Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1)

Title: Control of Portable and

Doc No: AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2

Transportable Equipment

Rev No: C4

Page 11 of 25

Guideline

Dated: December, 2010

Originating Dept: ENG

Supply Voltage and Frequency

Portable hand held tools shall be connected to the normal site small power supply of

centre tapped 110volts, 50 Hz. Battery powered tools may be used where 110V tools

are impracticable following a risk assessment.

Welding sets or other large equipment, where 110v supply is impracticable, shall be

supplied by a suitable 3-phase welding socket [table 1, appendix A]. The length of

the supply cable shall be limited and precautions taken to ensure that the likelihood

of damage to the cable is minimised, by suitable routing and/or additional mechanical

protection.

Any other portable equipment that is not suitable for a

110V supply, such as

specialist test gear, shall be used only after a formal risk assessment involving the

REP.

Battery Powered Equipment

Portable battery powered equipment (including flashlights) shall not be used out on

site or in a hazardous area unless this use has been risk assessed, and where

required, is controlled by a permit to work.

Note: the risk assessment should involve the site REP.

Mobile Telephones

When switched on, normal mobile telephones transmit a signal at all times which

may be capable of igniting a flammable atmosphere. They are not permitted to be

used or carried in a hazardous area. Each site will have procedures in place to

control the carrying and use of mobile phones.

Note: sites may approve the use of EEXi telephones on site however their use will be

controlled by site procedures

Earthing

Electrical equipment will be electrically earthed unless double insulated.

Note: Double insulated tools need not be earthed however particular care is required when

double insulated tools are used as part of a larger assembly that is not double insulated, for

example drills with magnetic stand bases. In such cases the metalwork shall be earthed,

including those parts of the double insulated item.

Within the Bounds of the operating site any equipment requiring earthing will be

earthed to the site earthing system via suitably sized cabling.

Note: Onshore this will be the site earth bars, offshore this will be a welded stud onto the main

metal structure

This excludes off site construction projects under the control of projects. In this

instance the construction team is required to install and maintain suitable earthing

facilities which may include the installation and testing of temporary earth rods.

Note: Onshore this will be the site earth bars, offshore this will be a welded stud onto the main

metal structure

Note: BS2754 gives general advice on earthing arrangements

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<December 15, 2010>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2>>

Print Date: 2/1/2011

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE

CONTROLLED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CAN BE FOUND AT

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Title: Control of Portable and

Doc No: AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2

Transportable Equipment

Rev No: C4

Page 12 of 25

Guideline

Dated: December, 2010

Originating Dept: ENG

Integral Cords / Leads

Integral power cords or leads on portable hand held equipment need not be

protected by a metallic screen or armour, but shall be double insulated with a robust

outer insulated surface protecting the insulated conductors. Non-armoured

screened integral cords shall be limited to a maximum length of 2 metres and care

shall be taken to avoid mechanical damage. Repairs to integral cords are not

permitted and damaged cords shall be replaced.

Extension Leads

Extension leads are to be limited to 20 meters maximum length and normally no

more than two may be connected together. If a longer supply is required, this is

classified as a temporary installation and the Responsible Electrical Person (REP)

shall approve the design. Trailing cables may also give rise to a trip hazard and

measures shall be taken to minimise this, for example by temporarily securing the

cables to suitable supporting steelwork. Extension leads shall be flexible with an

earthed armour or braiding for resistance to cutting and fault protection.

Extension leads on drums shall be fully unwound before being used due to the risk of

overheating. Extension leads should not be routed through doors but where this is

unavoidable; the door shall be secured such that it is prevented from closing onto the

cable.

Note: When approving the design of temporary installations of this nature the earth loop

impedance and voltage drop will require consideration to ensure the circuit protection is able

to operate and disconnect the equipment in the event of an earth fault.

Note: Where a supply for portable equipment is from a pressurised to non-pressurised area

consideration should be given to the use of a cable transit to prevent loss of pressurisation.

Hazardous Areas

Hazardous areas are defined on the area classification drawings, but for simplicity it

can be assumed that all production plant areas are hazardous. Where practicable

portable equipment for use in hazardous areas shall be approved for use in Zone 1

hazardous areas, as even if initially intended for a Zone

2 area that portable

equipment can readily be repositioned. The use of equipment not certified for use in

a Zone 1 area is only permitted to be used in any hazardous area following

completion of a risk assessment and work will be covered by a suitable work permit

and continuous gas test.

Interruption to Work

Electrical portable equipment (including extension leads) shall be disconnected from

the supply when not in use. This applies to portable equipment but does not apply to

normally fixed equipment i.e. kettles, computers, photocopiers, lights etc.

Non-certified portable electrical equipment used in hazardous areas may not be left

unattended while energised.

Plugs and Sockets

The socket outlets used in the Caspian region are detailed in appendix A. Equipment

supplied to each site shall have the correct plug type supplied with it for that site.

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<December 15, 2010>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2>>

Print Date: 2/1/2011

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE

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Title: Control of Portable and

Doc No: AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2

Transportable Equipment

Rev No: C4

Page 13 of 25

Guideline

Dated: December, 2010

Originating Dept: ENG

Sockets are only to be used to supply power and plugs may only be used to receive

power.

Note: The design is to be such that when disconnected a plug is not energized (example:

leads should not have two plugs on either end as this means that one plug is supplying

power. The risk being that due to design, plugs have exposed conductors when unplugged -

if this plug is being used to supply power then you have exposed live conductors)

5.2 WORKSHOPS, STORES AND OFFICES

Transportable Workshops, Stores and Offices must be tested and inspected as lifting

gear, and suitable test/inspection plates shall be attached, or documentation supplied

to confirm certification.

Any electrical equipment provided in temporary workshops, stores and offices shall

comply with the requirements detailed in the preceding electrical section above. The

use of items not certified for Zone

1 hazardous areas should be avoided in

workshops and stores out on plant, unless the areas of use are protected by positive

pressurisation.

(The requirement for zone 1 certified equipment is to prevent non

certified equipment being used in an uncontrolled manner in hazardous areas that it

may not be suited too. If the location of the temporary workshop office or store is

sufficiently remote from hazardous areas and the boundary between the hazardous

and non hazardous area is clearly identified then the use of hazardous area certified

equipment is not required.)

Positive pressure can be provided by mechanically ventilating the space to provide

an internal pressure of 65 Pa above the ambient. The ventilation fan shall be suitable

for operation in a Zone 1 hazardous area and the supply to the internal non-certified

equipment is automatically isolated in the event of either a platform initiated

shutdown to the area or loss of pressurisation in the unit.

In exceptional circumstances, the Responsible Electrical Person (REP) may approve

the use of normal commercial electrical equipment for temporary installations,

provided that the supply is provided with a suitable shutdown scheme to isolate the

equipment automatically in the event of an incident and a suitable risk assessment

has been completed.

Connection to the site fire and gas system may not be generally required for

temporary workshop and stores. Whether offices are to be connected to the facilities

fire and gas system will be advised when the technical details are approved.

5.3 DIESEL ENGINES

Diesel Engines will not normally be located within or close to hazardous areas.

Where this is unavoidable then the engine will be certified for use within a hazardous

area as per BS EN 1834 1 2000 and GS134-8 or equivalent.

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<December 15, 2010>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2>>

Print Date: 2/1/2011

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE

CONTROLLED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CAN BE FOUND AT

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Title: Control of Portable and

Doc No: AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2

Transportable Equipment

Rev No: C4

Page 14 of 25

Guideline

Dated: December, 2010

Originating Dept: ENG

To allow remote shutdown in the event of an incident, diesel engines for use offshore

in the Caspian region shall be fitted with:

 A fuel solenoid valve, to shut down the engine when the solenoid is de-

energised. The solenoid shall be suitable for connection to the local site 110v

electrical supplies via a suitable cable and plug arrangement.

 Volt free tripping contacts

Diesel engines intended for use offshore remote to hazardous areas will meet as a

minimum a zone2 standard as per BS EN 1834 2000 any exemptions will be risk

assessed and be subject to the approval of the OIM and the area authority.

Diesel engines intended for use onshore remote to hazardous areas will be in a

sound and safe condition and will as a minimum have an emergency stop button.

Note for full guidance for diesel engines in hazardous areas see BS EN 1834 1 2000

Reciprocating internal combustion engines - Safety requirements for design and construction

of engines for use in potentially explosive atmospheres - Part 1: Group II engines for use in

flammable gas and vapour atmospheres

Note: Additional guidance can also be found in “Electrical Safety Guidelines” document

number AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00288-2

5.4 PNEUMATICALLY OPERATED MANRIDING WINCHES

Minimum Supply Criteria

 Overload protective device

 Emergency stop on air supply

 Integral emergency lowering device (in event of power failure)



10mm diameter multistrand wire rope galvanised with steel core construction

(factor of safety = 10-1)

 Assisting spooling device

 Upper and lower travel limit switches

 Slack wire detection system

 Failsafe control lever

 Derail protection on rope drum

 Drum guard

 Air exhaust silencer

 Supply air regulator filter/lubricator

 Dual braking facility (1 automatic and 1 manual)

 Marine paint specification

 Materials certification to DIN 50049 3.1.b

 CE compliant/type approved

Specifications

 Rated line pull capacity = 150kg max

 Operating air supply pressure (nominal) = 6.1bar

 Standard air consumption (nominal) = 54cfm

 Rope drum storage = 115m

 Rated line speed = 30m/minute

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<December 15, 2010>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2>>

Print Date: 2/1/2011

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE

CONTROLLED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CAN BE FOUND AT

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Title: Control of Portable and

Doc No: AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2

Transportable Equipment

Rev No: C4

Page 15 of 25

Guideline

Dated: December, 2010

Originating Dept: ENG

Note: This section has been extracted from UKCS-SOP-005 addendum 6

5.5 PORTABLE LIFTING EQUIPMENT

Portable lifting equipment is defined as moveable lifting appliances and accessories

for general use on the site,

All lifting equipment is tested, maintained and controlled by the provisions laid down

in the AzBu SSOW - Lifting& Rigging document UNIF-HSE-PRO-109.

