JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM VOLUME II PLANNING FORMATS AND GUIDANCE (1999)

CJCSM 3122.03A

31 December 1999

3. General. This appendix should help integrate the use of operations

security (OPSEC), military deception, PSYOP, electronic warfare, physical

destruction, computer network attack (CNA), and other capabilities. IO

can be waged in wartime inside and outside the traditional military

battlefield. IO can also be waged in Military Operations Other Than War

(MOOTW) both involving and not involving the use or threat of force.

Information warfare (IW) is IO conducted during crisis or conflict.

Synchronization of both offensive and defensive IO is essential. C2W is

an application of IO that specifically attacks and protects the C2 target

set. The same capabilities and activities employed to achieve IO

objectives can be used inside the C2 target set and should be included in

this appendix.

4. Coordination

a. IO planning requires extensive coordination of all elements of IO to

avoid conflicts and to ensure mutual support. Additionally, IO planning

must be coordinated with air, ground, naval, special, and space

operations.

b. Supported and Supporting Commanders:

(1) The supported commander should ensure that the supporting

commander understands the assistance required for IO.

(2) Unless limited by the establishing directive, the supported

commander will have authority to exercise general direction of the

supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and

prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the

supporting IO, and any other instructions necessary for coordination and

efficiency.

(3) The supporting commander must provide the assistance

needed, subject to the supporting commander’s existing capabilities,

consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.

(4) The supporting commander will determine the forces, tactics,

methods, procedures, and communications to be employed in providing

IO support. The supporting commander will advise and coordinate with

the supported commander on matters concerning the employment and

limitations of such IO support, assist in planning for the integration of

such support into the supported commander’s effort as a whole, and

ensure that support requirements are appropriately communicated into

the supporting commander’s organization.

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(5) The supporting commander may provide a representative,

liaison officer, or support team to the supported commander’s IO cell.

c. Offensive IO involve the integrated use of assigned and supporting

capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect

adversary decision makers and achieve or promote specific objectives.

d. Defensive IO integrate and coordinate policies and procedures,

operations, personnel, and technology to protect information and defend

information systems.

e. Offensive and defensive IO are mutually supporting and require the

integration of various activities and capabilities. Examples of capabilities

and activities include deception and counterdeception, electronic warfare

(electronic attack and electronic protect), information assurance (IA),

OPSEC, physical attack/destruction, information security, physical

security, PSYOP and counter-propaganda, computer network attack

(CNA), Computer Network Defense (CND), counterintelligence, special

information operations, and potentially others.

f. IA protects and defends information and information systems by

ensuring their availability, integrity, identification, authentication,

confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for the

restoration of information systems (C4). IA is covered under Appendix 1,

Annex K.

g. Intelligence support is critical to successful IO. IO planning

requires information such as the identification of critical information

systems or processes, the identity of key decision makers and the

decision-making process to arrive at and disseminate a decision, detailed

descriptions of specific analog and digital communications systems and

information networks, location of information and infrastructure nodes,

determinations of the potential values of possible targets, and the enemy

threat to friendly information systems and processes.

5. IO Planning

a. Joint Pubs 3-13 and 3-13.1 discuss how IO planning relates to the

JOPES process.

b. The basic IO appendix should state the primary mission of each of

the capabilities or activities. It should provide the necessary guidance to

ensure that the capabilities and activities are all working toward the

accomplishment of the IO objectives. Provide detailed execution

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(Format, Information Operations Appendix)

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09128

28 February 1999

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCEUR OPLAN 4999-99 ( )

INFORMATION OPERATIONS ( )

( ) References: a. Any relevant plans or orders.

b. Required maps and charts.

c. Other relevant documents specifically referred to in

this plan element..

( ) Situation. Summarize the overall operational situation as it

pertains to IO.

( ) Enemy. Summarize the enemy situation, force disposition,

intelligence capabilities, and possible courses of action. If applicable,

reference intelligence estimates or summaries. Address any specific

information that bears directly on the planned IO.

( ) Friendly. Summarize the situation of those friendly forces that

may directly affect attainment of IO objectives. Address any critical

limitations and any other planned IO.

( ) Assumptions. List any assumptions made of friendly, enemy,

or third-party capabilities, limitations, or courses of action. Describe

the conditions that the commander believes will exist at the time the

plan becomes an order.

( ) Mission. State clearly and concisely the “essential” tasks to be

accomplished with regard to the purpose of this ANNEX as it relates to

the overall mission stated in the Basic Plan. The mission statement

should address the questions (who, what, when, where, and why).

( ) Execution

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CLASSIFICATION

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CLASSIFICATION

( ) Concept of Operations. Summarize how the commander

visualizes the execution of the IO from beginning to termination.

Describe how IO will support the command’s operational mission.

Summarize the concepts for supervision and termination of IO.

(1)

( ) The concept of operations may be a single paragraph or

divided into two or more paragraphs depending upon the

complexity of the operation.

(2)

( ) When an operation involve various phases (i.e., peace or

prehostilities, crisis, war, posthostilities), the concept of operations

should be prepared in subparagraphs describing the role of IO in

each phase.

(3)

( ) The concepts for offensive and defensive IO may be

addressed in separate subparagraphs. (Example: PSYOP and

counterpropaganda)

( ) IO Tasks. Identify the major tasks for each of the following

and/or additional capabilities or activities as required.

(1)

( ) Core IO.

(a)

( ) Military Deception

(b)

( ) Electronic Warfare

(c)

( ) Operations Security

(d)

( ) Psychological Operations

(e)

( ) Physical Attack/Destruction

(f)

( ) Computer Network Attack (limited distribution).

(g)

( ) Defensive Information Operations.

(Cross referenced to

Appendix 2 to Annex K.)

Note: The seven capabilities or activities listed above are

covered in Tabs A through G. Other or future IO capabilities

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Appendix C

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31 December 1999

CLASSIFICATION

and activities may be identified and require additional tab(s) be

added to Appendix 3 of Annex C. Appendix 1, Annex K covers

Information Assurance.

(2)

( ) Supporting IO.

(a)

( ) Public Affairs.

(Cross referenced to Annex F)

(b)

( ) Civil Affairs.

(Cross referenced to Annex G)

( ) Coordinating Instructions. Address any mutual support issues

relating to the elements of IO.

( ) Administration and Logistics. Address any IO-related

administrative or logistic requirements.

( ) Command and Control. List any IO-related C2 instructions. State

the command structure for IO. Discuss the role and composition of the

IO cell. Identify any special IO communications and reporting

requirements.

Tabs

A -- Military Deception

B -- Electronic Warfare

C -- Operations Security

D -- Psychological Operations

E -- Physical Attack/Destruction

F -- Computer Network Attack (CNA) (distributed separately)

G -- Defensive Information Operations (D-IO)

C-3-3

CLASSIFICATION

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Appendix C

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31 December 1999

PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C

MILITARY DECEPTION

1. Purpose. To provide background and guidance for the preparation of

the military deception tab of joint plans and orders.

2. References: a. CJCS Instruction 3211.01B, 2 January 1998, “Joint

Military Deception.”

b. Joint Pub 3-13, 9 October 1998, “Joint Doctrine for

Information Operations.”

c. Joint Pub 3-58, 31 May 1996, “Joint Doctrine for

Military Deception.”

3. General. Chapter IV in Joint Pub 3-58 establishes the process for

military deception planning conducted in support of joint operations.

Chapter V describes how the deception planning process relates to the

JOPES deliberate, crisis, and campaign planning processes.

a. Focus. Target the adversary decision-maker. The adversary’s

intelligence system is normally not the target.

b. Objective. To cause an adversary to take (or not to take) specific

actions.

c. Centralized Control. A deception operation must be directed and

controlled by a single element.

d. Security. Strict security, need-to-know criteria must be applied to

each deception operation and to each aspect of OPSEC.

e. Timeliness. Requires careful timing. Sufficient time must be

provided for its portrayal.

f. Integration - Each deception must be fully integrated with the

basic operation that it is supporting. Deception planning should occur

simultaneously with operation planning.

4. Security Guidance. As a general policy, any material related to

planned, ongoing, or completed military deception is accorded controlled

access.

“Need-to-know,” for the purposes of military deception, means

limiting access to those individuals who are involved in planning,

Appendix C

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31 December 1999

approving, or executing deceptions and must have knowledge of the

deception to perform their duties.

b. The deception tab will normally be developed, published,

distributed, and maintained separately from the rest of the OPLAN.

c. Do not use normal administrative procedures to distribute or staff

the deception tab. Only positive control means, such as hand-to-hand

delivery or STU-III fax, will be used to distribute deception related

material.

d. Specific deception events such as unit movements may be

included in the basic OPLAN and its annexes if not identified as

deception related.

e. Deception related documents will have cover sheets with the

appropriate classification markings. They will be annotated in

accordance with CJCSI 3211.01B.

5. Review and Approval Process. CJCSI 3211.01B establishes the

review criteria for deception concepts and plans. Deception planners

must follow the specific administrative and security procedures

established by that document to ensure that their plans are approved by

the appropriate authority.

Appendix C

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(Format, Military Deception)

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09128

28 February 1999

TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCEUR OPLAN 4999-99 ( )

MILITARY DECEPTION ( )

( ) References: Identify plans, documents, maps, and charts that are

essential to the effective execution of this tab.

( ) Situation

( ) General

( ) Enemy

(1)

( ) General Capabilities. Identify enemy military capabilities

directly relating to the planned deception.

(2)

( ) Deception Targets

(3)

( ) Target Biases and Predispositions

(4)

( ) Probable Enemy Course of Action. Refer to Annex B

(Intelligence), Basic Plan.

( ) Friendly. Summarize the friendly situation, critical limitation,

and concept of operations.

( ) Assumptions. State the assumptions concerning friendly,

enemy, or third-party capabilities, limitations, or COAs. State the

conditions that the commander believes will exist when the plan is

executed.

( ) Mission

( ) Operational Mission. Refer to the Basic Plan.

( ) Deception Mission

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Appendix C

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CLASSIFICATION

(1)

( ) Deception Goal. Describe the desired effect or the end state

a commander wishes to achieve (commander’s intent for the

deception operation). For example, “To cause the enemy to weight

its defense in the eastern corridor; To mislead the enemy as to the

time and place of US forcible entry operations; To cause

dissension within the enemy coalition such that

”

(2)

( ) Deception Objective(s). List the desired action or inaction

by the adversary at the critical time and location.

(3)

( ) Desired Enemy Perceptions. Describe what the deception

target must believe for it to make the decision that will achieve the

deception objective.

(4)

( ) Deception Story. Outline a scenario of friendly actions or

capabilities that will be portrayed to cause the deception target to

adopt the desired perception. When supporting a CINC’s OPLAN,

this could be an alternate course of action (COA) to the one chosen

for the OPLAN itself.

( ) Execution

( ) Concept of the Operation

(1)

( ) General. Generally describe the framework for the

operation. Include a brief description of the phases of the

deception operation.

(2)

( ) Other Capabilities or Activities. Discuss the use of other

capabilities and activities in support of the deception operation.

Discuss all other capabilities and activities plans and operations

pertinent to the deception. Include coordination required to

deconflict if necessary.

(3)

( ) Feedback and Monitoring. Provide a general statement of

the type of feedback expected, if any, and how it will be collected

(monitored). Include a brief statement on the impact of the

absence of feedback on the plan.

(4)

( ) Means

C-3-A-2

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Appendix C

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CLASSIFICATION

(5)

( ) Tasks. Specify execution and feedback tasks to

organizations participating in the execution and monitoring of the

deception operation.

