Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2)

Appendix D

D-12

JP 3-15.1

aa. (U)

Victim-Operated Switch.

A type of switch that is activated by the actions of

an unsuspecting individual. These devices rely on the target for the device carrying out some
form of action that will cause the device to function. Can include target selection switches or
anti-tamper switches.

6. (U) Technical Categorization—Initiators

(U) Any component that may be used to start a detonation or deflagration is an initiator;

it may or may not be a detonator.

a. (U)

Blasting Cap/Plain Detonator.

A device containing a sensitive explosive

intended to produce a detonation wave. Can be either electric or nonelectric (plain).

b. (U)

Electric Initiator.

An initiator for which functioning is initiated by an electrical

impulse that creates heat or a spark.

c. (U)

Exploding Bridge Wire.

An initiator or system in which a very high-energy

electrical impulse is passed through a bridge wire, literally exploding the bridge wire and
releasing thermal and shock energy capable of initiating a relatively insensitive explosive in
contact with the bridge wire.

d. (U)

Heat Initiator.

A type of initiator that serves as an igniting element through the

application of heat. This may include direct heat to a sensitive explosive.

e. (U)

Light/Flash Bulb Initiator.

Devices used as electric initiators that incorporate

an improvised use of the bulb to initiate primary or low explosives.

f. (U)

Nonelectric Initiator.

An initiator for which functioning is initiated by

nonelectric means.

g. (U)

Percussion Initiator.

An initiator that serves as an igniting element when

mechanically struck.

h. (U)

Shock Tube.

A thin, plastic tube of extruded polymer with a layer of high

explosive deposited on its interior surface that propagates a detonation wave to the blasting
cap.

i. (U)

Squib/Igniter.

A device used to initiate low explosives or high explosives when

used in an appropriate firing train. In general, any chemical, electrical, or mechanical device
used to ignite a combustible material.

j. (U)

Time Fuse/Safety Fuse.

A pyrotechnic contained in a flexible and weatherproof

sheath burning at a timed and constant rate; used to transmit a flame to the detonator or a low
explosive charge with a predetermined delay.

Weapons Technical Intelligence Construct of Improvised Explosive Devices (U)

D-13

7. (U) Technical Categorization—Main Charge

(U) The explosive charge that is provided to accomplish the end result in a munition is

the main charge. Note: Examples for end results are bursting a casing to provide blast and
fragmentation, splitting a canister to dispense submunitions, or producing other effects for
which it may be designed.

a. (U)

Blasting Accessory.

Devices and materials used in blasting, such as, but not

limited to, cap crimpers, tamping bags, blasting machines, blasting galvanometers, and
detonation cord.

b. (U)

Bulk Explosives.

Manufactured explosive charges in their original packaging or

that have been removed from weapons or munitions.

c. (U)

Commercial Explosives.

Explosives produced and used for commercial,

industrial, or recreational applications.

d. (U)

Directional Effect.

Type of main charge configuration in which the explosive

effect is channeled to an intended area.

e. (U)

EFP.

Specially designed main charge configuration incorporating an explosive

charge with a machined or pressed concave metal plate which by the force of the charge
reshapes the plate into a high-temperature, high-velocity metal slug capable of penetrating
armored vehicles.

f. (U)

High Explosives.

Materials that detonate; they do not require confinement as

they react chemically to produce heat, gas, a rapid expansion of matter, and a shock wave in
the explosion.

g. (U)

Improvised Claymore.

An improvised weapon, military or homemade,

designed to explosively propel a fan shaped pattern of ball bearings or other fragmentation in
an aimed direction.

h. (U)

Improvised Explosives.

Nonstandard explosive mixtures/compounds that have

been formulated/synthesized from available ingredients. Most often utilized in the absence
of commercial/military explosives. Also referred to as homemade explosives.

i. (U)

Improvised Grenade.

An improvised weapon, military or homemade, designed

to explode when a restraint is removed (usually handheld, but can be projected).

j. (U)

Improvised Mortar.

An improvised weapon, military or homemade, designed to

launch an explosive charge to the target.

k. (U)

Improvised Rocket.

An improvised weapon, military or homemade, designed to

propel an explosive charge to the target.

l. (U)

Incendiary.

Chemical mixtures that are intended and designed to cause fires.

Appendix D

D-14

JP 3-15.1

m. (U)

Low Explosives.

Combustible materials that are characterized by deflagration.

They do not produce a shock wave, generally requiring confinement to explode.

n. (U)

Main Charge Configuration.

The arrangement or design of the main charge

and other materials (usually metal) to create an effective weapon to attack personnel,
vehicles, or structures.

o. (U)

Military Explosives.

Explosives manufactured for military use.

p. (U)

Munitions.

Ammunition, ordnance, or demolition charges containing

explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics, initiating composition, or nuclear, biological, or
chemical material for use in military operations.

q. (U)

Omni-Directional Effect.

An aspect of main charge configuration in which the

explosion is omni-directional and expands in all directions; includes improvised rockets,
mortars, and grenades.

r. (U)

Platter Charge.

The use of an explosive to propel a metal plate toward a target

in a manner in which the plate remains intact.

s. (U)

Propellant.

An energetic explosive that produces high volumes of gas when

ignited. Propellant product gasses are utilized in work suitable for affecting the controlled
propulsion of a solid body, such as a projectile or rocket. Propellants are classified as low
explosives.

t. (U)

Shaped Charge.

