Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1)

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

• Consolidation:

In the context of establishing and/or

supporting authorities and organisations

entrusted with security tasks, the technical

qualification,

command and control

organisation and equipment of Military Police

forces make them particularly eligible for

such tasks. This includes (among others):

o training security forces

o giving advice to security forces

o partnering security forces

• Other tasks:

Acting as mediators and performing training

o carrying out military police tasks in the

functions, Military Police forces closely cooperate

scope of the national/international force

with authorities and organisations entrusted with

package

policing and security tasks in the area of

operations as well as with other military and

6.2.15 Military Information Support

civilian host nation authorities and agencies

Operations (MISO)

responsible for public order. Particularly by

PsyOp assets and activities enable military leaders

training security forces such as national military

at operational and tactical levels to address

police and civilian police forces, the German

directly and straightforward

- the mindset and

Military Police make a sizable contribution to

sentiments of adversaries, parties to a conflict, and

establishing and maintaining state structures.

the civilian population in the area of operations to

influence their demeanour, attitude and intentions

•

Combat:

in favour of the conduct of the operation.

The Military Police provide dedicated support

to operations by committing military police

Thus, they add to the military leader’s spectrum of

capabilities as required by the given situation,

influence and his scope of action the opportunity

mission and operation. In addition to their

of being effective without resorting to lethal or

originary tasks they supply specific and

kinetic weapons.

common capabilities in direct tactical support

of special forces and in support of special

PsyOp forces contribute to a common situation

picture with their findings on the psychological

operations.

and socio-cultural situation, their analyses and

•

Control:

assessments of the communication situation

Where the mission

- depending on the

among target audiences, the media situation in the

mandate

- encompasses establishing and

area of operations, and information activities by

maintaining public security and order by

the enemy.

military forces, the German Military Police

will, by virtue of their police-specific skillset

PsyOp forces provide cross-cultural advice on

and training, assume such tasks vis-à-vis the

operations. Cross-cultural operational advisors

civilian population in the area of operations.

deal with, in a dedicated and demand-oriented

This also includes:

way, any information on social, political, cultural,

o operating and backing up facilities of

ethnic, religious and historical facts and

local security forces (police stations) if

conditions that is needed to assess the security

and as long as regular police are not

situation and to plan and conduct operations. On

available in sufficient strength

behalf of the responsible military commander they

o conducting patrols and operating

exert influence on key individuals and groups

checkpoints to help with the surveillance

within their networks for the purpose of the

and protection of areas

operational objective.

o assisting in matters of custody and

detention

Information supplied by such advisors is

necessary for the early identification of conflicts

o conducting search-and-seize operations

and searches with the aid of service dogs,

and timely de-escalating measures. Maintaining

constant and direct contact to formal and informal

as the case may be

o assisting with crowd and riot control

local leaders also helps enhance the level of

protection of own forces. Information gained must

(CRC)

o making inquiries and investigations to

be regularly exchanged with military intelligence

personnel at the relevant HQ, and resulting

clear up crimes

o performing other policing or police-like

assessments coordinated.

tasks.

Cross-cultural operational advice encompasses:

- 40 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

• advice to military decision-makers with the

6.2.16 CIMIC Personnel

preparation

and conduct Bundeswehr

With a view to the prevailing situation and the

missions;

stance of the civilian population, movements of

• advice to soldiers who establish and maintain

refugees, critical infrastructure including sensitive

contacts with decision-makers and the local

areas, the assessment and conduct of flanking

population in the area of operations, as well

support measures by own forces, and the

assurance of permanent and approachable

• the development and cultivation of human

availability, CIMIC constitutes an essential

contacts with relevant persons and the use of

element in the conduct of operations.

such contacts for information collection.

CIMIC personnel have special capabilities of

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1,

communicating and cooperating with civilian

PsyOp forces are capable of performing the

authorities and actors. The level of protection and

following tasks as a military contribution to

tactical mobility of their vehicles as well as their

establishing security and state order:

command and control support equipment ensure

that they are integrated well into the operational

•

Control:

forces and adapted to the requirements of the

o effective, target group-specific activities

operation concerned. CIMIC staff elements

within the information environment to

provide advice to military leaders in all matters of

influence the population and INS via all

civil-military cooperation. Moreover, CIMIC staff

available media

(TV, video, radio,

elements assess, display and evaluate the civilian

printed material, internet etc.) while

situation; during the estimate of the civilian

drawing on the assistance of tactical

situation they assess the influence factors of the

PsyOp groups, and in that process

civilian environment. By doing so, they contribute

- analysis and assessment of the

to a holistic estimate of the situation. CIMIC

psychological situation of the target

functions relating to the

(civilian) medical and

groups

health services are fulfilled by assets of the

- analysis,

assessment

and

Bundeswehr Medical Service.

countermeasures

against

hostile

information activities

As far as the estimate of the civilian situation is

- supply of information to the local

concerned, those factors of the civilian

population

unlawful

environment are evaluated which may impact on

acts/consequences of hostile actions

the conduct of operations and/or put the success of

- demotivation of INS

own operations at risk. When encountering factors

- mobilisation of the local population’s

viewed as critical it has to be decided how the

support against the INS

mission can be accomplished and how unwanted

- measures to win understanding for

effects of the own conduct of operations on

military efforts to establish security

friendly forces, the population or specific

and state order among the local

population groups could be prevented or reduced.

population

The influencing factors of the civilian

- support of the host nation with the

environment must be duly investigated with

publication of official statements

regard to possible correlations.

- information of the population on the

situation and guidelines on how to

If the estimate of the civilian situation produces a

behave appropriately.

direct/indirect threat to own forces or if any such

•

Consolidation:

threat cannot be ruled out, the relevant influencing

o training and counseling of local military

factors will be dealt with by the J2/G2 division of

and civilian actors performing public

the HQ in question. Information gained must be

relations functions

exchanged with intelligence personnel of the HQ

•

Other tasks:

at regular intervals.

o reducing the effects of hostile

The situation and stance of the civilian population

information activities

may be sustainably influenced in a positive way

o assessing the effects of operations on the

by dedicated CIMIC activities, which may

information environment

ultimately contribute to an overall success. This is

o providing cross-cultural operational

achieved particularly by CIMIC activities

advice to military leaders

conducted at short notice and with immediately

visible results. Usually this requires support by

other forces

(e.g. engineers, CBRN defence,

logisticians or medical staff). In this context,

CIMIC activities are always directly linked to the

objectives of the operation.

- 41 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1,

6.2.17 Electronic Warfare Forces

CIMIC forces are capable of performing the

To conduct electronic warfare

(EW), the force

following tasks as a military contribution to

commander is provided - besides weapon system-

establishing security and state order:

specific electronic warfare assets

- with EW

•

Consolidation:

assets to conduct EW not specific to a weapon

o providing advice and training to relevant,

system as an EW Task Force that carries out

civilian actors of the host nation also

electronic support measures and electronic

involving

CIMIC specialists

countermeasures

.With the aid of electronic

capabilities in the following fields of

support measures

(ESM) the EW Task Force

activity:

directly contributes to the operational picture by

- public affairs,

situation, target and post-strike reconnaissance.

- civilian infrastructure,

Furthermore, they ensure that the automatic ESM

- humanitarian aid,

systems for platform protection are supplied with

- trade and industry, as well as

reference data.

- cultural affairs

Automatic ESM systems detect and identify

o cultivating

contacts,

exchanging

electromagnetic emissions of adversaries and/or

information and coordinating measures

parties to a conflict and their weapon systems as

with civilian actors

threats and, where needed, trigger protective

•

Other tasks:

systems. The sensor data produced in the process

giving advice to military leaders with

may then be evaluated further.

regard to

- civilian influences on the conduct of

Electronic countermeasures

(ECM) not only

operations,

affect the adversary’s command and control

- the effects of military measures on the

capability but also the employment options of

civilian environment

enemy weapon systems. Countermeasures

the

development,

improvement,

comprise electronic deception, jamming and

consolidation and cultivation of a

neutralisation of enemy reconnaissance and

network of information and relations

weapon sensor systems as well as detection and

with civilian actors

command and control systems by using

effective,

professional

cooperation,

electromagnetic jamming transmitters, false

coordination and consultation with

targets or LASER operation. Furthermore, the

civilian authorities and actors;

effects of electronic countermeasures come to bear

coordination of humanitarian emergency

against military and especially against civilian

relief measures

communication means and systems used by INS.

update, display and estimate of the

EW Task Forces are occasionally employed in

civilian situation with the exception of

isolated operations and generally cater for their

the (civilian) medical and public health

own security. Depending on the threat situation,

system

however, they must be supported by extra security

contribution to the military decision-

forces. The military commander must take this

making process, among other things, by

into account in his task organisation and operation

- identifying and rating facilities woth

plan. Commanders conduct EW specific to a

protecting

(critical infrastructure and

weapon system for platform protection within

sensitive areas);

their areas of responsibility.

- finding key personnel and multipliers

in civilian organisations, authorities,

The EW Task Force is capable, among other

facilities and among the civilian

things, of reconnoitering hostile communication

population

links including cellular networks, jamming such

- assessing options for CIMIC support

networks and detecting radar emissions.

activities

The aim of these activities is to detect INS

- supporting the process of rating the

network structures and to identify individuals.

availability and utilisation of civilian

Furthermore, under certain circumstances, the

resources

information transfer of INS may be impeded to

taking part in operations, among other

such an extent that INS can barely take action in

things, by

time or no action at all. Communication,

- ensuring emergency relief supplies to

detection, navigation, command and control and

the civilian population in interaction

guiding systems may be influenced in such a way

with other forces;

that their effect is reduced, the commander’s

- participating in measures by third

intent remains unclear and wrong assumptions by

parties during humanitarian disaster

the INS are caused or confirmed.

relief operations

- 42 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1,

6.2.19 Geoinformation Forces

EW Task Forces are capable of performing the

The military role in establishing security and state

following tasks as a military contribution to

order is significantly dependent on the area and

establishing security and state order:

prevailing environmental conditions.

• Consolidation:

As part of geographic information support such

o providing training and advice to local

data are assessed by geographic information staff.

electronic warfare forces

At national level the provision of geographic

• Other tasks:

information on operations is the responsibility of

o reconnoitering and identifying electronic

the Bundeswehr Geoinformation Service; this is

signals

done in cooperation and coordination with

o impeding the enemy’s communication

multinational regulations on geoinformation

possibilities

support. The document to be observed in this

o facilitating

own

communication

context is ANNEX T⁴⁰ to the OPLAN of the

possibilities

operation concerned. Other German organisations

o protecting march serials and convoys

operating in the area must be furnished with

against RCIED by means of RCIED

geoinformation across departmental boundaries.

jamming systems

The Bundeswehr Geoinformation Office

6.2.18 Computer Network Operations Forces

(AGeoBw) may assist with the preparation of

operations by providing

(CNO)

INS frequently use computer networks to

• material on fundamental regional studies (e.g.

communicate with each other and to deliberately

regional military-geographic information),

spread incorrect information. This can be

and

countered by friendly CNO. To this end, gaining

• geoinformation data and products for

control over key areas and objects (command and

planning operations (e.g. selected map series,

control systems, centres and systems of

high-resolution satellite images, information

communication, among other things) plays a

on climate and weather, etc.).

decisive role as CNO could easily be initiated

from such points.

In the future, geoinfo data will be made available

largely iaw the NATO concept for the Recognised

One particular advantage of employing CNO lies

Environmental Picture

(REP). The REP is to

in the fact that it can be brought to effect at a long

become the Bundeswehr Geoinformation Service's

distance from the target, depending on the

contribution to the common relevant operational

situation and mission. This means, that CNO

picture for network-enabled operations.

forces may operate from their camp or even from

the home country, which means that they would

Geoinfo personnel at the headquarters and local

be exposed to a very low threat or none at all. If,

staffs are employed at the Military Intelligence

for technical reasons, CNO forces have to be

Cell and the Geoinformation Centre. Such

employed directly within danger zones, however,

personnel may assist with preparing special

they will be under severe threat and hardly able to

products. This also includes presenting

protect themselves.

information collected on operations.

With regard to the military role in establishing

If required, the Bundeswehr Geoinformation

security and state order it must be borne in mind

Office may assist with modular Geoinformation

that as far as requests for effects to CNO forces

task groups that may, for instance, provide support

are made, the time needed to conduct CNO and to

in the field of terrain survey and terrain geology

satisfy the requests can hardly be predicted. That

on operations.

is why CNO forces are more suited to conduct

missions that are not under any acute time limit or

linked to follow-up operations, but are of a more

flanking nature.

For that reason, CNO forces are usually not placed

under the command of the tactical commander on

the ground but directed to support in strategic or

operational regard.

Due to limited resources, CNO forces are

available for effects only and not for further

⁴⁰ In

accordance

with

SHAPE

tactical measures to help establish security and

J5PLANS/COPD(T)FEB10

“Comprehensive

state order.

Operations Planning Directive”

- 43 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

6.3 Contributions made by Special Forces⁴¹

6.4 Contributions made by Air Forces

Special Forces are especially suited to conduct

Air power essentially characterises almost all

operations in the course of which collateral

military operations. Because of their inherent

damage to uninvolved parties and any escalation

characteristics air forces are particularly flexible

must be kept under control, limited or avoided, or

and thus in a position to establish main efforts and

which require particular secrecy.⁴²Special forces

be effective even at short notice and over long

operations comprise⁴³ (if applicable, in interaction

ranges.

with Army forces with advanced capabilities for

special operations⁴⁴) for example:

Air forces with their special capabilities act as

force multipliers and as such support forces

• offensive action to counter terrorist threats

employed on the ground.

and to fight subversive forces by the precise

In detail, they contribute to the military role in

elimination of such threats before they

establishing security and state order by:

become effective;

• airborne aerial strike/air defence forces,

• combat operations even in the depth of the

• ground-based air defence,

area against targets of strategic or operational

relevance;

• point defence forces,

• airborne reconnaissance forces, as well as

• covert operations;

• air transport forces.

