NATO ANTI–PIRACY MULTINATIONAL DOCTRINE (2008)

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER 8

Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations

0801 General

This Chapter is intended to provide guidance to NATO forces in the handling and processing of

CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs during the conduct of Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations

(NA5CROs).

NA5CROs are described in Allied Joint Publication 3.4, Non-Article 5 Crisis Response

Operations, as "multifunctional operations which encompass those political, military and civil

activities, initiated and executed in accordance with international law, including international

humanitarian law, contributing to conflict prevention and resolution, and crisis management in the

pursuit of declared Alliance objectives".

The purpose of NA5CROs is to conduct missions that contribute to international peace and

security. They are intended to respond in a timely and co-ordinated manner to crises that could either

affect the security of NATO nations, or threaten stability and lead to conflict on the periphery of the

Alliance. NA5CROs range from support operations that are primarily associated with civil agencies;

e.g. support to humanitarian operations, support to disaster relief operations, support to non-combatant

evacuation operations, extraction operations, military aid, enforcement of sanctions; through

operations in support of peace to combat operations.

Since the mid-1990s NATO has focused on two types of operations:

• Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and

• Defence Against Terrorism Operations (DATOs).

0802 Peace Support Operations

Operations in the support of peace are recognised as an aspect of NA5CROs. PSOs are

normally conducted in support of an internationally recognised organisation such as the United

Nations or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. They involve military forces and

diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. The purpose of a PSO is to achieve a long-term political

settlement or other specified conditions. PSOs include peacekeeping and peace enforcement as well as

conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building, and humanitarian operations.

PSOs contain their own unique characteristics and problems for NATO forces conducting them.

In many cases the conflict is undeclared, and there are armed personnel engaged with militia or

irregular forces who are not easily identified. In some cases, NATO forces conducting a PSO will be

required to stabilise conflict areas with or without the assistance of the local government. These

forces may also be called upon to assist local officials in minimising criminal activities; and if

authorised, to apprehend persons suspected of crimes against humanity and war crimes.

8 - 1

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

0803 Defence Against Terrorism Operations

Even though MC 327/2, NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations,

does not at present recognise DATOs as an aspect of NA5CROs, the purpose and nature of DATOs

are, for the purpose of this publication, assumed to be governed by the same principles as NA5CROs.

Defence against terrorism comprises counterterrorism and anti-terrorism as well as measures to

combat criminal activities in support of terrorism. Counterterrorism is defined in AAP-6 as “all

offensive measures taken to neutralise terrorism before and after hostile acts are carried out. (Note:

such measures include those counterforce activities justified for the defence of individuals as well as

containment measures implemented by civilian organisations or military forces.)” Military operations

executed by NATO forces in response to terrorism may be conducted by conventional forces or by

specially organised, equipped and trained counterterrorism assets. Anti-terrorism is commonly defined

as those measures, usually passive, that are meant to reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist acts.

DATOs contain their own unique characteristics and problems for NATO forces conducting

them. DATOs may be conducted in the context of an undeclared conflict against state-sponsored or

transnational, autonomous armed groups who are not easily identified, and who often do not fall under

the categories of combatants defined in the GC3 or applicable international law. NATO forces

engaged in a DATO may be required to operate in conflict areas with or without the assistance of the

local government. These forces will usually be authorised to apprehend persons suspected of terrorist

acts as well as crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes.

0804 Responsibilities

If there is no functioning local system of law enforcement, the NATO Force may be

responsible for maintaining basic law and order in the AO. In that case guidance must be provided on

the procedures to be followed in incidents resulting in NATO personnel detaining civilians and/or

hostile forces or belligerents. This guidance may be expressed in a memorandum of agreement, the

ROE, the operational order and other directives.

In a NA5CRO conducted within an AO under the sovereignty of a recognised national

government that has functioning police and court structures, the government of the host nation must

determine its own status and responsibilities under international law and its national laws with regard

to persons captured by its forces on its territory and is not affected by NATO decisions regarding the

handling of CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs. In any case, the transfer of CPERS to the host country is

contingent on its compliance with the GCs or other applicable international law. Procedures for

handling nationals of the host country and foreign nationals detained by the NATO Force must be

negotiated with the government of the host country by NATO, the nations participating in the

NA5CRO or the international body providing the mandate for the operation.

The NATO Force and the nations participating in the NA5CRO will under all circumstances

adhere to the provisions of the GCs and applicable international law. Furthermore, it is the

responsibility of the NATO Command charged with the operation and the nations whose forces are

engaged in a particular NA5CRO to include, in the operational plan, specific ROE to be followed in

that NA5CRO and also to include specific directions for the handling of CPERS including CPERS

suspected of terrorism, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes.

8 - 2

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

0805 Treatment of CPERS

All CPERS, regardless of capture or detention circumstances, shall be treated in a humane

manner in accordance with the GCs or other applicable international law. Their personal possessions

and documents, except for effects that may constitute evidence in legal proceedings, will also be

handled in accordance with applicable international law. This is reflected in the following rules of

behaviour towards CPERS:

a. CPERS shall be treated humanely.

b. CPERS shall not be physically or mentally abused.

c. Contact with CPERS shall not be of a sexual nature.

d. Members of the NATO force shall not accept bribes nor engage in commercial dealings

with CPERS.

0806 General Procedures

Where practicable, CPERS, CMAT and CDOCs will be dealt with in accordance with the

procedures outlined in Chapters 1-6 and relevant Annexes of this Publication. However, special

measures may have to be taken regarding the handling of certain CPERS as they may pose a greater

threat to guards and other personnel dealing with them than is the case with typical POWs and other

CPERS.

Use of Force. The use of force against any person to effect detention, and particularly

against civilians, shall be in accordance with the principles of necessity and proportionality.

No more force is to be used than that which is reasonable and necessary for the detention of

the person or persons in question in accordance with the principles of self-defence and

established ROE.

Disarming and Confiscation. Persons captured or detained in the course of a NA5CRO

are to be disarmed. Weapons and other articles that constitute a threat to members of the

NATO Force or the individual being detained as well as items that are to be used as

evidence in legal proceedings shall be confiscated. Confiscated items must be safeguarded,

the appropriate records kept and a receipt given. Unless otherwise instructed, such items

will follow the CPERS as he is processed.

Search. Searches are conducted to remove documents and effects of military or

investigative interest as well as items that may pose a threat to the security of own forces or

to the CPERS himself. Such items may be removed except for clothing, identity documents,

protective equipment etc, as stipulated in applicable international law. All identification

documents should be reviewed/inspected and catalogued, and then returned to the CPERS.

Searches should be conducted in accordance with the following procedures:

(1)

Searches are not to be used to humiliate or intimidate.

(2)

CPERS should be searched by personnel of their own gender. If that is not

possible, CPERS may be searched by personnel of the opposite sex in the presence

of a witness, when possible an officer or non-commissioned officer, to ensure that

8 - 3

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

the search is conducted in accordance with standards of propriety relevant to that

particular situation.

(3)

Vehicles or beasts of burden will be searched.

(4)

Searchers must neither be overly friendly nor overbearing.

(5)

Searches will always be conducted by two or more persons so as to maintain

security.

(6)

Searches must be carried out, when possible, in such a way as to avoid unnecessary

damage.

(7)

Searches will be promptly and fully reported in accordance with the Standing

Operating Procedures.

(8)

Care should be taken in handling articles of a religious or cultural nature so as not

to unnecessarily offend the person being searched..

Detention. Again, CPERS are at minimum to receive the same treatment that is accorded

to POWs by GC3 until their status is determined. However, in certain circumstances it may

be necessary to seek guidance from higher echelon’s Provost Officer (Military Police

Officer) or Legal Branch to ascertain the appropriate level of detention for the CPERS. For

example, certain CPERS will have to be segregated from individuals held for other reasons,

and special measures may have to be taken to restrain them so that they cannot escape,

destroy evidence, inflict self-harm or communicate with their accomplices.

Figure 8 - 1 illustrates the handling process for CPERS in NA5CRO.

Capture

Tactical

Questioning

Processing

and

Evaluation

Release

Detention

Interrogation

Extradition

Legal Proceedings

Incarceration

Figure 8 - 1. CPERS Handling Process in a NA5CRO

8 - 4

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

0807 CPERS Suspected of Committing or Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Acts, War

Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity or Other Crimes

If a CPERS is suspected of having committed, been involved in, or having knowledge of

terrorist acts, crimes against humanity, war crimes or other crimes, the Legal Branch and Force

Provost Marshal (Military Police Officer) will be notified and will be involved as soon as possible.

An uncontaminated, unbroken chain of custody/evidence is imperative to ensure a fair hearing if the

CPERS is brought to trial. (Guidance is provided in Annex F.) The individual and all pertinent

records, documents, photographs, and items pertaining to the alleged crime will be segregated from

the other CPERS. The CPERS will be held in a separate facility (if possible) and will be given a

CAPTAG, as shown in Annex A of this document. The tag will indicate in the additional remarks

section the suspicion of involvement in or knowledge of terrorist acts, crimes against humanity, war

crimes and other crimes. All associated documents and items will be tagged and processed in

accordance with Chapters 5 and 6 of this Publication. All documents and other items will accompany

the CPERS as he is processed through the system until handover to the legal authorities. The

documents and other items will be guarded. As soon as possible a “chain of evidence“ will be

established by NATO forces and maintained by the CPERS administration system, and all other

concerned authorities until handover has been completed.

The capturing unit will notify the higher echelon’s headquarters as soon as possible of the

CPERS’s capture. If appropriate, preliminary questioning may be carried out by the capturing unit to

obtain information of immediate value. Tactical questioning should subsequently be conducted by

qualified personnel. Any incriminating information divulged by the CPERS should be reported as

well. However, this information may not necessarily be admissible as evidence. Subsequent

interrogation should, therefore, be conducted by appropriate law enforcement agencies and judicial

authorities. The CPERS will be processed through the system as outlined in this Publication, until

such time as higher authority determines that other procedures are required. The NATO Force

Commander will contact higher (i.e. NATO) authority, who will determine whether the CPERS is to

be turned over to civilian authority and whether a full investigation is warranted. It may be appropriate

for him to appoint an officer (e.g. the Force Provost Marshal (Military Police Officer) or the Legal

Advisor) to liaise with the competent international authorities.

0808 Additional Procedures

Reporting. All cases of detention are to be reported through the chain of command in

accordance with the procedures outlined in this Allied Joint Publication and with the directives issued

by the commander of NATO force or command conducting the NA5CRO. All the particulars and

details of the detention should be included in the report in order that the status of the CPERS and his

continued detention can be reviewed.

Release. Guidelines for the release of the CPERS should be issued by the commander of

NATO force or command conducting the NA5CRO. Generally, a CPERS may only be released by the

Commander after consultation with the Force Provost Marshal and Legal Branch.

Records. The Military Police, or other element as ordered by the Commander, is at all times to

maintain and store a full record of the detention, including the medical record and the medical release

form, and a record of the procedures followed during the period of custody. All circumstances relating

to the apprehension and detention of the CPERS must be recorded and reported up the chain of

command, including:

8 - 5

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

a. When and why a person is detained.

b. When a person is searched.

c. When items are confiscated.

d. When a person is questioned.

e. When a person is released.

Segregation. POWs are to be separated in accordance with GC3. Other CPERS shall be

segregated according to citizenship. As the circumstances require, these CPERS may be further

segregated in the following categories:

a. Ethnic or religious groups.

b. CPERS suspected of having committed, been involved in, or having knowledge of terrorist

acts, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes. (These CPERS should be

segregated from each other as well as from other CPERS.)

c. Members of warring factions.

d. Within these categories, males shall be segregated from females.

e. Other CPERS as necessary (e.g. mentally disturbed or disabled CPERS, children, etc.).

0809 Media Operations

The increased ability of the international media to focus on the treatment of CPERS could lead

to adverse publicity and pressure and jeopardise military and law enforcement operations. The section

responsible for media operations within the NATO force or command's headquarters should be

involved in the CPERS planning process and kept informed of CPERS operations and data.

Exposure of CPERS to the media must not violate the provisions of the GCs, in particular

GC3, Articles 13 and 14, or other applicable international law.

8 - 6

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX A

Capture Tag

A001 General

The need to ensure that CPERS, POWs as well as other CPERS, their effects, their

equipment and documentation are cross-related/identified is important to the intelligence and

law enforcement effort. Therefore, a means of preserving the link between the CPERS and

his equipment should be established at the earliest practicable moment after capture.

The CAPTAG, is shown at Appendix 1 to this Annex. However, this degree of

administration may be impossible in confused war conditions and where linguistic difficulties

arise. The CAPTAG should be completed as fully as possible and at the earliest stage

possible. The administration of the CAPTAG system must not be allowed to interfere with the

speedy exploitation of the intelligence potential of the CPERS. An incomplete CAPTAG

and/or capture report, and early transfer, is preferable to a CPERS being held at the point of

capture until time is available for the administrative procedures to be fully completed.

The CAPTAG should not be used to label CMAT and CDOC which are not associated

with an individual. The procedures for dealing with such items are contained in Chapters 5

and 6.

The CAPTAG is in three parts:

a. Top Marked - PART A. This shall be provided to the captive in a manner which ensures,

as far as practicable, that interchange between CPERS is difficult. While specific

arrangements will be left to the discretion of the capturing unit, the ideal arrangement

would be to attach the tag to the captured person’s body directly by use of a plastic wrist or

leg band rather than to attach it to the captive’s clothing.

b. Middle Marked - PART B. This shall either remain attached to PART A, or be

detached and held by the prisoner guard/escort, and turned over to the first

interrogation unit or element located at the collecting point or CPERS holding

facility. Use of PART B is at the discretion of the NATO or national forces having

custody of CPERS.

c. Bottom Marked - PART C. This shall be attached to the documents or effects

found in the possession of the CPERS and turned over to the prisoner

guard/escort. Where possible, these items shall be placed in a single container

and sealed in order that the items may not become detached from the tag.

An example of a CAPTAG is set out at Appendix 1 to this Annex.

It shall be the responsibility of the capturing unit to cross-refer the CAPTAG to the

Group Capture Report (see Annex B) wherever possible.

Capture Tag Serial Numbers. The CAPTAG shall be clearly marked with a serial

number which shall be in the following format.

A - 1

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX TO ANNEX A

Capture Tag Format

(Reinforced Section)

ATTACH TO CAPTURED PERSON (CPERS)

PART A

REMARKS:

CAPTURE SERIAL NUMBER OF TAG

DTG OF CAPTURE

INCLUDE ANY INFORMATION WHICH MAY

LOCATIONS OF CAPTURE

ASSIST THE INTELLIGENCE EFFORT, E.G.,

CPERS NAME

CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE.

CPERS RANK

CPERS SERVICE NO

ASSOCIATED PERSONS CAPTURED AT THE

CPERS DATE OF BIRTH

SAME TIME/LOCATIONS, WITH CPERS UNIT

CPERS NATIONALITY

ETC.

POWER SERVED BY CPERS

CAPTURING UNIT

PART C ATTACHED TO EQUIPMENT OR

DOCUMENTS

YES/NO

COMMENTS OR REMARKS ON REVERSE

OF PART B

YES/NO

PART B

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS OR REMARKS, AS

REQUIRED

CAPTURE SERIAL NUMBER OF TAG

DTG OF CAPTURE

LOCATIONS OF CAPTURE

CPERS NAME

CPERS RANK

CPERS SERVICE NO

CPERS DATE OF BIRTH

CPERS NATIONALITY

POWER SERVED BY CPERS

CAPTURING UNIT

(PERFORATION)

PART C

(REINFORCED SECTION)

CAPTURE SERIAL NUMBER OF TAG

ATTACH TO CPERS EQUIPMENT OR

DTG OF CAPTURE

DOCUMENTS

LOCATIONS OF CAPTURE

CPERS NAME

CPERS RANK

CPERS SERVICE NO

ENSURE ALL DOCUMENTS/EQUIPMENT ARE

CPERS DATE OF BIRTH

SECURE IN ONE PACKAGE MARKED WITH X IN

CPERS NATIONALITY

BOX BELOW, IF OF PARTICULAR INTELLIGENCE

POWER SERVED BY CPERS

IMPORTANCE.

CAPTURING UNIT

A - 1 - 1

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX B

Group Capture Report

B001 GENERAL

The capturing unit unit will complete a GROUPCAPREP at the time of capture

whenever circumstances allow. The GROUPCAPREP shall alert the CPERS handling

organisation to facilitate the planning, movement, care and disposition of CPERS.

A copy of the GROUPCAPREP should be held by the escort accompanying the

CPERS, and this copy should be handed to the authority receiving the CPERS. It should also

list the tag numbers of the CPERS in the group, and may also contain any remarks by the

capturing unit or the escort on the behavior or conduct of individuals at capture or during

evacuation

Capturing units should complete the GROUPCAPREP as well as the capture tag (in

accordance with Appendix 1 to Annex B) as fully as circumstances allow but should not delay

the transfer of CPERS to CPERS handling facilities because it has not been possible to

complete them. The guiding principle is that an incomplete GROUPCAPREP and early

transfer to next echelon’s CPERS handling facility is preferable to a full report and late

transfer. Where an incomplete GROUPCAPREP is sent, amplifying or follow-up reports

should be sent as soon as circumstances allow.

