Index Manuals Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2)

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Chapter IV

IV-4 JP

3-15.1

2. (U) Strengths and Weaknesses of a Network

a. (U) Core strengths required to maintain an effective IED network may include:

(1) (U) The ability to adapt over time.

(2) (U) The ability to blend into the operating environment, making it difficult to

separate the adversary from the local population.

(3) (U) The ability to rapidly replace personnel losses by recruiting new members,

usually through personal relationships and an effective IO program.

(4) (U) A relative high level of insularity makes it difficult to gain intelligence on

them for purposes of either destruction or obtaining greater understanding of them. This
insularity is based primarily on the bonds of kinship, religion, and purpose that tie members
together.

(5) (U) Ability to establish cellular organizations that limit the friendly force’s

ability to roll up sizable portions of the network.

(6) (U) Networks can be highly connected both internally in terms of their

members and to the externally respective country’s social structure. Individuals can be
connected to one another and their leaders in multiple ways, including kinship, religion,
former association, and history, among other factors. This layering of affinity creates
densely internally connected networks and supports their cohesiveness. Through their
membership, these networks are also connected to major social structures—the tribal system
and its associated religious structure—giving them opportunities to acquire both resources
and support.

(7) (U) The ability to disassociate from the IED event by paying financially

motivated uninformed locals to emplace the IED or by using externally recruited suicide
bombers to execute missions, thereby minimizing MNF HUMINT collection capabilities.

b. (U) While adversary networks have inherent strengths, they also have exploitable

inherent weaknesses. These may include:

(1) (U) Competition for resources, including the loyalty of the population, often

leads to one group working against the other.

(2) (U) Connectivity among cells. Although the cellular structure is a highly secure

one, the links between cells can be identified and exploited over time.

(3) (U) The need to conduct activities, for example, reconnaissance, movement,

attack rehearsals, etc., that increase the likelihood of detection resulting in the exposure of
key network nodes or functions.

(4) (U) Competing interests or objectives among insurgent groups will often lead

one group to work against another.

Attacking the Improvised Explosive Device Network (U)

IV-5

(5) (U) The natural tendency to replicate previous successful actions and

unwittingly establish exploitable patterns.

3. (U) Attacking the Network—General Considerations

(U) While attacking the adversary’s network is a complex, time-consuming task, raising

the adversaries’ cost of IED employment to unacceptable levels can be accomplished
through a focused, continuous series of operations designed to disrupt the people, places,
processes, and materials that support the IEDs’ design, supply, and employment chain.
However, C-IED operations must be accomplished within the context of successfully
targeting the broader adversary infrastructure.

a. (FOUO) There is no guaranteed method of defining and codifying targetable

activities and major components of an IED network. To avoid detection and attack,
adversary networks camouflage and constantly revise, or adapt, their TTP. At the highest
echelons, the leadership rarely communicates openly and generally uses trusted aides and
couriers to provide broad guidance to subordinates and direct the network. At the lowest
echelons, the local cell members are detectable, targetable, and replaceable. Therefore,
eliminating individuals only provides temporary and limited solutions to countering IED
threats. But as networks function and move resources (information, money, supplies,
recruits) from the highest to the lowest echelons, these activities are detectable and
targetable. Disrupting the flow of resources is the most reliable way of neutralizing the
adversary’s use of IEDs. While ideology may produce recruits, they have to eat, obtain
weapons, travel, and build, transport, and emplace bombs. Personnel can be replaced, but
the adversary’s logistical infrastructure and materials often take more time.

(U) “What behavior do we want? Funerals or diminished/stopped IED [improvised
explosive device] activity? If killing leaders doesn’t achieve that, what will? This
brings us back to what I cited as the two most critical pieces of advice: In order to
stop the activity or make them go somewhere else, you have to know more than
HOW they set up IEDs, you need to know WHY they are setting IEDs. In order to
know that you have to know about the AO [area of operations]—the people, their
beliefs about certain behaviors, their goals, their fears, their leaders, their leaders’
goals, fears, motivations, etc. The S-2 [intelligence staff officer] doesn’t get that
data from higher HQ [headquarters] INTSUMs [intelligence summaries] or
assessments. He meets with the other intel professionals in the AO; he meets with
the PSYOP [psychological operations] guys, the CA [civil affairs] guys, the
engineer officer (if he is involved in local projects)—anyone who operates outside
the wire—and builds the picture of the AO.

(U) When you can answer “Why do they do this?” you can advise on the HOW to
make them stop. If the result of your information gathering indicates that a critical
node in the net is a person who, if removed, will seriously disrupt the local network,
not just the cell, then removal of that individual may be useful—provided the
elimination fits in or can be made to fit in with the larger narrative (messages).”

Bryan N. Karabaich, Colonel, US Army (Retired)

Chapter IV

IV-6 JP

3-15.1

b. (U) When designing an AtN program, the following information requirements must

be adequately addressed:

(1) (FOUO) What are the important elements of the IED networks? (Define them

in terms of key functions and nodes.)

(2) (FOUO) How do friendly lethal and nonlethal actions directed at different IED

network critical functions affect the network?

(3) (FOUO) If a given network critical function is eliminated or degraded, what are

its likely successors?

(4) (FOUO) How do removal and influencing actions directed at successors affect

the network?

(5) (FOUO) How long does it take for a network to recover when critical nodes are

removed?

(6) (FOUO) Which is more effective, removing a network function or influencing

it?

(7) (FOUO) Can observed activities be correlated with predictions, using

differences or comparisons to gain insight?

(8) (FOUO) How can the effectiveness of friendly actions directed at networks be

measured?

(9) (FOUO) How do we determine when a network is no longer capable of

accomplishing its mission or is successfully defeated?

(10) (FOUO) How do we influence the population to reduce/eliminate their support

to the network?

(11) (FOUO) Who are the local leaders or key actors who can influence the local

population and how can they be influenced?

4. (U) Counter-Network Strategy Development and Required Capabilities

a. (U) The ends of an effective counter-network strategy that curtails the IED threat to

the joint force or HN population will invariably focus on the operational environment that
allows the threat to take place. The perpetrators of IED attacks are motivated by various
causes. Political ideology, religious fervor, nationalism, or criminal gain are among the most
common reasons. Commanders will rarely attempt to neutralize the IED as the sole purpose
of an operation. Rather, effective commanders will understand the IED as a symptom of
deeper socio-political-economic issues. A successful long-term counter-IED strategy will
seek to find the root cause of the unrest and prevent the decision to use this weapon in the
first place.

Attacking the Improvised Explosive Device Network (U)

IV-7

b. (U) The ways of the counter-network strategy use an operation or campaign design

process that allows operational art to link ends, ways, and means to reach the desired end
state. The approach will include a description of the operational environment and a
statement of the problem to be solved. The operational approach will inform JOPP for
course of action determination, creation of the commander’s estimate, and plan/order
development.

c. (U) To attack the network, commanders and staffs must first understand the

operational environment in network terms. The previously described IED network is a
subset of the adversary network, and it will interact with the HN population, which can be
explained as a neutral network. Friendly forces can also be thought of and considered in
network terms as well. An important feature of any network is its adaptability to a changing
environment; one change to a node or link may substantially affect the entire network.
Because of this dynamic nature of complex adaptive systems, a second imperative for
effective counter-network operations is to closely link operations and intelligence. The third
essential element for an effective strategy is to rapidly assess the effects created by
operations and feed the assessment into the intelligence process. This will include both
foreseen and unforeseen results.

d. (U) The means a commander will use to conduct AtN operations is a joint force

alongside multinational, intergovernmental, and other like-minded partners that possess the
following capabilities and characteristics:

(1) (U)

Analyze.