• detention of target persons as well as

confiscation and documentation of important

6.4.1 Airborne aerial strike/air defence forces

material.

Because of their capability of being deployed

What is particularly important in the scope of the

flexibly and in area-wide operations, airborne

military role to help establish security and state

aerial strike forces and air defence forces

order is not only the Special Forces’ capability of

decisively contribute to gaining and maintaining

conducting special reconnaissance but also of

the initiative even over opponents appearing

taking discriminate offensive action such as

quickly and unexpectedly, and deny them possible

eliminating, fixing or detaining opposing high-

areas of retreat.

value targets, but also their capability of

rescuing/freeing own or friendly high-value

targets. Special Forces are mainly effective

against command and control structures of INS

and able to carry out precise attacks.

In the scope of supporting sovereign measures

they may provide assistance in the development

and training of special forces of the host nation.

If Special Forces’ operations need to be

coordinated with those of other forces, it must be

considered that the sensitivity of information

concerning the Special Forces must at all times be

Moreover, instead of directly making use of their

weighed carefully against the information

weapon systems they may also have a deterring

requirement of the other forces involved.

effect to INS and supporters by simply showing

Special Forces’ operations must always be

force in the area of operations.

harmonised particularly in an overall operational

In the scope of the military role to help establish

approach to ensure that the image established

security and state order, airborne strike and air

among the local population through the entirety of

defence forces may be effectively employed by:

own information efforts is not impaired.

• Threat elimination:

o providing precise and responsive support

of own forces (including those of the host

nation) by Joint Fire Support when

⁴¹ Cf.

Allied

Joint

Doctrine

for

directly countering of attacks (Close Air

Counterinsurgency (COIN) (Ratification Draft

Support)

2) and the Subconcept for the Employment of

o supporting the interdiction of areas

Special Operation Forces.

and/or disrupting lines of communication

⁴² Army Regulation HDv 100/100, para. 10043.

of the INS (Air Interdiction)

⁴³ See “Special Forces Operations” Subconcept,

o precisely and timely engaging ground

2004, Chapter 1.3.

targets from the air

⁴⁴ See “Special Operations” Subconcept, 2004,

Chapters 3.2.1.5 and 3.3.1.

- 44 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

• Establishing

a safe

and secure

6.4.3 Air Force Ground Combat Support

environment:

Forces

o combat air patrol operations

(both to

As a matter of principle, Air Force ground combat

support the host nations in their efforts to

support forces perform the following tasks on

perform sovereign tasks as well as to

operations:

show force)

•

Main tasks of the Air Force ground combat

• Consolidating a safe and secure

support forces on operations

environment:

o protection of facilities of the Air Force

o contributing to the establishment and

training of air forces of the host nation

and the adjoining area

- protection of mobile and static objects

• Enabling/supporting measures:

of the Air Force

o making available command and control

- protection of special infrastructure of

facilities

(Air Operations Centre,

the Air Force on operations

Deployable Control and Reporting

- support in setting-up and operating a

Centre) needed for the coordination and

remote operational basis

command and control of air operations

- protection of special weapons

o surveilling (possibly even remote) areas

o protection of approaching or departing

from the air.

airborne platforms and those on the

ground

6.4.2 Ground-based Air Defence

o protection of the ground-based air

Flying platforms (e.g. drones) used by INS will

defence forces of the Air Force

increasingly get into focus. Ground-based air

o protection of air transport assets on the

defence forces are equipped with powerful

ground

sensors, effective weapons and command and

o support of the task of Combat Search and

control systems so that they can contribute to

Rescue

providing protection in the scope of establishing

o tactical and technical advice to the

security and state order. They can be brought to

command echelons on the ground

bear against the overall spectrum of potential

o support of Air Force field intelligence

aerial threats including defence against tactical

forces

ballistic missiles in the lower intercept layer.

•

Secondary tasks of the Air Force ground

Ground-based air defence forces with their

combat support forces on operations

organic sensors are able to perform tasks such as

o creating a stable environment inside and,

searches, detection, identification, tracking and

if required, outside the adjoining area of

target illumination and thus contribute to the

the installation

recognised air picture.

o supporting special operations such as

Ground-based air defence forces employed in the

evacuation operations etc.

scope of the military contribution to help establish

o supporting the process of securing of

evidence

security and state order be effective as follows:

o participating in Fact Finding/Site Survey

• Threat elimination:

Tasks

o air defence

o supporting humanitarian aid and urgent

- protection of individual objects

emergency aid missions

- protection of groups of objects

As a matter of principle and on account of their

- area defence

equipment and training, Air Force ground combat

- protection of mobile operations

support forces in the scope of the military role in

- static employment even for camp

establishing security and state order are eligible to

security especially for countering

perform the following tasks - along the lines of

tactical

ballistic

missiles

and

chapter 6.2.1 infantry:

unmanned aerial vehicles

• Consolidating a safe and secure

• Threat elimination:

environment:

o seizing, gaining and reaching of confined

o training air defence forces

areas and mission-essential infrastructure

o giving advice to air defence units

within the respective area of operations

• Enabling/supporting measures:

and/or adjoining area of the installation

o airspace surveillance

even in urban and difficult terrain.

o contribution to the overall air situation

o surveilling, securing and defending

confined areas and mission-essential

infrastructure within the respective area

of operations and/or adjoining area of the

installation even in urban terrain.

- 45 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

• Establishing

a safe

and secure

o monitoring movement routes, patrols etc.

environment:

and consequently detecting/preventing

o conducting patrols

ambushes, IED attacks etc.

o setting up and operating checkpoints

o detecting and observing military,

o searching; area screening

paramilitary and mission-relevant non-

o operation of combat outposts

military groups

o interdicting areas

o supporting in fire fights by moving forces

• Consolidating a safe and secure

towards the enemy, preventing hit-and-

run tactics

environment:

o training local armed forces

o collecting data and information on target

and post-strike analysis

This task devolves upon the Air Force ground

o monitoring (possibly even remote) areas

combat support forces and must be carried out in

from the air.

coordination with other employed forces

responsible for that area.

6.4.5 Air Transport Forces

Operational and tactical air transport is provided

6.4.4 Airborne Reconnaissance Forces

by means of transport aircraft and helicopter

Manned and unmanned airborne reconnaissance

assets

(cf. Chapter 6.2.10) ensuring mobility of

forces have a broad spectrum of various sensors -

own forces within the area of operations. Air

high-resolution cameras, thermal-imaging devices,

transport forces continue to be available for

radar etc. Depending on the system used they are

MEDIVAC and only in exceptional cases for

capable of transmitting reconnaissance results to

CASEVAC missions, too.

ground forces in real time and/or near real time. .

By doing so, they provide information as a basis

for target allocation, planning/conduct of other

missions or even for the protection of own forces,

for instance by giving warnings on emplaced IED.

Manned systems

(for example TORNADO

RECCE) are able to cover long distances within

little time and allow the main effort to be shifted

instantaneously. They may enhance their range

and endurance by air-to-air refuelling and are

capable of transmitting sensor data in near real

time. Unmanned systems

(e.g. HERON

compared to manned systems are rather slow,

In addition, helicopter crews of the air transport

however, thanks to their extended loiter time they

forces provide their capacities in the field of

allow for continuous and detailed reconnaissance

search and rescue as well as in the overall

and assessment of the situation in the area of

spectrum of personnel recovery with a focus on

operations (>24 h depending on configuration and

Combat Search and Rescue of isolated personnel.

flight profile).

Aided by highly sensitive

reconnaissance

technology

(electro-optical,

Outside the perimeter of operational facilities,

infrared, radar) reconnaissance results needed for

helicopters are particularly threatened during

the estimate of the situation can be provided via

takeoff and landing. Therefore envisaged landing

radio and/or satellite communication in near real

zones must be secured by ground forces to provide

time and almost independent of the weather and

best possible protection from direct fire. This can

light conditions.

not always be guaranteed for Combat Search and

Rescue operations due to the constraints of the

In the scope of the military role to help establish

mission and situation. This is why situation-

security and state order, airborne reconnaissance

oriented freedom of decision as well as the

forces may be assigned the following tasks:

capability of self-protection are indispensable for

• Consolidating a safe and secure

Combat Search and Rescue forces.

environment:

Air transport forces may be assigned the following

o contributing to the establishment and

tasks in the scope of the military role to help

training of the air forces of the host

establish security and state order:

nation

• Enabling/supporting measures:

• Establishing

a safe

and secure

o performing

reconnaissance

tasks

environment:

inclusiding reporting and transfer of

o supporting transports of security forces,

sensor data

medical personnel, casualties, injured or

o monitoring areas of high interest;

sick persons as well as transports of relief

developing a “Pattern of Life”

supplies

- 46 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

•

Consolidating a safe and secure

On the whole, naval forces can be effectively

environment:

employed in any suboperation aimed to help

o assisting with the establishment and

establish security and state order. Their tasks may

training of air forces of the host nation

include:

o assisting with setting up an aeronautical

•

Threat elimination:

search and rescue organisation in the host

o disrupting maritime supply lines and

nation

lines of movement of INS

•

Enabling/supporting measures:

o engaging land-based targets by the JFS

o performing operational and tactical air

engagement network

transport for quick deployment of

o supporting special operations and Special

reserves and/or reinforcements allows for

Forces operations

the point of main effort to be shifted

•

Establishing

a safe

and secure

rapidly even over longer distances

environment:

(which is an important contribution to

o countering direct attacks, in particular

create of moments of surprise and thus to

from the sea and from the air

gain the initiative)

(this measure

o assuming sovereign maritime policing

encompasses, besides airland operations,

tasks by conducting sea-based patrols

delivery and/or airdropping of personnel

(establishing public order)

as a method of insertion).

o supporting civilian organisations in the

o ensuring follow-on supply of own forces

context of subsidiary aid, providing

even over longer distances (resulting in

goods and services:

enhanced sustainability even of isolated

- transporting and delivering relief

and/or remote units as well as to relieve

goods

distribution

the burden on the land forces so the

agencies/organisations ashore to help

number of convoys moving by road can

people in distress

be reduced)

- supporting and contributing to the

o conducting

qualified

aeromedical

provision of medical supplies to the

evacuation in the scope of FWD and/or

civilian population in a safe and

TAC AIRMEDEVAC

secure environment

o planning/conducting operations within

•

Consolidating a safe and secure

the overall spectrum of personnel

environment:

recovery

o helping with establishing and training

naval forces of the host nation

6.5 Contributions by Naval Forces

•

Enabling/supporting measures:

Naval forces are capable of developing maritime

o contributing

intelligence

and

space adjacent to an area of operations so that it

reconnaissance efforts

can be used as a base for joint operations. In the

o providing convoy escorts

scope of the military role in establishing security

o transporting own forces

(personnel,

and state order they usually act as force enablers

materiel, ammunition) by sea into the

and multipliers for the composite forces and thus

area of operations or the vicinity thereof

raise the number of tactical and operational

o ensuring supplies to friendly forces by

options for the conduct of operations.

sea to enhance their sustainability

Even ahead of military ground operations can

o providing medical care aboard sea-based

naval forces be deployed in the intended area of

platforms

operations. In the scope of Maritime Security and

o employing sea-based platforms to

Maritime Interdiction Operations they may

exercise command and control of initial

prepare the employment of land forces by

operations by land forces

displaying commitment and resolve, performing

o keeping open sea routes (incl. of harbour

sea-based reconnaissance and carrying out

installations) and merchant shipping

surveillance tasks.

routes as a basis for the deployment of

own forces and the provision of supplies

Using sea-based platforms, naval forces also allow

to the local population.

headquarters required for command and control of

the operation to be based early enough close to the

area of operations and to contribute to the

development of a joint situation picture. Land

operations close to the coast can thus be led by a

command based in a secure and logistically self-

sufficient environment.

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Part

Annex

C1 Guiding principles on the conduct of military measures to establishing security and state order in

crisis areas⁴⁵

Security and state order are established in an extremely complex environment where - on the assumption of

the classical conduct of operations - employed military forces often have to change their way of traditional

thinking. The following guiding principles shall provide food for thought - but not restrain it. The situation on

the ground determines to what extent individual guiding principles can be applied in practice.

The more you protect your force, the less secure you may be.

The success of military measures to establish security and state order is, among other things, achieved by

affording protection to the population. In this context, military forces must visibly show their commitment

throughout the area. If they keep to their (protected) facilities they will inevitably lose contact with the

population and give the insurgents freedom of action. Therefore, the commander’s challenge is to strike a

balance between integrating his troops firmly into the population and giving them maximum protection.

The more force is used the less effective it may be.

The use of coercive force or even violence has side effects the extent of which can not be anticipated. Any

collateral damage to uninvolved parties or other mistakes will help the insurgents find a basis for propaganda

that will depict the forces on operation as troops bent on brutality.

Approaches that work well today need not necessarily do so tomorrow. If it is successful in one particular

area it will not necessarily apply to others.

Insurgents are very flexible and often part of a busy communication network. They quickly adapt to identified

tactics of opposing actors and are just as fast at spreading all relevant information among fellow fighters.

Local problems often require local solutions: “All COIN is local!”

A tactical success may be a strategic defeat.

