most training tasks focus on combat

patrolling and survivability tasks. While this training is imperative it does prepare

MPs for the actual conduct of PTT. Military police officers and NCOs are

expected to be the SME on all Police policies and procedures. Classes need to

be taught to squad leaders and above on the following, HN criminal code,

investigations, hiring procedures, logistic procedures, HN police structure (MOI

through LPS), and HNP personnel procedures. Being the SME on this

information will help MP Commanders interact with maneuver commanders and

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can prevent wrong decisions and short cuts from being made. Knowing the

proper procedures and highlighting the impacts of short cuts to maneuver

commanders is essential to the PTT mission.

This Police Transition Team Training (PTT) was reported as very beneficial to

Military Police units who sent noncommissioned officers and officers to Fort

Leonard Wood to attend the course. The course taught the NCOs the PTT

program and the only emphasis was on police development—the forms used for

tracking police equipment and reporting on the readiness of police stations to

operate. From a RoL perspective, the training has not addressed how policing

interfaces with penal and judicial operations. Leaders reported there was limited

to no training on current Iraqi law and rule of law procedures within their criminal

justice system taught to inbound MP units. Efforts to establish a RoL

environment must be accomplished in total—all elements of the RoL effort being

synchronized and understood by all. The MP efforts to establish the Iraqi Police

are well documented and focused on police training at the basic level of police

development. There are growing but separate efforts (Army and Interagency) to

elevate the capabilities of penal and judicial programs within Iraq.

It was reported that patrol leaders need more Iraqi RoL training. Police Station

Monthly Reports (PSMR) continuity books are a must. Those interviewed

recommended additional training on PSMRs, training on the split Command and

Control (C2) relationship, and on automation systems. Further, many stressed

the garrison law enforcement training in preparation for the Police Transition

Teams (PTT) mission is lacking. One interviewed company brought out his

company did not receive any of this training. However, the civil skill sets brought

by the law enforcement officers serving in the Army Reserves more than makes

up for this capability gap. Iraqi law training is needed prior to deployment and is

still needed periodically after arriving in country.

Insights / Lessons:

Continue to update the PTT Training Support Package (TSP). The train

the trainer course provides the right type of information the unit needs to reduce

the transfer of authority process and make the unit more effective once they

assume the mission.

Incorporating the Rule of Law into PTT predeployment training is

absolutely vital.

Send specialized Mobile Training Teams (MTT) that are well versed on

Rule of Law to units during predeployment training.

Train HNPA on Rule of Law; they are supposed to be the SMEs but are

currently not at this level.

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HNP cannot generally search, collect, and preserve evidence in an

adequate manner. Tasks subjectively assessed to ―green‖ evaluate

effectiveness in a vacuum. Evidence classes and training on what is required for

the HN court system is needed.

Squad level PTTs identified that western training principles and tactics are

not the best to utilize. Include PTT members with Middle Eastern Arabic law

enforcement experience (possibly to replace HNPA).

Incorporate Rule of Law synchronization and integration of pillars of RoL

into the current PTT TSP. Establishing a Rule of Law TSP for MP and other

leaders engaged in police, judicial, penal, and civil affairs actions could enhance

synchronization of RoL efforts once in theater.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Training: Continue to update the PTT. Ensure units send train the trainer

leaders who can take back the information and training package to their units and

train them accordingly.

Leader Development and Education: Establish a PTT TSP for leaders

supporting efforts to establish Rule of Law. Continue the Police Transition Team

course currently being conducted at USAMPS.

Leader Development and Education: Continue to emphasize the

acquisition of recently re-deployed leadership to conduct PTT courses.

Gathering a cohesive team consisting of Provincial, District, and Station level

PTT leaders will enhance the training and better equip leaders in their future

rotations.

Leader Development and Education: Emphasize engagement

processes and study other regional police force‘s procedures. Provide specific

area successes and difficulties from PTT leaders.

Topic 1.9: Forming the Team

Discussion:

Forming the team is an important part of leveraging success in a COIN

environment. There was nothing found to indicate any effort at establishing a

RoL team during a pre-deployment phase. For MP unit efforts, MP Companies

stated that many Soldiers reported to their unit just prior to deployment. Many

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Reserve and NG companies, who reported to Fort Dix / Fort Bliss, said their

training did not focus them on their war-time tasks.

However, the Army has made great strides in deployment focused training.

Efforts to provide Training Support Packages (TSPs) and Mobile Training Teams

(MTTs) have proven beneficial to training and mission preparation. The

challenges are many and the manning activities associated with Army Force

Generation (ARFORGEN) are among these challenges. One company reported

that 47 new privates and other Soldiers arrived to the unit 60 days or less prior to

deployment. The only focus, at that point, the unit command team wanted to

achieve was the basics of shoot, move and communicate. Taking care of

personnel issues, taking care of families, and preparing for the missions in

theater all became difficult and competed for leader attention. The only thinking

afforded the unit on what could be trained on was individual preparation in the

basic areas just mentioned. Teams, squads, and platoons were adjusted at the

last minute and did not resemble the team, squads, and platoons that went

through situation training exercise (STX) lanes, external evaluations, and mission

rehearsal exercises (MRE).

To help improve team effectiveness, the unit moved to NCODP and OPD more

frequently. This involved qualifying once per month on equipment (until a degree

of proficiency reached) and key battle drills and rehearsals done weekly, in

addition to any done prior to missions. A key part of training included daily and

weekly adjustments to techniques and procedures used for operations—such as

having enough seats in the vehicle for accommodating Soldiers from a downed

vehicle being towed; adjusting load plans to accommodate a litter or ambulatory

patient who was unable to sit (or needs treatment for shock) in a seat for ground

evacuation when medical flights are unavailable due to weather; and how to train

(use of interpreters, etc.).

Insights / Lessons:

Assigning large numbers of personnel (almost 1/3 the unit) to a company

sized unit, within 60 days of deployment, places a critical training requirement on

the company leadership and resourced training program.

Units are and should continue to adjust TTPs and train while in theater to

ensure competencies are maintained.

TSP and MTTs are valuable tools for the commands / units to employ as

part of their deployment preparation.

MP efforts (MTT, TSP) during pre-deployment do not include RoL

information.

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Place emphasis on USAR / ARNG component training at Fort Dix, Camp

Shelby, and Fort Bliss. With the plethora of units mobilizing and the varying

mission sets, units conducting Police Transition Team operations are muddled in

the mix. Although much of the training is essential to successful mission

completion, prominence must be placed on those units conducting PTT,

especially on the unit leadership as they will be the ones directly engaging high-

level HN officials.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Training: USAMPS and other schools should look to incorporate TSP

training into class room PME and OSUT. This will mitigate the effects of last

minute deployment fills that are commonplace among the force.

Training: PTT training is a leader task. PTT training can take the form of

OPD / NCOPD, which are things that can be done outside of regular unit training.

Leader Development and Education: Leadership training in COIN is

essential, as well as, leader engagement training. Introduce concepts, such as

conducting SOI engagements, at the earliest possible point to allow leaders to

develop their engagement styles and become familiar with the uses of an

interpreter.

Topic 1.10: Command and Control of the MP Units in a RoL Environment

Discussion:

The MP Brigade is under the operational control of the division responsible for

Baghdad and subordinate MP Battalions are under the tactical control of either

BCTs or other divisions they supported.

The command and control of MP units have been a source of much discussion at

all levels. The MP Brigade was OPCON to a division and the subordinate

battalions are either TACON to another division (whom they support) or to a

BCT. MP Companies were typically assigned to a battalion and TACON to a

BCT for police transition team efforts. This alignment resulted in no issues to

significant issues, for the supporting and supported commanders / leaders.

Personalities seemed to play a big role in this.

Operationally, there seemed to be little impact on the C2 relationships—MP units

coordinated with battlespace owners and in most cases, attended commander

huddles, effects meetings, and similar coordination / planning meetings. In those

areas where supporting units did not establish in depth coordination with the

supported commander, the relationships were more adversarial.

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MP leadership raised the example of the 275^th MP CO to illustrate this case in

point. They asserted there must be a strong relationship between the MP

Company and the landowning BN that has TACON of it. They believed it is the

responsibility of the MP BN, OPCON to the DIV, to make sure that this link is

strong. Personalities and rank are important. It is incumbent upon the field-

grade officers, in the MP BN OPCON to the DIV, to do the necessary

engagements with landowning BN CDRs and S3s as part of the MP CDR‘s

battlefield circulation.

Policing operated in support of the HN government and there was a distinct

desire by civilian officials to separate policing from military operations. In a COIN

environment, security and stability are inextricably linked and therefore, the line

between military and policing responsibility is often blurred. Typically, the more a

military unit attempted to control the policing operation resulted in a greater

disconnect to the overall policing effort. This discussion did not come across as

adversarial at all but, rather, as a sincere attempt to work to ensure security and

policing efforts were linked and yet, ―freedom‖ to police and support the citizen

needs were addressed. In policing, if a call for an event / police assistance

comes in, police respond. The nature of their business is to de-escalate

situations and on the other hand, to investigate. A call for a ―minor disturbance

or assault‖ often led to an investigation which involved a complex murder case.

This is not unusual in a COIN environment. This COIN complexity is difficult to

manage in the maneuver commander‘s decision process due to concern for

security, Soldier / HN Police safety and other factors.

Most commanders and leaders described their C2 relationship as basically

effective, yet, room for improvement existed. As each described TACON, the

definition they used better described OPCON or direct support.. While there

seemed to be an Army move to get away from ―Support‖ relationships, many

discussed the value of direct support relationships in a complex COIN

environment where senior officers, knowledge and experience, and higher

headquarters capabilities of these supporting echelons / units in developing HN

police do play a significant and successful role. Maneuver commanders and

leaders echoed that having an MP LTC or MP COL vice a MAJ or CPT advising

them and orchestrating operations would be more beneficial to their overarching

mission and efforts to accomplish their mission.

In order to affect command and control, the following systems were used:

o FBCB2

o CPOF

o SIPR

o NIPR

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o FM Radio

o BREEZE

o Snag-it (Power point lug in)

o Ventrillo

o CIDNE (Combination Information Data Network Exchange)

o SharePoint

Outside of FBCB2, SIPR, and NIPR- these systems are not taught in any of our

Professional Military Education classes.

Insights / Lessons:

When an MP Commander / Leader was fully integrated into the supported

commander‘s battle rhythm, there were significantly less issues with C2 than

those who were not fully integrated.

SOPs and TOA are barely acceptable solutions for training C2 systems in

use today. Units that were able to train with these devices and systems before

deployment had an easier transition time and were more effective in their

operations and C2 efforts than those who were not previously trained.

It‘s a long term war and yet our materiel developers have not kept pace

due to arguably archaic and bureaucratic processes.

When MP BN HHD‘s are deployed to be OPCON to a DIV, a COA that

should be explored would be to deploy the entire staff as an IPS development

cell. This would be the most robust IPS development cell seen in Iraq. The S1

would develop HR functions, the S4 Logistics, the S3 officers would work on the

training, etc. This would be possible if the BCT‘s to which the MP companies are

assigned take ADCON responsibility for the MP companies as well.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: The Army should look at doctrine associated with COIN and the

HN development efforts that are spearheaded by non-combat arms branches

(police, engineers, medical etc.) to determine the most appropriate C2

relationship.

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Doctrine: Integrate CO level command with the BCT in targeting

meetings and current kinetic operations is key. Transition teams must be

absolutely knowledgeable of such operations as they are the ―face‖ of U.S. Army

forces. Transition teams are engaged constantly by both HN officials and locals

to provide insight on kinetic and non-lethal operations being conducted in that

OE. PTT leadership must be involved in all levels of the BCT operations such as

current non-lethal targets / projects, information operations, and kinetic strike

operations. This will signify a unified front across CF.