A main charge configuration incorporating a metal liner shaped

so as to concentrate its explosive force in a particular direction in order to cut or penetrate
(e.g., a plasma jet).

8. (U) Technical Categorization—Power Sources

(U) A device that stores or releases electrical or mechanical energy. The key elements

of information about a power source are its type/source, number of batteries and their
configuration (series or parallel), its voltage (if electrical), and how it is connected to close
an IED switch.

a. (U)

Alternating Current.

Electric current that flows through a circuit in both

directions with the change in direction occurring with a well-defined and specified
frequency.

b. (U)

Direct Current.

Electric current that flows through a circuit in just one

direction.

c. (U)

Mechanical Energy.

A retained spring that acts as the energy source.

Weapons Technical Intelligence Construct of Improvised Explosive Devices (U)

D-15

9. (U) Technical Categorization—Container

(U) A vessel commonly used to conceal the principal components of an IED is a

container.

a. (U)

Concealment Container.

A vessel commonly used to prevent the discovery of

an IED by visual inspection.

b. (U)

Confinement Container.

A vessel commonly used to hold the main charge

together.

10. (U) Enhancements (See Figure D-6)

(U) An optional additional component deliberately added as opposed to a secondary

hazard that modifies the effects of the IED. The IED would be effective, yet produce a
different measurable result, if this material were not added. The effect can be additional
physical destruction, proliferation of dangerous substances (e.g., radiation, chemicals), or
other results to enhance the effect of the IED.

a. (U)

Biological Enhancement.

A microorganism and/or biologically derived

compound or molecule that causes disease in people, plants, or animals, or causes the
deterioration of material.

Figure D-6. (U) Enhancements

ENHANCEMENTS

Nails

Ball Bearings

Fragmentation

Flame Fougasse

Propane

Radiological

Pebbles

Scrap Metal

Fuel

Powdered Metals

Gasoline

Military

Biological

Commercial

Homemade

Chemical

Appendix D

D-16

JP 3-15.1

b. (U)

Chemical Enhancement.

Chemical agent included in an IED and specifically

designed to cause death or other harm through toxic properties.

c. (U)

Flame Fougasse.

Typically a mixture of petrol (gasoline) and oil in a 40/60

ratio.

d. (U)

Fragmentation Enhancement.

Shrapnel and small objects designed to be

accelerated by explosive forces.

e. (U)

Fuel Enhancement.

An incendiary material designed to enhance the burning

and visual effect of the device.

f. (U)

Radiological Enhancement.

Radioactive materials that cause casualties or

restrict the use of terrain when dispersed by an explosive charge. May also be described as a
radiological dispersal device.

E-1

APPENDIX E

COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE ANNEX TEMPLATE (U)

(U) SECTION A. INTRODUCTION

(U) Below is a sample format that a joint force staff can use as a guide when developing

a C-IED annex for a joint OPLAN. The exact format and level of detail may vary somewhat
among joint commands, based on theater-specific requirements and other factors. However,
joint OPLANs will always contain the basic five paragraphs (such as paragraph 3,
“Execution”) and their primary subparagraphs (such as paragraph 3a, “Concept of
Operations”).

(U) CJCSM 3122.01,

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume

I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures)

, describes joint operation planning interaction

between the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the supported joint commander, and other joint planning and execution community members,
and provides models of planning messages and estimates. CJCSM 3122.03,

Joint Operation

Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II: (Planning Formats)

, provides the

formats for joint OPLANs when commanders must submit OPLANs in accordance with
JOPES policy requirements.

(U) SECTION B. OPLAN FORMAT

(U) Copy No. ______________________

(U) Issuing Headquarters

(U) Place of Issue

(U) Effective Date/Time Group

(U) OPERATION PLAN: (Number or Code Name)

(U) USXXXXCOM OPERATIONS TO…

(U) References: (List any maps, charts, and other relevant documents deemed essential to
comprehension of the plan.)

1. (U) Situation

a. (U)

General.

The use of IEDs has proven to be an effective tactic and weapon of

strategic influence. IEDs are complex, adaptive systems. Challenging and unpredictable
employment tactics, successful attacks without central direction, the social complexity of
IED networks, and the strategic impacts caused by IEDs create an ill-structured strategic
problem for US forces. C-IED is a focus of special effort for the command due to the unique
and challenging nature of an IED attack, the extreme difficulty in defeating the IED threat,
the adverse psychological effects a successful IED campaign has on friendly forces and local

Appendix E

E-2

JP 3-15.1

populations, and the overall confidence of an adaptive enemy. C-IED is a combination of
collective efforts and operations that include the offensive and defensive measures taken to
defeat the IED network.

b. (U)

Purpose.

This annex describes C-IED functions and assigns responsibilities for

the execution of

Plan XX

. It provides the concept for the scheme of C-IED operations, gives

employment guidelines, and assigns missions to component command C-IED Task Forces.

c. (U)

Enemy Forces.

Annex B (Intelligence). Refer to (Intelligence Estimate) for the

typical structure of an IED network (each network is unique yet contains the same functions
in varying capacity).

d. (U)

Friendly Forces.

Annex A (Task Organization)

2. (U) Mission

(U) Mission. Basic Plan.

3. (U) Execution

a. (U)

Concept of Operations.