The ability to apply analytical techniques to information detected

and collected to produce intelligence that describes the friendly, neutral, and threat networks
and the operational environment.

(2) (U)

Collect.

The ability to continuously and methodically acquire relevant

information by any means to gain data and understanding of the operating environment and
its friendly, neutral, and threat networks.

(3) (U)

Detect.

The ability to perceive, utilizing technologies or natural sensory

abilities, information, activities, material, or persons, potentially related to a friendly, neutral
or threat network.

(4) (U)

Disseminate.

The ability to communicate relevant information in a timely

manner across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

(5) (U)

Engage.

The ability to conduct actions, lethal or nonlethal, on a specific

target to create desired results.

(6) (U)

Exploit.

The ability to take full advantage of success in military operations

and follow up initial gains by detecting, collecting, and analyzing information, personnel,
and materials found during the conduct of operations.

(7) (U)

Target.

The ability and process to methodically select and prioritize an

entity, location, object, function, or behavior for possible action to create desired results.

Chapter IV

IV-8 JP

3-15.1

5. (U) Attack the Network Across the Levels of War

a. (U) At the strategic, national, and theater levels, AtN operations are focused on

global, international, or transnational threats and networks requiring coordination and
integration with interagency partners, MNFs, and multinational organizations. Key AtN
operations at this level include positively shaping the strategic environment using the full
range of the instruments of national power and developing and providing the partnerships,
information, and resources required for strategic success. Success at this level normally
depends heavily on influencing a range of audiences including international opinion, network
members and supporters, allies, and the US public. Strategic actions can also include
specific efforts to gain intelligence, conduct analysis, and target certain nodes and critical
functions that require interagency or multinational support.

b. (FOUO) At the operational level, AtN operations should employ a highly adaptable,

collaborative, and decentralized approach, blending physical and cognitive abilities to
achieve a desired end state. Through the use of specialized analytical tools, commanders
will be able to refine their understanding of the operating environment and focus resources
on key nodes in the IED infrastructure. For example, geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) can
be used to identify portions of the network such as safe houses, bomb-building locations, and
cache sites. Commanders and their staffs facilitate and enable AtN operations by developing
training activities that lead to better understanding of the operational environment prior to
deployment. When operating in sector, units employ their intelligence capabilities to
conduct analyses of IED proliferation networks and employ C-IED enablers to develop an
extended intelligence picture at the regional and international levels. They coordinate and
inform lower echelons of the effects desired, ensure unified actions are taken to favorably
shape the operational environment, and employ IO to influence the enemy, the populace, and
multinational partners. Most important, commanders should empower leaders at the lowest
levels to make timely decisions by pushing to them relevant information and C-IED enabling
capabilities. Operational success at this level may also have an impact at the strategic and
theater levels, affecting national and military operational strategies and planning.

c. (U) At the tactical level, the focus is on executing AtN operations. Accurate, timely,

and relevant intelligence will drive this effort, and tactical units should exercise refined
procedures to conduct analysis, template, and target networks. AtN tactical operations
include efforts to secure the population, strengthen HN security forces, and counter
insurgents’ ideology, propaganda, and ability to sustain themselves financially, materially,
and logistically. Tactical units will also conduct precise kill/capture operations, often based
on time-sensitive targeting. However, engaging in tactical operations against an IED
network is not done in isolation but is part of the broader national, strategic, and theater
campaigns to eliminate the causes of the insurgency and support the legitimate government.

d. (U) A successful AtN program includes network analysis, templating, and targeting.

It is based on the development and exploitation of C-IED-specific intelligence in the form of
WTI, usually derived from exploited IEDs, and intelligence derived from all sources to
include SIGINT, GEOINT, document and media exploitation (DOMEX), and measurement
and signatures intelligence. The central contribution of WTI to the AtN process is linking
specific individuals to particular IED events through the use of biometrics enabled

Attacking the Improvised Explosive Device Network (U)

IV-9

intelligence (BEI) and forensic-enabled intelligence, thus removing insurgents’ veil of
anonymity and exposing them to a range of counteractions—military, legal, and other. The
goal of an AtN program is to provide the commander and staff with an in-depth
understanding of the enemy networks in their operational area. In-depth understanding of
the network allows for more sophisticated, holistic approaches to attacking it, combining
lethal and nonlethal means. Since most unit-level intelligence staffs do not have the
personnel resources, time, or software to produce in-depth detailed network analyses,
reachback enablers like the JIEDDO COIC, US Army Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG),
and the NGIC capabilities can provide the requisite level of intelligence support for
optimized network prosecution.

6. (U) Targeting the Network

a. (U) There are a number of targeting methodologies that have been developed to

facilitate AtN. These methodologies (which include find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and
disseminate [F3EAD] and decide, detect, deliver, and assess) can also be merged to
complement each other. Regardless of the method employed, established processes and
procedures must be identified, standardized, and exploited to develop and refine a
comprehensive picture of the adversary to effectively target and attack an IED network.

b. (U) Every target should be exploited for information. Results from the exploitation

are documented and provided to operational-level analysts for further refinement and future
targeting actions. Exploitation can include examination of documents, financial ledgers, cell
phones, computer hardware, WTI collected from IED components (pre- and post-blast), and
biometric data from a variety of sources, and tactical questioning (TQ) or interrogations of
detainees. While individual pieces may not seem significant, over time, as information
accumulates and is correlated, these actions can reveal significant additional detail about the
network’s nodes and individual participants. Exploitation should be employed immediately
for the collection of WTI from IED components, DOMEX, cellular exploitation (CELLEX),
computers, and any other intelligence materials. Even pocket litter may reveal where the
individual has been or with whom they have been communicating.

7. (U) Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate

a. (U)

F3EAD, a subset of the find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA)

targeting process, may be used to engage selected high-value individuals (HVIs) or activities
(caches, bomb-making facilities). It incorporates the same fundamentals of the joint target
cycle and facilitates synchronizing maneuver, intelligence, and fire support. F3EAD features
massed, persistent ISR cued to a powerful and decentralized all-source intelligence
apparatus. The goal is to find an HVI or activity (weapons cache, bomb factory) in the midst
of civilian clutter and fix its exact location. This precise location enables surgical finish
operations (lethal or nonlethal) that emphasize speed to catch a fleeting target. The emphasis
on speed is not only to remove a combatant from the battlefield, but also to take the
opportunity to gain more information on the foe. The exploit and analyze steps are often the
main effort of F3EAD because they provide insight into the enemy network and may offer
new LOOs. The information gleaned during the exploit and analyze steps starts the cycle
over again by providing leads, or start points, into the network that can be observed and

Chapter IV

IV-10 JP

3-15.1

tracked. F3EAD is not a replacement for F2T2EA. Rather it is a subset of F2T2EA that
refines the actions to be completed when engaging HVIs or high-value activities. The
process still begins with a decide function in which decisions are made on priorities and the
allocation of resources. It is important to remember that the targeting process is a continuous
process. For any given target, the process tends to follow the flow depicted in Figure IV-3.
At any given time however, a unit may be at the find step for some targets, the exploit step
for several other targets, and at the fix, finish, analyze, or disseminate step for still other
targets. Similarly, the unit may disseminate information pertaining to the location of a target
prior to the finish or exploit steps. Generally, the process will follow the depicted flow, but
don’t let the process restrict what needs to happen next. The F3EAD process assists
commanders and staffs in:

(1) (U) Analyzing the IED network’s ideology, methodology, and capabilities,

thereby templating its inner workings—personnel, organization, and activities.

(2) (U) Identifying the links among enemy critical capabilities, requirements,

vulnerabilities, and observable indicators of adversary action.

(3) (U) Focusing and prioritizing dedicated ISR assets in support of C-IED efforts.

