Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1)

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•

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Foreword

The term

“counterinsurgency”

(COIN) is an

The document is divided into three parts:

emotive subject in Germany. It is generally

•

Part A provides the basic conceptual

accepted within military circles that COIN is an

framework as needed to give a better

interagency, long-term strategy to stabilise a crises

understanding of the broader context. It

region. In this context fighting against insurgents

specifically describes the overall interagency

is just a small part of the holistic approach of

approach to COIN.

COIN. Being aware that COIN can not be

achieved successfully by military means alone, it

•

Part B shifts the focus to the military

is a fundamental requirement to find a common

component of the overall task described

sense and a common use of terms with all civil

previously.

actors involved.

•

Part C contains some guiding principles to

However, having acknowledged an Insurgency to

stimulate discussions as well as a list of

be a group or movement or as an irregular activity,

abbreviations and important reference

conducted by insurgents, most civil actors tend to

documents.

associate the term counterinsurgency with the

The key messages of the “Preliminary Basics for

combat operations against those groups. As a

the Role of the Land Forces in COIN“ are:

result they do not see themselves as being

involved in this fight. For that, espescially in

•

An insurgency can not be countered by

Germany, the term COIN has been the subject of

military means alone.

much controversy.

•

Establishing security and state order is a long-

Germany has resolved this challenge with two

term, interagency and usually multinational

steps. First, in national discussions, the term

strategy (no military operation) in which the

COIN was replaced by the paraphrase

government of the country affected by

“establishing security and state order in crises

insurgency has the lead while the other

areas” (Herstellung von Sicherheit und staatlicher

nations and international organisations

Ordnung in Krisengebieten). Secondly, Germany

perform a supporting role.

has redefined the term insurgency as the “process

•

The military’s contribution to implementing

of destabilisation caused by political, economic

this strategy is, in principle, a cross-service

and/or social grievances, which affects both the

support task for the Bundeswehr.

effectiveness and legitimacy of the governmental

system; this process is exacerbated by insurgent

•

The general approach to describing the role of

activity”. This definition

- in contrast to the

the land forces is through the Triumvirate of

understanding of insurgency as a group or

CLEAR - HOLD - BUILD.

movement or as an activity - focusses on the real

This document specifies the tasks to be performed

challenge in

COIN-missions and leads

by the land forces in support of COIN. All these

automatically to a much clearer understanding of

tasks are mentioned in the Army Regulation

COIN. It must be a main aim to enable our

(HDv)

100/100

- however, this document

civilian co-actors in theatre to accept the COIN-

deliberately assumes a different systematic

apporach as a foundation for fruitful cooperation.

approach to emphasise the individual tasks

The present document does not constitute a

particularly relevant to COIN. As a result, it is

directive. It is meant to convey information,

more in line with the “Allied Joint Doctrine for

stimulate reflection on the topic and provide

Counterinsurgency (COIN) - AJP-3.4.4” currently

points for discussions. It describes the role of land

under development, which will be useful for the

forces at the tactical level, addresses the divisions

dialogue with Allies.

of capability development and instruction/training

The “Preliminary Basics for the Role of Land

at Army schools and training centres, and follows

Forces in COIN” will be adapted once the

international and national basic concepts currently

previously mentioned international and national

under development¹.

basic concepts are available. By the same token,

Army Office Section I

(1), bearing overall

“Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency

responsibility for this document, welcomes any

(COIN)

- AJP-3.4.4”,

“Konzeptionelle

suggestions for improvement. In the fullness of

Grundvorstellungen zum militärischen Beitrag

time this document will be superseded by the

zur Herstellung von Sicherheit und staatlicher

production of command and control regulations

Ordnung in Krisengebieten” (Basic Conceptual

for the Arms and Services.

Guidelines for the Military Contribution to

Establishing Security and State Order in Crisis

Areas) and “Joint Operational Guidelines 01/04

Counterinsurgency (COIN)”.

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Contents

Part A - Understanding the Overall Context

1. Insurgency and Insurgents

1.1 Definition

1.2 The root causes of insurgency

1.3 Characterisitics of INS

1.4 Means of destabilisation

1.5 Possible INS weak points

1.6 Conclusions

2. Establishing security and state order in crisis areas

2.1 Definition

2.2. Characteristics

2.3 Support by international actors

2.4 The role of armed forces

2.5 The significance of the information environment

2.6. Summary

Part B - The Military Role in Establishing Security and State Order in crises areas

3. Principles of the military role in establishing security and state order

3.1 Principles and overview

3.2 CLEAR

3.3 HOLD

3.4 BUILD

3.5 What is SHAPE?

3.6. Summary

4. Military operations and measures

4.1 Enabling/supporting measures

4.2 Eliminating a threat

4.3 Creating a safe and secure environment

4.4 Consolidating a safe and secure environment

5. Tactical tasks

5.1 General tasks during land operations

5.2 Combat tasks

5.3 Control tasks

5.4 Consolidating

5.5 Other tasks

6. Contributions and training provided by the forces

6.1 Land forces in general

6.2 Contributions by land forces

6.3 Contributions made by Special Forces

6.4 Contributions made by Air Forces

6.5 Contributions by Naval Forces

Part C - Annex

C1 Guiding principles on the conduct of military measures to establishing security and state order

C2 List of abbreviations

C3 Reference documents and recommended reading

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

1.3 Characterisitics of INS

INS are intent on destabilising state structures or

preventing their establishment. Their motives may

Part

be of materialistic, ethnic, religious, political,

national-separatist or spiritual nature. These main

Understanding the Overall

motives may be used as an excuse to justify

Context

violence, legitimise the insurgent organisation’s

claim to leadership and the leadership itself, and

to mobilise supporters. INS may also infiltrate

1. Insurgency and Insurgents

from abroad, pursuing completely different goals

that are not related to the situation in the country

1.1 Definition

concerned.

For the purpose of this document, insurgency² is

the process of destabilisation caused by political,

INS are often difficult to identify as they mingle

economic and/or social grievances, which affects

with the population and/or receive support from

both the effectiveness and legitimacy of the

parts thereof. They usually do not feel bound by

governmental system; this process is exacerbated

international humanitarian law or national law.

by insurgent activity.

Besides, complying with universal international

law and human rights may be a closed book to

For the purpose of this document, an insurgent

them. Nevertheless, INS are bound by their own

(INS) is a person carrying out or supporting

values and standards, which are often linked to

irregular activities as part of insurgency. INS are

customs that are observed unconditionally,

usually members of a group or supporters of a

sometimes ignoring the consequences to life and

movement; although their motives usually differ,

limb, which strikes us as outlandish.

they are united in the aim of extending or

preserving the state of instability.

To realise their interests and achieve their

intentions and goals, either directly or at least

1.2 The root causes of insurgency

indirectly, INS are open to all potential courses of

action, including operations in the information

The wide range and scope of insurgent activity

make it very hard to give a single general

environment.

description. There is often a combination of

Although their organisational structure must be

causes that lead to insurgency, such as poverty,

analysed on a case-by-case basis, the majority of

unemployment, a poor level of education, ethnic,

INS organisations are characterised by a small

social, political or religious prejudice, conflicts or

number of authoritarian, charismatic leaders

extremist tendencies but also inner-governmental

among whom tensions and rivalries may occur.

tensions and irregularities or wars between states.

INS organisations are rarely homogeneous. Every

It is thus primarily social, economic and political

INS organisation needs material resources. In

grievances that make parts of the population think

many cases, financial support comes from external

that the government lacks the ability or legitimacy

organisations or individuals, often even from

to establish or preserve state order and/or to

foreign states. The resulting dependencies may

provide the population with basic supplies and

lead to internal conflicts and reveal moral

services. As a result, the government will be at

controversies within the INS organisation.

risk of losing its legitimacy and effectiveness as

law enforcement authority or - if it has lost them

1.4 Means of destabilisation

already - it will eventually lapse into chaos and

Usually INS neither have the resources nor the

anarchy.

will to take rapid and direct action against a state

It is against this backg0round that INS are given the

and its allies by military means. But they do have

opportunity and motivation for armed struggle,

a wide range of means of destabilising state

which further accelerates the destabilisation

structures.

process outlined above.

INS often employ covert and / or irregular tactics,

even at the political level, with the objective of

undermining the population’s loyalty to the state

and gaining support for their own cause.

For this purpose, they may use propaganda to

directly address the population, discredit the

² These definitions result from the national

government and draw a positive image of

comments on the Allied Joint Doctrine for

themselves. Whilst at the same time, however,

Counterinsurgency

(COIN)

- AJP-3.4.4

they may also terrorise the population to

Ratification Draft

1 dated 29 January 2010.

intimidate and subjugate it.

They are of preliminary character until adopted

by the Bundeswehr Terminology Committee.

- 1 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

By acts of sabotage and attacks and by taking

The involvement of INS in organised crime often

hostages, INS expose the inability and weakness

contradicts the values and moral standards

of the government and demonstrate their own

claimed by INS. If this fact is conveyed to the

ability to act. Their motive for this is not so much

population, the position of INS will be weakened.

to inflict objective material losses on the state but

to spread fear and chaos among the population and

1.6 Conclusions

office holders. This effect is subsequently

•

INS are a symptom of insurgency and not the

magnified by media coverage and propaganda.

cause.

International actors, too, become a target for INS

•

INS activities in their entirety are primarily

attacks for their support of government authorities

aimed at producing effects in the information

(cf. Chapter 2.3). From the INS point of view, the

environment; causing objective material

fact that the populace has no emotional ties with

losses is usually of secondary importance.

the international actors and the resulting

•

The relation between the state and the INS

possibility to discriminate against them as

organisation is one marked by rivalry. INS

enemies, spies, occupying forces etc. often favour

feel less bound by legal and ethnic constraints

the subsequent exploitation of media and

while the state and its allies mostly have

propaganda purposes.

better resources.

If the maintenance of state structures actually

•

Establishing security and state order requires

dependes on the presence of international security

to successfully fight the root causes of an

forces, INS will probably seek to undermine the

insurgency, primarily by civilian means.

latter’s sustainability. Since the sustainability of

democratically

authorised

forces

hinges

•

It is the population and its attitude that decide

particularly on the approval of the people in their

whether

insurgency

will

prevail.

home countries, their population may iself become

Consequently, analysing the situation in the

a target group for INS, i.e.

information environment is key to the

planning of counterinsurgency activities.

•

indirectly by deliberately causing losses on

the part of the forces employed, or

•

International actors operating against INS

themselves or merely against INS objectives,

•

directly by threatening to commit or actually

i.e. actors seeking to establish security and

committing terrorist attacks on the sending

state order, must prepare to face considerable

nation itself.

threat posed by irregular forces conducting

INS will therefore always seek to influence public

covert operations.

opinion in the sending nations by leveraging the

media.

1.5 Possible INS weak points

The increasing use of force is often (not always)

in conflict with the values represented by INS. It

jeopardises the bond of trust between INS and the

local population.

Information activities³ may help increase or create

this awareness among the population and thus

isolate INS in the long term.

By revealing their material dependencies, INS

may be discredited amongst the population.

The consistent channelling of funds or freezing of

assets and the curbing of arms smuggling may

impair INS capability of action.

Deliberately exacerbating factional and power

struggles between rival INS groups may create

insecurity and incapacity among INS.

³ Information activities are measures intended to

produce a particular effect on information

and/or information systems

(e.g. individuals,

organisational structures, processes).

- 2 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

2. Establishing security and state order

This may also be aimed at minimising and/or

in crisis areas

eliminating the existing or potential factors of

discontent⁶ to remove the breeding ground for

2.1 Definition

insurgency. Causes of discontent are insufficient

For the purpose of this document, establishing

•

food supplies,

security and state order in crisis areas is the

•

water supply, waste water disposal, hygiene,

entirety of political, economic, social, legal,

executive and psychological measures taken by

•

health care,

civilian actors⁴ and

/ or military forces to

•

housing (protection from the weather),

eliminate the causes of an insurgency. ⁵

•

energy supplies

2.2. Characteristics

•

security (protection from violence).

Historically, operations against insurgencies were

often understood as the fight against INS

This shows that the military component in

(counterinsurgency or counterguerilla operations,

establishing security and state order is but one tool

translated into German as Aufstands- und

to be used together with other "civilian"

Bandenbekämpfung), which is a one-dimensional

instruments. It is only in a comprehensive,

approach. Ignoring the actual causes of conflict

interagency approach that the root cause(s) of

usually led to cycles of violence and counter-

insurgencies can be tackled

(see Figure

1).

violence and not to a viable and sustainable

Establishing security and state order is primarily

solution to the problem.

the responsibility of nonmilitary actors and

Instead, the establishment of security and state

organisations.

order is seen today as a comprehensive,

interagency, medium or long-term strategy aimed

at sustaining or rebuilding the population’s

confidence in the state system and at improving its

living conditions. This means above all to satisfy

its basic needs (food, clothing, security).

Countering an insurgency requires establishing

and maintaining public security. This includes

reliably protecting the population from attacks and

assaults by INS and, in addition, establishing

and/or strengthening functioning state institutions

that are recognised and respected by local

population.

In parallel with working on the issue of public

security it is necessary to eliminate the socio-

economic causes of insurgency, for example, by

2.3 Support by international actors

launching

education

and

employment

In crisis areas the states themselves are often

programmes, activities for infrastructure and

incapable of countering the socio-economic

economic development, job-creation measures or

causes and the threats posed by INS since they

anti-corruption initiatives.

neither have sufficient resources nor effective,

well-organised state institutions. In this case, the

state concerned may request support from the

United Nations or other organisations and/or

individual states.

⁴ Civilian actors as defined in the Subconcept for

Civil-Military Cooperation in the Bundeswehr

(TK ZMZBw) are governmental and

nongovernmental organisations on the one

⁶ Factors of discontent are categories derived

hand, and the population, state structures and

from “International Humanitarian Law on the

relevant groups on the other.

Protection of Civilians in Times of War and on

⁵ This definition results from the national

the Protection of the Victims of Armed

comments on the Allied Joint Doctrine for

Conflicts”

(Geneva Conventions), which

Counterinsurgency

(COIN)

- AJP-3.4.4

describe basic supplies and services provided

Ratification Draft 1, dated 29 January 2010. It

to the population. Guaranteeing/reaching the

shall be preliminary until adopted by the

local minimum standards in these categories is

Bundeswehr Terminology Committee.

a matter of priority.

- 3 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

The sending nations will provide support by

One major challenge connected with this is

offering advice and guidance to shape the strategy

consistent

and coordinated

multinational

for establishing security and state order and will

cooperation between the international actors and

then implement this strategy in cooperation with

the local authorities.

the authorities of the state in question. But they

Much needed coordination may be complicated by

will only act on a temporary basis and on behalf of

the fact that international actors are considerably

the state concerned and hand over responsibility

restricted in their actions by the national

as soon as possible. Wherever possible,

requirements of the sending nations.

international actors should confine themselves to a

supporting role, helping the people to help

2.4 The role of armed forces

themselves. Excessive direct assistance and

Some of the tasks connected with the

reconstruction aid will create a dependency that is

establishment of security and state order can only

counter-productive and contrary to building

be performed by armed forces with special

confidence between the population and the

capabilities and equipment needed for this

government. Encouraging the local people to take

purpose. Among these tasks are, to varying

the initiative and helping them to successfully

degrees, the collection of information, the

implement their own projects will not only

establishment and maintenance of public order,

improve their self-confidence and trust in the

and the protection of the population, governmental

government and its organisations but also raise the

institutions and critical infrastructure.