(6)

( ) Risks. Give a brief risk analysis in the categories given

below. Rate risk as low, moderate or high in each category. Refer

to Exhibit 3 (Operations) to this Tab for detailed risk analyses.

(a)

( ) Deception is successful. Include likely adversary

response. Describe impact on friendly forces from adversary

intelligence sharing.

(b)

( ) Deception fails. Describe the impact if the target

ignores the deception or fails in some way to take the actions

intended.

(c)

( ) Deception is compromised to allies or adversaries.

( ) Coordinating Instructions. Identify any tasks or instructions

pertaining to two or more of the units listed in the preceding

subparagraphs. List the tentative D-day and H-hour, if applicable,

and any other information required to ensure coordinated action

between two or more elements of the command.

( ) Administration and Logistics. State instructions regarding

administrative and logistics support procedures to be used in

developing, coordinating, and implementing the deception plan. Do not

include those administrative, logistic, and medical actions or ploys that

are an actual part of the deception operation. Place detailed instructions

in Exhibit 4 (Administration and Logistics).

( ) Administration

(1)

( ) General. Outline general procedures to be employed during

planning, coordination and implementation of deception activities.

(2)

( ) Specific. Detail any special administrative measures

required for the execution of the deception operation.

( ) Logistics. Detail logistics requirements for the execution of the

deception operation, such as the transportation of special material, or

C-3-A-3

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Appendix C

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31 December 1999

CLASSIFICATION

provision of printing equipment and materials. Do not include

executions conducted by logistics elements as part of the portrayal of

observables. Place detailed instructions in Exhibit 4 (Administration

and Logistics).

( ) Costs. As applicable.

( ) Command and Control

( ) Command Relationships. Use Exhibit 5 (Command

Relationships) to illustrate command relationships by phase if

required.

(1)

( ) Approval. State approval authority for execution and

termination.

(2)

( ) Authority. Designate supported and supporting

commanders, supporting agencies as applicable, and any caveats

to Exhibit 1 (Task Organization)or Exhibit 5 (Command

Relationships).

(3)

( ) Oversight. Detail oversight responsibilities particularly for

executions by nonorganic units or organizations outside the chain

of command.

(4)

( ) Coordination. Identify coordination responsibilities and

requirements related to deception executions and execution

feedback. Address in-theater and out-of-theater requirements.

( ) Command, Control, Communications, and Computers. Detail

communications means and procedures to be used by control

personnel and participants in the deception operation. Include all

reporting requirements.

( ) Security

( ) General. Outline general procedures to be employed during

planning, coordination, and implementation of deception activities.

( ) Specific. State access restrictions, handling instructions, and

who has authority to grant access to the deception appendix or plan.

C-3-A-4

CLASSIFICATION

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Appendix C

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CLASSIFICATION

Describe use of cover stories if applicable, code words, nicknames,

and procedures for planning and execution documents. If required,

place access rosters and other detailed security considerations in a

separate document.

Exhibits

1 -- Task Organization

2 -- Intelligence

3 -- Operations

4 -- Administration and Logistics

5 -- Command Relationships

6 -- Execution Schedule

C-3-A-5

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Appendix C

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(Format, Task Organization Exhibit)

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09128

28 February 1999

EXHIBIT 1 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCEUR

OPLAN 4999-99 ( )

TASK ORGANIZATION ( )

( ) References: Identify plans, documents, maps, and charts that are

essential to the execution of this exhibit.

C-3-A-1-1

CLASSIFICATION

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Appendix C

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(Format, Intelligence Exhibit)

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09128

28 February 1999

EXHIBIT 2 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCEUR

OPLAN 4999-99 ( )

INTELLIGENCE ( )

( ) References: Identify plans, documents, maps, and charts that are

essential to the execution of this exhibit.

Note: Information and intelligence provided here must be focused and

plan-specific. Do not reiterate information available in Annex B

(Intelligence) to the Basic Plan.

( ) Mission. Provide a concise statement of the deception mission.

Identify the command executing the deception, the deception target, the

deception objective(s), and the duration of the operation. Ensure

effective coordination between the intelligence staff and OPSEC, PSYOP,

and military deception planners.

( ) Situation

( ) Enemy

(1)

( ) Target Description. Describe the political, military, or

economic decision makers (or organizations) targeted by the

deception plan. Include personalities, strengths, weaknesses,

vulnerabilities and people or factors known to influence decisions.

(2)

( ) Target Biases and Predispositions.

(3)

( ) Adversary Intelligence Organizations. Identify the targeted

country’s intelligence organizations, their missions, and their

methods and capabilities for covert and clandestine operations.

Include collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination.

Specifically note those organizations most likely to provide

intelligence to the targeted decision maker and those tasked with

exposing deception.

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CLASSIFICATION

(4)

( ) Adversary Counterintelligence Organizations. Describe

missions, capabilities, and operations.

(5)

( ) Adversary Intelligence Sharing with Other Countries.

Identify other intelligence organizations available to the targeted

country, the nature of intelligence exchange, and the potential for

using that relationship for the deception.

(6)

( ) Other Sources and Related Matters. Identify scientific,

technical, diplomatic, or academic contacts that might act as

information conduits.

(7)

( ) Deception and Denial Activities. Provide an analysis of the

targeted country’s use of deception and denial in support of its

political and military goals. Identify the target’s deception and

denial methods and current deception and denial activities.

Note: Subparagraphs 2a(8) and 2a(9) below provide in-depth information

to document the risk assessments presented in Tab C-3-A (Military

Deception) and Exhibit C-3-A-3 (Operations).

(8)

( ) Target Reaction. Provide an estimate of the target’s reaction

if the deception is successful as well as likely target reactions if the

deception is not successful. Would the adversary use deception in

response?

(9)

( ) Third-party Reaction. Provide an analysis of the impact of

the deception on allies, neutrals, and potential adversaries and

their responses.

( ) Friendly. Provide information on activities by unwitting US

forces having an impact on the deception. Compare the time

necessary to collect, process, report, and analyze intelligence (in

support of deception) with the plan’s operational timeline. Assess the

impact here.

( ) US Intelligence Requirements

( ) Priority Information Requirements. PIR are listed in

Attachment A.

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CLASSIFICATION

( ) Feedback. Assess the US intelligence community’s ability to

identify and collect plan-specific feedback information.

( ) Assignment of Intelligence Tasks. Identify organizations to

produce plan-specific collection requirements. Address required

versus current capabilities and capacities for collection in support of

this plan and identify shortfalls. Consider not only technical

capabilities, but also actual capacities of current collectors in relation

to the projected volume of information requirements. Address how

collection managers will support planners and analysts in support of

this plan.

(1)

( ) Defense Intelligence Agency

(2)

( ) National Security Agency

(3)

( ) National Imagery and Mapping Agency

(4)

( ) Service intelligence agencies and organizations

(5)

( ) CINC intelligence organizations and assets

(6)

( ) Others

Attachments

A -- Priority Information Requirements

B -- Others (as needed)

C-3-A-2-3

CLASSIFICATION

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Appendix C

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(Format, Priority Information Requirements Attachment)

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09128

28 February 1999

ATTACHMENT A TO EXHIBIT 2 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C

TO USCINCEUR OPLAN 4999-99 ( )

PRIORITY INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS ( )

( ) General. Identify requirements, including those of subordinate

commanders, for priority information requirements for pre-execution

and execution phases of the planned operation.

( ) Before Implementation of the Plan. List questions for which

answers are needed for further planning and as a basis for decision on

plan implementation.

( ) Upon Implementation of the Plan. List the additional PIR and

other intelligence requirements that become relevant upon decision to

implement the OPLAN. (Use additional paragraphs if necessary to reflect

differing requirements during planned phases of the operation.)

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Appendix C

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(Format, Operations Exhibit)

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09128

28 February 1999

EXHIBIT 3 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCEUR

OPLAN 4999-99 ( )

OPERATIONS ( )

( ) References: Identify plans, documents, maps, and charts that are

essential to the execution of this exhibit.

( ) Concept of Operations

( ) Deception Story

( ) Operations by Phase. Describe each phase of the operation

using the following planning categories:

(1)

( ) Detailed Deception Story

(2)

( ) Means

(3)

( ) OPSEC. Address essential elements of friendly information

(EEFI), indicators to be managed, and protective measures.

(4)

( ) Risk Assessment

(5)

( ) Feedback and Monitoring

( ) Termination. Detailed instructions on conditions for

termination, actions to be taken (must be reflected in Exhibit X

(Execution Checklist), or emergency if there is unintended disclosure

or compromise.

C-3-A-3-1

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Appendix C

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(Format, Administration and Logistics Exhibit)

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09128

28 February 1999

EXHIBIT 4 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCEUR

OPLAN 4999-99 ( )

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS ( )

References: Identify plans, documents, maps, and charts that are

essential to the execution of this exhibit.

C-3-A-4-1

CLASSIFICATION

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Appendix C

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(Format, Command Relationships Exhibit)

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09128

28 February 1999

EXHIBIT 5 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCEUR

OPLAN 4999-99 ( )

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS ( )

( ) References: Identify plans, documents, maps, and charts that are

essential to the execution of this exhibit.

C-3-A-5-1

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Appendix C

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(Format, Execution Schedule)

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09128

28 February 1999

EXHIBIT 6 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCEUR

OPLAN 4999-99 ( )

EXECUTION SCHEDULE ( )

( ) References: Identify plans, documents, maps, and charts that are

essential to the execution of this exhibit.

EXECUTION EVENT SCHEDULE

(ALL DATES/TIMES ARE IN-COUNTRY)

Date: 5 May 95

WHO

----------EXECUTION-------------

EXECUTES

ACTION

REQUIRED

SCHED

EVENT

REQUIRED

RESOURCES

DATE

TIME(I)

OBSERVABLES

ABC 0001

SM-1

DUDLEY

15 DEC 94

DORIGHT

SUPPORTED

THEME

COORD

ASPECT

REQUIRED

CONDUIT

FEEDBACK

OF STORY

REMARKS

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Appendix C

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PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR TAB B TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1. Purpose. To provide background and guidance for the preparation of

the electronic warfare tab of joint plans and orders.

2. References: a. Joint Pub 3-13, 9 October 1998, “Joint Doctrine for

Information Operations”

b. Joint Pub 3-13.1, 7 February 1996, “Joint Doctrine

for Command and Control Warfare”

c. CJCS Instruction 3210.03, 22 November 1996, “Joint

Electronic Warfare Policy”

d. Joint Pub 3-51, 9 October 1998 (draft), “Joint

Doctrine for Electronic Warfare”

3. General. EW is any military action involving the use of

electromagnetic or directed energy to control the electromagnetic

spectrum or to attack the enemy. There are three major subdivisions of

EW: electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic

warfare support (ES).

a. EW planning must be accomplished in coordination with other

capabilities and activities such as PSYOP, military deception, OPSEC,

computer network attack, and physical attack/destruction. Some

planning factors include:

(1) Requirements for friendly communications nets,

electromagnetic navigation systems, and radars should be considered

with respect to the anticipated operations, tactical threat expected, and

electromagnetic interference considerations.

(2) Identify COMSEC and electronic security measures necessary

to deny OPSEC indicators to enemy passive-electromagnetic sensors.

(3) State prior coordination and precautions necessary to govern

use of EA to ensure continued effective ES in support of the

commander's needs. This includes developing Joint Restricted

Frequency List (JRFL).

