Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2)

Chapter V

V-12 JP

3-15.1

management board is chaired by the deputy commanding general. It is designed to allocate
resources, to include ISR, to support the overall C-IED effort. Membership includes the
JTF’s primary staff and senior representatives of the component commands. The
management board, if established, reviews and decides upon the recommendations
developed by the J-3’s (or C-IED task forces) C-IED working group. The C-IED
management board provides general officer-level updates on the IED threat and trends and
MSC concerns relating to C-IED efforts in equipment, training and intelligence.
Recommendations produced by the management board include:

(1) (U) C-IED-specific IO recommendations.

(2) (U) C-IED equipment distribution recommendations.

(3) (U) Decisions on C-IED technology requirements.

(4) (U) Priorities for asset allocation as pertains to C-IED efforts (ISR, air

platforms, route clearance, and EOD efforts).

c. (U)

J-3 C-IED Working Group.

Depending on the commander’s requirements, J-3

recommends the formation of a C-IED working group (Figure V-7). The working group,
consisting of representatives from the J-2, J-2 collection management, J-2 plans, J-7, J-3
plans, J-3 operations, C-IED task force, and other members, as required, is tasked to work
specific issues related to the C-IED plan. These issues can include anything from developing
major refinements to the C-IED plan to developing the command response to major
developments in the adversary’s employment of IEDs. While the working group usually
focuses on a specific IED-related issue of significant importance to the JTF, it can become a
standing body to establish, plan, coordinate, and manage the overall C-IED initiatives. IED
working groups may also be established at the MSCs. MSC-level working groups are
designed to identify C-IED-related issues that require JTF-level action/intervention. MSC-
level issues are presented to the J-3 C-IED working group via their working group
representatives.

d. (U)

Component Command-Level C-IED Working Groups.

When required, IED

working groups are also established at the joint force component commands. These working
groups are responsible for focusing C-IED efforts within their respective operational area to
mitigate current and future IED threats.

e. (U)

Specialized Cells for C-IED Task Force Operations.

There are a number of

specialized cells within the C-IED task force organization that can be created to develop
policy and provide direction for the JTF’s overall C-IED operations. These cells are
normally integrated into the C-IED task force’s principal staff (primarily the operations and
plans and policy staffs). These cells include:

(1) (U)

C-IED Intelligence Cell.

Discussed in detail in paragraph 2,

“Intelligence,” this cell is a specialized intelligence cell created to address a wide range of
issues related to the command’s C-IED plan. The cell, normally placed under C-IED task
force J-2, can be assigned a variety of tasks from IED event analysis, determining IED
trends, and IED pattern analysis.

Staff

Responsibilities

(U)

V-13

(2) (U)

Plans and Policy Cell.

The C-IED task force J-3’s plans and policy cell is

responsible for developing the command’s C-IED plan and for ensuring that the plan is
closely tied to the command’s overall COIN plan. The cell’s tasks include:

(a) (U) Developing the C-IED plan.

(b) (U) In accordance with the CJTF’s policy guidance, establishing the

command’s policies on IED event reporting to include timelines, IED data collection
standards, and dissemination of information.

disseminate C-IED TTP force-wide on a regular basis. Employ specialized mobile training

Figure V-7. (U) Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Working Group

COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

WORKING GROUP

Training Cell

J-2

J-3

J-7

MSC

C-IED

Task Force

Defeat the Device

Train the Force

Attack the Network

Plans and Policy Cell

J-2, J-3, J-7, J-9, SJA, MSCs, C-IED Task Force,

HN, PA

Technology

Cell

J-2

J-3

J-7

MSC

C-IED

Task Force

Assessment Cell

J-2, J-3, J-7, J-9, MSC, IO, JIEDDO,

CITP, C-IED Task Force

LEGEND

C-IED

counter-improvised explosive device

CITP

counter-IED targeting program

host nation

IED improvised

explosive

device

information operations

J-2

intelligence directorate of a joint staff

J-3

operations directorate of a joint staff

J-7

engineering staff section

J-9

civil-military operations staff section

JIEDDO

Joint IED Defeat Organization

MSC

major subordinate command

public affairs

SJA

staff judge advocate

Chapter V

V-14 JP

3-15.1

teams to routinely conduct assistance visits to subordinate units providing the latest
information on IED-related TTP and appropriate countermeasures.

(d) (U)

Technology Cell.

This cell is responsible for reviewing friendly force

protection and C-IED technologies, identifying potential shortfalls, and recommending near-
term solutions. It forwards all short-term recommendations through operations for
implementation within the JTF and provides longer-term recommendations through the chain
of command and C-IED task force for submission to JIEDDO for action.

(e) (U)

Training Cell.

This cell is responsible for reviewing friendly force

C-IED training programs and TTP, identifying potential shortfalls, and recommending near-
term (that can be addressed by the force’s organic training capabilities, i.e., unit-level TTP or
by mobile training teams) and long-term (for service or joint predeployment training)
solutions. Near-term recommendations are forwarded through the J-3 for implementation
within the command. Longer-term recommendations are forwarded, through the chain of
command, to DOD level for action by the appropriate Service.

f. (U)

Targeting.

The C-IED working group plays a critical role in developing and

recommending C-IED-related targets for lethal and nonlethal engagement. The C-IED
working group develops critical vulnerability candidates in each function area within the
overall IED network. Actionable targets and targets for development are matched to these
critical vulnerabilities. Targets for development steer requirements for intelligence.
Actionable targets that, if actioned together, will disable a critical vulnerability, are
prioritized in a list of recommended targets with recommended means of engagement (lethal
and nonlethal). This list is forwarded for consideration and action by the command’s
targeting board.

6. (U) Coordinating with Supporting Theater- and National-Level Counter-Improvised
Explosive Device Organizations

a. (U) In organizing the operational area for the C-IED effort, the commander will have

the ability to call upon assistance from highly specialized theater military, DOD, national,
and interagency assets that can deploy elements forward to augment the JTF staff. The
theater, national, DOD, and interagency assets can perform a wide variety of functions
designed to degrade the insurgents’ IED infrastructure from detailed forensic/technical
evaluations of IEDs, to managing an HVI targeting effort. The major theater- and national-
level C-IED enablers include:

b. (U) CEXC

(1) (U) The CEXC is a Navy-led task organized unit created to meet technical and

forensic intelligence requirements for the combatant commander. It provides expert-level
technical and forensic exploitation and analysis of IEDs and associated components,
improvised weapons, and other weapons systems in order to determine enemy tactics,
identify IED trends and bomb makers, and assist in the development of defensive and
offensive C-IED measures. Depending on the theater requirements, the CEXC construct is
often augmented by law enforcement professionals (LEPs), CITP personnel, intelligence

Staff

Responsibilities

(U)

V-15

analysts, and MNFs work closely with other forensic/exploitation labs and other government
departments and agencies to provide more synergetic and extensive exploitation capabilities
to the combatant commander. Some of the capabilities include:

(a) (FOUO) Conducting first-line technical and forensic exploitation and

evaluation of IEDs and components, and preparing detailed laboratory reports for all
exploited materiel.

(b) (FOUO) Providing technical assistance and advice on EOD, force

protection, and combat tactics regarding the threat posed by IEDs and counter-IED TTP.

the targeting process.

(d) (FOUO) Providing technical assistance to support the interrogation of IED-

related detainees.

(e) (FOUO) Assisting in operations against suspected bomb makers and

transporters, IED factories, storage locations, and training sites.

(f) (FOUO) Providing briefings, component familiarization, personnel, and

subject matter expert support.

(g) (FOUO) Conduct on-scene evaluations of significant IED incidents in

order to collect evidence and intelligence on IED-related TTP.

(h) (FOUO) Support site exploitation operations to include accompanying

units on raids and searches to exploit caches.

(2) (FOUO) When combined with on-scene reporting from the WITs, EOD teams,

detainee reporting, and unit-level information, the CEXC can provide a comprehensive
picture of adversary IED developments and TTP that can be used to modify friendly TTP
and force protection initiatives.

(3) (FOUO) CEXC exploitation reports are provided to various US national and

allied agencies for further technical analysis and EOD-related database development.
Additionally, these reports form the basis for targeting programs directed against key nodes
in the adversary’s IED infrastructure. The main customer for CEXC reports is the TDC in
the J-2 JIOC, which also manages the profiles. CEXC reports are also provided to unit-level
intelligence cells, and are available through the CEXC Web site. In addition, CEXC
generates spot reports for new devices and technical bulletins, which are educational in
nature. CEXC analysis provides only a piece of the total insurgent puzzle. Units must fuse
the CEXC information with EOD and WIT reports and with their own HUMINT and tactical
intelligence to fully understand the bomb maker network.

c. (U)

HVI Targeting Program.