Western armed forces will certainly win most tactical battles on account of their superior training, equipment

and command and control. Strategically this may be irrelevant and in the worst case distract from impending

strategic defeat. Likewise, tactical success - for instance a village stabilisation operation - may have strategic

effects as it may serve as a reference for future developments and provide an example for a sustainable defeat

of insurgency.

Military success in itself is no guarantee at all.

Military measures alone, however important they may be, cannot ensure success in establishing security and

state order. In some situations, a local teacher or doctor may turn out to be more efficient at tackling

insurgency than an entire infantry company.

Sometimes “doing nothing at all” is the best response.

Frequently actions taken by insurgents primarily aim to make operational military forces overreact, which can

subsequently be exploited for propaganda purposes. In this context, measures by friendly forces that have a

high symbolic value or the potential of being misconstrued must be carefully considered beforehand to avoid

triggering hostile propaganda and thus thwart the overall objective of the operation.

⁴⁵ Cf. Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) (Ratification Draft 2), Chapter 5 - The Military

Contribution, Section III - Paradoxes.

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VS - NUR FÜR DEN DIENSTGEBRAUCH

Some of the most suitable weapons cannot even fire.

Military measures with regard to establishing security and state order are often most effective and sustainable

if the focus is not on eliminating INS. The crucial fight is not the one against INS but the one to win the minds

of the population. Depending on the concrete local situation military forces must therefore work towards

establishing security and state order by rather non-kinetic measures.

It is often more beneficial to have forces of the host nation take a measure with imperfection than to have

own forces do it with exactitude and precision.

With a view to consolidating the local authority’s legitimacy it is essential to give measures a “local touch”.

Failing that, a feeling of dependence may emerge, impairing the reputation of the host nation government.

Many crucial decisions are not made by generals.

Successful military measures and operations require the competence and judgment of servicemen and women

of all levels. In practice, decisions at tactical level are often made by young military leaders and sometimes

even by the rank and file (“strategic corporals”), which sometimes has strategic consequences (e.g. at

checkpoints when a decision is to be made whether to open fire or not).

C2 List of abbreviations

Abbreviation/

Acronym

Meaning

ABRA

Artilleriebeobachtungsradar - artillery surveillance radar

Artillerie Daten-, Lage- und Einsatzrechnerverbund - artillery information

ADLER

network

Amt für Geoinformationswesen der Bundeswehr - the Bundeswehr Geo

AGeoBw

Information Office

AJP

Allied Joint Publication

Abbildende luftgestützte Aufklärungsdrohne im Nächstbereich - airborne

ALADIN

close-in range imaging reconnaissance drone

CNO

computer network operations

COBRA

counterbattery radar

COIN

counterinsurgency

CRC

crowd and riot control

Einsatzvorbereitende Ausbildung für Konfliktverhütung und Krisenbewältigung

EAKK

- predeployment training for conflict prevention and crisis management

EK/EW

Elektronischer Kampf - electronic warfare

EloGM

Elektronische Gegenmaßnahmen - electronic countermeasures

EloSM

Elektronische Schutzmaßnahmen - electronic protective measures

EloUM

Elektronische Unterstützungsmaßnahmen - electronic support measures

EMS

Elektromagnetisches Spektrum - electromagnetic spectrum

EOD

explosive ordonance disposal

FAC

forward air controller

Führungsinformationssystem des Heeres - German Army Command and

FüInfoSysH

Control and Information System

Führungs- und (Waffen-)Einsatzsystem - command, control, information, and

FüWES

weapons control system

Geo Info

Geoinformation

Geoinformationsdienst der Bundeswehr - Bundeswehr Geoinformation

GeoInfoDBw

Service

GeoInfoW

Geoinformationswesen - Geoinformation Affairs

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VS - NUR FÜR DEN DIENSTGEBRAUCH

Abbreviation/

Acronym

Meaning

governmental organisation

HAufklKr

Kräfte der Heeresaufklärungstruppe - Army ISR Corps

Heeresflugabwehr-, Aufklärungs- und Gefechtsführungssystem - Army Air

HFlaAFüSys

Defence Surveillance and Command and Control System

HUMINT

human intelligence

IEB

Interkulturelle Einsatzberatung - cross-cultural operational advice

IED

improvised explosive device

InfoOp

Informationsoperationen - information operations

INS

insurgents

international organisation

JFST

joint fire support team

KZO

Kleinfluggerät Zielortung - small air vehicle for target location

leSpähGrp

Leichte Spähgruppe - light reconnaissance squad

LuSK

Luftstreitkräfte - air forces

LSO i. E.

Leitender Sanitätsoffizier im Einsatz - force surgeon

MANPADS

manportable air defence system

MANTIS

modular automatic and network-capable targeting and interception system

MEDINT

medical intelligence

Mikroaufklärungsdrohne im Ortsbereich - micro drone for local area

MIKADO

reconnaissance

MilNachrL

Militärische Nachrichtenlage - military intelligence situation

MilNW

military intelligence

NG&A

Nachrichtengewinnung und Aufklärung - intelligence and reconnaissance

NGO

non-governmental organisation

ObjSKrLw

Objektschutzkräfte der Luftwaffe - Air Force ground combat support forces

OpInfoKr

Kräfte der Operativen Information - military information support operations

OPSEC

operations security

OSINT

open sources intelligence

REP

recognised environmental picture

RFI

request for information

SanDstBw

Sanitätsdienst der Bundeswehr - Bundeswehr Medical Service

SpezKr

Spezialkräfte - special forces

SpezlKr H

Spezialisierte Kräfte Heer - Army Specialised Forces

STF

Streitkräftegemeinsame Taktische Feuerunterstützung - joint fire support

TTP

tactics, techniques and procedures

ZMilNW

Zentrales Militärisches Nachrichtenwesen - military intelligence centre

ZMZ/A

Zivil-militärische Zusammenarbeit/Ausland - civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)

ZSanDstBw

Zentraler Sanitätsdienst der Bundeswehr - Bundeswehr Joint Medical Service

- 50 -

VS - NUR FÜR DEN DIENSTGEBRAUCH

C3 Reference documents and recommended reading

BMVg - Minister - vom 25.10.2006, Weißbuch 2006

BMVg - BM/Fü S VI 2 - Az 09-02-04/VS-NfD vom 09.08.2004, Konzeption der Bundeswehr (KdB)

BMVg - Sts/Fü S IV 1 - vom 10.12.2008, ZDv 31/1 VS-NfD Logistische Unterstützung von Einsätzen

der Bundeswehr, DSK FF410120083

BMVg - GenInsp/Fü S V 6 - Az 09-02-05/VS-NfD vom 27.10.2004, Teilkonzeption Einsatz der

Spezialkräfte (TK EinsSpezKr)

BMVg - GenInsp/Fü S II 2 - Az 41-50-02/VS-NfD vom 28.04.2008, Teilkonzeption Elektronischer

Kampf der Bundeswehr (TK EK Bw)

BMVg - GenInsp/Fü S V 4 - Az 09-02-05/VS-NfD vom 09.07.2007, Teilkonzeption Feldjägerwesen der

Bundeswehr (TK FJgWesBw)

BMVg

- GenInsp/Fü S V

- Az

09-02-05/VS-NfD vom

17.02.2005, Teilkonzeption

Informationsoperationen der Bundeswehr (TK InfoOpBw)

BMVg - GenInsp/Fü S II 1 - Az 05-00/VS-NfD vom 04.11.2008, Teilkonzeption Militärisches

Nachrichtenwesen (TK MilNW)

BMVg

- GenInsp/Fü S II

- Az

09-02-05/VS-NfD vom

06.07.2005, Teilkonzeption

Geoinformationswesen der Bundeswehr (TK GeoInfoWBw)

10.

BMVg - GenInsp/Fü SKB I 4 - Az 31-60-05/VS-NfD vom 08.03.2002, Teilkonzeption Operative

Information der Bundeswehr (TK OpInfoBw)

11.

BMVg - GenInsp/Fü H III 2 - Az 09-02-05/VS-NfD vom 03.06.2008, Teilkonzeption Operationen im

urbanen Umfeld (TK UrbOp)

12.

BMVg - GenInsp/Fü H III 2 - Az 32-13-00/VS-NfD vom 03.04.2006, Teilkonzeption Schutz von

Kräften und Einrichtungen im Einsatz (TK Schutz)

13.

BMVg - GenInsp/Fü S VI 2 - Az 09-02-05/VS-NfD vom 20.11.2006, Teilkonzeption Vernetzte

Operationsführung (TK NetOpFü)

14.

BMVg - GenInsp/Fü S IV 3 - Az 08-08-00/OFFEN vom 03.03.2009, Teilkonzeption Zivil-Militärische

Zusammenarbeit der Bundeswehr (TK ZMZBw)

15.

BMVg

- GenInsp/M II IT

- Az

09-02-05/VS-NfD vom

08.08.2006, Teilkonzeption

Führungsunterstützung Bundeswehr und IT-System der Bundeswehr (TK FüUstgBw und IT-SysBw)

16.

BMVg

- GenInsp/Fü S IV

- Az

99-64-10/VS-NfD vom

27.11.2006, Teilkonzeption

Kampfmittelabwehr der Bundeswehr (TK KpfmAbwBw)

17.

BMVg

- GenInsp/Fü S V

- Az

09-02-05/VS-NfD vom

09.05.2005, Teilkonzeption

Computernetzwerkoperation (TK CNO)

18.

BMVg - GenInsp/Fü S II

- Az

04-03-12/VS-NfD

(noch nicht erlassen), Teilkonzeption

Nachrichtengewinnung und Aufklärung (TK NG&A), Expose V2, Stand: 22.10.2009

19.

BMVg - InspH/Fü H III 2 - Az 09-02-05/VS-NfD vom 23.12.2004, Einzelkonzeption Spezielle

Operationen (EK SpezlOp)

20.

BMVg - InspH/Fü H III

- vom

05.11.2007, HDv

100/100 VS-NfD Truppenführung von

Landstreitkräften (TF), DSK HH320220020

21.

ZTransf Bw: Streitkräfte, Fähigkeiten und Technologie im

21. Jahrhundert

- Strategische

Zukunftsanalyse 2035, Gesamtergebnisse und Handlungsempfehlungen, Waldbröl (2005)

22.

SKUKdo FüUstg/G6 vom 11.09.08, Vorläufiges Gesamtkonzept für die Kräfte des Aufgabenbereichs

Führungsunterstützung der Streitkräftebasis (VorlGesKonz FüUstgKr SKB)

23.

Heeresamt I 1/I 7 - Az 31-05-50/VS-NfD vom 30.05.2008, Ergebnisbericht zum CD&E-Vorhaben

Urbane Operationen 2010

24.

NATO -AAP-6 Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French) (2009)

- 51 -

VS - NUR FÜR DEN DIENSTGEBRAUCH

25.

NATO - AJP-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations (Oktober 2009)

26.

NATO - AJP-3.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (November 2009)

27.

NATO - AJP-3.4.4 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) (Ratification Draft 2, März

2010)

28.

NATO - SACT - Joint Operational Guidelines 01/04 Counterinsurgency (COIN) (Version 1.6, April

2010)

29.

USA - National Security Council: National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (November 2005)

30.

USA - FM 3-07 Stability Operations (September 2008)

31.

USA - FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (Dezember 2006)

32.

USA - FMI 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency (März 2009)

33.

USA - JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations (Oktober 2009)

34.

USA - USMC Small-Unit Leaders’ Guide to Counterinsurgency, Quantico (2006)

35.

GBR - Joint Doctrine Note 2/07: Countering Irregular Activity within a Comprehensive Approach,

Shrivenham (März 2007)

36.

GBR - British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10: Countering Insurgency (Oktober 2009)

37.

FRA - Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces: Doctrine de Contre Rébellion, Paris (Januar 2009)

38.

Grunewald/Meyfeld/Fuchs, IED-Bedrohung und Counterinsurgency in Kunduz

- Erfahrungen des

Fallschirmjägerbataillons 373, in: Der Deutsche Fallschirmjäger 2/2008

39.

Noetzel/Zapfe, Aufstandsbekämpfung als Auftrag, SWP-Studie, Berlin (Mai 2008)

40.

Noetzel/Schreer, Strategien zur Aufstandsbekämpfung, in: SWP-Aktuell 3 (Januar 2008)

41.

Alderson, Learning, Adapting, Applying - US Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice, in: RUSI

Journal, volume 152 no. 6 (Dezember 2007)

42.

Bickers, An Approach to Counter Threat Operations within a Counterinsurgency Environment, in: The

Royal Engineers Journal, volume 122 no. 1 (2008)

43.

Donahue/Fenzel, Combating a modern insurgency: Combined Task Force Devil in Afghanistan, in:

Military Review (März-April 2008).

44.

Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare - Theory and Practice, Westport (2006)

45.

Gompert/Gordon, War by Other Means

- Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for

Counterinsurgency, RAND Counterinsurgency Study - Final Report, Santa Monica (2008)

46.

Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla, Oxford, 2009, ISBN: 978-0-19-536834-5

47.

Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency Redux, in: Survival, volume 48 no. 4: (Winter 2006-07)

48.

Kilcullen, Twenty-eight Articles - Fundamentals of Company level Counterinsurgency (März 2006)

49.

Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, London (1997)

50.

Petraeus, Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq, in: Military Review

(Januar-Februar 2006)

51.

Robinson, Tell me how this ends - General David Petraeus and the search for a way out of Iraq, New

York (2008)

52.