In order to achieve goals outlined in the basic plan,

Combatant Command X

conducts simultaneous C-IED actions coordinated through the six

planning phases: Phase 0—Shape, Phase I—Deter/Engage, Phase II—Seize the Initiative,
Phase III—Dominate/Decisive Operations, Phase IV—Stabilize, and Phase V—Enable Civil
Authority. While some JOAs are further along in the phases individually, across the whole
AOR, we are currently in

Phase X

. (General note: The combatant command should

establish a core set of C-IED enablers that run through each phase. As the phases progress,
the enabler will take on more fidelity or responsibility for action. An example would be
dynamic network analysis for IED network modeling (nonmaterial solution) or supply chain
countermeasures (materiel solution).)

(1) (U) Phase 0—Shape: This phase will set conditions that provide friendly forces

(US and partners) the freedom of action to conduct operations against the enemy and deter
the use of IEDs. These activities will be designed to enhance US and partner access to
priority and high-priority countries and develop the appropriate theater infrastructure
required to support C-IED operations against the enemy. By shaping the environment,

Combatant Command X

will create conditions that inhibit the IED threat from gaining a

foothold. This phase will establish an environment hostile to the IED network and establish
the battlefield infrastructure required to execute

Plan XX

(a) (U) Phase 0—Operational Objectives:

1. (U) Shape future behavior within regional area by expanding security

cooperation with allies and PN to protect US interests and prevent the spread of extremist
ideology.

2. (U) Develop relationships with and ensure operational access to allies

and PNs to enable effective partnerships in times of crisis.

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Annex Template (U)

E-3

3. (U) Propagate memorandums of agreement and memorandums of

understanding with the interagency to prevent bureaucratic restrictions.

4. (U) Establish mechanisms through the HN or the Department of State to

leverage commercial supply chains.

5. (U) Establish mechanisms through the HN to leverage local

telecommunication networks and to provide support to the communications strategy within
the local, national, and regional media sources.

6. (U) Adapt to changing and complex security environment.

(b) (U) Phase 0—Essential Capabilities:

1. (U) Network Attack. Establish a federated node and integrate into the

C-IED federated enterprise for access to C-IED information. Develop a phased ISR plan for
multilayered C-IED operations. Perform military intelligence operations to identify IED
networks and their supporters. Conduct dynamic network analysis to define IED network
structures and relationships.

2. (U) C-IED Training. Ensure friendly forces, individuals and staffs, are

appropriately postured and trained to conduct C-IED operations as

Plan XX

is executed.

3. (U) International. Establish relationships with partner organizations

and nations through embassy and country teams, military attachés, and other multiagency
efforts for information and capability sharing to build C-IED capacity throughout the region.

4. (U) Planning. Develop model for a joint C-IED task force if

Plan XX

enters offensive operations.

environment favorable to US interests and HN objectives. The results of the shaping
activities will be a favorable environment established for friendly forces to interdict the
target set at the place and time of their choosing.

(2) (U) Phase 1—Deter: This phase will set the conditions required to conduct

offensive actions against the IED threat network and achieve decisive results outlined in

Plan

and facilitate the competency of allied and PN C-IED organizations.

(a) (U) Phase 1—Operational Objectives:

1. (U) Bilaterally with HN, conduct direct action against known bomb

makers and facilitators

2. (U) Monitor environment to detect and predict IED trends and attacks.

3. (U) Exploit IED network C2 and decision-making capability.

Appendix E

E-4

JP 3-15.1

4. (U) Defend MNFs from the effects of IEDs.

5. (U) Develop proper C2 infrastructure with defined command

relationships and robust communications to link the strategic, operational, and tactical levels
of the C-IED campaign.

6. (U) Establish procedures to collect, consolidate, and disseminate IED

and C-IED lessons learned throughout the AOR.

7. (U) Establish procedures to identify capability needs, request new

technologies, and prioritize technology programs.

8. (U) Conduct JIPOE to identify key sources of IED supplies and critical

IED production facilities.

9. (U) Identify existing C-IED organizations within the AOR and establish

procedures for coordinated and supported efforts.

10. (U) Protect PNs from the effect of IEDs.

11. (U) Engage PN governments to assist in developing their C-IED

capabilities.

12. (U) Conduct joint C-IED exercises and training with allies and PNs.

13. (U) Conduct C-IED operations to implement strategic communication

guidance.

14. (U) Use elements of IO targeting AOR populations in order to

discredit the use of IEDs as an accepted tactic.

(b) (U) Phase 1—Essential Capabilities:

1. (U) Network Attack. Perform multilayered, multi-intelligence analysis

to identify IED networks. Conduct dynamic network analysis to define IED network
structures and relationships.

2. (U) C-IED Training. Ensure friendly forces, individuals and staffs, are

appropriately postured and trained to conduct C-IED operations as enemy tactics evolve.

3. (U) International. Share information through embassy and country

teams, military attachés, and other multiagency efforts to build C-IED capacity throughout
the region.

4. (U) Planning. Implement model for a joint C-IED task force

appropriately staffed for the threat level.

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Annex Template (U)

E-5

1. (U) Establishment of competent allied and HN C-IED organizations.

2. (U) Establishment of an environment and indigenous population that is

non-supportive of IED activity and its supporting network.

3. (U) The emplacement of a C2 structure that synchronizes all strategic-,

operational-, and tactical-level C-IED efforts and establishes unity of effort throughout the
AOR.

4. (U) Establishment of procedures to capture TTP and technology lessons

learned; technology capabilities and limitations; and methods to share lessons learned with
forces throughout the theater.