The HVI targeting program is a combatant

commander’s resource that works closely with the JTF and is designed to capture key
adversary personnel including those contributing to the adversary’s IED activities. The HVI

VI-1

CHAPTER VI

COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE TASK FORCE (U)

1. (U) Introduction

(U) As an alternative to using the JTF staff to manage the C-IED effort, the CJTF can

establish a task force, integrating tactical- and operational-level organizations and
streamlining communications under a single headquarters whose total focus is on the C-IED
effort. The task force construct is useful when a large number of C-IED assets (EOD; WIT;
C-IED training teams; and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
explosives [CBRNE] response teams [CRTs], formerly identified as technical escort teams
and their supporting organizations, [COIC, LEP, operations research and systems analysis
{ORSA}, joint expeditionary team {JET}, etc.]) have been deployed to support large-scale,
long duration operations. The organization and employment of the task force will depend on
the mission, the threat and the available C-IED enabling forces. Counter-IED resources are
scalable to meet not only the size of the supported JTF but also the mission and phase of the
operation (Figure VI-1).

2. (U) Organization

a. (U) A C-IED task force is normally built around an

appropriately augmented

brigade-level headquarters or its equivalent (EOD group, ordnance group, engineer brigade,
maneuver enhancement brigade,  Army  EOD  battalion  or Navy EOD mobile unit).  In
addition to controlling the subordinate EOD organizations and battalions, the C-IED task
force commander is given operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) of the
JTF’s specialized C-IED assets to include WIT, CEXC, CITP, COIC, C-IED training teams,
and the technical escort detachment.  The combination  of EOD assets with specialized
C-IED enablers allows the task force  to conduct focused C-IED network analysis and
targeting, provide direct support packages of C-IED enablers to BCTs, and organize and
conduct unit-level C-IED training programs.

b. (U) In establishing a task force to manage C-IED operations, the CJTF will align

supporting resources to provide the task force commander with the means necessary to
accomplish the mission. Under the task force construct, EOD units are normally OPCON
and/or TACON to the C-IED task force commander. The EOD battalion continues to
provide EOD teams in direct support of the MSCs. MSCs continue to provide combat
service support (CSS) to the assigned EOD team. The EOD battalion provides specialized
technical support to the deployed EOD teams and may also be tasked to provide CSS for
WIT. An augmented EOD battalion headquarters is well suited to form the nucleus of the
maneuver division’s C-IED effort, but as previously mentioned, this task could be filled by
any battalion staff headquarters augmented with technical experts and additional enablers. In
addition to the JTF’s attached EOD units that form the basis for the task force, the following
C-IED enabling assets will normally be assigned to or under the control of the C-IED task
force:

Chapter VI

VI-2

JP 3-15.1

Figure VI-1. (U) Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Scalable Team

COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE SCALABLE TEAM

LEGEND

AAB

advise and assist brigade

battalion

BDE

brigade

C-IED

counter-improvised explosive device

CEXC

combined explosives exploitation cell

CITP

counter-improvised explosive device

targeting program

CJTF

combined joint task force

CMD

command

COIC

counter-improvised explosive device

operations integration center

CREW

counter radio-controlled IED

electronic warfare

CSE

counter-improvised explosive device

support element

DTK

Defense Intelligence Agency

laboratory

EOD

explosive ordnance disposal

ECM

electronic countermeasures

EWO

electronic warfare officer

FWD

forward

host nation

information operations

IED

improvised explosive device

J-2

intelligence directorate of a joint staff

JET

joint expeditionary team

JIEDDO Joint IED Defeat Organization
JOC

joint operations center

LEP

law enforcement professional

NCOIC

noncommissioned officer in charge

OIC

officer in charge

ORSA

operations research and systems

analysis

PST

provincial security team

RCP

route clearance patrol

SAP

special access program

SME

subject matter expert

WIT

weapons intelligence team

CJTF

C-IED Joint

Task Force

AAB Cell

C-IED team focus

Attached from supported unit

AAB Cell

C-IED

Task Force

C-IED Cell

C-IED JOC

CMD Group

Joint Staff

COIC FWD

WIT
LEP

ORSA

IO/SAP

CREW ECM

EWO

CEXC

CITP

CSEs

EOD BN

RCP

WIT

DTK Lab
AAB Cell

Liaison

HN Trainers

CMD Group

Joint Staff

COIC FWD

WIT
LEP

ORSA

IO/SAP

CREW

EWO

CEXC

CITP

BDE CSE

EOD BN

RCP

DTK Lab

Liaison

HN Trainers

CMD Group

Joint Staff

COIC FWD

WIT
LEP

ORSA

IO/SAP

CITP

BDE CSE

EOD BN

RCP

DTK Lab

Liaison

HN Trainers

COIC FWD

WIT
LEP

ORSA

IO/SAP

CMD Group

Joint Staff

CREW ECM

EWO

CEXC

CITP

BDE CSE

EOD BN

RCP

Liaison

HN Trainers

OIC

NCOIC

J-2

Liaison

COIC FWD

WIT
LEP

ORSA

IO/SAP

HN Trainers

OIC

NCOIC

J-2

COIC

JIEDDO SME

JET

Reachback

PST

Trainers

Liaison

IO/SAP

HN Trainers

Host Nation

Training

Phase 5

ENABLE CIVIL

AUTHORITIES

Transition

Phase 4

STABILITY

Exploitation

Level 2/3

Phase 3

DOMINATE

Exploitation

Level 2

Phase 2

SEIZE

Analytic

Structure

Phase 1

DETER

Phase 0

SHAPE

Coordinator,

IO, and

Trainers

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Task Force (U)

VI-3

(1) (U) The JTF

C-IED intelligence cell

is a JTF J-2 asset that is detailed to the

task force commander.  The cell consists of the operations section, a network infrastructure
analysis and targeting section, the forward deployed CITP cell, the CEXC, and the WIT.
The  task force C-IED intelligence cell is the primary agency responsible for fusion of
technical assessments, forensic analyses, and all-source threat intelligence related to the IED
threat within the operational area. Working with the JTF corps analysis and control element
and the component commands, the cell develops all-source intelligence products designed to
target insurgent IED networks and disrupt the insurgent’s ability to effectively employ IEDs
as the weapon of choice. The task force C-IED intelligence cell also develops and
disseminates information on the latest developments in threat TTP and advises the JTF on
IED risk mitigation.

(2) (U)

JTF IO Staff.

The IO staff provides focused IO planning and support to

the C-IED TF commander. They coordinate and deconflict related IO capabilities with other
staff functions and supporting agencies and organizations.

(3) (U)

CEXC.

The CEXC is normally assigned to the CJTF, who then delegates

OPCON to the C-IED task force commander. The CEXC is the core of the task force’s
C-IED technical intelligence (TECHINT) element facilitating targeting of the adversary’s
IED infrastructure. Taskings for the CEXC are developed by the CJTF’s J-2.

(4) (U)

CBRN Response Teams.

CBRN response teams provide weapons of mass

destruction (WMD) site and chemical weapons assessment and exploitation support
throughout the theater.

(5) (U)

WIT.

The WITs or C-IED teams are assigned to

the C-IED

task force

Normally an EOD company, with a direct support WIT, will be placed in direct support of
each BCT.

The detachments normally will be placed OPCON to the C-IED task force

commander.

(6) (U)

CITP.

The NGIC forward deployed CITP cell is assigned to the task force

and acts as the focal point for C-IED intelligence fusion. The detachments normally will be
placed OPCON to the C-IED task force commander.

(7) (U)

C-IED Training Teams.

The JTF EHCC’s training teams normally are

placed OPCON to the C-IED task force commander.

(8)

(U)

Joint CREW Unit.

The CREW is assigned to the theater C-IED task

force. In coordination with the JTF EWCC, the CREW neutralizes the radio-controlled
improvised explosive device (RCIED) threat by deconflicting EMS use; conducting EW
coordination in support of current operations, training, and readiness; and providing fielding
support down to the BCT level. The detachments normally will be placed OPCON to the
C-IED task force commander.

(9) (U)

COIC-Forward.

JIEDDO deploys COIC teams forward with the C-IED

task force to enable reach back to the full capabilities of COIC analytic centers in theater and
at the JIEDDO COIC in the continental United States (CONUS) to enable more precise
attacks by the supported commander to defeat networks that employ IEDs.

Chapter VI

VI-4

JP 3-15.1

(10) (U)

JET.

The JET supports all echelons of the joint force, interagency, and

multinational partners. Its purpose is to train, advise, observe, analyze, and to collect and
disseminate TTP, lessons learned, and best practices to mitigate the IED threat. They will
normally operate in two- to three-person teams and be placed OPCON to the task force’s
C-IED commander.

3. (U) Roles and Responsibilities

a. (U) The mission of the C-IED task force is to enable and support the coordination of

the JTF’s C-IED operations to create the conditions that will deny the IED cells’ freedom of
action, reduce the IED cells’ effectiveness, and lower overall IED activity to a level
commensurate with the HN security forces’ capabilities. It does so by commanding and
controlling specialized C-IED forces as well as coordinating and synchronizing JTF-level
C-IED operations, intelligence, technology and training initiatives throughout the operational
area. The C-IED task force optimizes C-IED operations by fusing IED defeat-related
intelligence, capabilities, training, equipment, and EOD forces in one organization at the JTF
level. The task force acts as the single point of contact for C-IED matters within the
operational area. The task force can also be tasked to develop the JTF’s C-IED CONOPS
and C-IED OPLAN. The C-IED task force’s major missions include:

(1) (U) Execution and synchronization of C-IED operations by coordinating and

employing C-IED forces and enablers in support of the JTF’s C-IED plan. This includes
managing the analytical and intelligence assets that feed into the targeting and AtN
processes. The C-IED task force provides the CJTF with C-IED subject matter expertise.