Where the capturing unit has the ability to categorise CPERS, this should be done and

the category noted in the GROUPCAPREP.

B - 1

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX C

Special Provisions for the Handling of Persons Captured at Sea

C001. General Principles. Persons captured at sea—be they from enemy ships or destroyed

aircraft—are to be dealt with under the same principles as detailed in Chapter 2.

C002. After an Engagement at Sea. After each engagement at sea GC2 places a duty on all

Parties to the conflict to take all possible measures to, whenever circumstances permit, search for and

rescue those who have been wounded and shipwrecked as a result of the action.

C003. Hospital Ships. A belligerent warship may approach a military or civil hospital ship and free

from it those of its own forces held there as POWs. It may also capture those members of an opposing

force who are being treated on the hospital ship. These actions may only be carried out if the wounded

and sick are medically capable of being moved and if the capturing warship can provide suitable

medical care.

C004. Neutral Ports. Unless other arrangements are made between the belligerents and the neutral

power, POWs who are landed at a neutral port will be interned by the neutral power and prevented

from taking any further part in the conflict.

C005. CPERS Documentation. The capturing ship is to record details of each CPERS and

forward them up the chain of command as soon as possible. This information will then be transmitted

through the national or NATO appropriate agency to the Protecting Power or, if so designated, the

ICRC.

C006. Reports. Ships capturing POWs and other CPERS are to forward a GROUPCAPREP through

their chain of command as soon as possible.

C007. Tactical Questioning and Interrogation. Tactical questioning may be conducted at sea in

order to obtain information of immediate value and to determine whether CPERS should be subject to

further interrogation. Interrogation may be conducted onboard vessels until evacuation to more

suitable facilities ashore is possible.

C008. Evacuation of CPERS. Consistent with international law, CPERS can only be held

temporarily on board a naval vessel. CPERS and their associated documentation are to be transferred

to a CPERS handling facility on land as soon as possible. During the transfer from the ship they are to

be escorted by military police or trained guards where possible. The escort for such transfers may be

from either the organisation handling CPERS or another military unit depending on the circumstances

prevailing at the time.

C009. Transfer of CPERS Between Ships. CPERS taken aboard by minor war vessels, ships

with small ships' companies and auxiliary ships with limited military personnel are, where possible, to

be transferred to major units where the infrastructure will enable more effective CPERS handling.

C0010. Guidelines for Guarding and Handling CPERS at Sea. It is difficult to be

prescriptive with guidance on guarding and handling of CPERS at sea, as each class of ships'

capability will differ, as will the size of the crew and its skills. As part of his military decision making

C - 1

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

process, the Maritime Component Commander or the amphibious task force commander will need to

consider the possibility of taking prisoners in his plan. This will typically be the responsibility of the

Force or Group Logistic Co-ordinator. At a lower level individual units deployed as part of the Task

Force will be required to develop contingency plans for dealing with CPERS. These plans should

cover accommodation, feeding, exercise and medical treatment of CPERS held onboard. Where

possible CPERS should be given the same standard of accommodation, food and facilities as those of

the Detaining Power. However, practically it may be impossible to give CPERS domestic

accommodation onboard and they may have to be held in vehicle decks and hangers until evacuation

ashore can be arranged.

C0011. Removal of CPERS to Maritime Units in Amphibious Operations. CPERS taken

by amphibious forces deployed alongside land forces are to be processed through the land forces

CPERS handling organisation. However, CPERS taken during amphibious raids or in the initial stages

of an amphibious landing may need to be brought back to maritime units when:

a. The landing force is withdrawn to sea, and no assets left ashore and the operation is

terminated.

b. Where only a limited beachhead has been established and the retention of CPERS in the AO

would put them at significant risk from the continuing battle.

The removal of large numbers of CPERS to sea may overwhelm the capacity of the amphibious task

force to deal effectively with them. A decision may have to be taken as to how many CPERS and of

what category are to be held or released.

C - 2

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX E

Preliminary Technical Report (PRETECHREP)

To be submitted by accelerated intelligence reporting procedures immediately following the

acquisition of significant equipment.

Only use those letters for which information is available.

___________________________________________________________________

a. DTG of report.

b. Rank, name and unit of person submitting report.

c. Equipment

(1) Type⁵.

(2) Name.

(3) Quantity.

d. Nationality and designation of unit or organisation to which the equipment belongs (using

national identifying letters in accordance with STANAG 1059—see Annex W).

e. Technical characteristics of immediate tactical value.

f. Locations.

(1) Capture

DTG and location (geographic co-ordinates or UTM grid reference including grid zone

designation and 100,000 m square identification) of capture.

(2) Present

Present location (geographic co-ordinates or UTM grid reference including grid zone

designation and 100,000-m square identification) of captured equipment.

g. Description/characteristics of equipment as applicable:

(1) Country of manufacture (using national identifying letters in accordance with STANAG

1059—see Annex W).

⁵ Term to be in accordance with AIntP-3. Refer to STANAGs pertaining to designation of aircraft and ships.

E - 1

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX F

Guidelines for Handling Evidence

F001 General

This Appendix provides general guidelines for the handling of CMAT and CDOCs to be used as

evidence in legal proceedings against CPERS suspected of crimes against humanity, terrorism, war

crimes and other crimes. The detailed procedures for identifying, handling, storing, transferring,

releasing and disposing of CMAT and CDOCs used as evidence should follow accepted international

legal standards and may be set down in national manuals or regulations or in Standing Operating

Procedures for a NATO force.

F002 Evidence Custody

CMAT and CDOCs constituting evidence should be reported as soon as possible by the

capturing unit or person to the military police or other personnel specially trained and authorised to

handle evidence in order to ensure proper handling.

It is the responsibility of all military police or other law enforcement personnel to take every

precaution to preserve the integrity of evidence in its original condition. Evidence must be entered into

the custodial system as soon as possible after its collection, seizure, or surrender.

The Force Provost Marshal should establish and operate an evidence custodial system. This

custodial system could consist of:

a. An evidence custodian (designated in writing by the Force Provost Marshal).

b. An alternate evidence custodian (designated in writing by the Force Provost Marshal).

c. Evidence storage facilities.

d. An evidence log.

e. An active evidence custody record or file.

f. A final evidence disposition record or file.

The evidence custodian or, in his absence the alternate evidence custodian, has responsibilities

which cannot be further delegated. He should ensure that:

a. Evidence is properly inventoried, tagged, packaged, and marked prior to acceptance for

storage. The evidence tag should include the name, date of birth—and if applicable—the

rank and service number of the associated CPERS. The tag should also include an

identifying number, such as the INTERNSN, that connects the evidence to the CPERS.

b. Evidence custody documents are properly completed by military police personnel

delivering the evidence for safekeeping prior to acceptance for storage.

F - 1

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

c. Evidence is properly safeguarded.

d. The evidence log, active evidence custody record and final evidence disposition files are

properly maintained.

e. Inventories of evidence holdings are conducted regularly.

f. Evidence is disposed of in accordance with proper national or NATO force procedures.

F003 Evidence Submission

The capturing unit or person should tag the CMAT or CDOC as follows:

National identifying letters of capturing unit as prescribed in STANAG 1059. (See Annex W.)

Designation of capturing unit including service.

DTG of capture.

Location of capture (geographic coordinates or UTM grid reference including grid zone

designation and 100,000-metre square identification).

Captured from Unit (enemy or warring faction) (including national identifying letters in

accordance with STANAG 1059—see Annex W).

Summary of circumstances of capture.

Associated CPERS.

The law enforcement person first assuming custody of evidence will subsequently mark the evidence

itself for future identification as evidence. If such marking is not possible, the evidence will be put in a

container that can be marked. The marking should consist of time and date of acquisition and the rank

and name of the person who assumed custody of the evidence. When any person submits evidence to

the evidence custodian, it shall be properly tagged, in appropriate containers if needed.

All evidence being submitted shall be carefully examined, counted and weighed, as appropriate,

by the accepting custodian. The submitting individual must ensure those items being retained have

some evidentiary value. Any items which do not have evidentiary value will be promptly returned or

disposed of by the submitting individual, in accordance with authorised procedures.

The evidence custodian should not accept items that are not evidence nor should he accept evidence

which is not properly tagged and accompanied by the stipulated documentation such as a custody

receipt. Each item of evidence should therefore have a case control number or an equivalent designator

identifying the police report that pertains to the evidence seized.

F004 Evidence Storage Facilities

All property received as evidence will be physically safeguarded and stored in a separate and distinct

"evidence room." The evidence room should be of sufficient size to allow for the handling, storage,

and processing of volumes of evidence consistent with the size of the law enforcement operation. It

must also provide for the secure storage of the evidence. When a room has been designated as an

evidence room, other equipment and property, personal or official, shall not be stored in it under any

circumstances.

F - 2

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

F005 Evidence Inventory

When evidence is first received into custody by law enforcement personnel, whether

confiscated during an investigation or received from a unit or command representative, the receiving

party must inventory the evidence personally. Subsequently, when evidence is transferred between

parties for any reason, the inventory must be verified by the receiving individual unless it has been

placed in a sealed container by law enforcement personnel. Money and controlled substances will be

verified even if in a sealed container.

When an inventory is taken, it shall be accomplished by the evidence custodian, and a

disinterested officer outside of the provost marshal office. An entry shall be entered into the evidence

log reflecting the inventory and the participating personnel.

F006 Transfer and Shipment of Evidence

Physical evidence coming into the possession of military law enforcement personnel will, from time to

time, require its transfer and shipment to another agency where the chain-of-custody must be

maintained. Shipment shall be made by reliable and secure means. Documentation proving an

unbroken chain-of-custody shall be maintained.

F007 Disposal of Evidence

The final disposal of evidence requires authorisation as follows:

a. Approval for the final disposal of evidence shall be obtained from appropriate authority,

and entered in the final disposal section of the appropriate documentation, such as an

evidence custody receipt.

b. Obtaining authorisation for disposal of evidence will be accomplished by the evidence

custodian.

c. Any evidence which was used in any court action shall not normally be disposed of until

the initial trial and subsequent appeals have been completed. Authorisation for disposal

must be obtained from the commander, the appropriate legal officer or his representative.

d. Any evidence which is entered into the evidence custody system and which is not utilised in

judicial or administrative action may be disposed of upon authorisation from the provost

marshal or his designated representative.

Specific guidelines for evidence disposal are as follows:

a. Evidence which is obtained during the course of an investigation and is the personal

property of an individual shall, whenever possible, be returned to that person, with the

exception of items, the mere possession of which is unlawful. Such items would include

narcotics, unlawfully obtained drugs, illegal firearms, explosives, counterfeit currency, or

counterfeit identification. When personal property is returned to the owner or his authorised

representative, the individual receiving the property will be required to sign for it.

b. Evidence which, by its nature, cannot be returned to the owner or entered into a national

supply system for disposal, such as narcotics, illegal firearms or other contraband, shall be

F - 3

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX G

Holding Facilities for Captured Persons

G001 General

The GC3 provides very specific requirements for the construction and operation of Holding

Areas and Facilities for POWs. In summary, they require that:

a. POWs, and by inference, other CPERS are only to be detained in facilities which are based

on land and in circumstances which guarantee the maintenance of adequate standards of

hygiene and health.

b. POWs are not normally to be detained in prisons.

c. POWs are to be quartered under conditions as favourable as those for the forces of the

Detaining Power that are billeted in the same area. These conditions shall make allowance

for the habits and customs of the POWs and must be in no way prejudicial to their health.

This requirement applies particularly to the arrangements made for POW dormitories.

d. Accommodation is to be protected from damp, adequately heated and lighted, particularly

at night and protected against fire. Latrine facilities for use both by day and night are to be

provided. Baths and showers are to be provided together with sufficient supplies of water

for personal toilet and laundry. Adequate facilities are to be provided for messing.

e. A medical facility capable of accommodating sick POWs is to be provided. Adequate

premises and the necessary equipment for POWs to take exercise are also required

whenever military considerations permit.

f. POW Holding facilities are to be marked so as to be easily identifiable from the air by day.

Collecting Points, Holding Areas and Holding Facilities should be sited so that CPERS are not

able to observe sensitive installations or operational activities of friendly forces.

With the exception of initial collecting points, construction of all CPERS holding facilities is an

engineer responsibility. The tasking of engineer support is the responsibility of the operations staff and

the provision of construction materials is a logistics responsibility. Since the construction of CPERS

holding facilities requires considerable resources, planning and allocation of resources should be

initiated as early as possible.

Existing structures should be used when possible to reduce construction requirements.

G - 1

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

G002 Collecting point

Figure G-1 shows an example layout of an initial collecting point.

Concertina

Trench or cover

Water can or lister bag

Figure G-1: Example of an Initial Collecting Point.

Function. The Collecting Point is a facility where individual CPERS and small groups of

CPERS are consolidated into larger groups before being moved up the CPERS handling chain. While

it is not possible to set firm limits for the time a CPERS will remain in a Collecting Point, the aim

should be for them to be moved within 24 hours of their arrival.

Siting. The Collecting Point is to be established at battalion or brigade level, but may also be

established at any appropriate command level. A central collecting point may be established at

division level. An example is shown in Figure G-2. It is likely that there will be one Collecting Point

in each brigade area although this will depend on the overall size of the Area of Operations (AO).

Proximity to the Main Supply Route (MSR) will speed up the evacuation process. Collecting Points

must be able to move with little or no notice.

Construction. The Collecting Point should, where possible, be based on an existing building.

This increases the shelter available for CPERS and reduces the need for engineer support to erect

perimeter wire and overhead shelter (CPERS can be made to dig for their own protection). There is no

formal design for a Collecting Point but it must be built to suit the climate, the weather and the

operational situation.

G - 2

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

50 m

x x

30 m

x x

Inter-

Guard Force

POW

rogation

10 m

reception

Unit

Road

Figure G-2: Example of a Central Collecting Point (200 man capacity).

The size and configuration of compounds and the placement of internal facilities, field

registration and processing sites, intelligence screening sites, close-confinement areas for disruptive

captives and medical facilities vary depending on the situation.

Construction supplies include general purpose medium-size tents (approximately 20 captives

per tent), concertina wire, barbed or razor wire, screening materials, long and short pickets, staples,

anchors and water cans.

The Interrogation Unit must be located far enough from the CPERS to perform its function

effectively and should be screened from the CPERS, including routes in and out of the interrogation

area.

G003 Holding Area

Function. The CPERS Holding Area is an intermediate stage in the evacuation of CPERS to

their final destination in a CPERS long-term holding facility. The CPERS Holding Area can

accommodate more CPERS than Collecting Points and ideally CPERS should not stay for more than

72 hours. CPERS will require segregation in accordance with the procedures outlined in Chapters 2

and 3 of this publication.

Figure G-3 shows an example layout of a holding area.

Numbers. The CPERS Holding Area should be built on a modular basis. For planning

purposes the CPERS Holding Area should be capable of accommodating 500 CPERS in transit to a

CPERS long-term holding facility.

G - 3

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

Siting. The CPERS Holding Area should be sited so that it will support CPERS operations and

facilitate transit to a CPERS long-term holding facility. The holding area will normally be established

away from an area of immediate danger in a location with access to a MSR.

106 m

88 m

14 m

36 m

28 m

Other Ranks

Officers

11 x Tent (18 x 24)

7 x Tent (18 x 24)

Interrogation Unit

1 x Tent (18 x 24)

Exercise Area

POWs awaiting

interrogation

and defectors

1 x Tent (12 x 12)

POW

admin

(e.g.

Females

NCO's

feeding)

4 x Tent

8 x Tent (18 x 24)

3 x Tent

(18 x 24)

20 m

12 m

36 m

15 m

10 m

Facility HQ and Staff Lines

Legend

Staff Cccommodation - 17 x Tent (12 x 24)

Cattle Fence

Medical Centre - 1 x Tent (18 x 24)

Type 1 Cat Wire

Cook House - 1 x tent (18 x 24)

Highwire Fence (with single strand 0.3 m

xxx

Latrines & Ablutions

off ground 2 m inside)

Guard Tower

Security Lighting

Latrines

Ablutions

Figure G-3: Example of a Holding Area (500 man capacity).

G004 Long-Term Holding Facility

The Long-Term Holding Facility is the final stage in the CPERS handling process. It is a

purpose built facility capable of accommodating large numbers of CPERS for an indefinite period.

G - 4

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

The essential difference between the CPERS Holding Area and the Long-Term CPERS Holding

Facility is the nature of its construction. Figure G-4 shows an example layout of a long-term holding

facility for POWs. A Long-Term Holding Facility for other CPERS should contain facilities for

segregation according to type or status. Prisons⁷ and other suitable buildings may be used to

accommodate these CPERS. The Long-Term Holding Facility provides more durable accommodation

and generally more solid construction methods for perimeter fences, guard towers, interrogation

facilities and administrative offices.