(4) Coordinate and identify specific resources required for

interference potential (Tab E to Appendix 3 to Annex C).

Appendix C

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31 December 1999

(5) EW planning must identify PIR supporting commanders and

EW operations. These PIR must be included in Annex B (Intelligence) to

facilitate generation of ES. Coordinate and establish procedures to

ensure timely fulfillment, including tactical real-time dissemination.

b. EW plans should:

(1) Identify the desired electromagnetic profile selected by the

commander for the basic concept of operations and provide EMCON

guidance to commanders so that desired electromagnetic and acoustic

profiles are realized.

(2) Identify EW resources required to support PSYOP.

(3) Evaluate enemy threats to critical friendly C2 communications,

weapons control, target acquisition, surveillance systems, and computer

networks and specify electronic protection measures needed to ensure

effective operations during combat.

Appendix C

C-192

Enclosure C

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31 December 1999

(Format, Electronic Warfare)

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09128

28 February 1999

TAB B TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCEUR OPLAN 4999-99 ( )

ELECTRONIC WARFARE ( )

( ) References: a. Any relevant plans or orders.

b. Required maps and charts.

c. Other relevant documents specifically referred to in

this plan element..

( ) Situation

( ) Enemy Forces. Provide an estimate of the capabilities,

limitations, and vulnerabilities of enemy communications,

nonemitting, and electronic warfare systems, including the ability to

interfere with the accomplishment of the EW mission. If applicable,

refer to Annex B and the current intelligence estimate.

( ) Friendly Forces. Provide a summary of friendly EW facilities,

resources, and organizations that may affect EW planning by

subordinate commanders. Include friendly foreign forces with which

subordinate commanders may operate.

( ) Assumptions. State any assumptions about friendly or enemy

capabilities and courses of action that significantly influence the

planning of EW operations.

( ) Mission. Refer to the Basic Plan.

( ) Execution

( ) Concept of Operations

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Appendix C

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(1)

( ) Describe the role of EW in the commander’s IO strategy.

Summarize the scope of EW operations and the methods and

resources to be employed, including the employment of organic

and nonorganic capabilities. Address how EW will support

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) and other capabilities

and activities in the conduct of IO.

(2)

( ) The concept of operations may be a single paragraph or

divided into two or more subparagraphs depending upon the

complexity of the operation.

(3)

( ) In phased operations, the concept of operations may have

separate subparagraphs for each phase.

( ) Tasks. In separate numbered subparagraphs, assign individual

EW tasks and responsibilities to each component or subdivision of the

force. Include all instructions that are unique to that component or

subdivision.

( ) Coordinating Instructions

(1)

( ) List any instructions applicable to two or more subdivisions

or components.

(2)

( ) Identify any requirements for the coordination of EW actions

between subordinate elements.

(3)

( ) Provide guidance on the employment of each activity,

special measure, or procedure that is to be used but is not covered

elsewhere in the tab.

(4)

( ) Provide EMCON guidance. Address detailed or lengthy

guidance in an exhibit to this tab.

(5)

( ) Coordinate with J-6 to accomplish the Joint Restricted

Frequency List.

( ) Administration and Logistics

( ) Administration. Include necessary administrative guidance.

Provide examples of any required reports.

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Appendix C

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31 December 1999

CLASSIFICATION

( ) Logistics. Provide special instructions on logistics support for

EW operations.

( ) Command and Control

( ) Command

(1)

( ) Feedback. Describe the concept for monitoring the

effectiveness of EW operations during execution. Identify specific

intelligence requirements for feedback.

(2)

( ) After-Action Reports. Identify any requirements for after-

action reporting.

( ) Command, Control, Communications, and Computers.

Address any special or unusual EW-related C4 requirements.

C-3-B-3

CLASSIFICATION

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Appendix C

C-195

Enclosure C

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31 December 1999

PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR TAB C TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C

OPERATIONS SECURITY

1. Purpose. To provide background and guidance for the preparation of

the operations security tab of joint plans and orders.

2. References: a. CJCS Instruction 3213.01, 28 May 1993, “Joint

Operations Security”

b. Joint Pub 3-54, 24 January 1997, “Joint Doctrine for

Operations Security”

3. General. OPSEC is the process used by US military forces to deny to

enemies and potential enemies critical information about friendly

capabilities, intentions, and current operations. Critical information is

that information that can be used by an enemy to prevent or

significantly impede friendly mission accomplishment. Chapter II in

Joint Pub 3-54 describes how the OPSEC planning process relates to the

deliberate, crisis action, and campaign planning processes.

Appendix C

C-197

Enclosure C

CJCSM 3122.03A

31 December 1999

(Format, Operations Security Tab)

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09128

28 February 1999

TAB C TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCEUR OPLAN 4999-99 ( )

OPERATIONS SECURITY ( )

( ) References: a. Any relevant plans or orders.

b. Required maps and charts.

c. Other relevant documents specifically referred to in

this plan element..

( ) Situation

( ) Enemy Forces

(1)

( ) Current Enemy Intelligence Assessment. State the

estimated enemy’s assessment of friendly operations, capabilities,

and intentions. Specifically address any known enemy knowledge

of the friendly operation addressed in the basic plan.

(2)

( ) Enemy Intelligence Capabilities. State the enemy’s

intelligence collection capabilities according to major categories

(SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT, etc.). Address all potential sources to

include the capabilities of any nations that may provide support to

the enemy. Describe how the enemy’s intelligence system works to

include the time required for intelligence to reach key decision

makers. Identify major analytical organizations and key

personalities. Discuss unofficial intelligence organizations, if any,

that support the national leadership. Identify strengths and

weaknesses.

( ) Friendly Forces

(1)

( ) Friendly Operations. Briefly describe the major actions to

be conducted by friendly forces in the execution of the basic plan.

C-3-C-1

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Appendix C

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31 December 1999

CLASSIFICATION

(2)

( ) Critical Information. List the identified critical information.

Include the critical information of higher headquarters. In phased

operations, list the critical information by phase because

information that might be critical in one phase may not require

protection in later phases.

( ) Assumptions. Identify any assumptions upon which this

OPSEC plan is based.

( ) Mission. Refer to the Basic Plan.

( ) Execution

( ) Concept of Operations. Discuss the role of OPSEC in the

commander’s IO strategy. Describe the general concept for the

implementation of planned OPSEC measures. Describe by phase and

major activity (maneuver, logistics, communications, etc.), if

appropriate. Address OPSEC support to other capabilities and

activities in conduct of IO.

(1)

( ) The concept of operations may be a single paragraph or

divided into two or more subparagraphs depending upon the

complexity of the operation.

(2)

( ) In phased operations, the concept of operations may have

separate subparagraphs for each phase.

( ) Tasks. Identify specific OPSEC measures to be executed. List

by phase, if appropriate. Assign responsibility for execution to

appropriate subordinate elements. Particularly detailed or lengthy

listings should be added as an exhibit to this tab.

( ) Coordinating Instructions. Identify any requirements for the

coordination of OPSEC measures between subordinate elements.

Address required coordination with public affairs. Provide guidance

on termination of OPSEC related activities. Address the

declassification and public release of OPSEC-related information.

C-3-C-2

CLASSIFICATION

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Appendix C

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31 December 1999

CLASSIFICATION

( ) Administration and Logistics. Address any special OPSEC-related

administrative or logistic support requirements. List any administrative

or logistics related OPSEC measures in subparagraph 3.

( ) Command and Control

( ) Command

(1)

( ) Feedback. Describe the concept for monitoring the

effectiveness of OPSEC measures during execution. Identify

specific intelligence requirements for feedback.

(2)

( ) OPSEC Surveys. Address any plans for conducting OPSEC

surveys in support of this operation.

(3)

( ) After-Action Reports. Identify any requirements for after-

action reporting.

( ) Command, Control, Communications, and Computers.

Address any special or unusual OPSEC-related C4 requirements.

List all C4-related OPSEC measures in subparagraph 3.

C-3-C-3

CLASSIFICATION

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Appendix C

C-201

Enclosure C

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31 December 1999

PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR TAB D TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. Purpose. To provide guidance for using PSYOP to support

operational mission accomplishment and for preparing the PSYOP

appendix to the operations annex.

2. References:

a. DOD Directive S-3321.1, 26 July 1986, "Overt

Psychological Operations Conducted in Peacetime and

in Contingencies Short of Declared War.”

b. CJCSI 3110.05A, 15 June 1999, “Joint Psychological

Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan FY 1998.”

c. Joint Pub 3-13, 9 October 1998, "Joint Doctrine for

Information Operations."

d. CJCSM 3122.01, Draft, "JOPES, Volume I (Planning

Policies and Procedures)."

e. CJCSI 3122.04 (Draft), October 1994, "Joint

Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II

(Supplemental Planning Formats and Guidance)"

(classified).

f. Joint Pub 3-53, 10 July 1996, "Joint Psychological

Operations."

g. MCM-163-98, 13 July 1998, “Cooperation Agreement

for Policy Coordination between the United States

Information Agency and the Department of Defense

(1997).”

3. General. The references provide doctrine and specific guidance for

psychological operations and define the relationship of PSYOP and

information operations (IO) regarding coordination, integration, and

deconfliction. Address Command Relationships Agreements (CRAs) per

references b through f. Planning should address considerations in

references b and f.

Appendix C

C-203

Enclosure C

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31 December 1999

(Format, Psychological Operations Tab)

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09128

28 February 1999

TAB D TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCEUR OPLAN 4999-99 ( )

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ( )

( ) References: a. Joint Pub 3-53, 10 July 1996, “Doctrine for Joint

Psychological Operations.”

b. PDD 68, 30 April 1999, “International Public

Information”

c. CJCSI 3110.05A, 15 June 1999, “Joint Psychological

Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan FY 1998”

d. MCM-163-98, 13 July 1998, “Cooperation Agreement

for Policy Coordination between the United States

Information Agency and the Department of Defense

(1997)”

e. List plans, estimates, basic PSYOP studies, special

PSYOP studies, special PSYOP assessments, and other

documents that have a significant bearing on the

conduct of PSYOP.

( ) Situation. Summary of the psychological situation in the

operational area, any ongoing PSYOP programs and any significant

factors influencing PSYOP activities.

(If parts of the situation description

are long or complex, include as attachments.)

( ) Overview. Describe the general situation, competing goals, and

the task to be accomplished.

( ) US (or US and Allied) Perspective. Briefly outline intentions

(how the assigned task will be accomplished), capabilities (resources

C-3-D-1

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Appendix C

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CLASSIFICATION

to be used), and activities (current actions and general phasing of

future actions).

( ) Neutral Perspective (if applicable). Briefly outline estimated

neutral intentions under various circumstances, the resources

available to them, and their activities. State neutral actions and

behavior that would favor mission accomplishment. Indicate

apparent current COAs that might affect mission accomplishment

and summarize resources available to execute alternative COAs.

(Include the abilities to execute IO strategies.) State objective and

subjective factors that could affect decisions and resource

effectiveness. Identify staff factions and particularly influential

individuals. Describe the characteristics of decision makers, their

key advisers; major staff planners; staff factions, particularly

influential individuals; and intelligence system analysts. List groups

of related planner and decision-maker EEFI, and for each group list,

estimates of background knowledge and desired and harmful

appreciations.

( ) Enemy Perspectives

(1)

( ) Decision Maker and Staff. Identify the decision makers

who can direct development or allocation of resources of COA

execution pertinent to the task assigned. Outline feasible,

alternative actions that would favor or harm friendly operational

effectiveness. Indicate COAs that might affect friendly task

accomplishment and summarize resources available to execute

each COA. Describe the characteristics of enemy-decision

makers, their key advisers and staff (particularly intelligence

analysts).