(4) (U) Providing the resulting intelligence and products to elements capable of

rapidly conducting multiple, near-simultaneous attacks against the critical vulnerabilities.

(5) (U) Providing an ability to “see” the operating environment, and array and

synchronize forces and capabilities.

b. (U)

F3EAD—Find.

During this step, the intelligence team is building an

understanding of the adversary and preparing a JIPOE study, which develops a picture of the
IED support infrastructure, to include identifying nodes and functions and working
relationships. During the final step (Figure IV-4), all available intelligence sources and
resources are utilized but efforts are often heavily weighted to the tactical level, HUMINT-
oriented collection capabilities.

(U)

For more information on JIPOE, see JP 2-01.3,

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the

Operational Environment.

c. (U)

F3EAD—Fix.

To “fix” the adversary, it is necessary to accurately locate enemy

personnel or activities, real time, so that they can be targeted. During this step, intelligence
analysts continue to develop and refine the analysis of the network with sufficient detail to
produce actionable intelligence and targeting plans. As analysis identifies the network’s
working nodes, the J-2 prioritizes the collection effort and works with the operations
directorate of a joint staff (J-3) to determine an appropriate response. Some nodes require
immediate response/attack (lethal or nonlethal), while others require further refinement as
they lead to more critical nodes. The commander’s

guidance will normally provide the

criteria for this decision. Practicing “tactical patience” or delaying an attack involves risk.
Operational risks must be balanced against the opportunities for further intelligence gains.
Fixing (Figure IV-5) potential network targets is also resource-intensive and cannot be
conducted indefinitely. For example tactically tracking emplacers back to their safe house or

Attacking the Improvised Explosive Device Network (U)

IV-11

cache and from there to other links in the network must have a cutoff at some point for action
to be taken.

Figure IV-3. (U) Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate

LEGEND

CDR

commander

CELLEX cellular expIoitation
COIC

counter-improvised explosive device

operations integration center

DOMEX

document and media exploitation

electronic warfare

GEOINT

geospatial intelligence

HET

human environment team

HUMINT human intelligence
ISR

intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance

JCAST joint

counter-improvised

explosive

device analytical support team

JIPOE

joint intelligence preparation of

the operational environment

LLVI

low-level voice intercept

site exploitation

special intelligence

SIGINT

signals intelligence

tactical questioning

TST

time-sensitive target

TTL

tag, track, locate

UGS

unattended ground sensor

WTI

weapons technical intelligence

direct
coordinating

FIND, FIX, FINISH, EXPLOIT, ANALYZE, AND DISSEMINATE

Patrol

GEOINT

CDR

GEOINT

Vehicle

Interdiction

Tactical

Call Out

TST

Indigenous

Negotiation

COIC

JIPOE

JCAST

CELLEX

HET

National

SIGINT

Battle

Staff

DOMEX

UGS

LLVI

WTI

HUMINT

TTL

(SI

Targeting)

Immediate
Follow-On
Targets

Target

SE/TQ

New

Target

Operations/Intelligence

Fusion

ISR

Fix

Finish

Exploit

Find

Analyze

Chapter IV

IV-12 JP

3-15.1

Figure IV-5. (U) Fix

FIX

Tag, Target,

Locate

Electronic

Warfare Special

Intelligence

Targeting

Fix

Figure IV-4. (U) Find

LEGEND

GEOINT

geospatial intelligence

HUMINT

human intelligence

SIGINT

signals intelligence

UGS

unattended ground sensor

FIND

SIGINT

GEOINT

Human

Environment

Team

Low-Level Voice

Intercept

HUMINT

Find

Patrol

UGS

Attacking the Improvised Explosive Device Network (U)

IV-13

d. (U)

F3EAD—Finish.

See Figure IV-6. J-3 directs the conduct of lethal and

nonlethal network-wide engagements. When possible, these actions should be conducted
simultaneously. The commander’s engagement guidance will determine what specific
options will be employed during this step. In an insurgency, nonlethal opportunities, even
something as simple as providing jobs for the unemployed (who alternatively will take
money to emplace IEDs) can have a measurable impact on IED employment. When
executing the preferable option, it is important to employ a multi-echelon approach to disrupt
as much of the network as possible and then exploit the results with previously planned

Figure IV-6. (U) Finish and Exploit

LEGEND

CELLEX

cellular expIoitation

DOMEX

document and media exploitation

HUMINT

human intelligence

site exploitation

tactical questioning

TST

time-sensitive target

WTI

weapons technical intelligence

FINISH AND EXPLOIT

Vehicle

Interdiction

GEOINT

Tactical

Call Out

TST

Indigenous

Negotiation

Finish

CELLEX

DOMEX

WTI

HUMINT

Immediate
Follow-On
Targets

Target

SE/TQ

Exploit

Chapter IV

IV-14 JP

3-15.1

collection assets. It is also important to consider conducting near-simultaneous operations to
minimize the ability for the target to alert or warn other elements of the network. Where
network-wide engagements are not possible, targets of opportunity that may otherwise
escape should be engaged.

e. (U)

F3EAD—Exploit.

Information relevant to the C-IED fight comes from many

sources. Often, the adversary provides the best information, sometimes without knowing it.
Exploitation involves collecting a wide range of information and intelligence from multiple
sources, including that which is collected during tactical site exploitation and WTI (pre- and
post-blast), and cross-referenced or compared with previously collected intelligence such as
DOMEX, CELLEX, computers, and any other relevant materials. WTI is fused with other
sources of intelligence to provide critical insights into network members and their activities
and can facilitate positively matching specific individuals to particular IEDs or IED events.
Whenever a target (individual or material) is attacked (or captured/seized), an attempt should
be made to conduct a detailed exploitation (of documents, computer media, cell phones,
weapons/explosives, personnel, and other related items) as quickly as possible (Figure IV-7).
In addition to being used to populate databases, the information derived from exploitation
can often be immediately used to support other operations and to identify follow-on
exploitation operations.

Exploitation and analysis activities are continuous and mutually

supportive.

f. (U)

F3EAD—Analyze

(1) (U)

Analysis.

As exploitation information is received from ongoing collection

activities, the intelligence picture of the network is further refined and the foundation is laid
for the next set of actions against the network. This process is continuous and results in a
return to the first step—refining the JIPOE. During analysis (Figure IV-8) of adversary
networks, the joint force should acquire detailed knowledge of the interpersonal dynamics
among network members, while maintaining situational awareness of the changing
operational environment. The end state of F3EAD analysis is the capability to identify those
network members and activities that are most vulnerable to both lethal and nonlethal
targeting. Analysis end products should also support those friendly actions that are most
likely to yield the desired effects upon IED networks.

(2) (U)

Template.