194 m

176 m

14 m

92 m

60 m

Other Ranks

Officers

44 x Tent (18 x 24)

POWs awaiting

interrogation

and defectors

1 x Tent (12 x 12)

Exercise Area

Interrogation Unit

1 x Tent (18 x 24)

POW

Females

NCO's

admin

13 x Tent

32 x Tent (18 x 24)

(e.g.

feeding)

(18 x 24)

9 x Tent

(18 x 24)

34 m

68 m

32 m

28 m

16 m

Facility HQ and Staff Lines

Legend

Staff Cccommodation - 17 x Tent (12 x 24)

Cattle Fence

Medical Centre - 1 x Tent (18 x 24)

Type 1 Cat Wire

Cook House - 1 x tent (18 x 24)

Highwire Fence (with single strand 0.3 m

xxx

Latrines & Ablutions

off ground 2 m inside)

Guard Tower

Security Lighting

Latrines

Ablutions

Figure G-4: Example of a POW Long-Term Holding Facility.

G005 Facilities for Processing CPERS

The processing of CPERS as described in Chapter 3 of this Publication will usually take place

at a holding area or may also be completed at a long-term facility. Figure G-5 shows an example of the

layout of a CPERS processing facility.

⁷ The psychological impact on the local population and CPERS of using prison facilities that have been the site

of grievous human rights violations should be considered.

G - 5

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

PROPERTY

PRE-SCREENING

DISPOSAL

(TRIAGE):

-MEDICAL

STATION 1

STATION 2

STATION 3

STATION 4

-INTELLIGENCE

Detailed Search

Undress

Property Turn-In

Shave

Height, Weight

Medical or

in Line

Clothing

Intelligence

Hand Receipt

Haircut

DNA, Medical

Issue

Pullouts

INTERNSN Issue

Shower

Evaluation

-Jumpsuit

Delouse

-Shoes

WAITING

(WET AREA)

AREA

NETWORK

HOST

PROPERTY

SUPPLY

CLOTHING

Command &

HOLDING

ISSUE

Control

AREA

Administrative Area

STATION 8

STATION 7

STATION 6

STATION 5

Photo

Return of Author-

Record

Fingerprint

Admin Information

ised Property

Review

ID Card Issue

-Family Information

TO HOLDING

Supply Issue

Intelligence

-Education

AREA OR

Screening

Finance

FACILITY

Figure G-5: Example of a CPERS Processing Facility.

G006 Planning Factors for Holding Areas and Long-Term Holding Facilities

1. The following factors should be taken into consideration when selecting a particular area for the

establishment of a holding area or a long-term holding facility:

a. Whether there are any features of the ground such as marshes or swamps that might

promote conditions affecting the health of CPERS.

b. Sufficient water supplies to meet the needs of the long-term holding facility.

c. The availability of suitable electrical power supplies.

d. Existing buildings or structures which can be adapted, thus avoiding unnecessary

construction work.

e. The availability of local construction materials.

f. Proximity to potential target areas.

g. Proximity to existing infrastructure such as road (MSR), rail or airhead.

h. Additional logistic support which the establishment of a holding area or facility in the Area

of Operations will require.

The attitude of the local population.

G - 6

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

The threat of guerrilla or terrorist activity in the area.

k. The general attitude of the CPERS, i.e. aggressive and uncooperative or subdued and

cooperative.

The influence of the terrain on construction, access and security.

m. Any climatic considerations.

G007 Construction Recommendations

The construction of holding areas and long-term holding facilities is an engineer task. The

following are the construction standards that are considered to be necessary in order to satisfy security,

sanitation and safety requirements for holding facilities:

Fences. Perimeter fencing is to consist of:

(1) A double barbed wire fence around the perimeter of each of the one or more enclosures,

which make up the holding area or long-term holding facility.

(2) Top guards with two or more strands of barbed wire at the top of the outside perimeter

fence.

(3) A 4-meter lane, free of any vegetation between the inside and outside perimeter fences.

Guard Towers. Towers are to be sited around the perimeter of each enclosure constructed

to meet the following requirements:

(1) Of sufficient height to permit unobstructed observation of the section of perimeter

which they are sited to cover.

(2) Placed immediately outside the perimeter and where the perimeter is a double fence,

sited in such a manner as to allow an unrestricted view of the lane between the fences.

(3) Low enough to allow an adequate field of fire.

(4) Spaced to provide optimum observation. In conditions of poor visibility, extra guard

posts may have to be established between towers outside the outer perimeter fence.

(5) Of sufficient size to allow the mounting of crew served automatic weapons.

(6) Fitted with retractable ladders.

Lighting. Generators (including stand-by equipment) and lighting sets are to be provided

to enable the following lighting requirements to be met:

(1) Sufficient lighting of fences or walls to enable the detection of CPERS attempting to

escape at night.

(2) Sufficient lighting at strategic points within the holding area or facility to enable

security to be maintained at night within the compound.

G - 7

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

(3) All light fittings to be protected against breakage where necessary.

(4) All lighting to be shaded so that tower and other perimeter guards are not dazzled.

Access for Vehicles. Construction work is to be carried out to allow:

(1) Full vehicular access to the inside of the compound.

(2) Vehicle patrols full access to the perimeter fence along its complete length.

Communications. Telephone communications are to be established between perimeter

towers and other guard posts and the compound headquarters or operations centre. A

secondary means of communication, possibly by radio, is also to be in place.

Separation. A four-compound (2000 CPERS) facility is the maximum size of any one

enclosure. If it is assessed that the holding requirement is likely to exceed this figure,

further enclosures will be established.

Waste Disposal. An important aspect of the construction and management of CPERS

facilities is the requirement for an efficient waste disposal system. This must be considered

under two headings:

(1) Human Waste. A system must be put in place at the outset of construction for

disposing of the human waste from latrines in compounds and enclosures. For anything

other than the initial collecting point, the deep trench latrine will not suffice and a more

effective form of latrine must be provided. Depending on the resources available, this

will range from simple chemical toilet to a fully fledged disposal system equipped with

flushing lavatories and connected to either a local sewage system or to cess pits. Failure

to make provision for disposal of human waste will almost inevitably lead to the rapid

spread of disease among the CPERS.

(2) Other Waste. Arrangements must be made for the collection and disposal of the waste

and rubbish resulting from the wide range of activities taking place in detention

facilities. The amount of rubbish generated in a holding area for 2,000 CPERS each day

will be considerable and unless an organised system of rubbish collection and disposal

is set up from the first occupation of the facility, environmental and health problems

will arise.

(3) Waste Collection. The GC3 allows the use of POWs for tasks connected with camp

maintenance. The operation of sewage systems and waste disposal are tasks which fall

within this category provided that POWs employed on them are given appropriate

training and suitable protective equipment and clothing.

Fire Precautions. Fire fighting equipment must be provided in all CPERS facilities to the

same standard as that required for own forces accommodated in similar conditions. Where

piped water is not readily available, there may be a requirement for emergency water supply

tanks or reservoirs to be constructed close to the detention compound or enclosure.

Marking of Holding Areas and Facilities. GC3 provides protected status to POW

facilities. Roofs and walls of holding areas and long-term holding facilities for POWs are to

G - 8

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

be clearly marked with the letters “PW” or “PG” (Prisonnier de Guerre) so as to be visible

from both ground and air.

Facilities. The following facilities are to be provided in each long-term holding facility:

(1) A facility command post and administration office.

(2) A medical centre.

(3) A facility for the storage and issue of clothing and equipment and where appropriate the

operation of a POW Canteen.

(4) A facility for the conduct of religious services and intellectual pursuits for POWs.

Each separate compound within the long-term holding facility will have the following

facilities:

(5) Accommodations.

(6) Kitchen and Messing Facilities.

(7) Bath and washing facilities.

(8) Latrines.

G008 Interrogation Facility

The facility must provide the requisite number of rooms to service the volume of interrogations.

The rooms must be large enough to comfortably contain a minimum of four persons with appropriate

lighting and climate control with a table and chairs. Furthermore, they should be soundproof so that

CPERS undergoing interrogation cannot hear or be heard by other CPERS in the facility. Adequate

screening to obscure observation of the approaches to and from the interrogation facility is required.

Latrine facilities must be located in close proximity to the interrogation facility (within the screened

area). The interrogation facility should have space for guards and medical personnel, since they must

be available at all times during interrogations in very close proximity to the interrogation rooms. The

facility should also have rooms for observation through two-way mirrors or by means of surveillance

cameras.

The interrogation facility should be located far enough from the CPERS holding area or facility

that observation of interrogation operations and movement of CPERS to and from the interrogation

facility is not possible.

The interrogation facility should also contain a suitable room for the operations and analysis

cell. This room should have adequate space for necessary files, map boards, computers and

workstations and be located with discretion to the interrogation rooms.

Also, the interrogation facility should have office space for the interrogators, storage space for

CPERS effects, CMAT and CDOCs that are used in the interrogations.

Access control into the interrogation facility (by guards) must be tightly observed.

An example of the layout of an interrogation facility is shown in Figure G-6.

G - 9

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX H

Escorts and Guards

H001 Introduction

From the moment of capture to the time when released from captivity, the CPERS will

be escorted or guarded by members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power. The

procedures for escorting and guarding CPERS must be well known by those who carry out

these tasks in order to prevent CPERS from escaping from custody.

As the ultimate method of preventing a CPERS from escaping may be the use of lethal

force, it is essential that an effective system for escorting and guarding CPERS should be in

place in order to prevent the need for lethal force.

The purpose of this annex is to set out principles for the escorting and guarding of

CPERS.

H002 Definitions

The terms escort and guard are defined as follows:

a. Escort. An escort is an individual or a formed body of military personnel whose

task it is to prevent the escape of CPERS in the course of their movement from one

CPERS facility to another.

b. Guard. A guard is an individual or a formed body of military personnel whose task

it is to prevent the escape of CPERS from CPERS facilities and to maintain

discipline among the CPERS within the facility.

H003 The Escort

Role of the Escort. The role of the escort is to prevent CPERS from escaping in the

course of their movement from CPERS facility to another. The responsibility of an escort

begins at the dispatching facility and ends when they are handed over.

Provision of the Escort. The escort may be detached from the capturing unit, or from

other units as designated by CJ3 at Force HQ.

The Size of Escorts. The basic principle of escorting is that the minimum escort

should consist of no less than the basic 4 man team.

Planning the Move. The basic information required for the planning process is as

follows:

a. The Number of CPERS to be escorted. This will determine the size of the escort.

H - 1

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

Availability of Restraints. The availability of means of restraint (e.g. handcuffs)

may reduce the need for escorts. However, the use of such means of restraint must

be in accordance with provisions of GC3 and other applicable international law.

The Condition and Morale of the CPERS. Tired and co-operative captives do not

need as many escorts as those who are fresher and better motivated. Some

CPERS e.g. from special operations forces, may require a proportionally larger

escort than other CPERS.

The Method of Movement. Movement on foot offers more opportunities for escape

than vehicle movement. Certain types of movement such as movement by truck,

train and air require specific precautions to be taken by the escort.

The Terrain. The terrain across which the CPERS are to be moved will influence

the numbers in the escort and the method of escorting the CPERS. Close terrain

will require more escorts than desert.

Enemy Activity. Any likelihood of enemy interference with the move will require an

escort capable of taking offensive action to protect itself while still accomplishing its

mission.

The Location of Other Units on the Route. Before departure, the escort should

familiarise itself with the location of units on its planned route in order to be able to

seek assistance or make rest stops in the course of the journey.

The Communication Plan. The escort is to be in communication at all times with

the headquarters of the formation through whose AO it is moving.

CPERS Transport. It is unlikely that there will be dedicated transport for the

evacuation of CPERS. Their movement will be based on the return journeys of vehicles and

aircraft delivering combat supplies forward to the general area from which the CPERS are to

be moved. Transport arrangements will be co-ordinated by the J1/G1 and J4/G4 staffs at the

formation headquarters concerned. The movement of CPERS on foot will only be carried out

where there is no transport available and immediate evacuation is essential for operational or

security reasons.

Briefing of CPERS. CPERS should be briefed through an interpreter before the move

takes place. The briefing is to include:

a. The meaning of basic directions such as “Stop!”, “Go!”, “Lie Down!”, “Hands Up!”

etc.

b. The escort’s orders for opening fire (providing the ROE permits firing upon

escaping CPERS).

c. That the ‘Silence Rule’ applies at all times throughout the move (No talking to the

escort, no talking to each other).

d. The actions which CPERS are to take in the case of an emergency.

Briefing of the Escort. Before the move takes place the escort is to be briefed. This

briefing is to include:

H - 2

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

a. The destination, method of movement and route for the evacuation.

b. The understanding by the escort of its responsibility for the CPERS and the need to

safeguard them.

c. The requirement for CPERS to follow orders and instructions.

d. The need for all members of the escort to be aware of potential opportunities for

the CPERS to escape in the course of the move and of measures to prevent this

happening.

e. The understanding that CPERS are only to be spoken to when it is necessary to

give orders and maintain control.

f. What the appropriate actions are in the event of an enemy attack or other

emergency.

g. What actions are to be taken to prevent escape attempts.

h. The rules for opening fire or the use of force.

CPERS Documentation. The escort commander is to ensure that he is provided with:

a. A nominal roll of the CPERS who are to be escorted.

b. The appropriate CPERS documentation.

H004 The Guard

Role. The role of the Guard is to prevent the escape of CPERS from a CPERS facility,

to maintain discipline and to provide security within such facilities. Guards will also have a

subsidiary role in the day to day administration of the facility. The commander of the Guard

Force is responsible for ensuring that the Guard personnel under his command perform their

duties in a professional and detached manner. He must also ensure that the Guard Force is

not pressured or subverted in the performance of their duties.

Provision of the Guard Force. The Guard Force is to be found from all or part of a

formed unit or units, designated at the outset of operations by CJ3 at Force HQ. The

designated unit or units are to have no other task apart from the provision of guards for

CPERS facilities.

Organisation of the Guard Force. The Guard Force is to be composed of four

elements:

a. External Guards. External guards secure the perimeter of the facility by manning

guard towers and gate posts. Their main role is to ensure that CPERS remain

confined inside the facility but they also have the subsidiary role of protecting the

facility against attack or attempts to infiltrate the area from outside.

H - 3

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

b. Internal Guards. Internal guards maintain segregation and order within the facility

and restrict access to areas where the possibility of escape may exist such as

buildings sited close to the perimeter of the compound.

c. Roving Sentries. Roving sentries, operating in pairs, carry out random patrols

within the perimeter of the compound.

d. The Quick Reaction Force (QRF). The roles of the QRF will include:

(1) Reinforcing the external and internal guards where necessary.

(2) Defending the perimeter against outside attack.

(3) Pursuing and re-capturing escaped CPERS in the immediate area of the facility.

(4) Resolving any internal breakdown of CPERS discipline.

e. Dogs. Wherever possible, the guard force is to be augmented with trained dogs

and handlers. The dogs should include at least one tracker dog in their number.

H005 Control of CPERS

General. The effective control of CPERS in holding areas and camps is essential to

the conduct of humane internment operations within the requirements of the GCs. Effective

CPERS control can be achieved through a combination of:

a. Forward Planning. Staffs must ensure that plans exist for adequate CPERS

facilities, escorts, guard forces, transport and general administration and that these

plans can be implemented speedily and efficiently.

b. Abiding by the Geneva Conventions. NATO personnel at each stage in the

CPERS handling process from the point of capture to the CPERS Holding Facility

must scrupulously abide by, and be seen to be abiding by, the detailed

requirements of the GCs.

c. An Effective System of CPERS Discipline. There are a number of components

that constitute an effective system of CPERS discipline.

(1) A Definitive CPERS Regime. There is a requirement for a framework on which

CPERS can base an ordered life style and a system of discipline. This is

provided in CPERS facilities by:

(a) Establishing a disciplinary policy and implementing it in a firm but equable

manner.

(b) Promulgating the rules, regulations, instructions and orders which CPERS

are expected to obey in the CPERS’ own language.

H - 4

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX TO ANNEX H

Guidelines for the Movement of Captured Persons

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. Segregate CPERS by category, maintain segregation as far as is possible throughout

journey.

2. Search captives and baggage before loading in any transport.

3. If the use of restraints is specifically authorised, CPERS’ hands may be secured in front of

them

using ‘Plasticuffs’.

4. If food is provided, do not allow the use of metal cutlery and can openers.

ON FOOT

Type of

CPERS

Escorts

Location of Escorts

Formation

Numbers

Required⁸

Front, rear and flanks and in accompanying

Marching

300 - 500

transport.

Column

WHEELED VEHICLES

Type of

CPERS

Escorts

Location of Escorts

Transport

Load

Required

Light Utility

One in vehicle cab, other in following vehicle.

Truck

Medium

Utililty

One in vehicle cab, other in following vehicle.

Truck

4/8-Tonne

One in vehicle cab, the others in following

Cargo

vehicle.

14-Tonne

One in vehicle cab, the others in following

Cargo

vehicle.

One at front of vehicle, two at rear of vehicle,

Military Bus

two in following vehicle.