(2)

(U) Providing C-IED operations planning support. By coordinating with the

JTF planning staff, ensuring that the JTF integrates C-IED considerations into its operational
plans. Recommending C-IED operational priorities.

(3)

(U) Exercising command and control (C2) over C-IED and EOD resources.

When C-IED and EOD resources are placed in direct support of component maneuver units,
the C-IED task force will maintain responsibility for ensuring those resources have logistical,
administrative, planning, and communications support to accomplish their mission-essential
tasks.

(4)

(U) Managing and developing policy for the WTI and IED exploitation process

and managing the IED exploitation architecture. This includes ensuring that the results of
the collection, analysis, and dissemination of TECHINT, biometric information, forensics,
and media exploitation feed into the C-IED targeting process. It also includes the
synchronization of C-IED exploitation in the JOA and the tracking of exploitation labs,
personnel, requirements, and forensic material.

(5) (U) Conducting assessments of C-IED capabilities and gaps based on threat and

operational environment.

(6)

(U) Capturing and analyzing current TTP and best practices in order to support

in-theater training updates and refresher training. Coordinating refresher training and

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Task Force (U)

VI-5

training upon reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of incoming
units. Providing support for this training to multinational partners.

(7) (U) Providing constant relevant feedback based on the threat, operational

environment, and best practices that feeds into predeployment and IED awareness training.

(8)

(U) Organizing the intelligence assets required to determine IED threats and

provide analysis on IED cells and sources to feed the targeting process. Assisting units with
the employment and integration of C-IED operations within COIN.

(9)

(U) Conducting all-source intelligence analysis to build an understanding of the

enemy’s operations and IED system. Intelligence analysts can gain access to multiple data
feeds using COIC tools and taking advantage of US-based reachback support.

(10)

(U) Compiling analytically derived, empirically supported, quantitative

assessments in support of decision making with regard to targeting and C-IED planning to
enhance effectiveness of AtN efforts. Providing impact assessments of operations and
solutions on the IED networks.

(11)

(U) Developing networks, nominating C-IED targets, developing target

packages, and participating in the JTF’s joint targeting board to target IED cells and
individuals.

(12)

(U) Developing and maintaining the ability to share pertinent intelligence

across various networks to enable all friendly forces to make necessary linkages that will
support both AtN and defeat the device LOOs.

(13)

(U) Conducting liaison and sharing information with other organizations

involved in the C-IED effort.

(14) (U) Ensuring that there is a unified and coordinated effort for C-IED across

MNFs.

(15) (U) Enabling HN training and information sharing to facilitate a transition to

the C-IED effort.

(16) (U) Supporting the JTF’s strategic communication implementation and IO

activities.

(17) (U) Integrating material and nonmaterial solutions to include CONOPs,

concepts of employment, and training and sustainment plan development. Conducting
ongoing assessments of material and nonmaterial solutions to influence future planning.

b. (U) The C-IED task force coordinates the overall conduct of C-IED operations

through the JTF J-3. C-IED task force assets (EOD battalions/mobile units and companies
augmented by C-IED enabling assets) deployed in support of maneuver units coordinate their
respective operations through the supported unit’s J-3/battalion or brigade operations staff
officers (S-3s). Through participation in the JTF’s (and supported unit’s) staff planning

Chapter VI

VI-6

JP 3-15.1

cycle, including applicable boards, working groups, and cells, the C-IED task force
synchronizes and integrates its operations into the JTF’s and supported unit’s overall scheme
of maneuver.

c. (U) Service engineer units conducting route clearance operations either in direct

support of the maneuver brigades (or their equivalent formation) or on an area support basis
will normally coordinate for C-IED task force support through the supported headquarters’
J-3/S-3. Engineers identify their C-IED support requirements through participation in the
unit’s C-IED working groups and planning cells.

4. (U//FOUO) Task Force Intelligence Integrating Functions

a. (U) One of the most complex challenges in organizing the C-IED effort is in

gathering, analyzing, and disseminating information that is relevant to each echelon of the
command, from the BCTs that must stay current on the latest adversary IED TTP, to the
command that is organizing the fight to defeat the IED supporting infrastructure.

b. (U) C-IED Intelligence Cell

(1) (U)

Organization.

Consists of the J-2’s C-IED fusion and TDCs. The cell is

responsible for integrating the activities of a multitude of intelligence collection and analysis
functions to support the task force’s many activities. The cell has a number of specific
responsibilities including:

(a) (U) Recommending the focused employment of intelligence collection

assets against the adversary’s IED infrastructure.

(b) (U) Serving as the all-source focal point for IED-related intelligence

information originating within the national system, MNF, and HN sources.

design to enhance friendly force protection programs and IED defeat operational planning.

(d) (U) Identifying and developing information (target packages) on the critical

nodes in the adversary’s IED infrastructure to support C-IED operations.

(2) (U)

Responsibilities.

This cell is the primary agency responsible for fusion of

technical assessments, forensic analyses, and all-source threat intelligence related to the IED
threat within the theater of operations. The cell will develop and disseminate threat TTP and
advise the MNF in IED risk mitigation. Working closely with the J-2 collection manager
and the JIOC/JISE, the cell answers all relevant IED-related RFIs. The cell is also
responsible for developing actionable intelligence for the J-2’s portion of the CITP. In
developing its analytical products, the cell reviews all IED-related intelligence generated
within the command and by the relevant entities (NGIC, TEDAC, COIC, etc.), fusing this
information from a variety of sources including:

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Task Force (U)

VI-7

(a) (U) CEXC.

(b) (U) WIT.

(d) (U) J-2 terrain analysis team.

(e) (U) MSC input.

(f) (U) THTs.

(g) (U) JIEDDO field team after action reports.

(3) (U)

TDC.

The TDC is a consolidated effort of the NGIC and J-2’s intelligence

assets. The TDC cell, organic to the C-IED JTF intelligence cell, leverages all-source local
and national IED intelligence exploits NGIC reachback capability to identify IED cell
members and build targeting folders for execution by maneuver or special operations forces.

(a) (U)

Manning.

The TDC contains the following elements:

1. (U) Specialized target analytical team. This team can concentrate on

high priority concerns such as EFP manufacture.

2. (U) TECHINT.

3. (U) IED target analytical team.

4. (U) Database.

(b) (U) The majority of the cell’s personnel are dedicated to network targeting

as directed by J-2 JIOC/JISE officer-in-charge. Regional analysts are dedicated to each
MSC to include a joint special operations task force. These analysts have two basic
missions: assist the supported intelligence sections in developing targeting packages and act
as the C-IED intelligence cell’s local source for C-IED-related information that is passed
directly to those targeting cells at the JTF.

(4) (U)

Targeting.

In a typical targeting scenario, JTF or locally (BCT/forward

operating base level) developed information on a potential target will be compiled from all
available local sources. This information will be passed to the CITP at NGIC for further
refinement using whatever information is available from national sources. NGIC can also
provide imagery of the target area. NGIC will identify any gaps that exist in the available
intelligence information. These gaps will be monitored by the intelligence cell at the C-IED
task force and, using command resources, the C-IED intelligence cell will attempt to fill
those gaps. The final package will then be passed to the appropriate echelon for action.

(5) (U)

Products.

The C-IED intelligence cell develops products designed to meet

the specific needs of operational and tactical consumers. These products are based on all-

Chapter VI

VI-8

JP 3-15.1

source inputs and are designed to support the full range of information requirements for
organizing the C-IED effort from training on the latest adversary TTP to developing
targeting packages.

(a) (U)

Analytical Support Products.

Analysis of IED events detailing both

blue and red actions.

(b) (U)

Technical Analysis Products.

Consist of detailed evaluation of the

operating characteristics and potential vulnerabilities of IEDs (or their components) that have
been recovered by field teams.

Quick Look Reports.

Consist of quick turn reports with analysis on

changes or emerging trends in adversary IED employment TTP.

(d) (U)

Trend and Pattern Analysis.

A detailed analysis of IED events in

space and time to identify “hot spots” for C-IED targeting efforts and developments in the
adversary’s employment of IEDs to support C-IED targeting and force protection initiatives.

(e) (U)

Target Packages.

Provide analysis identifying specific individuals

and places associated with the adversary’s IED support infrastructure. The packages provide
operational planners with sufficient detail to plan and conduct operations focused on
disrupting /capturing/neutralizing the identified IED infrastructure components.

(f) (U)

Network Analysis.

Diagrams of IED cells and networks for targeting.

(g) (U)

Detainee Support Products.

Status of detainees with linkage to IED

networks.