(Figure IV-9) One means of describing the key output in

templating is a modified intelligence synchronization matrix, which is intended to
synchronize intelligence asset collection with the AtN operations of maneuver units. The
first step in the five-step templating process is to describe the network. Describing the
network combines all available analytical and exploitation means, including reachback, in
order to uncover threat network personnel and the activities in which they are involved. The
second step in templating is to identify and list the adversary’s indicators—those enemy
activities that we can see (observables) and measure (signatures)—in order to expose
potential enemy vulnerabilities. Irregular forces’ operations—such as IED manufacturing
and employment—must normally be defined in much greater detail than they would be in
traditional warfare. Adversary patterns of activity, processes, materials, and networks must
be described as highly specific, collectable “indicators” that once collected can either assist
in understanding the intentions or capabilities of the enemy, or trigger the commander to take

Attacking the Improvised Explosive Device Network (U)

IV-15

action against the enemy capability or activity. Because most of these indicators are less
familiar to soldiers, deliberately hidden and often difficult to distinguish from other
background activities, many of them can only be inferred through direct observation, indirect
observation, or technical measurements. To account for this required level of detailed
understanding, indicators are further categorized as “observables” (indicators that can be
directly or indirectly observed) and “signatures” (indicators that can be inferred through
measurements). The third step is to identify named areas of interest (NAIs)—those areas
where friendly collection capabilities can detect enemy activity or individuals and have the
greatest decisive effect against the enemy if interdicted—adversary’s critical vulnerabilities.
The fourth step is to identify both organic and nonorganic collection capabilities required in
order to maximize ISR collection against those indicators at their associated NAIs. Finally,
in the fifth step, the staff makes targeting recommendations to the commander taking into

Figure IV-7. (U) Exploitation

LEGEND

CELLEX cellular expIoitation
CEXC

combined explosives exploitation cell

COIC

counter-improvised explosive device

operations integration center

DOMEX document and media exploitation

EOD

explosive ordnance disposal

HUMINT

human intelligence

site exploitation

tactical questioning

WTI

weapons technical intelligence

Apply

WTI Inputs:

CEXC, CELLEX,

DOMEX

Conduct

Site Exploitation

Use COIC and

Reachback Tools

Employ EOD and

Weapons

Intelligence Team

Apply Tactical

Questioning

Employ

Multifunctional

Teams

EXPLOITATION

DOMEX

Find

Fix

Finish and

Exploit

Analyze

Disseminate

CELLEX

WTI

HUMINT

Exploit

Chapter IV

IV-16 JP

3-15.1

consideration all

lethal and nonlethal

friendly capabilities available. Throughout this

templating process, the staff must draw upon the results of critical factors analysis (CFA)—
the analysis of critical capabilities, critical requirements, specific activities, observable and
measureable indicators, and critical vulnerabilities—and evaluate CFA along with the
activities depicted in the network template. The output of both templating and CFA is
captured in the staff synchronization matrix (Figure IV-10). The staff synchronization
matrix is a modified intelligence synchronization matrix that portrays specific intelligence
requirements, NAIs, ISR capabilities, earliest and latest time the information is of value,
threat indicators, and friendly actions and aligns them with potential friendly operations and
commander’s decision points (shown as red stars).

Figure IV-8. (U) Analysis

LEGEND

CDR

commander

COIC

counter-improvised explosive device

operations integration center

IED

improvised explosive device

JCAST

joint counter-improvised explosive

device analytical support team

JIPOE

joint intelligence preparation of the

operational environment

TAI

target area of interest

Conduct Network

Dynamics

(Causes, Effects,

Consequences)

Conduct

Pattern

Analysis

Identify

Network

Signatures

Conduct

Social

Network

Analysis

Conduct

Predictive

Analysis

Match IED Events

to Networks and

Prioritize Threats

Conduct

Center of Gravity

Analysis

Identify TAIs

Assign Collection

Assets

ANALYSIS

Find

Fix

Finish and

Exploit

Analyze

Disseminate

CDR

COIC

JIPOE

JCAST

National

Battle

Staff

Analyze

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IV-17

(3) (U)

Target Prioritization.

Once analysis and templating have been completed

and refined by additional intelligence collection, the next step is targeting. The network
targeting process is described in Figure IV-11. There are a variety of mechanisms that can
be employed to facilitate the targeting of IED networks. These include the traditional
targeting working group process and quick response dynamic targeting cells that usually
focus on specific type of targets (HVIs, caches, or emplacers), which vary depending on the
echelon conducting the planning. The results of analysis and templating are assessed to
ensure that lethal and nonlethal AtN operations are aimed at the right network members and
functions using the right means and the best timing. When possible, targeting will result in
multiple, near-simultaneous operations aimed at several network targets.

Figure IV-9. (U) Analysis—Find (Template)

LEGEND

CDR

commander

CIC

combat intelligence center

COIC

counter-improvised explosive device

operations integration center

JCAST

joint counter-improvised explosive

device analytical support team

JIPOE

joint intelligence preparation of the

operational environment

Use COIC

Network

Analysis

Perform

Conceptual

Targeting

Perform

Dynamic

Targeting

Perform

Operational Area

Specific

Templating

Identify

Detailed
Network

Activities

Identify Areas of

Interest; Assign

Collection Assets

Produce Modified

Intelligence

Synchronization

Matrix

ANALYSIS—FIND (TEMPLATE)

Find

Fix

Finish and

Exploit

Analyze

Disseminate

CDR

COIC

JIPOE

JCAST

National

Battle

Staff

Analyze

Chapter IV

IV-18 JP

3-15.1

Figure IV-10.

(FOUO

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zatio

n Matrix

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Attacking the Improvised Explosive Device Network (U)

IV-19

(a) (U) In the C-IED fight, C-IED working groups at all echelons will take the

available intelligence information and the commander’s targeting guidance and develop a list
of prioritized lethal and nonlethal targets to submit to the targeting board. The goal of a
C-IED working group is to provide a series of recommendations to the commander and staff
identifying targets and the appropriate method to engage for maximum effectiveness.

(b) (U) The coordination and synchronization between the enablers that make

up the C-IED working group is crucial to supporting the commander’s targeting guidance.
There is a multitude of organizations, within and external to DOD, that provides enablers and
crucial technical support, for example, NGIC weapons intelligence team (WIT), combined
explosives exploitation cell (CEXC), and other reports of IEDs, and produces analytical
products to support targeting of enemy networks. DIA is the lead enabler for WTI process,

Figure IV-11. (U) Targeting

TARGETING

Conduct

Targeting

Meeting

Conduct C-IED

Working Group

Meeting

Synchronize

Lethal and Nonlethal

Targeting

Conduct

Time-

Sensitive

Targeting

Apply

CARVER

Apply WTI

Inputs

Build Target

Folders

Leverage

Interagency
Capabilities

Find

Fix

Finish and

Exploit

Analyze

Disseminate

LEGEND

CARVER criticality, accessibility, recuperability,

vulnerability, effect, and recognizability

CDR

commander

C-IED

counter-improvised explosive device

COIC

counter-improvised explosive device

operations integration center

JCAST

joint counter-improvised explosive

device analytical support team

JIPOE

joint intelligence preparation of the

operational environment

WTI

weapons technical intelligence

CDR

COIC

JIPOE

JCAST

National

Battle

Staff

Analyze

Chapter IV

IV-20 JP

3-15.1

which involves the scientific examination and analysis of materiel as well as data from an
event or site involving collected material. The primary function of WTI is to identify
associations among events, people, IEDs, improvised weapons, and collected material used
to support the IED cycle. Exploitation provides direct support to attacking insurgent and
terrorist networks by conducting “supply chain defeat” analysis. WTI facilitates the
interdiction of network infrastructures by linking IED supplies to specific individuals or
organizations.

working group will evaluate it for targetable potential. One method for evaluating potential
targets is targets systems analysis (TSA). Criticality, accessibility, recuperability,
vulnerability, effect, and recognizability (CARVER) is a well-known TSA tool that can be
used to evaluate potential targets. The CARVER criteria are:

1. (U) Criticality—Value of the target to the enemy.

2. (U) Accessibility—Operational element can reach the target with

available resources to accomplish its mission.

3. (U) Recuperability—The time it will take to replace, repair, or bypass

the destruction or damage of the target.

4. (U) Vulnerability—Operational element has the means and expertise to

successfully attack the target.

5. (U) Effect—Effect on the cell or network using political, military,

economic, social, information, and infrastructure, including second and third order effects.

6. (U) Recognizability—Degree to which the asset can be recognized by

an attacker, intelligence, or reconnaissance.