(2)

( ) Intelligence Systems. Identify intelligence systems that

support decision makers and their staffs. Summarize intelligence

systems’ capabilities pertinent to the situation. Cite references for

detail. Describe objective and subjective factors and the

characteristics of collection planners and decision makers that

affect their development and selection for use of information-

gathering resources. List groups of related collection planner and

decision-maker EEFI and for each group list, estimates of

background knowledge and desired and harmful appreciation.

C-3-D-2

CLASSIFICATION

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Appendix C

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31 December 1999

CLASSIFICATION

(3)

( ) Target Audiences. Identify groups that can influence plans,

decisions, and operational effectiveness in task accomplishment;

identify their susceptibility to PSYOP. State group behavior

favorable and harmful to task accomplishment. Briefly describe

the apparent goals, motivations, and characteristics of each group

and the leaders who can cause groups to behave in various ways.

List groups of related target audience EEFI and, for each group, list

estimates of background knowledge as well as desired and harmful

appreciations.

(4)

( ) Command Systems. Describe communication and

computer systems and command centers used to plan COAs and

control, coordinate, and supervise execution of the planned COA.

Briefly identify the purpose of each C4 system and its

characteristics. State targets for jamming or attacking. Indicate

when to execute operations to demoralize and disorganize

opposing command, reduce opposing operational effectiveness,

enhance the effectiveness of planned deceptions and PSYOP, and

support OPSEC to the maximum advantage.

( ) Mission. Refer to the Basic Plan.

( ) Execution

( ) Concept of Operations

(1)

( ) Overview. State the commander’s intent. Outline the

overall concept for using PSYOP in support of task

accomplishment. Sequentially address strategic PSYOP in

peacetime and in support of preconflict deterrence options;

strategic and theater PSYOP in support of sustained hostilities

(conduct of war globally or in a region, and support for campaigns

and operations); and joint tactical PSYOP in support of operational

COAs. State who will plan and conduct each PSYOP and the

supporting commanders.

(2)

( ) Provide the following as general guidance to units and

forces involved:

C-3-D-3

CLASSIFICATION

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Appendix C

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31 December 1999

CLASSIFICATION

(a)

( ) Valid PSYOP themes to be promoted to induce strategic

and theater PSYOP objectives.

(b)

( ) Valid or invalid PSYOP themes to be discouraged and

indications of specific target audience sensitivities and harm

that might occur if the themes are accepted by target

audiences.

(c)

( ) PSYOP actions suitable for use:

( ) Guidance for the conduct of military operations and

actions, and personnel behavior, to promote valid PSYOP

themes.

( ) Guidance for avoiding military operations and

actions, and personnel behavior, that would result in

harmful target audience attitudes and behavior.

( ) Description of the cultural and psychological

characteristics of target audiences to aid operational

planners and personnel in selecting COAs and interacting

with target audience members.

(d)

( ) Description of adversary PSYOP (including

disinformation and propaganda) directed at US personnel and

at foreign groups in the operational area and guidance for

countering such adversary operations.

(3)

( ) Provide an outline of each planned PSYOP operation.

Indicate for each target audience and set of PSYOP objectives,

overall themes, subgroups to be targeted, their characteristics,

and specific themes to be promoted for each subgroup. As

appropriate, refer to intelligence studies, BPS, SPS, and SPA for

detailed intelligence. State provisions for testing, producing,

stocking, and disseminating PSYOP materials and for measuring

PSYOP effectiveness. Describe command and staff arrangements

for each campaign or operation and indicate supporting

commanders. List resources required to plan and conduct PSYOP

actions, including civil capabilities, indigenous assets, exploitation

of EPWs, internees, and detainees for PSYOP, and military PSYOP

resources.

C-3-D-4

CLASSIFICATION

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Appendix C

C-208

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31 December 1999

CLASSIFICATION

State logistic requirements, including preparation, distribution,

and stocking of PSYOP materials; transport of PSYOP material and

personnel to operational areas and their basing and support while

conducting PSYOP; provisions for the supply and maintenance of

US and indigenous PSYOP material; and fiscal and personnel

matters. Indicate requirements for implementing schedules and

PSYOP operation control sheets. (Note: Handle plans for PSYOP

conducted in support of UW operations by SO forces in support of

military deceptions as OPSEC-sensitive. Assign each plan a code

word and distribute it separately from the Basic Plan and PSYOP

appendix.)

(4)

( ) In the basic concept description and in each tab describing

separate operations, provide OPSEC planning guidance. The

guidance should address planning for, preparing for, and

conducting PSYOP and PSYOP actions to maintain essential

secrecy for the commander’s intentions and to gain and maintain

essential secrecy for OPSEC-sensitive PSYOP COAs.

( ) Situation Monitoring. Describe how intelligence,

multidiscipline counterintelligence, security monitoring, and

operational feedback will be provided. State requirement for running

situation estimates; periodic estimates of target appreciations

responsive to EEFI, actions, and attitudes and behavior; and current

reporting of intelligence and multidiscipline counterintelligence

information, security monitoring results, and implementing actions.

Identify resources required and their availability.

( ) Control. Outline how control will be affected and

implementation centrally coordinated. State coordinating

instructions. Describe accomplishment of implementation planning

and supervision of the planned action. Identify the need for specific

PSYOP operations. Address coordination with adjacent commands

and civilian agencies, including US diplomatic missions, USIA, and

AID. Address also coordination with military deception and OPSEC

planners, EW planners, and planners in the fields of civic action,

humanitarian assistance, public affairs, civil affairs, EPW, CI, DET,

C4, legal, captured US personnel, and operations.

C-3-D-5

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Appendix C

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31 December 1999

CLASSIFICATION

( ) Tasks. Assign responsibilities to implement the concept. When

multiple organizations are involved, designate an executive agent to

coordinate implementation. Ensure that tasks clearly fix

responsibilities and provide for feedback about effectiveness.

( ) Administration and Logistics. Provide a statement of the

administrative and logistic arrangements applicable to PSYOP but not

covered in the Basic Plan or another annex thereof. Include data on:

( ) Logistics

(1)

( ) Stocking of propaganda and information materials and

provisions to disseminating organizations.

(2)

( ) Provisions for the supply and maintenance of PSYOP-

unique supplies and equipment.

(3)

( ) Provisions for control and maintenance of indigenous

equipment and materials.

(4)

( ) Fiscal matters relating to special funds.

(5)

( ) Personnel matters relating to indigenous personnel.

( ) Administration

(1)

( ) Requirements for special reports.

(2)

( ) Requirements for planning and operations in support of

education programs regarding EPWs and civilian internees.

(3)

( ) Participation in interrogation of EPWs, internees, and

detainees to obtain information essential for or peculiar to PSYOP.

( ) Command and Control. Refer to appropriate sections of Annex K

and provide pertinent extracts of information included in the Basic Plan

or Annex K, including:

( ) Recognition and identification instructions.

( ) Electronic policy.

C-3-D-6

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Appendix C

C-210

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31 December 1999

CLASSIFICATION

( ) Headquarters locations and movements.

( ) Code words.

( ) Frequency allocation.

Tabs

(If too lengthy for inclusion in the body of this appendix, place any

information required above in a tab. In each case, refer to the tab in

the appropriate paragraphs of the appendix.)

C-3-D-7

CLASSIFICATION

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Appendix C

C-211

Enclosure C

CJCSM 3122.03A

31 December 1999

PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR TAB E TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C

PHYSICAL ATTACK/DESTRUCTION

1. Purpose. To provide background and guidance for the preparation of

the Physical Attack/Destruction tab of joint plans and orders.

2. References: a. Joint Pub 2-01.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Intelligence Support to Targeting”

b. Joint Pub 3-13.1, 7 February 1996, “Joint Doctrine

for Command and Control Warfare”

3. General

a. The term “physical attack/destruction” as an element of IO refers

to the use of “hard kill” weapons against designated targets as an

element of an integrated IO effort. Although the word “destruction” is

used in the term, “hard kill” weapons may be used in IO for a purpose

other than the actual “destruction” of a specific target. Firepower

demonstrations or selective degradation of certain parts of C2-related

target through weapons effects are examples of the use of “hard kill”

weapons for a purpose other than actual destruction that might be part

of an in integrated C2W plan.

b. Normally, physical destruction would target identified C2 nodes.

However, physical destruction may also be against targets other than

adversary C2 nodes in support of one or more of the other elements of

IO. Physical destruction may support both C2-attack and C2-protect

operations.

c. Chapter III, Joint Pub 3-13.1, discusses physical

attack/destruction in support of IO.

Appendix C

C-213

Enclosure C

CJCSM 3122.03A

31 December 1999

(Format, Physical Attack/Destruction Tab)

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09128

22 February 1992

TAB E TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCEUR OPLAN 4999-99 ( )

PHYSICAL ATTACK/DESTRUCTION ( )

( ) References: List plans, estimates, studies, and other documents that

have a significant bearing on C2 and information

infrastructure attack/destruction.

1. ( ) Situation. In addition to references to current intelligence at Annex B

of Basic Plan, describe the politico-military and military situation expected

at the time the plan would be executed and the competing US and foreign

objectives.

( ) Enemy Situation. Describe the general situation in the target

country.

b. ( ) Friendly Situation. Summarize the situation of those friendly

forces (higher, adjacent, supporting, and reinforcing) that may directly

affect C2 and key infrastructure attack/destruction operations. Address

any critical limitations and any other planned IO.

( ) Assumptions. Identify any assumption on which this plan is

based.

2. ( ) Mission. Refer to the Basic Plan.

3. ( ) Execution. Summarize how the commander visualizes the execution

of this supporting plan to the IO plan from its beginning to its termination.

The overview should include a broad definition of the phases of the

operation, and the Joint Force Commander’s intent and the desired end

state. Complex plans should include a detailed scheme of support

categorized by phases.

C-3-E-1

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Appendix C

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31 December 1999

CLASSIFICATION

( ) Tasks for Subordinate Commands. Identify the major tasks of

each subordinate command.

b. ( ) Coordinating Instructions. Include rules of engagement references

that impact the C2 and information infrastructure attack/destruction

plan.

4. ( ) Administration and Logistics. Provide a statement of applicable

administrative and logistic arrangements not covered in the Basic Plan.

5. ( ) Command and Control. Provide a statement of applicable command

and control arrangements not covered in the Basic Plan.

C-3-E-2

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Appendix C

C-216

Enclosure C

CJCSM 3122.03A

31 December 1999

PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR TAB F TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C

COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK

1. Purpose. To provide background and guidance for the preparation of

the Computer Network Attack (CNA) tab of joint plans and orders.

2. References: a. DOD Directive S3600.1, 9 December 1996,

“Information Operations.”

b. DOD Directive S3600.2, 6 August 1998, “Information

Operations (IO) Security Classification Guidance.”

c. CJCSI 3121.01A, 1 June 1999, “Standing Rules of

Engagement for US Forces.”

d. Joint Pub 3-13, 9 October 1998, “Joint Doctrine for

Information Operations.”

3. General. Computer Network Attack (CNA) is defined as “operations to

disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and

computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves” by

references a and d. These objectives may be accomplished through

physical destruction, electronic warfare, or some combination of these,

and other, capabilities in a integrated IO effort. However, this tab

focuses on the use of computer software and hardware capabilities to

achieve these objectives. CNA targets may be attacked directly with

these capabilities or indirectly by targeting supporting infrastructure.