Schnaubelt, What NATO can learn from „the surge“ in Iraq, Research Paper no. 40, NATO Defense

College, Rome (Oktober 2008)

- 52 -

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHANGE PAGE

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

VII

AUTHORITIES

VIII

DEFINITIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

SCIF ACCREDITATION REQUIREMENTS

CONCEPT AND PRECONSTRUCTION APPROVAL

THE FIXED FACILITY CHECKLIST (FFC)

CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS AND SPECIFICATIONS

HANDLING AND DISTRIBUTION OF DRAWINGS

CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS

MILEPOSTS FOR INSPECTION

GENERAL NOTES

EXPANDED METAL MESH SPECIFICATIONS

SCIF PERIMETER WALLS

SCIF DOORS

PRIMARY ENTRANCE DOOR

SECONDARY ENTRANCE DOORS

SCIF EMERGENCY EXIT DOOR

DIELECTRIC BREAKS

DUCTS

TECHNICAL SECURITY

TELEPHONE SECURITY

COMPUTERIZED TELEPHONE SYSTEMS (CTS)

RF ATTENUATION & TEMPEST MITIGATION

RF WINDOW FILM SPECIFICATIONS

SOUND ATTENUATION

STC RATINGS

TESTING PROCEDURES

WINDOWS

ACCESSIBLE WINDOWS

INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM (IDS)

ALARM COVERAGE

DATA / TELEPHONES / POWER

DEDICATED POWER PANEL

DEDICATED GROUND

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COMPUTER EQUIPMENT ROOM (CER) SHUNT-TRIP BREAKER

UNITERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY (OPTIONAL UPS)

TEMPEST FILTERING

HVAC COMPUTER EQUIPMENT ROOM (CER) REQUIREMENTS

HVAC AIR CONDITIONING

TEMPERATURE ADJUSTMENTS

HUMIDITY RANGE

AIR SUPPLY DISSIPATION

AIR HANDLER LOCATION

COMMUNICATION LINE INSTALLATION

CONVEYANCE SYSTEMS INSTALLED IN CEILINGS

RED CONVEYANCE SYSTEMS UTILIZING WIRE

ACCESSIBILITY

CONVEYANCE BENDS

CONVEYANCE SYSTEMS BETWEEN SCIFS

PROTECTED DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(S) (PDS)

PROTECTED DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (PDS) APPROVAL REQUEST

CONNECTIVITY GUIDELINES / GENERAL SPECIFICATIONS

COMMERCIAL DEMARCATION

WIDE AREA NETWORK(S) (WAN) CONNECTIVITY

SECURE VIDEO TELECONFERENCING

NON-SECURE (BLACK) WALL PLATES (VOICE AND DATA)

NON-SECURE VOICE CABLE DISTRIBUTION

SECURE (RED) WALL PLATES (VOICE AND DATA)

SECURE VOICE CABLE DISTRIBUTION (TDM)

SECURE VOICE CABLE DISTRIBUTION (IP)

INFRASTRUCTURE CABLING

STANDARD WALL DESIGNS / DUCT DETAILS / FIGURES

WALL TYPE 1 - ACOUSTICALLY-TREATED PARTITION

WALL TYPE 2: - ACOUSTICALLY-TREATED PARTITION (STC-45)

WALL TYPE 3A: - SCIF WALL PERIMETER WALL PARTITION

WALL TYPE 3B - SCIF WALL PARTITION ON PERIMETER WALL

WALL TYPE 4 - SECURE PERIMETER PARTITION

TRANSFER DUCT -Z-DUCT / PASSIVE AIR RETURN

MANBAR BARRIER

SECURITY BAR DETAIL

SECURITY GRILL/PERIMETER WALL ELEVATION DETAIL

SAMPLE - UL FIRE RATED / STC RATED / DOOR AND FRAME ASSEMBLY

SUGGESTED CABLE TELEVISION ISOLATION EQUIPMENT (FIBERPLEX)

SUGGESTED CABLE TELEVISION ISOLATION EQUIPMENT (PCT-FTX3R)

SUGGESTED FIRE ALARM ANNUCIATOR EQUIPMENT (HORN STROBE)

SUGGESTED FIRE ALARM ANNUCIATOR EQUIPMENT (SPEAKER ASSEMBLY)

SUGGESTED PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT (PA) SYSTEM EQUIPMENT

BEST PRACTICES

iii

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOREWORD

This handbook is issued under the authority of the Director Central Intelligence Directive

(DCID) 6/9, "Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information

Facilities" and The Department of Homeland Security, Management Directive 11043,

"Sensitive Compartmented Information Program Management".

This handbook applies to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), its Components

(excluding the United States Coast Guard), Directorates, Offices, and Field Activities.

References made in this handbook to DHS will be considered to include all Components

(excluding the United States Coast Guard), Directorates, Offices, and Field Activities,

and entities encompassed under the jurisdiction of the Homeland Security Act and

amendments thereto. The United States Coast Guard maintains their designated

membership in the Intelligence Community and will continue to manage and operate its

own intelligence program.

This handbook also applies to contractors in SCI Facilities (SCIFs) accredited by the

DHS and to DHS SCI contract efforts conducted within facilities accredited by other

agencies and approved for joint use by co-utilization agreement.

Heads of DHS Intelligence Components may issue supplementary instructions when

necessary, to address unique situations to meet mission requirements within their

respective components. All supplementary instructions must be approved by the

Cognizant Security Authority (CSA) prior to implementation. Provisions outlined in this

handbook take precedence over previously issued legacy manuals, instructions,

guidance and other publications.

Comments regarding and/or recommendations to change this handbook, should be

directed to the DHS Security Office, ATTN: Special Security Programs Division (SSPD),

Accreditation and Technical Support Branch.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PURPOSE

This handbook contains security procedures, and details for the construction of

Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF) for the Department of Homeland

Security

(DHS). This handbook provides key milestones, construction standards,

electrical and technical guidance for use when planning and executing the construction

of DHS SCI Facilities (SCIFs).

This reference manual should be used as a guide for construction professionals,

engineers, architects, Special Security Officers and project managers to ensure the

required construction standards are established and meet DHS and DCID minimum

requirements.

Adherence to this guide will assist in facility accreditation in accordance with DCID 6/9

standards.

DHS Facilities Division, construction professionals, engineers, architects, Special

Security Officers and project managers should verify their design intent and concept of

operation through the Cognizant Security Authority (CSA) prior to entering into a DHS

SCIF construction project.

Approval of a SCIF Concept of Operations

(CONOPS) is critical to the facility

accreditation and should be the initial documentation established prior to beginning,

planning and or construction of an SCI facility.

Make all CONOPS approval requests through the Office of Security, ATTN: Special

Security Programs Division, Chief Security Officer.

vii

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AUTHORITIES

The Homeland Security Act of 2002, P. L. 107-296

The National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. 401

Executive Order 12333 “United States Intelligence Activities”

Executive Order 12829, “National Industrial Security Program”

Executive Order 12958, as amended, “Classified National Security Information”

Executive Order 12968, “Access to Classified Information”

Executive Order 13284, “Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security”

Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/1, “Security Policy for Sensitive

Compartmented Information and Security Policy Manual”

DCID 6/3, “Protecting Sensitive Compartmented Information Within Information

Systems”

10.

DCID 6/4, “Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for

Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information”

11.

DCID 6/7, “Intelligence Disclosure Policy”

12.

DCID 6/9, “Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information

Facilities”

13.

Department of Homeland Security Delegation Number 8000.1, “Delegation to

Chief, Office of Security of Determination Authority and Cognizant Security

Authority”

14.

Designation of Chief Security Officer as Senior Agency Official, March 3, 2004

15.

Department of Homeland Security Management Directive number 11043 Sensitive

Compartmented Information Program Management

viii

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DEFINITIONS

A. Accreditation is the formal approval of a specific place, referred to as a Sensitive

Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), that meets prescribed physical, technical,

and personnel security standards.

B. Cognizant Security Authority (CSA) is the individual designated by a Senior

Official of the Intelligence Community (SOIC) to serve as the responsible official for all

aspects of security program management with respect to protection of intelligence

sources and methods under SOIC responsibility. The CSA for DHS is the Chief Security

Officer.

C. Contractor Special Security Officer (CSSO) administers the receipt, control, and

accountability of SCI materials and the SCI security functions for contractor facilities.

D. Information System Security Manager (ISSM) The security official responsible for

the IS security program for a specific Directorate, Office, or contractor facility.

E. Information System Security Officer

(ISSO) The security official, either

government or contractor, responsible for the security posture of a specific Information

System.

F. Intelligence Community includes United States Government agencies and

organizations and activities identified in the National Security Act of 1947.

G. National Foreign Intelligence Board is chaired by the Director of Central

Intelligence and is comprised of Intelligence Community members and distinguished

civilians appointed by the President.

H. Need-to-know is a determination made by an authorized holder of classified

information that a prospective recipient requires access to specific classified information

in order to perform a lawful and authorized function. Such person shall possess an

appropriate security clearance and access approvals in accordance with Executive

Orders 12958, as amended, and 12968, as well as DCID 6/4.

I. Senior Agency Official is the official designated by the agency head under section

5.4(d) of E.O. 12958, as amended, who directs and administers the agency’s program

under which information is classified, safeguarded, and declassified. The Senior Agency

Official for DHS is the Chief Security Officer.

J. Senior Official of the Intelligence Community

(SOIC) is the head of an

organization within the Intelligence Community, as defined by the National Security Act

of 1947. Within DHS there are five SOICs: The Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, the

Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, the Assistant

Secretary for Information Analysis, and the Assistant Commandant for Intelligence for

the United States Coast Guard.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

K. Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) is classified information concerning,

or derived from, intelligence sources, methods, or analytical processes requiring

handling within formal access control systems established by the Director Central

Intelligence (DCI). SCI is also referred to as "codeword" information. The sensitivity of

this information requires that it be protected in a much more controlled environment

than other classified information. Therefore, the DCI has established special policies

and procedures for the protection of SCI. These policies and procedures are

promulgated through Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs).

L. SCI Facility (SCIF) is an accredited area, room, group of rooms, buildings, or

installation where SCI may be used, stored, discussed and/or processed.

M. Security Clearance is a formal authorization for an employee with a specific need-

to-know to have access to information that is classified as Confidential, Secret, or Top

Secret in the interest of national security or the defense of the United States.

N. Special Security Officer (SSO) works under the direction of the Chief, Special

Security Programs Division and administers the receipt, control and accountability of

SCI. The SSO oversees SCI security functions and reporting requirements for

subordinate SCIFs.

O. Special Security Representative (SSR) works under the direction of the supporting

SSO, and is responsible for the day-to-day management and implementation of SCI

security and administrative instructions for a separate, subordinate DHS SCIF.

P. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures are techniques and measures used

to detect and nullify a wide variety of technologies used to obtain unauthorized access

to classified national security information, restricted data, and/or unclassified sensitive

information.

Q. Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems (TAIS) is defined as

any telecommunications or computer related equipment, or interconnected system or

subsystems of equipment, that is used in the acquisition, storage, manipulation,

management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or

reception of voice or data

(digital or analog), including software, firmware, and

hardware.

R. TEMPEST: Telecommunications Electronics Material Protected from Emanating

Spurious Transmissions or Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Emanation Standard.

Refers to external electromagnetic radiation from data processing equipment and the

security measures used to prevent them.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

SCIF ACCREDITATION REQUIREMENTS

The Special Security Programs Division (SSPD) under authority of the Chief Security

Officer (CSO) is the sole accrediting authority for DHS SCIFs. Divisions are responsible

for ensuring SCIFs are established only when clear operational requirements dictate,

and when existing SCIFs are not adequate to support the requirements. A clear, active

SCI mission must exist before a SCIF is requested. SCI will not be discussed or

introduced into the proposed SCIF until the facility is formerly accredited by SSPD.

SCIF accreditation involves two basic steps: Concept and preconstruction approval, and

Accreditation.

CONCEPT AND PRECONSTRUCTION APPROVAL

The concept approval step is a key element in future accreditation actions. Concept of

Operations (CONOPS) approval certifies that clear operational requirements exist for

the SCIF and there is no existing SCIF to support the requirement. Upon receipt of the

CONOPS approval, the Directorate or Component Special Security Officer (SSO) will

coordinate directly with SSPD on all matters pertaining to physical security/TEMPEST

and accreditation of that SCIF. The SSO will send an information copy of any

documentation to the appropriate Division Head. Divisions will not impose procedures

which hinder this process. The CONOPS approval request, via Memorandum, will

include the exact location of the proposed SCIF (Street Address and City); required

level of SCI accesses (SI/TK/G/HCS, etc.); the storage requirement (Closed Storage,

Open Storage or Continuous Operations (24/7 operations) and brief description of

operation.

The DHS Chief Security Officer, or designee, is authorized to grant concept approval to

establish a SCIF and to validate the requirement for the requested level of SCI. The

CSO or designee will issue a concept validation (CONOPS) approval Memorandum to

the requesting organization, with an information copy to the supporting SSO.

The SCIF design will balance threats and vulnerabilities against appropriate security

measures to reach an acceptable level of risk. Proper security planning for a SCIF is

intended to deny foreign intelligence services and other unauthorized personnel the

opportunity for undetected entry into theses facilities and exploitation of sensitive

activities.

THE FIXED FACILITY CHECKLIST (FFC)

This is the primary document in the decision making process for granting an

accreditation. The preconstruction FFC must describe in sufficient detail the types and

methods of construction to determine if the SCIF construction will satisfy physical

security criteria listed in DCID 6/9. Complete (to the extent possible) and submit the

preconstruction FFC for the proposed SCIF along with a drawing of the space and the

CONOPS request to SSPD. SSPD will review physical security preconstruction plans

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

for SCIF construction, expansion, or modification and will provide preconstruction

advice, assistance, and formal written approval. Construction will not begin until SSPD

provides formal preconstruction approval to proceed with construction.

CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS AND SPECIFICATIONS

Prior to SCIF construction, SSPD must be provided with a copy of all preconstruction

drawings for approval. Based upon a threat analysis, additional technical or physical

enhancements may be required. Upon receipt of the drawings, SSPD will provide a

written concurrence/non-concurrence within ten working days.

HANDLING AND DISTRIBUTION OF DRAWINGS

Drawings should be considered and marked For Official Use Only and handled in

accordance with The Freedom of Information Act, The Intelligence Authorization Act of

2002 amending the FOIA and Privacy Act requirements accordingly.

Where possible drawings should be sanitized and a separate key document should be

maintained by authorized personnel providing detailed description of rooms, mechanical

and electrical details.

Drawings should have limited information regarding the activity or agency occupying the

SCIF, etc. Drawings should reference all rooms by number with a separate key

reference maintained separate from the drawing describing the room and requirements.

Drawings shall limit any indication(s) of function(s) or mission(s) of the facility.

Drawings shall not use the term (SCIF). As an alternative, another name, coding

system or number should be assigned at the discretion of the facilities project

manager and with concurrence from SSPD to identify SCI rooms and facilities.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS

MILEPOSTS FOR INSPECTION

Special Programs Security Division (SSPD) or Cognizant Security Authority (CSA)

assigned representative must inspect the construction points described below.

1. During wall construction, but before its completion, all wall layers need to be

inspected.

2. Following installation/welding of expanded metal in walls, but before walls are

covered in sheetrock.

3. Following the installation of any duct grills, non-conductive breaks, or inspection

ports.

4. Following any modification to seal cable trays (e.g. welding plates; installation of

grill etc.) but before the tray is sealed.

5. Inspection of doors and hardware as specified, i.e. once doors are hung and all

equipment is installed to include door sweeps, thresholds, and gaskets.

6. Final inspection to include confirmation of wall-to-ceiling

(slab-to-slab)

construction; complete sealing around all penetrations in perimeter walls,

completion of walls above false ceiling in a workman-like manner to include

painting both sides, and complete labeling of both ends of all telephone, fiber,

and electrical circuits, to include all wiring and conveyance methods.

Many of these items shown above will be inspected at the same time, e.g.

penetrations requiring dielectric breaks will be inspected as available at

the same time that the expanded metal installation is inspected.

Ceiling tiles will not be installed until after the final inspection, so as to facilitate

access to the plenum, and prevent damage to the tiles.

** Every element of SCIF perimeter wall(s) installation must be made available for

inspection by the government representative prior to concealment. **

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS

GENERAL NOTES

Building owner shall coordinate with government representative to obtain final

tenant approval and acceptance of build-out. This may not be applicable in

all locations, i.e. NAC facilities.

Any openings greater than 96 square inches in cross sectional area that

penetrate any demising or perimeter wall must have a grill barrier unless the

government representative (SSPD) certifies the opening is not man-passable.

All grillwork frames shall be visible from the exterior of ductwork. A 12" X 12"

(approximate) lockable access port shall be installed to permit periodic

inspection of the grill. The access port shall allow visual and physical

inspection of the grill or man-bar installation. All access ports shall be on

tenant (secure) side of wall, and positioned such that access is not restricted.

The actual size of the access port may vary, but shall be no less than 9" X 9"

square. Tenant approval is required.

All existing wiring penetrating tenant spaces shall be removed or relocated.

The only wiring approved to penetrate tenant space shall be wiring that is

required by building code, or for tenant use. Remaining wiring will be labeled

for identification. All wire penetrations shall be in conduit (unless otherwise

dictated by code) and approved by the government representative (SSPD).

All abandoned equipment and conduit must be removed. Contractor shall fill

voids with tenant-approved method.

All conduit or trough systems that penetrate perimeter walls, floors, or ceilings

shall be fitted with dielectric (non-conductive) breaks, and must be on tenant

(secure) side beginning within 6" of walls, floors, or ceilings, and should be no

longer than 6". If this cannot be accomplished, SSPD will review and provide

recommendations for mitigation of piping, fire systems, conduit or other

penetrations, i.e., single point grounding, wrapping, isolation or isolated

grounding.

Any trough system below floor or above ceiling shall be sealed, and the

government representative (SSPD) shall approve both the method and type

of seal.

Government project manager shall perform a final acceptance and inspection

before the space is released for occupancy.

It is recommended that a Special Programs Security Division (SSPD) or

Cognizant Security Authority (CSA) assigned representative be present with

project manager during final acceptance inspection.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS

EXPANDED METAL MESH SPECIFICATIONS

Expanded metal mesh shall meet ASTM F1267-89 type, Class 1 standard and

shall have the following characteristics:

a. Strand thickness: No. 9 - 10 gauge minimum (flattened)

b. Weight:

195 lbs/csf minimum

c. Material:

Carbon Steel

d. Shape:

Flattened

e. Pattern:

Diamond

f. Dimensions: 3.20 inch maximum (long opening) (LWD) 1.33 inch

maximum (short opening) (SWD)

g. Recommended mesh: 3/4" #9 (10 ga)

Mesh shall be fastened to steel stud and top and bottom runners using either

screw or weld attachment. Screws or weld shall be spaced at 6" on center

maximum, with all corners fastened to the framing. Mesh splice shall occur at

studs only. Splice between supports is not permitted unless: a) such splice is

welded continuously top to bottom; b) mesh is overlapped three inches, and

fastened or welded every six inches.

Steel framing receiving metal mesh shall be 16 gauge minimum.

Screws shall be self-drilling #8 shank minimum (1/4" minimum penetration into

steel framing.) Fasteners must be used from the secure side of the mesh. 1/2

inch washers must be installed when using screws to deter ability to pull mesh

over tops of screw heads.

Welds shall be 1/8" x ½" long fillet type excepting at unsupported splices where

the weld must be continuous.

There can be no gap in coverage. Gaps may be closed with steel studding or flat

metal welded (or fasted where welding is not permitted) to the secure side of the

expanded metal.

A determination for use of expanded metal within SCIF walls will be made based

upon threat assessment, facility type, government owned vs. leased, location as

well as other factors.

The Nebraska Avenue Complex (NAC) has a waiver for metal mesh

requirements for SCIF construction.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATIONS

Prior to SCIF construction, SSPD must be provided with a copy of all preconstruction

drawings for approval. Based upon a threat analysis, additional technical or physical

enhancements may be required. Upon receipt of the drawings, SSPD will provide a

written concurrence/nonoccurrence within ten working days.

SCIF PERIMETER WALLS

Perimeter walls must be true floor to true ceiling, finished and painted. Perimeter walls

will be constructed in the following manner:

On the interior (secure side) of the perimeter wall, install one layer expanded metal

mesh, standard flattened with diamond pattern, carbon steel with minimum

flattened thickness of .120 inches (i.e., ¾ inch # 9 - 10 gauge mesh). The

maximum dimensions of the long opening are 2.1 inches (80 millimeters) and the

short opening is .923 inches (34 millimeters). Secure mesh to the metal framing

via welding or with self-tapping #8 shank pan head screws at 6 inch (150

millimeters) on center maximum horizontally and vertically and a minimum of 7

millimeters penetration into the metal framing. Washers will be used to ensure

secure fastening. Reference expanded metal mesh requirements for weld and

installation instructions.

The interior (secure side) of the perimeter wall must consist of two layers 5/8 inch

drywall mounted, on top of the metal mesh, on 16 gauge metal studs @ 16 inches

O.C.

For perimeter walls that are adjacent to exterior building walls composed of

substantive material, CMU, concrete block, steel, brick, etc., one layer of drywall

may be eliminated. Reference wall detail type 3A and type 3B of this document.

Install a layer of 3 ½ inch sound batting or mineral wool material in the wall cavity.

This construction method should provide a sound attention level of sound

transmission class (STC) rating of 45 or greater.

On the exterior (non-secure side), install one layer of 5/8 inch drywall, with

staggered seams, horizontally and vertically. Drywall should be staggered when

using foil backed drywall. Drywall staggering is not required when using a foil

barrier stapled between the two layers of drywall.

SCIF DOORS

Doors and frames shall meet or exceed an STC 45 rating at a minimum. The entire

door, frame, partition, and door hardware assembly shall be designed and specified by

the A/E firm to ensure the required STC rating is achieved.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Additionally, doors must meet a minimum forced entry requirement and be composed of

a material that will withstand a forced entry attempt by

Doors will meet the following requirements:

Solid wood stave core door, a minimum of 1 ¾ inches thick, or

16 gauge metal cladding over wood or composition materials, a minimum of 1 ¾

inches thick, or

Metal fire or acoustical protection doors, a minimum of 1 ¾ inches thick., or

A joined metal rolling door, minimum of 22 gauge, used as a loading dock or

garage structure must be approved on a case-by-case basis.

All doors will be tested and meet a minimum Sound Transmission Class (STC) of

45. Install door sweeps, gaskets, astragal or overlapping molding to meet the

STC-45 rating. All doors will have heavy duty automatic door closures.

If door(s) are equipped with hinges located on the exterior side of the door where

it opens into an uncontrolled area outside of the SCIF, the hinge pins will be

treated to prevent removal (e.g. pined, brazed, set screws, spot welded, etc.).

The non-active door of a double door configuration must be secured at the top

(door jam) and bottom (floor) with heavy duty sliding deadbolts. Install heavy duty

throw bolts on the inactive leaf (type Sergeant and Greenleaf (S&G) SM 181

slide locks on top and bottom or equivalent heavy duty slide bolts).

Use of wireless door opening devices is prohibited on garage doors. Remote

door release devices are also prohibited unless approved in advance by the

SSPD.

Install a UL 634 compliant (level 2) Balanced Magnetic Switch (BMS) which

contains three or more balanced magnetic switches. A BMS is required on all

doors that make up and or are apart of the SCIF perimeter boundaries/walls.

PRIMARY ENTRANCE DOOR

There will be one designated primary entrance door, unless approved in advance in

writing from the CSO, Office of Security. The primary door must be equipped with a

DHS installed GSA-approved combination lock (X09), an electric door latch rated at

2000 lbs force entry, and one-way door peep viewing port.

The door must have high security locking hardware (Medeco, Schlage Primus, Assa or

similar approved hardware) that can override the access controlled electric door latch.

Locking hardware shall meet UL 437 standards. The primary entrance door must be

equipped with an automatic door closer and a dual access control device (key pad with

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PIN and proximity card), in addition to the currently installed GSA-approved combination

lock (X-09).

Install acoustical gasketing around the door and door sweeps to achieve an STC-45

sound rating. Reference Sound Attenuation.

SECONDARY ENTRANCE DOORS

These must be approved in advance by the SSPD. Secondary doors must be secured

with approved deadlocking door hardware for securing the space after hours. The

access control to this door must be disabled during periods of minimum staffing (6p.m. -

6a.m.). The keyway must be blanked on these doors.

SCIF EMERGENCY EXIT DOOR

The SCIF emergency exit door will be equipped with the following:

1. Deadlocking panic hardware (Von Duprin 9857-EO-F/9957-EO-F Three Point

Latching Fire Device or similar) on the inside and have no exterior hardware.

2. Automatic door closer.

3. Balanced magnetic switch (BMS), Sentrol Model 2700 series, Harco

Magnasphere HSD or equivalent (armed 24/7).

4. Local enunciator to alert personnel working in the area someone exited the

facility due to emergency condition or other.

5. Install acoustical gasketing around the door and door sweeps to achieve and

STC-45 sound rating.

6. Exposed hinges must be treated to prevent removal of the door (e.g., welded, set

screws, etc).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TECHNICAL SECURITY

TELEPHONE SECURITY

To prevent telephone lines and telephone instruments that service a SCIF from being

used as clandestine listening devices, the following controls will be required:

1. All incoming telephone cables and wires which penetrate a facility's perimeter will

enter the facility through one opening and be placed under control at the interior face of

the perimeter by the following:

a. All active incoming lines will be accounted for by the number of pairs in use, by

telephone and extension number, and the number of excess/unused pairs in existence.

The accounting will be updated whenever the status of a pair of wires is changed.

b. All excess/unused incoming wires will be either removed or disconnected and

grounded in a manner which prevents their unauthorized use.

2. The number of telephone instruments servicing a SCIF will be limited to those

operationally necessary. All telephone instruments will be equipped with a non-

resonating ringer, a positive disconnect either automatic or manual plug and jack, and,

in certain installations a line filter. Specially designed, for U.S. Government use,

telephone instruments and associated security devices are available from telephone

companies. When planning the telephone system for a SCIF, advance consultation with

SSPD is encouraged to obtain advice regarding recommended telephone instruments,

associated security devices, installation design, and the required "certification of need"

to obtain specially designed instruments and devices.

COMPUTERIZED TELEPHONE SYSTEMS (CTS)

Computerized telephone systems (CTS) or Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP) systems

within the SCIF must meet Telephone Security Group (TSG) TSG-2 standards or utilize

approved TSG type 6 equipment.

If the room is a “discussion area”, all telephones installed in the space must be TSG-6

approved telephones, as an alternative, a TSG-2 configuration may be approved and

utilized.

1. Administrative telephone systems are a potential source for fortuitous conduction

of Compromising Emanations (CE) due to their proximity to building maintenance

areas and their signal line distribution outside the facility. Additional protection is

recommended when commercial telephones are located in a RED

electromagnetic environment. The most effective protection is provided by line

disconnection switches and telephone line optical isolators that use waveguide

below cutoff. The use of these devices or telephone filters must be approved by

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the CTTA. These devices should be considered only when installing. replacing or

retrofitting telephone systems.