(d) (U) Once the C-IED working group has developed a prioritized list of

recommended targets with recommended means of engagement (lethal and nonlethal), it will

(U//FOUO) “Targeting in a COIN [counterinsurgency] environment requires
creating a targeting board or working group at all echelons. The intelligence cell
provides representatives to the targeting board or working group to synchronize
targeting with intelligence sharing and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance operations. The goal is to prioritize targets and determine the
means of engaging them that best supports the commander’s intent and the
operation plan. Effective targeting identifies the targeting options, both lethal and
nonlethal, to create effects that support the commander’s objectives. Lethal
targets are best addressed with operations to capture or kill; nonlethal targets are
best engaged with CMO [civil-military operations], IO [information operations],
negotiation, political programs, economic programs, social programs and other
noncombat methods. Nonlethal targets are usually more important than lethal
targets in COIN; they are never less important.”

Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency

Attacking the Improvised Explosive Device Network (U)

IV-21

forward that list for consideration and action by the command’s targeting board. Again, this
recommended targeting can be further enhanced or refined through reachback support from
the COIC.

(e) (U) Exploitation continues after the application of lethal or nonlethal fires

on the selected target. It involves the application of all available and suitable assets to gather
as much information as possible to feed back into the system.

g. (U)

F3EAD—Disseminate.

The success of a counter-network strategy requires a

robust communications architecture that connects all the participants in the C-IED process as
well as shares data. Additionally, experience, proper training, and established reporting
responsibilities and procedures help ensure the timely and accurate sharing of information.
While the exact architecture will be determined by the JFC, it should be flexible enough to
include multinational partners.

8. (U) Multi-Echelon, Multidiscipline Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Fusion

a. (U) Organizing and allocating resources for AtN operations requires a coordinated,

synchronized, and integrated effort beginning at the tactical level and often involving the use
of national-level resources. Intelligence personnel at all echelons must be prepared to
employ traditional and nontraditional information sources to build the picture of the
adversary’s infrastructure and share that information and intelligence across the joint force.

b. (FOUO) Modern technology (Figure IV-12) provides the JFC with unprecedented

abilities to maintain near-constant surveillance over specific geographic areas using a wide
variety of ISR resources to provide continuous coverage. When combined with the real-time
imagery downlink provided by the remote operational video enhanced receiver system, aerial
surveillance assets of organizations can provide C-IED analysts and targeteers with vital
real-time information on insurgent IED activities. This support is also capable of detecting
and back tracking emplacers to their safe houses and caches. Once these IED support sites
are located, they can be further exploited to identify and locate other network functions. An
identified site can be:

(1) (U) Further exploited through more intense all-source based surveillance. The

goal is to see if this opportunity will lead to other nodes (individual and support) in the
network.

(2) (U) Raided and on-site materials (computers, cell phones, documents

[DOMEX], IED components, WTI, other intelligence-related materials) and TQ of detainees
(HUMINT) for usable information. This will often require an on-site exploitation capability
(EOD, WIT) combined with the ability to immediately respond (with further raids) to any
time-sensitive information that may be discovered. It is also critical that recovered materials
and data get submitted into the proper channels in order to enable full exploitation and the
subsequent dissemination of valuable network intelligence to units.

c. (U) When these enhanced visual surveillance capabilities are combined with the

traditional ability to monitor communications means (radio, telephone, Internet) and the use
of HUMINT resources (media exploitation, informers, volunteer HN information sources,

Chapter IV

IV-22 JP

3-15.1

“every soldier a sensor”) and WTI, the C-IED analysts and targeteers will possess
information required to help develop an accurate picture of the critical nodes of the various
IED networks operating in the operational area. Gathering basic tactical information and
utilizing TQ is an essential part of C-IED operations. Whether we are looking at individual
soldiers on patrols, or information derived from meeting local leaders, or even conversations
with local workers, all of these are information sources. While interactions with the local
population and their observations of the physical environment may be considered a tactical
concern, when aggregated, they can provide an operational-level picture of adversary IED
activities. Over time, this information can be refined sufficiently to produce targetable
intelligence and further opportunities for exploitation.

d. (U) The key to success in attacking a network is to maintain disruptive attack

pressure on multiple functions simultaneously, forcing the individuals as well as cells out

Figure IV-12. (U) Surveillance Resources Supporting the Ground Forces

SURVEILLANCE RESOURCES SUPPORTING THE

GROUND FORCES

LEGEND

aerostat

(pressurized aerodynamic helium balloon)

BCT

brigade combat team

CAS

close air support

GMLRS

guided multiple launch rocket system

ISR

intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance

JSTARS

Joint Surveillance Target Attack
Radar System

SOF

special operations forces

UAV

unmanned aerial vehicle

Other assets can include: Other government departments and agencies, signals intelligence assets, sniper
teams, special operations forces reconnaissance teams, and the deployable ground station.

Attacking the Improvised Explosive Device Network (U)

IV-23

into the open as they take greater risks to continue their IED network operations. As the
network attempts to reconstitute the organization, it is vulnerable to detection and targeting
actions. While friendly C-IED efforts may not lead to the destruction of the organization,
maintaining constant pressure at multiple levels within the network will deny an adversary
the freedom of action and movement it needs to conduct operations against the JTF.

9. (U) Deliberate and Dynamic Network Targeting

a. (U) The JFC uses a mix of deliberate and dynamic targeting to actively identify and

attack networks that employ IEDs. In deliberate targeting, the joint force

prosecutes

planned targets—

the array of critical network components that are essential to the success

of that network which have been identified through the fusion of all-source intelligence and
C-IED working group information at all levels of command. These are targets that are
known to exist in the operational environment, which can be engaged with actions to create
effects that support JFC objectives. In the C-IED fight, WTI analysis (including information
derived from tactical, technical, and forensic exploitation, biometrics, document exploitation,
detainee operations, etc.) combined with information derived from all-source intelligence
resources facilitates the precise identification of those portions of the adversary’s networks
that employ IEDs. Once identified, the JFC can make a better informed decision on how to
apply lethal and nonlethal capabilities to attack the IED network before the next IED attack
occurs. The second targeting category is dynamic targeting, which prosecutes targets of
opportunity, which include targets that are identified too late, or not selected for action in
time, to be included in deliberate targeting and which, when detected or located, meet
specific criteria to achieving objectives. In the C-IED fight, HVIs are targeted as time-
sensitive and cleared for immediate attack when found. These targets are fleeting in nature
and are considered high-payoff targets (HPTs).

If removed, HVIs/HPTs will significantly

“disrupt” activities of the adversary’s forces within a commander’s operational area. An

(U) Threat networks that use improvised explosive devices (IEDs) comprise
state and non-state supporters, leaders, core cadre, planners, technology
suppliers, financial supporters, trainers, recruiters, transportation agents,
logistical storage facilities, IED precursors, surveillance teams, bomb
makers, cache locations, emplacers, trigger men, security personnel, people
that provide pre- and post-blast safe havens for action and facilitation
networks, host nation corrupt political and military officials and personnel
who support and collaborate with these networks, etc. In the Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM Anaconda Strategy, this entire network system was
targeted as a whole. Major named operations were developed in which
network critical vulnerabilities (i.e., critical sub-components and supporting
requirements of complex adaptive systems), many of which crossed friendly
boundaries at tactical through strategic levels, were identified and attacked.
Plans were put in place and executed that ultimately “Defeated,” not merely
disrupted, enemy networks that employed IEDs. Lethal and nonlethal
desired effects were identified and measured. There was over a 90%
reduction in use of IEDs from April 2007 to April 2009 in Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM.