Materiel: Materiel solutions should quickly catch up to operational

solutions already in place (and have been for over three years). The Army

should select a family of S2 systems and begin immediately filling unit TO&E

documents with the latest systems.

Topic 1.11: Aligning US Partnership Boundaries with HN Boundaries

Discussion:

In many instances, Military Police were aligned with HN police boundaries and in

other areas, they were not (aligning with BCT boundaries was a higher priority).

When partnering with police and attempting to develop their capabilities, it

appeared that synchronization and integration of these efforts was enhanced

when the partnership boundaries align.

Most have understood this necessity and the MP unit areas of operation

coincided with the boundaries of the stations / districts that they were assigned to

develop. There were still some areas where the boundaries of partnership did

not align. In a policing operation, if there are seams, the criminals will identify

them quickly and capitalize on the situation. Additionally, commanders reported

that the local police were confused and frustrated when they had more than one

police training team to work with in order to ―cover‖ their respective area of

responsibility.

Insights / Lessons:

Aligning police training team boundaries with the boundaries of the local

police provide the greatest chance for synchronization and support to the HN

police.

Align PTT element with the HN police force within the district. Each MP

squad that is assigned stations should fall under the same HNP district and also

fall under the same maneuver element. That makes it easier for PTT to establish

relationships and partnerships with the HNP leaders and keeps that PTT element

focused on that IP station and district as well. Further, it would enhance the

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maneuver element understanding the full dynamics of the police system in their

battlespace, versus viewing each police structure as the same entity.

Every effort must be made to ensure that provincial AO‘s line up with BCT

AO‘s. When this does not happen the DIV staff must take up the slack and make

the operational seams a priority in and of themselves.

Align U.S. Partnership Boundaries with HN Boundaries. This is what

MNC-I is currently doing. In Mosul, there is a constant state of flux with HNSF

(IP / IA) AORs and boundaries shifting and changing. Many stated it only makes

sense to set PTT boundaries to coincide with their partnered IP districts and flex

where needed.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: Doctrine should reflect the necessity to align partnership unit

responsibilities to the HN‘s area of responsibility that is being supported.

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Chapter 2

Military Police Support to Maneuver Commanders

Chapter Contents

Page

Summary

Topic 2.1: Military Police (MP) Mission Sets

Topic 2.2: MP C2 in Support of Maneuver Commanders in

COIN and Stability Operations

Topic 2.3: Providing PTT Support and Policing Capabilities

to Maneuver Commanders

Topic 2.4: LE Technical Skills in Support of Maneuver

Commanders

Topic 2.5: Providing MP Support to Divisions and BCTs—METT-C

Topic 2.6: MP C2 Relationships and Task Organization

Topic 2.7: MP Brigade (BDE), Battalion (BN), and Company (CO)

Capabilities

Topic 2.8: Corps and Division Provost Marshal (PM) Capabilities

Topic 2.9: MP Assets Organic to the BCT

Topic 2.10: MP Company in Support of a BCT

Topic 2.11: BCT MP Platoon (PLT) Employment

Topic 2.12: Non-lethal (NL) Weapons and Munitions Applications

Topic 2.13: HMMWV Equipment

Topic 2.14: Integration Host Nation Security Forces and Means

Summary

In the contemporary operating environment (COE), MP provide key support to

the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) and to subordinate maneuver

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commanders prosecuting their missions in one of the most complex and

challenging battlefields in recent history. The Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

operating environment (OE) was the driving force behind two major changes

to MP operations specifically designed to yield enhanced MP support to

MNC-I and its subordinate maneuver commanders. First, MP support

priorities and mission requirements shifted to focus on only two major mission

sets: Police Transition Team (PTT) operations and Detention Operations

(DO). The former supported maneuver commanders‘ overall mission of Iraqi

Security Forces (ISF) development and establishment of security within their

respective Areas of Operation (AO). The latter complemented the maneuver

commanders‘ overall security mission by keeping unlawful enemy combatants

off the streets and in detention while simultaneously conducting COIN ―Inside-

the-Wire‖. Second, MNC-I established what many MP would consider non-

traditional MP task organization and C2 / support relationships across the Iraq

Theater of Operations (ITO) in an attempt to better support maneuver

commanders. The various MP task organizations, as well as related C2

relationships, though widely varied from one Multi-national Division (MND) to

another, were typically functional, effective, and mission-tailored.

Additionally, the OIF OE placed additional and never-before experienced

demands on MP units and PM staffs at all echelons (from corps to platoon). It

was readily evident that maneuver commanders required MP that were highly

trained and knowledgeable in Law Enforcement (LE) technical skills (to

include forensics and evidence collection). This, along with several other

mission requirements, demanded that additional capabilities and assets be

resident (organic) within the Combat Support (CS) MP BDE, CS MP BN, CS

MP CO, and BCT MP PLT as well as within Corps, Division, and BCT PM

Sections. To better support the BCT (the centerpiece of Army combat

formations), additional MP assets needed to be resident (organic) and task

organized optimally within the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), Heavy

Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), and Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT).

Also, maneuver commanders were hesitant to employ NL weapons and

munitions in the OIF OE. In short, MP provided effective, responsive, and

timely support to maneuver commanders and thereby significantly contributed

to their mission accomplishment and success. Additionally, many

recommended that MP PTTs have a constant sector presence in the OE

enhancing firepower and maneuverability. PTTs can also respond rapidly

with their IP counterparts to any situation that develops with either HN or U.S.

forces.

Topic 2.1: Military Police Mission Sets

Discussion:

The OIF OE (namely COIN and Stability Operations) led to a significant shift in

and narrowing of focus for MP mission sets, priorities, and employment.

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Specifically, MP in the ITO were only focused on two major mission sets: Police

Transition Team (PTT) operations and Detention Operations (DO). This was

largely a result of a change in the type of MP support needed by and provided to

maneuver commanders on today‘s complex battlefield.

In recent history, MP traditionally provided MP combat support to maneuver

commanders primarily through the conduct of MP Battlefield Functions such as

Area Security (AS), Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations (MMSO), and

Internment/ Resettlement (I / R) Operations (primarily EPW operations). These

missions were particularly useful and effective in what was referred to as the

Corps Rear Area (CRA) and Division Rear Area (DRA) during linear major

combat operations (MCO) where there were defined front lines and rear areas.

As a result, MP were sometimes referred to as the ―Mobile Infantry‖ of those rear

areas.

The OIF OE significantly departed from this traditional MCO template as it

represented a battlefield absent of rear areas with the entire ITO neatly dissected

into multiple areas of responsibility (AOR) each owned by a specific BCT under

the C2 of a division. Additionally, with the prioritization of the PTT mission, BCTs

fully assumed responsibility for the traditional AS, MMSO and localized I / R

(division and BCT level detention operations) missions. This situation, coupled

with the ongoing insurgent threat, COIN environment, and the transition to

Stability Operations (SO) resulted in a new-found need for MP support primarily

in the form of Law & Order (L&O) and I / R operations. This spawned from the

intensive focus on Iraqi Police (IP) development and ongoing (and expanding)

theater-level detention operations across the ITO.

This eventually led to a change of mission and task organization for MP that

narrowed their focus to two of their five Battlefield Functions: Law & Order

Operations (IP development - PTT operations) and Internment / Resettlement

Operations (detention operations). Thus (and ironically), while the OIF OE

drastically limited MP mission focus to these two mission sets, it also significantly

expanded MP mission requirements across the ITO. MP leaders stressed this

narrowed mission set did nothing to eliminate MP workload or mission

requirements. In fact, quite the opposite occurred. While MP were focused on

only two of their doctrinal battlefield functions, mission requirements grew

exponentially to the point where there were not enough MP units available to

execute these two missions. This resulted in the sourcing of ―In Lieu Of‖ (ILO)

units mostly for DO but also, to a limited degree, for PTT. While MNF-I and

MNC-I senior leaders clearly recognized that MP units were the most suitable

units for these two mission sets, they also accepted the risk associated with

using non-MP units to meet mission requirements due to the overarching

strategic importance of these two missions. Most believe that MMSO and AS

should remain doctrinal missions for military police but that this will either require

additional MP companies or a reduction in other missions across the board (IP

development, etc.).

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Insights / Lessons:

The use of ILO units to conduct DO and PTT clearly indicates there is not

enough MP force structure in the Army to meet the mission requirements and

demands of the COE.

The COE has restricted the ability of MP to perform all five MP battlefield

functions simultaneously in support of maneuver commanders.

Traditional MP CS skills such as AS and MMSO are not being adequately

performed in the ITO, as evidenced by the numerous and continuous IED and

small arms fire attacks along Main Supply Routes (MSR).

MP must maintain high proficiency levels in the Law & Order and I / R

Battlefield Functions, or they run the risk of not providing maneuver commanders

with the expertise needed during contingency operations.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: MP doctrinal manuals, as well as overarching Army doctrinal

manuals, need to be updated to include the expanded operational requirements

associated with DO and PTT operations (IP development) in the COE as well as

detailed information on MP support to those operations.

Organization: Configure CS MP units to enable them to independently

accomplish PTT operations across the spectrum of policing capabilities

necessary / required in police stations and police headquarters.

Training: Modify and revamp current OES, NCOES, and OSUT

Programs of Instruction (POI) to adequately train MP in basic and advanced LE

skills as well as I / R skills.

Training: Revamp OSUT and NCOES training to encompass COIN

operations at the lowest level.

Leader Development: Enhance and / or add LE and corrections

technical skills training courses for MP senior leaders.

Leader Development: Vary assignments for MP officers and senior

NCOs to ensure that all are afforded the opportunity for assignment to

corrections and LE-related positions such as PM Operations Officers / NCOs,

Department of Emergency Services (DES), Installation PM, L&O Detachments,

Army Corrections Command (ACC), United States Disciplinary Barracks (USDB),

Regional Corrections Facility (RCF), etc.

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Topic 2.2: MP C2 in Support of Maneuver Commanders in COIN and

Stability Operations

Discussion:

The MP Brigade Commander was fully engaged in the command and control of

all subordinate units and the management and oversight of the Police Transition

Team (PTT) efforts throughout his assigned area of responsibility.

The MP Brigade Commander had Administrative Control (ADCON) over units

outside the brigade‘s operational area of responsibility. The awards processes,

judicial and other standards were implemented equally throughout the brigade.

The Brigade Commander provided PTT guidance to the subordinate battalions

and companies who where under Operational Control (OPCON) or Tactical

Control (TACON) to maneuver units but did not direct the synchronization or

integration of policing efforts to address counterinsurgency operations (COIN).

The battle rhythm included daily synch meetings with the brigade S3, near-daily

visits to subordinate units and/or the HN police stations being over-watched,

trained or developed and a commander‘s update brief (utilized the BREEZE

network—points to point internet voice of internet system). Weekly, the brigade

participated in the DIV G3 synch meeting, plans and operations meeting, PTT

working group meetings, update to the Division Commander, and brigade staff

call.

Other key meetings the brigade commander or S3 attended included a Crisis

Action Meeting, IP updates, Operational Readiness Assessment Brief, IO

working group, OPSEC working Group, Force Protection Working Group,

Coordinated IED meeting, Corps Iraqi Police Update and an Information

Operations Working Group.

The feeling among current MP commanders and some maneuver commanders

was that the span of control of MP battalions and brigades was too large in our

current set. Most felt that C2 of three to four companies or four battalions (or

equivalents) was ideal and the range of C2 should be 2-5 battalions or 2-5

companies, especially if the mission set for each is the relatively the same.