Remember that the administrative telephone system and its associated wiring

are BLACK. The telephone system cabling should be routed in a separate

distribution system. If filters or isolators are required and approved by the CTTA,

the lines should be filtered/isolated where they egress the inspectable space or

facility. Locating the filters/isolators at the controlled space is not recommended

because the equipment TEMPEST zone may extend beyond the controlled

space. In addition, fewer filters/, isolators will be necessary if the trunk lines

rather than the individual phone lines are filtered/isolated.

CATV: Cable Television service into the SCIF must be electrically isolated at the

point of entry. SSPD recommends the use of Fiber Plex Incorporated Uni-

Directional (Simplex) Composite Video Optical Transmitter and Optical Receiver

models (FOI-2170) and (FOI-2172) or similar isolation device also PCT

International's 1310 nm Rackmount Transmitter (PCT-FTX3R) suitable for NTSC

or PAL television signal transmission. Analog bandwidth to 870 MHz allows for

advanced services such as HDTV, VOD, PPV, and high speed data as well as

traditional cable TV.

Fire alarm horn strobes and horn enunciators installed inside of the SCIF will

have a self amplified speaker configuration. Wheelock models SA-70 and SA-

70s or similar device(s) are recommended.

RF ATTENUATION & TEMPEST MITIGATION

Based upon a threat determination and analysis of the proposed SCIF site, location and

mission, RF Attenuation may be required. A determination will be made by SSPD prior

to construction of the facility in accordance with CNSS 7000 and NSTISSI 7000,

TEMPEST countermeasures for facilities, date May 2004. If a determination is made

that TEMPEST countermeasures are required the following information is provided:

1. On the interior (secure side), on top of the metal mesh, install two layers of 5/8

inch foil back drywall, with staggered seams, horizontally and vertically.

2. The preferred method of RF mitigation is to install to two layers of drywall: Install

one layer of 5/8 inch drywall. Install a layer of TVM Ultra NT Radiant barrier foil

(part # 1800 48 125s) or equivalent approved product. Seams must be

overlapped and taped with metallic tape, or folded appropriately. Install a second

layer of regular 5/8 inch drywall on top of the foil barrier.

RF WINDOW FILM SPECIFICATIONS

The following are the technical recommendations for all clear window film installed as

an after market item. The preferred method is the film to be installed between the

glazing as part of the window construction process prior to being placed in the window

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SOUND ATTENUATION

Acoustical protection measures and sound masking systems are designed to protect

discussion of classified information from being inadvertently overheard by the casual

passerby. Secure Area and SCIF perimeter walls, doors, windows, floors and ceilings,

including all openings, will provide sufficient sound attenuation to preclude inadvertent

disclosure of conversation.

The ability of a Secure Area or SCIF structure to retain sound within the perimeter is

rated using a descriptive value, the STC. All DHS Secure Areas and SCIFs will meet

Sound Group III - STC of 45 or better. Higher levels are required for amplified sound

(e.g., video teleconferencing).

STC RATINGS

Sound Group III - STC of 45 or better. Loud speech can be faintly heard but not

understood. Normal speech is unintelligible.

Sound Group IV - STC of 50 or better. Very loud sounds, such as loud singing, brass

musical instruments or a radio at full volume, can be heard only faintly or not at all.

TESTING PROCEDURES

1. Procedures for measuring the sound attenuation levels of a completed structure can

be found in, "Tentative Recommended Practices for Measurement of Airborne Sound

Insulation in Buildings," Publication No. E-336-67T, American Society of Testing and

Materials.

2. Another acceptable procedure is found in the DCI Security Committee

memorandum, "Sound Attenuation Test for Secure Conference Rooms," dated 7 Feb

78.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

WINDOWS

Where windows exist affording visual surveillance of personnel, documents, materials,

or activities within the SCIF, the windows shall be made opaque or equipped with

blinds, drapes, or other coverings precluding such visual surveillance. All accessible

perimeter windows at ground level (less than 18 feet above the ground) shall be

covered by an Intrusion Detection System (IDS).

ACCESSIBLE WINDOWS

This should be interpreted to mean any windows which are less than 18 feet above the

ground measured from the bottom of the window, or are easily accessible by means of

objects directly beneath the windows, (e.g. roofs, fire escapes, electrical transformer, air

conditioning units, vegetation or landscaping which can be climbed) will be constructed

from or covered with materials which will provide protection from forced entry. The

protection provided to the windows needs to be no stronger than the strength of the

contiguous walls. Vertical Metal bars 1/2 inch thick, welded 6 inches on center will be

installed on all accessible windows. Additional horizontal bars must be used to prevent

spreading. As an alternative, Exeter, Level 5, or Kane Screens Level 5 (Crimeshield) or

similar product may be used. Secure areas located within fenced and guarded

government compounds with a 24/7 armed guard presence or equivalent may eliminate

this requirement if the windows are made inoperable by either permanently sealing

them or equipping them on the inside with a locking mechanism. In these instances,

shock-type glass break sensors must be installed on accessible windows. All windows

will be protected by Passive Infra-Red (PIR) motion sensors.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM (IDS)

An IDS must detect an unauthorized or authorized penetration in the secure area. An

IDS complements other physical security measures and consists of Intrusion Detection

Equipment, Security Forces and Operating procedures.)

IDS systems shall be installed in accordance with Annex B of the DCID 6/9.

ALARM COVERAGE

The facility will have adequate alarm coverage:

1. Install Sentrol Model 2700 series, Harco Magnasphere HSD or equivalent (armed

24/7) on all perimeter doors.

2. Install a UL 634 compliant (level 2) Balanced Magnetic Switch (BMS) which

contains three or more balanced magnetic switches.

3. A BMS is required on all doors that make up and or are apart of the SCIF

perimeter boundaries/walls.

4. Interior space must have full passive infrared (PIR) coverage.

5. Install alarm key pad inside the room, next to the primary entrance door.

6. Install alarm control panel inside the room or equipment closet.

7. IDS must be an independent system contained within the SCIF perimeter.

8. Alarm must be monitored by the DHS, FPS Mega Centers, or other UL 2050

Compliant monitoring station.

9. Alarm installer and monitoring location must be UL 2050 compliant.

10. Any wiring for the IDS or ACS penetrating the SCIF perimeter must be protected

utilizing 128 bit encryption.

11. Access control to be provided with a electronic access control device.

IDS systems shall be installed in accordance with Annex B of the DCID 6/9.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DATA / TELEPHONES / POWER

DEDICATED POWER PANEL

Electrical power connected to the communication equipment must be controlled via a

separate Power Distribution Unit (PDU). Within a SCIF / Computer equipment room a

circuit breaker from a preexisting PDU, which meets CIO shunt-trip requirements may

be utilized. The PDU will be dedicated to installed communication equipment located

within the CER; no power shall be fed from this panel that would service anything

outside the SCIF. Reference NSTISSI 7000 TEMPEST Countermeasures for Facilities

and contact SPECIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS DIVISIONS (SSPD) for additional

guidance. The dedicated power panel shall be surfaced mounted on, or recessed in, an

interior wall (IAW NEC) within the SCIF. The OCAO shall determine specific location of

the dedicated power panel and PDU voltage/amperage requirements during planning

phase.

DEDICATED GROUND

A dedicated ground conductor shall be provided. The dedicated ground installation

from the SCIF power panel to the ground point shall conform to National Electric code

(NEC) and local code requirements. The total resistance of the ground conductor

(minimum #2 AWG stranded green copper wire) between the SCIF technical ground

bus and the building ground point shall also conform to NEC and local code

requirements. Reference NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95, Red/Black Installation Guidance

and contact SPECIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS DIVISIONS (SSPD) for additional

guidance.

COMPUTER EQUIPMENT ROOM (CER) SHUNT-TRIP BREAKER

The dedicated power panel shall be equipped with a shunt-trip main circuit breaker.

When activated, the shunt-trip eliminates power distribution to communications

equipment within CER when temperature exceeds a set level. Equipment Cabinet

Power Communication equipment cabinets shall be directly hard-wired to the CER

dedicated power panel.

UNITERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY (OPTIONAL UPS)

Provides a degree of protection to attached equipment in the event of a short duration

power outage. If communications requirements dictate UPS installation, any existing

UPS may be utilized when placed prior to the CER PDU main power feed. However,

when a communication equipment cabinet is protected by an individual UPS being

supplied by CER PDU direct power, UPS will require ability to monitor the shunt-trip

breaker connected to temperature thermostat and remove voltage distribution to

protected equipment if a shunt-trip activation occurs. In the event customer determines

they are unable to provide adequate UPS service to CER, OCIO engineer will evaluate,

on a case-by-case basis, site requirements and determine if UPS unit(s) will be supplied

to protect equipment contained within equipment cabinet(s).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)

(For the protection of classified non-encrypted data processing)

The APC Smart-UPS design which utilizes a line-interactive topology as defined as a

Topaz isolation transformer, two Solar Electronics 8012-50-R-24-BNC LISNs (with line

impedance stabilization networks), and an Avtron K490 load bank as a secondary

power isolation unit for the protection of classified non-encrypted data processing for

desktop/laptop computer solutions at DHS. This is a baseline for desktop/laptop

workstation only, if power isolation is needed.

A separate CTTA approval is required for any equipment racks that support Top Secret

or above installation under National Security Telecommunications and Information

Systems Security Advisory Memorandum (NSTISSAM) TEMPEST 2-95A.

The APC Smart-UPS design will meet all requirements of Director of Central

Intelligence Directives (DCID) 6/9 and Intelligence Community guidance under the

provisions of DHS Management Directive, 11043, Sensitive Compartmented Information

Program Management and NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2-95A “Amendment to Advisory

Memorandum RED/BLACK Installation Guidance”.

TEMPEST FILTERING

TEMPEST filtering shall be done IAW applicable security documents. Reference

NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95, Red/Black Installation Guidance and contact SPECIAL

SECURITY PROGRAMS DIVISIONS (SSPD) for additional guidance.

HVAC COMPUTER EQUIPMENT ROOM (CER) REQUIREMENTS

HVAC AIR CONDITIONING

The CER requires cooled and filtered air. The air supply shall be a 24-hour/day 7-

day/week system and be separately zoned and controlled from within the CER. Air

filtering shall meet commercial codes.

TEMPERATURE ADJUSTMENTS

The room air supply shall be adjustable and provide a nominal return air temperature

range between 64º and 75º Fahrenheit with all communications equipment installed and

operational. National Security Agency standard.

HUMIDITY RANGE

Air supply humidity range shall be maintainable between 30 and 60 percent.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AIR SUPPLY DISSIPATION

The supply design shall be capable of dissipating a specified BTU/hr figure that meets

the installed communications equipment wattage and humidity air input requirements.

CIO project manager shall be responsible for ensuring the air dissipation specifications

to provide to the site facilities personnel. Heat Dissipation guidelines are 750 to 5,000

BTUs per hour per cabinet. The following formula will be used to determine BTUs

generated by installed equipment:

(Watts) x (.05689) x (60 Hz) = BTUs per Hour

(Watts): Total watts consumed by installed communications equipment in a CER.

AIR HANDLER LOCATION

Coordination with the OCAO must be made prior to the installation of any type of air

handling unit. OCAO also requires information regarding any planned air duct

installations or preexisting infrastructure alterations. This will negate any interference

with the CER design and installation. The location of the air handler should be in such a

fashion to limit the amount of overhead obstructions. It is recommended a stand-alone

wall unit be considered. The customer may contact the heating/air conditioning vendor

of their choice for price and installation guidelines.

COMMUNICATION LINE INSTALLATION

Communication lines shall be installed in an approved conveyance; they shall not be

installed loosely in ceilings, loosely installed under floors, or installed under carpeting.

CONVEYANCE SYSTEMS INSTALLED IN CEILINGS

Conveyance systems installed in the ceiling shall be no greater than 12 feet from the

finished floor.

RED CONVEYANCE SYSTEMS UTILIZING WIRE

ACCESSIBILITY

All RED main backbone grid conveyance systems shall be accessible; therefore they

shall not be installed within walls. This requirement does not apply for RED drop

conveyances extending off the main backbone grid to individual stations (i.e., phones,

PCs, etc.). Special security requirements may exist where a common wall is shared

with uncleared individuals. Contact SPECIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS DIVISIONS

(SSPD) for guidance.

CONVEYANCE BENDS

All conveyance bends shall meet EIA / TIA standards.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PROTECTED DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(S) (PDS)

PDS are used to transmit unencrypted classified NSI through an area of lesser

classification or control. If the classified NSI is unencrypted, the PDS must provide

adequate electrical, electromagnetic, and physical safeguards to deter exploitation.

Since PDS can be penetrated, given the opportunity and adequate time, a philosophy of

detection of attempted penetration shall be employed. Careful consideration is given to

the application before PDS is selected in preference to another INFOSEC system.

There may be economic, technical, or operational factors making PDS necessary in

comparison to other INFOSEC systems. Although proper design and installation of

PDS are important, continued physical security integrity after installation is critical. The

cost and operational impact of maintaining the security of the system should be

assessed prior to acquisition and installation, since such costs can easily exceed the

installation cost.

Reference the National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security

(NSTISSI) No.7003, 13 December 1996, PROTECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS

(PDS) for detailed guidance on use of PDS.