For Vehicle Movement. The following special instructions apply:

a. The proportion of escort to vehicles carrying CPERS is dependent on the size of

the

vehicle and numbers of CPERS. The proportion may be increased at night or in bad

visibility.

b. Drivers are to be fully briefed on routes, speeds and actions in the event of attack

escape of CPERS.

⁸ The numbers of escorts detailed under the various categories are for planning guidance.

H - 1 - 1

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

RAIL

Type of

CPERS

Escorts

Location of Escorts

Transport

Load

Required

Freight Car

In mesh enclosure in centre of wagon.

Passenger

At either end of the coach.

Car

For Train Movement. The following special instructions apply:

a. Escorts are to be briefed to dismount at halts and to secure a perimeter around

the train.

b. Where CPERS are in passenger coaches, Escorts are to ensure that windows are

locked

closed and are to carry out periodic checks of windows.

AIRCRAFT⁹

Type of

CPERS

Escorts

Location of Escorts

Transport

Load

Required

Lynx or

equivalent

Sea King or

12 - 14

2 - 3

equivalent

Merlin or

25 - 30

3 - 4

equivalent

Puma or

Escorts to guard exits and prevent CPERS

equivalent

access to flight deck.

Chinook or

equivalent

C-130

Hercules or

100

equivalent

For Aircraft Movement. The following special instructions apply:

a. Load CPERS and escorts under instructions from aircrew or ground staff.

b. Before loading remove from aircraft any equipment which could be used as a weapon.

c. Before departure, inform CPERS in their own language that the area of the flight

deck/controls is out of bounds to them at all times.

d. Order CPERS to keep seat belts fastened throughout flight.

e. Designate specific lavatories for the use of CPERS and remove locks from lavatory doors.

If practicable, remove doors.

SHIPS

⁹ Note that aircraft load limits may vary with different aircraft types.

H - 1 - 2

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

GC 3 prohibits the establishment of CPERS holding facilities at sea. Ships are,

therefore, most likely to be used to remove CPERS from the area of operations

and/or to repatriate them on cessation of hostilities. Clearly the type of vessel used

and the number of CPERS embarked will determine the size of the guard force, and

how they will be deployed. CPERS being repatriated are less likely to be aggressive

than those being removed from the area of operations while hostilities are

continuing. Warships are unlikely to be tasked

with such an activity; the most likely type of ship is a passenger vessel taken up from

trade. There is the possibility that officials from an organisation such as the ICRC will

be permitted onboard vessels repatriating CPERS. In such circumstances national

authorities or the NATO Joint Forces Command will give guidance as to the formal

relationship between such personnel and the Guard Commander. The national force

commander or the CJTF Commander will detail the military guard force. The Captain

or Ship’s Company of the vessel should not be used for the supervision and

handling of CPERS.

For ship movement. The following specific instructions apply:

a. Wherever possible CPERS are to be kept in domestic areas which have only one

entry/exit route.

b. When possible CPERS are to have a period of recreation on the upper deck each

day. Numbers undertaking recreation at any one time are to be commensurate with

the size of the guard force available. CPERS recreation is to be taken separately

from the Ship's Company.

c. If CPERS meals are taken in a Ship's Dining Hall, they are to be taken separately

from the Ship's Company. It may be that the CPERS administration will determine

that meals are taken within accommodation areas.

H - 1 - 3

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX I

Summary of Geneva Conventions Which Should Be

Communicated to Prisoners of War

Pertinent

Articles

III Convention

The purpose of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is to determine the

treatment of victims of war and to relieve and reduce suffering thereby.

There are four conventions:

- wounded and sick in the armed forces in the field

- wounded, sick, and shipwrecked in the armed forces at sea

III

- treatment of prisoners of war

IV - protection of civilians in time of war.

Whichever nation captures you is responsible for your care. Your

(12)

individual captor is aware that he is responsible to his nation for your well-

being.

You have and will retain individual privileges under the 3^rd

(17)

Convention according to your status and rank if you abide by the rules of

the Convention and state your true surname, first names and rank, date of

birth, and service number.

You will be treated humanely and respectfully as detailed in the 3^rd

(13, 14)

Convention. If you are wounded, injured or sick you will receive medical

treatment.

You will be removed from dangerous areas as soon as possible and

(19)

every effort will be made to protect you from harm.

You will not be humiliated or abused.

(3, 13, 14)

You will be disarmed and have all warlike military equipment

(18)

removed from you except articles required to protect you from harm and to

help you maintain your health. You may keep your identification

documents, gas mask, NBC clothing, water bottle, and while in the combat

zone, your personal protective equipment. You will receive sufficient

clothing and blankets to protect you from the environment.

You will be supplied with food and potable water sufficient in quantity

(20, 26)

and quality. Your captor will consider any dietary requirements due to your

I - 1

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

Pertinent

Articles

III Convention

racial, religious or environmental requirements.

Your personal documents and effects may be removed temporarily

(18)

but will accompany you and be returned later after examination. Your

identification documents will be shown for examination and administrative

purpose to your captor upon demand.

10. You will be segregated according to your nationality, sex, rank and

(16)

physical condition but you will not be treated any differently by this action.

11. You will be allowed to write to your family and to the Central POW

(70)

Information Agency informing them of your capture, address and state of

health.

12. You will be allowed to receive correspondence, plus parcels, and

(71, 72)

send at least two letters and four post cards per month.

13. You will be allowed to address complaints and requests to the

(78)

military authorities of your captor.

I - 2

ORIGINAL

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

January 2008

PUBLICATION NOTICE

ROUTING

Change 1 to AJP-3.1, ALLIED JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS, is available in

the Navy Warfare Library. The effective date will be promulgated by the Com-

mander, Navy Warfare Development Command, for U.S. Navy holders.

AJP-3.1 outlines the basic principles, doctrine, and practices of North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) maritime forces in a joint environment. It is in-

tended to influence thinking and provide guidance to NATO joint and maritime

staffs about the application of maritime power in Allied joint operations. Al-

though intended primarily for NATO forces, AJP-3.1 also applies to operations

within the framework of a combined joint task force in a multinational force of

NATO and non-NATO nations.

Change 1 updates descriptions of NATO doctrine for amphibious operations,

maritime interdiction operations (MIO), and naval cooperation and guidance for

shipping (NCAGS) that were finalized subsequent to ratification of the original

edition of AJP-3.1. Change 1 also incorporates updates stemming from changes

to supporting Allied joint doctrine for air and information operations and cor-

rects editorial shortcomings identified in the original edition.

Navy Warfare Library Custodian

Navy Warfare Library publications must be made

readily available to all users and other interested

personnel within the U.S. Navy.

Note to Navy Warfare Library Custodian

This notice will assist you in providing information to cognizant personnel. It is not accountable.

IIa

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

RECORD OF RESERVATIONS

NATION

SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

GRC

Para 0250.5c. The text of the paragraph is not acceptable to

Greece. There are cases when MCC might not be able to exercise

the OPCON of CATF (e.g., geographic constraints). Nevertheless,

MCC is the only appropriate commander to decide whether this is

possible or not. In any case, the OPCON should be exercised

through MCC, since the MCC is considered to be an insepara-

ble component of the chain of command. Therefore, paragraph

0250.5c has to be revised as, quote “The CATF is under OPCON

of the JFC through MCC. This may be appropriate when the MCC

decides that it is impractical to exercise the OPCON of the CATF.

In this case, C2 arrangements between the CATF and other com-

ponent commanders must be clearly defined to ensure effective

execution and coordination of operations within the battlespace.”

USA

The United States does not concur with the phrases “land effect”

and “effect on land.” AJP 3.1 introduces them in paragraph 0127,

subparagraph 3; in paragraph 0140, subparagraph 1; and in para-

graph 0140, subparagraph 6b; to describe the objective of allied

power projection of maritime forces and the conduct of maritime

offensive combat operations.

“Land effect” and “effect on land” are neither defined in allied joint

doctrine, nor is the effects-based approach to planning associated

with creating such an effect adequately described in allied joint

doctrine.

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

No.

CHAPTER 1 — CHARACTERISTICS OF MARITIME POWER

SECTION I — THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT

0101

Maritime Environment

1-1

0102

The Sea

1-1

0103

Multidimensional Maritime Battlespace

1-2

SECTION II — MARITIME FORCE CHARACTERISTICS

0110

Concepts of Maritime Power

1-3

0111

Inherent Characteristics of Maritime Forces

1-3

0112

Essential Operational Capabilities of Maritime Forces

1-4

SECTION III — ROLES OF MARITIME FORCES AND TYPES OF MARITIME OPERATIONS

0120

Roles of Maritime Forces

1-8

0121

Types of Maritime Operations

1-9

0122

Surveillance and Reconnaissance

1-9

0123

Coastal Defence Operations

1-9

0124

Protection of Shipping

1-9

0125

Sea Control Operations

1-10

0126

Maritime Power Projection Operations

1-11

0127

Maritime Support to Joint Air Defence

1-12

0128

Other Maritime Operations

1-12

SECTION IV — OPERATIONS IN THE LITTORALS

0130

Operations in the Littorals

1-14

0131

Environment in the Littorals

1-14

0132

Employment in the Littorals

1-15

0133

Offensive Employment in the Littorals

1-15

0134

Areas of Thorough Planning Considerations — Offensive

1-17

0135

Defensive Employment in the Littorals

1-19

0136

Areas of Thorough Planning Considerations — Defensive

1-20

0137

Shaping Operations

1-20

0138

Operations in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment

1-20

SECTION V — MARITIME WARFARE AREAS

0140

Maritime Power Projection Warfare Areas

1-22

0141

Anti-air Warfare

1-22

0142

Antisubmarine Warfare

1-22

0143

Antisurface Warfare

1-22

0144

Naval Mine Warfare

1-23

0145

Amphibious Warfare

1-23

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

Page

No.

0146

Strike Warfare

1-23

0147

Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping

1-24

0148

Electronic and Acoustic Warfare

1-24

CHAPTER 2 — COMMAND AND CONTROL

SECTION I — THE COMMAND SYSTEM

0201

Scope

2-1

0202

Authority

2-1

0203

Command

2-1

0204

Delegation of Authority

2-2

0205

Chain of Command

2-2

0206

Methods of Control

2-2

SECTION II — COMMAND AND CONTROL OF MARITIME FORCES

0210

Operational Command

2-4

0211

Operational Control

2-4

0212

Change of Operational Control

2-4

0213

Transfer of Authority

2-4

0214

Joint Force Commander

2-4

0215

Maritime Component Commander

2-5

0216

Tactical Command

2-8

0217

Officer in Tactical Command

2-8

0218

Tactical Control

2-9

SECTION III — SPECIFIC COMMAND CONSIDERATIONS

0220

Commanders of Allied Forces

2-10

0221

National Caveats

2-10

0222

Command during Task Force Operations

2-10

0223

Command of Maritime Air Operations

2-10

0224

Command in Submarine Operations

2-10

0225

Command of Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping

2-10

SECTION IV — COMMAND DURING SUPPORT OPERATIONS

0230

Support Situations

2-12

0231

Support Operations — Situation A

2-12

0232

Support Operations — Situation B

2-12

0233

Support Operations — Situation C

2-13

0234

Other Support Operations

2-13

SECTION V — TACTICAL COMMAND AT SEA

0240

Introduction

2-15

0241

Command of Large Forces

2-15

0242

Delegation of Command Functions

2-15

0243

Command and Control Options

2-16

XII

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

Page

No.

0244

Officer in Tactical Command Responsibilities

2-17

0245

Delegation of Authority

2-20

0246

Delegation Considerations

2-20

SECTION VI — COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

0250

Command of Amphibious Forces

2-23

0251

Parallel Chains of Command in the Amphibious Task Force

2-24

0252

Designation of Commanders

2-24

0253

Relationships during Planning of Amphibious Operations

2-24

0254

Command during Amphibious Operations

2-24

0255

Consultation between Commanders

2-25

CHAPTER 3 — PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF MARITIME OPERATIONS

SECTION I — PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

0301

General

3-1

0302

Principles of Joint Maritime Operations

3-1

0303

Maritime Operations across the Spectrum of Conflict

3-2

SECTION II — ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES

0310

General

3-5

0311

Task Organization

3-5

0312

Task Organization — Task Force Numbers

3-6

0313

Task Organization — Task Designators

3-6

0314

Submarine Operations

3-7

0315

Maritime Air Operations

3-7

0316

Maritime Electronic and Acoustic Warfare

3-7

0317

Delegation to Warfare Commanders

3-7

0318

Formation of Functional Groups

3-8

0319

Delegation to Coordinators

3-8

0320

Maritime Operations in a Naval Mine Environment

3-8

0321

Naval Mine Countermeasures Planning Factors

3-8

0322

Amphibious Operations

3-9

0323

Types of Amphibious Operations

3-9

0324

Composition and Organization of Amphibious Forces

3-10

0325

Sequence of Amphibious Operations

3-11

0326

Spare

3-14

0327

Termination of Amphibious Operations

3-14

SECTION III — MARITIME PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM

0330

Commander Estimate of the Situation

3-16

0331

Operation Plan

3-16

0332

Execution Directive

3-16

XIII

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

Page

No.

CHAPTER 4 — INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT

SECTION I — GENERAL

0401

Scope

4-1

0402

Definition and Extent

4-1

0403

Maritime Dimension of Information Operations

4-1

0404

Maritime Information Operations

4-2

0405

Maritime Offensive and Defensive Information-Network Operations

4-3

SECTION II — NON-MILITARY CAPABILITIES

0410

Non-military Activities Supporting Information Operations

4-5

0411

Maritime Application of Non-military Activities Supporting

Information Operations

4-5

SECTION III — MILITARY CAPABILITIES

0420

Command and Control Warfare

4-7

0421

Military Capabilities within Command and Control Warfare

4-7

0422

Military Capabilities Supporting Command and Control Warfare

4-8

0423

Maritime Application of Command and Control Warfare

4-8

0424

Measuring the Effectiveness of Maritime Information Operations

4-10

CHAPTER 5 — MARITIME LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT

0501

General

5-1

0502

Logistic Principles

5-1

0503

NATO Logistic Support Concept

5-2

0504

Maritime Component Logistic Support Concept

5-3

0505

Logistic Support Functional Areas

5-4

0506

Amalgamation between Multinational Joint Logistic Centre

and Multinational Logistic Command

5-5

0507

Logistic Reporting

5-5

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations-1

GLOSSARY

Glossary-1

REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS

Reference-1

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

LEP-1

XIV

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

No.

CHAPTER 1 — CHARACTERISTICS OF MARITIME POWER

Figure 1-1.

Employment in the Littorals

1-15

CHAPTER 2 — COMMAND AND CONTROL

Figure 2-1.

Maritime Component Command Relationships to JFC

and Other Components

2-7

Figure 2-2.

Maritime Component Command Relationships

2-8

Figure 2-3.

Levels of Command and Control within the OTC

Warfare Organization

2-17

CHAPTER 3 — PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF MARITIME OPERATIONS

Figure 3-1.

Maritime Operations across the Spectrum of Conflict

3-3

Figure 3-2.

Phases of an Amphibious Operation

3-12

CHAPTER 5 — MARTIME LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT

Figure 5-1.

Logistic Support Command and Control Concept

5-4

Figure 5-2.

Amalgamation between MJLC and MNLC

5-5

REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS

Maritime Publication Relationship Matrix

Reference-2

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

FOREWORD

Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.1, Allied Joint Maritime Operations, outlines the basic principles,

doctrine, and practices of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) maritime forces in a joint

environment. It is intended to influence thinking and provide guidance to NATO joint and maritime

staffs about the application of maritime power in Allied joint operations. AJP-3.1 derives its authority

from and complements AJP-3, Allied Joint Operations, which presents NATO doctrine for planning

and conducting joint operations. AJP-3 provides overarching doctrine on Allied joint operations, while

AJP-3.1 focuses on the unique characteristics and employment considerations for maritime forces in

joint operations. It addresses the fundamental factors that influence the employment of maritime

power and the key aspects of command and control from the command perspective. Although intended

primarily for NATO forces, AJP-3.1 also applies to operations within the framework of a combined

joint task force in a multinational force of NATO and non-NATO nations.

XVII

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

CHAPTER 1

Characteristics of Maritime Power

SECTION I — THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT

0101 Maritime Environment

Maritime power, in the broadest sense, is military, political, and economic power exerted

through the use of the sea, and exercised by sea, air, and land resources. Maritime power has

traditionally been employed to control the sea lines of communications (SLOC) for the general

economic welfare or survival of sea-dependent states, and for support of allied, joint, and combined

operations on land. Maritime power has long been used to project power ashore through amphibious

operations and carrier-based aircraft. Power projection capabilities have been greatly expanded with

the advent of sea-based missiles and improved gun systems.

NATO maritime doctrine is concerned specifically with the application of sea power at and

from the sea. NATO maritime forces, under most circumstances, will operate at the strategic and

operational levels alongside the other components. This section examines the features of the maritime

environment that shape the employment of allied maritime forces in a joint environment.

In accordance with rights and jurisdictions recognised under international law, the preponderance

of the sea and airspace above it remains essentially neutral and uninhabited. Maritime operations,

therefore, contrast with land operations in that the sea cannot be possessed in the same way as land.