5. (U) Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Task Force Staff Functions

(U) The C-IED task force has two major responsibilities: directing the assigned EOD

units and optimizing the JTF’s overall C-IED operation. While it operates as a normal task
force headquarters in planning for the employment and support of its assigned forces, the
staff have some unique C-IED-related responsibilities including:

a. (U)

C-IED Task Force J-3

(1) (U) Assist in the development of the JTF’s C-IED plans and execute staff

supervision over the operational aspects of them (subordinate unit involvement, rules of
engagement, training, etc.).

(2) (U) Support the coordination of JTF-level C-IED operations and chair or attend

designated C-IED organizations.

(3) (U) Coordinate with JTF’s designated engineer brigade on route clearance,

sanitation, and improvement operations by providing forces and TECHINT.

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Task Force (U)

VI-9

(4) (U) Supervise and facilitate the partnering operations with HN force’s bomb

disposal companies and HN police IED defeat teams.

b. (U) C-IED Task Force Plans

(1) (U) In coordination with J-3, Develop and integrate C-IED enabler support into

Future Plans, develop C-IED enabler subject matter expert (SME) input to plans and orders.

(2) (U) In coordination with J-3, develop and manage joint C-IED enabler force

generation requirements for support to the MNF.

c. (U) C-IED Task Force J-7 (C-IED Training Team)

(1) (U) Provide a C-IED program (relevant to the in-country threat) in order to

provide personnel with the knowledge required to identify IEDs and IED indicators,
application of CREW systems, cache search awareness, and the skills required to respond
safely to threat situations.

(2) (U) Provide C-IED training teams to support in country RSOI as well as one

mobile training team for deployment as required. Coordinate with JIEDDO, JTF J-3
training, and JTF J-7 to provide up-to-date training in C-IED TTP in theater and the
CONUS. In conjunction with JIEDDO develop and disseminate C-IED TTP to all forces.

6. (U) Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Task Force Support to the Maneuver
Units

a. (U) The planning and conduct of C-IED operations is a multi-echelon effort that must

be closely coordinated and integrated. The C-IED task force plays a critical role in this effort
by attaching specialized C-IED support teams to the land component’s subordinate divisions,
maneuver brigades, and battalions. These C-IED support elements are designed to assist the
maneuver unit in the planning, coordination,  and integration of its  immediate C-IED
operations and act as a liaison to the C-IED task force.  The C-IED support element also
coordinates the unit’s IED infrastructure targeting efforts.

b. (U) The division C-IED support element coordinates and integrates C-IED operations

within the division operational area, and integrates C-IED enablers, analysis, and products
into the division targeting process in order to support the division in maintaining freedom of
action and defeating insurgent networks. The division C-IED support element is comprised
of a mix of specialized C-IED personnel such as CEXC, CITP, intelligence analysis, ORSA,
and LEP) along with intelligence and operations staff. Critical division C-IED support
element tasks are detailed in Figure VI-2.

Chapter VI

VI-10

JP 3-15.1

DIVISION COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

SUPPORT ELEMENT CRITICAL TASKS (U)

(U)

Execution and

synchronization of counter-
improvised explosive device
(C-IED) operations.

(U)

Coordination and employment of forces in support of a C-IED

plan. This includes the analytical and intelligence assets that
feed into the targeting and “attack the network” processes.
Provide the division commander with C-IED subject matter
expertise (SME).

(U) Provide C-IED operations
planning support.

(U) Planning support to division headquarters with regards to
integrating C-IED to operations. Conduct internal planning to
better provide SME to leadership and recommend C-IED
priorities.

(U) C-IED and explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD)
forces.

(U) Oversight and life support functions such as logistical,
administrative, planning, and communications that enable C-IED
forces to perform mission-essential tasks.

(U) Conduct exploitation of
improvised explosive device
(IED) forensic and biometric
material.

(U) Personnel and develop future requirements. Feed data into
the incident database and report in accordance with the
established forensic tracking process.

(U) Identify and request
emerging and immediate
C-IED requirements.

(U) Conduct assessments of C-IED capabilities and gaps based
on threat and operational environment; document and
communicate those gaps through appropriate channels for rapid
resolution.

(U) Support and provide in-
theater C-IED training and
feed information to update
predeployment training.

(U) Capture and analyze current tactics, techniques, and
procedures and best practices in order to develop in-theater
training updates and refresher training. Provide constant
relevant feedback based on the threat, operational environment,
and best practices that feeds into predeployment and IED
awareness training.

(U) Intelligence, analytical
and network development
support to C-IED operations.

(U) Employment of required intelligence assets to determine IED
threats and provide analysis on IED cells and sources that feed
the targeting process.

(U) Operations, intelligence,
and analysis fusion.

(U) Conduct multidiscipline intelligence analysis to build an
understanding of the enemy's operations and IED system.
Intelligence analysts can gain access to multiple data feeds
using C-IED operations integration center tools and taking
advantage of US-based reachback support.

(U) Operational research
analysis.

(U) Compile analytically derived, empirically supported,
quantitative assessments in support of decision making with
regards to targeting and C-IED planning to enhance
effectiveness of “attack the network” efforts. Provide impact
assessments of operations and solutions on the IED networks.

(U) Support to C-IED
targeting.

(U) Working within the joint task force’s targeting methodology,
lead or participate in the joint targeting board to target IED cells
and individuals. Develop networks, nominate C-IED targets, and
develop target packages.

(U) Information sharing and
archiving.

(U) Ability to share pertinent intelligence across various networks
to enable all friendly forces to make necessary linkages that will
support both “attack the network” and “defeat the device” lines of
operation. Ensure subordinate units collect all data on IED
events that occur within their battle space.

(U) Liaison with other
organizations.

(U) Ability to link with and include other organizations into the
C-IED effort and ensure necessary information is shared.

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Task Force (U)

VI-11

(U) Multinational operation
coordination and support.

(U) Ensuring that there is a unified and coordinated effort for
C-IED across multinational forces.

(U) Host nation partnering.

(U) Enabling host nation training and information sharing in order
to facilitate a transition of the C-IED effort.

(U) Support C-IED
information operations (IO).

(U) Understanding the human environment and supporting
division IO campaign for IED awareness and information to
create a favorable impression or environment for multinational
forces or the host nation among the local populace.

Figure VI-2. (U) Division Counter-Improvised Explosive Device

Support Element Critical Tasks

c. (U) The brigade and battalion C-IED support element plans, coordinates, and

integrates C-IED operations within the units; and plans, coordinates and integrates C-IED
enablers, analysis, and products into the unit’s targeting process to support the unit in
maintaining freedom of action and defeating insurgent networks. Brigade and battalion
C-IED support element tasks are listed in Figure VI-3 and VI-4.

BRIGADE COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

SUPPORT ELEMENT CRITICAL TASKS (U)

(U) Execution and
synchronization of counter-
improvised explosive device
(C-IED) operations.

(U) Coordination and employment of forces in support of a C-IED
plan. This includes the analytical and intelligence assets that
feed into the targeting and “attack the network” processes.
Provide the brigade commander with C-IED subject matter
expertise.

(U) Provide C-IED operations
planning support.

(U) Planning support to brigade headquarters with regards to
integrating C-IED to operations. Conduct internal planning to
better provide subject matter expertise to leadership and
recommend integrating C-IED priorities.

(U) C-IED and explosive
ordnance disposal force.

(U) Oversight and life support functions such as logistical,
administrative, planning, and communications that enable
integrating C-IED forces to perform mission-essential tasks.

(U)

Conduct exploitation of

improvised explosive device
(IED) forensic and biometric
material.

(U)

Integrate

IED

exploitation into brigade operations, manage

and coordinate personnel and exploitation assets to best support
collection and the brigade commander’s intent. Feed data into
the joint operations area incident database and report in
accordance with forensic tracking process.

(U)

Identify and request

emerging and immediate

C-IED

requirements.

(U)

Conduct assessments of

C-IED

capabilities and gaps based

on threat and operational environment; document and
communicate those gaps through appropriate channels for rapid
resolution.

(U)

Support and provide in-

theater

C-IED

training and

feed information to update
predeployment training.

(U)

Capture and analyze current tactics, techniques, and

procedures and best practices in order to develop in-theater
training updates and refresher training. Provide constant
relevant feedback based on the threat, operational environment,
and best practices that feeds into predeployment and

IED

awareness training.

(U)

Intelligence, analytical,

and network development
support to

C-IED

operations.

(U)

Employment of required intelligence assets to determine

IED

threats and provide analysis on

C-IED

cells and sources that

feed the targeting process.

(U)

Operations, intelligence,

and analysis fusion.

(U)

Conduct multidiscipline intelligence analysis to build an

understanding of the enemy’s operations and

IED

network.

Intelligence analysts can gain access to multiple data feeds
using combined operations integration center’s tools and taking
advantage of reachback support.

Chapter VI

VI-12

JP 3-15.1

(U)

Operational research

analysis.

(U)

Compile analytically derived, empirically supported,

quantitative assessments in support of decision making with
regards to targeting and

C-IED

planning to enhance

effectiveness of “attack the network” efforts. Provide impact
assessments of operations and solutions on the

IED

networks.

(U)

Information sharing and

archiving.

(U)

Ability to share pertinent intelligence across various networks

to enable all friendly forces to make necessary linkages that will
support both “attack the network” and “defeat the device” lines of
operation.