All PDS must be approved in writing by the DHS Certified Technical TEMPEST

Authority (CTTA).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PROTECTED DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (PDS) APPROVAL REQUEST

Requests for PDS approval shall be completed by the responsible SSO and forwarded

to the department or agency Approval Authority, DHS Special Programs Security

Division. It shall include the following information in each listed category:

Installation Site (Identify the organization where the PDS will be installed and a

point-of-contact’s name and phone number);

Installation Activity (Identify the organization responsible for the installation of the

PDS, and a point-of-contact’s name and phone number);

System Information (Provide a description of the components directly connecting to

the PDS, and a summary of the type of cable used in the PDS (e.g., fiber optics,

shielded twisted pair, coaxial cable) and the electrical parameters (e.g., voltage

and current levels);

Security Profile (Identify the highest classification of NSI processed on the PDS (if

special category information, identify the specific categories or compartments

processed); and provide a percentage breakdown of the type of NSI processed on

the PDS);

Facility Security (This section provides information concerning the security

conditions of the facility where the PDS will be located by providing the following);

a. Indicate on a map of the residential and commercial area, the facility’s

approximate location;

b. Indicate a fenced facility’s fence location on the map and describe the type

of fencing construction (also, indicate if a perimeter Intrusion Detection

System (IDS) is installed);

c. Indicate the automobile, pedestrian, and amphibious access points on the

map;

d. Are guards posted at these access points, and what hours are the access

points open;

e. Is a personnel badge recognition system used; are access lists

maintained; and is an escort required for uncleared personnel;

f. Is a registration control system used for vehicles, employees, visitors, and

tradesmen;

Building Security (This section requests information on security conditions of the

building(s) within which the PDS will be installed as follows);

a. Provide a floor plan of the building(s), describe the exterior and interior

construction, and identify whether or not the building’s perimeter has an

IDS installed;

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

b. Indicate on the floor plan the access points to the building(s) (all windows

accessible from the ground, fire escapes, etc. should be identified and any

implemented window tamper protection devices should be described);

c. Are guards posted at the building access points, what hours are the

access points open, and are cipher/simplex locks used for administrative

access control to the building;

d. Indicate what type of doors and locks secure the access points;

e. Is a personnel badge recognition systems in use and are access lists

maintained;

f. Indicate the clearance level of personnel entering the building, and if a

clearance is required for unescorted access to the building;

g. Specify how the movement and operation of custodial, maintenance, and

vending personnel is controlled, and if this requires an escort or

continuous surveillance for uncleared personnel;

Protected Distribution Systems (PDS) (This section describes the security condition

of PDS by providing the following information);

a. Provide classification level of the area controlled, and indicate if uncleared

personnel are monitored?

b. Indicate on a map or floor plan the location and routing of the proposed

PDS. Describe its construction;

c. Describe the inspection procedures for detection of tampering; and

d. Will the PDS be alarmed, if so, describe in detail.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONNECTIVITY GUIDELINES / GENERAL SPECIFICATIONS

COMMERCIAL DEMARCATION

Adequate space to meet installation requirements for common carrier interface /

demarcation equipment shall be provided. The customer site is responsible for

extending incoming Telco service from the Commercial Demarcation point to CER; a

termination point (i.e. RJ-48) will be provided within the CER, which now becomes

OCIO's service demarcation point. This includes installation of required conduit and

cabling, terminating and cross connecting cabling at both ends and testing and labeling

termination within CER.

During initial site survey, media and cable specifications will be determined. Generally

this shall be copper cabling, either individually shielded pairs or two individually jacketed

cables, segregating Transmit and Receive signals from Telco. The number of pairs

installed to be dictated by site requirements. The CIO project manager shall determine

specific location of the commercial service termination point within the CER

WIDE AREA NETWORK(S) (WAN) CONNECTIVITY

The customer is responsible for installing cable, connecting their infrastructure, to the

GFE router. They must enter the cabinet via the existing conveyance and this cabling

will be laced inside the cabinet using current installation practices, under the supervision

of a COMM Maintenance technician. If the customer has chosen to install a fiber

infrastructure they will be responsible for providing the conversion device (transceiver)

for converting the signal from copper to fiber.

SECURE VIDEO TELECONFERENCING

Installation of video infrastructure shall employ the same type of media as the data

infrastructure. The current network standard video equipment employs Video over IP

technology and will use RJ45 connectors from the designated video wall plate to the

video component. Cat 5 or higher UTP cabling will meet the video needs, however UTP

may only be utilized if placed within Red conveyance devoid of any Black cabling; STP

cabling is required if previously annotated requirement is unobtainable. If the site

employs a fiber distribution system, fiber optic modems designed for fiber infrastructure

& video will be utilized.

All commercially procured equipment to support the Video Teleconferencing (VTC)

network within a SCIF requires a technical security evaluation prior to its installation and

use, as well as Program Security approval.

Whether the media type is copper or fiber, both require a dedicated, continuous run

between the VTC location(s), i.e. conference room, back to the CER. An exception to

this is when Video/IP is being utilized for VTC purposes; termination is usually

accomplished at a switch within an IDF location. The CIO project manager shall

determine specific location.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

If the customer site will only be provided DHS SCI Wide Area Network connectivity then

a special connection will be required from the DHS SCI Wide Area Network router to the

video components, bypassing the customers DHS SCI Wide Area Network firewall.

Wall plates will be marked as red or black and ideally, different type connectors should

be used to prevent accidental connections.

NON-SECURE (BLACK) WALL PLATES (VOICE AND DATA)

The customer shall install, terminate and label all Black outlet/wall plates. All cables will

be labeled at both ends. Wall plates shall be of a modular dual RJ-45 (digital data or

voice) or RJ-11 (analog voice) jack types as appropriate. Labels on all cables shall

indicate room and jack location for user end of the cable. The COMM preferred

approach to infrastructure cabling is to utilize Cat 5 Shielded Twisted Pair (STP) copper

wire for all voice cabling; CIO project manager shall specify specific cabling and pin-out

(i.e. EIA-T568A or T568B) requirements. Station drops to extend from user office to

MDF not located in CER. Terminate at MDF onto 110 blocks. Clearly label all drops at

both user office and MDF.

NON-SECURE VOICE CABLE DISTRIBUTION

The design and installation of the unclassified (black) voice system in the SCIF must

comply with Annex G, DCID 6/9 requirements. The exception to this would be if the

customer were a government organization occupying government owned or leased

space, in which case administrative (black) phone services may be provided by COMM.

However, cable infrastructure installation shall remain the customer’s responsibility.

Program Security in conjunction with resolution of potential physical and technical

security concerns must approve any administrative telephone system speakerphone

capability, on a case-by-case basis. COMM requires an administrative phone be

installed within close proximity to CER equipment to facilitate possible maintenance

coordination activities. Contact SPECIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS DIVISIONS (SSPD)

for additional guidance regarding any limitations.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SECURE (RED) WALL PLATES (VOICE AND DATA)

The customer shall install, terminate and label all data outlet/wall plates. All cables will

be labeled at both ends. The COMM preferred approach to infrastructure cabling is to

utilize Cat 5 Shielded Twisted Pair (STP) copper wire for all voice cabling; CIO project

manager shall specify specific cable and pin-out (i.e. EIA-T568A or T568B)

requirements.

If media type is Multimode (MM) fiber, wall plates shall be terminated in accordance with

pre-established facility standards. All cables will be properly identified at both

termination ends.

SECURE VOICE CABLE DISTRIBUTION (TDM)

The cables shall be terminated and labeled at a termination block (i.e. 66/110) at the

CER end, and CIO project manager shall specify specific cable and pin-out (i.e. EIA-

T568A or T568B) requirements at office drop end.

SECURE VOICE CABLE DISTRIBUTION (IP)

Secure Voice cables shall be terminated at a termination block (i.e. 66/110) at the CER

end, and CIO project manager shall specify specific cable and pin-out (i.e. EIA-T568A

or T568B) requirements. CIO project manager may tailor as appropriate to facilitate

specific installation requirements.

INFRASTRUCTURE CABLING

The COMM preferred approach to infrastructure cabling is to utilize Cat 5 Shielded

Twisted Pair (STP) copper wire for all secure data and voice cabling. This type of

infrastructure is more cost effective than fiber for the cabling, installation and the cost of

associated switching equipment.

For larger installations with multiple TC/IDF closets, COMM recommends using multi-

mode fiber optic cable be run from the CER to the TC/IDF, with Cat 5 STP copper

extending out from the TC/IDF to the wall plate. In this case fiber optics must be

terminated to a fiber optic patch panel within TC/IDF.

STP cabling, which supports secure voice (TDM only) connectivity, will be terminated at

a 110 punch down block within CER and any TC/IDF as it transverses between the

customer’s wall plate and CER location. These connections shall be labeled and tested

by the installer.

STP cabling, which supports secure data connectivity will be terminated per CIO project

manager’s direction. COMM recommends utilization of patch panels for versatility, and

for addressing any varying security levels that may require isolation. Regarding data

connections, cables will be terminated at a patch panel.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

WALL TYPE 3A: - SCIF WALL PERIMETER WALL PARTITION

NON-SECURE SIDE

SECURE SIDE

Structural Deck

Sealant, both sides

Ferrous pipe

16 GA Mtl Runner, top and bottom,

Sleeve, seal both end

3/4" #9-10 GA Expanded Metal Mesh,

weld or screw to metal framing @ 6"

O.C. vertically @ each stud and 6" O.C.

Non-ferrous coupling

horizontally @ top & bottom track

Di-electric break (6"

Di-electric break

(152) max.)

Sheetmetal Duct

Manbars on Steel angle frame screwed

to wall framing at duct opening

Access door

Sealant all around duct

opening, both sides

1 layer of TVM Building Products "ULTRA NT-

RADIANT rFOIL" between the 2 layers of 5/8"

Mtl Framing all around

GWB. Overlap foil joint 6" and tape with

duct penetration

aluminum "rFoil" tape.*

Scheduled Ceiling

3 5/8" (92) 16 GA Mtl Studs @ 16" (406) O.C.

Foil backed Ceiling

2 Layers of 5/8" (16) GWB. Stagger

joints, tape and finish with joint compound

5/8" (16) GWB

and paint slab to slab.

3 1/2" (89) Sound

Sealant, both sides, (caulk)

attenuation blanket.

Full height

Scheduled flooring and base

Structural Deck

Rev. 02-01-07

Wall Type 3A (SCIF PERIMETER WALL PARTITION)

Conduit/pipe penetrations through wall type A6a shall be sealed all around, and shall be fitted with a dielectric

break within 6" (152) of the wall at the secure side of the room.

Duct penetrations on the wall type 3A shall be sealed all around, and shall be fitted with a dielectric break

within 6" (152) at the secure room side of the wall. A 12"X12" (305x305) access panel shall be provided in the

bottom of the duct. Duct openings larger than 96 SqIn (61,935) (unless one dimension is 6" (152) or less) shall

be protected with 1/2" (13) manbars spaced and welded at 6" (152) O.C. horizontally and vertically - refer

manbar detail.

"ULTRA NT- RADIANT rFOIL" shall be used between the 2 layers of 5/8" GWB. Overlap foil joint 6" and tape

with aluminum "rFoil" tape, or approved equivalent product

* 2 layers of 5/8" aluminum foil backed GWB may be used in lieu of "ULTRA NT- RADIANT rFOIL". First layer

of GWB joints shall be taped with "rFoil" tape. Joints of second layer shall be offset staggered from joints in

first layer.

Partition shall be sealed continuously with an acoustical sealant wherever it abuts another element (i.e. wall,

column, mullion, etc.) Gypsum board joints shall be taped and finished with joint compound slab to slab.

Expanded Carbon Steel Security Mesh to be ASTM A569/569M, ASTM F1267, Type II, Class1, standard,

flattened, style 3/4" #9-10 GA, 171 lbs/csf. SWD=.923" (23), LWD=2.1"(53) with overall thickness of 0.120 with

max. open area of 63%. Metal mesh to be welded or screwed to metal framing at 6" (150) O.C. at each stud

and horizontally at top and bottom track.If screws are used as the method of attachment

1"diameter

shall be used with each screw.

If wall abuts adjoining tenant, all electrical wiring and boxes shall be surface mounted on the secure side.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

WALL TYPE 3B - SCIF WALL PARTITION ON PERIMETER WALL

SECURE SIDE

Structural Deck

Sealant, top and bottom, both sides

Exterior CMU wall.

1layer of "ULTRA NT- RADIANT rFOIL", apply to

Mtl furring by TVM Building Products. Overlap foil

joint 6" and tape with aluminum "rFoil" tape.*

7/8" (22) Mtl furring @ 24" (405) O.C. vertically.

Anchored with PAF @ 6"(152) O.C. max.

Scheduled Ceiling

1Layer of 5/8" (16) type GWB*. Stagger

Joints

tape and finish with joint

.ompound and paint slab to slab.

Sealant, top and bottom, both sides

Scheduled flooring and base

Structural Deck

Rev. 02-01-07

Wall Type 3B (Building Perimeter SCIF Wall)

Conduit /pipe penetrations through wall type 3B shall be sealed all around. Partition shall

be sealed continuously with a sealant wherever it abuts another element (i.e. wall,

column, mullion, etc.) A double layer of RF foil (example product TVM ultra Radiant NT

Foil) or similar approved product. Overlap foil joint 6” and tape with aluminum “rFoil” tape.

** 2 layers of 5/8” 2 layers of 5/8" aluminum foil backed GWB may be used in lieu of

"ULTRA NT- RADIANT rFOIL". First layer of GWB joints shall be taped with "rFoil" tape.

Joints of second layer shall be offset staggered from joints in first layer.