Nations may have interpretations of international law that differ subtly or materially from those of

other allies, partners or adversaries.¹ The maritime force commander must be cognisant of national

differences in interpretation and the impact that may have on operations.

0102 The Sea

Coverage. The sea covers over 70 percent of the Earth’s surface, and provides a fluid

medium for the efficient transport of large and bulky items. In addition, the sea is increasingly

exploited for its economic resources.

Influence. Approximately 90 percent of the world’s population lives within 300 n.m. of a

coastline. An estimated 80 percent of the world’s major cities and a majority of financial centres are

within 100 n.m. of a coastline. Thus, the sea provides vital strategic access.

Physical Environment. Sea areas can range from large open oceans to the more confined

waters of coastal regions. Environmental conditions will affect the ability of maritime forces to

conduct operations. However, skilful seamanship and tactics can help to minimize these effects, and

the inherent mobility of maritime forces may allow them to move to an area where the conditions are

more favourable. A good knowledge of the environments in which maritime forces operate is

essential. There is, therefore, a need for maritime forces to maintain expertise in oceanography and

meteorology.

¹ For example, interpretation of hostile intent, innocent passage, or claimed territorial waters.

1-1

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

International Law. Maritime forces generally may exercise unrestricted freedom of

navigation and overflight in international waters and airspace. NATO maritime forces can legally

operate close to the territorial waters of a nation without prior approval of the government concerned.

This gives them an unrivalled freedom of navigation to position relatively close to shore. A

commander should always maintain situational awareness with regard to operating forces and the

lawful and excessive legal boundaries and demarcations of the seas, airspace and land territory

claimed by coastal states. When time permits, a commander should seek the advice of a legal advisor

during the planning and conduct of Allied joint maritime operations.

0103 Multidimensional Maritime Battlespace

NATO maritime forces operate above, on, and below the sea throughout the joint operations

area (JOA). The oceans and the littoral² provide three-dimensional space in which maritime forces can

operate and manoeuvre at a time of political choosing, and an international arena for the demonstration

of capability and the will to use force. However, a threat can come from any direction. The recognised

maritime picture (RMP), including the adversary’s positions and movements, is established through

three-dimensional surveillance. All assets, including space- and air-based sensors, which can cover

large areas quickly, must be used to maintain a continuous information flow. The sea, however, is

largely opaque to many sensors. It can, therefore, be used as a hiding place, as demonstrated by the

effectiveness of sea mines and submarines. NATO maritime commanders must always consider these

vulnerabilities when positioning maritime forces to support allied operations ashore.

Surface warships can be located by satellite or air surveillance. However, their mobility often

makes them hard to locate and track with the precision necessary for engagement, especially if they do

not give away their identity through emissions.

Activities closer to shore involve limitations on the freedom of movement or direction of

approach, and the possible need to pass through geographical or adversarial created chokepoints. This

will limit the options of a NATO commander, give warning of possible movement, and provide

opportunities for the positioning of hostile forces at key locations. Surveillance and weapon systems

must deal with the complicated conditions close to shore and the different environment over the land.

allied maritime forces must be capable of conducting military operations in open ocean and the littorals.

Maritime forces are most effective when they form a part of a larger joint force. The

commander’s concept of operations capitalises on the ability to use open ocean and the littorals to

manoeuvre to a positional advantage, thus supporting attainment of the joint force commander’s

(JFC’s) objectives. Additionally, maritime forces conducting amphibious or strike operations may be

the only way for land forces to obtain access. Even when this is not the case, land forces may be

prevented from achieving their objectives without maritime forces to safeguard their lines of

communication and resupply.

0104 - 0109 Spare

² The littoral means: In military operations, a coastal region consisting of the seaward area from the open ocean to the shore

that must be controlled to support operations ashore, and the landward area inland from the shore that can be supported and

defended directly from the sea. Control of the area in the littorals is often essential to dimensional superiority. Maritime

operations in the littorals can support other components of the joint force in many ways that are described later in this

publication. One example is the seizure of an adversary’s port, naval base or coastal air base to allow entry of other joint

force elements. (This definition does not have any implication on rules of international law of the sea and rights and duties of

states arising from rules of international law of the sea.)

1-2

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

SECTION II — MARITIME FORCE CHARACTERISTICS

0110 Concepts of Maritime Power

Maritime operations include any actions performed by forces on, under, or over the sea to gain

or exploit command of the sea, sea control or sea denial, and/or to project power from the sea. In a

joint environment, maritime forces do more than simply pursue the maritime objectives of the JFC’s

campaign. Their utility lies in being able to contribute effectively as a component of a joint operation,

whose main effects will invariably be focused ashore. Maritime operations can influence land and air

operations by poising at sea and acting as a coercive force, reducing the need for host-nation support

(HNS), manifesting deterrence, enabling access to the JOA, providing battlespace dominance,

projecting power ashore and providing sustainable logistics.

Maritime operations contribute to all three NATO military missions: Article 5 Collective

Defence, Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO), and Consultation and Cooperation.

They can encompass demonstrations of force and humanitarian assistance, warfighting operations at

sea, protection of SLOCs, strikes against an adversary’s maritime, air and land forces, amphibious

operations, information operations (INFO OPS), and other activities throughout the range of military

operations to attain JFC and national objectives.

0111 Inherent Characteristics of Maritime Forces

Maritime forces possess the following inherent characteristics:

a. Poise. The ability to poise navy, amphibious, air, land, and special operations forces

(SOFs) in international waters avoids the political complications and military risks of

deploying forces ashore.

b. Readiness. One of the strengths of maritime forces lies in their immediate availability

to respond to contingencies. Preparedness for warfighting closely parallels many non-

warfighting military functions, such as presence, logistic and health service support. By

maintaining proficiency in the capabilities necessary to resolve major conflicts, maritime

forces can provide a wide range of services in support of peacetime operations in benign

environments and throughout the full spectrum of conflict.

c. Flexibility. The inherent flexibility of maritime forces permits political leaders and

commanders to shift focus, reconfigure and realign forces quickly to handle a variety of

contingencies by providing a wide range of weapons systems, military options, and

logistic/administrative skills. Maritime forces offer presence without occupation and

deterrence without commitment. In tasks ranging from forcible entry and strike operations to

noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), disaster relief and humanitarian assistance,

maritime forces can control the seas and provide diplomatic leverage in peace or time of

crisis. The strategic, operational and tactical command and control (C2), and intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities of maritime forces provide for a uniquely

controllable force to complement diplomatic efforts.

d. Self-Sustainment. The degree of self-sustainment achieved by maritime forces will be

determined by the nature of the operation and the types of units committed by the

participants. NATO maritime forces, with their ability to conduct replenishment at sea, are

capable of operating in forward areas without significant land-based supply structures for

1-3

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

prolonged periods. Maritime forces have their organic C2 capabilities, which can be used

with flexibility for many tasks.

e. Mobility. Mobility enables maritime forces to respond from over the horizon, becoming

selectively visible and threatening to adversaries, as the situation requires. Maritime forces,

with their inherent strategic and tactical mobility, provide the JFC with the ability to monitor

a situation, remain poised on station for a sustained period, and respond to a crisis rapidly. If

diplomatic, political or economic measures succeed in stabilising a situation, maritime forces

can quickly be withdrawn without further action ashore. Maritime forces can also respond to

indications of pending crises by relocating rapidly from one end of a JOA to another, or from

one strategic area to another, usually independent of fixed logistics. In combat, the ability to

manoeuvre maritime forces quickly provides commanders with a significant tactical and

operational advantage.

0112 Essential Operational Capabilities of Maritime Forces

NATO forces must possess seven essential operational capabilities to carry out the three

military missions of Alliance strategy. (See Article 0110, paragraph 2.) Maritime force characteristics

contribute to each of these capabilities. They are: effective engagement, effective intelligence,

deployability and mobility, timely force availability, effective C2, logistic sustainability, and

survivability and force protection.

Effective Engagement.

a. Maritime forces can establish long-term presence, crisis response, and extended

deterrence within and beyond the NATO area of responsibility, while minimising the need

for HNS and force protection in comparison to forces stationed ashore. In low-intensity

operations, their presence and benign engagement (for example, in defence diplomacy or

disaster relief) may be sufficient in themselves to meet political objectives with minimal

complication. At higher levels of intensity, building on a range of capabilities that enable

secure JOA access and freedom of navigation, they can rapidly exploit the sea to complement

and support manoeuvre on the ground, thereby complicating and constraining an adversary’s

military options. This will add to the JFC’s range of choices for intervention, while avoiding

irrevocable commitment and premature reliance on a complex exit strategy.

b. The mere presence of a maritime force can be a significant factor in preventing or

containing conflict. The early effect of ready, mobile forces can be decisive. If conflict

nevertheless occurs, maritime presence can compel an adversary to defend a broader front,

while allowing the Allies to concentrate their maritime forces at a time and place of their

choosing. Once a decision has been made to engage, approach from the sea and/or applied

pressure on the maritime flank of the JOA can help define and exploit the JOA to NATO

advantage, and to establish a more favourable ground and air situation for the main point of

joint effort ashore. Maritime forces can project power into the JOA at graduated levels of

intensity to achieve discrete effects required by the JFC in synergy with other components of

the joint force. Furthermore, maritime platforms offer relatively protected bases from which

to command and control the allied engagement effort, and to support complementary INFO

OPS, public information (PI), and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) activities.

1-4

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

Effective Intelligence.

a. Effective intelligence is a crucial enabler that allows commanders at all levels to identify

operational risks, threats, and opportunities and provides essential support to joint

contingency and operational planning. Intelligence assets designed to provide indications and

warnings (I&W), which in turn drive timely force availability, logistics considerations,

survivability and force protection, have particular utility in the preliminary stages of crisis

response. To be effective, intelligence support must include emphasis on relevant forward

areas, possibly beyond Alliance borders, in order to identify, monitor and analyse potentially

threatening developments.

b. The fusion of all-source intelligence data produces the common operational picture

(COP). Joint staffs have a key and continuous responsibility to produce the COP required by

a JFC. The maritime contribution to the COP is the RMP. The RMP, typically from forward-

deployed maritime platforms, is derived from scouting (surveillance and reconnaissance),

signals intelligence

(SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and acoustic intelligence

(ACINT). For example, the ability of forward-deployed submarines to provide I&W can act

as a valuable force multiplier, providing early indication of the need to deploy follow-on

elements of a joint force.

c. Many intelligence sources are under national rather than Alliance control and are subject

to restrictions on releasability and access. A primary consideration in the delivery of effective

intelligence is not only the means by which data is gathered, but also the process for fusing,

analysing and distributing data to provide a comprehensive, continuous and accurate

intelligence picture to the JFC. The prospect of future Alliance engagement beyond the area

of responsibility reinforces the need to further develop maritime support to strategic,

operational, and tactical intelligence gathering, dissemination, and exploitation.

Deployability and Mobility.

a. Sea-based forces are globally mobile and deployable. They are able to exploit freedom of

navigation, transiting to and arriving in the JOA in fully operational mode to establish a

scalable, sustained military presence, and to demonstrate finely measured political intent.

Early arrival in the JOA provides a potentially significant psychological and political impact

for allied forces, lending credible weight to manage and contain crises. They may be

particularly valuable in the preliminary stages of an emerging crisis, where early influence,

coercion or military intervention may help to prevent deterioration into conflict. Once in the

JOA with significant force, the maritime component offers the JFC a range of options to

influence the operation, from sea-based command and presence at one end of the spectrum,

to power projection at the other.

b. The principal prerequisites for these roles include: high readiness, long-range deployability,

self-sustainment, interoperability, role-versatility, integral force protection, and self-

contained command facilities. A wide range of maritime forces, from a single unit to a full

NATO expanded task force (NETF) or a combined joint task force (CJTF) supported by a

sea-based joint C2 system, provide the capability required for rapid and flexible operational

manoeuvre. Deployability and mobility also embrace the ability of strategic sealift to move

freely and flexibly into and within the JOA. The natural advantages enjoyed by maritime

forces can thus be exploited to support the broader joint campaign.

1-5

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

Timely Force Availability. Force generation requirements vary from smaller forces that are

configured for humanitarian assistance operations and available to deploy on short notice to more

capable and substantial forces, including headquarters (HQ) forces, deployed in support of the joint

campaign. Future security challenges are unpredictable and demand speed and flexibility of response,

a state of balanced readiness, and capabilities to face a wide range of contingencies. Timely force

availability encapsulates these qualities and provides essential military support to political decision-

making in crisis. NATO maritime forces currently offer considerable flexibility in terms of capability,

platform versatility, readiness and well-practised multinational cooperation and interoperability. These

qualities enable mission-oriented task forces (TFs) and task groups (TGs) to be formed relatively

quickly and efficiently. Standing naval forces (SNFs) are already formed and available for these tasks.

In this way, maritime forces can be deployed and pre-positioned, without commitment, in the earliest

stages of crisis management.

Effective Command and Control.

a. Effective C2, properly supported by a joint operations planning process, is essential to the

success of future NATO joint operations. It relies on cohesion and interoperability at and

between military strategic, operational, and tactical levels. At the military strategic level,

political imperatives and the Alliance’s core mission of collective defence have determined

many of the characteristics of NATO existing C2 structure (the NATO command structure)

and planning policy as described in Military Committee (MC) 133/3. The responsiveness of

this structure to wider missions will be improved by further evolution of existing systems

and processes, and the development of new approaches, including the CJTF concept. In

particular, these should address the requirement for the efficient C2 of deployed, joint

maritime forces operating external to the reach of the NATO command structure and include

efficient access to the use of civilian communications in crisis response operations (CRO).

b. Maritime units can rapidly provide operational level C2 facilities for the JFC during the

initial stages of an operation, where speed of reaction and the effective collation,

management and use of information are paramount. Effective C2 at the joint operations level

demands high-speed, high-data-rate communications networks and reliable long haul, rear-link

systems in sufficient numbers and capacity. Such capabilities exist only on a few select maritime

platforms.

Logistic Sustainability.

a. Maritime forces are in themselves largely self-sustaining with organic logistic support that

enables them to operate independently of HNS for prolonged periods, thus allowing the JFC

considerable freedom of action in deployment and employment options for maritime forces.

Such independence will be particularly valuable in the early stages of a land campaign when

logistic resupply may not be fully established. Early deployment of maritime forces can

contribute significantly to a graduated and optimised logistic footprint ashore and enable

leaner land and air forces by the provision of a logistically self-sustaining, sea-based power

projection capability.

b. Since JOAs in the case of CRO might need to be established beyond NATO area of

responsibility, the majority of logistic support by volume will need to be transported by sea.

This may also apply to combat and combat support personnel entering the JOA behind the

initial echelons of the joint force. Safe and timely delivery of such support will require

secure SLOCs, protected maritime holding areas in and outside the JOA, and secure means

of delivery; either through established seaports of debarkation (SPODs) or by joint logistics

1-6

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

over-the-shore transit systems where adequate SPOD facilities do not exist. Accordingly,

NATO needs guaranteed short-notice access to substantial volumes of logistic shipping,

along with escort forces and mine countermeasure (MCM) and local maritime defensive

forces, in order to dominate the destination points in the JOA.

Survivability and Force Protection.

a. The survivability of joint forces is a crucial consideration in strategic planning and

decision-making, with implications that extend well beyond the military mission and into

issues such as public support, political cohesion, and other areas that could be exploited by

an adversary. Maritime forces can contribute significantly to the wider protection of joint

forces in the JOA. In particular, maritime fire support and air power, intelligence,

surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance, reinforcement operations and theatre

ballistic missile defence, will offer the JFC significant additional force defence.

b. Maritime forces will normally enjoy a high degree of survivability using organic means.

Additionally, operating with the natural protection of the sea reduces their vulnerability to

asymmetric warfare and nuclear, biological, radiological, and chemical threats. However, as

expeditionary operations prompt greater use of the littorals, and as weapon sophistication and

weapons of mass effect and mass destruction proliferate, with the exception of submarines,

the inherent protection afforded to maritime forces will diminish. The achievement of sea

control, as an important factor in effective engagement from the sea, will invariably be time

consuming and resource intensive in any scenario where adversarial capabilities, aimed at

sea-denial or access-denial, can be effectively employed.

0113 - 0119 Spare

1-7

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

SECTION III — ROLES OF MARITIME FORCES AND TYPES OF MARITIME OPERATIONS

0120 Roles of Maritime Forces

Maritime power provides the JFC a long-term, flexible presence and fighting capability that

can be employed throughout the spectrum of conflict from benign to high-intensity warfighting. Allied

maritime forces can exploit the vast area of the sea and influence events ashore through deployment,

concentration and manoeuvre.