While all agreed that more can be controlled for short periods, the complexity and

dynamic nature of the current and projected future battlefields is such that

anything greater than five subordinate units place mission success at too much

of risk.

Insights / Lessons:

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The COIN environment is extremely complex. Building HN Police

capability is complex and takes a significant effort across Interagency

organizations. The ability of a commander to effectively influence the battlefield

is diminished due to the complexity involved and the lack of the experience

available in our junior leaders in our Army to effect HN change.

The feeling among current MP commanders and some maneuver

commanders was the span of control of MP battalions and brigades are too large

in our current set. Most felt that C2 of four companies or four battalions (or

equivalents) was ideal and the range of C2 should be 2-5 battalions or 2-5

companies. While all agreed that more can be controlled for short periods, the

complexity and dynamic nature of the current and projected future battlefields is

such that anything greater than five subordinate units place mission success at

too much risk.

MP BN HQs are not being effectively utilized to exercise C2 over

subordinate units in all division OEs. In Iraq there are currently only four MP BNs

executing PTT operations in support of the four divisions. MND-N and MND-C

each have only one MP BN HQ OPCON to them for the PTT mission. The

expanded OE that these divisions are responsible for, the geographic array of IP

stations across the OE, and the lack of additional MP BN HQs has influenced

division commanders to assign TACON of MP companies to landowning BCTs in

all division OEs except Baghdad. The MP BN HQs in MND-C and MND-N

exercise ADCON only over subordinate companies. As a result, rather then

utilizing their MP BNs as tactical C2 HQs, both divisions have utilized their MP

BN HQs as extended division PMO sections and augmentations to ISF cells

When operating in a COIN environment, where there are a small number

of divisions arrayed over a large area, each division would benefit from having its

own MP BDE OPCON to support it. The MP BDE exercises OPCON of up to

four MP BNs that in turn exercise OPCON of up to five companies each. This

allows doctrinal utilization of MP HQs as tactical C2 elements and provides a

single HQ to exercise OPCON of all PTTs. This solution facilitates unity of effort

and a singular approach to IP development across the division OE.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: Army and MP Doctrine should reflect a span of control of 2-4

MP companies or battalions for battalions and brigades, respectively. Adequate

span of control of five companies or battalions is achievable but when complexity

and distances are greater, even this figure is too high to effectively achieve solid

span of control.

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Doctrine: MP Doctrine should capture as vignettes and examples the

various meetings and efforts that must be undertaken in order to effectively

develop host nation policing capability and rule of law effectiveness.

Organization: Rules of allocation should be reviewed and adjusted to

reflect 2-5 companies per MP battalion and two-five MP battalions per MP

brigade.

Topic 2.3: Providing PTT Support and Policing Capabilities to Maneuver

Commanders

Discussion:

Police Transition Teams (PTT) operated at the squad level and worked in close

coordination with maneuver elements within their area of responsibility.

Part of PTT mission included instructing IP and establishing and running

(oversight in some areas) of ―police‖ academies. The Division PM did not feel

that the NCOs and officers had the complete skill sets, to include instructor skills,

to maximize their training efforts. Putting an instructor through certification

courses as we do in our institutions does not exist in the Iraqi or current coalition

system, nor with the interpreters who play a key role in training oversight.

Follow-up IP training is near non-existent. There is a basic review of police skills

and courses set up to train advanced schools / education, but the selection

process and utilization process once the course is completed were not organized

properly. There was a Police Essential Task List, a scaled down version of what

was developed in OIF 1 and OIF 004-06.

PTT teams lived on Forward Operating Bases (FOB), Contingency Operating

Bases (COBs), Combat Out Posts (COP), and police stations. All venues had

advantages and disadvantages with living at police stations. Soldiers interviewed

stated the police stations represented the worst conditions for troop health,

welfare, and living but best scenario for stabilizing and enhancing police

effectiveness. The minimum size unit ―in quarters‖ at IP stations reported to the

team was a platoon-sized organization. This structure provided force protection

and 24/7 coverage but did not allow for multiple station coverage. There was an

MP squad living at a station that also served as a Joint Security Station with

infantry augmentation that was co-located. All leaders related that doctrinally a

platoon-sized element was the best solution for working with police stations,

24/7.

Some leaders felt the MP lacked enough skills in detention cell or jail operations

(outside the detainee operations functional mission of the MP Corps). In the jail

role, interpreters, hand held radios, HIIDE, BAT and Police Intelligence

Operations (PIO) were the skills and materiel the MP required to operate

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effectively in tracking jail progress and capturing and passing on the vast amount

of intelligence that was available in a typical Iraqi jail population. One hindering

factor in developing police capabilities, operating in stations and jails, and

developing PIO was the inability to communicate directly with the populace

because of the language barrier.

Commanders (MP and non-MP) related they are moving heavily to finding ways

to hold IP station commanders and leaders to high standards. They felt if the

police leaders were accountable for the standards, they could achieve more

progress. Many who were also in Iraq in 2004-2005, related the concept of

partnering with headquarters down to station level was essential to holding folks

accountable. As the leaders work through upcoming plans for enhancing police

capabilities, they are ensuring that the concept of fixing police simultaneously

from top to bottom is not lost.

Of critical importance to the MP PTT mission is what commanders described as

effective police intelligence capabilities. They reported using a Tactical HUMINT

Team (THT) at battalion and brigade levels was key to more effectively gather

information and development of further police intelligence. The brigade initially

had a THT team that helped ensure subordinate units were tasked with specific

police intelligence. The team would deploy to various subordinate units to move

contacts to informants to source levels. Without this capability, the brigade was

not able to develop the contact, informant, and source network they could

develop before and this reduced their intelligence effectiveness. The brigade

was working with division and they believed that the division understands this

capability gap and will move to support them in the future with a THT. MPs

trained in basic HUMINT would benefit greatly.

The brigade S2 section stated they could use 35E capabilities in COIN

operations. This skill set was critical to effective COIN operations. This is

especially correct for an MP brigade where this skill set can guide commanders

and PTTs to more effective PIO and other collection efforts in support of

maneuver commanders.

The brigade did not receive its required and authorized Civil Affairs officer. This

caused significant issues in that aspect of their operations as they attempted to

develop IP and get the community involved in policing efforts. This skill set is

absolutely fundamental in police operations and is a key reason many believe we

have labored so long in getting community policing type concept accepted.

Insights / Lessons:

PTTs living in police stations provide the greatest level of oversight and

overall station development.

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Platoon-sized elements aligned with stations are doctrinally the most

feasible although a squad per station, or squad per three stations, may be

necessary depending on METT-TC.

Training leaders on instructor techniques helped in instructing the IP

(especially in the academies).

Follow-up training is necessary, especially when basic police training is

eight weeks or less.

Using THT teams in a direct support role to MP Battalions and Brigades in

a COIN or Stability operation and police development environment adds great

value to PIO. The MP brigade S2 NCOIC recommended that USAMPS work

with the MI School to train MP on basic HUMINT collection procedures / skills.

Police Transition Team training is a key in succeeding in current

operations. One of the main efforts of PTT is to train the HN police force.

However, training and other aspects in current operations, training is only as

productive as the interpreter. Interpreters are one of the most important

multipliers in today‘s force. A push for CAT 2 interpreters for transition teams

would prove to be extremely beneficial and allow for improved relations with HN

leadership. Trust is a key factor in how cooperative the Iraqi Police, especially

the leadership, can be. Any facet through which those relations can be improved

can only benefit the mission.

The transition team concept is loosely based on past Special Forces

functions. Being embedded or ―available‖ to the HN is of the utmost importance.

PTT has seen tremendous success and improvements from Iraqi Police forces if

the team is able to operate from a local police station, providing constant

mentoring and training. Patrol Bases also offer the same results as the transition

team is more readily available for consultation and mentoring. Such operational

environments provide optimal results in transition team operations and the

improving in the productivity in the force being trained.

PTTs also benefit from HUMINT and tactical questioning training. Building

strong rapport and relationships with the transition team‘s counterparts is

essential to mission success. Along with those relationships comes trust and

information sharing, to a certain extent. A basic MP CS company is not equipped

or authorized to utilize ‗sources‘ or to process vital / sensitive information. To

avoid information becoming ‗lost in translation‘, having either a THT embedded or

one readily available could be a most crucial force multiplier. Casual or common

information passed from HN officials should be commonplace to the PTT. That

same information could be the missing piece to an intelligence puzzle. Simply

reporting station engagements to BN S2s is not as productive as having a THT

readily available or embedded within the PTT.

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It would be virtually impossible for the MP command to commit one MP

platoon per HN police station for 24/7 coverage. The current PTT to station ratio

sits on / around 1:3. However, assigning a MP CS platoon to partner with upper

echelons of HN police leadership, i.e., Provincial HQ, would prove beneficial in

that it would allow and entire ―PTT‖ to cover on the key sections such as logistics,

finance, or training.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: USAMPS should develop refined doctrine in support of Stability

and COIN Operations.

Doctrine: USAMPS should ensure doctrine reflects one platoon per

station for 24X7 Police Station development.

Doctrine: Doctrine should reflect the need for THTs to be DS to an MP

battalion or brigade as they work with the populace and police. Additionally, this

same doctrine should describe how to task PTT capabilities with collection efforts

within the police and the local populace.

Materiel: MP operating with the local populace should have an interpreter

with each squad or a technology capability to have a simultaneous translation

device that one can speak into and it translates the language needed.

Organization: Army should consider assigning THT capabilities to MP

brigade structure so that capability always exists with the unit.

Training: USAMPS should work with USAIC&FH to develop a one or two

week course on basic ―HUMINT collection‖ techniques.

Training: Training MPs in instruction techniques would be beneficial

during the mobilization / deployment process. The training could be incorporated

into the Police Transition Team course at USAMPS.

Topic 2.4: LE Technical Skills In Support of Maneuver Commanders

Discussion:

Maneuver Commanders in the OIF OE required MP that were highly trained and

knowledgeable in LE technical skills (to include forensics and evidence

collection). This was largely a result of the fact that the OIF OE significantly

expanded (while simultaneously narrowing) the mission set for MP across the

ITO. Specifically, MP were focused primarily on only two areas: IP development

(PTT operations) and DO. MP units and staffs from Corps down to MP CO and

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BCT MP PLT level all experienced the challenges associated with taking on the

difficult and constantly expanding missions of PTT operations and DO. These

two missions clearly resulted in the recognition that MP across the spectrum

need enhanced LE and corrections technical skills to enable them to better meet

mission requirements, accomplish commanders‘ intent, and better support

maneuver commanders. Deployed MP commanders, as well as leaders and

staff, at all echelons within MNC-I consistently recognized this capability gap.

The need for this unique and more technical MP support to maneuver

commanders already manifested itself in several contracted and relatively short

term solutions. First, Iraqi Police Advisors (IPA), formerly called Iraqi Police

Liaison Officers (IPLO) partnered with MP as an integral member of every PTT.

These personnel had varying degrees of civilian law enforcement experience and

served as law enforcement technical experts on each PTT. Their purpose was to

train and mentor IP on basic law enforcement operations, police administrative

procedures, logistics systems, personnel systems, and the basic operation of an

IP station.

Second, Law Enforcement Professionals (LEP) were embedded in all BCTs and

most maneuver battalions. These personnel had intensive and advanced law

enforcement investigations experience (15-20 years) at major metropolitan police

departments and federal agencies. Their purpose / mission was to advise,

assist, and train BCT CDRs, staff, and subordinate units on investigations geared

primarily towards attacking criminal and insurgent networks, site exploitation, and

evidence collection and preservation.