(3) (U) Phase 2—Seize the Initiative: This phase will shift the main effort to the

destruction of enemy IED networks and contain the spread of IEDs throughout the area of
operations.

(a) (U) Phase 2 Operational Objectives:

1. (U) Conduct detailed JIPOE focused upon the specific IED networks

the JOAs and conduct tailored CFA on the networks.

2. (U) Identify effective TTP and technologies to defeat IEDs.

3. (U) Source, in significant quantities, networks proven effective against

emplaced devices.

4. (U) Execute the explosive remnants of war (ERW) reduction plan to

decrease the supply of IED components.

5. (U) Test and develop technologies to defeat anticipated future devices

and emplacement tactics.

6. (U) Initiate joint interdiction operations that neutralize bomb makers,

facilitators, and resources.

7. (U) Transition applicable C-IED solutions to HN forces and MNFs.

8. (U) Engage HN governments to assist in developing their C-IED

capabilities.

9. (U) Execute IO targeting AOR populations in order to discredit the use

of IEDs as an accepted tactic.

(b) (U) Phase 2 Essential Capabilities:

1. (U) Network Attack. Perform multilayered, multi-intelligence analysis

to identify, attack, and defeat IED networks. Conduct dynamic network analysis to define
IED network structures and relationships.

Appendix E

E-6

JP 3-15.1

2. (U) C-IED Training. Ensure friendly forces, individuals and staffs, are

appropriately postured and trained to conduct C-IED operations as enemy tactics evolve.

3. (U) International. Share information through embassy and country

teams, military attachés, and other multiagency efforts to build C-IED capacity throughout
the region.

4. (U) Planning. Implement model for a joint C-IED task force

appropriately staffed for the threat level.

1. (U) Effective technologies fielded in significant quantities to defend all

MNFs in theater against current IED techniques.

2. (U) C-IED joint interdiction operations established.

3. (U) ERW reduced to a manageable level. Accountability and security

maintained over remaining ERW stockpiles.

4. (U) HN has a trained and ready C-IED force.

5. (U) Focused research and development on anticipated IED techniques.

6. (U) Institutionalize C-IED efforts throughout DOTMLPF.

(4) (U) Phase 3—Dominate: This phase will focus on defeating IED networks and

reduce IED employment throughout the area of operations.

(a) (U) Phase 3 Operational Objectives:

1. (U) Identify, target, and interdict all elements of the IED network, with

specific emphasis on critical nodes and commodities of network.

2. (U) Continue ERW reduction plan.

3. (U) Continue to target and neutralize bomb makers and facilitators.

4. (U) Continue to engage HN governments to assist in developing their

C-IED capabilities.

(b) (U) Phase 3—Essential Capabilities:

1. (U) Network Attack. Perform multilayered, multi-intelligence analysis

to identify, attack, and defeat IED networks. Conduct dynamic network analysis to define
IED network structures and relationships.

2. (U) C-IED Training. Ensure friendly forces, individuals and staffs, are

appropriately postured and trained to conduct C-IED operations as enemy tactics evolve.

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Annex Template (U)

E-7

3. (U) International. Share information through embassy and country

teams, military attachés, and other multiagency efforts to build C-IED capacity throughout
the region.

4. (U) Planning. Implement model for a joint C-IED task force

appropriately staffed for the threat level.

1. (U) Severely restrict insurgent and terrorist IED networks’ freedom of

action and movement.

2. (U) Destroy and disrupt IED networks.

3. (U) PN populations unsupportive of IED use within the AOR.

4. (U) IED critical components developed out of theater are tracked and

interdicted.

5. (U) ERW reduced to a manageable level. Accountability and security

maintained over remaining ERW stockpiles.

(5) (U) Phase 4—Stabilize the Environment: This phase will shift the main effort

from US forces defeating IED networks to HN forces responsible for C-IED operations.

(a) (U) Phase 4 Operational Objectives:

1. (U) Protect the US, MNF (if applicable), and HN from the effects of

IEDs.

2. (U) Develop and share C-IED capability within the MNF and HN.

3. (U) Transition control of the C-IED effort from US to HN.

(b) (U) Phase 4—Essential Capabilities:

1. (U) Network Attack. Perform multilayered, multi-intelligence analysis

to identify, attack, and defeat IED networks. Conduct dynamic network analysis to define
IED network structures and relationships.

2. (U) C-IED Training. Ensure that friendly forces, with special emphasis

on HN forces, are appropriately postured and trained to conduct C-IED operations as enemy
tactics evolve.

3. (U) International. Share information through embassy and country

teams, military attachés, and other multiagency efforts to build C-IED capacity throughout
the region.

Appendix E

E-8

JP 3-15.1

4. (U) Planning. Implement model for a joint C-IED task force

appropriately staffed for the threat level.

1. (U) HN assumes lead role in executing C-IED efforts.

2. (U) HN manned, trained, and equipped to execute C-IED efforts.

(6) (U) Phase 5—Enable Civil Authority: This phase will shift the main effort to

support legitimate civil governance in the theater and ensure that the HN military can
effectively and independently perform C-IED operations.

(a) (U) Phase 5—Operational Objectives:

1. (U) Enable viability and provision of essential civil services.

2. (U) Train HN forces.

(b) (U) Phase 5 Essential Capabilities:

1. (U) C-IED Training. Ensure friendly forces, individuals and staffs, are

appropriately postured and trained to conduct C-IED operations as enemy tactics evolve.