Maritime operations include any actions performed by forces on, under or above the sea to gain

or exploit command of the sea, sea control, or sea denial and/or to project power from the sea.

a. Command of the Sea. Command of the sea gives maritime forces the freedom to use

the sea and to deny its use to an adversary. Total command of the sea, in the sense that

maritime forces are unchallenged anywhere and that an adversary is unable to carry out any

maritime operations, can be achieved only by the destruction or elimination of the

adversary’s maritime forces. It is more practicable to limit the objective of command of the

sea in time or place. This is referred to as sea control.

b. Sea Control. Sea control allows the use of the sea in specified areas for specified

periods of time. The early achievement and retention of a level of sea control is a likely

requirement across the entire range of military operations and will be a probable prerequisite

of an Allied joint campaign or operation. The level of sea control required will be a balance

between the desired freedom of action and the degree of acceptable risk. Sea control

comprises the control of the surface and subsurface environments and the airspace above the

area in which control is required. The minimum requirement for control of the airspace is to

secure and maintain a favourable air situation, but air superiority will be a requirement for

robust sea control where an adversary’s challenge from the air is likely to occur.

c. Sea Denial. Sea denial is exercised when one party, unable to control a maritime area,

denies another control of the same area. Sea denial is not a concept distinct from sea control,

as denial of an adversary’s freedom of action is an aspect of sea control. However, the

concept is applicable only when full sea control is not exercised by choice or necessity. At

the operational level, a zone of sea denial may be used as part of the outer defence of a force

or area, or as a way of containing opposition forces. At the strategic level, sea denial can be

used in warfare by sustained attack on an adversary’s shipping to prevent reinforcement and

sap national morale and the ability to wage war.

d. Maritime Power Projection. Maritime power projection is the use of, or threat of the

use of, maritime power to influence events on land. It exploits sea control to achieve access

to the littorals and to deliver power ashore in the forms of amphibious forces, organic

aircraft, land attack weapons and SOF. Forces engaged in maritime power projection will

also contribute to INFO OPS. Maritime power projection is a concept that has broad

application during crisis management and in hostilities. Maritime forces remain one of the

most politically acceptable and versatile forms of military presence, since they are able to

demonstrate the Alliance’s resolve and political intent without violating an adversary’s, or

potential adversary’s, territorial waters or airspace. During hostilities, maritime forces use

the sea to provide access to territory that is less accessible to land forces or to create a

forward operating base (FOB) for other components.

1-8

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

In joint operations, maritime forces can be employed in the littorals for the conduct of power

projection operations to achieve force protection or to assist in the provision of force protection and

support missions. Maritime power projection, including amphibious operations, integrates ships and

aircraft and ranges from benign operations with negligible military threat (such as presence and

surveillance), through operations in times of tension (such as CRO), to warfighting operations at sea

(such as protection of SLOCs, where defence against threat has to be three-dimensional). Amphibious

operations integrate ships, submarines, aircraft, and landing forces (LFs) in a concerted joint military

effort in an environment ranging from permissive to hostile.

Conflicts at sea rarely exist in isolation from land operations or the pursuit of territorial

objectives. Even when the maritime component is operationally dominant, the ultimate outcome in the

JOA is likely to depend on success ashore. Maritime operations can influence land operations by

deterrence, providing access to the JOA, assisting in providing battlespace dominance, projection of

power ashore and provision of sealift and sea-basing. Maritime operations encompass and contribute

to the full range of joint operations, through the application of naval and air forces and, during

amphibious operations, the projection and support of amphibious and land forces. Land-based forces

can support maritime operations with intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance,

fires and force protection, INFO OPS, logistics and air assets.

0121 Types of Maritime Operations

For the purpose of this publication as joint doctrine, a useful distinction can be made between

applications of maritime power from the sea, which equates broadly to power projection operations,

and at sea, of which sea control operations are the essence. Power projection operations have a natural

close relation to joint operations, whereas sea control operations are purely naval in nature, but

contribute to joint objectives. Articles 0122 thru 0128 describe the operations that could normally be

assigned to a maritime force commander in an allied defence plan, contingency plan, operation plan

(OPLAN) or other operational directive.

0122 Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Surveillance and reconnaissance, also known as scouting, is a basic maritime task involving the

locating, identifying and tracking of aircraft, surface vessels and submarines and, where relevant,

shore facilities. Implicit to all operational maritime tasks, surveillance and reconnaissance forms the core

activity for many operations in response to a crisis, such as maritime interdiction operations (MIO), and

missions in support of peace. In the context of CRO, for some missions this may be the sole tasking for

allied maritime forces.

0123 Coastal Defence Operations

Coastal defence encompasses those tasks related to protecting friendly ports and seaward approaches

from adversary intrusion. This threat may be posed by overt actions of an amphibious or naval force,

or covert actions of SOFs or terrorists. Shore-based installations often contribute to coastal defence.

Maritime forces with their inherent mobility and flexibility can contribute, depending on the threat, to

surveillance and reconnaissance operations, barrier operations against submarines and/or surface

forces and sea minelaying operations.

0124 Protection of Shipping

A NATO commander who is tasked with the protection of shipping has to make an important choice

between a deterrent concept, perhaps employing distant or close escort, and the establishment of

1-9

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

robust sea control across a wider area. This decision involves the following factors:

a. Sea Control. If the threat to shipping is sufficiently great, protection will require

mobile or static sea control methods or a combination of both. Merchant shipping may

benefit from a wider sea control plan that will offer protection in the waters through which it

will pass; or a specific sea control operation may be devoted to the sea lanes under threat

using accompaniment, active protection, convoying or defended lanes. Both concepts can of

course be used within a wider sea control plan if resources permit.

b. Distant and Close Escort. If there is regional tension, or where there is a threat of

piracy or attack by irregular forces, destroyers, frigates, and other vessels can be on hand in

the JOA to deter attack. When the threat is greater, distant or close escort provides more

specific protection. Allied maritime forces can provide surveillance against threats. Naval

vessels can be positioned in the vicinity of concentrations of merchant shipping (distant

escort) or accompany selected ships (close escort). While conducting both close and distant

escort, allied maritime forces offer a measure of defence; but the concept is to deter attack by

the threat of reprisals. It will rarely be possible to escort and defend every vessel, although it

is possible to fit portable defensive systems (and embark military protection parties) to some

merchant ships to enhance their defensive capability.

c. Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping. In periods of crisis where there is

a significant risk to maritime trade, NATO may offer specific protection to sealift and

merchant shipping through special procedures. Participation would be voluntary by ships’

owners and operators within a clearly defined geographical area under naval cooperation and

guidance for shipping (NCAGS). In the higher end of the threat scale, the NCAGS may

organize routing of shipping while under risk of attack. Under certain situations, allied forces

may be called upon to protect ships of many nationalities carrying cargoes of interest to the

Alliance.

d. Convoying. Convoying is an important and tested method of reducing the scale of the

sea control problem when there are risks to maritime trade or NATO sealift shipping.

Gathering shipping into convoys reduces the area and time over which sea control must be

exercised for their protection. Convoying may complicate the attacker’s task in finding

targets and concentrates escorting forces so that they can take action against the attackers at

an opportune time. Convoying is disruptive to trade. The strategic or operational decision to

convoy requires a careful risk/benefit assessment including the prospect of drawing the

enemy into decisive action.

0125

Sea Control Operations

Sea control operations are static and conducted using long-range surveillance and airborne weapon

delivery systems over large areas of sea. Their targets are principally enemy aircraft, ships, and

submarines that are in transit to attack positions. Careful coordination of C2 is required to allow a

mobile force, under afloat command with its layered defences of moving close and distant screens, to

pass through areas of operations under the control of NATO commanders ashore without mutual

interference and fratricide.

a. Establishment and Maintenance of a Recognised Maritime Picture. In all

maritime operations, ranging from peacetime through increasing tension to hostilities, it is

necessary to establish and maintain a picture of the surface, air, and subsurface situation. In

peacetime, this is normally under national responsibility. In accordance with MC

367,

1-10

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

surveillance coordination centres coordinate NATO surveillance operations in order to

optimise the information obtained for the dissemination of the RMP.

b. Shaping Operations. Shaping operations are conducted before the arrival of a main

force, particularly a power projection force, in its area of operations. They shape the

battlespace to enable Alliance operations and could include neutralising enemy sea denial

forces such as submarines and sea mines. Shaping operations in the littorals may take a

considerable time to achieve clearance to acceptable levels of risk. Although they may be

conducted as part of a deception plan, shaping operations should not compromise operational

or tactical surprise.

c. Barrier Operations. Barriers of sea control forces can be set up where geographic,

oceanographic features, or operational constraints will channel or concentrate attacking

enemy forces.

d. Layered Defence. Moving layers of air and antisubmarine defence are organised about

a unit, formation of high value, or sea area of importance in screens and patrol areas. Specific

units or formations within the screens are allocated sectors or zones of responsibility. Sectors

or zones ensure economy of effort and prevent mutual interference.

e. Exclusion Zones. Exclusion zones have been justified, in part, as a reasonable

measure to contain the geographic area of a conflict or to keep neutral shipping at a safe

distance from the areas of actual or potential hostilities. To the extent that such zones serve to

warn neutral vessels away from belligerent activities and reduce their exposure to collateral

damage and incidental injury, and to the extent that they do not unreasonably interfere with

legitimate neutral commerce, they are undoubtedly lawful. However, the establishment of

such a zone does not relieve the proclaiming belligerent of the obligation under the law of

armed conflict to refrain from attacking vessels and aircraft that do not constitute legal

targets.

0126

Maritime Power Projection Operations

Maritime combat power can be projected ashore by sea-based attack aircraft, submarine and

surface-launched cruise missiles, naval fire support, amphibious forces, and SOF. Operations against

the land will usually be joint operations, requiring effective cooperation and a clearly understood

command structure.

Maritime Air Strikes.³ Maritime forces can contribute to attacks against targets ashore using

carrier-based strike aircraft or sea-launched cruise missiles. In maritime operations, particularly in the

littorals, air forces work in close cooperation with maritime forces to ensure the most effective use of

available air assets in strike roles. Air strike operations are divided into:

a. Major Strike. A major strike is a coordinated attack by a large number of aircraft,

fighter sweep/escort, combat air patrol, and support aircraft, all deployed in a single or

multiple packages.

b. Limited Strike. A limited strike is similar to a major strike, but with a smaller number

of aircraft. This type of strike is preferred for sustained operations, or when the requirement

is to get a moderate number of aircraft to the objective in the shortest possible time.

³ In this context, the term strike is used in the conventional weapons sense.

1-11

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

Amphibious Operations. An amphibious operation is a military operation launched

from the sea by a naval and landing force embarked in ships or craft, with the principal purpose of

projecting the LF ashore tactically into an environment ranging from permissive to hostile.

Amphibious operations can be demonstrations, raids, assaults and withdrawals. Amphibious forces

supported by organic aircraft can contribute to a ground campaign by specific manoeuvre operations

from the sea such as envelopment, turning movements, or infiltration, and by interdiction of key

vulnerabilities ashore. By poising, power projection forces afloat can provide land effect at the

operational level. An uncommitted, credible amphibious force will always be a factor in an

adversary theatre commander’s estimate and may cause the commander to deploy a disproportionate

number of forces to defend the littorals, making them unavailable for other operations. Raids or

demonstrations can enhance the effect of surprise and distraction. Chapter 3 describes amphibious

operations in greater detail.

Special Operations Forces. Maritime SOFs are specially organised, trained and equipped

to operate in the naval environment. They can be covertly inserted ashore using an air, surface or

subsurface unit to conduct activities such as reconnaissance and surveillance, direct action, support

and influence operations, or combat search and rescue (CSAR).

0127 Maritime Support to Joint Air Defence

In joint operations, the air defence commander (ADC), controls all air defence efforts. The air

component commander (ACC) and ADC are designated by the JFC and may be the same individual or

maritime commanders. It is of great importance that the C2 relationship between the ADC and officer

in tactical command

(OTC)/anti-air warfare commander (AAWC) is clear to all involved. The

exchange of liaison staff between air and maritime forces is essential to this purpose.

Maritime forces contribute to joint air defence by providing ship-borne surveillance and

warning, airborne early warning (AEW), electronic warfare (EW), and C2 and weapons platforms

(surface-to-air missiles and fighter aircraft). Depending on the availability of assets and overall

priorities, these capabilities may be completely committed to joint air defence or alternatively may be

made available to the joint ADC, if this does not conflict with their primary tasking. Procedures for

this cooperation are termed coordinated air/sea procedures and are found in AJP-3.3.3, Air Maritime

Coordination Handbook. This publication also provides guidance on the air/sea liaison structure.

0128 Other Maritime Operations

Maritime Interdiction Operations. Maritime interdiction operations are conducted to

enforce prohibition on the maritime movement of specified persons or material within a defined

geographic area. They encompass seaborne enforcement measures to interdict the movement of

certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specific area.

Embargoes and Quarantine. An embargo means a prohibition on the entry or exit of

shipping into and out of a country. Today, the term is sometimes associated with the United Nations

Security Council Resolution sanctions that prohibit the movement of specific cargoes in and out of a

country. Quarantine is an expression used loosely to mean a restriction on the exit or entry of certain

types of cargo. Enforcement of embargoes and quarantines involve maritime interdiction force

operations.

Blockade. Blockade is considered an act of war that prevents access to, or departure from, a

defined area of an enemy’s coast and waters, for all shipping and air traffic. It can be used

operationally as a method of achieving full sea control or sea denial through containment.

1-12

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

Strategically, it may also be used as an extreme form of sanctions enforcement and, during full

hostilities, a method of preventing reinforcement, resupply, and maritime trade, thereby depriving an

opponent of national materiel and moral resources to continue hostilities. To be recognised under

international law, a blockade must have been declared and notified to all concerned, and be applied

impartially to ships of all nations. A blockading force has the legal right to seize in prize any merchant

ship, enemy or neutral, which attempts to run the blockade either inwards or outwards. The blockade

can be either close, denying an opponent access to or from ports, or distant, denying the access

through a sea area which all ships must pass in order to reach the opponent’s territory.

0129 Spare

1-13

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

SECTION IV - OPERATIONS IN THE LITTORALS

0130 Operations in the Littorals

Maritime operations include any actions performed by forces above and under the sea to gain or

exploit command of the sea, sea control or sea denial, and/or to project power from the sea. The

oceans and the littorals provide three-dimensional space in which maritime forces can operate and

manoeuvre, and an international arena for the demonstration of capability and the will to use force.

Allied maritime forces must be capable of conducting military operations in open ocean and in the

regions of the littorals of the world.

0131 Environment in the Littorals

Operations in the littorals are affected by a unique set of environmental conditions. The following

paragraphs highlight some of these special conditions, particularly in contrast to open sea operations,

and their requirements in operational planning.

a. Geography. The geographical scope of the coastline ranges from clear and/or flat to

jagged and rugged coastline up to an archipelago-like environment. If operating close or

within the hostile coast, the topography degrades detection ranges and reduces the reaction

time available for evaluation, decision and response. In addition to land-based defence, the

more irregular the coastline, the more maritime forces can thoroughly defend it. For the

offensive force, the defensive measures of the opponent remain covered to a great extent. In

fjord environment, with mountainous landscape, the height of radar and electro-optical

sensors favours the detection range of the defenders. Land-based defence might be based on

fortified installations. Mountainous environment hampers electromagnetic propagation;

however, a defender may install landline communications to overcome that shortfall. Fjord

inshore areas may be very narrow, thus restricting freedom of movement, employability of

weapons, force and self-defence. The closer a TG/TF operates towards a coastline, the

greater the shore-based threat up to single combatants armed with hand-held weapons.

Picture compilation gets more complicated, as density of traffic and complexity of

environment increase, and situations develop more rapidly producing decreasing reaction

times.

b. Hydrography. Mine threat is high in the littorals. Underwater target detection is

hampered by ground, coast and layer reflections. The use of underwater weapons may be

restricted by shallow water. Low water depth enables the installation of fixed-passive

surveillance means. Access to the beaches for amphibious operations needs good knowledge.

c. Atmosphere. Atmospheric changes

(layers and humidity) may occur and effect

complex electromagnetic propagation conditions. It is necessary to carefully observe the

atmosphere to identify the actual propagation conditions and subsequently the detection

ranges of sensors.

d. Population. Dense population in areas of the littorals causes immense electronic signal

heaviness, resulting in interception difficulties. Land targets require high position accuracy

weapons and careful consideration of the collateral damage they may cause.

e. Military Factors. Offensive employment in the littorals exposes forces to land, air and

maritime threats. Forces must be able to counter all these threats. The closer they operate to

or within the coast, the smaller the size of employable units. That means that those units are

1-14

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

more dependent on closely located and more frequent logistic support and that logistic

support in a hostile area is highly threatened. In general, coastal areas are advantageous to

the defender. Any kinds of sea mines are likely to be laid in those waters and pose a threat to

submarines and surface ships. Coastal defence systems, such as radar stations and/or

batteries, armed with surface-to-surface missiles, guns or torpedoes, are often positioned at

chokepoints. Fast patrol boats are a significant threat due to their high mobility, ease of

concealment and potent weapons systems on small platforms. Helicopters are also versatile

threats in warfare in the littorals and may be used for reconnaissance, identification or third

party targeting, as well as a weapon platform for air-to-surface missiles. Additionally, a

submarine operating in the vicinity of a coast may pose a serious threat to operations. The

most dangerous threat is a combination of the above systems operating in coordination.