Depending on the circumstance or means involved, CNA may fall under

the category of special information operations which require a special

review and approval process.

a. CNA planning is normally accomplished through the joint IO cell

in coordination with other offensive IO capabilities and activities such as

EW, PSYOP, military deception, OPSEC, and physical destruction. Some

CNA planning factors include:

(1) Requirements for specific resources to accomplish CNA.

(2) The need to identify security measures necessary to deny

OPSEC indicators to enemy intelligence and/or computer network

defense (CND) efforts.

(3) Establishing prior coordination and precautions necessary to

govern use of CNA to ensure continued effective operations in support of

the commander's objectives. This includes establishing rigorous

targeting, legal, and intelligence gain/loss review procedures with

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appropriate sections of the Joint Staff, components, supporting

organizations, and higher authority.

(4) CNA requires specific and detailed intelligence in order to be

successfully executed. CNA planners must work with intelligence

planners to ensure that Annex B (intelligence) contains sufficient

guidance to allow intelligence personnel to adequately support CNA.

Coordination with intelligence planners should include a frank appraisal

of what intelligence can reasonably be expected, given the time and

resources available.

(5) Amount of lead time available. CNA efforts normally require

substantial lead time. This requirement is driven by (1) the need for

detailed intelligence support; and (2) the need to sometimes prepare CNA

techniques based on intelligence support.

(6) Identification of supported and supporting commands and

agencies. Many technical aspects of CNA may be executed by supporting

commands and agencies. CNA may have unique interagency review

requirements. Clarification of roles and responsibilities of all concerned

will be a crucial aspect of CNA success.

(7) CNA reconnaissance and targeting requires authorities not

normally granted a commander prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

Planning will therefore require coordination with appropriate government

agencies for reconnaissance and targeting approval.

b. CNA plans should:

(1) Identify the desired effect(s) which CNA is to accomplish. The

effect(s) desired may be to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information

or information systems at one or more physical locations. These effects

may achieve the operational objectives or they may support one or more

of the other IO capabilities. The desired effect(s) drives such planning

elements as timing, sequencing, means, and priority of effort.

(2) Identify risks associated with CNA. Risks to be discussed

include: collateral damage (to other networks or to other information

within the same network), discovery and/or attribution (in the case of

sensitive information operations), fratricide (to US or allied/coalition

networks or information), and possible conflict (with CND, CNE, and

other CNA activities).

(3) Evaluate the enemy’s ability detect, counter, and respond to

CNA. Identify backup or contingency actions that are to be taken in the

event of detection or counter actions. Coordinate such actions with

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other IO capabilities planners and ensure such actions are addressed in

other appropriate sections of the OPLAN. Coordinate with J-2, J-3, J-6,

and other appropriate planners on information assurance measures and

preparations in anticipation of possible counterattack.

(4) Identify differences in procedural, review, and approval

processes between a CNA effort initiated as part of the offensive IO effort

and CNA actions taken in response to a detected enemy CNA. Failsafe

procedures must be established when responding to enemy CNA to

ensure that the true origin of the attack has been identified, as this is

essential in determining DOD authority to respond to an attack with

CNA.

(5) Identify measures of effectiveness. The executing organization

is probably in the best position to measure the effectiveness of an attack.

The plan must identify means to verify the target, “impact”, and damage

immediately. The Intelligence Community may be able to support/assist

the damage assessment with indirect means. Intelligence organizations

need to have a clear understanding of how CNA success is to be

measured in order to provide timely, relevant attack assessment (battle

damage assessment (BDA)). How CNA success is measured may also

affect how supporting commands and agencies plan and execute CNA.

Measures of effectiveness must be stated in a way that can be supported

by the given CNA, intelligence, and other supporting resources. For

example, measuring effectiveness as a “percentage of enemy computers

(or C2, etc.) destroyed” may not be realistic if either the total number

(100%) cannot be determined or if timely BDA of ongoing degradation of

capability cannot be obtained.

(6) Identify special C4 resources required to conduct the CNA

effort.

(7) Integrate military actions with the the Physical Destruction

Plan and other elements of IO to achieve synergistic effects.

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(Format, Computer Network Attack (CNA) Tab)

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09128

28 February 1999

TAB F TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCEUR OPLAN 4999-99 ( )

COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK ( )

( ) References: a. Any relevant plans or orders.

b. Required network/system diagrams and overlays.

c. Other relevant documents specifically referred to in

this plan element..

( ) Situation

( ) Enemy Forces. Provide an estimate of the capabilities,

limitations, and vulnerabilities of enemy information systems and

any connected systems, including the ability to interfere with the

accomplishment of the CNA mission. Address the same for enemy

CNA/IA forces. If applicable, refer to Annex B and the current

intelligence estimate.

( ) Friendly Forces. Provide a summary of friendly CNA facilities,

resources, and organizations that may affect CNA planning by

subordinate commanders. Include friendly foreign forces with which

subordinate commanders may operate.

( ) Assumptions. State any assumptions about friendly or enemy

capabilities and courses of action that significantly influence the

planning of CNA operations.

( ) Mission. Refer to the Basic Plan.

( ) Execution

( ) Concept of Operations

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CLASSIFICATION

(1)

( ) Describe the role of CNA in the commander’s IO effort.

Discuss CNA’s contribution to the commander’s intent.

Summarize the scope of CNA operations and the methods and

resources to be employed, including the employment of organic

and nonorganic capabilities. Address how CNA will support other

capabilities and activities in the conduct of IO and the overall

plan.

(2)

( ) The concept of operations may be a single paragraph or

divided into two or more subparagraphs depending upon the

complexity of the operation.

(3)

( ) In phased operations, the concept of operations may have

separate subparagraphs for each phase.

( ) Tasks. In separate numbered subparagraphs, assign

individual CNA tasks and responsibilities to each supporting

command, component or subdivision of the force. Include all

instructions that are unique to that supporting command,

component, or subdivision.

( ) Coordinating Instructions

(1)

( ) List any instructions applicable to two or more supporting

commands, subdivisions, or components.

(2)

( ) Identify any requirements for the coordination of CNA

actions between supporting command and organizations and

subordinate elements.

(3)

( ) Identify commander’s critical information requirements

(CCIRs) for CNA. These requirements should be cross referenced

in Annex B (Intelligence) as appropriate.

(4)

( ) Provide guidance on the employment of each activity,

special measure, or procedure that is to be used but is not covered

elsewhere in the tab.

(5)

( ) Provide review and approval guidance. Address detailed or

lengthy guidance in an exhibit to this tab.

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CLASSIFICATION

(6)

( ) Coordinate with JTF-CND to accomplish the CND mission

support.

( ) Administration and Logistics

( ) Administration. Include necessary administrative guidance.

Provide examples of any required reports.

( ) Logistics. Provide special instructions on logistics support for

CNA operations.

( ) Command and Control

( ) Command

(1)

( ) Roles and Responsibilities. Identify the supported

command and supporting commands and agencies.

(2)

( ) Feedback. Describe the concept for monitoring the

effectiveness of CNA operations during execution. Identify specific

intelligence requirements for feedback.

(3)

( ) After-Action Reports. Identify any requirements for after-

action reporting.

( ) Command, Control, Communications, and Computers.

Address any special or unusual CNA- related C4 requirements.

C-3-F-3

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PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR TAB G TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C

DEFENSIVE INFORMATION OPERATIONS

1. Purpose. To provide background and guidance for the preparation of

the Defensive-Information Operations (D-IO) tab of joint plans and

orders.

2. References: a. CJCS Instruction 3210.01, 2 January 1996, “Joint

Information Warfare Policy ( ).”

b. CJCS Instruction 6510.01A, 31 May 1996,

“Defensive Information Warfare Implementation.”

c. Joint Pub 3-13, 9 October 1998, “Joint Doctrine for

Information Operations.”

3. General. Joint Pub 3-13 establishes the general process for D-IO

planning conducted in support of joint operations.

4. Security Guidance. As a general policy, any material related to

planned, ongoing, or completed D-IO is accorded controlled access.

“Need-to-know,” for the purposes of D-IO, means limiting access to

those individuals who are involved in planning, approving, or executing

D-IO tasks and must have knowledge of the D-IO operation to perform

their duties.

b. The D-IO tab may be developed, published, distributed, and

maintained separately from the rest of the OPLAN.

c. If the D-IO tab is published separately, then do not use normal

administrative procedures to distribute or staff the D-IO tab. Only

positive control means, such as hand-to-hand delivery or STU-III fax, will

be used to distribute D-IO related material.

d. Specific D-IO events such as nongovernment agency coordination

may be included in the basic OPLAN and its annexes if not identified as

D-IO related.

e. D-IO related documents will have cover sheets with the appropriate

classification markings.

5. Review and Approval Process. D-IO planners must follow the

appropriate administrative and security procedures to ensure their plans

are approved by the appropriate authority.

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(Format, Defensive Information Operations (D-IO) Tab)

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09128

22 February 1992

TAB G TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCEUR OPLAN 4999-99 ( )

DEFENSIVE INFORMATION OPERATIONS (D-IO) ( )

( ) References: Identify plans, documents, maps, and charts that are

essential to the effective execution of this Tab for OPLAN.

( ) Situation

( ) General. Describe general scenario for OPLAN.

( ) Enemy.

(1)

( ) General Enemy Capabilities and Activities to Conduct IO.

Identify general enemy capabilities and activities (include enemy

collection capability) directly relating to the D-IO plan in support of

OPLAN.

(2)

( ) IO Target Biases and Predisposition. List any known enemy

IO target biases, intelligence collection capability and

predispositions. Identify any historic employment of propaganda,

EW, military deception, OPSEC, computer network attack (CNA)

and other capabilities or activities to conduct IO.

(3)

( ) Probable Enemy Courses of Action. Discuss any probable

enemy courses of action during OPLAN that could impact D-IO.

Also, refer to Annex B (Intelligence) Basic Plan for OPLAN. NOTE:

Place any detailed intelligence specifically related to the execution

of this plan in Exhibit 3.

( ) Friendly. Refer to Annex C of the Basic Plan for OPLAN.

(1)

( ) General Vulnerabilities. Identify general vulnerability areas

for US forces, public and allied forces, and populations as they

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CLASSIFICATION

apply to OPLAN. Describe in general terms how each could be

exploited by enemy IO.

(2)

( ) General Defensive Capabilities. Summarize our defensive

capabilities to conduct IO available for OPLAN. List the national

agencies that will provide IO support and the type of support they

will provide for OPLAN.

(3)

( ) Concept of Operations. Summarize the overall concept of

D-IO operations that directly support the Commander’s D-IO

objectives for OPLAN. Do not duplicate descriptions contained in

paragraph 3-Execution, subparagraph a-Concept of Operation.

( ) Defensive Information Operations Mission

( ) Operational Mission. Briefly explain how D-IO supports the

accomplishment of the objectives of Appendix 3 to Annex C to the

OPLAN. Address the overall goal; ensure no enemy action(s) via IO

will critically degrade UNIFIED COMMAND’s ability to effectively

conduct military operations in its AOR when directed to do so by the

NCA.

( ) D-IO Mission. Refer to the Basic Plan.

( ) Goals. State the D-IO goals for OPLAN.

( ) Objectives. State the D-IO objectives for OPLAN.

( ) Tasks. State the D-IO tasks for OPLAN.