Acceptance of foreign actors in the country.

Effective protection cannot be given by adopting a

passive wait-and-see strategy. On the contrary, the

armed forces must be proactive based on sound

analysis, elimination of the threat and, where

necessary, deter it by a show of force.

Basically, this is a task for local police forces. If

they are not available or lack the required

capabilities, armed forces will be employed. A

high level of INS threat or acute shortcoming of

the local police may result in armed forces being

mainly or even exclusively employed for a limited

time.

The military role in establishing security and state

order (Figure 2) generally includes the following

measures:

•

Eliminate a threat

•

Create a safe and secure environment

•

Consolidate the safe and secure environment

•

Carry out enabling/supporting measures

If the host countries armed forces are not strong

enough, the state may request international

assistance or support as specified under Chapter

2.3. The potential commitment of German armed

forces in support of establishing security and state

order in the country of deployment is described in

On no account must international actors - be they

Part B of this document.

civilian or military - assume the attitude of an

occupying force. They often have a cultural

2.5 The significance of the information

backg0round that is completely different from the

environment

customs, values and standards in the country

concerned. Establishing security and state order

The attitude and demeanour of the population are

will, however, be particularly effective if

key to establishing security and state order. What

international actors adopt a policy that is in line

is of crucial importance in this regard is the

with the local customs and standards and therefore

population’s perception of INS and at the same

likely to create consensus. For this reason, they

time its perception of government actors and their

must have a high level of cultural awareness.

supporters.

Decision makers, in particular, need advice on

cultural matters tailored to the special features of

the country of deployment.

- 4 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

The strategic significance of the information

2.6. Summary

environment, especially with regard to producing

•

Establishing security and state order is

regional and global strategic effects, encourages

primarily a civilian responsibility which is

INS to concentrate their efforts in this field to

aimed at maintaining, restoring and

compensate for their inferiority in other areas.

establishing a stable state system in the long

run.

Transparency, media coverage and political

processes help INS reach their goals. They feel

•

This requires above all to provide a safe and

less bound by restrictions in their choice of means

secure environment focused on giving the

than the actors in the country of deployment and

people a subjective sense of security. Military

their allies who follow constitutional law. Actual

forces can make a contribution to this goal.

or even alleged misconduct of government and

•

The key to success in establishing security

international actors and undesired side effects of

and state order is to implement a

military and police measures (civilian casualties,

multinational,

interagency

information

violation of cultural norms and values) but also

strategy and consistently gear all activities

activities of INS themselves are exploited for their

towards the desired effect to be achieved in

effects in the information environment to

the information environment.

influence, if possible, all persons in the country of

•

The long-term goal is to improve the

deployment, in the sending nations and elsewhere.

INS have recognised the potential of the

economic and social conditions, e.g. by

raising the level of education, creating new

information environment and use it to their

benefit.

They capitalise on the fact that

jobs, providing incentives for economic

growth, improving the infrastructure or

international forces on operations are exposed to

permanent media coverage. In contrast to the large

developing an appropriate political culture

based on consensus.

number of positive events, misconduct of the

chain of command and negative side effects of the

•

The short-term goal is to carry out measures

conduct of operations will rapidly trigger global

that produce an immediate visible effect for

feedback. This may have a negative impact on the

the population, i.e. measures that create a

acceptance of the use of military means - both in

palpable difference in their living conditions

the country of employment and in the sending

such as the provision of emergency

nations of international actors.

accommodation, clothing and sufficient food.

All efforts to establish security and state order

•

With the threat inherent to INS, establishing

must therefore be planned and implemented

security and state order may require active

against the backg0round of how they might be

and offensive measures to counter INS in

perceived by the public. The attitude and

order to prevent or impede them from taking

demeanour of the population can be influenced by

violent action.

military information activities and civilian public

•

If a state has not enough forces and assets

relations work. Emphasising positive events and

available to counter an insurgency it may

developments is a first step to stabilise a

request assistance from the international

population traumatised by violence and terror.

community or from individual states and

Although this cannot make up for the absence of

organisations. In any such case action taken

public security and economic rebound nor for the

to establish security and state order must be

non-satisfaction of primary and secondary needs,

aimed at stabilising state structures and laying

it may reinforce positive developments and

the foundation for the rule of law, enabling

alleviate negative effects. Viewed as such,

the state to take control of its own affairs.

information activities and public relations work

are key to establishing security and state order.

This includes gearing civilian and above all

military activities towards the effect they have in

the information environment. At the same time, it

is crucial to completely deny the effective use of

information by INS. In this context, however, the

rights to freedom of opinion and freedom of the

press must be observed.

- 5 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

maintain the support of the local population. For

this purpose, it is crucial to effectively implement

the protection of the population who must feel that

the security forces exercise and live up to their

Part

responsibility for the people. This requires strong

and sustained presence throughout the area,

The Military Role in Establishing

geared to personal contacts with the population

even if this increases the risk for friendly forces at

Security and State Order

least temporarily. This presence is usually ensured

by smaller, independent units widely dispersed in

3. Principles of the military role in

the area and tailored to the demands of the given

establishing security and state order

situation/mission.

3.1 Principles and overview

The military role in establishing security and state

order in crisis areas involves an interagency

strategy which must be planned and implemented

by the Armed Forces as a whole, at multinational

level and, as a matter of principle, in cooperation

or with the approval of the responsible local

security forces.

For the purpose of restoring governmental power

in the country of deployment it is crucial to

closely cooperate with local security forces

(police, armed forces, intelligence community).

Depending on their level of readiness, the security

forces must be increasingly integrated into

operations and ultimately take over responsibility

The leaders of these mixed subunits (platoon or

in its entirety

(e.g. partnering⁷). This is an

patrol leaders) must have the equipment and the

indispensable prerequisiste for successfully

skills to exploit the entire range of means and

concluding the military deployment which is not

capabilities available and integrate them into

to be confused with the successful completion of

current operations. Besides they must know how

all measures taken in support of establishing

to conduct talks for the purpose of collecting

security and state order in crisis areas since these

information.

measures must continue even after our own forces

have terminated their military commitment. In this

With the subunits operating independently, every

respect, the withdrawal of own forces from the

soldier must be prepared to take quick decisions

country of deployment is but one part of the

with far-reaching consequences that go beyond his

objective in the process of establishing security

scope of responsibility.

and state order in crisis areas.

As a result, there is a need for cultural awareness

The key to success in establishing security and

and responsible action at all levels and for the

state order with regard to the military role in this

consistent application of the principle of mission

process is the population and/or its subjective

command. Depending on their responsibilities, the

perception of the situation. Analysing the needs of

soldiers must be familiar with and understand the

the population against its cultural backg0round is

operational environment, this means the cultural,

thus of great importance.

economic, social and political backg0round.

The focus of all military measures is to uphold or

Ultimately, however, the people’s security can

build and enhance the population’s confidence in

only be guaranteed if the forces are determined to

the security forces and/or governmental structures.

provide lasting protection from attacks by INS.

This may require to weigh the demands of

This means that the military commitment is not

protection of the population against those of force

primarily aimed at achieving a tactical success

protection.

against INS. The intended effect of any action

must follow the subjective perception among the

One particular feature of the military role in

population, which must be the prime measure of

establishing security and state order is that overall

its worth. Whatever channels of communication

success cannot be achieved at one crucial point

are available must utilised for this purpose. In this

but depends on the overall impact of individual

context, information operations have an important

successes and failures at local level.

function. The aim of any action is to gain and

This underlines the importance of small,

sometimes dismounted units and subunits.

⁷ See AJP-3.4.4 (RD2), No. 0580.

- 7 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

For the purpose of establishing security and state

In this situation, any action by friendly forces

order in crisis areas military leaders will task their

against INS, their structures and safe havens is

subordinates to take the following measures:

mainly offensive by nature.

•

Eliminate a threat

•

Create a safe and secure environment

•

Consolidate the safe and secure environment,

and

•

Carry out enabling/supporting measures.

On operations, these measures will not be taken

separately but concurrently even at local level.

The local character of the military role in

establishing security and state order in crisis areas

results from the proportionate relation of the

previously mentioned measures on the ground. It

is summarised by the threesome of CLEAR,

HOLD and BUILD (see Figure 3).

To avoid jeopardising the overall success of

establishing security and state order it must be

ensured that uninvolved people do not come to

harm and that collateral damage is avoided

wherever possible. On the one hand, offensive

military action may be tactically successful in that

it causes considerable harm to INS but on the

other hand it may alienate the population from the

security forces and provoke resistance against the

state system. This must be avoided at all costs.

Any action must therefore be judged not only by

its physical effect but also by the repercussion on

the information environment and thus by its

psychological impact on both the population and

on INS. It is indispensable to interlink offensive

Figure 3 - CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD

measures and information activities.

3.3 HOLD

3.2 CLEAR

HOLD begins when allied forces and/or civilian

CLEAR is when INS control an area and/or are so

actors can manoeuvre freely in an area and have

aggressive that friendly forces, population and/or

assumed control of the largest part thereof.

members of governmental organisations are under

The objective in HOLD is to create a safe and

permanent threat and constantly subject to hostile

secure environment which is the prerequisite for

acts and as a result it is not possible to maintain

improving the people’s situation in political,

enduring civil order.

social and economic terms.

The objective in CLEAR is to force INS into the

Accordingly, actions in HOLD are focused on

defensive and to prevent them from taking action

operations and measures intended to create and

against friendly forces, civilian organisations,

preserve a safe and secure environment⁹. These

governmental structures or the population.

operations or measures are aimed at increasing or

This allows friendly forces to gain the scope of

stabilising the subjective sense of security among

action needed to enforce public order. One

the people, at dispelling its fears of terror and

criterion for success in CLEAR is that friendly

violence, and at building confidence in the

forces can manoeuvre freely while keeping the

government and its security agencies. Although

risk at an acceptable level.

actions in HOLD may at least initially still be

accompanied by direct operations or measures

Actions/operations in CLEAR are primarily aimed

against INS, the focus is on the effects produced

at eliminating threats by resticting INS courses of

among the population.

action or denying them the capability to take

action. This is to gain control of the area and

ensure friendly forces freedom of action.⁸

⁹ See Chapter 4.3 on measures to “create a safe

⁸ See Chapter 4.2 “Eliminate a threat”.

and secure environment”.

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED

It is important to demonstrate commitment and

The objective in BUILD is to enable the

resolve in the area and to enforce or establish

responsible non-military authorities to provide for

public order to give the population a sense of

permanent local security and public order without

security while deterring INS. This may also

external support, and thus to terminate the military

include performing police or police-like tasks if

commitment to establishing security and state

the responsible forces are not available in

order.

sufficient numbers. If necessary, the population

In this phase the military activitities focus on

must be informed in advance about the reasons for

setting up and consolidating national security

any restrictions or inconvenience this may cause.

forces in the country of deployment. They may

have to be trained, advised and sustainably

qualified to perform control and supervisory

functions independently and reliably. This

includes to win and retain / secure the confidence

of the people. If multinational police forces are

not available, this task may also be fulfilled by

friendly military forces.

The troops on the ground will gradually cease to

be the mainstay of operations, confining

themselves to an observer role.

They will remain a passive guarantor of security

who is almost invisible in public life.

The crucial criterion for a successful BUILD

phase is the independence of the local security

agencies.

Blatant deficiencies in supplies to the population

must be remedied by military resources, if need

be, because wherever friendly forces exercise

control they will be held responsible for any

existing grievances. In this context, the principle

of helping the people to help themselves must be

applied as early as possible to counter a possible

sense of categoric entitlement among the

population, enhance the self-esteem of the locals

and prevent local economic developments from

being impeded.

In the end, HOLD also involves the need to

defend the control gained over the area against

attacks from INS, if necessary.

All in all, it is of increasing importance in HOLD

to consistently enhance civilian freedom of action

3.5 What is SHAPE?

and to support their activities. Military means

In the concept of the current NATO mission in

alone are insufficient to ensure security for more

Afghanistan, the previously mentioned triumvirate

than a limited period of time. Increasingly

of CLEAR - HOLD - BUILD is preceded by the

drawing on civilian commitment will stabilise the

SHAPE phase which basically serves to pave the

situation and allow the transition to BUILD.

way for the CLEAR - HOLD - BUILD approach.

The SHAPE phase is primarily aimed at setting up

3.4 BUILD

and subsequently augmenting not only friendly

BUILD begins when perceivable regional security

forces and assets but also and above all

has been established and public order achieved

local/national security forces. In concrete terms it

and when a positive development of the living

is about establishing, training and integrating

conditions becomes apparent that is when security

these forces into the conduct of friendly

must to permanently consolidated.¹⁰

operations. This enhances the sustainability of

friendly forces and, in addition, improves the

professionalism of the local/national security

forces and gives operations a “national face”. The

cooperation between friendly and local/national

forces opens up additional sources of information.

¹⁰ See Chapter 4.4 on measures to “consolidate a

safe and secure environment”.

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED

With regard to INS, operations in the SHAPE

The focus of SHAPE will thus be on

phase are primarily conducted to

enabling/supporting and consolidating measures¹¹.

•

identify/localise INS,

Demonstrating commitment throughout the area

and maintaining contact with the population

•

identify the main reasons and causes for the

exposes deployed forces to threats by INS that are

backing and support that INS receive from

in fact directed at governmental organisations.

(parts of) the population,

Besides the troops themselves may become the

•

drive a wedge between INS and the rest of the

target of INS attacks.

population,

•

reveal that INS goals and courses of action

3.6. Summary

prejudice the interest of and are detrimental to

•

The military commitment to establishing

the population,

security and state order is intended to support

•

restrict INS freedom of movement and

or strengthen the state structures of the

freedom of action (including impairment of

country of deployment; the multinational

their communication capabilities), and

military forces are not occupying forces.

•

isolate INS.

•

In this context military measures must not be

considered in isolation but have to be in line

with the interagency strategy.

•

Successful military measures to establish

security and state order always require a

strong visible commitment throughout the

area based on personal contact with the

population even if this increases, at least

temporarily, the risk for friendly forces.

•

The mainstay of the military commitment to

establishing security and state order are

usually smaller, independent subunits widely

dispersed in the area and tailored to the

demands of the given situation.

•

Any military action or inaction has an impact

On the whole, the spectrum of tasks performed by

on the information environment, especially

the armed forces in the SHAPE phase comprises:

because of the omnipresence of the media.

•

Support in establishing and training

•

Although it may be necessary to directly fight

local/national security forces and cooperation

the INS, the focus is always on gaining the

in the conduct of operations;

support and approval of the population.

•

Comprehensive information activities;

•

Military means can weaken INS but they

cannot destroy them. The root cause of

•

If required, the establishment of safe areas

insurgency, i.e. the political, social and/or

and the protective surveillance of flows of

economic grievances and the resulting

people;

resentment among parts of the population

•

Show of commitment throughout and control

against governmental institutions, must be

of the area (if possible, in cooperation with

alleviated or removed above all by non-

local/national security forces). In this respect,

military measures.

it is important to establish, develop and

maintain contact with the local population.