2. (U) International. Share information through embassy and country

teams, military attachés, and other multiagency efforts to build C-IED capacity throughout
the region.

b. (U) Tasks

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

[Expand this section as necessary.]

4. (U) Administration and Logistics

[Expand this section as necessary.]

5. (U) Command and Control

[Expand this section as necessary.]

F-1

APPENDIX F

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE NETWORK ACTIVITIES (U)

(U) C-IED operations should begin with a thorough understanding of the enemy and the

common activities associated with an IED attack.   IED attacks are the results of many
interrelated activities, including planning, financing, material procurement, bomb making,
target selection, recruiting, and attack execution.  Understanding each activity can assist
commanders and their staffs in identifying adversary vulnerabilities and points of attack.
Once identified, these vulnerabilities can be exploited to disrupt the IED network and break
the enemy’s operational chain of events.

1. (U)

Strategic Leadership.

A person or group that provides the strategic direction

and purpose for the network. This leadership may coordinate the activities between regional
and local nodes.

2. (U)

Regional and Local Leadership.

A person or group that carries out the

operations delegated by the international leadership. A network can also be made up of
many splinter organizations carrying out specific orders from a larger, more centralized
group.

3. (U)

Recruiting.

Recruiting includes the activities related to the act of building a

force of operatives, including trainers, technicians, bomb makers, treasurers, comptrollers or
accountants, emplacers, fighters, suppliers, distributors, fund-raisers, donors, and financial
service providers to carry out the group’s campaign.

4. (U)

Training.

Training is the act of providing a means to educate recruited

personnel in a skill needed to perform a role in the overall effort. Some personnel may be
trained as engineers, while others may be trained to emplace IEDs.

5. (U)

Target selection and planning.

Planners must first select a target before

mission planning can begin; this will be based on ISR assessments and overall campaign
objectives of network leadership. Target selection and planning will become more complex
as friendly security and C-IED capabilities grow.

6. (U)

Surveillance.

Includes observing and assessing potential targets to collect

information used in the planning of IED operations. Through observation, the enemy collects
valuable information on troop movements, times of vulnerability, and target vulnerability.
These observations also aid the enemy planner with critical information, such as ideal IED
emplacement locations, high-traffic areas, concealment data, observation points, and avenues
of approach, escape, and reinforcement.

7. (U)

Attack Rehearsal.

A rehearsal prepares the IED team for its actions and tests

and evaluates the plan of attack.

8. (U)

Movement.

Movement is the physical transport of devices, supplies, personnel,

and possibly money (cash funds) into and out of an operational area during pre- and post-

Appendix F

F-2

JP 3-15.1

detonation phases. Movement may also take place during an incident that distracts friendly
forces.

9. (U)

Financing.

This includes the fund-raising, funding, and financial facilitation

activities required to establish, maintain, and grow networks of IED cells and pay for the cost
of their operations, including, but not limited to, the cost of planning and executing IED
attacks. Financing also includes the electronic transfer of funds and other methods of
finance required to procure IED parts, components, and technology.

10. (U)

Supplies.

The materials required to execute IED operations.

11. (U)

IED Makers.

People involved in the design and fabrication of an IED.

12. (U)

IED Team.

The personnel who emplace, monitor, and detonate the IED. The

team may also include an element to videotape the explosion for exploitation/propaganda
purposes.

13. (U)

International Support.

Support in the form of funding, financial facilitation,

training, organization, recruiting, publicity, and planning assistance that is provided to the
group from nonlocal sources, including sympathetic foreign nations and states,
nongovernmental organizations, terrorist organizations, media outlets, and other
organizations or individuals.

14. (U)

Regional and Local Support.

Active local support consists of efforts on the

part of citizens and other locals to assist enemy IED efforts (such as looking out for troops
while IEDs are being placed or donating supplies). Active local support may also be the
result of the local or regional IED networks providing employment opportunities to
individuals who would otherwise be unemployed. Passive local support for insurgent IED
efforts consists of the refusal of citizens and other locals to give US or multinational troops
information or assistance. Passive local support of IED efforts results in part from fear of
reprisal, but may also be attributed to sympathy with enemy objectives.

15. (U)

Orders Group.

The orders group (which may have no formal name) is a small

cell made up of one or more members of the regional and/or local leadership and possibly the
IED maker(s). It is designed to coordinate the IED effort including the procurement of IED
components while compartmenting information in case of infiltration or discovery.

16. (U)

Battle Damage Assessment.

Battle damage assessment is the act of observing,

which may include videotaping the event for propaganda purposes, the detonation or
aftermath of an explosion to evaluate the destruction of the IED. Often this is a decision
point for the enemy to initiate a follow-on attack or egress out of the kill zone.

17. (U)

Emplacement.

This is the positioning of an IED for the purpose of conducting

an attack. It may be simply placing an IED by a road or burying a large device at a specific
location.

18. (U)

Monitor and Detonate.

The act of observing the area of emplacement in order

to command detonate an IED.

Improvised Explosive Device Network Activities (U)

F-3

19. (U)

Ideology and Other Motivating Factors.

The set of reasons, including the

body of ideas shaped by social, religious, cultural,  and criminal factors,  that drive the
formation of a network, dictate function, and govern behavior.  Regardless of motivation, the
TTP, or business model, for planning, executing, assessing, and exploiting IED attacks or
events may be the same.

20. (U)

Infrastructure.

IED makers require an infrastructure of safe houses, work

areas, storage facilities, and transport or courier facilities to move devices, supplies, cash,
and personnel.