6 REFERENCES

UNIF-ENG-STG-004

Caspian Lifting and Rigging Strategy

AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00048

Electrical Safety Guidelines

BS EN60079-17

Inspection and Maintenance in electrical

installations in hazardous areas

BS 2754:1976

Classification of electrical and electronic

equipment with regard to protection against

electric shock.

BS 7671

The Institution of Electrical Engineers

“Recommendations for the electrical and

electronic equipment of mobile and fixed offshore

installations”.

BS EN 1834-1:2000

Reciprocating internal combustion engines. Safety

requirements for design and construction of

engines for use in potentially explosive

atmospheres.

Health & Safety at Work Regulations, 1974

LOLER (1998)

Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment

Regulations

SI 1994 No.2063

The Supply of Machinery (Safety) Regulations

SI 1996 No. 913

The Offshore Installation and Wells Design &

Construction Regulations (DCR)

SI 1997 No.743

Prevention of Fire, Explosion & Emergency

Response Regulations (PFEER)

SI 1998 No. 2306

Provision and Use of Work Equipment

Regulations (PUWER)

GS 134-8

Requirements for the protection of diesel engines

operating in zone 2 hazardous areas

7 APPLICABLE TO

All sites / Installations

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<December 15, 2010>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2>>

Print Date: 2/1/2011

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE

CONTROLLED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CAN BE FOUND AT

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Title: Control of Portable and

Doc No: AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2

Transportable Equipment

Rev No: C4

Page 16 of 25

Guideline

Dated: December, 2010

Originating Dept: ENG

Revision Date

Authority

Custodian

Revision Details

<<August 30^th, 2008>>

<< Central Engineering

<<Electrical Technical

<< Initial Issue >>

Senior Authority,

Authority, Houghton,

Hepburn, Yvonne >>

Chris >>

<<February 09^th, 2009>>

<< Central Engineering

<< Electrical Technical

<<Changing Flame

Senior Authority

Authority

arrestor to Spark

Chris Houghton >>

Yvonne Hepburn >>

arrestor on the 2nd

check sheet

March 11, 2010

<< Central Engineering

<< Electrical Technical

Specific requirement

Senior Authority

Authority

to check for potential

Chris Houghton >>

Yvonne Hepburn >>

flammable materials

on portable

equipment where

heat is generated and

may ignite flammable

material to be

included in AzSPU

procedure for

portable and

transportable

equipment check

lists; Appendix C-

Equipment Inspection

Check Sheet,

Appendix D -

Transportable and

Portable Equipment

User Inspection,

APPENDIX E -

Inspection Check

Sheet for Diesel

Engines.

December 15, 2010

<< Central Engineering

<< Electrical Technical

Requirement for

Senior Authority

Authority

portable equipment to

Chris Houghton >>

Yvonne Hepburn >>

be used in excess of

500kG on a platform

to have an MoC so

that structural checks

can be made

Reference to 106

documents removed

and updated. Web

site for ordering

portable equipment

labels added

Updated equipment

check sheets for

diesel engines and

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<December 15, 2010>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2>>

Print Date: 2/1/2011

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE

CONTROLLED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CAN BE FOUND AT

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Title: Control of Portable and

Doc No: AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2

Transportable Equipment

Rev No: C4

Page 18 of 25

Guideline

Dated: December, 2010

Originating Dept: ENG

Appendices

8.1 APPENDIX A- PORTABLE POWER OUTLET INFORMATION

Location

Duty

Voltage

Manufacturer

Socket Type

Plug Type

Sangachal

110v

110v / 50Hz / 1 phase /

CEAG

GHG511 4304

GHG 511 7304 R0001

Terminal

16A

Sangachal

220v

220v / 50Hz / 1 phase

Crouse Hinds

CPS 152-301-SA

CPP516 or CPP512

Terminal (EOP)

Sangachal

380v

380V / 50Hz / 3ph + E

Crouse Hinds

SRD6424D

SP6463D or SP6465D

Terminal (EOP)

Sangachal

Welding

660v / 50Hz / 3 phase +

CEAG

GHG514 4405

GHG 514 7405 R0001

Terminal

Feeder

earth / 63A

Shah

Deniz

110v

110v / 50Hz / 1 phase /

CEAG

GHG511 4304

GHG 511 7304 R0001

Platform

16A

Shah

Deniz

Welding

400v / 50Hz / 3 phase +

CEAG

GHG514 4506

GHG 514 7506 R0001

Platform

Feeder

earth / 63A

ACG Platforms

110v

110v / 50Hz / 1 phase /

CEAG

GHG511 4304

GHG 511 7304 R0001

16A

ACG Platforms

230v

230v / 50Hz / 1 phase /

CEAG

GHG511 4306

GHG 511 7306 R0001

16A

ACG Platforms

Welding

400V / 50Hz 3Ph + N +

CEAG

GHG514 4506

GHG 514 7506 R0001

Feeder

earth / 63A

Chirag

110v

110V / 50Hz / 1 phase

Lewden

PM16/520

PM16/500

Chirag

220v

220v / 50Hz / 1 phase

Crouse Hinds

CPS 152-301-SA

CPP516 or CPP512

Chirag

Welding

380V / 50Hz / 3ph + E

Crouse Hinds

SRD6424D

SP6463D or SP6465D

Feeder

BTC

240V

240v / 50Hz / 1 phase

Stahl

BTC

Welding

400V /50Hz 3Ph + N

Stahl

8146/5093

Feeder

SCP

110v

TBA

SCP

Welding

TBA

Feeder

WREP

110v

110v/16A/1Ph+N+E

Mennekes/Lewden

BS4343

PM16/500

WREP

230v

230v/32A/1Ph+N+E

Mennekes/Lewden

BS4343

PM32/501

230v/16A/1Ph+N+E

Mennekes/Lewden

BS4343

PM16/501

WREP

Welding

400v/ 63A 3Ph+N+E

CEAG

GHG

534

0002

GHG 534 2506 V0 6h

Feeder

R0716

NREP

110v

110v / 16A

CEAG

GHG511 4304

GHG 511 7304 R0001

NREP

240v

240v / 16A

CEAG

GHG543 4306

GHG543 2306 VO

NREP

Welding

380v / 3Ph+E

ABB

GHG534 1406 VO

(Shirvanovka and

Feeder

Siyazan)

NREP (Sumgayit)

Welding

415v / 3Ph+N+E

Stahl

8578/11-506

Feeder

NREP

(additional

240v

240v/ 16A

Legrand

Hypra

(Legrand

Shirvanovka

052026)

CCR)

NREP

(additional

Welding

380v / 3Ph+E

Legrand

Hypra

(Legrand

Shirvanovka

Feeder

053827)

CCR)

Supsa Terminal

110v

110v / 16A

CEAG

GHG511 4304

GHG 511 7304 R0001

Supsa Terminal

Welding

380V/ 63A

CEAG

ABB GHG

534

Feeder

1506

CEAG GHG 534

GHG 534 2506 V0 6h

0002

CEAG GHG 631

4606

Supsa Terminal

24V

10h / 24v 16A

Legrand

ATX PC

16X-

IP66

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<December 15, 2010>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2>>

Print Date: 2/1/2011

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE

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Title: Control of Portable and

Doc No: AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2

Transportable Equipment

Rev No: C4

Page 20 of 25

Guideline

Dated: December, 2010

Originating Dept: ENG

8.3 APPENDIX C- EQUIPMENT INSPECTION CHECK SHEET

*Owner / suppler:

*Equipment serial number:

*Equipment description:

*Equipment Hazardous Area Zone Classification:

*Materials used with the equipment (i.e. fuel used etc)

Propose Location

Proposed location Hazardous Area Classification

BP portable equipment tag number

Re-Inspection Period:

Date on site:

Date off site:

On Site Manifest no:

Off Site Manifest no:

CARRY OUT THE FOLLOWING CHECKS:

YES

Associated documentation (supplier)

Are maintenance records available and up to date?

Are operating and maintenance instruction/drawings supplied, applicable and legible?

Are calibration certificates supplied, applicable and in date?

Is the weight of the equipment identified

Is equipment certified for lifting and are certificates/ drawings/ method statements available, applicable and in date?

Are hazardous area equipment certificates supplied and applicable?

Are pressurised containers/vessels/PSV‟s certified and are certificates available, applicable and in date?

Is unit fitted with safety shutdown systems and if so are test certificates available?

Have the material data sheets been supplied with the associated COSHH assessment (ie fuels, ect)

General Inspection (Supplier)

*10

Is unit fitted with spark arrestors?

*11

Are all belts and guards correctly fitted?

*12

Are there any signs of modifications to the equipment that could affect its mechanical integrity or its lifting

capabilities?

*13

Is equipment in good all round condition, (i.e. No oil leaks, diesel leaks, frayed belts, damaged hoses or fittings etc)

and fully functional.

*14

Is unit electrically protected and if so are settings correct?

*15

Is all associated electrical equipment in good condition and correctly installed? (BS7671) (IEC60079 17)

Location / equipment selection considerations

Is portable equipment a new safety critical element (SCE)?

Does location of portable equipment impacting existing safety critical element (SCE)?

Is associated equipment certified for use in the proposed hazardous area (ie equipment and intakes and exhausts

are correctly sited)

Does the sited equipment effect any of the SCE (ie evacuation, escape routes, ventilation, weigh control)

Does the equipment have adequate electrical bonding to the site earthing system?

Function Test

Is unit tied into platform shutdown system and been tested?

Do all interlock systems work correctly

Is unit fitted with over speed/rig saver protection and if so does it work correctly?