Various Sources

Chapter IV

IV-24 JP

3-15.1

approach that focuses only on the engagement of HVIs, without conducting a full-spectrum
comprehensive attack against multiple facets of the entire network, allows enemy networks
that employ IEDs to reorganize, rearm, refit, and reengage US forces or MNFs. In other
words, the network continues to operate.

b. (U) C-IED operations employ a mix of deliberate and dynamic targeting actions and

commanders must be prepared to allocate the necessary mix of ISR and attack assets to be
able to respond to targets as they are identified. C-IED working groups can facilitate the
identification of networks and their critical vulnerabilities and provide the JFC and the joint
targeting board with the information needed to more precisely enable attack of networks that
employ IEDs.

V-1

CHAPTER V

STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES (U)

1. (U) Introduction

a. (U) This chapter examines the roles and responsibilities of the JTF staff with attached

and assigned C-IED enabling organizations. Depending on the size and duration of the
operation, there are a number of approaches for organizing the conduct of C-IED operations.
In small-scale, short duration operations where technical specialist assets are limited, the JTF
may create specialized C-IED cells within the J-2, J-3, and engineering staff section (J-7) to
plan and oversee the conduct of C-IED operations. This is the normal arrangement in a
small-scale operation in the early stages of an insurgency and insurgent IED employment.
Another option is to employ a C-IED task force to manage assigned C-IED assets and, in
coordination with the JTF staff, plan and conduct C-IED operations. In larger-scale
operations or a fully mature insurgency with widespread IED use, the JTF is likely to employ
a separate C-IED task force. The C-IED task force has primary responsibility for managing
the JTF’s C-IED assets and coordinating the activities of many of the assigned/attached
C-IED enabling organizations. When a C-IED task force is established, the JTF staff
resumes a more traditional staff role in establishing policy and general direction for the JTF’s
overall C-IED effort.

b. (U) While all elements within the staff are expected to contribute to the C-IED effort,

the primary responsibility for organizing and leading the operation lies with the J-2, the J-3,
the J-7, and the IO/strategic communication section. The successful conduct of C-IED
operations depends on the J-2’s ability to organize and direct intelligence operations that are
designed to develop timely, predictive, actionable intelligence on specific operational-level
IED-related targets, the J-3’s ability to direct forces to act on that information, and the J-3’s
and J-7’s ability to ensure that the members of the JTF have individual/unit training packages
with the latest available information on the IED threat.

c. (U) At each level of command, the cell or unit assigned the C-IED mission needs to

be properly resourced and have the appropriate skills and specialist enablers. Although
similar tasks and requirements are present at different levels, proper mission analysis needs
to be conducted in order to create an appropriate structure to be able to fulfill those tasks and
requirements (see Figures V-1 to V-4). The commander, joint task force (CJTF), should
establish a series of staff organizations to assist in the management of the IED-related
information flow, to provide direction to attached and supporting C-IED assets (see
Appendix A, “Counter-Improved Explosive Device Enabling Organizations”) to develop and
continuously refine the CJTF’s C-IED targeting and countermeasures programs. National,
joint, and Service assets in the form of specialized technical, forensic, biometric, and
targeting analysis teams will deploy forward to assist organic/assigned EOD teams in the
investigation of IED-related incidents and the collection, management, and dissemination of
IED information and targeting the IED network. Reporting from those units should be
shared immediately within the JTF to help refine unit/individual TTP. It should also be
forwarded for more detailed evaluation by specialized national capabilities to help drive the
development of improved active and passive force protection measures and develop the
information needed to support targeting of the IED support infrastructure. Success normally

Chapter V

V-2 JP

3-15.1

relies upon a clear understanding of missions, roles, and responsibilities; a clearly established
information gathering, analysis, and dissemination architecture that simultaneously links all
participants at all echelons; and an aggressive, innovative, proactive mindset that develops
the tools and strategies to carry the fight to the adversary.

(U) Note: In the United States Marine Corps (USMC), C-IED planning and coordination is
considered a staff function. The C-IED cell does not control or direct EOD assets. EOD
units are organic to the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) and employed in direct
support of the infantry battalions. EOD officers are assigned as liaison to the regiments.
While Marine Corps EOD assets are not usually assigned to the C-IED task force, the JTF’s
C-IED task force provides WTI teams, C-IED support teams to facilitate planning and
specialized C-IED training teams to support Marine Corps forces and share C-IED
intelligence and device-specific information with Marine Corps units. Marine Corps
representatives participate in the JTF-level C-IED working groups.

2. (U) Intelligence

a. (U) The J-2’s mission is to provide the commander with timely and accurate

intelligence to support the CJTF’s objectives, as stated in the C-IED plan, and to meet the
information needs of the staff and component commands for operations and planning. The
J-2 is responsible for organizing and directing the operations of the command’s intelligence
assets. The J-2’s C-IED-related information sources within the operations area will include
the command’s organic intelligence assets (all-source, especially HUMINT); HN and MNF
sources, unit level reporting, the command’s assigned EOD, WIT, CEXC assets, and national
assets (such as WIT, CEXC, etc.) deployed forward to conduct specialized exploitation of
IED incidents and devices. In order to manage and exploit this information flow, the J-2 will
cooperate with a number of staff organizations and reporting organizations, each with a
specific focus on some aspect of the IED problem. The J-2 may elect to create a C-IED
intelligence cell in order to focus the analyst’s efforts. The mission of the J-2’s C-IED
intelligence cell is to produce and disseminate timely, all-source fused intelligence that will
serve as a basis for the development and conduct of the command’s C-IED effort. When the
CJTF forms a C-IED task force, the J-2 will support the task force’s C-IED intelligence
fusion cell, facilitating the collection, analysis, and application of all-source intelligence to
the C-IED fight.

b. (U)

Organization.

In addition to AOR-based sources of IED-related information,

the JTF J-2 works closely with the combatant command J-2 for ISR support and coordination
and to obtain theater analytical products. The combatant command makes a significant
contribution to the identification, tracking, and attack of adversary networks and HVI. See
Figure V-1.

(U)

For additional information on the relationship between the combatant command

intelligence organization and the JTF, see JP 2-0,

Joint Intelligence.

(1) (U)

Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) or Joint Intelligence

Support Element (JISE).

The mission of the JIOC/JISE is to conduct focused all-source

analysis to produce target intelligence and participate in the JTF J-3 and the major

Staff

Responsibilities

(U)

V-3

subordinate commands’ (MSCs’) dynamic targeting process. The JIOC/JISE is an
intelligence fusion cell responsible for developing a current intelligence analysis on the
insurgency to include the adversary’s activities, objectives and support structure. It produces
detailed IED-related assessments on devices and adversary TTP developments. The
JIOC/JISE also conducts trend analysis in order to predict future adversary activities.
JIOC/JISE reporting is designed to produce intelligence that is tailored to support corps
COIN operations and C-IED efforts. In addition to the traditional intelligence summary, the
JIOC/JISE develops a variety of general and specialized intelligence reports that are
designed to meet the information needs of planners and operators at all echelons within the
JTF. The JIOC/JISE may also have a

C-IED intelligence cell

that is responsible for

developing all-source reports that are designed to provide friendly forces with detailed
C-IED-related assessments on devices and changes in adversary IED-related TTP. The
C-IED-related intelligence information flow for the JIOC/JISE is illustrated in Figure V-2.
When operating with a C-IED task force that has formed a target development cell (TDC),
the JIOC/JISE’s IED intelligence reporting supports the C-IED task force’s TDC.