This is the only way to win confidence,

counter prejudice against foreign soldiers and

ultimately gather information;

•

Protection

individuals

and

objects/installations;

•

Support of national authorities in performing

sovereign duties;

•

Assistance in performing administrative tasks,

implementing reforms and conducting

elections;

•

Support of civilian organisations by providing

¹¹ See Chapter

4.1 on enabling/supporting

protection

and

security

and/or

measures and Chapter

4.4 on measures to

supplies/services.

consolidate a safe and secure environment.

- 10 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

The focus here is on:

4. Military operations and measures

• The intent, capabilities, TTP¹², motivation,

The military role in establishing security and state

structures of the different local pressure groups

order in crisis areas comprises the following

• The intent, capabilities, TTP, motivation,

measures:

structures, networking, strength, weapons and

•

Eliminate a threat

equipment of INS groups

•

Create a safe and secure environment

• The opinion, attitude, demeanour and needs of

the population

•

Consolidate the safe and secure environment,

and

• Local decision-making processes, power

structures and channels of communication

•

Take enabling/supporting measures

• Political, commercial, religious, ethnical and/or

4.1 Enabling/supporting measures

social structures of power and order, to include

the relevant actors in theatre

All military actions and operations must be

continually backed by enabling/supporting

• The conduct, reputation and courses of action

measures. In addition to combat service support

of local security forces and of security forces

and command support which are important for any

deployed

military operation but not specifically necessary

• Possibly imminent or existing security threats

for the establishment of security and state order,

special importance must be attached to military

• Perception of the different actors among the

intelligence, operations in the information

local population

environment, and civil-military cooperation.

Evaluating/analysing the usually diverse and

ample supply of intelligence and any other

Military intelligence

information is a particular challenge. This must be

The early detection of changes in public opinion,

achieved by a sufficient number of situation

of the realignment of forces and preparation of

analysis personnel. Any important evaluation and

INS activities is crucial for the planning and

analysis work that cannot be done for lack of

implementation of both civilian and military

personnel must be carried out at the home base

measures. For this purpose, comprehensive and

following the REACHBACK concept.

current information must be available. It enhances

The evaluation of the influencing factors must

the effectiveness of any friendly action and

also involve open sources (OSINT¹³) and civilian

operation and considerably contributes to the

experts.

effective protection of civilian and military actors.

As part of the situation assessment all available

For this reason, friendly information and

intelligence is systematically incorporated into a

intelligence, to include that of other military,

current, comprehensive and accurate situation

governmental and civilian elements, must be

picture which provides the basis for the estimate

incorporated into a permanently updated situation

of the situation and information to the

picture based on comprehensive situation

commander. The situation assessment ends with

assessment.

the military security estimate and comprises

The information needed by the commander must

recommendations for the further course of action.

be provided in a targeted manner to the

The analysis of the military intelligence situation

appropriate levels by using all assets available.

includes exercising a controlling influence on

The results achieved by deployed intelligence and

intelligence and reconnaissance for the purpose of

reconnaissance assets as part of continuous and

optimising the results produced (situation picture,

area-covering reconnaissance activities are

estimate of the situation). The intelligence made

complemented by the observations and

available to the subordinate units must be tailored

information of friendly forces performing other

to their needs, taking into account that the unit

tasks in theatre as well as by the

level does not have the personnel required to

findings/information of the military intelligence

analyse and process extensive documentation.

organisation. Gauging the public opinion at an

early stage is especially effective through face-to-

Information processing is the original task of

face communication.

S2/G2/J2/CJ2 elements, military intelligence

centre and geoinformation service at HQ level.

¹² Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.

¹³ Open source intelligence

- 11 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

If information or assumptions need to be

Information operations help the commander see

consolidated or verified, friendly forces will be

the information environment as his scope of action

employed to perform concrete intelligence and

and understand it in its overall context and

reconnaissance missions to enhance the situation

dynamics. The personnel in charge of information

picture. Information that cannot be collected by

operations coordinate military information

friendly intelligence and reconnaissance forces is

activities and advise the commander on any

gathered by submitting an RFI¹⁴ to the higher

effects and consequences in the information

command to improve or consolidate the

environment. This is based on the interagency

operational

picture.

Intelligence

and

information strategy coordinated at political level,

reconnaissance operations

can be conducted

which defines the type and purpose of the

concurrent with other missions. It is therefore

operation and the goals to be achieved in the

always recommended that friendly forces be

information environment.

ordered

meet concrete

information

As a matter of principle, information operations

requirements in addition to other missions.

and their specific, coordinated activities in the

information environment serve the purpose of

Operations in the information environment

• influencing the decision-making process and

With the population and its subjective sense of

the behaviour of relevant actors in favour of

security at the centre of all activities, special

one's own objectives (key leader engagement),

importance must be attached to the information

environment to establish security and state order.

• weakening the will and capabilities of INS to

Any action taken reverberates in the information

wage conflict, and

environment, which may be perceived and

• preventing enemy information activities from

assessed differently both by the population and by

having an impact or at least reducing their

INS. This varying perception is often more

impact not only on one’s own situational

important to achieving the strategic goals than the

understanding and capabilities but also on the

actual, objective tactical effect of an action. For

understanding and perception among the

this reason, it is essential to influence the

population.

information environment and not to yield it to

INS. Operations in the information emvironment

Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)

may enhance positive efforts and alleviate

negative side effects. At the same time, enemy

CIMIC is aimed at the cooperation with civilian

information activities and/or active exertion of

actors, i.e. civilian authorities, governmental/non-

INS influence on the information environment

governmental,

national

and international

must be prevented, put into perspective, impeded

authorities and

organizations, and with the

or restricted.

population in the country of deployment.

The key functions of CIMIC, i.e.

• shaping civil-military relations,

• providing civilian authorities and actors with

information, advice and support, and

• contributing to the command and control

process and supporting the operation,

are performed by CIMIC staff elements and

CIMIC forces. CIMIC functions related to the

(civilian) medical and health services are fulfilled

by the service personnel and assets of the

Bundeswehr Medical Service.

Integration, support, advice and information of

civilian actors are provided in compliance with the

relevant security provisions. Wherever possible,

Operations in the information environment are

this is coordinated with one’s own military intents

aimed at influencing the situational understanding,

and plans.

the will and capabilities of INS and other mission-

relevant actors for the purpose of one’s own

Other German ministries

mission accomplishment through the coordinated

Establishing security and state order is an

employment of adequate military assets. In this

interagency task which requires appropriate and

connection, information operations are of

targeted cooperation at equal terms. All persons

particular importance.

involved need to be aware that they pursue the

same goal and must coordinate their assets to

avoid undesired overlaps/duplication of effort, and

¹⁴ Request for Information

- 12 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

achieve synergetic effects. It is important to share

(OPSEC¹⁸) measures are a matter of course and it

expertise and to provide assistance and support at

also goes without saying that directives on and

all times. Besides it is of importance to draw on

orders for the transfer of military intelligence and

the experience of other ministries.

the handling of personal data must be complied

with.

If military operations and actions may have a

negative impact on other, civilian measures (or

vice versa), these (military or civilian) operations

need to be adapted accordingly.

CIMIC makes a major contribution to the

overarching, appropriate and targeted cooperation

with other German ministries and their

subordinate agencies. The basis for this

cooperation must be built at home at the earliest

stage possible. Wherever possible, regular contact

at and between the appropriate levels must be

established, common situational awareness

created and, in addition, common goals defined,

courses of action coordinated and potential fields

of cooperation identified.

International civilian actors

These actors include governmental

(GO¹⁵),

Involving local civilian actors may provide

nongovernmental

(NGO¹⁶) and international

additional security and support among the

(IO¹⁷) organisations which support the country of

population since they act as multipliers. What

deployment in establishing security and state order

needs to be given due consideration, however, is

and/or provide humanitarian assistance.

that their goals and intentions may conflict with

the overall objective of establishing security and

These organisations have a positive effect on

state order because local rulers may not be

establishing security and state order and must

interested in strong, efficient state structures that

therefore, as far as possible, be supported and

would necessarily restrict their sphere of

protected against any type of attack.

influence.

All information gathered by civilian actors must

For this very reason it is important to enter into

be evaluated for its reliability as part of the

dialogue with the local chiefs, build confidence

situation assessment.

and seek common solutions. If this cooperation

Civilian cooperation with military forces is

does not exist, local chiefs may feel threatened

coordinated by CIMIC personnel. The scope for

and turn to INS.

cooperation should, in principle, be driven by the

goals defined, the willingness to cooperate and the

4.2 Eliminating a threat

loyalty of the civilian actors.

Operations to eliminate a threat are primarily

In this context, consideration must always be

directed against INS. They are conducted to

given to the requirements of military security for

actively counter existing or potential threats, that

force protection.

is, in particular, to fight covertly operating

adversaries and their lines of supply and

Local civilian actors

communication. In the context of establishing

As a matter of principle, local politicians/officials

security and state order such action will become

and dignitaries (mayors, religious representatives,

necessary if or when INS activities have become

judges etc.) and, as the case may be, unofficial

numerous enough to either restrict or totally

leaders and rulers are integrated into and/or

nullify the freedom of action of friendly forces

informed about the conduct of operations and are

and civilian

relief

and law-and-order

invited to join negotiations and exchange views

organisations.

and ideas. Without the general willingness to

Operations to eliminate a threat can also be

disclose relevant information, the necessary

conducted prior to a potential rise of INS that is

confidence cannot be achieved. Even in the

before INS take offensive and massive action.

context of this type of cooperation special care

must be exercised when selecting the information

Within the overall strategy, they must be

to be transmitted in order to avoid any jeopardy to

orchestrated sensitively. Using military force

friendly forces. In this process, operations security

carries the risk of producing a counterproductive

effect in the long run although, on the other hand,

a tactical success will neutralise a current threat.

¹⁵ Governmental Organisations

¹⁶ Non-Governmental Organisations

¹⁷ International Organisations

¹⁸ Operations Security

- 13 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

If, at the end of an operation, the local population

Once the overall situation has been assessed, the

is alienated from friendly forces or responds with

attack is continued by pursuing fleeing,

increasing opposition (e.g. as a result of casualties

withdrawing or evading INS until they are fixed,

among uninvolved people), the operation will not

detained or destroyed.

only be useless but even detrimental. As early as

The purpose of doing this is to exploit a friendly

in the planning phase, operations to eliminate a

success in combat or to prevent the enemy from

threat must therefore be combined with

accomplishing his hit-and-run strategy after

information activities or operations to positively

launching an attack.

shape the information environment or at least

mitigate potential negative effects. Besides they

Relief operation

may have a negative impact on the provision of

If friendly forces are isolated or encircled it may

supplies and services to the local people or the

be necessary to conduct a relief operation.

work of civilian organisations.

Friendly forces operating in wide areas may easily

To avoid or minimise such risks it is necessary to

lead to local superiority of enemy forces.

assess the interaction of military and civilian

Isolated situations may also occur as a result of

measures as early as possible during operational

other incidents/events such as technical failures,

planning.

encirclement caused by a demonstration etc. On

It is especially in operations to eliminate a threat

the whole, there is a wide range of threats

that we must not lose sight of the purpose of our

conceivable that lead to isolated situations. For the

action. The fight against INS is not an end in

relief of friendly forces it is therefore of special

itself. The objective is not to destroy INS but, first

importance to hold reserve troops available.

and foremost, to deny them the will and capability

to fight, which is a precondition for establishing a

Moving members of GO/IO/NGO to safety

safe and secure environment.

Situations may degenerate to the extent that the

Operations to eliminate a threat may be:

prevailing threat will deny civilian members of

GO/IO/NGO to stay in a particular area for a

Attack

specific time. Friendly forces must be prepared to

Attacks are always conducted according to the

move such personnel to a safe place, if necessary.

principles of offensive action.¹⁹ The military force

This may require reserve forces to be employed.

used in an attack is actively and directly aimed at

INS to either seize terrain or destroy enemy forces

Evacuation/rescue of hostages

and their infrastructure. Enemy forces will,

Non-combatant evacuees or friendly forces

wherever possible, be apprehended to be detained.

detained and/or held hostage by enemy forces can

Larger groups of enemy forces can be encircled

be liberated by personnel earmarked for national

and subsequently be engaged or forced to

risk prevention. Such operations must be

surrender. Surprise and quick, resolute action are

supported.²⁰

the key to success. Ambushes, for example, are an

appropriate means to destroy or detain an

Searching and seizing INS

identified enemy by exploiting the element of

Seizing areas without coherent resistance is often

surprise.

possible because INS evade approaching friendly

Reconnoitred and identified targets can be

forces and/or resort to covert operations.

engaged by long-range fire support assets

Therefore occupying an area will not be enough to

(artillery, air support). With hardly any effective

ensure control by friendly forces. Further

means to defend themselves, enemy forces will be

offensive operations will be necessary to break

surprised by friendly fire. At the same time,

irregular resistance and allow friendly forces and

friendly forces will be saved and not exposed to

civilian actors in the area to gain freedom of

any threat.

action.

The special operational procedure of combat

INS operating covertly and waging armed struggle

patrol operations is applied to reconnoitre, wear

from the underground must be actively engaged to

down, harass, fix or deceive enemy forces.

ensure that friendly control of the area can become

Given a favourable situation and appropriate

effective. This means that covertly operating INS

conditions, even smaller units with inferior

must be targeted for active search operations.

combat power can momentarily seize enemy

buildings, areas, infrastructure or facilities in a

raid by exploiting the element of surprise.

¹⁹ See German Army Regulation 100/100 Chapter

²⁰ See German Army Regulation 100/100 Chapter

14.

25.

- 14 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

For this purpose, compound forces and assets

If the local security forces are not yet capable of

must be employed to identify the INS structure

assuming this responsibility, the military forces

and network and subsequently encircle, fix and

must prepare to perform police and police-like

defeat INS, or apprehend them to be detained by

tasks as well. But any such action should always

appropriate measures such as interdiction and

be carried out in close consultation with the local

searches. In doing this, the inward and outward

security forces. What is important is to establish

movements of the people to and from a defined

positive, personal contact between friendly forces

area are denied for a limited period of time and the

and the population. It is only on the basis of a

area is intensively combed for INS and/or INS

relationship

characterised

mutual

materiel as well as wanted criminals.

understanding that confidence and credibility can

develop.

If the terrain does not allow the forces to take

interdicting measures, if not enough personnel are

Operations and measures to create a safe and

available for this purpose or if the situation makes

secure environment may include:

any such action seem unnecessary, the operation

may also be limited to systematically searching

Protection of the population and infrastructure

buildings/combing terrain and seizing INS (search

Areas under the control of friendly forces, to

& destroy).

include the local population living in these areas,

Operations of searching and seizing INS may also

must be protected from attacks by INS or other

be conducted by using a tight-woven network of

armed forces. This must be appropriately and

checkpoints or patrols. Any such measures will

visibly prepared to give the population the feeling

only rarely bring about tactical success since they

that its protection is sustainable and credible.

can be reconnoitred in advance or sidestepped by

If necessary, protection must also be provided to

INS and yet they are effective in that they deny or

civilian organisations operating in the country of

restrict INS freedom of action.

deployment.