Third, the importance of forensics and evidence collection in attacking criminal

and insurgent networks in the ITO (and maneuver commander recognition of the

importance of this approach) resulted in the establishment and fielding of the Law

Enforcement Forensics Lab (LEFL) in support of MNC-I. Leaders indicated that

these three examples clearly delineated, described, and supported the need for

MP that were highly trained and knowledgeable in LE technical skills (to include

forensics and evidence collection) in addition to more traditional MP combat

support skills. MP skilled in these areas would provide optimal support to

maneuver commanders in the OIF OE. MP, the enduring and long term Army

solution for these capability gaps, would require greater Knowledge, Skills, and

Abilities (KSA) in these areas.

CS MP units and leaders also consistently recognized the need for enhanced LE

technical skills to further enhance MP support to maneuver commanders in the

OIF OE. Staff officers assigned to the MP BDE OPCON to Multi-national

Division - Baghdad (MND-B) stated that increased LE technical skills would

greatly enhance success in the conduct of the PTT mission and thereby provide

better support to maneuver commanders in the prosecution of assigned missions

within their areas of operation (AO). They felt that the mission was being

accomplished successfully, but they could make significantly greater strides if MP

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had enhanced technical skills in police investigations, evidence collection, police

station administration, etc. MP BN staff officers interviewed in Baghdad

concurred with this assessment, stipulating that CS MP COs needed Soldiers

trained and skilled in Military Police Investigations (MPI) or Criminal

Investigations (CID) resident (organic) within the CO HQ and within CS MP PLTs

to better enable these units to train IP on investigations, evidence collection,

criminal intelligence, and police information and intelligence analysis. Two CS

MP CO CDRs further agreed with this need, stating that they need police

investigation skills organic within the MP CO. They also went on to say that a

Police Intelligence Operations (PIO) ―Analyst‖ is required in the MP CO HQ due

to the large amount of police information the unit gathers on a daily basis during

the conduct of their PTT mission.

Division PM Sections also found that their mission sets shifted to a greater

emphasis on the supervision, management, and synchronization of operations

requiring increased MP LE and corrections technical skills within their sections

and within division MP assets. For instance, two Division PM sections were

focused primarily on DO and PTT operations. However, their divisions also gave

them responsibility for Force Protection (FP), security mitigation measures, LEP

proponency, site exploitation oversight, customs, and Military Working Dog

(MWD) oversight. These responsibilities demanded that MP in division PM

sections had enhanced knowledge of Law & Order operations, DO, customs,

Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection, evidence collection / preservation, and basic

and advanced police investigations. Division PM staff officers recommended

adding some Skill Identifiers (SI) and Additional Skill Identifiers (ASI) to officer

and NCO positions, respectively, within the Division PM Section TOE to serve as

a forcing function for these personnel to obtain these enhanced MP technical skill

KSAs.

Senior MP leadership stressed that IPS development consumes the majority of

their time. MNC-I reported working very closely with the MP BNs and gained

some great synergy, however, manning in general was the greatest challenge.

Theater officials stated just as it is difficult for the Division PM shop to stay on top

of IP issues, one MP BN HQ cannot cover down on 4 separate provinces.

Various BCT PM Sections interviewed also identified a need for MP with

enhanced LE technical skills to better support maneuver commanders in the ITO.

They cited a critical need for the 31E Internment / Resettlement Specialist within

the BCT PM section to provide technical oversight to Division Holding Area

Annex (DHAA) operations. In addition to synchronizing IP development and DO,

most BCT PM Sections were also charged with MWD oversight, customs

operations, and Law & Order operations. These areas of responsibility clearly

support the need for MP with enhanced LE technical skills to better support

maneuver commanders. BCT PMs cited the need for skills in the following

areas: FP, police investigations (basic and advanced), forensics, the Military

Decision Making Process (MDMP), intelligence, battle staff procedures, physical

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security, customs, DO, non-lethal (NL) training, and nation building (i.e. lawyer

and real estate agent skills). Furthermore, a few BCT PM sections stated that

the fact that they did not have a Law & Order detachment assigned to their FOB

resulted in them having purview over most criminal investigations (unless it

required CID involvement). This caused a significant drain on PM resources.

BCT MP PLTs, also serving as resident MP experts within the BCT, also

recognized the need for enhanced LE technical skills applied within the OIF OE

to better provide MP support to maneuver commanders within their formations.

Most BCT MP PLT leaders stated that commanders, staff, and other troop

leaders within the BCT many times looked to them to provide LE and DO related

expertise and training to subordinate maneuver units. For instance, one BCT MP

PLT provided training to maneuver units in site exploitation, evidence collection

and documentation, and DO. As a result, it was evident that BCT MP PLT

personnel would be better able to accomplish their assigned missions if they

received technical skills training in such areas as Special Reaction Team (SRT),

FP, Physical Security, and site exploitation. Both BCT PM Staff officers as well

as BCT MP PLT leaders also recommended adding some Skill Identifiers (SI)

and Additional Skill Identifiers (ASI) to officer and NCO positions, respectively,

within the BCT PM section TOE and the BCT MP PLT TOE to serve as a forcing

function for these personnel to obtain these enhanced MP technical skill KSAs.

Law Enforcement, non-Lethal training, MWD, and Customs rests solely on the

Military Police and tenant units on the assigned FOB / COB. Most FOBs and

COBs do not have a Law & Order Detachment which can result in them having

purview over most criminal investigations (unless it requires CID involvement).

This caused significant drain on Provost Marshal resources.

Further reinforcing this, MNC-I PM section key staff officers stipulated that BCT

MP PLTs needed to be trained as experts in forensic collection. They added

that, if BCT MP PLTs continued to be trained as relatively generic forces capable

only of conducting AS, convoy escorts, and detainee backhaul, they would

continue to require augmentation from other MP organizations in order to best

support the BCT CDR and subordinate maneuver units. While several BCT

CDRs stated they needed MP with combat skills, they also needed MP who were

skilled in evidence collection and preservation. The proper skill sets within these

BCT MP PLTs would enable them to be used optimally (i.e. for PTT, DO, site

exploitation/evidence collection, and PIO) rather than as a mobile security asset

for the Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB) CDR. Additionally, CS MP COs

could better support maneuver commanders during the conduct of PTT if they

were equally knowledgeable in these KSAs.

Insights / Lessons:

Maneuver Commanders in the ITO require MP who have enhanced LE

technical skills (to include forensics and evidence collection) due to the

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increasing focus on defeating terrorist networks through a police investigation

type approach in addition to PTT operations.

The LEP and IPA programs are short term efforts to fill MP skill / capability

gaps and capacity gaps in support of maneuver commanders.

Current OES, NCOES, and OSUT Programs of Instruction (POI) do not

adequately train MP to be knowledgeable in LE skills.

High MP deployment OPTEMPO, since the start of Operation Enduring

Freedom (OEF) and OIF, has prevented many MP from sustaining their LE

technical skills through the conduct of garrison Law & Order operations at home

station.

MP organizations and staff sections, at all echelons, require NCOs and

officers who have attended enhanced MP LE technical skills courses and have

the resulting required KSAs.

The current MP assignments process many times does not adequately

provide MP Officers and NCOs with the opportunities and experiences to develop

practical LE expertise.

MP must be trained on site exploitation (evidence collection and

preservation).

Short-term solutions, specifically partnering PTTs with Iraqi Police

Advisors, can be beneficial if the IPAs possess vital cultural and operational

knowledge of the HN. However, United States law enforcement is critically

exclusive to Iraqi law enforcement. IPAs do serve well within transition teams as

U.S. law enforcement subject matter experts, however, often exert very little in

the OE of Iraqi police operations. Integrating technical experts, such as police

logisticians or investigative experts (detectives) would be of greater benefit to

PTTs. ―Beat-cops‖ can serve in initial training of basic police functions whereas

the technical experts can provide greater knowledge, experience, and

applicability to the intricacies of law enforcement.

A thorough assessment must be made of the HN law enforcement

capabilities, specifically, of their technological aptitude. Training in such areas

where HN capabilities do not exist can deter from mission priorities. For

example, crime scene investigations and exploitation is primitive in some areas

of Iraq. The Iraqi Police do not have the databases or technology sets required

to completely exploit and document evidence, such as fingerprinting, or other

types of evidence collection. Reverting back to reporting and validation

requirements, these types of measureable successes should not count against

the HN police being validated due to technological vacancies. A possible

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solution would be to incorporate a short training program in basic investigation

techniques. A modified MPI course, for instance, to give transition team leaders

a basic knowledge in which to base HN police training.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: Incorporate battlefield forensics, site exploitation, and evidence

collection and preservation into MP keystone, Law & Order, and Police

Intelligence Operations doctrinal manuals as well as into overarching Army

Stability Operations and COIN doctrine.

Organization: Incorporate LE technical skill-related Skill Identifiers (SI)

and Additional Skill Identifiers (ASI) to officer and NCO positions, respectively,

within the MNC-I PMO JMD and the DIV PM Section, MP BDE HQ, BCT PM

Section, MP BN HQ, MP CO, and BCT MP PLT TOEs, respectively, to serve as

a forcing function for these personnel to obtain enhanced LE technical KSAs.

Organization: Add MP Officer and NCO positions within the MP BDE,

MP BN, BCT, and maneuver BN TOEs that provide the same capability as the

LEP and IPA programs currently provide to maneuver commanders and MP

Commanders.

Training: Modify and revamp current OES, NCOES, and OSUT

Programs of Instruction (POI) to adequately train MP in basic and advanced LE

skills.

Training: Add additional LE technical specialty courses at USAMPS.

Training: USAMPS should establish a course for Division and BCT PM

and key staff officers and NCOs that prepares them for the varied responsibilities

that maneuver commanders assign them.

Materiel: Develop battlefield forensics / evidence collection kits and / or

other materials for use by both MP units as well as maneuver units.

Materiel: ―Tacticalize / Ruggedize‖ some garrison Law & Order

equipment for application in the COE.

Leader Development and Education: MP Leaders: Enhance and / or

add LE technical skills training courses for MP senior leaders.

Leader Development and Education: Vary assignments of MP Officers

and senior NCOs to ensure that all are afforded the opportunity for assignment to

LE-related positions such as PM Operations Officers / NCOs, DES, Installation

PM, Law & Order Detachments, etc.

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Leader Development and Education: Maneuver Unit Leaders: Develop

courses and / or TSPs designed to educate maneuver unit commanders and staff

on the LE technical capabilities of MP, to include site exploitation, battlefield

forensics, and evidence collection / preservation.

Personnel: Add MP positions, SIs, and / or ASIs within the MP BDE, MP

BN, BCT and maneuver BN TOEs that provide the same capability as the LEP

and IPA programs currently provide to maneuver commanders.

Facilities: Create training facilities that replicate the current OIF OE and

are designed to train MP on site exploitation, battlefield forensics, and evidence

collection and preservation.

Topic 2.5: Providing MP Support to Divisions and BCTs

Discussion:

Two Assistant Division Commanders and one Division Chief of Staff stated that

there are two enablers that they do not have enough of, Military Police and

Engineers. Maneuver Commanders and senior division leaders also stated that

as the spectrum of conflict moves from major combat operations to stability

operations, so too might the command and control and support requirements of

corps and theater assigned units also adjust. All, in different words, postulated

that while corps separates (enablers or functional brigades) might be best

missioned in a support role to the corps on the battlefield, as the spectrum of

conflict moves toward stability, these enablers might be best suited for direct

support to a division.

The MP brigade, initially assigned to the corps, was reallocated and is now under

the Operational Control (OPCON) of one of the divisions. There were

discussions ongoing with the new corps about how best to employ the MP

brigade. Headquarters mean a difference in a complex operating environment—

the skills and experience of senior leaders and complete staffs are necessary to

establish legitimacy of efforts with host nation senior government and police

officials.