Have safety shutdown systems been tested? (ie shutdowns, trips, etc)

Has electrical equipment with plugs been pat tested

Confirm that no miscellaneous flammable material stored in the machine

Comments

*Supplier

Electrical

Mechanical

Instrument/

Telecomms

Area

F&G

Authority

Name

Signature

Date

Note 1: If the equipment if replace due to breakdown before completion of task, the assessment must be completed again for replacement equipment

Note 2: On completion of inspection, this form together with an certification should be return to the portable equipment site coordinator for entering

portable equipment into the portable equipment register

Note 3: Where indicated with a * the supplier should complete this certificate before dispatch and send it with the equipment document pack

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<December 15, 2010>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2>>

Print Date: 2/1/2011

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Title: Control of Portable and

Doc No: AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2

Transportable Equipment

Rev No: C4

Page 21 of 25

Guideline

Dated: December, 2010

Originating Dept: ENG

8.4 APPENDIX D - TRANSPORTABLE AND PORTABLE EQUIPMENT USER INSPECTION

CHECK SHEET

OWNER / SUPPLER:

EQUIPMENT NUMBER:

EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION:

DATA OF INSPECTION

Inspection

YES

Comment

Is there any obvious damage to the

equipment or supplying cable

Is the plug damaged, for example is the

casing cracked or pins bent

Are there inadequate joints, including taped

joints in the cable

Is the outer sheath of the cable secured

effectively when it enters the plug or the

equipment

Has the equipment been subjected to

conditions for which it is not suitable

Is there any damage to the external casing

of the equipment of are there any loose

parts or screws

Is there any evidence of over heating (burn

marks or discoloration)?

Confirm that no miscellaneous flammable

material stored in the machined

If the answer to any of these questions is

„yes‟ the equipment should be isolated and

reported immediately

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<December 15, 2010>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2>>

Print Date: 2/1/2011

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Title: Control of Portable and

Doc No: AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2

Transportable Equipment

Rev No: C4

Page 23 of 25

Guideline

Dated: December, 2008

Originating Dept: ENG

8.5

APPENDIX E - INSPECTION CHECK SHEET FOR DIESEL ENGINES

Supplier:

Unit No.

INSPECTION OF DIESEL ENGINES

Unit Description:

Location:

Page No:

Periodic Function Check every 4 weeks ( 28 days)

Inspection at

Post Arrival

Parameter

Suppliers works

Checks

4 weeks

8 weeks

12 weeks

16 weeks

20 weeks

Coolant Temperature Trip Operates at ^oC

Low Lube Oil Pressure Trip

Operates at barg

Engine Vibration Trip

High Exhaust Temperature Trip Operates at ^oC

Over speed Trip

Operates at RPM

Exhaust Gas Temperature at Exit to Atmosphere ^oC

Manual Emergency Stop Operation

Does the engine meet the requirements of BS EN

1834 1 2000 and is it suitable for hazardous areas

110v Fuel solenoid shutdown valve or volt free

tripping contacts fitted

Confirm that no miscellaneous flammable material

stored in the machined

Normal Stop Operation

Lifting Certification Renewal

Name of Owner representative in attendance

Date of Inspection

Site Inspector

Location of Unit

NB - Completion of hatched areas is optional

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<March 11, 2010>>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2>>

Print Date: 2/1/2011

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Title: Control of Portable and

Doc No: AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2

Transportable Equipment

Rev No: C4

Page 24 of 25

Guideline

Dated: December, 2010

Originating Dept: ENG

8.6 APPENDIX F - AUDIT PROTOCOL

Audit Protocol

Audit Title:

Control of Portable and Transportable

Location:

AZSPU HSSE

HSSE-DOC-

Equipment

Ref:

Auditor Name and

Date:

Position:

Item

Standard

Findings

Evidence

Remedial Actions Required

Are procurers aware of

their responsibilities as

per the document

Have personnel been

nominated for

controlling hired and

transportable equipment

at site?

Are these personnel

aware of their

responsibilities as per

this document; is there

evidence of

implementation of the

procedure?

Is there evidence on site

that the procedure is

being followed

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<December 15, 2010->>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2>>

Print Date: 2/1/2011

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE CONTROLLED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CAN BE FOUND AT

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Title: Control of Portable and

Doc No: AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2

Transportable Equipment

Rev No: C4

Page 25 of 25

Guideline

Dated: December, 2010

Originating Dept: ENG

Audit Protocol

Audit Title:

Control of Portable and Transportable

Location:

AZSPU HSSE

HSSE-DOC-

Equipment

Ref:

Auditor Name and

Date:

Position:

Item

Standard

Findings

Evidence

Remedial Actions Required

How effective do you

consider this audit

procedure to be?

Does this document

need to be amended?

Are there any

outstanding actions

incomplete from the

previous audit?

Control Tier:

<<2>>

Revision Date: <<December 15, 2010->>

Document Number: << AZSPU-HSSE-DOC-00153-2>>

Print Date: 2/1/2011

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING. THE CONTROLLED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CAN BE FOUND AT

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Department of Defense

MANUAL

NUMBER O-5205.13

April 26, 2012

DoD CIO

SUBJECT: Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Security and Information Assurance (CS/IA)

Program Security Classification Manual (SCM)

References: See Enclosure 1

1. PURPOSE. In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5144.1 (Reference (a));

Executive Order (E.O.) 13526 (Reference (b)); E.O. 12829 (Reference (c)); and part 2001 of title 32,

Code of Federal Regulations (also known as “Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO)

Directive No. 1”) (Reference (d)) and the guidance in DoD Manual 5200.01-V1 (Reference (e)), this

SCM:

a. Establishes security classification guidance and identifies the original classification

authority (OCA) for DIB information developed during the implementation of DoD Instruction

(DoDI) 5205.13 (Reference (f)) in order to mitigate risks to critical DoD unclassified information

supporting present and future DoD warfighting capabilities and residing on, or transiting, DIB

unclassified private networks.

b. Identifies the level of protection required for information and materials produced under

the DIB CS/IA program, including information within the DIB CS/IA cyber intrusion damage

assessment process, between the DoD and DIB companies participating in the DIB CS/IA

Program (hereinafter referred to as “DIB participants”), and as described in the DoD-DIB

Framework for Cyber Security Information Sharing (Reference (g)) (hereinafter referred to as the

“Framework Agreement”).

c. Provides uniform criteria for the classification of aggregated DIB information and

information related to cyber intrusion damage assessments to protect it from unauthorized

disclosure. This SCM is the primary source of derivative classification guidance for reports and

assessments developed within the DIB CS/IA program.

d. Incorporates and cancels the DoD DIB CS/IA Interim Security Classification Guidance (Reference (h)).

2. APPLICABILITY

This document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of

Information Act. Exemption (b)(2) high applies.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

a. This SCM applies to:

(1) OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the

DoD, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within

the DoD (hereinafter referred to collectively as the “DoD Components”).

(2) Information developed and disseminated in direct support of the DIB CS/IA program.

Information originating from another DoD program or intelligence source is governed by the

appropriate program security classification guidance.

(3) Companies and programs participating in the DIB CS/IA program in accordance with

the Framework Agreement and contracts that contain DIB cyber security requirements for

safeguarding DoD classified and unclassified information. DIB participants shall handle

classified and sensitive unclassified information, such as controlled unclassified information

(CUI) (which includes For Official Use Only (FOUO) information), Critical Program

Information (CPI) (as described in DoDI 5200.39, (Reference (i)), as required by law and

regulation, the Framework Agreement, contracts, or this SCM.

b. This SCM does not address threat or intelligence information and materials generated

outside the DIB CS/IA program. Threat or intelligence information is classified by the agency

that generated the information.

3. DEFINITIONS. See Glossary.

4. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:

a. In accordance with Reference (b), information shall not be considered for

classification unless its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause

identifiable or describable damage to the United States’ national security, and it pertains

to one or more of the following:

(1) Military plans, weapons systems, or operations;

(2) Foreign government information;

(3) Intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;

(4) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the U.S., including confidential sources;

(5) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security;

(6) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

(7) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects,

plans, or protection services relating to the national security; or

(8) The development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction.

b. In accordance with Reference (b), Reference (c), Reference (e), DoD 5220.22-M (Reference

(j)), classified transmissions will adhere to Government regulations and procedures for the transmission

of classified information (e.g., SIPRNet, DIBNet-Secret, secure FAX, Secure Terminal Equipment).

c. In accordance with the Framework Agreement and DoD Instruction 8520.02 (Reference

(k)), unclassified transmissions of unclassified cyber threat information products from the DoD

to a DIB participant, and exchanges of information from the DIB participant to the DoD, will use

DoD-approved Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates.

d. Information provided by a DIB participant is inherently unclassified since the DIB does

not have original classification authority (Reference (e)). Information provided by the U.S.

Government must be properly classified in accordance with the appropriate program security

classification guide or manual.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES

a. DoD Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO). The DoD CIO shall:

(1) Oversee and monitor DoD compliance with this SCM.

(2) Exercise Original Classification Authority (OCA) for information and materials

produced under the DIB CS/IA program in accordance with References (a), (j), and (e).

(3) Oversee review of this SCM every 2 years and update it at least every 5 years.

b. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs (ASD(GSA)). The

ASD(GSA) shall, through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Cyber Policy,

and under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

(USD(P)), coordinate with DoD CIO on security classification decisions, integrating DIB CS/IA

cyber threat information sharing, and enhancing DoD and DIB cyber situational awareness in

accordance with Reference (e).

c. Heads of the DoD Components. The Heads of the DoD Components shall oversee

Component compliance with this SCM in accordance with Reference (e).