Operations of searching and seizing INS may

The robustness and resolve of friendly forces must

target both individual, currently wanted persons

leave no reason to doubt so as to avoid a decline

and less clearly defined groups or materiel (e.g.

in confidence among the people. To create a

weapons). Depending on the situation, terrain and

normal, safe and secure living environment it is

forces available, several operations may be

important for the population to overcome its fear

conducted sequentially

(in

sections)

of INS, their violence or even their takeover of

simultaneously (in one single effort).

power. Ultimately, this may also imply that

particular areas or the population must be

Snatch operations

defended against attacks. This may require the

Snatch operations are conducted against clearly

weighing up the demands of the people's

identified targets

(individuals and storage

protection against those of force protection. The

facilities/hiding place for materiel) by exploiting

conduct of defensive operations is governed by

the element of surprise.

the principles described in Chapter 15 of German

Army Regulation 100/100.

They are usually preceded by a long

reconnaissance phase. Unlike an attack, this

Show of Commitment

operation is, in principle, aimed at detaining

enemy forces and/or seizing enemy materiel.

By showing commitment

24 hours a day, if

Wherever possible, local security forces should be

possible, friendly forces will not only substantially

involved in the operation and cultural practices of

raise the level of security but also enhance the

the population be taken into account.

subjective sense of security among the population.

4.3 Creating a safe and secure environment

Operations and measures to create a safe and

secure environment are primarily aimed at

producing effects among the population. The key

objective is to considerably enhance the local

population's sense of security.

This requires to restore and/or enforce public

order in close cooperation with local security

forces.

- 15 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

They are the point of contact for the local

Supporting the provision of basic supplies and

population and discourage people from resorting

services

to violence or committing a crime by their mere

If the country of deployment or other actors are

passive presence. It is only by their show of

not able to supply the local population with food,

commitment throughout the area that contact can

clothing, emergency accommodation and medical

be established with the population, and the

emergency assistance that are sufficient and

commander can be provided with a permanently

adequate from the humanitarian point of view,

updated situation picture. Measures and operations

measures will have to be taken by the military

intended to show presence underpin the claim for

forces in the areas controlled by them to provide

a safe and secure environment and help build

the people with basic supplies and services. This

confidence.

is not only a matter of course and a humanitarian

necessity but also an effective measure to gain

Showing commitment throughout the area is

support among the population.

largely achieved by a network of

Capacities permitting, the Bundeswehr Medical

•

mounted and dismounted and, to a limited

Service - in addition to the medical support of the

extent, also aerial patrols,

armed forces

- may as

“force effectors” be

•

combat outposts,

actively involved in the medical assistance to the

•

checkpoints.

population and contribute to the above measures

to win the hearts and minds.

Establishing public order

If the local security forces are unable to maintain

Relief measures beyond emergency care must, as

or establish public order independently, military

a matter of principle, be taken carefully

forces will have to train or actively support them

technical assistance is generally not a task of the

in performing their tasks if no other forces are

armed forces. Active development or construction

available for this purpose. This may also include

efforts by friendly forces incur a risk of making

the performance of police tasks - but always in

the country of deployment dependent, impeding

cooperation with the local security forces.

its drive for independence and of delaying the

successful completion of international measures to

Operations to establish public order require a

establish security and state order. For this very

network of patrols, checkpoints and combat

reason, any support or assistance should primarily

outposts, which is also necessary to demonstrate

be based on the principle of “help for self-help”.

commitment. In this case, however, friendly

forces take an active role by monitoring and

4.4 Consolidating a safe and secure

enforcing the observance of public regulations.

environment

Besides, military forces may also be employed to

reinforce the observation posts of the local

Military measures to consolidate a safe and secure

security forces. In addition, operations to establish

environment are primarily aimed at enabling the

public order may include monitoring borders and

local security agencies to assume their own

operating border stations.

responsibility for security and state order. Besides,

During public order operations it is of importance

the multinational forces must strengthen and train

to deploy and, if necessary, rapidly reinforce

the local armed forces to a point where they can

small, independent subunits operating throughout

take military measures and perform tasks without

the area. The strategy of deploying but large units

support by multinational entities. The buildup and

for reasons of protection will only have an isolated

training of local troops and security forces are

effect and give INS and other criminals the space

therefore key elements of the multinational exit

and opportunity to (re)organise.

strategy.

Operations to establish public order also comprise

crowd and riot control duties²¹ (CRC²²).

²¹ See CRC Concept, Chief of Staff, Bundeswehr,

18 January 2007, and “Streitkräftegemeinsame

Ausbildungshilfe Einsatz zur Kontrolle von

Menschenmengen

und

gewalttätigen

Ausschreitungen in Einsätzen der Bundeswehr

im Ausland“ (Joint Training Manual for Crowd

and Riot Control during Bundeswehr

Operations Abroad), Director of Joint Training,

12 November 2007.

²² Crowd and Riot Control

- 16 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

The principle of conducting joint operations

Such tasks call for particular skills and

qualifications by forces that have been prepared

Multinational forces contribute to consolidating a

and trained accordingly.

safe and secure environment especially by

conducting operations always together with local

In addition to their training and mentoring

armed forces.

functions these teams are the liaison element

between

international

and

local

armed

forces.

This gives local forces the opportunity to learn

from the concepts and approaches of multinational

troops and apply what they have learned

according to their understanding.

The conduct of joint operations, however, must be

adapted to the given equipment and training

standards.

Local armed forces must be involved in operations

at least at the lowest levelthat is as passive

observers. As a next step, they can actively

participate in operations under the guidance and

control of the multinational forces and

increasingly perform key functions. Ultimately,

the security forces will be able to conduct

operations independently and on their own

responsibility with friendly forces playing an

advisory role only in planning and execution,

which will finally be restricted to a mere

supervisory function.

Apart from that, multinational efforts to

consolidate a safe and secure environment may be

independent of the actual conduct of friendly

operations. They cover initial and follow-on

training and/or advice to local, regional and/or

national security personnel and, in particular,

armed forces to consolidate and strengthen them.

Training and development programmes

At the earliest stage possible friendly forces will

begin to train and develop the local armed forces,

for instance by inviting them to training courses in

Germany, offering in-theatre training and

advanced training to security forces, or providing

on-the-job training. In doing so, they must take

into account that the local forces are usually more

familiar with the culture of the country and can

better assess the situation on the ground.

Local people must not be forced to adopt the

views of the friendly forces.

Operational training and mentoring teams

Operational training and mentoring teams may be

employed to support national military and local

security forces; they will provide advice at the

relevant levels on measures and operations

conducted independently and - as the case may be

- train them to help themselves. This implies that

the training and mentoring teams will deploy

together with local military forces on operations

they may conduct, which may include combat

action.

- 17 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

The military leader on the ground will regularly

5. Tactical tasks

brief his soldiers on what to pay special attention

Operations and measures intended to eliminate a

to. Particularly after concluding tasks with

threat, to create and consolidate a safe and secure

personal contact with the population the relevant

environment as well as enabling/additional

military leader will, as a matter of principle, hold

measures

(for an overview see figure

4) are

an after-action review to ask his soldiers about

conducted according to the command principle of

their impressions and information.

composite force operations - that is, in interaction

with various national or multinational assets at

Protection²⁴

tactical level, under unified command, and with a

Protecting forces and installations on operations is

common objective. The tactical tasks to be carried

a general operational task at all levels of command

out in this context (overview see figure 5) can be

where responsibility rests with each military

summarised as follows:

leader. The aim is to sustain operational readiness

•

general tasks during land operations,

of the forces and consequently ensure own

freedom of action.

•

tasks in the category of combat,

Active and passive self-protection in general are

•

tasks in the category of control,

permanent operational tasks of all forces and will

•

tasks in the category of consolidation, as well

remain unchanged even against the backg0round of

the military role in establishing security and state

•

other tasks.

order in crisis areas. Every soldier must be

vigilant in all situations, observe his environment

This kind of categorisation allows a better

and identify and report changes in the situation at

accentuation of individual tasks/bundles of tasks

an early enough stage (situational awareness).

while aspects relevant to establishing security and

state order are duly observed.²³

The requirements of protecting own soldiers, on

the one hand, must permanently be weighed

5.1 General tasks during land operations

against the need for contact with the population

and the inherent hazard. Excessive routine and

The general tasks during land operations defined

getting stuck in the daily rut within a seemingly

in part E of German Army Regulation

(HDv)

peaceful environment can lead to boredom or

100/100 also apply to the military contribution to

cause failures in procedures. Commanders at all

establishing security and state order. In the

levels must prevent that.

following, however, some special aspects and/or

focal areas will be pointed out.

Operating in the information environment

Intelligence and reconnaissance

The desired effects of information activities

contribute

considerably

successfully

Intelligence and reconnaissance remains a crucial

establishing security and state order. Information

task even in the context of the military role to

activities are not rigidly associated with particular

establish security and state order, ensuring that

assets but may be performed by all forces. Within

information requirements are met and the

their scopes of capability all forces have dialogues

protection of own forces is improved.

at their respective levels to promote more

Every soldier contributes to intelligence and

understanding of military operations in general

reconnaissance. Besides the fact that the

and to convey the value and possibilities of

environment is permanently monitored

- in

consensual conflict resolution. Dismounted forces

particular regarding new developments

- talks

address the local population to achieve

with the population, local security forces and with

understanding, mutual respect and peaceful

civilian state and non-state organisations each held

solutions to end conflicts. By doing so, they

at their respective level considerably contribute to

contribute to the development of mutual trust and

the development of the military intelligence

to the protection of friendly forces. This requires

situation. Therefore, interpreters are often required

sufficiently developed communicative skills and

to be employed even at lower levels.

intercultural competence.

Furthermore, soldiers must be given guidelines as

to what to say in conversation while on a mission

²³ Following the command principle of composite

to improve their security and confidence.

force operations, tasks of the combat, control

Pocket cards containing key information are

and consolidation categories as well as the

available for distribution among the troops. All

other tasks may well be conducted in parallel

soldiers must assimilate this information enough

and during one single operation. An operation

to eliminate a threat may therefore run

concurrent with a combat mission, efforts to

²⁴ Protection as defined in German Army

exercise control, and consolidation measures.

Regulation (HDv) 100/100, chapter 34.

- 19 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

to hold conversations as set out in their pocket

cards. In this context they must also be aware of

the significance of appropriate facial expressions,

gestures, and wording and use them during

conversations.

Using the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS)

In electronic warfare (EW), the electromagnetic

spectrum

(EMS) is available to military and

civilian users as well as adversaries

(INS) to

almost the same extent. Hazards from the EMS

usually appear in the form of

•

active optronic components

(LASER) for

Electronic warfare personnel will advise the

measuring, reconnaissance, target marking,

military leader on planning and conducting such

weapon guidance and dazzling purposes ;

measures.

•

active and passive electronic components

Electronic protective measures encompass

(radio, radar) for reconnaissance, detection,

activities and procedures of employment,

and command and control;

operation by friendly forces, and technology in the

•

radio or optronic components for triggering or

fields of communication and detection/command

jamming of weapons or ammunition (mines,

and control installations. They ensure that the

IED²⁵, fuses);

EMS can still be utilised by friendly forces even

when exposed to enemy electronic warfare

•

the employment of active electronic and

measures, which is why they constitute an

optical components for jamming and

essential contribution to the own command and

deception;

control capability, effective engagement as well as

•

the use of passive electronic components for

survivability and protection. Electronic protective

protection by means of sensor-controlled

measures also extend to laser protection of optics

automatic protective installations.

and eyes as well as steps to reduce platform

signatures in all detectable ranges of the EMS. In

Moreover, the EMS is used for communication

this context electronic protective measures are key

purposes. In this context, further threats may arise

ingredients of signature management.

•

opposing forces use the EMS to coordinate

Terrain reconnaissance

attacks and/or to make arrangements, and

On their return from tasks outside military camps

•

friendly means of communication are jammed

and installations, friendly forces will immediately

by electronic components.

report their findings on the condition of routes,

bridges and defiles, particularly to update current

If the threat posed by the utilisation of the EMS is

maps at the relevant operations centre

not identified and countered at an early enough

accordingly.

stage, the INS will benefit from it. This is why the

EMS is such an integral part of the military role in

establishing security and state order. The aim is to

sustainably support their own conduct of

operations by taking measures to use the EMS as

effectively as possible, to protect friendly forces

and to impair the opponent’s capabilities of

utilising the EMS. Electronic warfare measures

comprise:

•

electronic protective measures

•

electronic support measures

(see chapter 6.2.17), and

•

electronic countermeasures

(see chapter 6.2.17).

²⁵ Improvised Explosive Device

- 20 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

5.2 Combat tasks

The core mission of the patrol is mobile area

surveillance while demonstrating one’s presence

The tasks to be performed in the category of

on the ground. By doing so, information on and

combat comprise conventional forms of military

contact with the population may be gained, which

force, applied directly to destroy opposing forces,

may add to the situation picture. Unlike scout

namely INS, and to seize or hold ground. In

teams, patrols usually proceed openly and visibly

principle, the traditional terms of conventional

so as to deter INS and to have a reassuring effect

combat shall apply. Combat tasks are e.g.:

on the population.

•

seizing

Depending on their operational directives, patrols

•

destroying

may take on other tasks independently and

•

securing

without prior planning.

•

defending

Operating checkpoints

•

holding

Operating a static checkpoint²⁷

is a task given to a

•

containing

subunit which may be reinforced as necessary.

•

fixing

Checkpoints serve to check persons and vehicles

along a route. They may also be set up to channel

•

pursuing

civilian traffic.

•

directing fire support

There are permanent and temporary checkpoints.

•

providing fire support

The soldier in charge of operating the checkpoint

may have combat support and combat service

•

conducting combat patrol operations

support forces attached to his subunit.

•

encircling

The underlying principle of a checkpoint is to

check

- either continuously or at random

5.3 Control tasks

persons or vehicles passing its location; that is, to

Control tasks cover forms of military tasks

check the relevant personal particulars and to

performed to supervise an area and particularly

search a person and/or vehicle for illegal objects

the population therein and to control their

(e.g. weapons, explosives, contraband goods,

behaviour. The main tasks required in this context

drugs) or wanted persons (e.g. wanted criminals,

are:

war criminals, ringleaders).

Conducting patrols

Operating/reinforcing facilities of local security

Patrolling²⁶ is a task given to a subunit usually

forces/police stations

performed with at least three vehicles.

Depending on the given mandate, facilities of

Conducting patrols is an essential key element of

local security forces

(police stations) may be

the military contribution to establishing security

operated and/or reinforced by friendly forces,

and state order. A distinction must be made

unless and as long as original police forces are

between heavy (armoured), medium (protected)

available only in insufficient numbers or

and light

(unprotected) patrols. Furthermore,

completely unavailable. In situations like this,

patrols can be conducted mounted and dismounted

such forces are usually employed at a static

(with combat vehicles in the immediate vicinity,

facility and on a permanent basis to be available at

e.g. in small towns) or on foot (e.g. in terrain

all times as points of contact to the people to

unsuitable for vehicles). The patrol commander

assure public order.

may have combat and service support assets

attached to his subunit.