(U)

Liaison with other

organizations.

(U)

Ability to link with and include other organizations into the

C-IED

effort and ensure necessary information is shared.

(U)

Host nation partnering.

(U)

Enabling host nation training and information sharing in order

to facilitate a transition of the

C-IED e

ffort.

(U)

Support

C-IED

information operations.

(U)

Understanding the human environment and supporting

brigade information operations activities for

IED

awareness and

information to create a favorable impression or environment for
multinational or host nation forces among the local populace.

Figure VI-3. (U) Brigade Counter-Improvised Explosive Device

Support Element Critical Tasks

BATTALION COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

SUPPORT ELEMENT CRITCIAL TASKS (U)

(U)

Advise battalion

commander on counter-
improvised explosive device
(

C-IED)

matters.

(U)

Coordination and employment of forces in support of a

C-IED

plan. This includes the analytical and intelligence assets that
feed into the targeting and “attack the network” processes.
Provide the battalion commander with

C-IED

subject matter

expertise.

(U)

Provide

C-IED

operations

planning support.

(U)

Planning support to battalion headquarters with regards to

integrating

C-IED

to operations. Conduct internal planning to

better provide subject matter expertise to leadership and
recommend

C-IED

priorities.

(U)

Conduct and manage

explosive ordnance
disposal/improvised explosive
device (

IED)

disposal

operations.

(U)

Coordinate and conduct explosive ordnance disposal/

IED

disposal operations in support of the battalion’s operations.

(U)

Conduct exploitation of

C-IED

forensic and biometric

material.

(U)

Exploit, to the extent possible, all

IED

incidents within the

battalion’s operational area. Coordinate proper tracking and
evidence handling procedures of all collected material and ship
to the appropriate lab for exploitation, taking care that all
explosive safety procedures are followed.

(U)

Identify and request

emerging and immediate

C-IED

requirements.

(U)

Conduct assessments of

C-IED

capabilities and gaps based

on threat and operational environment; document and
communicate those gaps through appropriate channels for rapid
resolution.

(U)

Intelligence, analytical

and network development
support to

C-IED

operations.

(U)

Employment of required intelligence assets to determine

IED

threats and provide analysis on

IED

cells and sources that feed

the targeting process.

(U)

Operations, intelligence,

and analysis fusion.

(U)

Conduct multidiscipline intelligence analysis to build an

understanding of the enemy's operations and

IED

system.

Intelligence analysts can gain access to multiple data feeds
using combined operations integration center’s tools and taking
advantage of reachback support.

(U)

Support to

C-IED

targeting.

(U)

Working within the joint task force headquarters’ targeting

methodology, participate in the targeting board to target

IED

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Task Force (U)

VI-13

network cells and individuals. Develop networks, nominate

C-IED

targets, and develop target packages.

(U)

Support

C-IED

information operations.

(U)

Understanding the human environment and supporting

battalion’s information operations activities for

IED

awareness

and information to create a favorable impression or environment
for multinational or host nation forces among the local populace.

(U)

Deliver in-theater

C-IED

update/refresher training and
provide information to update
predeployment training.

(U)

Capture and analyze current tactics, techniques, and

procedures and best practices and feed that information to
higher headquarters. Deliver in-theater update/refresher training
based on the battalion commander’s intent

Figure VI-4. (U) Battalion Counter-Improvised Explosive Device

Support Element Critical Tasks

7. (U) Multinational Considerations

a. (U)

In multinational operations, many of the participants do not have the trained and

deployable EOD units, C-IED technologies, and exploitation capability required to protect
their forces and take the fight to the enemy. When participating in a multinational operation
that is facing a significant IED threat, the US CJTF may be called upon to provide our
partners with a variety of C-IED support. At a minimum, this can include one or more of the
following:

(1) (U) Providing EOD/WIT support to maneuver units.

(2) (U) Establishing a communications network for the rapid dissemination of IED-

related TTP for force protection.

(3) (U) Assistance in organizing and providing individual and unit IED awareness

training.

(4) (U) Assistance in organizing and providing specialized training for deployed

engineer sapper and EOD personnel.

(5) (U) In some instances, this training and technical assistance could extend to the

loan of armored vehicles and CREW equipment.

(6) (U)

Upon DOD approval, sharing of C-IED network-related intelligence

information derived from various surveillance platforms and other intelligence sources.

b. (U) A GCC, as a part of the theater campaign plan, can seek to facilitate the

competency of HN PNs’ C-IED capabilities. For a list of those tasks from phase 0 (Shape)
to phase 5 (Enable Civil Authority), see Appendix E, “Counter-Improvised Explosive Device
Annex Template.”

8. (U) Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Task Force Counter-Improvised
Explosive Device Working Group

(U)

C-IED Task Force C-IED Working Group.

When the CJTF establishes a C-IED

task force, the responsibilities of the JTF J-3’s C-IED working group will normally transfer
to the C-IED task force. When the C-IED task force commander establishes the working

Chapter VI

VI-14

JP 3-15.1

group,  it will be responsible for identifying command-wide C-IED-related  issues and
initiatives that impact the JTF’s C-IED effort. The C-IED task force working group meets
on a regular basis with representatives drawn from all the major organizations in the
command.  It is chaired by the C-IED task force commander, who normally sets the group’s
working agenda. The working group shares information related to C-IED developments
(updated information on adversary TTP modifications and friendly best practices) throughout
the area of operations and works to resolve issues related to the JTF’s conduct of the C-IED
efforts, including resource allocation issues, training, and information dissemination.  Issues
that have a force-wide impact would be referred to the CJTF through the C-IED management
board.

a. (U)

Task Force C-IED Working Group Membership.

The working group

normally consists of representatives from the JTF’s staff and component commands, the
C-IED task force staff and specialized cells (such as the TDC) and representatives of the
specialized C-IED organizations supporting the JTF, such as JIEDDO field team, science
advisor, IO cell, EWCC, Joint CREW Composite Squadron–One, Army Test and Evaluation
Command, Rapid Equipping Force (REF), C-IED targeting cell, and the CEXC. Special
attention should be placed on including liaison officers on the task force C-IED working
group . Appropriate liaison officers can provide efficient and effective dissemination of
emerging adversary TTP, friendly TTP, and best practices throughout the operational area.

b. (U)

Task Force C-IED Working Group Products.

In developing their

recommendations for the overall conduct of the JTF’s C-IED efforts, the working group
reviews the latest intelligence on the IED threat and relevant IED trend analysis; reviews and
updates the current C-IED TTP and emerging best practices; and examines the current
fielding and testing of the C-IED technologies. The working group’s recommendations will
normally be in the form of a change (or new guidance) for the JTF’s C-IED efforts, and/or
the basic issue that will be referred to the JTF’s C-IED management board. The C-IED
working group process is described in Figure VI-5.

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Task Force (U)

VI-15

Figure VI-5. (U) Counter-Improvised Explosive Device

Working Group Process

COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

WORKING GROUP PROCESS










Analysis/determination of

engagement area spots

Recommended priority intelligence

requirements and/or named areas of
interest

Electronic warfare plan/counter radio

electronic warfare plan

Recommended route status

Route clearance plan/schedule

Recommended equipment fielding

plan

Technical forensics trends

Counter-improvised explosive device

operations request for support
initiation








Lethal and nonlethal

Intelligence collection plan

Allocation of resources

Recommendation to act on

intelligence (or not)

Actions/projects nested to operation

plan to achieve objectives

Ultimate result: to neutralize,

interdict or defeat an individual or
network

Technical data

and focus:



Trend and pattern

analysis

Frequency

management

Counter radio-

controlled
improvised
explosive device
electronic warfare

Technical

forensics trends

Route clearance

analysis

Equipment

fielding

Counter-Improvised Explosive

Device Working Group

Analysis and Recommendations

for Commander

Joint Targeting

Board

Input

Output

Feeds

Output

A-1

APPENDIX A

COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

ENABLING ORGANIZATIONS (U)

1. (U) National Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Enabling Organizations

a. (U) IEDs will certainly be employed in future conflicts. The proliferation of highly

detailed bomb-making technologies on numerous sites over the Internet has greatly increased
the probability that these asymmetric means will be exploited by our adversaries. To counter
IEDs and develop effective technological countermeasures to protect the joint force, the USG
has organized a multiagency effort to actively assist DOD in the current C-IED effort and to
address emerging threats. This effort assists commanders, material developers, and the
strategic community in their C-IED efforts and also provides direct support to attacking
insurgent and terrorist networks by conducting “supply chain defeat” analysis. While their
overall efforts are complementary, each agency may pursue a different aspect of the IED
challenge, but they should be synchronized and integrated. These complementary efforts
include:

(1) (U) Technical exploitation of the device to identify the potential technological

means of neutralizing or defeating IEDs, i.e., employment of systems similar to CREW.

(2) (U) Forensic and biometric exploitation of the device in order to identify the

bomb makers for future targeting.