( ) Execution

( ) Concept of Operation. The D-IO concept of operations for

OPLAN is based on the four point premise that (1) we are vulnerable

to attack, (2) we can protect and defend our critical information,

information systems, information-based processes and

infrastructures, (3) if attacked, we can, given time, identify the source

of those attacks, and (4) we will respond. The D-IO concept of

operations is broken down into four phases: Peacetime, Heightened

Tensions, Hostilities, and Post Hostilities (or Post Heightened

Tensions). NOTE: For the following sections, place more detailed

information in Exhibits 1, 4, 6, and 7 as required.

C-3-G-2

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CLASSIFICATION

(1)

( ) Peacetime Operations Phase

(a)

( ) Identify information, information systems, information-based

processes, and infrastructure critical for execution of

OPLAN. Identify any information, information systems,

information-based processes, and infrastructures without

which the unified command absolutely could not fight or

defend itself in its AOR for OPLAN.

( ) Information. Identify any information (intelligence,

logistic, medical, etc.) that is absolutely critical for the

execution of the OPLAN with respect to D-IO. Do not

duplicate information found in the JOPES OPSEC tab.

( ) Information systems and information-based

processes. Identify those systems and processes

(command, control, communications, computer systems)

both inside and outside of the unified command’s AOR

that are absolutely critical for the execution of OPLAN.

( ) Infrastructures. Identify infrastructures (power,

communication, transportation, etc.) both inside and

outside the unified command’s AOR absolutely critical for

the execution of OPLAN.

(b)

( ) Identify and analyze threats to systems critical for

execution of OPLAN. Identify enemy threats to the critical

information, information systems, information-based

process, and infrastructure identified above by the following

categories: propaganda, military deception, EW, physical

destruction, OPSEC, and CNA.

(c)

( ) Determine vulnerabilities. Discuss the vulnerabilities

of critical information, information systems, information-

based process, and infrastructure by the following

categories: propaganda, military deception, EW, physical

destruction, OPSEC, and CNA.

(d)

( ) Analyze and assess level of risk(s). Discuss the level

of risk associated with the identified critical information,

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CLASSIFICATION

information systems, information-based process and

infrastructure, and their vulnerabilities based on the

threat(s). Analysis relates to the threat’s impact on each

critical system and, in turn, on mission accomplishment,

coupled with the likelihood an adversary would conduct IO

in a given scenario.

(e)

( ) Implement appropriate defensive measures. This is

very system dependent. Next to identifying all the critical

systems, this step is probably the most difficult. Each

countermeasure will have a lead agency associated with it

(i.e., somebody responsible for implementing the

countermeasure). At a minimum, list the agency responsible

for that particular countermeasure.

(f)

( ) Determine and monitor I&W. Determining and

monitoring I&W is the “trip wire” for D-IO operations. List

the I&W applicable for OPLAN and who and how they’ll be

monitored. The I&W will help determine the INFOCONS.

(g)

( ) Establish INFOCONs. Define INFOCONs and

establish tasks for each one.

(h)

( ) Develop D-IO CONOP. Develop a plan for systematic

implementation of defensive IO measures based on

established IO INFOCONs normally including: (1)

increasing the level of protection and attack response, (2)

activating redundant capabilities, (3) planned acceptance of

graceful degradation of friendly capabilities within

acceptable limits, and (4) coordinating appropriate offensive

counter IO responses.

(i)

( ) Develop supporting D-IO plans.

( ) Counterpropaganda. Based on media/information

threat capabilities and past activities, develop a plan to

counter adversary propaganda attacks on friendly

forces/world opinion.

( )

Electronic Protect. Based on EW threat

C-3-G-4

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CLASSIFICATION

capabilities, plan to protect critical systems, links, and

nodes from the effects of radio frequency (RF) weapons

(electromagnetic pulse, ultra-wide band, and all other

types of jammers, direction finders, or exploitation

devices). Plan to protect threat warning, ELINT

collection/identification, and weapons systems from the

effects of adversary employment of wartime reserve

operating modes through the joint EW reprogramming

process.

( ) Counterdeception. Implement counterdeception

intelligence analysis to enhance detection of adversary

deception efforts.

( ) Information Assurance. Identify absolutely critical

information, information systems, and information-based

processes required for mission execution. Plan for

implementation of defensive measures IAW established

INFOCONs and operational requirements. Include

passive protection against enemy intelligence collection.

( ) Physical Protection. Plan to implement physical

protection of critical information systems, infrastructure,

and personnel based on counterintelligence assessments

of personnel security and the physical threat.

( ) OPSEC. Implement counter-OPSEC intelligence

analysis, in coordination with counterdeception, to

enhance detection of adversary OPSEC efforts.

(2)

( ) Heightened Tensions Phase of Operations

(a)

( ) See Peacetime Operations. The actions listed under

peacetime operations are to be done continuously and not

necessarily in a serial process. Keep doing them.

(b)

( ) Execute related INFOCON tasks. Self-explanatory

and situation dependent.

(c)

( ) Recommend response to hostile IO. Self-explanatory.

Look at the critical systems, links, nodes, and

infrastructures and plan response(s).

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CLASSIFICATION

(d)

( ) Perform IO damage assessments. Situation

dependent. Also depends on the system attacked. Again,

look at the critical information, information systems,

information-based processes, and infrastructure and plan

for how assessments will be made, coordinated, and

reported.

(e)

( ) Perform recovery operations as required.

(3)

( ) Hostilities Phase of Operations

(a)

( ) See Heightened Tensions Phase. Complete all

actions in both previous phases as they apply here.

Remember, the actions listed under the two previous phases

are to be done continuously and not necessarily in a serial

process. Keep doing them.

(b)

( ) Execute appropriate INFOCON tasks. Self-

explanatory and situation dependent.

(c)

( ) Implement response to hostile IO. Self-explanatory

and situation dependent.

(4)

( ) Post Hostilities (or Post Heightened Tension) Operations

Phase

(a)

( ) See Hostilities (or Heightened Tension) Phase of

Operation. Complete all actions in the previous phases as

they apply here. Remember, the actions listed under the

previous phases are to be done continuously and not

necessarily in a serial process.

(b)

( ) Execute appropriate INFOCON tasks. Self-

explanatory and situation dependent.

(c)

( ) Document Lessons Learned. Discuss why this is to

be done and how.

( ) IO Cell

(1)

( ) Organization. D-IO is a J-3 responsibility. Describe the IO

cell here. Use Exhibit 2 for details as required.

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CLASSIFICATION

(2)

( ) Tasks. The IO cell, under J-3 leadership, is responsible for

development, overall coordination, and implementation of the D-IO

plan. Discuss the specific tasks of the IO cell and of its members’

roles and responsibilities as they apply to OPLAN. Use Exhibits 2,

4, and 6 for details as required.

( ) Coordinating Instructions. Extensive coordination is required,

both within and outside the unified command’s AOR. Discuss them

here. Use Exhibits 4 and 6 for details as required.

( ) Administration and Logistics. State instructions regarding

administrative and logistics support procedures to be used in

developing, coordinating, and implementing the D-IO plan. Place

detailed instructions in Exhibit 5.

( ) Administration

(1)

( ) General. Outline general procedures to be employed during

planning, coordination, and implementation of the D-IO plan.

(2)

( ) Specific. Detail any special administrative measures

required for the execution of the D-IO plan.

( ) Logistics. Detail logistics requirements for the execution of the

D-IO plan, such as transportation of special computer protection

equipment to field units or installation of secure voice equipment to

local authorities. Place detailed instructions in Exhibit 5.

( ) Costs. As applicable.

( ) Command, Control, Communications, and Computers

( ) Command Relationships. Use Exhibit 6 (Command

Relationships) to illustrate command relationships by phase if

required. Be sure to include relationships with other military,

Federal, state, local, and foreign departments/agencies as applicable.

(1)

( ) Approval. State approval authority for execution and

termination of phases.

(2)

( ) Authority. Designate supported and supporting

commanders or agencies as applicable.

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CLASSIFICATION

(3)

( ) Oversight. Detail oversight responsibilities particularly for

the execution by nonorganic units, agencies, or organizations

outside the chain of command.

(4)

( ) Coordination. Identify coordination responsibilities and

requirements related to D-IO executions and execution feedback.

Address in-theater and out-of-theater requirements.

( ) Communications. Detail communications means and

procedures to be used by personnel, including reporting

requirements, in executing the D-IO plan.

( ) Security

( ) General. Outline general procedures to be employed during

planning, coordination, and implementation of deception activities.

( ) Specific. State access restrictions, handling instructions, and

who has authority to grant access to D-IO plan. Describe use of cover

stories if applicable, code words, nicknames, and procedures for

planning and execution documents. Place STO access rosters and

other detailed security considerations in a separate document.

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Appendix C

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PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX C

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1. Purpose. To provide guidance for preparation of the Special

Operations Appendix to OPLANS and CONPLANS with/without TPFDDs

and FUNCPLANs.

2. References:

a. CJCSI 3110.06, Supplemental Instruction to the

JSCP, “Special Operations.”

b. MCM-136-91, 8 August 1991, “Delineation of

Responsibilities for Evasion and Escape within the

Department of Defense.”

c. SM-801-88, 3 October 1988, “Charter for the

Counterterrorist Joint Task Force.”

d. Joint Pub 3-05, 17 April 1998, “Doctrine for Joint

Special Operations.”

e. Joint Pub 3-05.3, 25 August 1993, “Joint Special

Operations Operational Procedures.”

f. Joint Pub 3-05.5, 10 August 1993, “Joint Special

Operations Targeting and Mission Planning

Procedures.”

g. Joint Pub 3-53, 10 July 1996, “Doctrine for Joint

Psychological Operations.”

(See Supplement, JOPES Volume II)

3. General. The references provide doctrine and specific taskings for

SO. Planning should address requirements in Section III of CJCSI

3110.06, Supplemental Instruction to the JSCP and doctrine in Joint

Pubs 3-05, 3-05.3, and 3-05.5.

a. Planning and Preparation for Special Operations

(1) The CINCs will plan and prepare for the organization,

administration, support, and conduct of special operations to support

the CINC's missions and tasks, as prescribed in approved plans or

directives of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Planning should

CLASSIFICATION

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include the considerations contained in the references listed in

paragraph 2 of this appendix.

(2) SO plans for the CINCs will contain, but will not be limited to:

(a) Intelligence and counterintelligence evaluations and

estimates upon which the plans are based.

(b) Requirements for resources that exceed the supported

command’s capabilities to support SO.

systems support necessary to the SO mission.

(d) SO peculiar support procedures and equipment validation.

(e) Procedures for handling requests for:

1. Equipment for use by allied and other non-US forces.

2. Military logistics support for US non-DOD forces.

(See Supplement, JOPES Volume II)

(3)

(See Supplement, JOPES Volume II)

(a)

(See Supplement, JOPES Volume II)

(b) Ratio of US to friendly allied operational detachments and

teams.

(d) Procedures for logistics and communications support.

(e) Delineation of command and control relationships for US

special operations forces (SOF).

(4) When US forces are to conduct direct-action missions, SO

plans will contain the following:

(a) Designation of targets by priority. Refer to reference f for

detailed targeting procedures.

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(b) Direct-action mission team composition and special

equipment required.

to stay-behind assets, if appropriate.

b. Planning and Preparation for Unconventional Warfare (UW)

(1)

(See Supplement, JOPES Volume II)

(a) Define the type and scope of planned operations and the

size of indigenous forces to be developed in each UW operational area.

(b)

(See Supplement, JOPES Volume II)

supportable.