Operating combat outposts

To enhance their sustainability on the ground even

at long distances from the base, units or subunits

at platoon level may operate their own combat

outposts as a starting point for other tasks.²⁸

See German Army Regulation (HDv) 100/100,

No.13108, 13041, 13148, 32036.

²⁶ See German Army Regulation (HDv) 100/100,

²⁸ Cf. FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency,

Nos. 13060, 13105, 13108.

Chap. 6, page 9.

- 21 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

The outpost is then operated as a camp with all

5.4 Consolidating

inherent requirements of military security. Where

Consolidating covers all military tasks intended to

the situation permits, the camp is to be developed,

enable state organs - especially security forces,

structurally reinforced as necessary; containers or

but above all armed forces - to perform sovereign

tents

must be provided to serve as

and particularly military tasks. This is essentially

accommodation, command posts or medical

achieved by own forces who provide

facilities, for instance.

•

training,

If existing infrastructure is used, lease agreements

•

guidance,

must be concluded.

•

consultation, and / or

Among other purposes, the combat outpost may

serve to

•

supervision

•

permanently protect vital infrastructure;

to the corresponding state organs. As cooperation

with local security and armed forces is part of the

•

maintain permanent contact to the local

basic principles of any military contribution to

population;

establishing security and state order (see chapter

•

sustainably deny INS access to an area;

3.1), the tasks to be performed in the category of

•

demonstrate commitment at a crucial

consolidation also play a major role in this

location;

context. During all operations conducted jointly

with armed and/or security forces of the country

•

gain information, and/or

of deployment it is crucial to fulfill these tasks in

•

support local security forces.

line with the given situation.

Depending on the intended duration of the

Furthermore, where a safe and secure environment

operation, the combat outpost may be developed

is to be consolidated (chapter 4.4) training support

into a camp.

teams and/or advisory teams are tailored which, in

a structured manner and at their respective levels,

Detaining

will assist the armed forces of the country of

Detaining persons is a task assigned to a subunit -

deployment

- now required to operate

in exceptional cases even to individual soldiers -

independently

- with their tasks and also in

to detain a person or a group of persons; i.e. to

combat situations and explain to them ways of

disarm them and to restrict and control their

improvement.³²

freedom of movement. The right of friendly forces

Wherever feasible, soldiers with operational

to arrest and detain a person as well as details on

experience who serve as instructors in their home

where detainees will be remain in custody are

units should carry out training and consulting

governed by the Rules of Engagement applicable

functions. In this context it is essential to employ

to the specific country of deployment.

them at their relevant levels.

Searches

5.5 Other tasks

Searching²⁹ is a task to try and find certain objects

Other tasks are tasks that neither refer to the

(e. g. weapons, explosives, drugs) on a person or

combat, nor control or consolidation categories.

inside a structure (vehicles, buildings etc.).

As a rule, they are to be performed separate from

establishing security and state order; that is, they

Combing

are carried out in any conceivable operational

Combing³⁰ is a task assigned with the aim to

scenario of the land forces. They do, however,

locate persons in hiding or illegal material.

considerably enhance the effectiveness of the

armed forces as they prepare, facilitate, flank or

Interdicting

supplement tactical tasks.

Interdicting³¹ is a task to prevent unauthorised

That is why mainly special-to-arm tasks of a

persons

(including occupants of vehicles) from

supporting, accompanying or preparing nature fall

passing a road, a passageway or a terrain section.

into this category. Chapter

6 specifies them in

closer detail.

²⁹ See German Army Regulation (HDv 100/100),

No. 13148, 24019.

³⁰ See German Army Regulation (HDv 100/100),

No. 24019.

³¹ See German Army Regulation (HDv 100/100),

³² See German Army Regulation (HDv) 100/100,

No. 23018, 24019.

No.13225.

- 22 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

6. Contributions and training provided

by the forces

6.1 Land forces in general

6.1.1 Tasks for all forces

To face the challenges within a dynamic changing

environment, to avoid unnecessary losses and to

perform tasks as efficiently as possible, some of

the latter must carried out as cross-cutting tasks;

this means that all land forces

(Bundeswehr

• Consolidation

Medical Service personnel may be subject to

o Cooperating with local security forces

restrictions resulting from international law or

• Other tasks

deployment orders) directly involved with

o securing camps

executing and enforcing the mission must be

o contributing to the consolidation of the

capable of performing such tasks. This is required,

military

intelligence

situation

on the one hand, to cope with an emergency

conversations and scouting

situation at a certain location and to save and/or

o conductinroad moves in varying threat

protect life, and, on the other, to give the force

situations

commander the opportunity to detail forces

o administering self and buddy aid (first

independent of the capabilities of their specific

aiders A or B on operations)

arm or service, and to establish points of main

o ensuring appropriate action in mass

effort at short notice.

casualty situations

o participating in convoy operations

The tasks of all land forces directly employed in

o participating in rescue and evacuation

executing and enforcing the mission (forces of the

operations focusing on combat recovery

Bundeswehr Medical Service may be subject to

on the ground.³³

restrictions resulting from international law or

deployment orders) encompass:

6.1.2 Individual basic capabilities

•

Combat

The requirements profile to be met by every single

o action to be taken in the event of an

land force soldier results from the tactical

ambush

demands illustrated above. Service personnel must

o defence of installations/facilities

be capable of accomplishing their tactical mission

•

Control

within their respective small combat team.

o conducting mounted and dismounted

Every soldier taking an active part in establishing

patrols in low-level threat situations

security and state order is required to have special

o monitoring and securing overstretched

knowledge, capabilities and skills, all of which

areas in low-level threat situations

will hereafter be referred to as basic capabilities.

o setting up and operating checkpoints in

Such basic capabilities are a prerequisite for

low-level threat situations

successful operations and must therefore be

trained throughout the arms and services.

Moreover, it provides the foundation to master

new situations under changed conditions and to

successfully carry out any given task. This calls

for expedient methodology in the conduct of

training coupled.

The overarching training objective is to qualify

the soldier to act self-reliantly and in line with the

higher commander’s intent, and to quickly adapt

to changes in the situation while keeping his focus

on accomplishing the mission even in complex

situations. The warfighting capability ensures

survivability and sustainability of friendly forces

on operations and must therefore remain the focus

o searching persons and vehicles

of soldiers’ basic capabilities. Another key factor

o controlling access to small towns

o basic crowd and riot control

(CRC)

capability

³³ See German Army Regulation (HDv 100/100),

No. 25003.

- 23 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

in training is to teach soldiers to cope with stress

•

immediate decontamination with organic

situations continually. Avoiding unintended

resources;

damage by precisely planning the employment of

•

recovery of wounded and trapped persons;

weapons, for instance, is as much an integral part

•

measures in case of imbalances between the

of training as dealing with uninvolved civilians

number of casualties and the medical support

and facilities/goods to be protected.

capacities;

Individual basic skills such as

•

combat lifesaver measures (including self and

•

safe and secure handling of personal small

buddy aid) to be conducted until hand-over to

arms;

the organic medical service or airborne

•

excellent physical fitness;

medical evacuation assets;

•

distinct

physical

and

mental

•

casualty

evacuation

by non-medical

stamina/robustness;

personnel;

•

mastering of self and buddy aid of all soldiers

•

interaction with (possibly assigned) forces of

(combat lifesavers A or B on operations),

the organic medical service/medical service at

basic NBC defence and basic fire fighting

tactical level;

capabilities, as well as

•

communication with the population;

•

observing and reporting

•

basic knowledge of the national language;

are indispensable prerequisites to acquire the basic

•

mastery of the communication and

capability required for any military deployment on

information systems on operations required

operations to establish security and state order in

for mission accomplishment;

crisis areas.

•

knowledge and application of protective and

DEU soldiers usually acquire these basic

active measures within the electromagnetic

capabilities during basic military training, which

spectrum, and

also comprises

“Conflict Prevention and Crisis

•

general

demeanour and intercultural

Management Training (EAKK)”, on “advanced

competence.

and assignment-related training” as well as in the

scope of operational training including EAKK

These competences must be supplemented by

advanced training. All these training segments

practical skills in the use of non-lethal force. Not

must also address the requirements of operations

only must soldiers master available, non-lethal

intended to establish security and state order in

weapons and close combat techniques; they must

crisis areas. These training segments have to be

also be conversant with the implications of using

fully pursued and/or successfully completed.

coercive force and be able to safely apply current

legal provisions on operations.

Follow-up training is already mandatory for

military personnel of the Army and the Joint

6.2 Contributions by land forces

Support Service. It involves elements of the

following training subjects up to crew/team level:

A key factor for success of the military role in

establishing security and state order is that the

•

mission-oriented combat duty;

principle of mission command is consistently

•

all-arms NBC and explosive ordnance

applied.

defence;

Military leaders at all tactical levels must be

•

all-arms engineer and signal service;

capable of taking action rapidly, flexibly and on

•

(extended) self and buddy aid;

their own initiative, and, if required, without any

contact to the higher commander and in line with

•

weapons/marksmanship training.

his intent.

These training subjects are to be tailored as

Given the spread-out deployment of forces,

follows to match the needs on operations

concerning the military role in establishing

operations are generally conducted as composite

force operations even at low levels of command;

security and state order in crisis areas:

•

firing with the TOE weapon at short and very

military leaders must be capable of employing

attached forces in line with their capabilities,

short range;

strong and weak points and doctrines. Forces of

•

detecting and tackling ambushes and booby

one single arm or service only will not be able to

traps;

cope with upcoming challenges. Instead, all

•

utilising special GeoInfo data/products;

available assets even at low levels of command -

and across all armed and joint services - must be

•

foot marches especially in urban areas during

brought to bear in a synchronised manner. This

daytime and in limited visibility, using

must be taken into account during pre-deployment

navigation means;

training.

•

action to be taken during and after attacks;

- 24 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

As a matter of principle, tactical tasks to be

Apart from those soldiers armed with G36 the

performed are specified in the existing doctrines

infantry company has sniper teams, automatic

of the arms and services and various (command)

grenade launcher teams as well as antiarmour

echelons. Consequently, there is no need for

teams with guided missiles and/or long-range,

fundamental changes in the capability profiles of

large-calibre weapons. These teams with stand-off

the arms and services of the Army.

support weapons are organisationally integrated in

the heavy platoon.

Therefore, no further requirements to training will

be necessary beyond the basic capabilities of all

Furthermore, each infantry company is equipped

land forces, adjustment of leadership training as

with an ALADIN Reconnaissance Drone,

well as pre-deployment training as illustrated in

permitting aerial combat reconnaissance at a range

the above section.

of up to

5,000 metres. In the future, infantry

platoons will also be equipped with the MIKADO

6.2.1 Infantry

Reconnaissance Drone which is capable of

hovering in flight over an operational range of up

The infantry comprises the three arms of light,

1,000 metres in unrestricted terrain for

mountain and airborne infantry. The infantry is

minutes. It can also be employed within buildings.

one of the key military actors in establishing

security and state order. With its three arms, the

As a matter of principle, infantry assets operate

infantry is capable and trained to conduct

dismounted, however, they use their protected

operations in difficult and very complex terrain as

transport vehicles wherever possible. Depending

well as in severe climatic and weather conditions.

on the situation, mission and availability these

Iis forces lend themselves to seizing and holding

may include:

ground denying normal movement. Thanks to the

•

the Fuchs armoured transport vehicle - to be

large number of dismounted forces their presence

succeeded by the Boxer MRAV equipped

comes to bear particularly in urban areas or

with mixed weaponry such as a heavy

villages. This is why infantry forces are especially

machine gun and automatic grenade launcher;

qualified for employment in the immediate

•

the MUNGO protected vehicle of the

vicinity to and above all directly among the

specialised forces;

population. Having direct contact to the

•

the BV 206 S;

population, the infantry has immediate access to

•

the DINGO and/or DINGO 2, mine-protected,

information.

but with a reduced transport capacity.

Infantry forces remain sustainable and fully

Usually,

further

infantry

forces

are

operational even when employed in areas

organisationally pooled in the heavy company to

controlled by the enemy, at remote locations and

support (sub)units on operations. These include:

in independent missions. Provided with protected

transport capacity or aerial vehicles, infantry

•

Joint Fire Support Teams

(JFST)

forces are highly mobile and rapidly deployable.

corresponding to those of the artillery;

•

mortar support along with the fielding of the

The “Enhanced Future Infantryman System”

mortar system (from 2012), also available as

gives the infantry substantially improved C3,

terminally guided ammunition with a range of

comprehensive night vision, and combat

up to 8 km;

capabilities; considerably improved individual

•

airmobile weapon carriers with machine

protection with high-performance protective vests

guns and antiarmour guided missiles;

lends it noticeably enhanced robustness across all

•

reconnaissance platoons with additional

ranges. The infantry has its maximum operational

airborne and ground-based reconnaissance

effectiveness when employed in areas with short

means mainly to support combat

lines of sight and at small-arms combat range. It is

reconnaissance, for scouting operations, area

operational in any climatic conditions.

surveillance and monitoring of gaps and

flanks as well as for establishing and

maintaining contact.

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1,

infantry forces are capable of performing the

following tasks as a military contribution to

establishing security and state order:

• Combat:

o combat patrol operations

o seizing/gaining ground, but also of

objects and lines of communication,

chiefly in urban, difficult and most

complex terrain

- 25 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

o defending/holding ground, but also of

Army specialised forces their inherent intelligence

objects and lines of communication,

and reconnaissance capabilities.

chiefly in urban, difficult and most

complex terrain

o defending friendly forces, civilian

personnel, forces of the host nation as

well as cultural assets

o reinforcing inferior forces by land or air

o directing fire support in conjunction with

joint fire support (JFS)

o providing fire support with own mortars

•

Control:

o conducting patrols as a show of force

o conducting patrols to enforce public

order, ideally supported by military

All elements of Army specialised forces are

police assets

capable of conducting air-assault operations as

o monitoring/securing areas, objects, lines

well as airborne operations and, on account of

of communication, civilians, forces of the

their training and their technical means, can

country of deployment as well as cultural

directly interact with air crews.

assets

o establishing and operating permanent

Army specialised forces are only employed in a

and/or temporary checkpoints

modular system made up of forces of the Special

o supporting civilian and military police

Operations Division and its own medical assets (at

forcesinterdicting,

searching,

and

NATO level Role 1), elements of the Bundeswehr

sweeping areas

Joint Medical Service and - organisationally

o operating tactical combat outposts

with forces provided by various armed and joint

o conducting crowd and riot control (CRC)

services.

operations.

As a contribution to establishing security and state

order they may be tasked to conduct the following

•

Consolidation:

operations/ take the following measures:

o training local infantry forces

o supporting relief operations in the event

•

Eliminating a threat

of humanitarian emergencies

o direct tactical support of specialised

•

Other tasks:

forces operations

(only by Army

o collecting information and scouting

specialised forces with advanced basic

during combat reconnaissance

capabiltities³⁴)

o escorting convoys

o operations to capture INS

o conducting overt force collection

o rapid, airmobile reinforcement of inferior

activities.

friendly forces

o attacks on INS

6.2.2 Army Specialised Forces

o reception and recovery of stragglers and

encircled forces in critical situations.