Figure V-1. (U) Notional Intelligence Staff Organization

NOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE STAFF ORGANIZATION

J-2

Plans

JIOC

C-IED Intelligence Cell*

* Includes COIC analyst support and JIEDDO ORSA analysis

CITP

HOC

Force

Modernization

Production

HARC

J-2X

GEOINT/

TERR

Teams

Systems

LEGEND

C-IED

counter-improvised explosive device

CITP

counter-improvixed explosive device

targetting

COIC

counter-IED operations integration center

GEOINT

geospatial intelligence

HARC

HUMINT analysis and reporting cell

HOC

HUMINT operations center

HUMINT

human intelligence

IED

improvised explosive device

J-2

intelligence directorate of a joint staff

J-2X

joint force counterintelligence and human

intelligence staff element

JIEDDO Joint IED Defeat Organization
JIOC

joint intelligence operations center

ORSA

operations research and systems analysis

TERR

terrain

Chapter V

V-4 JP

3-15.1

(2) (U)

C-IED intelligence fusion

is accomplished in the JIOC and relies heavily

on target intelligence produced by the counter-improvised explosive device targeting
program (CITP) cell. The CITP cell, which is also known as a TDC, is responsible for
producing target intelligence on high-threat IED networks.

(3) (U)

J-2 C-IED Intelligence Cell.

Consisting of the J-2’s C-IED all-source

analysis cell and the TDC, the C-IED intelligence cell, consisting of intelligence analysis,
collection management, and CITP technical specialists, will normally have the following
responsibilities:

(a) (U) Plan the focused employment of intelligence collection assets against

the adversary’s IED infrastructure.

Figure V-2. (U) Corps Analysis and Control Element

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Intelligence Flow

CORPS ANALYSIS AND CONTROL ELEMENT COUNTER-

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE INTELLIGENCE FLOW

LEGEND

CEXC

combined explosives exploitation cell

C-IED

counter-improvised explosive device

CITP

counter-IED targeting program

COIC

counter-IED operations integration

center

EOD

explosive ordnance disposal

GEOINT geospatial intelligence

HUMINT

human intelligence

JIOC

joint intelligence operations center

MASINT measurement and signature

intelligence

MSC

major subordinate command

SIGINT signals

intelligence

WIT

weapons intelligence team

CITP

Taskings

COIC

Analysis

SIGINT

HUMINT

GEOINT

Fused

Intelligence

Products

MASINT

JIOC

C-IED Cell

Products

CEXC

Reporting

EOD/WIT

Reporting

MSC

Reporting

Staff

Responsibilities

(U)

V-5

(b) (U) Serve as the all-source focal point for all IED-related intelligence

information originating within the command and from national and multinational/HN
sources.

device design to enhance friendly force protection programs and C-IED operational
planning.

(d) (U) Identify and produce target intelligence on the critical nodes in the

adversary’s IED infrastructure to support C-IED operations.

(e) (U) The intelligence cell is the primary agency responsible for fusion of

technical assessments, forensic exploitation, and all-source threat intelligence related to the
IED threat within the operational area. The cell analyzes developments in the threat’s TTP
and disseminates advisories to MNFs. The cell also advises the joint forces in IED risk
mitigation. Working closely with the J-2 collection manager and the JIOC/JISE, the cell
answers all relevant IED-related intelligence requests for information (RFIs). The cell is also
responsible for developing intelligence for the J-2’s portion of the CITP. In developing their
analytical products, the cell reviews all C-IED-related intelligence generated within the
command and by the relevant national agencies (NGIC, Terrorist Explosive Device
Analytical Center [TEDAC], described in Appendix A, “Counter-Improvised Explosive
Device Enabling Organizations”). The cell’s reporting on adversary emerging TTP and IEDs
are contained in a series of special assessments.

(f) (U) The C-IED intelligence cell fuses information from a variety of sources

including:

1. (U) CEXC,

2. (U) WIT,

3. (U) EOD teams,

4. (U) J-2 GEOINT/terrain team,

5. (U) Explosive hazards coordination cell (EHCC),

6. (U) Tactical human intelligence teams (THTs), and

7. (U) COIC analysis.

(4) (U)

Human Intelligence Analysis and Reporting Cell (HARC).

Operating

under the J-2X [joint force counterintelligence and HUMINT staff element], this cell is
responsible for analyzing information collected through human sources in order to detect
potential insurgent activity directed toward friendly forces. Much of the HARC’s reporting
is designed to support the production of target folders. The HARC accomplishes the
following:

Chapter V

V-6 JP

3-15.1

(a) (U) Provides HUMINT collection focus and develops HUMINT collection

requirements based on the commander’s priority intelligence requirements and information
requirements.

(b) (U) Incorporates HUMINT into all-source fused products to provide

timely, actionable intelligence leading to positive identification, exploitation, or
neutralization of high-value targets.

c. (U) The J-2 also obtains information from deployed interagency IED technical

exploitation capabilities supporting the JTF. This national support enables the J-2 to better
define the operational environment and develop actionable intelligence to target the IED
support structure. Organizations that are specifically designed to

provide information that

supports the development of actionable intelligence to support the C-IED effort are the
CEXC manned by joint Service and multinational EOD personnel, the CITP sponsored by
the NGIC, WITs deployed to support the command’s brigade combat teams (BCTs), and
assigned Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent Bomb Technicians and Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and Explosives (ATF) explosives experts (See Appendix
A, “Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Enabling Organizations”). In the IED effort,
these elements can provide the following:

(1) (U) Databases that track different types of IEDs and can link an IED to a known

or suspected bomb maker based on materials and methods used in its construction.

(2) (U) Analysis of found or captured materials to determine if they are in fact IED

precursors.

(3) (U) Analysis of current IED construction and initiation methods.

(4) (U) Prediction of IED trends and likely future construction and initiation

methods.

(5) (U) Identification of possible sources responsible for IEDs and associated

materials based on exploitation and analysis of technical, forensic, and biometric materials
and information from site exploitation.

d. (U) The overall C-IED-related intelligence information flow for the JTF is illustrated

in Figure V-3.

3. (U) Operations

a. (U)

Mission.

The J-3 (Figure V-4) is responsible for the direction of the JTF’s

combat forces. The J-3 ensures that sufficient, properly equipped C-IED forces (see
Appendix A, “Counter-Improved Explosive Device Enabling Organizations”) are available
to support the JTF’s mission within the operational area. The configuration that is depicted
applies in the early stages of an operation when the IED threat is low, the JTF numbers less
than a division in size, and a C-IED TF has not been established.

Staff

Responsibilities

(U)

V-7

b. (U) J-3 C-IED Operations Intelligence Fusion Cell. The JTF J-3 C-IED operations

intelligence fusion cell is the J-3’s focal point to coordinate and synchronize all IED-related
matters. It approves all friendly TTP and C-IED training packages used in theater and,
through the C-IED working group, coordinates C-IED efforts across organizations. It tracks
developments in adversary IED employment and TTP and participates with the J-2 in the
development of appropriate friendly countermeasures.