(3) (U) Technical exploitation of the device and/or its target (post-blast analysis) to

develop improved protection systems for personnel/vehicles and develop unit-level IED
avoidance TTP and mitigate the IED’s effects.

b. (U) National-level agencies conduct detailed analysis and provide the results to

interested parties. Much of this information supports in-theater C-IED efforts, providing
timely, relevant, and predictive tactical IED intelligence on insurgent IED tactics and trends.
National databases and technical IED intelligence also assist operational staffs at all
command levels and specialized C-IED units in formulating C-IED TTP.

c. (U) To assist the national agencies in their C-IED efforts, a number of teams (WIT,

EOD, JIEDDO, AWG) actively collect information associated with actual devices on-site.
After preliminary in-theater technical analysis (CITP, CEXC), this information is forwarded
to the national agencies for in-depth evaluation. The principal entities involved in this effort
include the multiagency TEDAC and NGIC.

2. (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation

a. (U)

TEDAC.

The TEDAC is within the FBI to coordinate and manage a unified

national effort to gather, and technically and forensically exploit, terrorist IEDs worldwide.
Together with the ATF and other partner agencies, it works to thoroughly analyze all IED-
related  information to form actionable intelligence that can be used to assist in terrorist
investigations or develop strategies and technologies to counter  terrorist attacks.  The

Appendix A

A-2

JP 3-15.1

TEDAC compiles data and TECHINT  and has established direct links between terrorist
explosive devices leading to the capture of insurgents. It also functions as a repository and
dissemination point for investigative, intelligence, bomb data, and safety information
through the exploitation and cataloging of IEDs and the  analysis of  terrorist explosive
incidents. It is responsible for overseeing and facilitating the nation’s strategic-level WTI
effort in support of strategic attack, targeting, and international policy development  by
delivering analytical products to the warfighter through CEXC and NGIC based on priorities
established by the GCC. Other reports and information may be accessed by customers via
the TEDAC’s Explosives Reference Tool Program database.

b. (U)

Biometrics.

In an effort to support the overseas contingency operations and

information-sharing initiatives, the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division, in
conjunction with DOD’s

BIMA, works to share data collected by military troops deployed

internationally. The data consists of fingerprints, photographs, and biographical data of
military detainees, enemy prisoners of war, or individuals of interest posing national security
threats to the United States.

(1)

(U) Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS).

DOD’s ABIS

consolidates, formats, and exchanges data equivalent and consistent to the FBI’s current
state/county/local law enforcement model. The ABIS database provides DOD with the
ability to gather, store, share, and enter the information into the FBI’s Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System, which allows the FBI to disseminate the information to
other government and law enforcement agencies.

(2)

(U) Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE).

TIDE is the USG’s

central repository of information (including biometric information) on international terrorist
identities. TIDE supports the USG’s various terrorist screening systems or “watch lists” and
the US Intelligence Community’s overall counterterrorism mission. The Terrorist Identities
Group, located in National Counter-Terrorism Center’s Information Sharing and Knowledge
Development Directorate, is responsible for building and maintaining TIDE. The TIDE
database includes, to the extent permitted by law, all information the USG possesses related
to the identities of individuals known or appropriately suspected to be or have been involved
in activities constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism, with the
exception of purely domestic terrorism information.

(U) “Examining tiny bits of bomb housings, wirings, detonation cords, fuses,
switches, the chemical composition of the explosives and the electronic signatures
of remote switching devices often used to detonate bombs, experts at the center
have begun to compile a data bank about terror[ist] bombs. In some cases,
forensic scientists have been able to obtain evidence of who made the bomb
through a fingerprint or DNA [deoxyribonucleic acid] material left on an explosive
part.”

New York Times, 22 February 2004

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Enabling Organizations (U)

A-3

3. (U) Defense Intelligence Agency—National Ground Intelligence Center

a. (U)

DIA.

The Director, DIA, in coordination with JIEDDO, directs, monitors, and

modifies the WTI process, as necessary, to include activities pertaining to the collection,
analysis, and primacy for exploitation of IED components, either forensic or force
protection. The Directorate for Measurement and Signature Intelligence and Technical
Collection’s Office of Forensic Intelligence plans, collects, processes, and exploits materiel
of intelligence value to associate individuals, weapons and components, and locations and
events in support of the DOD and intelligence community requirements. DIA also
coordinates more advanced exploitation of specific IEDs by a number of national technical
laboratories.

b. (U)

NGIC.

The NGIC fuses EOD, WIT, CEXC, and other reports of IEDs and

produces analytical products to support targeting of bomb makers and networks. The NGIC
maintains the CITP both in Virginia and forward locations to provide intelligence support to
interrogation, targeting of bomb makers and insurgents, detainee management, biometrically
enabled watch lists, and threat analysis. The NGIC also produces biometric intelligence
analysis reports (BIARs). Additional WTI-related functions within NGIC focus on
supporting the warfighter as well as providing solutions for force protection. NGIC provides
biometrically focused analysis, tools, training, watch list management, and operational
support to enable DOD and its interagency and multinational partners to deny anonymity to
our nation’s adversaries.

(1) (FOUO)

CITP.

The CITP is designed to collect TECHINT and conducts

analysis of IED patterns, IED-related biometric matches, and IED/vehicle-borne improvised
explosive device (VBIED) cell structures. CITP is closely integrated with the NGIC’s
biometrics effort to rapidly match individuals to specific IED incidents. These actions are
accomplished by matching and assessing latent prints, fibers, and other data. CITP also
supports targeting efforts by conducting personality-based network analysis and device-
based network analysis. CITP analysts stationed at forward locations work with targeting
cells, attend targeting meetings, and support efforts to identify IED networks by providing
relevant information and analysis to targeting packages.

(2) (U)

Anti-Armor Analysis Program.

The Anti-Armor Analysis Program, also

located at the NGIC, investigates and analyzes the outcome of insurgent attacks on armored
vehicles worldwide. Analysis is provided to operational commanders down to battalion
level, materiel and research and development program managers, and DOD leaders. The
Anti-Armor Analysis Program uses WTI-derived intelligence to identify trends in the
adversary’s development, manufacture, and procurement of anti-armor weapons. The Anti-
Armor Analysis Program makes TTP and interdiction recommendations to battlefield
commanders and the Army staff to mitigate the effectiveness of the adversary’s weapon
systems.

(3) (U)

NGIC IED/Mines Branch.

The IED branch determines how an IED or an

IED component impacts the current and future joint force operations. The IED branch
analyzes the technology to understand how it functions, effectiveness of the device,
frequency of use, emplacement TTP involving the device placement, how it may be used as

Appendix A

A-4

JP 3-15.1

an advantage over current counter-technology, and how it may evolve in the future. This
analysis is provided directly to the warfighter and the C-IED developers and related
organizations.

4. (U) Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization

a. (U) JIEDDO focuses all DOD actions in support of combatant commanders and

CJTF efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence. JIEDDO develops force
protection requirements and streamlines science and technology (S&T), along with
prioritizing research, development, and acquisition. JIEDDO also determines the priority for
exploitation of materiel at TEDAC and works with other PNs to assist in the exploitation of
IEDs.

b. (U)

COIC.

JIEDDO provides direct support to the deployed warfighter through the

COIC. The COIC’s mission: “In support of all geographic combatant commands, the COIC
harnesses, masses, and fuses information, analysis, technology, interagency collaboration,
and training support to enable more precise attacks to defeat networks which employ IEDs.
Be prepared to provide analytical support and enemy network information to other USG
organizations and multinational partners.” The COIC focuses on integrating and analyzing
information from multiple intelligence databases and fusing it into products that answer a
strategic, operational, and tactical commander’s request for support (RFS). Within the latest
time of value model, JIEDDO COIC answers RFS directly from joint and Service members
in order to alleviate hours of organizational intelligence staff work. The COIC maintains a
federated architecture ,which leverages the expertise from the intelligence community as
well as national laboratories and academia. Products forwarded from JIEDDO COIC
include, but are not limited to, comprehensive persistent views of networks employing IEDs;
pattern analysis; geospatial analysis; network dynamics analysis; social network analysis;
complex adaptive systems analysis; products that support JIPOE and targeting packages, all
focused on defining and enabling the commander to have more lethal and nonlethal desired
effects on networks that employ IEDs.

c. (U)

Joint Training Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations

Integration Center (JTCOIC).

The JTCOIC trains units on COIC tradecraft

methodologies prior to their deployment. The JTCOIC replicates JIEDDO COIC’s
reachback capability and processes, computer-based applications, and AtN methodologies.
Training occurs primarily at home station, combat training centers, and mission readiness
exercises (MRXs). The JTCOIC develops tactical scenarios to replicate real-world threats
within the deploying units’ operational area to create training realism and enhance
understanding of reachback capabilities that JIEDDO COIC can provide upon deployment.
JTCOIC analysts tie into JIEDDO COIC’s software applications to obtain actual theater-
specific intelligence data. They subsequently sanitize this data and prepare training products
for units going through MRXs.

d. (U)

Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization Knowledge and

Information Fusion Exchange (JKnIFE).

JKnIFE acts as the DOD central repository for

IED-related information. Its primary purpose is to exchange information, consolidate best

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Enabling Organizations (U)

A-5

practices, and respond to RFIs related to the asymmetric application of IED-related TTP by
both enemy and friendly forces.