Further discussions with these maneuver leaders highlighted that essentially,

each division should be allocated a military police brigade and as METT-TC

dictates, the subordinate battalions might be task organized in direct support,

Tactical Control (TACON), or OPCON to brigade combat teams. These leaders

stated that the BCTs must have direct control of (own) the units operating in their

battlespace in order to have most effect on the overall operation.

During the discussions, a general officer related that the previous corps

commander used to state that: ―….in this environment, headquarters make a

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difference…...‖ The message here was that senior leaders, with experience and

wisdom, are many times ideally suited to effect operations in the many complex

lines of operations necessary for successfully operating in a COIN environment.

Multiple generals and BCT commanders stated that if they could, they would

have an MP brigade with each division and sub allocate battalions as appropriate

to BCTs. Each of the MP battalion and brigade commanders and their staffs

were in partnership roles with their HN police counterparts and their experience

level contributed heavily to the influence they were having on developing the

police. Junior MP leaders were often frustrated by the lack of ability to influence

the HN police leadership and others as they were very junior and less

experienced in policing than those they were assigned to advise.

BCT commanders were quick to state that the MP companies are heroes but in

the end, in this environment, a higher level of experience was necessary at a

greater number. One issue the corps had to work through was the lack of corps

assets available to weight a main effort or change in priority. The divisions have

somewhat of a similar issue where there were few division retained assets

available to the division commander to weight an effort.

Many senior MPs stated with conviction that one of the worst things we‘ve done

is do away with the Division MP Companies. If anything, they state, we should

have added an MP BN to the Division. Currently, we have the last Division MP

Company in the Army and it has paid enormous dividends. The unit has

performed a variety of missions- from detention operations, support to division

operations, battlespace owners, and PTT missions. The BCTs on the other

hand, have sliced up their MP platoons and are using them either to run their B-

DHAs or as PSD elements for their command groups. Further, those interviewed

stated the Provost Marshal (PM) sections are absolutely inadequate and in many

cases are being dual-hatted as the P-PTTs. This cuts down on their

effectiveness and ability to focus on PM-type functions.

Insights / Lessons:

MP battalion and brigade headquarters must be involved in the COIN and

AT fight as they bring tremendous experience and expertise.

MP battalion and brigade staffs routinely traveled to police headquarters

and effected partnership relations in an attempt to stand up the IP forces. These

units carved out portions of their staffs to take on this added mission (different

mission than their doctrinal mission set).

MP junior leaders needed more technical training, experience, and

exposure to higher levels of policing and police management in order to bring

greater success to the battlefield.

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Direct support relationships or operational control gave the BCT

commanders optimal support to conduct their operations.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: MP Doctrine should capture the police partnership concept that

partners the experience and capabilities of senior leaders in battalion and

brigade staffs with the appropriate level of HN police leadership in order to effect

change from the most subordinate to most senior echelons of police

organizations.

Doctrine: The Army should study or take for consideration the roles and

support relationships of functional battalions and brigades in support of

maneuver commanders. This review should look to determine what size MP unit

should be aligned or even assigned to maneuver brigades and divisions.

Training: USAMPS should increase the technical training available to

squad and platoon level leaders. This training, institutional and home station

centric, must mitigate the lack of experience of our younger leaders with an

abundance of knowledge.

Topic 2.6: MP C2 Relationships and Task Organization

Discussion:

MP task organizations, as well as related C2 relationships with maneuver

commanders, though widely varied from MND to MND, were functional, effective,

and tailored to the mission. The results were MP units and commanders that

were able to provide enhanced, flexible, responsive, and timely MP support to

maneuver commanders across the ITO.

MP task organizations and C2 relationships varied widely from MP BDE to MP

CO level and from MND to MND. For instance, one MP BDE was OPCON to

Multi-national Division for PTT operations. MP BNs operating in the AOR were

attached to the MP BDE in support of the PTT mission. Subsequently, all

subordinate MP COs within the same AOR were attached to one of these two

MP BNs. The CS MP BNs operating in other AOs were OPCON directly to the

MND they supported; one MP BN was OPCON to one Multi-national Division,

and one MP BN was OPCON to another Multi-national Division. The subordinate

units of these two MP BNs were generally TACON to the various BCTs operating

within the respective MND AO. As previously discussed, all CS MP units within

MNC-I were performing PTT operations only. These C2 relationships all

stipulated that the MP BDE, MP BNs, and MP COs were OPCON and / or

TACON (based on their specific situation and location) for PTT only.

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The established C2 relationships for MP organizations across the ITO generally

made sense within the OIF OE. Within MND-B, for example, the C2 relationship

for MP was logical given that the center of gravity and primary focus (main effort)

for IP development was Baghdad. If the main effort were to shift elsewhere, it

was expected that the MP BDE task organization might change. Leaders stated

that within MND-C and MND-N, the C2 relationships for MP were sound based

on geographic dispersion and span of control reasons for the MP BNs and their

subordinate units. They also stated that they did not believe the MP BDE would

have been able to effectively C2 all of these MP organizations across the ITO.

There were clear advantages associated with these established C2 relationships

across the ITO. The major advantage was that the MP BDE, MP BNs, and MP

COs were well connected with, synchronized with, and integrated into various

MND and BCT Iraqi Security Force (ISF) development efforts. This enhanced

MP unit PTT efforts and operations within their respective MNDs and BCTs.

Another advantage was that the MP BNs and MP BDE could provide more

responsive and available MP support to maneuver commanders for the purpose

of IP development. Furthermore, within MND-B, the MP BDE CDR still retained

the ability to synchronize PTT operations, efforts, and priorities across the MND-

B AO. Another advantage was that, due to the wide dispersion of MP units

across the ITO, it enabled the MP BDE to narrow its focus on MND-B, the center

of gravity and main effort for MNC-I. Additionally, within MND-B, these C2

relationships still enabled the MP BDE to shift MP PTT assets where they were

needed most.

There were multiple challenges related to these MP C2 relationships as well. MP

C2 relationships within the MNDs were generally effective, but primarily in a local

sense as they tended to reduce the synchronization of IP development efforts

across all MNDs and throughout the ITO. The MP BDE CDR could only directly

influence and shape PTT efforts within MND-B. His ability to maneuver and

assign priorities for MP BNs did not extend beyond MND-B boundaries. Within

MND-C and MND-N, MP BNs could not shift MP COs from one area to another

without BCT approval because they only had ADCON of those units. This

resulted in a situation where MP COs were very much contained within the BCT

AOs. Also, within MND-C and MND-N, the MP BN S3s more or less became MP

plans officers because they could not immediately surge or shift MP forces.

Their subordinate MP COs became compartmentalized into BCT sectors. This

resulted in the reduced ability of the MP BNs to influence or adjust subordinate

unit disposition and priorities rapidly and independently, as every decision had to

involve maneuver units. The TACON of MP COs to BCTs presented challenges

due to the different alignments of maneuver BN AOs and MP CO boundaries

(incorporating IP stations). Specifically, some MP CO AORs traversed multiple

maneuver BN boundaries. This sometimes caused friction in synchronizing

operations if the MP BN CDR was not in synch with the corresponding BCT

CDR.

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When interviewed, multiple MP senior leaders had varying opinions on what MP

C2 relationships should have been in place. Some leaders stated that the MP

BDE should be in a General Support (GS) role to MNC-I with all MP BNs

attached to it throughout the ITO. Others indicated that the current C2

relationships were optimal due to geographic dispersion and span of control

considerations.

Across the ITO, Division and BCT CDRs were generally happy with the amount,

type, and quality of MP support they were receiving from MP units operating

within their AOs. There were two primary reasons for this. First, this was a result

of multiple MP BN and MP CO LNOs at each BCT HQ (either within the BCT

TOC or within the BCT PM Section). Second, constant and effective

communication between MP organizations and leaders at all levels (from MP

BDE to MP PLT) and maneuver units was pivotal. These two factors were

absolutely critical to maintaining the MP C2 relationships as they were without

having MP units further broken down and parceled out completely to maneuver

units.

Insights / Lessons:

MP C2 relationships should exist to support the maneuver commander in

the prosecution of his mission within his AO.

MP C2 relationships need not be standardized to be functional and

effective; excellent communication and flexible and competent commanders and

staffs are the key to success.

Regardless of the formal C2 relationship that exists among various

organizations, the key to success is consistent and effective communication

between MP units and maneuver units.

MP should be as responsive as possible to maneuver unit requests for MP

support (both formal and informal); this will result in less concern with formal C2

and/or support relationships and more MP mission synchronization across a

larger AO.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: No change to current C2 / support relationships doctrine.

Vignettes need to be incorporated into MP doctrine that illustrates the MP C2

relationships existed within the ITO, the rationale behind those decisions, and

evaluations of effectiveness.

Organization: Increase personnel authorizations within the MP BDE, MP

BN, and MP CO HQs to enable the resourcing and placement of multiple LNOs

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at BCT and maneuver BN TOCs without degradation to MP mission

requirements.

Organization: Ensure that documented MP BN and MP BDE rules of

allocation (ROA) take into account the geographic dispersion of units.

Organization: Add Personnel. Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) and

Intelligence Analyst at the company level. Both are critical to mission success.

Motor Sergeant should be an E7 position. Squad Leaders are only as good as

their linguists. Companies should be authorized U.S. hire linguists. Keeping as

close to 100% interpreter strength as possible is critical. The mention of utilizing

reservists in their civilian skill sets offers a combat multiplier with no additional

resource expenditures.

Leader Development and Education: Train MP Officers and NCOs

during OES and NCOES courses on best practices for working with and

coordinating with maneuver units and on the duties and responsibilities of an

LNO. The Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS3) course formerly

provided this training development and experience for officers.

Topic 2.7: MP Brigade, Battalion, and Company Capabilities

Discussion:

The OIF OE has placed additional and never before experienced demands on

MP organizations at all echelons from BDE to PLT. This complex battlefield

demanded that additional capabilities and assets were resident (organic) at the

CS MP BDE, CS MP BN, and CS MP CO levels. These required additional

capabilities included additional MP forces (units), personnel, and materiel

resources.

Most MP senior leaders interviewed consistently cited a need for additional MP

forces on the ground to better meet mission requirements and enhance support

to maneuver commanders prosecuting their missions. MP leaders indicated that

additional MP units were needed for both the PTT and the DO missions. One

MP senior leader stipulated that MNC-I needed approximately 30 additional PTTs

(the equivalent of four to five additional CS MP COs) to independently field

enough PTTs so that ILO units were no longer needed in order to meet PTT

mission requirements. This, in turn, would drive the requirement for two

additional MP BNs to C2 and / or provide oversight and coordination to PTT

operations. Similarly, he stated that MNF-I required additional MP units in order

to eliminate the need for any ILO units to conduct DO. MP BDE senior leaders

stipulated that the MP BDE needed an additional two to three CS MP COs given

current PTT mission set requirements within MND-B. This also would have

enabled the MP BDE to resume additional and more traditional MP missions (i.e.

AS, MMSO, etc.) in addition to PTT, thereby better contributing to overall mission

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success within MND-B as well as enhanced MP support to maneuver

commanders.

An MP BN senior leader cited the need for at least one additional CS MP CO to

cover the number of provinces within his respective MND AOR. Furthermore,

certain MP leaders stated that the personnel fill rule for deployment of MP units

to the ITO (i.e. units can deploy at P2 vice P1) needed to be changed to stipulate

that all units must deploy at P1. Units that deploy at P1 would have been better

postured to accomplish their respective mission sets.

MP leaders in OIF also indicated the need for additional capabilities and skill sets

resident within MP units at the CS MP BDE, CS MP BN, and CS MP CO levels.