0132 Employment in the Littorals

Figure 1-1 illustrates offensive or defensive employment in the littorals for projecting power from the

sea or gaining or exploiting sea control or sea denial.

Employment in

the Littorals

Offensive

Defensive

Employment

Maritime

Command

Sea

Command

Sea

Power

of the Sea

Denial

of the Sea

Denial

Projection

Sea Control

Figure 1-1. Employment in the Littorals

0133 Offensive Employment in the Littorals

Typical examples for an offensive employment in the littorals are employments to exercise sea

control as an enabling measure for maritime power projection, to exercise sea control for the purpose

of protecting SLOCs along a hostile coast, to prevent hostile action from a hostile coast towards the

sea, to provide cover to an evacuation operation, or to support a maritime interdiction operation. A

common basis is to operate against a neutral to hostile coast where no support is expected from the

shore.

If there is a need to operate a force in the littorals of an adversary, shaping operations to

eliminate hostile (sea denial) forces should be carried out. This may compromise operational and

tactical surprise. A combination of MCM forces to ensure safe passage, fighter-bomber aircraft and/or

helicopters equipped with air-to-surface weapons, FOBs, submarines, amphibious and SOFs operating

1-15

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

in coordination is the best maritime means to oppose threats in the littorals. Table 1-1 illustrates

typical required actions in an offensive employment in the littorals aiming at exercising sea control.

Table 1-1. Offensive Employment in the Littorals

Required Action

Means

Intelligence

Air and space reconnaissance and surveillance

Destroy/Neutralize/Deter Shore-Based Threats

Air interdiction and maritime air strikes

Tactical Scouting

Tactical air reconnaissance and surveillance by

maritime units and supporting air operations

Clearing Minefields

MCM force

Protecting MCM Force

AAW; DCA;

Antisurface operations by maritime units;

ASFAO

Destroy/Neutralize/Deter Hostile Forces

ASUW/ASW;

Afloat (Surface and Subsurface)

ASFAO in the maritime environment (AMC)

Destroy/Neutralize/Deter Hostile Shore

Naval fire support; Close air support;

Facilities

ASFAO in the land environment; SOF

Protecting Forces Against Air Threat

Offensive counter-air operations;

DCA; AAW; ASFAO

Occupying Key Positions/Areas

Naval units

Combat Service Support

Support ashore/afloat

a. Intelligence. Maritime operations need current and adequate intelligence, well in

advance, through air and space reconnaissance and surveillance concerning a possible land-

based or mine threat and the specific EW environment.

b. Destroy/Neutralize/Deter Shore-Based Threats. Air interdiction and maritime air

strike operations may be needed prior to the offensive employment of sea control forces in

the littorals to eliminate or reduce threats to friendly maritime forces operating there.

c. Tactical Scouting. Scouting by air and other means is necessary to gain a surface

situation picture and provide target information. The aim is to locate and identify threats and

targets at sea, ashore and above the ground/sea. Since the results of ship-borne sensors are

limited, locating and identifying threats and targets ashore requires, apart from ship-borne

sensors, airborne capabilities that might be provided by organic assets or by supporting air

operations (tactical air reconnaissance and surveillance).

d. Clearing Minefields. Whenever possible, enemy minefields, if detected, should be

cleared to provide freedom of movement to maritime forces.

1-16

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

e. Protecting Mine Countermeasure Force. If an MCM force is employed, sufficient

protection should be given to that force. In addition to the protecting effect of offensive and

defensive counter-air (DCA) operations, anti-air warfare (AAW), antisurface operations by

maritime units, and antisurface force air operations (ASFAO) contribute to that protection.

f. Destroy/Neutralize/Deter Hostile Forces Afloat

(Surface and Subsurface).

Antisurface warfare (ASUW) and antisubmarine warfare (ASW), supported by ASFAO in the

maritime environment, is to be exercised.

g. Destroy/Neutralize/Deter Hostile Shore Facilities. Naval fire support, close air

support and ASFAO in the land environment (i.e., the air attack support element of an

amphibious force) might be employed to eliminate coastal threats posed by shore-based

weapons, command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems,

and other facilities.

h. Protecting Forces Against Air Threat. Protection against the air threat is vital

when operating towards a hostile coast or within the hostile coastal waters, where building

up an air threat favours the opponent. Offensive and DCA operations, as well as AAW,

contribute to this protection.

i. Occupying Key Positions/Areas. Once the littorals and coastal areas have been

sanitized, key/chokepoint/areas at sea might be physically occupied in order to deny hostile

infiltration in the sanitized area.

j. Combat Service Support. Combat service support is the support provided to maritime

forces, primarily in the field of administration and logistics. In principle, the maritime

logistics and support regulations are valid. Protection of logistic and supply units is vital. The

more the operation shifts to operation close to or within the coast, the smaller the size of

employable combat units

(with considerably reduced endurance compared to ships).

Therefore, those units are more dependent on closely located logistic support. Attention

should be given to establishing an instant support on the battlefield with small and fast

support units, capable of providing petroleum, oil(s) and lubricants, ammunition, spare parts

for instant repair, and food and crew-exchange. The small support units will be replenished at

open sea or nearby friendly harbours. This option is preferred, instead of having the small

combat units’ shuttle between forces at open sea for replenishment and the battlefield close

to shore.

0134

Planning Considerations — Offensive

Communications and Information Systems. Timely and efficient CIS are essential to

effectively coordinate and execute employment in the littorals. As the geography may disrupt

electromagnetic propagation, robust communications planning is necessary, considering the use of the

whole frequency spectrum, relay stations (airborne to gain height might be necessary) and back-up

circuits in order to provide redundancies in case of communications failure.

Picture Compilation. In all maritime operations, it is necessary to establish and maintain a

picture of the surface, air, and subsurface situation (i.e., the RMP). Operations in the littorals include

maintaining the picture of the ground situation in the area of operations as well. The complexity of the

environment close to the coast, the limited availability of the electromagnetic spectrum, and high

density of shipping hamper picture compilation.

1-17

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

Gathering Information. During operations in the littorals, extensive use of standoff,

airborne, and highly mobile sensors are recommended to overcome the disadvantages of environment

and threat. Gathering information on land targets may as well be supported by the use of electro-

optical and infrared sensors, electronic warfare support measures

(ESM), and imaging radars.

Selecting a short revisiting cycle is necessary in order to detect mobile targets. Employment of SOFs

for rescue ashore may be considered as well as launching INFO OPS against hostile information

equipment. In general, employment of a diversity of sensors (radar, tactical SIGINT) is recommended

in order to reduce the effects of the vulnerability of each sensor in an environment that favours the

opponent.

Transfer of Information. Transferring information via data link is preferable. The more joint

assets are employed and the number of participating units increase, the more complex the evaluation,

correlation and coordination of the recognized maritime picture. Having all assets in one net at the same

time makes the use of the tactical data system (TDS) preferable. However, there are some shortfalls. For

example, the equipment of the different assets might vary and might not be interoperable; the capacity of

the TDS might not allow for the necessary number of participants; and the correlation of the received

information might become too complex. Therefore, a core data net, including all units afloat, should be

considered. The importance to execute the duty of force track coordination is stressed. Collocated to the

task force commander should be a picture coordination element of the littorals, receiving all picture

compilation information from all participating assets, equipped with all information exchange and

display devices in use within the TF in the littorals. It should be tasked to evaluate, correlate and

coordinate incoming information and to deliver essential information into the various information

exchange circuits and nets. The aim is to maintain the highest degree of situational awareness within the

entire force.

Situational Awareness and Weapon Employment. The closer the force operation in

the littorals is to the hostile coast, the more complex the environment becomes, and the more essential

the need to coordinate the whole operation by means of area coordination. This coordination is

paramount in order to provide very good situational awareness and deconflict friendly forces to avoid

fratricide engagements. Protection against air threats needs to be coordinated by zones. (See AJP-3.3

series.) For the employment of the surface forces, a method of area coordination for prevention of

mutual interference and deconflicting in the littorals (e.g., see PLAN CASTLE in Allied Tactical

Publication (ATP) 31, NATO Above Water Warfare Manual) should be used, taking into account

established zones for protection against air threats. If forces are operating ashore (i.e., SOF, spotter

etc.), fire support coordination measures such as establishing no-fire, free-fire, restrictive-fire areas or

fire support coordination lines, should be implemented and well synchronized with air zone and

surface area coordination. Collocated to the picture coordination element in the littorals should be a

joint area/zone coordinator, tasked to establish, activate or deactivate zones and areas, based on

information gained from the picture coordination element. The aim is to provide quick response to the

development of the situation for the purpose of effective engagement, situational awareness and safety

of forces.

Command and Control Issues. An important factor in successful employment in the

littorals is adequate liaison between employed joint assets. The liaison structure required during an

operation must be addressed as part of the operational planning process. The supporting force

should carefully consider the targeting cycle if the operation is supported by non-organic air assets

(e.g., DCA, ASFAO).

Electronic Warfare. The expected density of the electromagnetic environment and the

techniques employed from ashore requires specifically tailored ESM/electronic countermeasures

1-18

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

(ECM) equipment and a very high degree of coordination and specific EW tactics. The area of EW in

the littorals is discussed in greater detail in AJP-3.6, Allied Joint Electronic Warfare Doctrine.

0135 Defensive Employment in the Littorals

Typical examples for defensive employment in the littorals might be national defence or the

defence of allied territory against an amphibious attack, the defence against embargoes of SLOCs, or

the disruption of sea control/denial operations of an adversary in adjacent waters. The common basis is

to operate from a coastline or a friendly coast, possibly supported by maritime action from the high

seas. Table 1-2 reflects typical actions in a defensive employment in the littorals aimed at exercising

sea control.

Table 1-2. Defensive Employment in the Littorals

Required Action

Means

Intelligence

Air and space reconnaissance and surveillance

Tactical Scouting

Tactical air reconnaissance and surveillance by

maritime units and supporting air operations

Clearing Minefields

MCM force

Blocking Coastal Areas by Mining

Naval or aerial mining

Protecting MCM Force

AAW; DCA;

Ground-based air defences;

Antisurface operations by maritime units;

ASFAO

Destroy/Neutralize/Deter Hostile Forces

ASUW/ASW;

Afloat (Surface and Subsurface)

ASFAO in the maritime environment (AMC)

Protecting Forces Against Air Threat

Ground-based air defences;

Offensive counter-air operations;

DCA;

AAW; ASFAO

Occupying Key Positions/Areas

Naval units

Combat Service Support

Support ashore/afloat

The main difference between offensive and defensive employment in the littorals is the truly

joint nature of defensive employment, involving all services in picture compilation and engagement of

the enemy. In defensive employment, the advantage of the operation rests within the maritime forces.

As more land and air forces participate in defensive employment than in offensive employment

operations, the coordination requirement remains, but is far more extensive. The following comments

address defensive actions and are exceptions to subjects addressed by offensive employment in the

littorals.

1-19

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

a. Tactical Scouting. Approaching from the sea, threats and targets are to be located and

identified. Land-based assets are to be included apart from the use of ship-borne sensors and

airborne capabilities.

b. Protecting Forces Against Air Threat. Ground-based air defences make additional

contributions.

c. Occupying Key Positions/Areas. Once the littorals and coastal areas are under sea

control, key/chokepoint/areas at sea might be physically occupied or secured by employing

land-based surveillance and weapon systems in order to deny hostile infiltration in the

sanitized area.

d. Combat Service Support. Land-based support is possible.

0136 Planning Considerations — Defensive

Communications and Information Systems. CIS may overcome geographic restrictions

through the use of land-based communications transmitting and receiving stations and by the use of

landlines.

Picture Compilation. An integrated system of sensors and information distribution devices

might be installed, using all means of services. The need of a core data net, including all units afloat

and the importance to execute the duty force track coordination, is stressed. In view of extensive land-

based support, establishment of a picture coordination element in the littorals, receiving all picture

compilation information from all participating assets, has to be considered. It should be equipped with

all information exchange and display devices in use within the TF, and, tasked to evaluate, correlate

and coordinate incoming information, and to deliver essential information into the various information

exchange circuits and nets.

Situational Awareness and Weapon Employment. As land-based surveillance and

weapon systems employment is used, coordination is stressed to provide the best degree of situational

awareness and deconfliction of friendly forces, and prevent fratricide engagements. Situational

awareness is the key for success.

0137 Shaping Operations

These are operations conducted before the arrival of a main force, particularly a power projection

force in its area of operations, to shape the battlespace to enable Alliance operations. Shaping

operations aim to prepare the entire battlespace for follow-on operations and include both sea control

operations to neutralise enemy sea denial forces such as submarines and sea mines, power projection

operations such as maritime air strikes, some types of amphibious operations, and special operations.

Shaping operations in the littorals may take a considerable time to complete to achieve clearance to

acceptable levels of risk. Care should be taken not to compromise operational or tactical surprise by

shaping operations, although they may be employed as part of a deception plan.

0138 Operations in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment

Many countries and some terrorist organizations have, or are seeking to acquire, nuclear,

biological and chemical (NBC) weapons. Maritime forces may be targeted directly or be exposed to a

downwind spread of an N, B or C hazard from land targets. Additional hazards may be encountered,

including radiological contamination from so-called “dirty” weapons that use radioactive material

1-20

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

spread using conventional explosives, and toxic materials such as those arising from commercial

accidents or damage to industrial facilities during conflict.

The greatest threat to allied maritime forces will occur in the littorals, during passage through

navigational choke points and when in harbour. The direct effects of nuclear explosions will be

immediately apparent, while N, B or C contamination must be detected using all means available.

Survival will depend on accurate threat information, sound preparation, training, and the immediate

application of individual and collective protection.

Evasive manoeuvring should be used to avoid, to the maximum practicable degree, the

immediate and residual hazards resulting from nuclear detonations and chemical and biological

attacks, although modern warships have closed working and living quarters (citadels) that enable them

to continue the majority of their operations in a contaminated environment. Precautions for the

passage of a contaminated area should be stated well in advance.

Nuclear and Radiological Hazards. The effects of a nuclear weapon will depend upon its

size and whether it is a surface, sub-surface, air or exo-atmospheric burst. Effects will include light,

blast, heat, initial gamma radiation and electromagnetic pulse. Maritime forces may also be affected by

underwater shock or base surge. Fallout will be a consideration downwind for a surface burst. ATP-45,

Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical Attacks, and Predicting and Warning of

Associated Hazards and Hazard Areas (Operators Manual), provides further information on plotting,

warning and reporting. Guidance for maritime tactics is provided in ATP-1 Volume I, Allied Maritime

Tactical Instructions and Procedures. Enhanced radiation weapons are designed to maximise prompt

radiation output at the expense of other effects and radiological weapons are specifically designed to

disseminate radioactive material, possibly using conventional explosive. These hazards need to be

managed using the same principles as the radioactive hazards arising from nuclear weapons.

Chemical Hazards. Chemical warfare agents and commercial toxic substances can produce

incapacitating or lethal effects through inhalation, ingestion or absorption through the skin. Chemical

Warfare agents may be delivered against maritime forces at sea by aircraft, bombs, shells or missiles

that may release vapour or spray in the vicinity of the target or breach the citadel of a unit directly.

There are significant differences between vapour and liquid agents. A persistent liquid will have long

lasting effect and deny access to affected areas until decontamination can be achieved.

Biological Hazards. Biological warfare is of considerable concern in view of its widespread

effects and ease of manufacture of agents with high lethality. Weaponisation is difficult but simple

spray systems, including crop-spraying aircraft, are effective. The very limited availability of

biological detectors means that medical vigilance and trend analysis in conjunction with medical

countermeasures offers the best response. Incubation times favour strategic rather than tactical use and

the difficulty of identifying the source could allow the aggressor to avoid detection. Maritime forces

should be particularly vigilant for signs of biological contamination following periods in harbour,

where the covert delivery of agents is significantly simpler.

0139 Spare

1-21

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

SECTION V — MARITIME WARFARE AREAS

0140 Maritime Power Projection Warfare Areas

Maritime missions and tasks encompass a full range of activities requiring the application of naval and

maritime air combat power. Sea control includes operations that locate, classify and track surface

vessels, submarines and aircraft, and, if necessary, apply force against them. It may also include

cooperation with merchant shipping and blockades or embargoes against commercial and military

shipping. Power projection, on the other hand, involves using maritime offensive combat power to

achieve decisive effect on land. Fundamental to all maritime operations is the ability to use force at sea

and against the land. This ability to use force is categorised into distinct warfare functions or warfare

areas. During NATO operations, the degree of effort in each warfare area will depend on the size and

scope of the maritime operation, and the military threat against allied forces.