6. PROCEDURES

a. This SCM shall be cited as the authority for classification, changes in classification, and

declassification of all DIB CS/IA-related information and materials under DoD cognizance and

control. Changes in classification guidance required for operational necessity will be made upon

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

notification and concurrence of the OCA.

b. The OCA shall retain classification authority for information and materials produced

under the DIB CS/IA program. Users shall adhere to this Manual and shall cite authority derived

from this Manual when classification and markings are applied.

c. All inquiries concerning the content and interpretation of this guidance, as well as any

recommendations for changes, should be addressed to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) at:

DIB CS/IA Program Office

DoD CIO

6000 Defense Pentagon

Washington DC 20301-6000

E-mail: DIB.CS/IA.Reg@osd.mil

d. Authorized recipients of this SCM may, as necessary, reproduce, extract, and disseminate

the contents of this SCM consistent with References (e), (g), (j), or contract requirements.

e. Detailed procedures are contained in Enclosure 2.

7. RELEASABILITY. RESTRICTED. This SCM is approved for restricted release. It is

available to users with Common Access Card authorization on the Internet from the DoD

Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.

8. EFFECTIVE DATE.

a. This SCM is effective upon its publication to the DoD Issuances Website.

b. If this SCM is not otherwise reissued or cancelled in accordance with DoD Instruction

5025.01 (Reference (l)), it will expire effective April 26, 2022 and be removed from the DoD

Issuances Website.

Teresa M. Takai

DoD Chief Information Officer

Enclosures

1. References

2. Procedures

3. Classification Tables

Glossary

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ENCLOSURE 1: REFERENCES

ENCLOSURE 2: CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURES

GENERAL

REASONS AND LENGTH OF CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION STANDARDS

CLASSIFICATION BY COMPILATION

EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

CHALLENGES TO CLASSIFICATION

MARKING REQUIREMENT

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

RELEASE OF INFORMATION

ENCLOSURE 3: CLASSIFICATION TABLES

GLOSSARY

PART I. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

PART II. DEFINITIONS

TABLES

1. Terms

2. General Information

3. Associations

4. Threats

5. Incident Reporting And Cyber Intrusion Damage Assessment

6. Vulnerabilities

FIGURES

1. Classification Explanations

2. Derivative Classification Markings

3. Derivative Classification Markings (Multiple Sources)

4. Distribution Statements

CONTENTS

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

ENCLOSURE 1

REFERENCES

(a)

DoD Directive 5144.1, “Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information

Integration/DoD Chief Information Officer (ASD(NII)/DoD CIO),” May 2, 2005

(b)

Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” December 29, 2009

(c)

Executive Order 12829, “National Industrial Security Program,” January 6, 1993, as

amended

(d)

Part 2001 of title 32, Code of Federal Regulations (also known as Information Security

Oversight Office (ISOO) Directive No. 1, “Classified National Security Information; Final

Rule,” June 28, 2010)

(e)

DoD Manual 5200.01-V1, “DoD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and

Declassification,” February 24, 2012

(f)

DoD Instruction 5205.13, “Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Security/Information

Assurance (CS/IA) Activities,” January 29, 2010

(g)

DoD-DIB Framework for Cyber Security Information Sharing (also known as the

“Framework Agreement”)¹

(h)

DoD Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Security/Information Assurance (DIB CS/IA)

Interim Security Classification Guidance, November 20, 2009 (hereby cancelled)²

(i)

DoD Instruction 5200.39, “Critical Program Information (CPI) Protection Within the

Department of Defense,” July 16, 2008

(j)

DoD 5220.22-M, “National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual,”

February 28, 2006

(k)

DoD Instruction 8520.02, “Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Public Key (PK) Enabling,”

May 24, 2011

(l)

DoD Instruction 5025.01, “DoD Directives Program,” October 28, 2007

(m) DoD Manual 5200.01-V2, “DoD Information Security Program: Marking of Classified

Information,” February 24, 2012

(n) DoD Directive 5230.24, “Distribution Statements on Technical Documents,”

March 18, 1987

(o) U.S. Security Authority for NATO Affairs Instruction 1-07, “North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) Security,” April 5, 2007³

(p) DoD Directive 5230.09, “Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release,”

August 22, 2008

(q) DoD Directive 5230.25, “Withholding of Unclassified Technical Data From Public

Disclosure,” November 6, 1984

(r) DoD Instruction 5230.29, “Security and Policy Review of DoD Information for Public

Release,” January 8, 2009

(s) DoD 5400.7-R, “DoD Freedom of Information Act Program,” September 4, 1998

¹ Reference may be obtained from the DIB CS/IA Program Office, DoD CIO, 6000 Defense Pentagon, Washington

DC 20301-6000, E-mail: DIB.CS/IA.Reg@osd.mil

² Reference may be obtained from the DIB CS/IA Program Office, DoD CIO, 6000 Defense Pentagon, Washington

DC 20301-6000, E-mail: DIB.CS/IA.Reg@osd.mil

³ Reference may be obtained from the Central U.S. Registry (https://secureweb.hqda.pentagon.mil/cusr/)

ENCLOSURE 1

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

(t)

DoD Directive 5400.07, “DoD Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program,”

January 2, 2008

(u) DoD 5205.02-M, “DoD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program Manual,”

November 3, 2008

(v) National Disclosure Policy (NDP-1), "National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of

Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations,"

(short title: National Disclosure Policy (NDP-1)), October 1, 1988

(w) DoD Directive 5230.11, “Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign

Governments and International Organizations,” June 16, 1992

(x) DoD Directive 5530.3, “International Agreements,” June 11, 1987

(y) Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Unclassified Information,” November 4, 2010

(z) Joint Publication 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated

Terms,” current edition

ENCLOSURE 1

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

ENCLOSURE 2

CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURES

1. GENERAL

a. This enclosure provides guidance on the level and duration of classification for each

specific topic covered by this SCM, as determined by the OCA. References (b) and (e) provide

further guidance on the level and duration of classification and describe all classification

duration options available to the OCA.

b. DIB CS/IA is the DoD program to protect critical DoD unclassified program, technology,

and operational information residing on, or transiting, DIB unclassified networks. DoD

Components and industry participants collaborate to protect DoD information through the

development, implementation, and execution of DoD and DIB processes and procedures.

c. Classification of specific system capabilities is generally addressed in individual DoD

Component program, system, or operations planning security classification guides or manuals.

For security classification guidance on threat, intelligence information, or information related to

other DoD programs that may be included in information and materials produced under the DIB

CS/IA program, refer to the appropriate published security classification guide or manual or the

agency that originated the information in question.

d. DoD Components are responsible for validating compliance with this SCM for their

specific contractor or industry support.

2. REASONS AND LENGTH OF CLASSIFICATION

a. Classification is reserved for specific categories of information, or the compilation of

related information, meeting the standards and criteria for classification as defined in Reference

(e) and DoD Manual 5200.01-V2 (Reference (m)).

b. References (b) and (e) provide guidance on the duration of classification.

3. CLASSIFICATION STANDARDS

a. Information and materials produced under the DIB CS/IA program must meet the

standards for classification as cited in Reference (b) and implemented by Reference (e). When

determining classification of information produced under the DIB CS/IA program, the OCA

must determine whether:

(1) Information and materials produced under the DIB CS/IA program is owned by,

produced by or for, or is under the control of the U.S. Government. In this context “control”

ENCLOSURE 2

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

means the authority of the agency that originates the information, or its successor in function, to

regulate access to the information.

(2) Information and materials produced under the DIB CS/IA program falls within one or

more of the categories of information listed in References (b) and (e).

(3) Unauthorized disclosure of the information and materials produced under the DIB

CS/IA program could reasonably be expected to result in damage to U.S. national security,

which includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the OCA is able to identify or

describe the damage.

b. Organizations that only reproduce, extract, or summarize classified information, or who

apply classification markings derived from source material or as directed by a security

classification guide or manual, need not possess original classification authority.

4. CLASSIFICATION BY COMPILATION

a. . A compilation of unclassified information is normally not classified. Information

originating from contractors is unclassified. However, in certain circumstances, a compilation of

unclassified information could become classified. If the compiled information infers an

additional association or relationship that meets the standards for classification in Reference (e),

then it could be classified because of the association revealed. When the OCA determines that

classification by compilation is necessary, the OCA must provide an explicit explanation as to

what elements of the compilation, when combined, require classification and the reason for

classification and the proposed level of classification.

b. A compilation of classified information should be classified at the same level as the

highest classification level of any item of information contained therein until the OCA can render

a judgment on the classification of the compilation. Under certain conditions a compilation of

multiple items of information, all of which are classified at one level (e.g., CONFIDENTIAL),

can be classified at a higher level (e.g., SECRET) if the total damage caused by the unauthorized

release of all of these items of information meets the criteria for a higher classification.

c. In accordance with References (e) and (m), when a document is classified by compilation,

the overall classification must be marked conspicuously at the top and bottom of each page. An

explanation for classification by compilation must be placed on the face of the document or in

the text. If portions standing alone are unclassified, but the document is classified by

compilation or association, mark the portions “U” and the document and pages with the

classification of the compilation. The statements in Figure 1 must be used to explain the

classification.

ENCLOSURE 2

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

Figure 1. Classification Explanations

Classified by: DoD CIO or other OCA

Reason: (Insert justification)

Declassify on: (Enter appropriate date)*

* 5 years for CONFIDENTIAL; 10 years for SECRET; 25 for TOP

SECRET

5. EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

a. A situation may arise where a holder of U.S. Government information has reason to

believe:

(1) Information should be classified but it is not covered by this SCM;

(2) A compilation of unclassified information should be classified; or

(3) Information should be classified, and thus handled and safeguarded, at a higher level

of classification.

b. Under such circumstances the information shall be marked with the anticipated level of

classification and the notation “Pending Classification Review” and transmitted to the OCA for a

classification determination.