Senior staff officers interviewed within the MP BDE and MP BNs indicated a

need for additional assets at the CS MP CO HQ, CS MP BN HQ, and CS MP

BDE HQ for personal security teams (PSD) for command teams, key staff, and

provincial PTTs to facilitate battlefield circulation and the conduct of the PTT

mission. Due to increasing demands on the MP BN and its mission to

independently conduct operations in support of various MNDs, certain MP

leaders suggested that the MP BN HQ needs to more closely mirror the MP BDE

HQ in terms of the more robust personnel, equipment, and capabilities resident

within the staff.

MP BN key leaders also indicated that the increasing emphasis on PIO resulted

in the need for an organic Human Intelligence (HUMINT) capability [i.e. HUMINT

Control Team (HCT) or HUMINT Team] at either the CS MP BDE or CS MP BN

level in order to develop contacts and informants and hand off as applicable for

source work by Military Intelligence (MI) personnel. Closely tied to this was the

stated need for assets at the CS MP CO, CS MP BN, and CS MP BDE levels

dedicated to the conduct, analysis, and synthesis of police intelligence in support

of the Police Intelligence Operations (PIO) battlefield function and the capability

to better participate in and support the maneuver unit targeting process. This

PIO capability at CS MP BDE and CS MP BN level [i.e. Criminal Investigation

Division (CID) Warrant Officer, CID NCO, or Military Police Investigations (MPI)

NCO] was needed to provide Police Intelligence on such items as crime

statistics, personnel connected to IP, types of crime, kidnappings, organized

crime, etc.

Key MP leaders also voiced the requirement for personnel, administration, and

logistic experts resident within the MP unit staff to better enable the unit to

conduct PTT operations with higher level police staffs. Those interviewed also

saw the need for MPI or CID capabilities at CS MP CO level to train IP on

investigations, evidence collection, and criminal intelligence and analysis.

Additionally, those interviewed stated that CS MP CO communications section

personnel must be afforded enhanced training on the myriad of new equipment

and devices in operation in the OIF OE. Certain interviewees described a need

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for MP to receive training in tactical questioning [similar to THT but not at the

same level of proficiency].

MP leaders additionally, saw a need for specific additional personnel within their

organizations. For example, additional MP Majors at the CS MP BDE or CS MP

BN HQs are sometimes needed to cover Provincial Director of Police (PDOP)

partnership requirements and thereby enable the CO CDR to focus on

commanding his subordinate elements in the conduct of their PTT mission. CS

MP BN leaders also mentioned a need for up to six additional MP CPT

authorizations in the MP BN S3 section to better enable the organization to meet

PTT and LNO requirements without degrading MP BN staff capabilities as well as

subordinate MP CO capabilities.

Additionally, certain interviewees mentioned the need for up to three MP SQDs at

the MP BN and MP BDE HQ levels to conduct personal security for the MP BDE

and MP BN command teams as well as PTTs sourced by the BN and BDE staffs.

Certain MP leaders also described the need for an Electronic Warfare Officer

(EWO) at the MP CO level, an Information Operations (IO) Officer at both the MP

BDE and MP BN levels to work directly with the respective BCTs and MND BCT

PM Sections, and an intelligence analyst at the MP CO HQ. Furthermore, CS

MP BN and CS MP CO leaders indicated a need to have IPAs integrated at the

CS MP CO level from pre-deployment training through deployment. They also

needed to have a single chain of command that provided consistent guidance.

Soldiers stated IPAs needed to come with specific critical skill sets over and

above basic ―beat cop‖ skills (i.e. former detectives to work criminal intelligence

and former instructors to spearhead IP training). Lastly, due to the large,

complex, and diverse vehicle fleet and ensuing intensive maintenance

requirements at the MP CO level, MP CO key leaders indicated that the CS MP

CO Motor Sergeant position should be authorized a SFC.

Lastly, some MP leaders interviewed stated that specific materiel resources were

required in order for them to better accomplish their assigned missions. MP BN

key leaders interviewed stated that Armored Security Vehicles (ASV) had

limitations in Baghdad and that some of their subordinate units were not using

them. As a result, they needed additional Up-Armored HMMWVs (UAH) and

MRAPs. Others mentioned a need for Escalation of Force (EOF) kits and the

requisite equipment / materiel required to enable effective data storage and data

mining capabilities (effective databases).

Insights / Lessons:

This war (OIF) has again proven that the MP Corps is severely short the

requisite number of MP units and force structure needed to meet mission

requirements.

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Given the complex mission set and size of the ITO, the span of control

(Rules of Allocation) for an MP BDE should not exceed three to four MP BNs.

Given the complex mission set and size of the ITO, the span of control

(Rules of Allocation) for an MP BN should not exceed three to four MP COs.

Span of Control (Rules of Allocation) for MP BNs and MP BDEs need to

take into account geographic dispersion. C2 of four MP COs or MP BNs may not

be effective if these units are too widely dispersed for the BN CDR and / or BDE

CDR and staffs to effectively C2 and sustain them.

IPAs should be embedded in MP (PTT) units prior to deployment to

facilitate pre-deployment training, preparation, cohesion, synchronization, and

unity of command.

With recent MP Corps growth, deploying MP units may be able to deploy

at P1; this might eventually reduce the number of MP COs needed for OIF

sourcing.

The MP BN and MP BDE staffs need enhanced capabilities and skill sets

and additional personnel in order to more effectively support mission

requirements in the OIF OE (COIN and Stability Operations environments).

MP COs, MP BNs, and MP BDEs must be resourced with the requisite

equipment, personnel, and training to effectively conduct PIO; there are

documented positions on the TOEs that refer to AS, MMSO, L&O, and I/R

positions, but none refer to PIO.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: Add COIN-related and Stability Operations-related additional

MP CO through MP BDE HQs staff responsibilities and requirements to MP

doctrinal manuals and related publications.

Organization: Add increased capabilities, skill sets, and positions (i.e.

PIO, IO, EWO, and HUMINT) to MP CO through MP BDE HQs.

Training: Develop enhanced PIO training courses at USAMPS.

Materiel: Develop databases and systems that enable efficient data

mining, data analysis, and data synthesis in support of PIO.

Leader Development and Education: Incorporate required additions to

the MP BN and MP BDE Pre-command Courses that educate future CDRs on

the capabilities of enhanced MP BN and MP BDE staffs.

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Leader Development and Education: Develop intensive MP staff officer

and NCO training events that enable MP staffs to exercise their abilities

collectively under challenging conditions.

Personnel: Add Additional Skill Identifiers (ASI) and Skill Identifiers (SI)

to specific enlisted and officer positions, respectively, within the MP CO, MP BN,

and MP BDE TOEs that better enable staff officers and NCOs to meet current

OE and mission demands.

Facilities: Provide requisite facilities (i.e. office space, barracks, etc.) to

accommodate enhanced MP BN and MP BDE staffs.

Topic 2.8: Corps and Division PM Capabilities

Discussion:

The OIF OE has placed additional and never before experienced demands on

PM staffs at the Corps and Division levels. This complex battlefield demanded

that additional capabilities, resources, personnel, and other assets were resident

(organic) within Corps and Division PM Sections. MP senior staff officers

interviewed consistently agreed with this assessment.

MNC-I PM Section senior staff officers cited various reasons for the increased

demands on the Corps PM Section. First, they indicated that the expansion and

evolution of the PTT mission was the number one reason for the expanded

personnel requirements within the Corps PM Section. Another contributing factor

was the subordination of the MP BDE doing the PTT mission under the MND-B,

which caused additional oversight requirements of MP BNs performing PTT

operations in support of other divisions. Additionally, with the large amount of

MP forces required in the ITO, the Force Generation planning requirement grew

significantly. Managing 14,000 deployed MP required an independent,

deliberate, and well-trained Force Generation cell within the MNC-I PM Section.

Senior staff officers also indicated that the ―post-hostility engagement‖ phase and

the ensuing requirements to perform functions as nation-builders drove

enormous requirements for C2, plans, and operations with limited inter-agency

involvement.

MP senior staff officers indicated that the MNC-I PM Section (and Corps PM

Sections in general) required additional manpower authorizations and

capabilities. The Joint Manning Document (JMD) authorizations for the MNC-I

PM Section were grossly insufficient. MNC-I PM senior staff officers indicated

that the current JMD only enables the section to perform approximately 25% of

its assigned duties, missions, and responsibilities. The JMD only provided 18

authorized personnel to work in the MNC-I PM Section. However, at the time of

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the interview, the MNC-I PM Section consisted of at total of 44 personnel. 18

personnel were provided through JMD authorizations, while the additional 26

personnel were either contractors or Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM). This

was the only way that the MNC-I PM Section could maintain oversight of all

required areas and missions. MNC-I PM senior staff officers cited an inadequate

JMD review process as contributing to the problem. Changes in section task

organization and mission sets of the MNC-I PMO were so frequent that the JMD

was never able to keep pace with change. The problem also stemmed from the

fact that sister services many times chose to not fill allocated joint slots on the

JMD. The MNC-I PM Section was generally organized into nine major sub-

sections: Plans (headed by an Army LTC), Detention Operations (DO) (headed

by a USAF LtCol), the Law Enforcement Forensics Lab (headed by an Army

MAJ), Force Generation (headed by an Army MAJ), Current Operations (headed

by an Army LTC), Law & Order (L&O) (headed by an Army MSG), Military

Working Dogs (MWD) (headed by an Army SFC MWD Program Manager), Iraqi

Police Advisors (IPA) (headed by a senior contractor), and Law Enforcement

Professionals (LEP) (headed by a senior contractor). This was in sharp contrast

to only five minimally-manned sub-sections authorized by the JMD (Plans,

Current Operations, MWD, DO, and L&O).

In order to be fully functional and effective, the MNC-I PM Section needed

significant augmentation in terms of personnel, skill sets, and capabilities. Senior

staff officers interviewed indicated that the JMD needed to authorize a robust

number of staff personnel that enabled the full manning of the nine major sub-

sections outlined above. Contractor and BMM solutions were not enduring or

long term solutions and would continue to force the PM section to fight for the

requisite number of personnel to efficiently conduct staff oversight, planning, and

operations. In one MNC-I PM Section staff officer‘s opinion, the ―Objective Corps

PMO‖ was a combination or summation of all authorizations within the MNC-I

PMO, the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT), and the Rule of

Law Task Force. This staff officer also stipulated that the PMO needed to be

modular in structure (so that one could add additional modules / sections) and

have a core of authorizations that were supplemented by documented

requirements.

Division PM Sections were similarly undermanned. Those personnel interviewed

also stated that the COE and the COIN / Stability Operations environment

affected and / or expanded the responsibilities and duties of the Division PM

Section. Specifically, the OIF OE resulted in an increased requirement for

Division PM Section personnel participation in working groups and increased

requirements stemming from PTT, NPTT, and MiTT support to the division. The

OE also led to a reorganization of one Division‘s PM Section into two major sub-

sections each tied to its primary responsibilities: DO and PTT. Division PM

Section staff officers indicated that they were not able to take on any additional

missions, but if they were resourced to do so, they felt that they should be

responsible for all missions relating to policing and corrections (i.e. NPTT and

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ISF DO). It is important to note that the OPCON and TACON of MP

organizations to divisions and BCTs for PTT greatly alleviated workload

requirements for the Division PM Sections. Without these C2 relationships, the

authorizations for the Division PM Sections would have been woefully inadequate

to meet mission requirements.