Figure V-3. (U) Joint Task Force Improvised Explosive Device Intelligence Flow

JOINT TASK FORCE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

INTELLIGENCE FLOW

LEGEND

CEXC

combined explosives exploitation cell

C-IED

counter-improvised explosive device

CITP

counterinsurgency targeting program

EHCC

explosives hazards coordination center

EHT

explosives hazards team

EOD

explosive ordnance disposal

EWCC electronic warfare coordination cell
G-2

component intelligence staff officer

G-3

component operations staff officer

G-7

component engineer staff officer

GEO-

geospatial terrain technology cell

TECH

INSCOM

US Army Intelligence and Security

Command

J-2

intelligence directorate of a joint staff

J-3

operations directorate of a joint staff

J-7

engineering staff section

JIC

joint intelligence center

JIOC

joint intelligence operations center

NAVEOD-

Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal

TECHDIV

Technology Division

NGIC

National Guard Intelligence Center

WIT

weapons intelligence team

Combatant Command

JIC

Joint Task Force

C-IED Task Force

WIT

CEXC

EOD

CITP

J/G-2 J/G-3 J/G-7

Components

J-2

Intelligence

Supporting

National

Organizations

J-3

Operations

J-7

Engineers

JIOC

GEO-TECH

NAVEOD

TECHDIV

INSCOM

NGIC

EWCC

EHCC

EHT*

* if established

C-IED Cell

C-IED

Operations

Intelligence

Fusion Cell

Chapter V

V-8 JP

3-15.1

c. (U) In some instances, the cell, when augmented by representatives from the

operational C-IED assets, can expand its responsibilities to include assisting in prioritizing
the C-IED targeting effort, fusing IED-related intelligence and information, providing
analytical products to the division and BCT, and providing persistent surveillance on select
IED threats. The cell (Figure V-5) produces products for the targeting board and support the
planning effort. This “fusion” configuration usually facilitates the synchronization of
operations and intelligence activities and is adopted when the JTF is facing personnel
constraints and must consolidate its staff functions. The core of the “fusion” cell is normally
provided by the C-IED task force and is in direct support of the J-3.

(1) (U)

IO Cell.

IO planning should begin at the

earliest stage

of C-IED operations

and must be an integral part of, not an addition to, the overall planning effort. The IO cell
should be tailored as necessary to understand the human terrain environment and IED
awareness to create a more favorable environment for friendly forces among the local
populace.

(2) (U)

J-3 Effects Cell.

The effects cell, when established, coordinates and

synchronizes all lethal and nonlethal assets in support of corps operations and conducts
assessments of the operations in order to achieve the commander’s objectives. This cell is

Figure V-4. (U) Operations Staff Organization

OPERATIONS STAFF ORGANIZATION

J-3

C-IED Operations

Intelligence

Fusion Cell

Training

Plans Policy

Air

Electronic

Warfare

Coordination Cell

Force

Protection

Information

Operations Cell

Effects

Force

Modernization

LEGEND

C-IED

counter-improvised explosive device

J-3

operations directorate of a joint staff

Staff

Responsibilities

(U)

V-9

normally assigned to the J-3 but can also be a stand-alone staff section, in which case, the
electronic warfare coordination cell (EWCC) would be part of the cell. The effects cell
develops, executes, and manages a robust and focused C-IED information operation.

(3) (U)

EWCC.

An EWCC can be established at the corps or division to serve as

the lead for electronic warfare (EW) coordination, planning, and prioritizing the execution of
EW actions in the JOA. The EWCC seeks to deny the adversary the use of the
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and secure and maintain effective control and use of the
EMS in support of the JTF. Depending on the size of the operation, the JTF may be assigned
a joint counter radio-controlled improvised explosive device electronic warfare (CREW) unit
to manage CREW systems, conduct CREW systems training for the JTF, and develop

Figure V-5. (U) Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations-Intelligence Fusion Cell

COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

OPERATIONS-INTELLIGENCE FUSION CELL

LEGEND

CEXC

combined explosives exploitation cell

C-IED

counter-improvised explosive device

CITP

counter-improvised explosive device

targeting program

COIC

counter-IED operations integration center

IED

improvised explosive device

J-2

intelligence directorate of a joint staff

J-3

operations directorate of a joint staff

LEP

law enforcement professional

ORSA

operations research and systems

analysis

J-3

Plans and

Policy

Brigade Combat Team

Route

Clearance

Patrol

C-IED

Support
Element

Operations-

Intelligence

Fusion Cell

Operations-
Intelligence
Synchronization

J-3

Orders

J-2 Analyst

J-3 Operations

CEXC

CITP

ORSA

COIC

LEP

Engineers

C-IED Task Force

Intelligence

Joint

Targeting

Board

Chapter V

V-10 JP

3-15.1

CREW-related TTP. The unit will also coordinate with the JTF spectrum manager to
deconflict CREW systems employment within the JTF’s electronic spectrum.

(4) (U)

J-3 C-IED Working Group.

Chaired by the J-3, the C-IED working group

is tasked to work specific issues relating to the development of the JTF C-IED plan. The
working group is described in detail in paragraph 5, “Joint Task Force Counter-Improvised
Explosive Device Boards, Working Groups, and Cells.”

d. (U)

J-3 and Supporting C-IED Enablers.

EOD and WIT assets will normally

accompany a JTF when it deploys. Depending on operational requirements, these EOD and
WIT assets could range from a few teams to several battalions. Initially,

prior to the

creation of

C-IED task force,

these assets were placed under the tasking authority of

the J-3.

4. (U) Engineers

(U)

Mission.

The J-7 (Engineer) (Figure V-6) coordinates combat, general and, in

coordination with the J-2, geospatial engineering requirements for the joint force. The J-7
also provides engineer expertise to many of the JTF’s boards, centers, cells, and working
groups. In the C-IED effort, the J-7 establishes the EHCC to advise the joint force on
developments in adversary IED employment and potential friendly countermeasures. In
certain situations, the EHCC may also forward deploy (with the maneuver units) an
explosive hazard awareness team.

Figure V-6. (U) Engineer Staff Organization

ENGINEER STAFF ORGANIZATION

LEGEND

J-7

engineering staff section

J-7

Engineer

Explosive Hazards

Coordination Center

Explosive Hazards

Teams

Logistics

Geospatial

Facilities

Plans

Explosive

Remnants of War

Reconstruction

Staff

Responsibilities

(U)

V-11

a. (U) The mission of the EHCC is to enable the land component commander to predict,

track, distribute information on, and mitigate explosive hazards within the theater by
conducting information management and exchanging information concerning explosive
hazards with sector and division cells. The EHCC establishes and maintains an explosive
hazards database (EHDB). EHCC provides technical advice on the mitigation of explosive
hazards, including the development of TTP, and provides training updates to field units,
provides explosive hazards awareness and mine detector training teams; and has oversight
responsibility for geospatial and topographic products and weapons intelligence. They
coordinate explosive hazard teams (EHTs).

b. (U) The EHCC capabilities include:

(1) (U) Establishing, maintaining, and sharing the EHDB within the operational

area.

(2) (U) Ensuring accuracy of explosive hazard information distribution via the

battle command system.

(3) (U) Coordinating site evaluations and/or strike incident investigations at four

sites simultaneously or conducting unit training at four sites simultaneously.

(4) (U) Coordinating technical and tactical training for the BCT by the EHT.

(5) (U) Providing updated TTP and guidance for route and area clearance

operations.

(6) (U) Maintaining the EHDB.

5. (U) Joint Task Force Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Boards, Working
Groups, and Cells

a. (U) In order to effectively manage the overall C-IED effort, the JTF will establish a

variety of specialized boards, working groups, and cells. These organizations are designed to
provide time-sensitive, joint, cross-functional C-IED operational unity of effort within the
operational area through the integration and synchronization of the C-IED activities of the
JTF with enabling theater and national resources. The inclusion of such organizations within
the normal staff structures of a JTF may be appropriate for smaller-scale operations to assist
the command in organizing and managing the command’s C-IED efforts. While several of
the organizations have overlapping, even redundant missions, the commander, because of
force and resource constraints, will need to design the C-IED construct to pool resources and
clearly delineate staff section responsibilities and eliminate unnecessary redundancies in
order that the organizations perform their mutually complementary functions with minimum
overlap.

b. (U)

JTF C-IED Management Board.

The JTF commander may decide to establish

a JTF C-IED management board as a senior steering committee to manage the command’s
C-IED efforts. The purpose of the C-IED management board is to bring together senior JTF
leadership with C-IED specialists to shape and direct the C-IED fight. The C-IED

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