6. CHALLENGES TO CLASSIFICATION

a. If holders of information have substantial reason to believe that the information is

improperly or unnecessarily classified, they shall communicate those reasons to their security

manager or the classifier of the information.

b. If any of the security classification guidance contained in this SCM is challenged, the

items of information involved shall be protected at the higher level until the OCA renders a final

decision on the challenge. Address classification challenges to the OCA, through the DIB CS/IA

Program, via the activity security manager and the originator of the classified information.

c. If a conflict occurs between the classification guidance in this SCM and that associated

with other specific capabilities, programs, or guidance, promptly notify the OCAs of all

concerned programs to adjudicate the differences. Until resolved, the more stringent guidance

shall be followed.

ENCLOSURE 2

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

d. Organizations wishing to classify DIB CS/IA-produced data (e.g., reports or threat

products) at levels higher than the prescribed minimums listed in this SCM must submit to the

OCA a letter detailing the justification for the increased level of classification. Include with the

submission a means by which this data can be displayed and used at the prescribed level, and an

assessment of whether all holders of the information can be notified of the change in

classification. The OCA will review the submitted request and issue a formal adjudication

within 60 days of receipt. If the decision is to upgrade the classification, the OCA shall notify all

holders of the change in classification.

7. MARKING REQUIREMENT

a. Documents and other products covered by this SCM will be marked in accordance with

References (b), (e), (m), and DoDD 5230.24 (Reference (n)).

b. When information is derivatively classified:

(1) Using this SCM as the source, markings should reflect the information in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Derivative Classification Markings

Classified by: (Use name and title or personal identifier of

document author)

Derived From: DoDM 5205.13, date

Declassify On: (Use the date or event stated in the declass

column of the appropriate topic in tables 1 through 6 of

Enclosure 3 of DoDM 5205.13

(2) On the basis of more than one source document or classification guide, the marking

should reflect the information in Figure 3. If “Multiple Sources” are used for a derivatively

classified document, the derivative classifier shall include a listing of the source materials on, or

attached to, the derivatively classified document.

Figure 3. Derivative Classification Markings (Multiple Sources)

Derived From: Multiple Sources

Declassify On: (Use the most restrictive declassification

guidance from all the source documents)

8. FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

a. The U.S. Government affords protection to information provided by foreign governments.

Classification designations for foreign government information in many cases do not parallel

U.S. classification designations. Many foreign governments and international organizations have

a fourth level of classification “Restricted”, and a category of unclassified information that is

ENCLOSURE 2

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

protected by the originating country and must be treated “in confidence”. The portions of the

document that contain the foreign government information shall be marked to indicate the

government and classification level, using accepted country code standards. If information

produced under the DIB CS/IA program contains foreign government information, follow the

proper safeguarding, marking, and handling of foreign government information as directed in

Reference (e).

b. NATO classified information shall be safeguarded in compliance with U.S. Security

Authority for NATO Affairs Instruction 1-07 (Reference (o)).

9. RELEASE OF INFORMATION

a. Public Release

(1) Government unclassified information is not releasable to the public without review.

DoD information requested or proposed for release shall be processed in accordance with DoDD

5230.09 (Reference (p)), DoDD 5230.25 (Reference (q)), DoDI 5230.29 (Reference (r)), DoD

5400.7-R (Reference (s)), DoDD 5400.07 (Reference (t)), and DoD 5205.02-M (Reference (u)).

(2) DoD shall take reasonable steps, by controlled access and need-to-know procedures,

to protect against public release of DIB participant information. Full use of the exemptions of

the DoD Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program (Reference (t)) shall be used to protect

against disclosure of DIB participant information to unauthorized persons.

b. Release to U.S. Government Agencies and Contractors

(1) Classified DoD information will be released to U.S. Government agencies and

contractors in accordance with References (e), (g), and (j).

(2) Based on this SCM, sensitive unclassified information, critical program information,

proprietary information, or attribution information may be provided to other DoD Components,

other U.S. Government agencies, and U.S. contractors only in accordance with the signed

Framework Agreement and upon determination by the holder of the information that the

requester has the proper level of security clearance and has a valid “need-to-know.” DIB

attribution or proprietary information will be protected and distribution limited in accordance

with the Framework Agreement, if applicable, and Federal statutes.

(3) Pursuant to this SCM, authority is delegated to the Heads of the Defense Criminal

Investigative Organizations (DCIOs) to release information and materials produced under the

DIB CS/IA program marked FOUO, to local U.S. law enforcement counterparts, when the

release is required in the timely performance of law enforcement activities, and when

accomplished in accordance with applicable law and regulations.

(4) Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3) products for the DIB CS/IA program, incident

reports, and cyber intrusion damage assessment documents prepared by DoD shall use

ENCLOSURE 2

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT F in Reference (n) as shown in Figure 4, as appropriate.

Documents that are export controlled must have the required export controlled warning statement

applied. In addition, the documents will be labeled with the appropriate FOIA exemption, in

accordance with Reference (t).

Figure 4. Distribution Statements

Further distribution only as directed by DoD CIO in the DoD-DIB Framework for Cyber

Security Information Sharing or higher DoD authority; [date].

c. Foreign Disclosure

(1) Classified information is a national security asset that shall be protected and shall be

shared with foreign governments only when there is a clearly defined benefit to the U.S.

Government. Disclosure to foreign officials of information classified by this SCM shall be in

accordance with the procedures set forth in the National Disclosure Policy (Reference (v))as

implemented in Reference (b), Reference (j), DoDD 5230.11 (Reference (w)), DoDD 5530.3

(Reference (x)), and in other established agreements.

(2) Release or disclosure to foreign officials of information and materials produced

under the DIB CS/IA program is authorized only in accordance with this SCM or with DIB

CS/IA policy or program guidance, including the Framework Agreement and must follow

disclosure procedures in References (b), (e), (w), and (x). For law enforcement purposes only,

after appropriate foreign disclosure review, DCIOs are authorized to release information and

materials produced under the DIB CS/IA program marked FOUO to foreign law enforcement

counterparts in accordance with applicable law and regulations.

d. CUI

(1) There are certain types of unclassified information that do not meet the standards and

criteria for classification established in Reference (b), but for which Executive Branch agencies

require application of controls and protective measures for a variety of reasons. This information

is referred to collectively as CUI (see Glossary). E.O. 13556 (Reference (y)), establishes the

National Archives and Records Administration as the Executive Agent for establishing a

program for managing CUI. Upon establishment of the executive branch CUI program, CUI

categories and subcategories shall serve as exclusive designations for identifying unclassified

information throughout the executive branch that requires safeguarding or dissemination

controls, pursuant to and consistent with applicable law, regulations, and Government-wide

policies.

(2) FOUO is a designation applied to unclassified information (Reference (e)) that may

be exempt from mandatory release to the public under the FOIA (Reference (t)). The FOIA

specifies nine exemptions that may qualify certain information to be withheld from release to the

public if, by its disclosure, a foreseeable harm would occur. See Reference (s) for guidance on

the FOIA exemptions. Once the CUI program is established, FOUO in this security

classification manual shall be replaced with the appropriate CUI designation.

ENCLOSURE 2

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

ENCLOSURE 3

CLASSIFICATION TABLES

1. Tables 1 through 6 provide security classification guidance for information and materials

produced under the DIB CS/IA program. In each table:

a. Column 1 provides the specific element, item, or category of information to be protected.

b. Column 2 provides the minimum classification for those items listed in Column 1.

c. Columns 3 and 4 provide the reason for classification and the declassification

specification in accordance with Reference (e).

d. Column 5 provides special marking and handling guidance and remarks.

2. If information is designated FOUO, a determination of which FOIA exemption applies must

be made when the information is requested under the FOIA. For information and materials

produced under the DIB CS/IA program, exemptions 2, 4, or 7 commonly apply.

3. The markings and classifications listed are the minimum to be applied. Data associated with

a specific DoD classification level (e.g., SECRET) will be handled in accordance with

References (b), (e), (g), (j), and (w). Network and information security requirements will be

included in contracts via Federal Acquisition Regulations, Defense Federal Acquisition

Regulations, the DD-254 “DoD Department of Defense Contract Security Classification

Specification”, and the “Addendum to DD Form 254 (Block 10j) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.”

4. When intelligence or information from another DoD program is involved, always refer to the

originating intelligence or DoD program source, document, or security classification guidance

for the proper (derivative) classification.

ENCLOSURE 3

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

Table 1. Terms

TOPIC (Element, Item, Category

CLASSIFICATION

REASON

DECLASS

REMARKS

of Information)

(Reference (b))

The term and/or definition of “DIB CS/IA.”

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

The term and/or definition of “Advanced Persistent

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

Threat.”

The term and/or definition of “Passive network

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

security measure.”

The term and/or definition of “DIB CS/IA Incident

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

Report” or “Intrusion Event.”

The term and/or definition of “DIB Cyber Intrusion

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

Damage Assessment Report.”

The term and/or definition of “Damage

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

Assessment.”

Table 2. General Information

TOPIC (Element, Item, Category

CLASSIFICATION

REASON

DECLASS

REMARKS

of Information)

(Reference (b))

DIB created network mapping or other collected

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

• Mark and handle as FOUO. Use

network data on a DIB participant unclassified

FOIA exemption (b)(4)

network provided to DoD.

Classification and special handling

restrictions may be required and shall

be applied if warranted by program,

system, or operations planning

classification guidance. General and

specific Government provided

information will be classified and

handled in accordance with

appropriate security classification

guidance and other appropriate

guidance. Consult appropriate

classification guides.

ENCLOSURE 3

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

Table 2. General Information, Continued

TOPIC (Element, Item, Category

CLASSIFICATION

REASON

DECLASS

REMARKS

of Information)

(Reference (b))

•

Proprietary information collected

during collaboration with a DIB

participant will be protected at a

minimum as FOUO and handled in

accordance with the Framework

Agreement and the non-disclosure

agreement (NDA), as applicable, with

the respective DIB participant. Mark

document with distribution statement

as required by section 9 of Enclosure

General budget information on DIB CS/IA activities

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO. Use

(pre-decisional or pre-Program Objective

FOIA exemption (b)(5).

Memorandum).