Division PM Section staff officers and NCOs generally agreed that TOE

authorizations were marginally adequate to accomplish OIF duties,

responsibilities, and missions. They indicated that they could continue to get by

with the resources they had on hand, but could easily use additional personnel

and enhanced capabilities. While most Division PM Sections deployed at 100%

strength, one Division PM SGM indicated that his section was at 60% available

strength due to requirements to divert some of their personnel to other duties and

organizations such as manning of the Division ISF Cell, support to Military

Transition Teams (MiTT), and support to the JVB for the Division. Personnel

interviewed indicated that Division PM Sections required one additional 31BZ6

(MWD Handler) NCO, one additional 31E (I / R Specialist) NCO, and at least one

additional company grade MP Officer while deployed. In one division, the need

for additional personnel was offset by the OPCON MP BN that provided

personnel to man the Division ISF Cell for PTT. Personnel interviewed also

noted that the Division PM Section required NCOs and officers who had attended

MP technical skills courses as well as the Battle Staff Course and recommended

the addition of certain MP technical SIs and ASIs to the Division PM Section

TOE.

Some senior MP staff officers recommended robust additions and modifications

to the Division PM Section. Recommendations included authorizing a 31A O-6 to

serve as the Division PM (build x10 MP COL positions - one per each Active

Component Division), adding an MWD Program Manager organic to the Division

PM Section, and adding an SJA (27A O-3) within DIV PM Section to work RoL

issues. Additionally, the Division PM Section required the capability to conduct

intensive planning efforts, conduct more effective battle tracking, and operate

more like a miniaturized version of an MP BN S3 Section in addition to serving as

an advisory organization to the Division CDR and subordinate maneuver BNs.

Insights / Lessons:

Corps PM Sections need to be fully resourced and documented on TOEs;

we can no longer strip out the Long Range Plans Section from the CS MP BDE

and make it the heart of the Corps PM Section with the BDE CDR dual-hatted as

the Corps PM.

Customs operations need to be a function of large Army transportation

commands rather than MP organizations; need to mirror the USAF customs

concept of operation where customs is organized and integrated into the

transportation / movement process.

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PM oversight, integration, planning, and synchronization of contractor

organizations and solutions are critical to ensuring that contractor efforts and

operations are effective, productive, integrated into MP operations, and nested

within overall MP planning efforts.

The OPCON of MP BNs and MP BDEs to the divisions forces Division PM

Sections to redefine their roles and responsibilities and to reorganize accordingly

in support of the division.

Division PM Section composition and authorizations need to be enhanced

in order to better meet mission requirements in COIN and Stability Operation

environments.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: Update MP Operations, Division Operations, and Corps

Operations doctrinal manuals to include the expanded compositions and

responsibilities of PM Sections at all echelons.

Organization: Add authorizations within the Corps HHC TOE to fully

resource and man a robust Corps PM Section that is completely independent of

MP BDE plugs.

Organization: Add authorizations to the Division PM Section within the

Division HHC TOE to better enable it to accomplish the expanding roles and

responsibilities stemming from COIN and Stability Operations in the COE.

Training: Add and / or enhance blocks of instruction to MP OES and

NCOES courses to ensure that MP leaders can function as productive members

of Corps and Division PM Sections (i.e. Force Generation, MWD Employment,

Corps and Division Staff Composition and Responsibilities, Military Decision

Making Process at Corps and Division Levels, Corps and Division level DO, Law

& Order Support in a Deployed Environment, MP Support to Security Force

Assistance).

Leader Development and Education: Develop a Corps / Division PM

Leader Course (or TSP) to prepare officer and NCO leaders to assume

responsibilities within a PM Section.

Personnel: Add required MP personnel to Corps and Division HHCs.

Identify bill payers as required.

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Topic 2.9: MP Assets Organic to the BCT

Discussion:

The BCT MP PLT and BCT PM Section organic within a BCT provided only

limited MP support to the BCT Commander. Additional MP assets needed to be

resident (organic) within the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), Heavy

Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), and Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT).

Those interviewed stated this would have provided more robust MP support to

maneuver commanders as they prosecuted their missions.

Many leaders conveyed that, in their opinion, the Army‘s conversion to modularity

and the resulting decision to make the BCT the centerpiece of the Army‘s

maneuver / combat force left the BCT with woefully inadequate organic MP

assets within its formation. Within the IBCT and HBCT, organic MP assets

consisted of a BCT PM Section (comprising 1x 31A CPT PM, 1x 31B4O PM

SGT, and 1x 31E4O I/R Specialist) and one MP PLT comprising 42 personnel

and 14 combat vehicle platforms [a mix of Armored Security Vehicles (ASV) and

Up-armored HMMWVs (UAH)]. The BCT MP PLT was assigned to the

Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) of the BSTB. The Stryker BCT

(SBCT) varied somewhat from this model in that it only had a PM Section

(comprising 1x 31A MAJ and 1x 31B4O PM SGT). The SBCT did not have an

organic MP PLT.

Adding to the problem was that many of the BCT PM Sections were not manned

adequately. Specifically, three of the four BCT PM Sections interviewed reported

that they were undermanned and that all had experienced increased missions

due to the enormity and complexity of operations. For instance, two BCTs

reported that they did not have their authorized 31E4Os, while another BCT

indicated that it had a 31A 1LT instead of its authorized 31A CPT. Despite being

undermanned, the BCT PM Section‘s assigned responsibilities continuously

expanded to meet the dynamic mission requirements of the OIF OE. BCT PM

Section responsibilities typically included such tasks as MWD oversight (for

anywhere from two to five MWD teams), DO oversight, force protection (FP),

customs, IP development support and synchronization, police intelligence

information sharing, Law Enforcement Professional (LEP) program oversight,

special projects, and anything security related (i.e. mission analysis and COA

development for various security scenarios). The lack of authorized personnel,

coupled with the expanded and complex mission sets described above, left the

BCT PM Section lacking in terms of personnel and capabilities.

The four BCT PM Sections interviewed unanimously recognized the need for

additional personnel within their sections as well. First, all BCT PMs stated that

the BCT PM should be a 31A MAJ, the PM SGT should be a 31B5O, and the

I / R Specialist should be a 31E4O. These changes would allow the PM Section

to have better parity with other staff sections and would enable them to achieve a

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better audience with BCT CDR and CSM. Another BCT PM interviewed also

stipulated the need for a 31A CPT Plans Officer and 31B3O Plans NCO.

Another BCT saw the need for an Assistant PM Operations Sergeant position

preferably filled by a 31B2V5 (MPI qualified SGT). One BCT PM saw the need

for an additional company grade officer to oversee the Division Holding Area

Annex (DHAA), thereby enabling the MP PLT Leader to oversee the operations

of his entire PLT. These additional assets and skills would have helped the PM

better support the BCT CDR in a timely and effective manner.

The four BCT PM Sections interviewed also unanimously recognized the need

for additional capabilities within their sections. Cited skill sets and capabilities

included the ability for the PM Section to simultaneously conduct customs, DO,

FP, MWD management, police investigation skills, forensics / evidence collection

skills, MDMP skills, military intelligence skills, and battle staff procedures skills.

To illustrate this point, one BCT PM reported that the BCT CDR and staff always

looked to the BCT PM Section to be the subject matter expert (SME) for PTT,

DO, and FP. He went on to state that, collectively and if done to standard, these

missions exceeded the capabilities of the small number of authorizations

allocated to the BCT PM Section.

Of equal importance was the collective observation that the BCT MP PLT is not

able to provide an adequate level of organic MP support to the BCT. Most BCT

PM Section personnel and BCT MP PLT personnel interviewed indicated that, at

a minimum, there needed to be an entire MP CO resident (organic) within the

BCT to better enable it to provide the level of MP support to maneuver

commanders required in the OIF OE. Others indicated that even more MP

assets (up to one MP BN) were required to better accomplish required tasks in

the current COIN and Stability Operations environment. Having only one MP

PLT organic to the BCT severely limited the ability of that MP PLT to significantly

contribute to the overall mission set of the BCT and to truly provide support to

maneuver CDRs on the ground. Most BCT MP PLTs were limited to conducting

DO and personal security missions, thereby preventing them from participating in

other missions such as PTT. This left many BCT MP leaders wanting to conduct

additional missions in support of the BCT.

The task organization and assignment of the BCT MP PLT presented some

challenges as well. BCT PM Section and BCT MP PLT senior leaders indicated

that the organization of the BCT MP PLT under the BSTB HHC was ineffective

and inefficient. They felt that this current organization resulted in the MP PLT

being left out of the BCT planning process, not being viewed as a BCT asset,

and, in many cases, ultimately being forgotten about. In many instances, BCT

and BSTB CDRs and staffs viewed the MP PLT as a BSTB asset rather than a

BCT asset. As a result, most believed that the BCT MP PLT should be assigned

to the BCT HHC and fought / maneuvered by the BCT S3 and BCT CDR. In only

one BCT did the BCT CDR make the decision to remove the MP PLT from the

BSTB and pull it up to the BCT level to be managed by the BCT Staff. This

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enabled the BCT CDR and Staff to better weight the effort of MP skills to

maneuver priorities and caused maneuver BNs to have better visibility of MP

capabilities available to support their mission sets.

Insights / Lessons:

One MP PLT organic to the IBCT and HBCT is not enough to effectively

support the continuously increasing MP requirements within the BCT mission set

in the OIF OE.

To provide it minimal MP capability, the SBCT needs to have the same

amount of organic MP assets within its formation as the IBCT and HBCT.

The limited amount of MP assets currently organic within the BCT

severely limits the ability of the MP PLT to truly contribute to the overall BCT

mission set.

The limited amount of MP assets currently organic within the BCT

severely limits the ability of the MP PLT to actually provide support to maneuver

commanders on the ground.

Due to limited numbers and types of MP positions resident within the BCT,

HRC needs to assign the right type of personnel to these critical positions; these

positions need to be filled by MP leaders who are professional, competent,

aggressive, and true experts in the full spectrum of MP operations and functions.

DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: Ensure any future increases in MP force structure within the

SBCT, IBCT, and HBCT are documented in both MP and maneuver unit doctrine

as appropriate.

Organization: Increase / modify MP force structure within the IBCT,

HBCT, and SBCT in the following ways:

o All BCT PM Sections should be authorized a minimum of a 31A

MAJ PM, a 31B5O PM OPS SGT, and a 31E4O I/R Specialist.

o Add additional authorizations to the BCT PM Section: at least one

31A CPT Plans Officer, one 31B3O Plans NCO, one 31B2V5 Assistant OPS

SGT, and one 31B1O Driver.

o Increase the MP PLT authorization within the BCT to a minimum of

one MP CO (complete with CO HQ structure) and place under BSTB.

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o Immediately move the MP PLT from the BSTB to the BCT HHC.

o Incorporate LE technical skill-related Skill Identifiers (SI) and

Additional Skill Identifiers (ASI) to officer and NCO positions, respectively, within

the BCT PM Section and BCT MP PLT TOEs to serve as a forcing function for

these personnel to obtain enhanced LE technical KSAs.

Materiel: Provide requisite equipment to any increase in MP force

structure within the BCT (i.e. vehicles, weapons, communications equipment) at

a proportionate basis of issue as that of the current BCT MP PLT.

Materiel: Add one complete combat vehicle platform to the BCT PM

Section to enable them to move independently or with other units depending on

threat levels.

Leader Development and Education: Establish a BCT PM course at

USAMPS that prepares MP officer and NCO leaders to function effectively as a

member of the BCT PM Section and BCT Staff.

Personnel: Add required MP personnel to BCT formations; identify bill

payers as required.

Facilities: Provide requisite facilities to any increase in MP force

structure within the BCT (i.e. barracks, arms rooms, motor pools, office space) at

a proportionate basis of issue as that of the current PM Section and BCT MP

PLT.