Army specialised forces primarily consist of

•

Establishing a safe and secure environment

airborne infantry forces. Being part of the infantry

o Monitoring/securing and defending

arms and services they possess all the capabilities

remote areas/infrastructure

of the infantry described under

6.2.1. Their

o conducting patrols especially in high-

special, in-depth training and their equipment

threat situations posed by INS

qualifies them for flexible, remote and to some

extent isolated operations of forces of various

•

Consolidating a safe and secure

strengths and with changing areas of main effort.

environment:

Thanks to organic JFST, airborne medical service

o Training local armed forces

and airborne engineer forces, Army specialised

o forming local specialised forces

forces have direct capabilities at hand that

•

Enabling/accompanying measures:

enhance their operational effectiveness and allow

o Concealed observation and observation

rapid operations. Their fire control capability

posts

enables them to keep off and precisely engage

o Human Intelligence

their opponents by pin-point attacks while

o airborne

unmanned

imaging

avoiding collateral damage to uninvolved parties.

reconnaissance

In this respect they can also support operations of

local armed forces. Organic reconnaissance

elements (two airborne reconnaissance companies,

³⁴ See also EK SpezlOp, (Specialised Forces

one long-range reconnaissance company) give

Concept), Chapters 3.2.1.5 and 3.3.1.

- 26 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

6.2.3 Armoured forces

Armoured infantry fighting vehicles give the crew

a fast and protected means of transport. They also

Armoured forces are made up of armour and

allow them to quickly change the method of

armoured infantry. Their main features are the

fighting and enable the fire team to join mounted

interaction and high firepower of their primary

combat.

weapon systems as well as their high mobility on

the ground and heavily armoured vehicles.

The infantry fighting vehicle with its rapid-fire

Generally, armour and mechanised infantry

weapon system, the coaxial machine gun and the

cooperate in battle; however, in military activities

antitank guided-missile system, and the PUMA

to establish security and state order, the sole

with its extra turret-independent secondary

employment of mechanised infantry assets is

armament are capable of supporting the

possible, particularly so in the HOLD phase.

employment of dismounted mechanised infantry

by delivering highly-effective and precise fire.

The rapid-fire weapon system, among others,

supports the fire fight of the dismounted fire team.

With its flexible operational arc and traverse,

targets in upper storeys of buildings can also be

engaged.

In the future, the PUMA Armoured Infantry

Fighting Vehicle will be capable of directing its

air-burst ammunition against targets behind cover

without significantly increasing the risk of

collateral damage to uninvolved parties. The

optical means of the PUMA will allow for

Armoured forces are capable of rapidly changing

omnidirectional close-range field observation

their method of fighting

(from mounted to

under armoured protection.

dismounted and vice versa) and may be employed

Generally, dismounted mechanised infantry fight

in open as well as in urban terrain and in any

in the immediate vicinity of the armoured infantry

weather conditions.

fighting vehicle; employment at a distance from

With their superior armour and firepower and the

the vehicle is the exception.

resulting continuous command and control

In special situations, mechanised infantry fire

capability in combat they may prevent violence

teams may also be deployed aboard helicopters.

from breaking out. Their observation equipment

and weapon systems enable them to keep main

The “Enhanced Future Infantryman System”

lines of communication and supply routes open.

lends the infantry substantially improved C3 as

Armoured forces are capable of settling escalating

well as extensive night vision and combat

situations at a mimimum risk to themselves, thus

capabilities, considerably improves individual

helping to establish security and state order. In

protection thanks to high-performance protective

situations where commanders or tactical leaders

vests and, owing to the provision of new small -

on the ground are required to respond to lethal

particularly short-range

- arms has noticeably

threats quickly, main battle tanks and armoured

enhanced robustness across all ranges.

infantry fighting vehicles are the proper means to

At company level mechanised infantry forces have

rapidly produce the intended effect in almost all

a sniper team which is qualified, amongst others,

kinds of terrain. They enable the troops to

for monitoring and reconnaissance tasks at

maintain or regain their initiative.

immediate and very short range as well as for the

The armoured forces’ reconnaissance and liaison

accurate engagement of individual targets while

platoons have additional airborne and ground-

minimising the risk of collateral damage to

based reconnaissance means to support combat

uninvolved parties.

reconnaissance, conduct scouting operations, area

The armoured forces are equipped with the

surveillance, monitor gaps and flanks as well as to

LEOPARD 2 Main Battle Tank. This vehicle is

establish and maintain contact.

a highly-mobile, well-protected weapon system

The ALADIN reconnaissance drone provides

with long range and high firepower. Long range

the reconnaissance and liaison platoons of the

and magnifying optical devices allow for

armoured forces with an imaging reconnaissance

reconnaissance by day and night at long distances

system allowing airborne reconnaissance at a

and in poor visibility.

distance of up to 5,000 metres.

The armoured infantry is equipped with the

MARDER Infantry Fighting Vehicle and will be

fielding the PUMA AIFV in due course.

- 27 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

The armament consisting of a 120-mm main gun

•

Combat:

as well as one coaxial and one antiaircraft

o seize/gain/reach ground;

machine gun enables the crew to support the

o destroy/encircle opposing forces;

employment of dismounted forces by delivering

o pursue withdrawing forces;

highly effective and precise fire.

o relieve encircled forces;

o extract/evacuate

threatened/isolated

Equipped with comprehensive ballistic as well as

personnel (civilian/military) by road;

mine and CBRN protection, MBT crews are

o destroy individual targets (combat ranges

highly survivable even in asymmetrical threat

of up to 5,000 m);

situations where the enemy often cannot be

o provide direct fire support to dismounted

prevented from being the first to fire. The main

troops;

battle tank is even capable of immediately

o defend/hold ground;

engaging the enemy even if exposed to direct

o reinforce forces in combat;

hostile fire. Enemy forces can also be effectively

o carry out combat reconnaissance.

engaged inside buildings, hardened positions and

•

Control:

at long distances. This will also enhance the

o interdicting areas;

survivability of forces interacting with main battle

o securing areas/area surveillance;

tanks but less well protected than the latter.

o sweeping areas;

The considerable side effects of the vehicle

o searching persons and vehicles;

weapon systems on own forces but also on the

o conducting mobile and foot patrols;

civilian population (sound, blast, fragments and

o operating (temporary) observation posts;

ammunition parts) must be considered - especially

o operating combat outposts;

in urban environments. Due to the confined

o operating (temporary) checkpoints.

elevation of the tank gun, main battle tanks in

•

Consolidation:

such an environment may be restricted in bringing

o Training mechanised forces;

the effect of their weapon system to bear.

o giving advice to mechanised battalion-

Furthermore, the gunner’s field of view at short

size units

range is restricted owing to the powerful

•

Other tasks:

magnification of the sight so that engaging targets

o conducting reconnaissance in all weather

and orienting at a distance of less than 400 m is

conditions;

complicated.

o collecting information and scouting as

part of combat reconnaissance;

Wherever possible, main battle tanks must not be

o conducting

elicitation

through

employed in urban environments without

dismounted forces;

accompanying infantry and mechanised forces.

o escorting convoys.

Since INS frequently rely on ambushes and urban

infrastructure and can therefore hardly be engaged

6.2.4 Army ISR Forces

at long ranges, main battle tanks operated on

Army ISR

(Intelligence, Surveillance and

missions to establish security and state order are

Reconnaissance) forces gain and provide whatever

usually employed to reinforce fire in interaction

information is required on forces, resources,

with light infantry and/or mechanised infantry

intents, activities and possible courses of action of

forces. In situations like this, the psychological

INS and other groups of the population as well as

effect of their presence primarily comes to bear. In

on the area of operation to establish security and

combat situations their level of protection, their

state order.

mobility and fire power are of particular

To achieve this, Army ISR forces are employed

importance. In this context it must be considered

throughout

the

commander’s area

that employing the tank gun and using the MBT’s

responsibility.

high mobility especially in urban areas may cause

considerable destruction. This is why the

In the process they are frequently required to

employment of main battle tanks must be

observe particular OPSEC standards. Units with

reviewed for proportionality at an early enough

responsibility for specific areas are informed

stage and, if applicable, be limited by

accordingly - and often subject to constraints - by

corresponding rules of engagement.

their superior command. The actual form of

cooperation and support in reconnaissance

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1,

activities by Army ISR forces is specified in

armoured and/or mechanized infantry forces are

orders. Wherever possible, Army ISR forces will

capable of performing the following tasks as a

keep their tactical commanders in the area of

military contribution to establishing security and

operations informed about the conduct of their

state order:

missions. In this context they will coordinate

restricted areas (black boxes) and operations by

- 28 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

their forces employed within that area as cover

airmobile and mountain combat patrols are

and concealment for reconnaissance activities.

provided with:

Army ISR forces gain information by

•

ground-sensor equipment;

synergistically drawing on their sub-capabilities:

•

one ALADIN minidrone system;

•

ground-based scout reconnaissance (including

•

one nerve agent alarm device;

battlefield radar reconnaissance);

•

one set of radiation detection equipment, and

•

airborne unmanned imaging reconnaissance;

•

their

on-board

observation

and

•

long-range reconnaissance, as well as

reconnaissance equipment.

•

intelligence collection by field intelligence

forces.

Army ISR forces provide intelligence and

reconnaissance results for situation, target, and

battle damage assessment. In terms of JFS

essentially contribute results on target data, target

verification and for monitoring battle damage.

Ground-based scout reconnaissance forces with

their lightly armoured reconnaissance patrols,

light

reconnaissance

squads,

airmobile

reconnaissance

patrols

and

mountain

reconnaissance patrols have specific capabilities

tailored to match the special requirements of the

given mission and terrain. They are capable of

operating under severe climatic conditions as well

as in difficult and hardly accessible terrain

In the future, they will be additionally equipped

including

urban

areas.

with mobile sensor systems (MoSeS). Until the

Ground-based scouting reconnaissance operations

command, control, information, and weapons

in the scope of wide-range situation, target and

control system of the relevant arm or service is

poststrike reconnaissance as well as during

fielded, data will be provided by the FENNEK

surveillance and scouting missions throughout the

command and control component. Combat patrols

area

operations

produce

detailed

are equipped with long range command and

reconnaissance results for the tactical and, if

control means. Moreover, their radiation detection

required, operational level of command. At the

equipment enables them to pick up N/C combat

same time, information and findings gained by

agents and N/C hazardous substances.

other reconnaissance forces and means are

consolidated,

verified

and updated by

To complement combat patrols, light

reconnaissance activities on the ground. Ground-

reconnaissance squads are especially qualified

based scout reconnaissance forces mainly gain

for dismounted and sensor-aided reconnaissance

their intelligence and reconnaissance results by

and surveillance in hardly accessible and rough

relying on human perception and tactical

terrain as well as under unfavourable weather

conversations held directly on the ground,

conditions. Performing their function in

supplemented by optical and optronical

establishing security and state order, they may

reconnaissance assets, military tracking as well as

also be employed both self-sufficiently and in

ground-based and air-based sensors.

teams to support other ground-based forces in

their intelligence and reconnaissance efforts. In

This allows the forces on the ground to assess the

the process they provide support by observations

results of intelligence and reconnaissance directly

from remote positions, the additional employment

and at the relevant levels. They are capable of

of sensors and tactical human source contact

operating in areas controlled by INS and, by the

operations. The light reconnaissance squad has a

sustained employment of sensors and through

higher dismounted strength and always consists of

observation from concealed positions, of gaining

two light combat patrols, their transport vehicles,

information without being detected by the enemy.

accessory kit for dismounted operation

(e.g.

Scout reconnaissance forces have the capability of

portable observation equipment, laser range

finder) and subsystems issued for the mission.

identifying targets even in remote areas beyond

friendly control and of fighting them by directing

They usually comprise:

•

one set of ground-sensor equipment with six

fire support.

sensor packages;

Combat patrols perform ground-based

•

one MIKADO microdrone;

reconnaissance by means of sensor systems.

•

one mobile sensor system with up to two

FENNEK reconnaissance patrols as well as

sensor platforms.

- 29 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Battlefield radar reconnaissance forces gain

while remaining undetected (sustainable without

information on mobile and static objects and

follow-on supplies up to 7 days depending on the

facilities of interest, and are essentially capable of

climatic prerequisites) during day and night and in

classifying targets. The identification of targets

almost any weather conditions. Since they operate

and reconnaissance of the target environment

away from any platforms they can deploy by

usually call for further reconnaissance equipment

airlanding or parachute to the area to be

to be employed. Radar reconnaissance is capable

reconnoitered for the requesting entity. As a rule,

of detecting movement patterns and deviations

long-range reconnaissance forces are intended to

therefrom within a certain area. Information is

work from a fixed position. For the surveillance,

chiefly gained during periods of bad weather, poor

reconnaissance or scouting of areas, however, they

visibility as well as from a distance and/or over

may proceed on foot or use very light vehicles.

wide ranges. Battlefield radar reconnaissance

Information gained by field intelligence forces

forces are capable of surveiling extensive areas,

may provide information that would otherwise be

terrain sections as well as low-level airspace at

impossible or almost impossible to obtain.

day and night for long periods of time and, above

Performing their specific function in establishing

all, in unfavourable weather conditions. In

security and state order, field intelligence forces

addition to this they extend the area covered by

collect information on the mindset and intentions

reconnaissance and/or facilitate the surveillance of

of the population especially by objective-oriented

areas and flanks if no other reconnaissance assets

conversations with local key sources. Specialist

are available. The range of radar sensors depends

support may be required to obtain technical

on the prevailing weather and terrain conditions.

information. This approach seems promising

To this end, a quasi-optical line of sight is

particularly in sustained operations as it depends

required to the target to be reconnoitered.

on mutual trust to be established first.

Long-range reconnaissance forces are mainly

In addition to that, field intelligence forces gain

involved with deep operations and conduct

information by interrogating INS/persons detained

reconnaissance self-sufficiently and independent

by the Bundeswehr as well as by document

of the intensity of the operation; they strive to

analysis and initial visual examinations of

remain undetected when scouting from static or

property.

mobile positions, i.e. on foot and in vehicles, in

impassible terrain, buildings and/or structures and

They also analyse open sources and may conduct

in areas not immediately visible to the eye, such as

briefings/debriefings of friendly units, as

natural and man-made caves and canal systems, as

requested/directed. Field intelligence forces are

well as in all climatic zones. Using their optic and

especially qualified to describe facilities.

optronic special equipment they contribute to

Reconnaissance flights can be conducted at any

situation reconnaissance, target acquisition and, if

time and in almost any weather conditions by

required, to poststrike reconnaissance. They

airborne unmanned imaging reconnaissance

observe and monitor objects as well as areas

systems into the depth of the area; moreover, they

and/or persons and/or groups of persons of special

can consolidate reconnaissance results within the

importance, use their optronic devices for

very short range of a scout reconnaissance

documentation even from distant positions during

subunit. That is how large areas can quickly be

day and night, analyse the results and forward the

covered with optronic sensors. Thanks to the

information gained without delay in target data

results

airborne

unmanned imaging

quality to the superior command/requesting

reconnaissance, ground, air and sea vehicles and

agency via hard-to-decipher transmission systems.

also groups of persons are detected, categorised

Chiefly on account of their observation activities

and often even identified. Moreover, information

they contribute to situation and target

on the state of the existing infrastructure can be

reconnaissance as well as to post-strike

gained.

reconnaissance, if required.