•

Pre-decisional documents shall be

marked “Unauthorized release of this

document is prohibited.”

•

NDA must be on file for non-

Government access to specific

planning, programming, budgeting,

and execution data.

Specific budget information on DIB CS/IA

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO. Use

activities (pre-decisional or pre-Program Objective

FOIA exemption (b)(5).

Memorandum).

•

Pre-decisional documents shall be

marked “Unauthorized release of this

document is prohibited.”

•

NDA must be on file for non-

Government access to specific

planning, programming, budgeting,

and execution data.

ENCLOSURE 3

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

Table 2. General Information, Continued

TOPIC (Element, Item, Category

CLASSIFICATION

REASON

DECLASS

REMARKS

of Information)

(Reference (b))

An Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) cover name

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO. Use

by itself or an abbreviation of a cover name.

FOIA exemption high (b)(2).

•

Cover names are not generally used in

unclassified channels because

information becomes classified when

the cover name is associated with

many types of information. A cover

name abbreviation should be treated in

the same way as the cover name itself.

The broad concepts and general discussions

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO if

associated with the DIB CS/IA activity.

identifying a specific DIB participant

unless the DIB participant has self-

disclosed its identity. Use FOIA

exemption (b)(4).

The fact that the DoD participates with the DIB to

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO if

assist with improving the protection of its

identifying a specific DIB participant

unclassified networks containing critical DoD

unless the DIB participant has self-

unclassified information and network defense

disclosed its identity. Use FOIA

activities.

exemption (b)(4).

•

DoD declines to provide the names of

participating companies; it is the

prerogative of individual companies if

they choose to self-disclose their

participation. Mark document with

distribution statement as required by

section 9 of Enclosure.

The fact that DC3 is involved and leverages,

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Information will be cleared for public

integrates, generates, disseminates and analyzes

release in accordance with References

cyber threat information products, processes, and

(p) and (r).

systems.

ENCLOSURE 3

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

Table 2. General Information, Continued

TOPIC (Element, Item, Category

CLASSIFICATION

REASON

DECLASS

REMARKS

of Information)

(Reference (b))

The fact that DoD is evaluating, formulating polices

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Information will be cleared for public

for, and developing capabilities associated with DIB

release in accordance with References

cyber security.

(p) and (r).

The fact that the Damage Assessment Management

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Information will be cleared for public

Office (DAMO) Case Management System tool is

release in accordance with References

used to analyze files and data. (DAMO is located in

(p) and (r).

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.)

Information on or a description of the cyber

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Information will be cleared for public

intrusion damage assessment process that would be

release in accordance with References

found in flowcharts, project schedules, written

(p) and (r).

descriptions, concepts of operations, and standard

operating procedures.

The general fact that the DC3 Defense Computer

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Information will be cleared for public

Forensics Laboratory is analyzing a specific

release in accordance with References

intrusion or doing digital forensics work.

(p) and (r).

Information revealing specifics of a DoD-led

CONFIDENTIAL

1.4(c)

5 years

•

Intelligence information will be

counterintelligence investigation of a DIB intrusion.

classified in accordance with the

appropriate intelligence classification

guidance.

Information revealing specifics of a DoD led law

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO. Use

enforcement investigation of a DIB intrusion.

FOIA exemption (b)(7).

ENCLOSURE 3

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

Table 3. Associations

TOPIC (Element, Item, Category

CLASSIFICATION

REASON

DECLASS

REMARKS

of Information)

(Reference (b))

DIB participant provided information associating

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO. Use

domain name of attack source with IP address of

FOIA exemption (b)(6).

attack source.

•

General and specific Government

provided information will be classified

and handled in accordance with

appropriate classification guidance.

Associating name of DIB participant or attribution

SEE REMARKS

SEE

•

Intelligence information will be

information with a named APT.

REMARKS

classified in accordance with the

appropriate intelligence classification

guidance.

•

Mark and handle as FOUO if

identifying a specific DIB participant.

Use FOIA exemption (b)(4).

•

DoD declines to provide the names of

participating companies; it is the

prerogative of individual companies if

they choose to self-disclose their

participation. Mark document with

distribution statement as required by

section 9 of Enclosure 2.

Associating name of DIB participant(s) with a

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO if

specific cyber intrusion damage assessment case

identifying a specific DIB participant.

number.

Use FOIA exemption (b)(4).

•

DoD declines to provide the names of

participating companies; it is the

prerogative of individual companies if

they choose to self-disclose their

participation. Mark document with

distribution statement as required by

section 9 of Enclosure 2.

ENCLOSURE 3

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

Table 4. Threats

TOPIC (Element, Item, Category

CLASSIFICATION

REASON

DECLASS

REMARKS

of Information)

(Reference (b))

Information revealing Foreign Intelligence Entity

SECRET

1.4(c)

10 years

•

Intelligence information will be

attribution or tools, tradecraft, or procedures, when

classified in accordance with the

derived from classified information, including

appropriate intelligence classification

classification resulting from the compilation of

guidance.

unclassified DoD information.

General information regarding a DIB CS/IA

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO. Use

incident.

FOIA exemption (b)(4).

General information about the transmittal of

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO. Use

classified or unclassified cyber threat information

FOIA exemption (b)(2).

products.

Cyber threat information products.

SEE REMARKS

SEE

•

Intelligence information will be

REMARKS

classified in accordance with the

appropriate intelligence classification

guidance.

•

Mark and handle in accordance with

Reference (j) and the guidance within

the cyber threat information product; if

unclassified, mark and handle as

FOUO. Use FOIA exemption high

(b)(2).

•

Sharing of cyber threat information

products data, classified or

unclassified, is restricted in

accordance with the Framework

Agreement.

The fact that an unnamed DIB participant has been

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Information will be cleared for public

exploited.

release in accordance with References

(p) and (r).

ENCLOSURE 3

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

Table 4. Threats, Continued

TOPIC (Element, Item, Category

CLASSIFICATION

REASON

DECLASS

REMARKS

of Information)

(Reference (b))

The fact that a named DIB participant has been

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO. Use

exploited.

FOIA exemption (b)(4).

•

Strict “need to know” basis.

•

Intelligence information will be

classified in accordance with the

appropriate intelligence classification

guidance.

•

DoD declines to provide the names of

participating companies; it is the

prerogative of individual companies if

they choose to highlight their

participation. Mark document with

distribution statement as required by

section 9 of Enclosure 2.

The fact that a DIB participant has been exploited

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO. Use

and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)

FOIA exemption (b)(4).

identified:

•

Strict “need to know” basis. Limited

- Are not attributed to a specific adversary; or

distribution in accordance with the

- When the TTPs are known via unclassified

Framework Agreement.

collection methods.

•

Intelligence information will be

classified in accordance with the

appropriate intelligence classification

guidance.

•

DoD declines to provide the names of

participating companies; it is the

prerogative of individual companies if

they choose to highlight their

participation. Mark document with

distribution statement as required by

section 9 of Enclosure 2.

ENCLOSURE 3

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

Table 4. Threats, Continued

TOPIC (Element, Item, Category

CLASSIFICATION

REASON

DECLASS

REMARKS

of Information)

(Reference (b))

The fact a DIB participant has been exploited and

SECRET

1.4(c)

10 years

•

Intelligence information will be

the TTPs identified:

classified in accordance with the

- Are attributed to a specific adversary; or

appropriate intelligence classification

- When the TTPs are known via classified

guidance.

collection methods.

•

General and specific Government

provided information will be classified

and handled in accordance with

appropriate security classification

guidance.

•

DoD declines to provide the names of

participating companies; it is the

prerogative of individual companies if

they choose to highlight their

participation. Mark document with

distribution statement as required by

section 9 of Enclosure 2.

ENCLOSURE 3

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

Table 5. Incident Reporting and Cyber Intrusion Damage Assessment (FOUO)

TOPIC (Element, Item, Category

CLASSIFICATION

REASON

DECLASS

REMARKS

of Information)

(Reference (b))

Information revealing Foreign Intelligence Entity

SECRET

1.4(c)

10 years

•

Intelligence information will be

attribution or TTPs, when derived from classified

classified in accordance with the

information, including classification resulting from

appropriate intelligence classification

the compilation of unclassified DoD information.

guidance.

The title or existence of an intrusion event report, an

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO. Use

interim compromise assessment, or a cyber

FOIA exemption (b)(4).

intrusion damage assessment report (if the title does

•

Classification may be required if there

not reveal the status or conduct of the report in

is content or compilation of data as

association with a DIB participant, intrusion, or

identified in this or other classification

exfiltration).

guides.

DIB participant generated report information about

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO. Mark

specific threat methodology.

document with distribution statement

as required by section 9 of Enclosure

2. Use FOIA exemption (b)(4).

Information on intrusion event reported by DIB

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO. Mark

participant, to include:

document with distribution statement

- Date(s)/time incident occurred or was

as required by section 9 of Enclosure

discovered

2. Use FOIA exemption (b)(4).

- Type of incident

•

Dissemination of incident reports (e.g.,

- Security category

Incident Collection Forms,

- Classification of information affected

Consolidated Report Forms) will be in

- Critical infrastructure affected

accordance with law and regulations,

- Description of attack

and the Framework Agreement.

- Method of detection

- IP address of attacker(s)

- Domain name of attacker(s)

- Destination port(s) and protocol(s)

ENCLOSURE 3

This document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA. Exemption (b)(2) high applies.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

Table 5. Incident Reporting and Cyber Intrusion Damage Assessment, Continued (FOUO)

TOPIC (Element, Item, Category

CLASSIFICATION

REASON

DECLASS

REMARKS

of Information)

(Reference (b))

- Suspected method of intrusion or attack

•

DIB participant generated information

- Suspected perpetrators or possible motivations

reporting is transmitted via signed and

- Name of Trojan(s) or malicious code(s)

encrypted email using DoD-approved

- Evidence of spoofing

PKI certificates in accordance with the

- Security structure in place

Framework Agreement. If DoD-

- Number of machines affected

approved PKI is not available,

- IP address of affected machine(s)

transmission will be via landlines or

- Domain name of affected machine(s)

other DoD-approved method.