(d) Substantiate authorization for stockpiling arms and

equipment in advance.

(e) Review periodically to determine adequacy of stock levels

and content.

(f) Describe the desired functions and capabilities of assets

that are to be developed by category:

1. Guerrilla Warfare. Assets to furnish intelligence

information, establish contact with local resistance personnel, and

provide reception for UW detachments.

2. Evasion and Escape (E&E). Assets to establish an E&E

organization.

3. Subversion. Assets to disrupt enemy activities and

resources.

(2) CINC plans for conducting UW will contain but not be limited

to:

(a)

(See Supplement, JOPES Volume II)

(b)

(See Supplement, JOPES Volume II)

(d)

(See Supplement, JOPES Volume II)

Appendix C

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31 December 1999

(e) The legality of each course of action under domestic and

international law.

(See Supplement, JOPES Volume II)

d. Planning for PSYOP and Civil Affairs (CA) in Special Operations.

Commanders of unified commands will develop plans for the use of

PSYOP and CA in support of SO if appropriate. The inherent

psychological impact of SO should be considered as well. See references

d, e, and f for missions, capabilities, and functions of PSYOP and CA.

e. Logistics Planning for Special Operations. Basic logistics guidance

is contained in CJCSI 3110.03A, Logistics Supplement to the JSCP, and

references d, e, and f.

(1) Logistics support for US forces engaged in or supporting SO

will be provided consistent with the current guidance for logistics

support of other US military forces.

(2) The operational reliability requirement for equipment used by

SOF may require higher than normal spare parts stockage and

equipment floats.

(3)

(See Supplement, JOPES Volume II)

(4) Coordination. Geographic areas for planning and coordination

of SO are delineated in the UCP and Annex E (Special Operations) to

JSCP.

4. Command and Control. The nature of SO requires close cooperation

and coordination among the Department of Defense and other US

Government agencies. Further, SO resources are relatively few in

number and usually targeted against strategic objectives. References d,

f, and g contain detailed information concerning the structure and

responsibilities of theater operation task organizations.

Appendix C

C-238

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31 December 1999

(Format, Special Operations Appendix)

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09128

28 February 1999

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCEUR OPLAN 4999-99 ( )

SPECIAL OPERATIONS ( )

( ) References: List plans, maps, charts, and documents essential to the

effective implementation of this appendix.

( ) Situation. In the subparagraphs below, describe the general

special operations situation expected upon OPLAN execution.

( ) Enemy. Supplement Annex B as appropriate, including:

(1)

( ) Information to support SO planning. Specify the political,

military, economic, psychological, and sociological factors that may

affect SO.

(2)

( ) Information on hostile capabilities to counter US SO.

( ) Friendly. Supplement Basic Plan and Annex A as appropriate.

List friendly forces not assigned to the SO component command,

including:

(1)

( ) US and other friendly military forces possessing SO

capabilities or tasked to support or be supported by the SO

component.

(2)

( ) Civilian agencies that may support or be supported by the

SO component.

(3)

( ) Indigenous military and paramilitary forces that may

support or be supported by the SO component.

( ) Assumptions. List any assumptions applicable to SO but not

listed in the Basic Plan.

( ) Mission. Refer to the Basic Plan.

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Appendix C

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CLASSIFICATION

( ) Execution

( ) Concept of Operations. Provide an outline of concept for the

deployment and employment of SOF in support of each phase of the

Basic Plan, including:

(1)

( ) Joint force commander’s intent concerning SOF

employment.

(2)

( ) Specific SO objectives to be accomplished (by phase, if

appropriate).

(3)

( ) Anticipated SO activities by each subordinate force of the

SO component command (by phase, if appropriate), including

preconflict activities and postconflict activities.

(4)

( ) Control of and coordination with friendly SOF.

(5)

( ) Synchronization with conventional military operations.

(6)

( ) Provision of conventional fire support to SOF.

( ) Tasks. Assign tasks to the SO component commander and

other component commanders responsible for furnishing resources

and otherwise supporting the SO concept of operations, including but

not limited to, specific duties of SO units assigned or attached to the

SO component.

( ) Coordinating Instructions. Include instructions:

(1)

( ) Applicable to two or more elements of the joint force.

(2)

( ) For coordination and deconfliction with subordinate,

adjacent, supported, and supporting commands and other US

Government agencies.

(3)

( ) For coordination with indigenous military and paramilitary

forces and government agencies.

(4)

( ) For coordination of EW, PSYOP, CA, Combat Search and

Rescue (CSAR), OPSEC, and military deception activities in

support of SOF

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Appendix C

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31 December 1999

CLASSIFICATION

( ) Administration and Logistics. Specify the administrative and

logistic arrangements required for SO support not covered elsewhere in

the plan or published in standard operating procedures.

( ) Logistics. Supplement Annex D as appropriate. Provide the

general concept of logistic support for SOF, including:

(1)

( ) Responsibility for providing or arranging for logistic support

of the SO component command headquarters and its subordinate

forces.

(2)

( ) A statement that standard items of military equipment and

supplies will be used when practicable.

(3)

( ) Procedures for establishment, procurement, delivery,

storage, processing, and distribution of operational project stocks

in support of US and indigenous forces.

(4)

( ) Procedures for requesting and coordinating inter-Service

support arrangements.

(5)

( ) Procedures for covert or clandestine procurement, delivery,

storage, processing, and distribution of SO-peculiar items when

the concept of operations includes special activities.

(6)

( ) Procedures for medical support and evacuation of SO

personnel.

( ) Administration. Supplement Annex E as appropriate. List

special SOF administrative requirements and provide the general

concept for administrative support of SOF, including:

(1)

( ) Requirements for special reports.

(2)

( ) Instructions regarding disposition of detainees, EPWs, and

captured equipment.

( ) Command, Control, Communications, and Computers

( ) Command Relationships. Refer to Annex J for command

relationships external to the SO component. Detail any changes to

C-4-3

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Appendix C

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CLASSIFICATION

command relationships planned to occur during plan execution

(including provisions for chop of SOF):

(1)

( ) During deployment and forward movement.

(2)

( ) Upon introduction of major conventional combat forces.

(3)

( ) After linkup of SOF with friendly conventional forces in the

combat zone.

( ) Command, Control, and Communications Systems. Refer to

Annex K for detailed C4 systems requirements. Provide a general

statement of the scope and type of C4 support required, including:

(1)

( ) Dedicated networks required at or above the SO component

level, including requirements for CJCS-controlled C4 assets.

(Note: CJCS-controlled C4 assets are not apportioned and must

be requested in accordance with CJCSI 6110.01 at the time of

plan execution.)

(2)

( ) Secure communications.

(3)

( ) Recognition and identification instructions.

(4)

( ) Code words.

(5)

( ) Frequency and satellite channel allocation.

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Appendix C

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31 December 1999

PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX C

PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS

1. Purpose. To provide guidance for preparation of the Personnel

Recovery Appendix to OPLANS and CONPLANS with/without TPFDDs

and FUNCPLANs.

2. General. The references listed in the model provide doctrine and

specific taskings for personnel recovery. Joint force commanders with

geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) or joint operations areas (JOAs)

will plan and prepare for personnel recovery to support mission

accomplishment.

Appendix C

C-243

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31 December 1999

(Format, Personnel Recovery (PR) Operations Appendix)

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09128

28 February 1999

APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCEUR OPLAN 4999-99 ( )

PERSONNEL RECOVERY (PR) OPERATIONS

( ) References: a. Joint Pub 3-50.2 “Doctrine for Joint Combat Search

and Rescue (CSAR).”

b. Joint Pub 3-50.21 “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Combat Search and Rescue.”

c. Joint Pub 3-50.3 “Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Evasion and Recovery.”

d. List applicable documents that provide users

essential information for planning and executing

personnel recovery operations.

e. Designate the relevant maps and charts that ensure

plan addressees have the necessary tools to conduct

personnel recovery operations.

( ) Purpose. To describe procedures and assign tasks for the recovery

of isolated personnel from enemy controlled or hostile territory.

Personnel recovery includes, but is not limited to, Combat Search and

Rescue; Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE); Evasion and

Recovery (E&R); and the coordination of negotiated as well as forcible

recovery operations.

( ) Situation. Refer to the basic plan and include any additional

information that could affect personnel recovery operations.

( ) Enemy Forces. Refer to the Basic Plan and Intelligence Annex

and include any additional information that could affect

establishment of evasion nets or hostile action against recovery

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Appendix C

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31 December 1999

CLASSIFICATION

forces. Assess the attitudes of the local populace toward evaders.

See reference c for other enemy force considerations in personnel

recovery planning.

( ) Friendly Forces. Refer to the Basic Plan and include any

existing recovery forces other than those tasked in this appendix that

could have a recovery capability either as an assigned mission or as

an inherent capability.

(1)

( ) List applicable SAFE.

(2)

( ) Identify recovery assets available for planning.

( ) Definitions. Define recovery terms used for procedures,

personnel, capabilities, units, and equipage to ensure that users of

recovery forces are familiar with support that will be provided. Most

specific definitions can be found in the glossaries of references a, b,

and c.

( ) Assumptions. List any assumptions not reflected in the Basic

Plan that are applicable to personnel recovery operations. For

example, consider including assumptions concerning indigenous

populace relations to evaders, existence of assisted evasion

mechanisms, and constraints governing successful recovery force

operations.

( ) Execution

( ) Concept of Recovery Operations. Describe the overall theater

concept for integrating the available recovery capabilities. This

concept should address situations ranging from rear area search and

rescue conducted by the host-nation to a recovery mission involving

specialized recovery assets, SAFE areas, and Unconventional Assisted

Recovery (UAR). Include specific responsibilities to be accomplished

by recovery units during deployment, employment, and redeployment

phases of the planned operation. State the OPSEC planning

guidance for recovery operations.

( ) Tasks. In separate subparagraphs, list the tasks assigned to

each command element, unit or agency providing support to the plan.

C-5-2

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Appendix C

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31 December 1999

CLASSIFICATION

Ensure that task assignments are sufficiently described to ensure

understanding of all essential elements of the operation and support

required. Provide manning for the Joint Search and Rescue Center

(JSRC) when established. As appropriate include establishment of the

JSRC, component rescue coordination centers and local area rescue

units, and describe the responsibilities of the Service forces. Provide

guidance on the following topics, either in subparagraphs or tabs

(1)

( ) Task one of the components to establish a JSRC.

(2)

( ) List specific tasks assigned to the JSRC such as developing

and publishing “SAR SPINS” for the ATO, coordinating for

establishment of additional SAFE areas.

(3)

( ) Assign each component the specific tasks required to

establish an effective command control coordination and

intelligence link among all participating forces.

(4)

( ) Task each component to establish a Rescue Coordination

Center (RCC) or equivalent and as appropriate provide manpower

and equipment to establish the JSRC.

(5)

( ) List the specific recovery tasks assigned to each subordinate

commander required to implement the recovery concept.

(6)

( ) Task each component to forward requirements for SAFE

areas, Unconventional Assisted Recovery support, and recovery

aids such as Blood Chits, evasion maps, “pointee-talkees” to the

Command recovery POC or the JSRC.

( ) General Guidance. Provide guidance on the flow of

information, how requirements are established for the various

recovery aids, and how recovery information will be disseminated. As

appropriate, provide guidance to units and isolated individuals to

provide a full understanding of how the recovery system will operate.

As a minimum, include the following:

(1)

( ) State the various ways planning requirements are

generated to support the recovery concept.