Airborne unmanned imaging reconnaissance is

With their forward air controllers, long-range

suitable for temporary surveillance of areas and

reconnaissance forces are capable of directing

targets. Data thus gained and transmitted in near-

long-range, ground-based weapon systems as well

real time need to be further analysed by qualified

as close air support by fixed- and rotary-wing

air photograph interpreters. This information not

aircraft. They belong to Army specialised forces

only serves to develop a military intelligence

and thus support operations as described in

situation as required but is also important for the

chapter 6.2.2. They are capable of providing direct

subsequent

consolidating

and

verifying

support to special forces. Moreover, they can

employment of other intelligence

and

conduct force collection activities in isolated areas

reconnaissance assets.

and

high-threat

situations.

Long-range

reconnaissance forces are especially capable of

conducting reconnaissance for extended periods

- 30 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Data gained by airborne unmanned imaging

The ABRA Artillery Surveillance Radar is

reconnaissance can be stored, analysed and

capable of reconnoitering moving targets as long

transmitted onward. Comparing such with data

as there is a quasi-optical line of sight between the

collected during earlier overflights allows for

radar and the target to be reconnoitered. ABRA

changes to be detected, for instance of the surface

allows reconnoitering persons at a distance of up

of the earth or of structures on the ground. Since

to 14 km, small vehicles up to 24 km and large

the course may be altered at any time during the

vehicles up to 30 km.

given flight time, corresponding measures can be

That is how most of all remote tracts of terrain

taken almost instantly in case the main effort is

used by the INS as smuggling or supply routes can

shifted or reconnaissance requirements occur

be surveilled.

elsewhere.

The COBRA Counter Battery Radar is capable

As a rule, unmanned aerial vehicle operations are

of reconnoitering firing mortar, tube and rocket

subject to regulations under civil law and military

artillery systems up to a distance of 40 kilometres.

requirements of airspace control. Since UAV in

It takes two minutes to reconnoiter up to

flight can be seen and heard, OPSEC implications

hostile firing positions. It is even possible to

must be considered.

determine the firing and target points of the shells.

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1,

The KZO Target Acquisition UAV is suited for

Army ISR forces are capable of performing the

target, situation and post-strike reconnaissance at

following tasks as a military contribution to

a penetration depth of up to

100 km. One

establishing security and state order:

particular advantage of the KZO is its capability

• Combat:

of collecting information by day and night and

o directing fire support

transmitting it in near-real time without any risk to

• Control:

friendly forces. It is, however, unable to

o conducting patrols in exceptional cases

reconnoitre inside any infrastructure. For the time

o carrying out area surveillance

being, no target discrimination capability is

• Consolidation:

available either.

o training and advising reconnaissance

On account of its performance specifications and

forces

the endurance of 3.5 hours the KZO lends itself

• Other tasks:

especially to escorting convoys and patrols as well

o situation,

target

and

post-strike

to conducting pre-deployment reconnaissance of

reconnaissance in any weather and

an operational area. Thus INS can be

climatic conditions

reconnoitered and monitored until finally engaged

o provision of reconnaissance results

with indirect fire.

concerning impacts on the environment,

infrastructure and population

The Armored Howitzer

2000 is the strike

resource of the tube artillery. It offers superior

o aerial reconnaissance

o surveillance of areas, objects and

firepower to support combat troops, long-range

fire to avoid duel situations as well as

opposing forces

o reconnaissance in urban terrain

opportunities to concentrate and rapidly shift fires

with an element of surprise and quick response.

o tactical human source contact operations

o overt conversations.

With its precision-guided ammunition it permits

highly accurate engagement of targets while at the

same time minimising any collateral damage to

6.2.5 Artillery

uninvolved parties.

Forces of the artillery have a broad spectrum of

skills for the employment of standoff-capable,

precise weapon systems and for conducting

reconnaissance.

To ensure efficient fire support, the Artillery tasks

Joint Fire Support Teams (JFST) to cooperate

with combat subunits. As a matter of principle,

these teams will have the same level of mobility

and protection as the units they support.

Compared to classical observers the JFST have far

enhanced capabilities inasmuch as they not only

employ artillery and mortar strike resources but

also other weapon systems (land-, air- and sea-

based) to satisfy the need for fire support to

requesting units.

- 31 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

From a firing position within the camp perimeter,

6.2.6 Army Air Defence

the Armored Howitzer

2000 is capable of

The Army Air Defence Artillery has sensors and

supporting own forces within a radius of

weapon systems that enable it to perform tasks to

kilometres. The weapon system is responsive,

establish security and state order. It is capable of

precise and combat serviceable in any weather

countering airborne threats at short and very short

conditions. Combined with the COBRA system,

range, with the exception of tactical ballistic

hostile artillery and mortar positions can be

missiles.

engaged quickly and effectively.

Active reconnaissance assets of the Army Air

Rocket launchers with guided missiles as weapon

Defence comprise the air surveillance radar, the

system of the rocket artillery are suitable for

short range radar as well as the

precision engagement of individual targets at long

reconnaissance, command and fire control

range. The firing range is some

16 to 85 km

vehicle. They ensure airspace surveillance by day

depending on the munition used. Accuracy is at

and night and locate, identify and report aircraft at

approximately 5-10 m. The UNITARY rocket is

low and medium altitudes. They contribute to the

suited to engage static targets

(e.g. command

preparation of a recognised air picture.

posts, bunkers, bridges as

well as INS

emplacements).

The radar groups/teams must always be given

priority in selecting their positions to achieve their

Like the Armoured Howitzer

2000 the rocket

maximum reconnaissance depth.

launcher is capable of delivering fire support for

own forces so that INS attacks can be effectively

The weapon systems of the Army Air Defence

countered without exposing own forces to any

comprise the MANTIS³⁵ Air Defence System and

increased threat. This can be achieved at any time

the STINGER Fliegerfaust

2 which can be

and in almost any weather. Because of the

employed both as MANPADS³⁶ (shoulder-fired

enhanced range the area covered is also extended

weapon) or be fired from the OZELOT SAM

to 85 km. The rocket is equipped with a SMArt

Missile Platform (light air defence system).

warhead and used against armoured targets.

The target spectrum of the Light Surface-to-Air-

Aborting a mission and discriminating targets,

Missile Forces encompasses manned and

however, is not possible.

unmanned aerial vehicles. MANPADS even

The ADLER command, control, information,

allows the use of positions in impassable terrain

and weapons control system assists the artillery

and inside buildings. Owing to its technical design

commander in exercising command and control

the STINGER Fliegerfaust 2 MANPADS may be

and employing his artillery assets. It is the heart of

subject to limitations in terms of effectiveness, for

the Artillery System and ensures immediate

instance in weather-related poor visibility or by

interaction of all command and control,

insulating window edges of buildings in built-up

reconnaissance and weapon systems within the

areas.

Artillery System.

The MANTIS Air Defence System is a system

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1,

designed to protect facilities/objects and capable

artillery forces are capable of performing the

of countering rockets, artillery and mortar

following tasks as a military contribution to

grenades especially at very short range. It is also

establishing security and state order:

capable of calculating the point of launch³⁷ as well

as the point and time of impact.

• Combat:

o fire support

The Army Air Defence Surveillance and

to counter attacks

Command and Control System (AADSACCS)

to eliminate threats during operations

is the centrepiece of the Air Defence System. The

o direction of fire support

AADSACCS allows the preparation of a fire-

• Control:

control-capable real-time air situation by

o area surveillance

interconnecting the sensors, providing the air

• Consolidation:

situation picture and ensuring fire control.

o training artillery forces

o giving advice to battalion-size artillery

units

• Other tasks:

o aerial reconnaissance

o reconnaissance of hostile firing positions

³⁵ Modular, automatic and network capable

o reconnaissance of movements

targeting and interception system

³⁶ Manportable Air Defence System

³⁷ With artillery and mortar grenades; given the

ballistic trajectory of rockets, however, this

applies to them to some extent only.

- 32 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1,

Operating from armoured transport vehicles,

Army Air Defence forces are capable of

armoured engineer squads provide direct

performing the following tasks as a military

engineer support to combat units. They can also

contribution to establishing security and state

provide engineer support inside buildings (e.g. by

order:

using breaching charges and mechanical aids to

force doors open) and in underground systems.

• Combat:

The inventory of weapons and equipment held by

o protecting

armoured engineer squads is to some extent

objects

(static

and deployable

similar to that of the infantry. Thus, they are

infrastructure);

especially qualified to afford direct support during

areas

(strategically and tactically

operations in an urban environment. If required in

vital ground), as well as

a given situation, they can operate checkpoints or

forces

(units as well as civilian

carry out point defence tasks. Independent

actors)

infantry-type operations, however, must remain an

against airborne threats.

exception.

• Control:

o airspace surveillance

Armoured engineer vehicles can be employed to

clear debris and barriers or to open breaches and

• Consolidation:

o training air defence forces

develop positions. If capacities permit, they may

also directly and quickly support civilian tasks

o giving advice to air defence units

(digging,

clearing,

recovery,

grading,

• Other tasks:

pushing/spreading etc.).

o coordinate the use of airspace

o contributing to the overall air situation

Armoured vehicle-launched bridges (AVBLs)

and other bridging materiel (e.g. folding girder

6.2.7 Engineers

bridge) may be used to restore destroyed bridges

The forces of the corps of engineers have assets

over bodies of water and terrain gaps for military

and capabilities that enable them to provide direct

use or to create additional crossings at short

support to establishing security and state order.

notice.

Manoeuvres such as ensuring friendly movements

They can also be used to cross craters in destroyed

(e.g. clearing of obstacles, construction or

road sections.

reinforcement of bridges, improving the capacity

When armoured engineer vehicles, AVLBs and

of roads and routes) also add to gaining trust

other engineer equipment are used, their

among the population. Engineers make their

protection and movements must be carefully

effective contribution to enhancing survivability

coordinated. The hazards to the equipment must

by structurally reinforcing camps and facilities.

be weighed against the necessity of its rapid

Echelon-tailored expert advice given by the

availability. Individual pieces of engineer

relevant senior engineers provides military

equipment cannot provide for their own protection

leaders and task force commanders with an

while performing engineer tasks; instead,

immediate, situation-oriented and technically

additional forces must be kept available for that

qualified suggestion on how to commit scarce

purpose.

engineer resources. The chief engineer of the

Camp construction/camp support forces are

brigade-.size unit makes sure that all aspects of

skilled to set up and operate camps (by doing so

military engineering are taken into account during

they

cater

for:

infrastructural

security,

the estimate of the situation. This also includes

accommodation, water supply, power supply, fire

engineer capabilities of other armed and joint

protection, dining and recreation facilities).

services. Depending on the mission, these

Besides their original tasks these forces make their

capabilities can be made available within an

military contribution to establishing security and

engagement network as required.

state order by setting up and operating tactical

As early as during the preparation and the start of

combat outposts (Chapter 5.3).

an operation engineer reconnaissance forces

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1,

ensure that information is obtained on the physical

engineers are capable of performing the following

characteristics of roads and bridges, dimensions of

tasks as a military contribution to establishing

tunnels, soil trafficability as well as on explosive

security and state order:

ordnance

defence.

All

engineer-specific

information provided

will

supplement the

• Combat:

common operational picture of the higher

o ensuring access by means of explosives

command. Based on this information the chief

and mechanical tools

engineer will prepare and permanently update

o clearing barriers under enemy fire

digital engineer top level information and deal

with specific engineer reconnaissance tasks.

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED

o employing own weapon systems to

6.2.8 Explosive ordnance disposal forces

impede enemy movement and to block

(EOD³⁸)

areas of retreat

In crisis areas friendly forces as well as the local

o using weapon systems to canalise enemy

population are threatened by unexploded ordnance

forces

as part of asymmetrical warfare - especially by

o providing reinforcements to inferior

IED.

forces in infantry battle situations

(tactical reserve at company level)

•

Control:

o supporting infantry control tasks,

especially crowd and riot control,

interdicting

areas,

conducting

dismounted

patrols,

operating

checkpoints

•

Consolidation:

o training/instructing civilian workforce on

how to improve civilian infrastructure

and obtain construction material

o training

and instructing

civilian

workforce in matters of environmental

To counter this threat EOD forces and explosive

protection

ordnance clearance experts of the engineer corps

o training engineers

pursue a holistic approach in line with the

o giving advice to battalion-size engineer

Bundeswehr Subconcept for Explosive Ordnance

units

Defence

•

Other tasks:

Compared to explosive ordnance clearing experts

contribution to the operational picture by

EOD forces have different capabilities of

engineer reconnaissance and scouting of

detecting, localising and countering a threat by

environmental, infrastructural and

explosive ordnance. EOD forces can, for example,

population influences

render unexploded ordnance safe, recover

local resources;

munitions and destroy it without causing collateral

communication and traffic networks;

damage to uninvolved parties. They also have

natural obstacles;

special qualifications to recover, dispose of and

engineer action taken by the enemy

neutralise IED and, when dealing with threats

(e.g. barriers, IED)

posed by hazardous CBRN substances, interact

collection, analysis and provision of

with CBRN defence forces. Explosive ordnance

engineer

command and control

disposal teams must always be supported by

information;

securing and medical forces to fulfil their mission.

provision of advice on explosive

ordnance defence;

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1,

explosive ordnance clearing (if necessary

Army EOD forces are capable of performing the

even at the risk of incurring collateral

following tasks as a military contribution to

damage to uninvolved parties);

establishing security and state order:

contribution to the explosive ordnance

• Consolidation:

situation;

o training and instructing civilian personnel

facilitation of friendly movements by

in matters of EOD defence

improving the infrastructure;

o providing support during large-scale

EOD activities in order to improve the

increase of own operational effectiveness

quality of life and security of the local

preparing

positions,

field

population

(direct support of the

fortifications, reinforcing command posts

population and civilian organisations,

etc.;

however, can be afforded only if

surveillance of lines of communication

capacities permit and if the possible risk

with explosive ordnance disposal forces

to employed personnel and, in particular,

(route clearance);

operational requirements have been duly

ensurance of access by means of

taken into account).

breaching charges;

employment of Army engineer divers

(e.g. in sewage systems).

³⁸ Explosive Ordnance Disposal

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED

• Other tasks:

o operating EOD control centres to

exercise command and control of

explosive ordnance disposal forces;

o giving advice on explosive ordnance

defence;

o updating the explosive ordnance defence

situation;

o performing explosive ordnance disposal

tasks.