- Operating system(s) of affected machine(s)

•

Classification and special handling

- Time of last patch of affected machine(s)

restrictions may be required and shall

- Functions of affected machine(s)

be applied if warranted by program,

- Application software affected

system, or operations planning

- Damage to machine(s) if applicable

classification guidance. Consult

appropriate classification guides.

•

Intelligence information will be

classified in accordance with the

appropriate intelligence classification

guidance. This includes methods of

information collection employed in the

intrusion. More information on this

issue can be provided by DC3.

•

Any report of an intrusion involving

classified information or systems must

be reported to Defense Security

Service (DSS) via procedures set forth

in Reference (j).

ENCLOSURE 3

This document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA. Exemption (b)(2) high applies.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

Table 5. Incident Reporting and Cyber Intrusion Damage Assessment, Continued (FOUO)

TOPIC (Element, Item, Category

CLASSIFICATION

REASON

DECLASS

REMARKS

of Information)

(Reference (b))

Information associating a DIB participant with an

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO. Use FOIA

intrusion event, interim compromise assessment

exemption (b)(4).

reports, or with unclassified elements of a cyber

•

Strict “need to know” basis. Limited

intrusion damage assessment report that does not

distribution in accordance with the

identify threat actors.

Framework Agreement.

•

Sharing of DIB participant attribution

or proprietary information is protected

in accordance with law and

regulations, and the Framework

Agreement. Mark document with

distribution statement as required by

section 9 of Enclosure 2.

Identification of potentially impacted DoD

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO. Use

programs resulting from an unauthorized intrusion

FOIA exemption (b)(4).

or compromise.

•

Strict “need to know” basis. Limited

distribution in accordance with the

Framework Agreement.

•

Classification and special handling

restrictions may be required and shall

be applied if warranted by program,

system, or operations planning

classification guidance. Consult

appropriate classification guides.

•

Mark document with distribution

statement as required by section 9 of

Enclosure 2.

ENCLOSURE 3

This document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA. Exemption (b)(2) high applies.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

Table 5. Incident Reporting and Cyber Intrusion Damage Assessment, Continued (FOUO)

TOPIC (Element, Item, Category

CLASSIFICATION

REASON

DECLASS

REMARKS

of Information)

(Reference (b))

Disk images of computers in support of incident

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO. Use

investigations.

FOIA exemption (b)(4).

•

Classify in accordance with the

classification of the system or if

required by other criteria such as if

possession of disk images reveals

classified associations, or if disks

contain classified data.

•

Pursuant to Reference (j), DSS is

responsible for incident investigation

if the system is classified or if the

disks contain classified information

(other than coincidentally by

compilation of unclassified

information).

The fact that a cyber intrusion damage assessment

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO. Use

was done, is ongoing, or will be conducted to

FOIA exemption high (b)(2).

determine damage impact to DoD programs.

Cyber Intrusion Damage assessment report,

SECRET

1.4(g)

10 years

•

Classification and special handling

preliminary or final.

restrictions may be required and shall

be applied if warranted by program,

system, or operations planning

classification guidance. Consult

appropriate classification guides.

•

Mark document with distribution

statement as required by section 9 of

Enclosure 2.

•

Intelligence information will be

classified in accordance with the

appropriate intelligence classification

guidance.

ENCLOSURE 3

This document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA. Exemption (b)(2) high applies.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

Table 5. Incident Reporting and Cyber Intrusion Damage Assessment, Continued (FOUO)

TOPIC (Element, Item, Category

CLASSIFICATION

REASON

DECLASS

REMARKS

of Information)

(Reference (b))

•

Consider compilation of data when

classifying and, if applicable, use

appropriate justification marking.

Details of the assessed loss or effects or impacts of

SECRET

1.4(g)

10 years

•

Classification and special handling

the compromise to DoD program(s) or systems in

restrictions may be required and shall

the cyber intrusion damage assessment report,

be applied if warranted by program,

compromise impact assessment, or any other

system, or operations planning

document or briefing.

classification guidance. Consult

appropriate classification guides.

•

Mark document with distribution

statement as required by section 9 of

Enclosure 2. Intelligence information

will be classified in accordance with

the appropriate intelligence

classification guidance.

Details of loss or effects or impacts to the DIB

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO. Use

participant infrastructure or information protection

FOIA exemption (b)(4).

capability when such infrastructure or information

•

Strict “need to know” basis. Limited

protection capabilities do not involve information

distribution in accordance with the

systems or networks that may impact or are used by

Framework Agreement. Mark

DoD Components.

document with distribution statement

as required by section 9 of Enclosure

ENCLOSURE 3

This document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA. Exemption (b)(2) high applies.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

Table 5. Incident Reporting and Cyber Intrusion Damage Assessment, Continued (FOUO)

TOPIC (Element, Item, Category

CLASSIFICATION

REASON

DECLASS

REMARKS

of Information)

(Reference (b))

Metrics or statistical facts that do NOT reveal

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO. Use

details of loss or impact (e.g., amount of data

FOIA exemption low (b)(2).

analyzed, types of files, number of files, number of

•

Mark document with distribution

programs affected).

statement as required by section 9 of

Enclosure 2.

DIB participant IP Address.

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO. Use

FOIA exemption (b)(4).

DIB participant IP address paired with a

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO. Use

vulnerability.

FOIA exemption (b)(4).

•

Strict “need to know” basis. Mark

document with distribution statement

as required by section 9 of Enclosure

Metrics or statistical facts that reveal details of loss

SECRET

1.4(g)

10 years

•

Classification and special handling

of information or impact.

restrictions may be required and shall

be applied if warranted by program,

system, or operations planning

classification guidance. Consult

appropriate classification guides.

•

Mark document with distribution

statement as required by section 9 of

Enclosure 2.

•

Intelligence information will be

classified in accordance with the

appropriate intelligence classification

guidance.

ENCLOSURE 3

This document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA. Exemption (b)(2) high applies.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

Table 5. Incident Reporting and Cyber Intrusion Damage Assessment, Continued (FOUO)

TOPIC (Element, Item, Category

CLASSIFICATION

REASON

DECLASS

REMARKS

of Information)

(Reference (b))

Periodic DIB participant status updates providing

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

• Mark and handle as FOUO. Use

projected schedules, timelines, participants, general

FOIA exemption (b)(4).

information, and assessment progress without

• Mark document with distribution

revealing preliminary results.

statement as required by section 9 of

Enclosure 2.

Forensic assessment analysis reports.

SEE REMARKS

SEE

• Marking and handling instructions are

REMARKS

as required by OCA.

• Classify in accordance with applicable

security classification guide.

The triage report or analysis revealing specific

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

• Mark and handle as FOUO. Use

programs or DIB participants.

FOIA exemption (b)(4).

• Classification and special handling

restrictions may be required and shall

be applied if warranted by program,

system, or operations planning

classification guidance. Consult

appropriate classification guides.

• Mark document with distribution

statement as required by section 9 of

Enclosure 2.

• Intelligence information will be

classified in accordance with the

appropriate intelligence classification

guidance.

ENCLOSURE 3

This document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA. Exemption (b)(2) high applies.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

Table 6. Vulnerabilities

TOPIC (Element, Item, Category

CLASSIFICATION

REASON

DECLASS

REMARKS

of Information)

(Reference (b))

Information on vulnerabilities for commercial off-

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

the-shelf (COTS) systems or components

(hardware, firmware, or software) for which the

vulnerability information is available within the

public domain and there is no value-added analysis

by a DoD Component.

Information on vulnerabilities for COTS systems or

SECRET

1.4(g)

10 years

•

Classification and special handling

components (hardware, firmware, or software) for

restrictions may be required and shall

which the vulnerability information is not available

be applied if warranted by program,

within the public domain and there is value-added

system, or operations planning

analysis by a DoD Component.

classification guidance. Consult

appropriate classification guides.

Information on unpatched vulnerabilities of DIB

UNCLASSIFIED

N/A

•

Mark and handle as FOUO. Use

participant unclassified information systems or

FOIA exemption (b)(4).

networks (including analysis or assessment).

•

Classification and special handling

restrictions may be required and shall

be applied if warranted by program,

system, or operations planning

classification guidance. Consult

appropriate classification guides.

•

Mark document with distribution

statement as required by section 9 of

Enclosure 2.

ENCLOSURE 3

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

GLOSSARY

PART I. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APT

Advanced Persistent Threat

COTS

commercial off-the-shelf

CPI

Critical Program Information

CUI

controlled unclassified information

DAMO

Damage Assessment Management Office

DC3

DoD Cyber Crime Center

DCIP

Defense Critical Infrastructure Program

DCIO

Defense Criminal Investigative Organization

DIB

Defense Industrial Base

DIB CS/IA

Defense Industrial Base Cyber Security/Information Assurance

DoDD

DoD Directive

FOIA

Freedom of Information Act

FOUO

For Official Use Only

information assurance

LES

Law Enforcement Sensitive

NDA

non-disclosure agreement

OCA

original classification authority

PKI

Public Key Infrastructure

RDA

research, development and acquisition

TTP

tactics, techniques and procedures

GLOSSARY

DoDM O-5205.13, April 26, 2012

PART II. DEFINITIONS

Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this SCM.

adversary. A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the

use of force may be envisaged.

APT. An extremely proficient, patient, determined, and capable adversary, including such

adversaries working together.

attribution information (regarding a DIB participant). Information that identifies a company or

its programs, whether directly or indirectly by the grouping of information that can be traced

back to the company (e.g., program description, facility locations, number of personnel).

compilation. An arrangement of preexisting materials (e.g., facts and statistics) gathered from

multiple sources into one document or other single repository, such as a database or data

management system.