21. (U)

IO.

The enemy can be very effective in using IO as a method of promoting

group success; for example, the filming of attacks may enhance recruiting efforts and
encourage support by portraying a positive image of the group’s operations.

G-1

APPENDIX G

REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-15.1 is based upon the following primary references:

1. Strategic Guidance and Policy

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.

National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.

National Military Strategy.

d. Department of Defense Directive 2000.19E,

Joint Improvised IED Defeat

Organization.

2. Joint Publications

a. JP 2-01.3,

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

b. JP 3-0,

Joint Operations.

c. JP 3-11,

Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN)

Environments.

d. JP 3-13,

Information Operations.

e. JP 3-16,

Multinational Operations

f. JP 3-33,

Joint Force Headquarters.

g. JP 5-0,

Joint Operation Planning.

3. Allied Joint Publications

Allied Joint Publication-3.15,

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations.

4. Service Publications

FM 3-90.119 (Field Manual Interim 3-34.119/Marine Corps Interim Publication 3-

17.01).

Combined Arms Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Operations.

5. General

a. US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 09-49,

IED-Defeat Leader’s

Handbook,

2009.

b. Defense Intelligence Agency and Joint IED Defeat Organization Handbook,

Weapons Technical Intelligence Handbook,

2009.

H-1

APPENDIX H

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint

Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting
Center, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Support Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA
23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency,
and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the XXX. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this

publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO:

DA WASHINGTON DC// G35-SSP//

INFO:

JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-7-JEDD//

CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JT10//

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint and

Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Support
Division and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development, J-7/JEDD.

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that
directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal.
The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes
to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted.

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be in accordance
with DOD 5200.1-R,

Information Security Program

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET) and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil
(SIPRNET), and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant

commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments or

GL-1

GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABIS

Automated Biometric Identification System

AOR

area of responsibility

ATF

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives

(DOJ)

AtN

attack the network

AWG

Asymmetric Warfare Group (Army)

BCT

brigade combat team

BEI

biometrics-enabled intelligence

BIAR

biometric intelligence analysis report

BIMA

Biometrics Identity Management Agency

command and control

CARVER

criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability,

effect, and recognizability

CBRN

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

CBRNE

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield

explosives

CEHC

Counter Explosive Hazards Center (Army)

CELLEX

cellular exploitation

CEXC

combined explosives exploitation cell

CFA

critical factors analysis

CIDNE

Combined Information Data Network Exchange

C-IED

counter-improvised explosive device

CITP

counter-improvised explosive device targeting program

CJCSM

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual

CJTF

commander, joint task force

COIC

counter-improvised explosive device operations

integration center

COIN

counterinsurgency

CONOPS

concept of operations

CONUS

continental United States

COP

common operational picture

CREW

counter radio-controlled improvised explosive device

electronic warfare

CRT

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield

explosives response team

CSS

combat service support

CTF

counter threat finance

DHS

Department of Homeland Security

DIA

Defense Intelligence Agency

DNA

deoxyribonucleic acid

Glossary

GL-2

JP 3-15.1

DOD

Department of Defense

DOJ

Department of Justice

DOMEX

document and media exploitation

DOTMLPF

doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and

education, personnel, and facilities

EFP

explosively formed projectile

EHCC

explosive hazards coordination cell

EHDB

explosive hazard database

EHT

explosive hazard team

EMS

electromagnetic spectrum

EOCA

explosive ordnance clearance agent

EOD

explosive ordnance disposal

ERW

explosive remnants of war

electronic warfare

EWCC

electronic warfare coordination cell

EWO

electronic warfare officer

F2T2EA

find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess

F3EAD

find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

field manual (Army)

G-3

assistant chief of staff, operations

G-5

assistant chief of staff, plans

G-7

assistant chief of staff, information engagement

GCC

geographic combatant commander

GEOINT

geospatial intelligence

HARC

human intelligence analysis and reporting cell

host nation

HPT

high-payoff target

HUMINT

human intelligence

HVI

high-value individual

I2WD

Intelligence and Information Warfare Division (Army)

IED

improvised explosive device

information operations

ISR

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

irregular warfare

J-2

intelligence directorate of a joint staff

J-3

operations directorate of a joint staff

J-7

engineering staff section

JDIGS

Joint Digital Information Gathering System

JEFF

Joint Expeditionary Forensic Facility (Army)

Glossary

GL-3

JET

joint expeditionary team

JFC

joint force commander

JIEDDO

Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization

JIOC

joint intelligence operations center

JIPOE

joint intelligence preparation of the operational

environment

JISE

joint intelligence support element

JKnIFE

Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization

Knowledge and Information Fusion Exchange

JOA

joint operations area

JOPES

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

JOPP

joint operation planning process

joint publication

JTAIC

Joint Technical Analysis and Integration Cell (Army)

JTCOIC

Joint Training Counter-Improvised Explosive Device

Operations Integration Center

JTF

joint task force

LEP

law enforcement professional

LOO

line of operation

MAGTF

Marine air-ground task force

MCTOG

Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group

MCWL

Marine Corps Warfighting Lab

MNF

multinational force

MRX

mission readiness exercise

MSC

major subordinate command

mtDNA

mitochondrial deoxyribonucleic acid

NAI

named area of interest

NAVEODTECHDIV

Naval Explosives Ordnance Disposal Technology Division

NGIC

National Ground Intelligence Center

OPCON

operational control

OPLAN

operation plan

ORSA

operations research and systems analysis

PBIED

person-borne improvised explosive device

partner nation

RCIED

radio-controlled improvised explosive device

RCT

regimental combat team

REF

Rapid Equipping Force (Army)