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Appendix C

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31 December 1999

CLASSIFICATION

(2)

( ) State how and what type of recovery information and

equipment will be provided.

(a)

( ) Recovery environment (e.g. SERE Guides and Country

studies)

(b)

( ) Use of recovery aids.

(c)

( ) Identify contact points to be used.

(d)

( ) Describe procedures to be used at contact points.

(3)

( ) Describe any special operations requirements, recovery,

etc..

(4)

( ) Outline requirements for intelligence collection.

(5)

( ) Describe special techniques for identifying, assisting, or

evacuating escapees and evaders.

(6)

( ) State OPSEC planning guidance for recovery forces and

operations.

(7)

( ) State guidance for strategic and theater PSYOP in support

of recovery.

(8)

( ) State the concept for SERE refresher training for

combatants. Include who will provide the training and the topics

training will cover.

(9)

( ) Develop repatriation plans for escapee/prisoner of war

(POW) returnees.

( ) Administration and Logistics

( ) Logistics. Include all applicable 1ogistic support

responsibilities of friendly forces.

( ) Administration. See Basic Plan. Include information on

reports required by the JSRC to execute a search or recovery mission

and post mission reporting required. Specify formats for preparation

and time, methods and classification of submission.

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CLASSIFICATION

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Appendix C

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31 December 1999

CLASSIFIATION

( ) Command and Control. Include all instructions applicable to

recovery operations concerning recognition, identification, C4 systems,

and related items. As a minimum include command relationships for

combat recovery forces dedicated to the PR mission and augmenting

forces. Coordinate plans and procedures as appropriate with:

( ) Host-nation for friendly area search and rescue support.

( ) Casualty affairs office in J-l when a person is missing,

captured, or recovered.

( ) The theater medical teams for support after a recovery and

during the repatriation process.

( ) Mortuary affairs when a body is recovered during a rescue or

recovery operation.

( ) The J-2 for theater and national level intelligence support.

( ) The J-5 to and Department of State to provide diplomatic

support to search and or recovery operations.

( ) Nongovernmental humanitarian organizations such as the

International Red Cross.

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Appendix C

C-249

Enclosure C

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31 December 1999

(Format, Rules of Engagement Appendix)

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09128

28 February 1999

APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCEUR OPLAN 4999-99 ( )

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) ( )

( ) References: List DOD Directives, rules of engagement (ROE) issued

by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and existing

and proposed ROE of the supported commander to be

applied when conducting operations in support of this

OPLAN.

( ) Situation

( ) General. Describe the general situation anticipated when

implementation of the plan is directed. Provide all information needed

to give subordinate units accurate insight concerning the

contemplated ROE.

( ) Enemy. Refer to Annex B, Intelligence. Describe enemy

capabilities, tactics, techniques, and probable COAs that may affect

existing or proposed ROE on accomplishment of the US mission.

( ) Friendly. State in separate subparagraphs the friendly forces

that will require individual ROE to accomplish their mission; for

example, air, land, sea, SO, hot pursuit. Where appropriate, state the

specific ROE to be applied.

( ) Assumptions. List all assumptions on which ROE are based.

( ) Mission. Refer to the Basic Plan. Further, state the mission in

such a way that ROE will include provisions for conducting military

operations according to the “Laws of War”.

( ) Execution

( ) Concept of Operation

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Appendix C

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31 December 1999

CLASSIFICATION

(1)

( ) General. Summarize the intended COA and state the

general application of ROE in support thereof. Indicate the time

(hours, days, or event) the ROE will remain in effect.

(2)

( ) US National Policies. Refer to appropriate official US policy

statements and documents published by the command pertaining

to ROE and the Laws of War. Include reference to ROE for allied

forces when their participation can be expected. When desired,

include specific guidance in a tab. Refer to a separate list of NO

STRIKE targets in Appendix 4 to Annex B, which may include

facilities afforded special protection under international law.

( ) Tasks. Provide guidance for development and approval of ROE

prepared by subordinate units.

( ) Coordinating Instructions. Include, as a minimum:

(1)

( ) Coordination of ROE with adjacent commands, friendly

forces, appropriate second-country forces, neutral countries,

appropriate civilian agencies, and Department of State elements.

(2)

( ) Dissemination of ROE.

(3)

( ) Provision of ROE to augmentation forces of other

commanders.

(4)

( ) Procedures for requesting and processing changes to ROE.

( ) Administration. Provide requirements for special reports.

( ) Command and Control. Refer to the appropriate section of Annex

K. Provide pertinent extracts of information required to support the

Basic Plan, including:

( ) Identification, friend or foe, or neutral (IFFN) ROE policy.

( ) Relation of ROE to use of code words.

( ) Specific geographic boundaries or control measures where ROE

are applicable.

( ) Special systems and procedures applicable to ROE.

C-6-2

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Appendix C

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31 December 1999

PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX C

RECONNAISSANCE

1. Purpose. Planning guidance for reconnaissance in support of nuclear

operations is contained in JSCP CJCSI 3110.04 “Supplemental

Instruction to the JSCP (Nuclear).”

2. General. Planning guidance for conducting peacetime

reconnaissance is contained in CJCSI 3250.01A. Although CJCSI

3250.01A makes provision for a commander to conduct crisis

management reconnaissance, it does not apply to reconnaissance in

combat operations. Crisis management reconnaissance planning, and

certain contingency planning, should be in accordance with existing

command directives and the specific requirements of the OPLAN. The

support from national systems should be included in the overall

consideration for planning reconnaissance operations.

3. Planning Guidance

a. A plan that includes intelligence collection operations will include

a reconnaissance appendix within the operations annex.

b. Special requirements must be identified and consideration must be

given to the potential employment of the various systems and

capabilities required.

(1) Types of Missions. Indications and warning, special

reconnaissance, surveillance, prestrike and poststrike, or threat

assessment.

(2) Coverage. Hours per day, area, and specific locations.

(3) Type of Collection. Examples include: SIGINT, photo, high-

resolution radar, infrared, acoustic, visual, or other.

(4) Manned, remotely piloted vehicle, or other.

(5) Special Requirements. Examples include: scientific and

technical, specific photo scale or obliquity, stereo, color, camouflage

detection, or long focal length.

c. Considerations for coordination, employment, and tasking of

supporting forces and agencies should include:

Appendix C

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31 December 1999

(1) Coordinating with the Joint Staff, DIA, National Security

Agency (NSA) or Central Security Service (CSS), NIMA, Services, other

unified commands, and component commands, as appropriate.

(2) Mission support - C4, scheduling and reporting, escort,

tracking, EW, and enemy defense suppression.

(3) Processing, distribution, and intelligence dissemination of

mission products.

d. Other considerations should include:

(1) ROE, operating authorities, and special restrictions such as

buffer zones, restricted areas, and weather criteria.

(2) Enemy countermeasures.

(3) OPSEC.

(4) COMSEC.

Appendix C

C-254

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31 December 1999

(Format, Reconnaissance Appendix)

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09128

28 February 1999

APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCEUR OPLAN 4999-99 ( )

RECONNAISSANCE ( )

( ) References: a. Joint Pub 3-55, (date), “Doctrine for Reconnaissance,

Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Support to Joint

Operations.”

b. List DOD, DCI, CJCS, Service, or combatant

command directives or plans pertinent to the conduct or

support of reconnaissance operations, coordination or

tasking of forces, operating authorities, processing, and

distribution or dissemination of mission products.

( ) Situation

( ) General. State what is to be accomplished through

reconnaissance. Briefly identify the reconnaissance effort required

and planned to support operations. Refer to the Basic Plan and

include information that would affect reconnaissance operations.

( ) Enemy. Refer to Annex B, Intelligence, for basic enemy

situation. Provide guidance or information on specific enemy

capabilities that may interfere with the conduct of reconnaissance

operations required by this plan.

( ) Friendly. List the specific tasks assigned to friendly forces and

agencies not part of this command in support of reconnaissance

operations envisaged herein. State OPSEC planning guidance for

supporting activities.

( ) Assumptions. List all assumptions applicable to

reconnaissance operations.

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Appendix C

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CLASSIFICATION

( ) Mission. Refer to the Basic Plan to accomplish the tasks

established in the “collection guidance” in Annex B.

( ) Execution

( ) Concept of Operations

(1)

( ) General. Summarize the scope of reconnaissance

operations and the systems and resources to be employed. State

the general concept for the conduct and control of reconnaissance

operations. Include OPSEC planning guidance for reconnaissance

operations.

(2)

( ) Commitment of Forces. Designate forces involved in the

conduct and support of reconnaissance operations.

( ) Tasks. In separate numbered subparagraphs, assign detailed

tasks and responsibilities to be performed by each subordinate

command and subordinate organization to implement this plan.

( ) Operating Authorities. Establish any special operating

authorities or constraints, such as overflight restrictions, closest point

of approach, or weather minimums not otherwise covered in Appendix

( ) Processing. Establish special requirements or procedures for

processing mission materials. Refer to Annex B for details.

( ) Targeting. Refer to Annex B regarding procedures for

submitting reconnaissance objectives and determining priorities.

Summarize tasking requirements or responsibilities. State any

special requirements for employment of specific sensors. Provide

guidance or special procedures for preplanned reconnaissance and

summarize limitations or any special considerations regarding sensor

tasking.

( ) Reporting. Include specific procedures for reporting

reconnaissance mission information and operations data, such as

operational reports (OPREPs). Refer to Annex B for intelligence

reporting.

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Appendix C

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CLASSIFICATION

( ) Coordinating Instructions. Include information and procedural

guidance necessary to coordinate reconnaissance operations.

Include:

(1)

( ) Liaison and communication requirements between

commands.

(2)

( ) Requirements for coordination with national strategic plans

or programs.

(3)

( ) Survivability criteria or procedures.

( ) Administration and Logistics

( ) Supply. Provide necessary instructions regarding supply

procedures and responsibilities such as providing mobile processing

centers, transport of mission take (product), or other special support

requirements.

( ) Reports. Provide instructions for submitting any required

administrative reports.

( ) Command and Control. Establish any special systems and

procedures required for the command and control of reconnaissance

operations.

(Refer to Annex K.)

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Appendix C

C-257

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31 December 1999

(Format, Air Base Operability Appendix)

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09128

28 February 1999

APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX C TO USCINCEUR OPLAN 4999-99 ( )

AIR BASE OPERABILITY ( )

( ) References: a. Joint Pub 3-10, (date), “Joint Doctrine Rear Area

Operations.”

b. Joint Pub 3-10.1, (date), “JTTP FOR Base Defense.”

c. Joint Pub 3-11, (date), “Joint Doctrine for NBC

Defense.”

d. List other appropriate Joint Service Agreement, DOD,

CJCS, Service, or combatant command directives

pertinent to air base operability (ABO).

( ) Situation

( ) General. Provide, as needed, subordinate units with any

information that would give them a clear understanding of the air

base operability aspects of the operation.

( ) Enemy. Refer to Annex B, Intelligence, for the basic enemy

situation. Highlight key enemy capabilities related to attack of air

bases.

( ) Friendly. List the organizations that are not subordinate to this

command.

( ) Assumptions. List assumptions not reflected in the Basic Plan

that will have a significant impact on this plan or supporting plans.

( ) Missions. Indicate the missions to be accomplished by ABO that

provide for integrated active defense, passive defense, and recovery

C-8-1

CLASSIFICATION

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Appendix C

C-259

Enclosure C

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM VOLUME II PLANNING FORMATS AND GUIDANCE (1999) - page 3