Critical Program Information. Elements or components of an RDA program that, if

compromised, could cause significant degradation in mission effectiveness; shorten the expected

combat-effective life of the system; reduce technological advantage; significantly alter program

direction; or enable an adversary to defeat, counter, copy, or reverse engineer the technology or

capability. CPI includes information about applications, capabilities, processes, and end items;

elements or components critical to a military system or network mission effectiveness; or

technology that would reduce the U.S. technological advantage if it came under foreign control.

CUI. The designation “CUI” identifies information that does not meet the standards for national

security classification consistent with Reference (b), but is pertinent to the national interest of the

U.S. or to the important interests of entities outside the U.S. Government, and under law or

policy requires protection from unauthorized access or disclosure, special handling safeguards,

or prescribed limits on exchange or dissemination. CUI includes information labeled “FOUO,”

“Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU),” “Drug Enforcement Agency Sensitive,” and “Law

Enforcement Sensitive (LES).” Mark and handle CUI, including FOUO and other sensitive

information, in accordance with current DoD policy. See Reference (j) for further information.

cyber security. Includes preventing damage to, unauthorized use of, or exploitation of electronic

information and communications systems and the information contained therein to ensure

confidentiality, integrity, and availability; also includes restoring electronic information and

communications systems in the event of a terrorist attack or natural disaster.

DIB. See Joint Publication 1-02 (Reference (z)).

DIB participant. Commercial company signatory of the Framework Agreement.

GLOSSARY

Body Cavity Screening:

Technology Assessment

(Version 1.1)

DOJ Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

Sensor, Surveillance, and Biometric Technologies (SSBT)

Center of Excellence (CoE)

April 10, 2014

Prepared by

ManTech Advanced Systems International

1000 Technology Drive, Suite 3310

Fairmont, West Virginia 26554

Telephone: (304) 368-4120

Fax: (304) 366-8096

Dr. Lars Ericson, Director

UNCLASSIFIED

This project was supported by Award No. 2010-IJ-CX-K024, awarded by the National

Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions,

findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Justice.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Body Cavity Screening: Tech Assessment

April 2014

NIJ SSBT CoE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

iii

LIST OF TABLES

iii

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2.0 INTRODUCTION

2.1 About the SSBT CoE

3.0 QM BODY CAVITY SCREENING PROTOTYPE SUMMARY

4.0 ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

4.1 Programmatic

4.2 Technical

4.3 Practitioner Engagement

4.4 Operational Use

5.0 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TECHNOLOGY NEED

5.1 Sensors & Surveillance Technology Needs: Priorities

5.2 Body Cavity Screening System Requirements

5.3 BCS Applications in Criminal Justice

5.4 Feasibility of BCS Technology Limitations

5.4.1 Detection of Metal Objects

5.4.2 Enclosed System for Scanning

5.4.3 Scan Time

5.4.4 Audio-Visual Alert

5.4.5 Torso Scanning

5.5 Image Testing of Other Materials

5.6 Minimum Detection Rates

6.0 ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION

6.1 QM System Technology Maturity

6.2 NIJ QM Project Status

6.3 Criminal Justice Technology Need

6.4 EFT vs. Other Technology Approaches

7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

APPENDIX A: CRIMINAL JUSTICE PRACTITIONER QUESTIONNAIRE - SENSORS &

SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY NEEDS PRIORITIES

A-1

APPENDIX B: ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND REFERENCES

B-1

B.1 Acronyms and Abbreviations

B-2

B.2 References

B-3

UNCLASSIFIED

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Body Cavity Screening: Tech Assessment

April 2014

NIJ SSBT CoE

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: QM BCS System

Figure 2: Human Subject Inside BCS Device

Figure 3: BCS System Interior

Figure 4: Sensors & Surveillance Technology Needs Priorities

Figure 5: BCS Requirements Survey Results

Figure 6: Detection of Metallic Objects: Value

Figure 7: Detection of Metallic Objects: Priority Change

Figure 8: Enclosed System for Scanning: Value

Figure 9: Scan Time: Value

Figure 10: Scan Time: Priority Change

Figure 11: Audio-Visual Alert: Value

Figure 12: Audio-Visual Alert: Priority Change

Figure 13: Torso Scanning: Value

Figure 14: Torso Scanning: Priority Change

Figure 15: Material Type vs. Minimum Detection Rate

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: QM Body Cavity Screening Prototype Summary

Table 2: Sensors & Surveillance Technology Needs Priorities

Table 3: Detection of Metallic Objects: Revised Rating

Table 4: Scan Time: Revised Rating

Table 5: Audio-Visual Alert: Revised Rating

Table 6: Torso Scanning: Revised Rating

Table 7: Image Testing of Other Materials

UNCLASSIFIED

iii

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Body Cavity Screening: Tech Assessment

April 2014

NIJ SSBT CoE

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) Sensor, Surveillance, and Biometric Technologies (SSBT)

Center of Excellence (CoE) has conducted a technology assessment of a Body Cavity Screening

(BCS) system being developed by Quantum Magnetics

(QM, a component of Morpho

Detection).^[1,2] The research and development (R&D) is funded by NIJ (under Awards 2007-DE-

BX-K001 and

2011-IJ-CX-K001) to address the need of criminal justice personnel at

correctional facilities to screen persons for metallic and non-metallic contraband concealed in

body cavities. The QM system utilizes electric field tomography (EFT) as a new method of

detecting concealed contraband on or in a person. This report combines information gathered

from a site visit to QM and a survey of criminal justice practitioners to provide an independent

assessment of the project and technology to determine commercial maturity, current and

projected capabilities, overall value to the criminal justice community, and to assist NIJ in its

decision-making and research strategy.

The QM BCS system uses EFT on a human subject to detect the presence of non-metallic objects

on or in a person. The system has antenna positioned along the interior perimeter of a large 4’

diameter aluminum cylinder for transmitting and receiving low power radio waves. Wire mesh

is used as shielding around the lower third of a person and a metal plate is secured as a roof to

add additional environmental shielding. The system uses a custom-built multi-channel

spectrometer to transmit/receive radio waves. The backend software model subtracts the

theoretical signal from a human body, consisting of multiple basic organic materials (e.g., bone,

muscle) to reveal the rough presence of foreign objects. The system has only been tested with a

large plastic object and has not undergone parametric test and evaluation (T&E) or human

subject testing.

QM System Technology Maturity - The current laboratory prototype is at a Technology

Readiness Level

(TRL) 2-3

(i.e., Technology concept and/or application formulated OR

Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristics proof of concept).^[3]

QM Project Status - The project has suffered from schedule and work efficiency issues due to

organizational laboratory moves and the loss of key personnel. Based on information gathered

during the site visit, the SSBT CoE estimates that completing the project will require:

 Cost Estimate (includes burdens): $1.2 - 2M (basic research); $0.9 - 1.3M (prototype)

 Schedule Estimate ~2 yrs (basic research); 1 - 2 yrs (prototype)

Criminal Justice Technology Need - Based on the survey results from the limited Technology

Working Group (TWG) practitioner group, there continues to be a Medium-High priority

criminal justice technology need for Contraband Detection that is able to detect both metallic and

non-metallic objects concealed on or in a person in an affordable manner.

UNCLASSIFIED

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Body Cavity Screening: Tech Assessment

April 2014

NIJ SSBT CoE

SSBT CoE Recommendations - Based on the technology assessment of body cavity screening

technologies, the SSBT CoE provides the following three recommendations to NIJ:

1. NIJ should continue to pursue R&D of body cavity screening technologies capable

of detecting non-metallic objects. Based on the limited TWG survey, the technology

need remains at a Medium-High priority. There are few commercial options for meeting

this technology need. Therefore, this topic should remain a key priority for future NIJ

R&D funding. However, the topic should be left agnostic to the technology approach

used to deliver the practitioner capability.

2. NIJ should investigate regulation and policy issues regarding the use of low dose

transmission x-ray technologies in criminal justice contraband screening. This

technology is known to be able to detect non-metallic objects concealed in body cavities.

Changes in regulations at the state and federal levels could allow for the technology need

to be met by a low-cost technology that is already well established. Studies on the topic

from a technical and policy perspective could help educate criminal justice agencies and

legislatures.

3. There does not exist a compelling case to continue funding the current prototype

system and QM team. Although the QM project has made progress in tackling

fundamental technical challenges, there remain many technical, programmatic, and

operational challenges in the follow-on stages. For this technical topic, NIJ should return

to a competitive solicitation to allow alternative performers and technologies.

UNCLASSIFIED

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Body Cavity Screening: Tech Assessment

April 2014

NIJ SSBT CoE

2.0 INTRODUCTION

The NIJ SSBT CoE has conducted a technology assessment of a Body Cavity Screening (BCS)

system being developed by Quantum Magnetics (a component of Morpho Detection). The R&D

is funded by NIJ to address the need of criminal justice personnel at correctional facilities to

screen persons for metallic and non-metallic contraband concealed in body cavities. The QM

system utilizes electric field tomography

(EFT) as a new method of detecting concealed

contraband on or in a person. This report combines information gathered from a site visit to QM

and a survey of criminal justice practitioners to provide an independent assessment of the project

and technology to determine commercial maturity, current and projected capabilities, overall

value to the criminal justice community, and to assist NIJ in its decision-making and research

strategy.

2.1 About the SSBT CoE

The NIJ SSBT CoE is a center within the National Law Enforcement and Corrections

Technology Center (NLECTC) System. The Center provides scientific and technical support to

NIJ’s R&D efforts. The Center also provides technology assistance, information, and support to

criminal justice agencies. The Center supports the sensor and surveillance portfolio and

biometrics portfolio. The Centers of Excellence are the authoritative resource within the

NLECTC System for both practitioners and developers in their technology area(s) of focus. The

primary role of the Centers of Excellence is to assist in the transition of law enforcement

technology from the laboratory into practice by first adopters.