RFI

request for information

RFS

request for support

RSOI

reception, staging, onward movement, and integration

Glossary

GL-4

JP 3-15.1

S&T

science and technology

S-2

battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer (Army;

Marine Corps battalion or regiment)

S-3

battalion or brigade operations staff officer (Army;

Marine Corps battalion or regiment)

SIGINT

signals intelligence

SIPRNET

SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network

SME

subject matter expert

TACON

tactical control

TDC

target development cell

TECHINT

technical intelligence

TEDAC

Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (FBI)

TFE

threat finance exploitation

THT

tactical human intelligence team

TIDE

Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment

tactical questioning

TSA

target system analysis

TTP

tactics, techniques, and procedures

USG

United States Government

USMC

United States Marine Corps

UXO

unexploded ordnance

VBIED

vehicle-borne improvised explosive device

WBIED

waterborne improvised explosive device

WIT

weapons intelligence team

WMD

weapons of mass destruction

WMD-E

weapons of mass destruction-elimination

WTI

weapons technical intelligence

GL-5

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

asymmetric.

In military operations the application of dissimilar strategies, tactics,

capabilities, and methods to circumvent or negate an opponent’s strengths while
exploiting his weaknesses. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

attack the network operations.

Lethal and nonlethal actions and operations against

networks conducted continuously and simultaneously at multiple levels (tactical,
operational, and strategic) that capitalize on or create key vulnerabilities and disrupt
activities to eliminate the enemy’s ability to function in order to enable success of the
operation or campaign. Also called

AtN operations.

(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-

02.)

counter-improvised explosive device operations.

The organization, integration, and

synchronization of capabilities that enable offensive, defensive, stability, and support
operations across all phases of operations or campaigns in order to defeat improvised
explosive devices as operational and strategic weapons of influence. Also called

C-IED

operations.

(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

explosive hazard incident.

The suspected or detected presence of unexploded or damaged

explosive ordnance that constitutes a hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or
material. Not included in this definition are the accidental arming or other conditions
that develop during the manufacture of high explosive material, technical service
assembly operations, or the laying of mines and demolition charges. (Approved for
replacement of “explosive ordnance disposal incident” and its definition in JP 1-02.)

explosive ordnance disposal procedures.

None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

final disposal procedures.

None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

improvised explosive device.

A weapon that is fabricated or emplaced in an

unconventional manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or
incendiary chemicals designed to kill, destroy, incapacitate, harass, deny mobility, or
distract. Also called

IED.

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

intelligence summary.

None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

man portable.

None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

recovery procedures.

None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

render safe procedures.

The portion of the explosive ordnance disposal procedures

involving the application of special explosive ordnance disposal methods and tools to
provide for the interruption of functions or separation of essential components of
unexploded explosive ordnance to prevent an unacceptable detonation. (Approved for
incorporation into JP 1-02.)

Glossary

GL-6

JP 3-15.1

technical escort.

An individual technically qualified and properly equipped to accompany

designated material requiring a high degree of safety or security during shipment.
(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-15.1 as the source JP.)

technical evaluation.

The study and investigations by a developing agency to determine the

technical suitability of material, equipment, or a system for use in the Services.
(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

weapons technical intelligence.

A category of intelligence and processes derived from the

technical and forensic collection and exploitation of improvised explosive devices,
associated components, improvised weapons, and other weapon systems. Also called

WTI.

(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

Maintenance

Approval

Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #3 - Approval

STEP #2 - Development

l
l
l
l

JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for
signature

l
l
l

LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first
draft (FD)
PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
FD comment matrix adjudication
JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to
JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
J

adjudicates FC comment

matrix
FC joint working group

oint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS)

STEP #4 - Maintenance

JP published and continuously
assessed by users
Formal assessment begins
24-27 months following
publication
Revision begins 3.5 years
after publication
Each JP revision is completed
no later than 5 years after
signature

STEP #1 - Initiation

Joint doctrine development
community (JDDC) submission to fill
extant operational void
Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-
end analysis
Joint Doctrine Planning Conference
validation
Program directive (PD) development
and staffing/joint working group
PD includes scope, references,
outline, milestones, and draft
authorship
JS J-7 approves and releases PD to
lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant
command, JS directorate)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT

DOCTRINE

JP 1

LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEM

PLANS

OPERATIONS

PERSONNEL

INTELLIGENCE

JP 1-0

JP 2-0

JP 3-0

JP 4-0

JP 5-0

JP 6-0

OPERATIONS

JP 3-0

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the

series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below

illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint

Publication (JP) 3-15.1

Operations

ARMY, MARINE CORPS, NAVY, AIR FORCE

MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

AIR LAND SEA

APPLICATION

CENTER

ADVISING

MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS,

TECHNIQUES, AND

PROCEDURES FOR

ADVISING FOREIGN

FORCES

FM 3-07.10

MCRP 3-33.8A

NTTP 3-07.5

AFTTP 3-2.76

September 2009

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:

Distribution authorized to DOD

and DOD contractors only to protect technical or operational
information from automatic dissemination under the International
Exchange Program or by other means. This protection applies
to publications required solely for official use and to those
containing valuable technical or operational information. This
determination was made on 14 November 2008. Other requests
will be referred to:

HQ TRADOC, ATTN: ATFC-EJ, Ft Monroe, VA 23651-1067;
HQ MCCDC, ATTN: C427, Quantico, VA 22134-5021;
NWDC, ATTN: N5, Norfolk, VA 23511-2723; and
LeMay Center, ATTN: DDJ, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6112

DESTRUCTION NOTICE:

Destroy by any method that will

prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

FOREWORD

This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective
commands and other commands as appropriate.