(U)

Department of Defense, Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office,

Technical Support Working Group

(U) The technical support working group is part of the national interagency research and

development program for combating terrorism requirements. Its C-IED mission is to
identify, prioritize, and execute research and development projects that satisfy interagency
requirements to more safely and effectively render terrorist devices safe. Particular emphasis
is placed on technologies to access, diagnosis, and defeat terrorist IEDs, improvised CBRN
devices, and VBIEDs.

6. (U) Service Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Enabling Organizations

a. (U)

The Naval Explosive

Ordnance

Disposal Technology Division

(NAVEODTECHDIV) develops and delivers EOD knowledge, tools, equipment, and life
cycle support through an expeditionary workforce that exploits technology and information,
contributes to the TECHINT process, and provides expertise which meets the needs of the
DOD  EOD community, combatant commanders,  and interagency partners.
NAVEODTECHDIV as the program of record organization for CEXC is also responsible to
man, train, and equip the Technical Support Detachment’s CEXC platoons in both Level I
and Level II exploitation.  NAVEODTECHDIV also manages the Joint Digital Information
Gathering System (JDIGS), which is the standardized EOD reporting system for the joint
EOD community.  Data captured by JDIGS is networked to the Combined Information Data
Network Exchange (CIDNE) reporting system and is used to produce WTI-related reports
for analysis.

b. (U)

US Army Research, Engineering and Development Command—Intelligence

and Information Warfare Division (I2WD).

I2WD performs exploitation and

characterization of IED components in support of Electronic Warfare Reprogramming, as
well as SIGINT systems and countermeasures development. I2WD’s intelligence staff also
tracks IED and asymmetric technologies worldwide, monitors and analyzes current IED
events to document enemy TTP that may be relevant to detect and counter threat systems,
and identifies infrastructure requirements for US test sites.

c. (FOUO)

US Army Criminal Investigations Command, Forensic Exploitation

Battalion—Joint Expeditionary Forensic Facility (JEFF).

Assigned to the Army’s

Forensic Exploitation Battalion,

the JEFF is a modular and scalable deployable forensic

laboratory designed to support targeting, sourcing, prosecution, and detainment and
interrogation operations. JEFFs serve as stand-alone facilities for the forensic exploitation of
non-IED-related materiel, although they can also provide C-IED-related analysis if needed.
JEFF capabilities include fingerprint processing, firearm (including fired bullets and
cartridge cases) and tool-mark analysis, and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis. JEFF
laboratories provide direct support to CEXC by analyzing the tool marks on EFP liners to
determine fabrication processes and link EFP liners discovered in caches to caches in
adjacent areas.

Appendix A

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JP 3-15.1

d. (U)

20th Support Command (CBRNE)

provides C2 of full-spectrum CBRNE

forces and is capable of deploying as JTF weapons of mass destruction-elimination (WMD-
E) in support of joint and Army force commanders. It provides C2 to all CONUS-based
EOD formations. The 20th Support Command also exercises training and readiness
oversight of the Army National Guard EOD Group (111th EOD Group).  The command’s
Joint Technical Analysis and Integration Cell (JTAIC) provides CBRNE  TECHINT
assessments and planning expertise in support of WMD-E to enable worldwide C-IED and
WMD-E operations. JTAIC products include: providing analysis and fusion of WTI and
CBRNE intelligence; providing support to targeting and RFI management; advising the J-3
on the composition and skill sets required for site exploitation teams; prioritizing the WMD
master site list and producing finished TECHINT  reports to support force protection,
targeting, sourcing and support to prosecution.

e. (U)

REF.

The REF is an organization that takes its operational guidance from the

Department of the Army assistant chiefs of staff, operations/plans/information engagement
(G-3/5/7), and reports directly to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. It has a broad task to
rapidly increase mission capability while reducing the risk to Soldiers, Marines, and others.
The REF accomplishes this mission by providing the following services:

(1) (U) Equips operational commanders with off-the-shelf (government or

commercial) solutions or near-term developmental items that can be developed, tested, and
acquired quickly.

(2) (U) Introduces future force technology solutions that support deploying forces’

requirements. Actions are accomplished by developing, testing, and evaluating key
technologies and systems under specific operational conditions per requiring units CONOPS.

(3) (U) Assesses the capabilities and advises Army and other stakeholders of the

findings that will enable forces to rapidly confront an adaptive enemy.

f. (U)

US Army

AWG.

The AWG is a sensitive activity under the headquarters,

Department of the Army G-3/5/7, that provides operational advisory assistance in support of
Army and JFCs. The AWG was created by the Army to enhance the combat effectiveness of
the operating force and enable the defeat of asymmetric threats to include IEDs. The AWG
deploys its forces worldwide to observe, assess, and analyze information regarding the
evolving operating environment and the threat. They also assist in the development,
dissemination, and integration of material and nonmaterial solutions including
countermeasures. The AWG serves as an agent of change providing key observations and
perspectives for leaders when considering policy and resource decisions. The following
capabilities summarize the units’ contributions to joint force C-IED efforts:

(1) (U) Identifies and develops solutions for capability gaps that:

(a) (U) Exploit adversary vulnerabilities, and

(b) (U) Mitigate friendly vulnerabilities.

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Enabling Organizations (U)

A-7

(2) (U) Provides a global presence and insight regarding emerging asymmetric

threats.

(3) (U) Enhances existing Service capabilities:

(a) (U) Rapid Title 10, US Code (doctrine, organization, training, materiel,

leadership and education, personnel, and facilities [DOTMLPF]) solution development
through first-hand observations and internal combat/materiel development capabilities.

(b) (U) Operates in support of all types of forces—generating/operating

(special operations and conventional forces).

(4) (U) Conducts simultaneous collaboration with geographic combatant

commands/Army Service component commands and through the Army’s REF for solution
development, dissemination, and integration.

g. (U)

US Army Engineer School Counter Explosive Hazards Center (CEHC)

. The

CEHC is the Army integrator for all countermeasures involving explosive hazards and serves
as a center of excellence to ensure that the US Army maintains superiority in all facets of
countermine and counter-explosive warfare. During contingency operations, these
countermeasures may include new operational concepts  and  application of nonstandard
materiel or off-the shelf technology into unique conditions. Countermeasures may also
include development and training of theater-specific TTP against explosive threats consisting
of landmines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and IEDs. The CEHC remains in continuous
contact with the field to identify equipment and training needs or capability gaps in order to
immediately provide combat engineers with better mission capabilities. When a requirement
is identified, the CEHC coordinates with program managers, combat developers, government
laboratories, the REF, JIEDDO, and others to  evaluate suitable material systems and
candidates for potential integration and rapid fielding. Once a device or item is selected, the
CEHC assists in the system’s integration, development of its operational concept, training
support package, and operational assessment.  To ensure countermeasures are up-to-date and
relevant, the CEHC gathers the latest intelligence on explosive hazards and adversary TTP as
well as TTP employed by friendly units to counter the threat. A key task for the CEHC is
training and updating the force in current counter explosive hazards techniques and
employment of commercial off-the-shelf  and contingency equipment. This instruction
enables units to receive theater-specific training prior to deployment and allows them to
focus on  the mission during transition of authority. Contingency training that will be
permanently retained in the Army will eventually be institutionalized and transferred to the
official school training curriculum, such as operator training for route clearance vehicles.

h. (U)

United States Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL).

MCWL is

the lead USMC agency for IED defeat. MCWL leads a USMC IED working group made up
of representatives from the USMC, national-level intelligence agencies, and operating forces.
The USMC IED working group rapidly identifies, evaluates, and facilitates the fielding of
material and nonmaterial IED defeat solutions to the operating forces. It works in close
coordination with the JIEDDO integrated product team to synchronize DOD IED defeat
efforts.

Appendix A

A-8

JP 3-15.1

i. (U)

Other Marine Corps Organizations That Support C-IED Efforts.

The

following Marine Corps organizations provide primary support to the development and
implementation of C-IED capabilities within the Marine Corps:

(1) (U) Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration, is the Service

advocate for C-IED matters and integrates C-IED operational issues across the DOTMLPF
spectrum.

(2) (U) Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned collects and archives reports of

C-IED training and operations. It provides classified and unclassified archives that can be
used to identify DOTMLPF trends, materiel requirements, and MAGTF C-IED best
practices.

(3) (U) Marine Corps Systems Command performs acquisition and life cycle

maintenance of materiel solutions in support of MAGTF C-IED operations. The command’s
material acquisitions may be in response to an urgent universal need statement or to more
deliberate acquisition requirements.

(4) (U) Training and Education Command is responsible for development,

standardization, and execution of Marine Corps training at the individual, unit, and force
level. It is also responsible for coordinating cross-Service C-IED training.

(5) (U) Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group (MCTOG) conducts training

for the battalion and regimental combat team (RCT) ground combat element headquarters.
As the Marine Corps experts on AtN training within the MAGTF C-IED operational
environment, MCTOG trains regimental, battalion, and company battle staffs using the
Spartan Resolve training exercise.