** Every element of SCIF perimeter wall(s) installation must be made available for

inspection by the government representative prior to concealment. **

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

WALL TYPE 4 - SECURE PERIMETER PARTITION

(NON-SCIF PERIMETER PARTITION)

NON-SECURE SIDE

SECURE SIDE

16 GA Mtl Runner, top and bottom, anchored with

Structural Deck

PAF @ 6" (152) O.C.

3/4" #9-10 GA Expanded Metal Mesh, weld or

Sealant all around

screw to wall framing @ 6" O.C. vertically @ each

duct opening,

stud and 6" O.C. horizontally at top and bottom

both sides

track.

Sheet metal Duct

Mtl Framing all

around duct

Access door

penetration

Manbars on Steel angle frame welded or

screwed to wall framing at duct opening

5/8" (16) GWB

3 5/8" (92) 16 GA Mtl Studs @ 16" (405) O.C.

Scheduled Ceiling

2 Layers of 5/8" (16) GWB. Stagger Joints,

tape and finish with joint compound and paint

3 1/2" (89) Sound

slab to slab.

attenuation blanket.

Sealant, top and bottom, both sides

Full height

Scheduled flooring and base

Structural Deck

Rev. 02-01-07

Wall Type 4 (Collateral Area Perimeter Wall, STC-45)

Conduit/pipe penetrations through wall type 4 shall be sealed all around.

Duct penetrations through wall type 4 shall sealed all around, and shall be fitted with a 12"X12"

(305x305) access panel in the bottom of the duct on the Secure Side. Duct openings larger than 96

Sq in (61,935) (unless one dimension is 6" (152) or less) shall be protected with 1/2" (13) manbars

spaced and welded at 6" (152) O.C. horizontally and vertically - refer to manbar detail.

Partition shall be sealed continuously with a sealant wherever it abuts another element (i.e. wall,

column, mullion, etc.)

Expanded Carbon Steel Security Mesh to be ASTM A569/569M, ASTM F1267, Type II, Class 1,

standard, flattened, style 3/4" #9-10 GA, 171 lbs/csf. SWD=.923" (23), LWD=2.1"(53) with overall

thickness of 0.120 with max. open area of 63%. Metal mesh to be welded or screwed to metal

framing at 6" (152) O.C. at each stud and 6" O.C. horizontally @ top & bottom track. If screws are

used as the method of attachment 1"diameter washer shall be used with each screw.

If wall abuts adjoining tenant, all electrical wiring and boxes shall be surface mounted on the secure

side.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

National Guard Bureau

NGR 500-5/ANGI 10-208

Arlington, VA 22201-3231

August 18, 2010

Emergency Employment of Army and Other Resources

National Guard Domestic Law Enforcement Support and Mission Assurance Operations

By Order of the Secretary of Defense:

CRAIG R. MCKINLEY

General, USAF

Chief, National Guard Bureau

Official:

JOHN D. SELMER

Lt Col, USAF

Chief, Strategy and Policy Division

History. This is a new publication in the 500 series.

Summary. This regulation/instruction prescribes policies, procedures, responsibilities, and direction for activities

related to National Guard domestic law enforcement support and mission assurance operations. It governs the

training, planning, preparations, and operations of National Guard units and forces in the Homeland, hereafter referred

to as National Guard Domestic Operations (NGDO) as they relate to domestic law enforcement support and mission

assurance operations, to include Provost Marshal, Antiterrorism, Force Protection and Security Operations, Threat

Information Cells, National Guard Reaction Force, non-lethal capabilities, and critical infrastructure protection.

Applicability. This regulation/instruction applies to the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and to the Army National

Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG) of the 50 States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of

Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, hereafter referred to as the several states. It does not apply to National

Guard units or forces when they are serving in their federal role in the Army National Guard of the United States or

the Air National Guard of the United States. When operating in their federal status, these units and forces are under

Department of Defense (DOD) direction and control. This regulation does apply to National Guard members

conducting National Guard Counterdrug support operations; however, they shall refer to NGR 500-2/ANGI 1-0801,

for the counterdrug support specific procedures and policy.

Proponent and exception authority. The proponent of this regulation/instruction is the Director, Domestic

Operations, National Guard Bureau (NGB-J3/DO). The proponent has the authority to approve exceptions to this

regulation/instruction that are consistent with controlling law and regulation. Submit requests for exception to

policy as set forth in this regulation/instruction to the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB), ATTN: NGB-J3/DO,

1411 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, VA 22202-3231. All requests must contain information detailing the

reason(s) for the exception, that it will meet applicable federal, state, tribal, and local laws, and how it will affect any

related state program(s).

Management Control Process. This regulation/instruction contains management control provisions, but does not

identify key management controls that must be evaluated.

Supplementation. Supplementation of this regulation/instruction is prohibited without prior approval from the

Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB), ATTN: NGB-J3/DO, 1411 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, VA

22202-3231.

NGR 500-5/ANGI 10-802

August 18, 2010

Suggested Improvements. Users are encouraged to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form

2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to the Chief, National Guard Bureau

(CNGB), ATTN: NGB-J3/DO, 1411 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, VA 22202-3231.

Effective Date and Implementation. This regulation/instruction is effective immediately. The NGB (National

Guard Bureau) Joint Staff and Service Directorates and the National Guard of the several states shall revise existing

documents or develop implementing documents as necessary to comply with this regulation/instruction.

Distribution. A/F;X.

_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Contents

Chapter 1

Introduction

1-1. Purpose

1-2. References

1-3. Explanation of Abbreviations and Terms

Chapter 2

Responsibilities

2-1. Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB)

2-2. Director, Army National Guard (DARNG)

2-3. Director, Air National Guard (DANG)

2-4. Adjutant General (TAG)

2-5. Director, Joint Staff, National Guard Bureau

2-6. National Guard Bureau Provost Marshal

2-7. National Guard Bureau J-34 Division Chief

2-8. State Provost Marshal

2-9. State J-34 Division Chief

2-10. State Antiterrorism Officer

Chapter 3

Policy

3-1. General

3-2. State Policy

3-3. Federal Policy

3-4. Interagency Coordination

3-5. Cross Border Operations in Canada or Mexico

Chapter 4

Authorities and Restrictions

4-1. The National Guard

4-2. Command and Control Authorities

4-3. Legal Considerations

4-4. Rules of Engagement and Rules for the Use of Force (ROE/RUF)

Chapter 5

National Guard Domestic Law Enforcement Operations

5-1. Introduction

5-2. Support to Domestic Law Enforcement

5-3. Civil Disturbance Support Operations

5-4. Border Security Operations

5-5. Equipment and Training Support

5-6. Use of Non-Standard Weapons and Ammunition

August 18, 2010

NGR 500-5/ANGI 10-208

Chapter 6

Mission Assurance Operations

6-1. Critical Infrastructure Protection

6-2. Joint Antiterrorism Force Protection Program

6-3. Law Enforcement Information Sharing

Chapter 7

National Guard Domestic Law Enforcement and Mission Assurance Capabilities

7-1. State National Guard Reaction Force (NGRF)

7-2. National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State Provost Marshal- J-34 (JFHQ-State-PM)

7-3. Nonlethal Capabilities Program

Chapter 8

Planning

8-1. Planning Considerations

8-2. Planning Requirements

8-3. Law Enforcement Support Planning Priorities

8-4. The National Response Framework (NRF)

8-5. The National Incident Management System (NIMS)

8-6. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)

8-7. Emergency Support Function 13 - Public Safety and Security

Chapter 9

Reporting

9-1. General

9-2. Mission Reporting

9-3. NGB Provost Marshal Lessons Learned Remedial Action Program

Chapter 10

Funding

10-1. General

10-2. State Active Duty (SAD)

10-3. Title 32

10-4. Title 10

10-5. The Economy Act

10-6. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act

10-7. Immediate Response Authority

10-8. The Antideficiency Act

Appendices

A. References

National Guard Domestic Law Enforcement Support Operations After Action Report

National Guard Domestic Law Enforcement Support Lessons Learned Report

The Posse Comitatus Act

Statutory Authorities for the Use of the Armed Forces

Procedures for Requesting Nonlethal Equipment from the Consequence Management Support Center

(CoMSUPCEN)

Glossary

iii

August 18, 2010

NGR 500-5/ANGI 10-208

Chapter 1

Introduction

1-1. Purpose

a. Consolidate the policy and responsibilities for National Guard law enforcement support and mission assurance

operations.

b. Define consistent terminology and concepts for use by the National Guard Bureau and the National Guard of

the several states for the planning and conduct of domestic law enforcement support and mission assurance

operations.

c. Provide direction for the planning and reporting requirements for National Guard domestic law enforcement

support and mission assurance operations.

d. Define National Guard capabilities for domestic law enforcement support and mission assurance operations.

1-2. References

Required and related publications and prescribed and reference forms are listed in Appendix A.

1-3. Explanation of Abbreviations and Terms

Abbreviations and terms used in this publication are listed in the glossary.

Chapter 2

Responsibilities

2-1. Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB)

a. Serves as the principal advisor to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force and to the Army and Air Force

Chiefs of Staff on matters relating to the National Guard, the Army National Guard of the United States, and the Air

National Guard of the United States, including domestic law enforcement support and mission assurance operations.

b. Serves as a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on

matters involving non-federalized National Guard forces and on other matters as determined by the Secretary of

Defense.

c. Ensures that the National Guard Bureau performs those functions described in DOD Directive 5105.77 as

needed to support the conduct of National Guard domestic law enforcement support and mission assurance

operations.

d. Serves as the Department of Defense’s official channel of communication with the Adjutants General (TAGs),

but has no authority to command the National Guard.

e. Assists the Adjutants General in assessing the impact of requested law enforcement support activities on the

military training and readiness of the National Guard.

f. Develops, maintains, and promulgates National Guard Domestic Operations readiness and reporting systems

and processes.

g. Prescribes the law enforcement and mission assurance training discipline and training requirements for the

Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Air National Guard (ANG).

h. Assists the Secretary of Defense in facilitating and coordinating the use of National Guard personnel and

resources operating under Title 32 status or in support of state missions with other federal agencies, the TAGs of the

several states, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and with the Combatant Commands with geographic responsibility for

the United States.

2-2. Director, Army National Guard (DARNG)

a. Serves as the conduit between the Army Chief of Staff and the CNGB in all matters relating to ARNG

involvement in National Guard Domestic Operations, including National Guard domestic law enforcement support

and mission assurance operations.

b. Directs resources to support domestic operations.

c. Administers Army National Guard resources for force structure, personnel, facilities, training, and equipment.

NGR 500-5/ANGI 10-802

August 18, 2010

2-3. Director, Air National Guard (DANG)

a. Serves as the conduit between the Air Force Chief of Staff and the CNGB in all matters relating to ANG

involvement in National Guard Domestic Operations, including National Guard domestic law enforcement support

and mission assurance operations.

b. Directs resources to support domestic operations.

c. Administers Air National Guard resources for force structure, personnel, facilities, training, and equipment.

2-4. Adjutant General (TAG)

a. Typically serves, in accordance with state law, as the principal advisor to the Governor on military matters.

The Adjutant General (or Commanding General, where appropriate) directs and oversees the daily activities of the

state National Guard in order to accomplish the statutory and regulatory functions assigned.

b. Maintains the training and readiness of their assigned forces, ensuring that those forces are able to conduct all

assigned state and federal missions, including National Guard domestic law enforcement support and mission

assurance operations.

c. Supports the CNGB in his/her role as the channel of communications between the several states and the

Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the National Guard. Operates and maintains a Joint Operations Center

(JOC) with the capability to receive and respond to classified messages, execute command and control operations,

and provide situational awareness of National Guard activities and operations.

d. Complies with the reporting requirements specified in this publication.

2-5. Director, Joint Staff, National Guard Bureau

a. Directs the Joint Staff of the National Guard Bureau and is subordinate to the CNGB.

b. Leads and directs NGB Joint Staff actions to assist the CNGB in accomplishing his/her responsibilities for the

strategic direction of the National Guard forces; their operation under unified command; and their integration into an

efficient team of land and air forces.

c. Assists the CNGB in the decision making and execution process of National Guard missions and performs

such other duties as the CNGB may prescribe.

d. Coordinates NG state-to-state assistance if requested.

e. Directly supervises the National Guard Bureau Provost Marshal.

2-6. National Guard Bureau Provost Marshal

a. Is a member of the CNGB’s special staff.

b. Serves as the principal advisor to the CNGB and all senior National Guard Bureau leadership on all issues

related to force protection, law enforcement, antiterrorism, security, critical infrastructure protection and domestic

threats.

c. Serves as the primary liaison on the NGB staff to military and civil law enforcement agencies.

d. Responds to requests for information relevant to criminal intelligence and law enforcement sensitive

information in accordance with governing directives, laws and regulations.

2-7. National Guard Bureau J-34 Division Chief (NGB J-34)

a. Is the NGB J-3’s principal advisor on all issues related to force protection, law enforcement, antiterrorism,

security and domestic threats.

b. Oversees the management and resourcing of National Guard domestic law enforcement support and mission

assurance capabilities.

c. Facilitates, develops and supports, as appropriate, the training discipline and training requirements for

National Guard domestic law enforcement support and mission assurance operations.

d. Develops guidance and direction as needed to support National Guard domestic law enforcement support and

mission assurance operations, including the integration and coordination of joint, interagency and intergovernmental

matters.

e. Maintains operational awareness of all National Guard law enforcement operations to include state provost

marshal functions, critical incident response and National Guard Reaction Forces.

f. Develops National Guard critical infrastructure program strategic policy guidance.

g. Is the NGB’s antiterrorism and force protection officer.

h. Serves as the proponent for the NGB Antiterrorism Strategic Plan.

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1) - page 8