JOSEPH E. MARTZ

Brigadier General, US Army
Deputy Director/Chief of Staff,
Army Capabilities Integration Center

W. L. MILLER, JR.

Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Director
Capabilities Development Directorate

WENDI B. CARPENTER

Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commander
Navy Warfare Development Command

STEPHEN J. MILLER

Major General, US Air Force
Commander
Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine
Development and Education

This publication is available through the ALSA Web site

(

www.alsa.mil

); through the Army at Army Knowledge Online (AKO)

(

www.us.army.mil

) and at the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and

Doctrine Digital Library (

www.train.army.mil

) Web sites; and through the

Air Force at the Air Force Publishing Web site (

www.e-publishing.af.mil

10 September 2009 FM 3-07.10 / MCRP 3-33.8A / NTTP 3-07.5 / AFTTP 3-2.76

PREFACE

1. Purpose

This multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publication will assist in
advising foreign forces. It serves as a reference to ensure coordinated multi-Service
operations for planners and operators preparing for, and conducting, advisor team
missions. This MTTP is intended to provide units and personnel that are scheduled to
advise foreign forces (FF) with viable tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) so that
they can successfully plan, train for, and carry out their mission. Currently, material
regarding advising is found in joint and Service doctrinal treatment of foreign internal
defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), security assistance (SA), and unconventional
warfare (UW). Several Services are developing documents that focus on basic survival
and common advisor skills, but do not sufficiently cover how an advisor team might
function at all levels. This MTTP provides guidance that will help to enhance the
activities of some advisor functions and improve inter-Service coordination for this joint
mission.

2. Scope

This publication incorporates the positions of organizations within each Service that
relate to preparing, controlling, and employing advisors with FF. Information in this
MTTP publication incorporates TTP extracted from existing Service doctrine,
publications, and directives, as well as joint, Service, and coalition lessons-learned,
subject matter expert (SME) input, and other identified best practices. It is designed for
use by advisors at all levels, in any region or theater, and provides guidance for tactical
forces on conducting advisor team planning and training.

3. Applicability

This MTTP publication applies to all commanders, their staffs, and individuals
participating in advising missions with FF.

4. Implementation Plan

Participating Service command offices of primary responsibility (OPR) will review this
publication, validate the information and, where appropriate, reference and incorporate
it in Service manuals, regulations, and curricula as follows:

Army

. Upon approval and authentication, this publication incorporates the

procedures contained herein into United States (US) Army Doctrine and Training
Literature Program as directed by the Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC).

Marine Corps

The Marine Corps will incorporate the procedures in the publication

in US Marine Corps training and doctrine publications as directed by the Commanding
General, US Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). Distribution is
in accordance with the Marine Corps Publication Distribution System (MCPDS).

Navy

. The Navy will incorporate these procedures in US Navy training and doctrine

publications as directed by the Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command
(NWDC)[N5]. Distribution is in accordance with Military Standard Requisition and Issue
Procedure Desk Guide (MILSTRIP Desk Guide) Navy Supplement Publication-409
(NAVSUP P-409).

Marine Corps PCN: 144 000174 00

FM 3-07.10 / MCRP 3-33.8A / NTTP 3-07.5 / AFTTP 3-2.76 10 September 2009

Air Force

. The Air Force will incorporate the procedures in this publication in

accordance with applicable governing directives. Distribution is in accordance with Air
Force Instruction (AFI) 33-360.

5. User Information

a.  TRADOC, MCCDC, NWDC, LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and
Education, and the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center developed this publication
with the joint participation of the approving Service commands. ALSA will review and
update this publication as necessary.
b.  This publication reflects current joint and Service doctrine, command and control
organizations, facilities, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures. Changes in
Service protocol, appropriately reflected in joint and Service publications, will likewise
be incorporated in revisions to this document.
c.  We encourage recommended changes for improving this publication. Key your
comments to the specific page and paragraph and provide a rationale for each
recommendation. Send comments and recommendations directly to—

Army

Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command
ATTN: ATFC-EJ
Fort Monroe VA 23651-1067
DSN 680-3951 COMM (757) 788-3951
E-mail: doctrine.monroe@us.army.mil

Marine Corps

Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration
ATTN: C 116
3300 Russell Road, Suite 204
Quantico VA 22134-5021
E-mail: Publication POC at https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil

Navy

Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command
ATTN: N5
1530 Gilbert St STE 2128
Norfolk, VA 23511-1723
DSN 948-1070/4201 COMM (401) 841-1070/4201
E-mail: alsapubs@nwdw.navy.mil

Air Force

Commander, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education
ATTN: DDJ
115 North Twining Street
Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6112
DSN 493-2640/2256 COMM (334)953-2640/2256
E-mail: afddec.ddj.workflow@maxwell.af.mil

ALSA

Director, ALSA Center
114 Andrews Street
Langley AFB VA 23665-2785
DSN 575-0902 COMM (757) 225-0902
E-mail: alsa.director@langley.af.mil

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2) - page 35