(6) (U) Marine Corps Engineer School conducts unit and individual C-IED

operations (AtN, defeat the device, route reconnaissance, and clearance) training.

(7) (U) Marine Corps Intelligence Activity provides intelligence analysis to support

C-IED training and operations.

7. (U) Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Enablers within the Joint Task Force

(U) A number of specialized organizations have been created to assist with the

identification of and defeat of individual IEDs and the supporting infrastructure. These
enablers are normally found supporting the joint force and its maneuver units and include:

a. (U)

Site exploitation teams

are specifically detailed and trained teams at the tactical

level. The teams conduct search operations identifying, documenting, and preserving the
cache site and its material. The team also collects material of intelligence evidence value for
further analysis and exploitation, including pattern analysis, trend identification, and rule of
law.

b. (U) The

DOMEX center

is responsible for the rapid and accurate extraction,

exploitation, and analysis of captured enemy documents, media, and material. The NGIC

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Enabling Organizations (U)

A-9

manages the Army’s DOMEX program. DOMEX exploitation and analysis teams are
deployed to the brigade level and work with maneuver units.

c. (FOUO) The Navy CEXC conducts investigations of significant events; exploits

IEDs and recovering frequencies from RCIEDs to update EW equipment; tests explosive
residue; recovers and evaluates forensic and biometric material; identifies IED trends and
bomb maker signatures; creates profiles to better enable offensive operations; and conducts
limited component tracking. CEXC has direct linkages to NAVEODTECHDIV (as the
program of record organization for CEXC), NGIC, COIC, DIA, and TEDAC to support AtN,
“defeat the device,” and “train the force” LOOs.

d. (U)

EOD

units are the forces employed to render safe and exploit IEDs as well as

dispose of UXO and exploit and reduce enemy weapons stores and caches in either a land
based or maritime environment. The Army and Navy group headquarters provide command,
control, and staff planning for two to six ordnance battalions. It provides technical direction
for the EOD mission operations of subordinate units. The group also disseminates
TECHINT information throughout the command and to other selected organizations. The
group commander acts as the senior EOD land warfare officer for the theater army
command. Army and Navy EOD groups are utilized as the core C2 element for C-IED task
forces, with C2 over assigned Army, Navy, and Air Force EOD units and specialized C-IED
enablers. These formations can be utilized to provide C2 for a two- to three-star-level JTF or
joint EOD task force. When a C-IED task force is established, it will direct the employment
of Army (and other attached) EOD assets in support of the maneuver force. (Note: The
USMC’s EOD assets are not normally assigned to a C-IED task force, when established, but
do receive a WIT to coordinate with radio battalions, and download cell phone and computer
information for local exploitation. USMC EOD units are organic to the MAGTF and
provide direct support to Marine infantry battalions. As the Marines retain their assets, the
joint force provides enablers in the form of C-IED teams for the headquarters, WIT, to
accompany Marine EOD elements, and intelligence support of all types [as requested].)

(U)

For additional information on Service EOD capabilities, see Field Manual (FM)

4-30.16/Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-17.2C/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures 3-02.5/ Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Instruction) 3-2.32,

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal in a
Joint Environment.

e. (

EHCC.

Part of the JFC’s land component engineer staff, the EHCC assists in the

development of the COP and provides informational and situational understanding on
explosive hazards to all MNFs, the National Mine Action Authority, and nongovernmental
organizations. EHCC enables the land component commander to predict, track, distribute
information on, and mitigate explosive hazards within the theater that affect force
application, focused logistics, protection, and operational environment awareness. The
EHCC supports C-IED efforts throughout the theater and JOA with technical advice and
TTP training. The EHCC has oversight responsibility for geospatial and topographic
products and manages acquisition and distribution of specialized route clearance equipment.
The EHCC:

Appendix A

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JP 3-15.1

(1) (U) Provides counter-IED and explosive hazard awareness training to the force.

(2) (U) Provides technical and tactical training using mobile training teams.

(3) (U) Manages acquisition and distribution of specialized route clearance

equipment.

(4) (U) Establishes, maintains, and shares the EHDB within the JOA.

(5) (U) Assists intelligence analysts and ISR planners with explosive hazards

pattern analysis and intelligence collection management.

(6) (U) Supports efforts with J-7 engineers in sourcing engineer units (mine

detection equipment, specialized search dogs, and new technologies).

f. (U)

Service Engineer Units.

Service engineer units perform specific combat

engineer missions relating to explosive hazards, including breaching, clearing, and proofing
minefields. In extreme high-operational tempo or combat missions, US Army engineers or
other non-EOD units may conduct limited reduction or clearing of nonmine explosive and
IED hazards, under the technical guidance of Army EOD forces. US Army engineer units
involved in addressing IED explosive hazards include:

(1) (U)

US Army Clearance Company.

A clearance company conducts detection

and limited IED reduction along routes and within areas of support to enable force
application, focused logistics, and protection. It provides training readiness and oversight of
assigned route and area clearance platoons. The company provides battle command for three
to five route, area, or sapper platoons. It is capable of clearing a total of 255 kilometers of
two-way routes per day (three routes of 85 kilometers each) and can clear a total of two acres
per day (two areas at one acre each), depending on the enemy situation, terrain, and weather
conditions. The company’s route clearance platoons and teams are assigned the mission of
clearing routes that have had a high incidence of IED activity.

(2) (U)

Engineer Mine Dog Detachment.

Engineer mine detection dogs are

trained for the military operating environment to perform area and route clearance and
search, minefield extraction, combat patrols, building search (disruptive and nondisruptive),
vehicle search, and cave clearance. The dogs can reduce the time spent on a search and can
detect metallic and nonmetallic mines, both buried and surface laid.

(3) (U)

Explosive ordnance clearance agent (EOCA)

personnel are Army combat

engineers trained to perform limited battlefield disposal of UXO as outlined in the EOCA
identification guide and supplemental list of EOCA ordnance provided by the theater EOD
commander (part of the ordnance order of battle) during route reconnaissance or route
clearance operations or other engineer missions. EOCA personnel are authorized to blow in
place single munitions-based IEDs that are positively identifiable in the EOCA identification
guide. They are NOT trained to move, combine, and/or destroy multiple UXO (such as a
cache or IED incorporating more than one munition) or to perform reconnaissance or
handling of IED or VBIED incidents.

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Enabling Organizations (U)

A-11

(4) (U)

Terrain teams

are deployed at the brigade, division, and corps levels to

provide terrain analysis and geospatial support to the field. IED defeat-related support
includes route analysis, identification of choke points, assembly areas, line-of-sight analysis,
and other tactical decision aids. Terrain teams can also perform geospatial pattern analysis
for tracking and locating IEDs.

(5) (U)

EHT.

Assigned to the J-7 EHCC, the mission of an EHT is to provide

evaluation of explosive hazard incident sites in support of brigade-size and smaller units and
other similar-size joint, interagency, and multinational forces and organizations. The EOD
company and EHT coordinate and synchronize explosive hazard information and capability
throughout the COP and AOR. The EHT’s capabilities include:

(a) (U) Conducting site evaluation of explosive hazard incident sites, and

(b) (U) Conducting TTP training (explosive hazards awareness training,

AN/PSS-14, and area clearance) for BCT and RCT and joint, interagency, and multinational
personnel on explosive hazard mitigation in a JOA.

g. (U)

Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO).

The EWO is the commander’s subject

matter expert on CREW. The EWO coordinates spectrum management with the division and
brigade’s communications officer to deconflict electronic attack, manages and oversees the
employment of CREW systems, conducts EW training, and monitors exploitation results for
changes in the enemy’s use of the spectrum to ensure that load sets are valid.

h. (U)

Marine Corps engineer units

possess personnel that

are trained to identify and

destroy (blow in place) certain explosive obstacles based upon mission requirements and the
supported commander's approval/authorization.

8. (

Weapons Intelligence Teams

a. (U) WITs consists of four- to five-person elements (Figure A-1). WITs gather data to

exploit IED-related intelligence, recreate the scene of attacks to understand adversary TTP,
and contribute input to unit after-action reviews and friendly force TTP development. The
WIT provides IED intelligence collection capability to support BCT, RCT, and corps
intelligence analysis of IEDs and the adversary’s IED operations. WIT-derived intelligence
also forms the basis for potential targeting of bomb makers and bomb-making networks
within the AOR. WIT capabilities include the ability to provide IED reports directly into the
theater and national intelligence fusion cells via CIDNE; the ability to conduct
complementary IED investigations with EOD, to include assisting in TECHINT collection,
cataloging, reporting and evacuation of IED to theater (e.g., CEXC) and national lab (e.g.,
TEDAC) for exploitation; and the provision of weapons intelligence training for the soldiers
in the maneuver units.

b. (U) There are a variety of ways to configure and assign WITs. Organic to the C-IED

task force’s weapons intelligence flight, individual WITs are normally found at the brigade
level responding to IED events. They can be assigned in direct support to the EOD
companies that are in direct support to the maneuver BCTs or as part of a brigade C-IED
team (consisting of a C-IED training element, a WIT element, a CITP element, and a CREW

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2) - page 33