6.2.9 CBRN Defence

CBRN defence forces including CBRN medical

•

Other tasks:

defence forces of the Bundeswehr Joint Medical

o contributing to the operational picture by

Service are equipped and skilled well enough to

CBRN reconnaissance and CBRN

support employed forces both under CBRN threat

analysis/effects information on

and in CBRN conditions, i.e. they can detect and

CBRN munitions

identify hazardous substances and subsequently

industrial

and natural CBRN

decontaminate personnel and materiel and/or

hazardous substances

provide medical care to contaminated casualties.

possible CBRN threats posed by the

Apart from the threat of INS using CBRN

enemy/terrorists

munitions and/or actually doing so, another hazard

o decontaminating;

may be posed by industrial CBRN substances.

o decontaminating and affording medical

care to casualties;

CBRN defence advice also extends to

o supporting EOD forces in disposing of

systematically collecting, analysing, assessing and

CBRN munitions;

processing any information associated with a

o taking prophylactic measures against

CBRN incident. In this context it is essential to

epizootic diseases to prevent epidemics

identify, at any early enough stage, and to assess

from entering Germany.

particular hazards posed by industrial installations,

laboratory and research facilities as well as natural

6.2.10 Army Aviation

hazards.

As the bearers of air mobility of land forces, Army

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1,

Aviation assets are employed in their military role

the forces of the CBRN Defence Corps are

to establish security and state order under the

capable of performing the following tasks as a

same principles as for any other land operation.

military contribution to establishing security and

Helicopters are the most agile and flexible ground

state order:

support assets. Since they operate away from the

ground they can avoid obstacles such as barriers,

• Control:

debris, craters, mountains, valleys or even crowds

o monitoring the security of local facilities

of people and use the airspace for command and

with a potential CBRN risk

control, reconnaissance, combat and combat

• Consolidation:

service support purposes.

o giving advice on CBRN defence to local

personnel

By making use of their sensors combat

o giving advice on CBRN defence to local

helicopters are to some extent capable of

personnel

compensating natural limitations of ground-based

o conducting water treatment to provide

reconnaissance means due to vegetation, buildings

the population with drinking water at

and terrain.

short notice if necessary as an emergency

The same goes for the employment of kinetic

relief measure

munitions. From their elevated position

helicopters leave the enemy little chance to find

cover and to evade the effects of fire.

- 35 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

security and state order, they perform the

following tactical tasks:

• Combat:

o destroying targets

o providing direct fire support

o rapidly inserting infantry forces into

contested areas

• Control:

o conducting airborne patrols as a show of

force

o ensuring area surveillance

• Consolidation:

Transport helicopters have special air drop and

o training and giving advice to pilots and

recovery equipment for inserting/extracting

(as directed by and under training

friendly forces at places where rotary wing aircraft

responsibility of the Air Force) to aircraft

cannot land (e.g. on rooftops, in forests, on steep

technicians

slopes). They support ground forces even over

o supplying the population with relief

long distances by ensuring the rapid transport of

goods in states of emergency

material. Transport helicopters specially equipped

• Other tasks:

as MEDEVAC helicopters, once fitted with the

o providing

transport

capacity

for

necessary material and /or the relevant conversion

personnel and material

kits and carrying qualified medical personnel, can

o conducting aerial reconnaissance

be employed for aeromedical evacuation as

o transporting casualties

forward

(FWD) or

tactical

(TAC)

o acting as airmobile command post

AIRMEDEVAC missions. In this context, the

o interacting with the forces of the CBRN

Army Aviation Corps closely cooperates with the

defence staff of the Bundeswehr Joint

Bundeswehr Medical Service.

Medical Service to ensure qualified

Support helicopters use the airspace as airborne

aeromedical evacuation in a CBRN

command and control assets, aerial liaison

environment.

vehicles, for reconnaissance, observation and

scouting purposes, as a relay station, for personnel

6.2.11 Logistics

and material transport as well as for air

The basic procedures remain unchanged even in

surveillance.

the logisticians’ role in establishing security and

Their agility and altitude in flight allow

state order. Logistic support is ensured in an

helicopters to quickly evade the effects of enemy

integrated network of Joint Support Service (JSS)

weapons. That way, they considerably extend the

logistics, service logistics and services provided

tactical scope of action. At the same time,

by third parties.³⁹

however, they are particularly exposed and attract

Army service logistic assets are the logistic

hostile fire. Helicopters are vulnerable and high-

services of the units and elements as well as the

value targets, even for small-arms, light rocket

logistics battalions and/or the supply battalions or

launchers and MANPADS. It is imperative that

the airborne command support battalions of

helicopter crews cooperate directly with the forces

brigade-size units. Mobile JSS logistics forces

on the ground, even down to the level of single

ensure initial and follow-on supply for the

weapon systems, as may be necessary.

operational contingent and are therefore largely

Near real time situation data, especially accurate

independent of the actual mission of the forces on

deployment. .

information on the position of friendly forces as

well as whatever target acquisition data may be

Wherever possible, JSS and service logistics

available are a prerequisite for reliable

assets can be pooled under organisational,

identification. This is the only way to minimise

procedural and geographic aspects. The necessary

the risk of fratricide.

military expenditure in terms of manpower and

material can be reduced by:

Outside the perimeter of operational facilities,

helicopters are particularly at risk during takeoff

and landing. Therefore envisaged landing zones

must be secured by ground forces to provide best

possible protection from direct fire. As a rule this

affects the availability of operational forces.

Because of their special capabilities helicopter

³⁹ See Joint Service Regulation

(ZDv)

31/1

forces cannot perform all-arms tasks as those

LogUstg von Einsätzen der Bw Nos. 2006 and

covered under

6.1. In their role to establish

3004.

- 36 -

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

• the organisational concentration of logistic

The maintenance and repair forces of the logistic

assets as an opportunity to

battalions are capable of carrying out system

o benefit from identified synergy effects,

repairs in line with tactical requirements and at a

and to

given location. This is done by tactically mobile

o reduce and/or avoid duplications;

maintenance and repair forces who usually

combine the test and repair process as one cycle

• the reduction of theatre operational stocks;

with the use of easily replaceable spare part

packages of the respective level of maintenance

• the performance and sharing of logistic tasks

and/or system-specific spare parts. Moreover, they

on a multinational scale;

are capable of conducting improvised and battle

• the usage of logistic services provided by

damage repair and may, as required and ordered

third parties.

accordingly, even modify defence materiel.

Proactive planning and requests for logistic

In addition, they provide recovery services as

services made at an early enough stage are

required by the units to be supported. The

indispensable ingredients in this context to avoid

responsibility for the recovery of damaged materiel,

supply bottlenecks.

however, generally devolves upon the units.

If no point defence personnel is available, JSS

The evacuation of materiel to the receiving repair

logistic forces themselves must provide security of

facility and/or to the service provider is initiated by

their own logistic facilities; consequently, fewer

the responsible logistic control element (disabled-

logisticians are thus available to perform their

materiel control), to be performed by mobile

original logistic mission.

logistic forces.

As a rule, logistic forces in their military role in

Materiel management assets of units/elements

establishing security and state order work from

and of the logistic battalions generally have

fixed facilities, and, due to poor or destroyed

tactical mobility and are capable of supplying

infrastructure, supply routes are far and few

their own forces in the area.

between, which makes activities along the

In the scope of their military role in establishing

reaming routes predictable to the enemy.

security and state order, deployed forces are

Therefore, they are easily reconnoitered and

usually supplied inside camps. Depending on the

rewarding targets to INS.

nature of the mission and on how long and where

Depending on the given situation and logistic

operational forces are deployed, however, it may

mission, additional assets may be required to

be necessary to reinforce them with logistic assets

perform security-related tasks.

and/or to supply them with goods.

Maintenance forces belong to the logistic

With their low level of protection, supply and

services of units/elements and are the repair assets

recovery vehicles (driver’s cabin protection, lack

of the logistic battalions of brigade-size units as

of protection of the loading platform) and given

well as the mobile repair and maintenance forces

the fact that such vehicles are “less” well armed,

of JSS logistics.

they are vulnerable and rewarding targets to INS.

They are particularly jeopardised. This is why

Maintenance and repair forces are capable of

logistic forces in particular require protected

performing service and maintenance work,

transport capacity as well as protected recovery

preventive maintenance as well as standard, short-

and transport means. Depending on the situation

term repairs of vehicles and/or materiel on charge

and the threat posture, logistic transports by road

units and/or elements and that do not require

must be conducted as self-protective transports, as

special tools and spare parts. They have their own

transports with extended self-protection or as

equipment to recover disabled or damaged

convoy operations.

vehicles and/or materiel and to carry out battle

damage and improvised repair to restore the basic

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1,

functions of moving, communicating and firing, as

Army logistic forces are capable of performing the

well as conducting repair work not requiring

following tasks as a military contribution to

special tools or spares.

establishing security and state order:

Mobile/deployable military maintenance and

• Consolidation:

repair forces of the service and JSS logistic

o supporting the provision of relief

services generally carry out maintenance work in

supplies to the population, as needed

the shape of damage-specific materiel tests, time-

o training logistic leaders, technical and

consuming service and scheduled maintenance,

employed personnel

modifications, damage repair as well as final

o giving advice to battalion-size logistic

inspections of materiel.

units.

• Other tasks:

o providing logistic support

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED

6.2.12 Armed Forces Joint Medical Service

•

Consolidation:

o emergency and general medical care of

Forces of the Armed Forces Joint Medical Service

the local population

cooperate with the armed services’ organic

o training of medical personnel

medical assets to ensure medical support of the

o training of local armed forces and

troops. In this context, all elements of the different

security forces in of self and buddy aid

levels of treatment (roles) of the Armed Forces

o assistance with setting up and operating

Joint Medical Service may be involved.

medical facilities (hospitals etc.)

Depending on the situation and the availability of

o support and training of local forces in

capacities, security forces of the host nation and

epidemics control and hygiene

civilian personnel may also be afforded medical

support. Usually, however, no extra assets are

provided for and kept available for this particular

purpose.

Nevertheless, the Armed Forces Joint Medical

Service is essentially suited to meet the medical

requirements of the local population and may thus

temporarily support parts of the civilian health

system on a subsidiary basis, for instance by

providing medical supplies and conducting

vaccination programmes as well as by taking over

medical treatment temporarily. Subsidiary medical

support of the local population may become

necessary and be granted for a specific period of

time if the capacities of the state concerned and of

the civilian organisations on the ground turn out to

•

Other tasks:

be insufficient. What is crucial in this context is to

involve the local health system, if existent. The

the SMO in theatre advises the force

commander on all medical matters

concept of “help for self-help” has first priority.

This kind of assistance may be beneficial in

medical support provided to own forces

in all types of operation with

winning the support of the local population.

Support provided to the civilian population,

mobile/highly mobile medical forces and

medical facilities (Roles 1-3)

however, must not prejudice the main mission, i.e.

the support for own forces.

medical support and care of own forces

(Roles

1-4) inclusive of

“Strategic

Furthermore, Medical Intelligence Forces

Aeromedical Evacuation”

(MEDINT) help to consolidate the situation

organisation and conduct of casualty

picture and advise the force commander while

control in all Roles

closely interacting with the Senior Medical

medical support provided to EOD forces

Officer (SMO) in theatre.

during the

disposal

CBRN

munitionsground-based

medical

Moreover, the Armed Forces Joint Medical

evacuation and ensuring all relevant

Service may assist in establishing a military

organizational measures

medical service and training of medical personnel;

interaction with Army Aviation and Air

this applies particularly to training non-medical

Force assets in tactical and strategic

service personnel in the subject of self and buddy

aeromedical evacuation, as may be the

aid.

case

The service logistics of the Armed Forces Joint

supply of medical materiel

Medical Service ensures the operational readiness

CBRN medical defence and casualty

of materiel of own deployed units/facilities in

decontamination

interaction with JSS logistics and, if required,

MEDINT.

service logistics.

It supplies medical material for all deployed

forces and provides direct logistic support to units

and facilities of the Armed Forces Joint Medical

Service.

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1,

forces of the Armed Forces Joint Medical Service

are capable of performing the following tasks as a

military contribution to establishing security and

state order:

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED

6.2.13 Command and Control Support

military

decision-making

processes

and

corresponding procedures as well as the

Drawing on the Bundeswehr IT system, efficient

Bundeswehr IT system.

command and control support provides the

necessary information technology to ensure the

On account of the large number of different forces

rapid and uninterrupted supply of information

IT security gains special importance. Following

tailored to meet the needs on and across the

the principle of proportionality, all measures must

command and control levels of all participating

be taken and enforced to deny INS any possibility

units and allies.

to affect friendly communication and command

and control systems and related data so as to rule

Command and control support encompasses the

out any risk to an operation to establish security

management, supply and security of information

and state order.

and related technology. These functional tasks are

performed by a network of command and control

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1,

support forces, signal forces including all-arms

signal and C2 support forces are capable of

signal communications as well as non-military

performing the following tasks as a military

service providers.

contribution to establishing security and state

order:

One prerequisite to be successful in establishing

security and state order in crisis areas is that the

• Consolidation:

relevant forces have access at all times to a

o training

and giving advice to

common role-based and up-to-date operational

telecommunications personnel

picture.

o providing advice and assistance in setting

up a communications infrastructure

The Army Command, Control and Information

within the host nation

System (FüInfoSysH) and the future command,

• Other tasks:

control, information, and weapons control

o ensuring and improving the command

system (FüWES) provide the necessary technical

and control capability

basis. The automated exchange of information

with the command, control and information

6.2.14 Military Police

systems of other armed and joint services, allies,

partners or even civilian actors with systems of

Performing their policing and technical tasks with

their own must be improved step by step.

their vehicles, materiel and equipment issued,

Military Police forces lend themselves well to

The transfer of information as part of information

help establishing and maintaining security and

supply is realised via the core network/system

state order, especially so for standard police tasks.

establishing a network both between areas of

Their command and control equipment permits

operation abroad and to the home base. There are

quick-response,

coordinated

and

mobile

access networks connected to this core

employment.

network/system which are set up and operated by

command support and signal forces.

Military Police forces are an indispensable part of

the force package not only in maintaining public

On Bundeswehr operations abroad satellite

order but also in restoring it. Military Police

communication, radio relay, HF, VHF and trunked

support is particularly important in securing

radio are used; their available maximum data and

actionable evidence, clarifying and documenting

voice transmission rates, however, may vary

the facts of a conflict to be subsequently dealt

depending on the system employed.

with in court, and for crowd and riot control. The

Physical challenges such as insufficient range or

equipment available to the Military Police

terrain obstacles may require the dismounted

includes a number of non-lethal weapons whose

operation of signal forces and command and

controlled employment enables intervening forces

control support forces, for instance radio or relay

to provide fast and qualified support in operations

teams positioned at terrain points crucial for

of that nature. Depending on the situation,

network operations.

Military Policemen and women may be directed to

cooperate with the combat units.

Since incoming information usually exceeds the

the volume of information that can be processed

To avoid friction, any employment of the Military

(information overload), the necessary exchange

Police must be coordinated with the military

relations must be permanently analysed and

leader responsible for a specific area.

adjusted by a powerful and quick-response

Military Police forces help compile the military

information management.

and civil situation picture by contributing, via

Only by mission- and situation-related assessment

their standardised reporting system, any findings

and specification of the actual information

gained through their operational reconnaissance.

requirement will crucial information be made

available in good time without encumbering

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Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1) - page 7