Topic 2.10: MP Company in Support of a BCT

Discussion:

Military Police Companies are an integral part of the Brigade Combat Team

(BCT) team. The MP Company commander must be a part of the BCT and this

includes attending the targeting meetings. The BCT commander typically met

with National Police Transition Teams (NPTT), Police Transition Teams (PTT)

(MP Company Commander), Military Transition Teams (MTT), Iraqi Police (IP)

District Commander, the Iraqi Security Force (ISF), and the brigade staff to

identify priority of effort (themes) that all would pursue the following two weeks as

all tried to enhance the security environment for the area of operations. The

meeting was an Iraqi led meeting that included discussions of issues /

challenges, ―targets‖ forces would pursue, and a review of information from the

past two weeks of activities. Units stressed this joint coordination meeting was

essential in coordinating and synchronizing all elements of host nation

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development in order to meet security and development needs. It included

security, rule of law, and development representatives. In security operations it

was important to link other HN development leads in order to maximize the

efforts of all those elements that enhance public trust and security.

Leaders relayed to the CAAT that MP need training in several areas—

investigations, crime scene processing, and Arab culture. Further, they

recommended that MP receive host nation training on local laws, criminal justice

system process, and the HN process for managing police stations and policing

efforts in order to help MP train IP and enforce laws.

Military Police lieutenants, while trained in basic police skills, were attempting to

influence more senior and experienced host nation police officers and this

sometimes caused problems for the unit. This was overcome by forceful

leadership and self development.

Military Police units TACON to the maneuver commander in a COIN environment

have a unique challenge. The maneuver commander ―owns‖ the AO and as he

tries to balance protection with population engagement, he might make a

decision for his assigned personnel on the force protection posture for a given

community. While the supporting MP forces might abide by the supported

commander‘s direction / order to travel with so many vehicles or other

heightened protection posture, when the supported commander directs a lesser

―aggressive profile‖ for a given area (or reduced protection posture), the

supporting MP units in his area of operation remain in their parent unit protective

posture. This often resulted in the supported commander having some

personnel in different postures / uniforms engaging the same populace.

Insights / Lessons:

All echelons of a supporting unit must be fully integrated into the

supported unit. This will ensure complete synchronization and integration of

enabling efforts in support of the maneuver commander‘s efforts and intent.

MP participation in Joint coordination meetings, which involved all

stakeholders working an issue, should be sustained.

Maneuver commanders are responsible for establishing the conditions for

successful operations within the battlespace. Within a COIN environment, this

includes establishing the force protection posture Soldiers will portray to the

populace. All supporting units should work toward enhancing the maneuver

commander‘s efforts in this line of operation.

The more technical training that can be imparted on our junior leaders, the

better they will be able to support the maneuver commander.

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DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: MP and COIN doctrine should emphasize the full participation

of all elements of the rule of law triad (legal, penal, law enforcement) in the joint

security meetings.

Training: MP need additional training in investigations, crime scene

processing, and Arab culture.

Training: MP need host nation training on local laws, criminal justice

system process, and the HN process for managing police stations and policing

efforts in order to help MP train IP and enforce laws.

Topic 2.11: BCT MP Platoon Employment

Discussion:

The employment and task organization of the BCT MP PLT within the BSTB

provided very limited MP support to maneuver commanders. MP leaders

reported that the employment and task organization of the BCT MP PLT

negatively impacted its ability to provide optimal MP support to maneuver

commanders. The limited MP assets (one MP PLT) organic to the BCT, coupled

with its assignment within the BSTB HHC, resulted in a situation in which the

BCT MP PLT did not, in essence, provide any significant support to the

maneuver BNs within the BCT as nearly all MP PLT assets were committed to

BSTB internal missions. Some BCTs tasked MP PLTs to conduct DO and

personal security missions for the command team, BCT level staff, and Provincial

Reconstruction Teams (PRT). Most BCT MP leaders interviewed believed that

many maneuver BN CDRs and staff were not familiar with MP capabilities and

battlefield functions and were not aware that they could request MP support from

the BCT staff for specific missions or events. Additionally, many BCT PMs felt

isolated from and unable to impact the operations of the MP PLT due to their

assignment to the BSTB HHC.

BCT MP PLT missions (within interviewed BCTs) ranged widely from one BCT to

the next. The recurring theme, however, was the fact that in no instance did any

element of the BCT MP PLT provide any support to maneuver BNs within the

BCT. Cited BCT MP PLT missions included DO at the DHAA, personal security

for BCT key leaders, security for route clearance teams from the BSTB, detainee

escort (backhaul and transfer), convoy escorts (for EOD, gravel, MWD, etc.),

Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) reaction force for Forward Operating

Bases (FOB), barrier emplacement security, and other miscellaneous BSTB

missions as dictated by the BSTB staff. Most BCT MP key leaders interviewed

felt that these missions were a restrictive use of the tremendous firepower and

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mobility of the BCT MP PLT and also a less-than-optimal employment and

leverage of MP technical skills.

When queried, most BCT PM Section personnel, as well as, BCT MP PLT

personnel recommended that the BCT MP PLT be removed from the BSTB and

assigned to the BCT HHC. This would have better enabled the BCT S3 to task,

maneuver, task organize, and assign priorities to the BCT MP PLT. MP leaders

stated this task organizational change in itself would have made it easier to meet

the BCT CDR‘s intent and better support the mission sets of the BCT and its

maneuver BNs. This would also have resulted in a situation where the BCT MP

PLT would have been a high visibility and well-known asset that could have been

requested by maneuver commanders and staffs for specific missions as required.

This, in turn, would have facilitated better support to the maneuver commander

as he prosecuted his assigned missions on the battlefield. Some BCTs have

recognized this and have taken action.

Certain BCT MP leaders interviewed stipulated that the MP PLT could have

better supported maneuver commanders and could have been more optimally

employed through the conduct of such missions as AS within the BCT AO,

MMSO (with a focus on MSR security) within the BCT AO, Point of Origin (POO)

(for indirect fire attacks) site interdiction, PTT operations, cordon and search (site

exploitation / evidence collection), blocking position support to maneuver BNs,

and initial reaction force (IRF) operations for FOB security. Many even

suggested that the best utilization of the BCT MP PLT would have been for it to

have been employed in a Direct Support (DS) role to the BCT‘s maneuver BNs

(either in its entirety for specific operations and short periods of time or by having

one MP SQD DS to each maneuver BN as a habitual relationship over extended

periods of time). The bottom line is that, if the BCT MP PLT was assigned to the

BCT HHC, it would have better enabled it be truly viewed as a BCT asset. Those

interviewed stated this relationship might have resulted in more optimal and

efficient employment that better supported the maneuver commander in areas

such as site exploitation, PTT, and DO.

Insights / Lessons:

The employment and task organization of the BCT MP PLT has degraded

the ability of this limited, yet valuable, asset to provide effective and value-added

MP support to maneuver commanders.

BCT MP PLTs could significantly contribute to the PTT mission and overall

security mission within their respective BCT AOs if diverted from other missions

that do not capitalize on MP technical expertise.

BCT MP PLTs that are organized under the BCT HHC and controlled by

the BCT CDR and S3 can provide better MP support to maneuver commanders

within their AOs.

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DOTMLPF Implications:

Doctrine: Add detailed information on MP capabilities, functions, and

employment (such as site exploitation and cordon and search support) to

maneuver unit doctrine.

Organization: Remove the BCT MP PLT from the BSTB HHC and assign

it to the BCT HHC, thereby making it a BCT asset that directly supports

maneuver commanders.

Leader Development and Education: Establish a BCT PM course that

prepares MP Officer and NCO leaders to function effectively as a member of the

BCT PM Section and BCT Staff.

Leader Development and Education: Add block of instruction on BCT

MP PLT capabilities, functions, and employment to all BCT and BSTB Pre-

Command Courses (PCC), to include incorporation into the practical exercise

portion at PCC at Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Facilities: Provide requisite and / or expanded facilities (i.e. arms room,

office space, motor pool, barracks) to the BCT HHC to enable the incorporation

of the BCT MP PLT to that formation.

Topic 2.12: NL Weapons and Munitions Applications

Discussion:

Maneuver Commanders seemed reluctant to employ NL weapons / munitions in

the OIF OE (COIN / Stability Operations environments). While NL weapons and

munitions have proven their worth through wide application in DO within Theater

Internment Facilities (TIF), maneuver commanders were hesitant to employ them

elsewhere in the OIF OE. NL weapons and munitions, if employed correctly,

could be a great tool within a Stability Operations environment to determine

hostile or benign intent of unidentified individuals on the battlefield. However,

several MP leaders interviewed stated that maneuver leaders were still reluctant

to use NL weapons and many times placed so many limitations on their use that

Soldiers found it easier to just use lethal weapons and munitions.

While most MP leaders interviewed were aware of the various NL weapons and

munitions available, there were mixed reviews on the application and utility of NL

weapons and munitions in the OIF OE. There were several challenges related to

these views. First, most of those interviewed indicated that there was a shortage

of NL trained personnel. Second, units deployed to OIF needed NL weapons

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sets that were more modular (i.e. SQD sets rather than just PLT sets) and easier

to order components for. Third, many BCT MP leaders were restricted from

using NL weapons and munitions in the DHAA, but all felt that they should be

able to employ them within that mission set. Most importantly, however, leaders

indicated that one of the primary problems affecting the employment of NL

weapons and munitions within the OIF OE was the lack of a set theater standard

of incorporation of NL into the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Escalation of

Force (EOF) procedures.

Further exacerbating the issue was the fact that the availability of NL weapons

and munitions was inconsistent across the ITO. Some MP leaders indicated that

NL weapons and munitions were available to them whenever they wanted and in

as much quantity as desired. Others, however, stated that any requests they

submitted for NL weapons and munitions were always denied. The most

common forms of NL weapons and munitions documented as being on hand

were NL shotgun munitions, green lasers, dazzlers, and riot control gear. It was

important to note that the largest capability gap cited by MP senior staff officers

was the absence of the Active Denial System (ADS) in the ITO. MNC-I

submitted multiple Operational Needs Statements (ONS) for this system, but all

were denied.

Most MP leaders indicated that NL weapons and munitions played a valuable

role in Stability Operations. Primarily, those interviewed stated that it had great

application for EOF procedures (prior to using lethal force) at checkpoints, Joint

Security Station (JSS) entry control points and guard towers, FOB / Coalition

Outpost (COP) entry control points and guard towers, within division-level

detainee holding facilities, and for the purpose of crowd control. It also had the

potential to contribute to ―winning the hearts and minds‖ in COIN by not inflicting

undue injury or death. MP leaders indicated that, while NL had great potential for

use in Stability Operations, it was overridden by a fear of potentially misusing the

weapon systems. There appeared to be a belief that it was easier to simply kill

an individual through the use of lethal weapons than to accidentally fire NL

munitions, injure the individual, and then have to risk liability for NL misuse or

improper / inadequate training.

Other leaders indicated that they saw little application of NL in the OIF OE

outside of the DO mission set. Specifically, some mentioned that a secure

environment must exist before use of NL can become truly useful. To illustrate

this point, one MP leader stated the following: ―Why fire a NL round at a possible

SVBIED when our current SOP is a lethal shot in safe direction at the vehicle. I

believe our current use of NL with our gunners is ineffective. The gunner‘s ability

to quickly transition from NL to lethal based on the current threat has been taken

away with the incorporation of NL rounds. NL is just another step to slow down

the EOF measures.‖ This clearly depicted the challenges associated with the

OIF OE and the concerns with NL use in an environment that remained kinetic

and deadly.

U.S. UNCLASSIFIED

REL NATO, GCTF, ISAF, MCFI, ABCA

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 3) - page 1