0141 Anti-air Warfare

AAW in the maritime environment, part of air defence at sea, is the term used for the defence of

friendly forces against the threat of aircraft and airborne weapons, whether launched from air, surface,

or subsurface platforms. AAW is the maritime term for DCA operations and is part of the joint air

defence system. Maritime units execute AAW as part of the overall air defence effort, as coordinated

by the ADC. AAW is based on the principles of defence in depth and layered defence, defeating air

attacks at the maximum possible distance from maritime forces, using organic and shore-based

aircraft, long and medium range surface-to-air missile systems, point defence missile systems, guns,

close-in weapons systems and decoys and jammers. These layers are necessary to gain early warning,

counter the adversary’s surveillance and targeting effort, destroy attacking aircraft before they can

release their weapons, and to destroy or decoy missiles before they can hit friendly forces. Maritime

units execute AAW simultaneously with other maritime operations, such as mine warfare and

amphibious operations. Both in planning and execution, liaison exchange, and subsequently close

coordination, between maritime and air components is essential. Critical items of coordination are a

clearly understood command structure, information exchange and weapon coordination.

0142 Antisubmarine Warfare

ASW comprises operations with the intention of denying the opponent the effective use of submarines.

The ASW protection of a force depends on defence-in-depth and close coordination between ships,

helicopters, maritime patrol aircraft

(MPA), shore-based facilities and friendly submarines. The

complexity of such coordination, and the special environmental factors involved makes the submarine

threat one of the most difficult problems to counter. Organic submarines provide the JFC a range of

options for strategic and tactical employment. They can operate in high threat areas, which might be

untenable to other maritime forces, and are capable of sustained independent operations in pursuit of

sea denial or as part of a larger TG in sea control operations. ASW capable nuclear and conventional

submarines may be employed to enhance the mix of surface and air forces in ASW operations, and

these composite ASW forces form the forward forces for ASUW operations. Submarines are most

commonly used to provide I&W and reconnaissance in advance of hostilities. Subsequently they can

be used to interdict SLOCs for sea denial, or to enforce sea control when acting as part of a larger TG.

1-22

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

0143 Antisurface Warfare

ASUW is defined as the actions necessary to detect, identify and counter an adversary’s surface

capability. ASUW operations, which may include sea control and sea denial operations, disruption of

SLOCs, defence of friendly forces from surface attack, or a combination of all, seek to ensure that the

necessary actions are conducted in a timely fashion, denying any adversary the ability to employ

forces in an effective manner. It is normally controlled by the antisurface warfare commander

(ASUWC) utilising organic and shore-based aircraft, and ships, and may be supported by submarines.

In the littorals, fast attack craft and fast inshore attack craft that are operated by many nations, pose a

particular threat to allied operations. Groups of friendly fast attack craft, together with armed

helicopters may offer a viable solution to counter this threat, particularly when combined with larger

units offshore providing advanced C2, supporting fire with long-range weapons and helicopter support

facilities.

0144 Naval Mine Warfare

Mine warfare is divided into two areas: laying of mines and actions to counter the threat of an

adversary’s mines (referred to as MCM). Minelaying, or the threat of mining, can either be protective,

defensive or offensive. Protective sea minefields are laid inside friendly waters with the aim of

protecting friendly forces or shores. Defensive sea minefields are laid in international waters, straits or

other chokepoints with the aim of restricting or channelling any adversary’s movements. Offensive sea

minefields are laid in adversary waters or water under enemy control in order to force the adversary to

take action such as closing ports or rerouting shipping, thus disrupting military and economic supply

and naval deployments. MCM in general includes all measures for countering sea mines by reducing

or preventing danger or damage to ships and personnel. This may involve actions taken to prevent an

adversary from successfully laying sea mines by attacking adversary’s minelayers, laying allied sea

minefields or damaging facilities required for the support of adversary’s minelaying, such as

employment of MCM units, routing of shipping around high threat areas or through cleared routes,

and those actions taken to reduce ship’s magnetic, acoustic and pressure signatures.

0145 Amphibious Warfare

Amphibious warfare incorporates virtually all types of ships, submarines, aircraft, weapons, and LFs

in a concerted military effort launched from the sea by a naval and landing force embarked in ships or

craft, with the principal purpose of projecting the LF ashore tactically into an environment ranging

from permissive to hostile. The inherent naval character of an amphibious operation is reflected in the

principles that govern the organization of the forces involved, and the conduct of an operation.

1. Amphibious forces offer great operational mobility together with both political and

military flexibility. Because they do not require specific points of entry such as ports or

airfields, they pose significant operational problems for an adversary. However, amphibious

operations are complex and require detailed planning, training and specialist equipment.

2. Amphibious forces require defence of shipping (ASW, AAW, ASUW and NMW) and

control of ship-to-objective movement either by surface craft and/or helicopters. Amphibious

forces supported by organic aircraft can contribute to the land campaign by specific

manoeuvre operations from the sea such as envelopment, turning movements, or infiltration⁴

⁴ Infiltration - a technique and process in which a force moves as individuals or small group over, through, or around enemy

positions without detection.

1-23

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

and by interdiction of key vulnerabilities ashore. Refer to Article 0323 for details on the

different types of amphibious operations. By poising, power projection forces afloat can

provide land effect at the operational level. Raids and/or demonstrations can enhance the

effect of surprise, distraction and confusion within the adversary commander’s decision

cycle.

0146 Strike Warfare⁵

Strike Warfare consists of those maritime operations to destroy or neutralise enemy targets ashore,

including attacks against strategic or tactical targets such as manufacturing facilities and operating

bases from which the enemy is capable of conducting or supporting air, surface, or subsurface

operations against friendly forces. Maritime forces can contribute to strikes against targets ashore

using sea-based aircraft, sea-launched and/or subsurface-launched cruise missiles, and naval guns. In

maritime operations, particularly in the littorals, air forces work in close cooperation with naval forces

to ensure the most effective use of available air assets in strike roles.

0147 Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping

The purpose of NCAGS is to cooperate with merchant shipping in periods of crisis and conflict,

including crisis response shipping and neutral shipping under charter to allied nations, in order to

enhance their safety and deconflict shipping from military operations. (See ATP-2, Naval Cooperation

and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) Manual.)

0148 Electronic and Acoustic Warfare

The three divisions of electronic and acoustic warfare (EAW) are parallel and complementary. All

military forces make extensive use of the electromagnetic and acoustic spectrums. Most maritime

operations seek to dominate the use and exploitation of these spectrums. Naval ships and aircraft are

equipped with a variety of systems that utilise or exploit the electromagnetic and acoustic spectrums.

The coordination of these systems in a joint force requires a detailed plan to manage use of the

spectrums, control emissions, ensure comprehensive monitoring and avoid mutual interference. (See

AJP-3.6.)

1. Electronic warfare comprises three divisions:

(a) Electronic Warfare Support Measures. ESM involves actions taken to search

for, intercept and identify electromagnetic emissions and locate their sources for the

purpose of immediate threat recognition. ESM provides a source of information required for

immediate decisions involving ECM, electronic protective measures (EPM), and other

tactical actions. (See Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) 6, NATO Glossary of Terms

and Definitions.)

(b) Electronic Countermeasures. ECM involves actions taken to prevent or reduce

an adversary’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum through the use of

electromagnetic energy in the form of electronic jamming, electronic deception, and

electronic neutralisation. (See AAP-6.)

⁵ In this context, the term “strike” is used in the conventional weapons sense.

1-24

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite the adversary’s use of electromagnetic

energy, through the use of active and passive electronic protective measures. (See AAP-6.)

2. Acoustic warfare also is subdivided into three divisions:

(a) Acoustic Warfare Support Measures. AWSM involves the search, interception,

location, recording and analysis of radiated underwater acoustic energy for the purpose of

exploiting such radiation. The use of AWSM involves no intentional underwater acoustic

emission and is generally not detectable. (See AAP-6.)

(b) Acoustic Countermeasures. ACM prevents or reduces the use of the acoustic

spectrum by an adversary and involve intentional underwater acoustic emissions for

deception and jamming. (See AAP-6.)

acoustic spectrum by countering hostile acoustic warfare measures. APM involves anti-

acoustic warfare support measures and anti-acoustic warfare countermeasures, and may not

involve underwater acoustic emissions. (See AAP-6.)

3. Emission Control. EMCON is the frequency management of emitted electromagnetic

or acoustic energy to deconflict and coordinate all emissions throughout a maritime force,

with particular concern that safety frequencies are adequately assigned. To best exploit its

potential, EAW policies and activities must be harmonised with other warfare areas and

force/component commands. After coordination with the JFC’s electronic warfare

coordination cell, the maritime component commander (MCC) promulgates emission policy.

All requirements are then incorporated into an EMCON plan that is promulgated by an

operation order (OPORD) or signal.

4. EAW Tasking. The objective of EAW tasking is to ensure that all emissions likely to be

intercepted are covered by detection and analysis facilities, and active assets such as radars,

active sonars, jammers, decoys, etc., are deployed, briefed and pretuned to counter the threat.

The overall tasking policy has to consider the equipment availability and should be adjusted

to meet changes in the tactical situation.

1-25

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

CHAPTER 2

Command and Control

SECTION I— THE COMMAND SYSTEM

0201 Scope

As a system, maritime C2 has three components — the C2 organization, information, and C2 support.

The C2⁶ organization encompasses the commander and the chain of command that connects superior

commanders with subordinate commanders. Information is the lifeblood of the entire C2 system. It

includes the people, equipment, and facilities that provide information to commanders and

subordinates. This chapter describes the organizational aspects of maritime C2.

0202 Authority

Person. An authority is a person vested with the power to make decisions and issue orders.

Individual Power. Authority is also the individual power to make decisions and issue

related orders imposing those decisions. Such power may be limited in scope, time, and location.

Responsibility. Authority automatically confers the responsibility to carry out tasks and

report results to the assigning authority.

0203 Command

Command is defined as the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the

direction, coordination, and control of military forces. (See AAP-6.) The aim of command is to

achieve the maximum operational and/or administrative efficiency.

a. Direction. The process of planning decision-making, establishing priorities, formulating

policies, and imposing decisions.

b. Coordination. The establishment in operations, according to a changing situation, of

an orderly correlation in time and place of planned actions in order to achieve the best

overall result. In the maritime environment, the term coordination may include certain

specified control functions.

c. Control. Authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate

organizations, or other organizations not normally under command, which encompasses the

responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be

transferred or delegated.

Exercising command presupposes the existence of a chain of command and a C2 system. Some

functions arising from direction, coordination, or control may be delegated to subordinates. This is

normally done in large or widely dispersed forces where decentralised decision-making is required.

However, a centralised command is the most direct way a commander uses experience and ability.

⁶ Certain AAP-6 definitions that appear in this chapter are expanded to clarify their meaning within the context of maritime

command.

2-1

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

0204 Delegation of Authority

Delegation of authority is the action by which a commander assigns authority commensurate with the

assigned task to a subordinate commander. While ultimate responsibility cannot be relinquished,

delegation of authority carries with it the imposition of a measure of responsibility. The extent of the

authority delegated must be clearly stated. (See AAP-6.) Delegation to a subordinate commander

creates a new responsibility for a specific task. Subordinates should be kept aware of the policies and

intentions of their superiors, so that they can act accordingly when faced with unexpected

circumstances. A subordinate should never await instructions beyond the time for action.

0205 Chain of Command

The chain of command is the succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate

through which command is exercised.

(See AAP-6.) The chain of command establishes the

interdependencies that exist at various levels between a superior and subordinate. Command functions

may be exercised at any one of these levels. The organization (task, type, or warfare) adopted for the

forces employed automatically defines the chain of command.

0206 Methods of Control

Historically, in striking a balance between orchestrating operations and granting freedom of

action to subordinates, commanders have used two methods of control — detailed control and mission

command mission type orders.

a. Detailed Control. When using detailed control, a commander manages with a tight

rein. Command and control is centralized. Orders and plans are explicit, as when a formation

of ships is conducting tactical manoeuvring. Such control emphasizes vertical information

flow, with information flowing up and orders flowing down the chain of command. Detailed

control is often the preferred method when time is not a critical factor, when procedures must

be closely adhered to for safety reasons, or when restrictive rules of engagement (ROE)

demand close monitoring and extensive reporting of events. Detailed control, however,

neither works well in a rapidly changing situation; nor does it function well when the vertical

flow of information is disrupted. Therefore, it is not the preferred method of control under

conditions of great uncertainty and time constraints.

b. Mission Command. In contrast, mission command seeks to cope with the effects of

uncertainty and time by creating a system that can respond quickly in combat. Rather than

seeking certainty prior to making decisions, a commander lowers the degree of certainty

needed before deciding to act. When using mission command, a commander controls with a

loose rein. Command and control is decentralised and flexible. Orders and plans are succinct.

In addition to keeping the commander informed, mission command emphasizes horizontal

information flow among subordinate commands. The commander guides the actions of

subordinates by imparting an understanding of mission requirements, and allowing them

freedom of action. Unity of effort is not attained by conformity imposed from above, but

grows instead from spontaneous cooperation among all elements of the force. By

decentralising decision-making authority, the tempo of operations is heightened and the

force's ability to deal with rapidly changing situations is improved. Moreover, because it

relies on implicit understanding of mission requirements, mission command is much less

vulnerable to disruption than detailed control. Mission command has the following key

elements:

2-2

ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

(1) Orders given in a manner that ensures that subordinates understand the commander’s

intentions, the mission, and the context of the mission.

(2) Telling subordinates what affect they are to achieve and the reason why it needs to be

achieved.

(3) Allocating sufficient resources to subordinates to carry out their missions.

(4) Using a minimum of control to avoid limiting subordinate freedom of action.

(5) Allowing subordinates to decide within their delegated freedom of action how to best

achieve their missions.

c. Command by Veto. In many aspects of maritime warfare, it is necessary to preplan the

actions of a force to an assessed threat and to delegate some command functions to a

subordinate. Once such functions are delegated, the subordinate is to take the required action

without delay, always keeping the commander informed of the situation. The commander

retains the power to veto any particular action.

In practice, no commander will rely solely on either detailed control, mission command or

command by veto. The type of control used will depend on the nature of the operation or task, the

environment, the nature and capabilities of the enemy, and, perhaps most of all, the qualities of the

force. Detailed control may be more appropriate in performing specific, precise tasks of a procedural

or technical nature, such as controlling airspace, but it is less effective in the conduct of high-tempo

operations where judgment, creativity, and initiative are required. Mission command is the more

demanding, as it requires the highest standard of interoperability and understanding of the

commander’s intent.

0207 - 0209 Spare

2-3

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

SECTION II -- COMMAND AND CONTROL OF MARITIME FORCES

0210 Operational Command

OPCOM is the authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate

commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical

command (TACOM) as may be necessary. It does not include responsibility for administration or

logistics. It may also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander. A strategic commander

(SC) normally maintains OPCOM. (See AAP-6.)

0211 Operational Control

OPCON is the authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander

may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to

deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control (TACON) of those units. It does not

include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does

it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. (See AAP-6.)

0212 Change of Operational Control

CHOP is the date and Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) at which the responsibility for OPCON of a

force or unit passes from one operational control authority (OCA) to another. (See AAP-6.) When it is

intended that a force or unit CHOP, the operation order should state in explicit terms the manner of

execution for the CHOP. This may be done in terms of GMT, position, or boundary crossing. Subject

to the EMCON plan, units executing CHOP should report to both OCAs and to the authority vested

with OPCOM over the force or unit. When a CHOP occurs, task organization commanders should

inform the OCA of changes in the composition of their forces and major deviations from their normal

capabilities.

0213 Transfer of Authority

Within NATO, transfer of authority (TOA) is an action by which a member nation or NATO

command gives OPCOM or OPCON of designated forces to a NATO command. (See AAP-6.)

0214 Joint Force Commander

The JFC will normally have OPCON of maritime forces and exercises that control by

delegating the appropriate level of authority to the maritime component commander.

2. The JFC:

a. Exercises C2 as delegated by the SC (normally OPCON) over all force components

provided. The JFC should also exercise coordinating authority over all forces remaining

under national control that are operating in or transiting to the JOA. Coordinating authority

should be granted, as a minimum, for area security, for positioning and reporting, movement

control, and ROE.

b. Plans and executes the operation to accomplish operational objectives. Issues directives

and guidance to component commanders, approves their OPLAN and coordinates their

operations. The operational objectives contained in the directives should be clear and

2-4

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

concise, applicable, attainable and measurable (an indicator of the success required, not

necessarily quantifiable).

c. Plans and orchestrates the operation to accomplish objectives. Assigns, within the limits

of command/control authority, tasks to component commanders, coordinates their operations

and approves their missions. The JFC needs to clearly state intentions, designate the

objectives to be achieved and provide the resources and authority required by the forces to

accomplish their tasks. In addition, the JFC should grant forces as much latitude as possible.

d. Designates the airspace control authority (ACA) and appoint the ADC.

e. Seeks approval of the campaign plan either by the SC or regional commander (RC).

f. Establishes the targeting priorities via a joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) and

approves the joint integrated prioritised target list, within the limit of delegated target

approval authority, in the respect of SCs and component commanders nominations.

g. Appoints supporting commanders for specific tasks, as appropriate. These may be defined

by time, activity or location.

h. Synchronises operations and activities to build consensus and achieve unity of effort with

other military forces, local government officials, and non-governmental organizations in the

JOA.

i. Establishes liaison with the commands and authorities operating in support of the

campaign or independently in the JOA, as well as between the components of the force.

j. Develops CIMIC policy in the JOA in accordance with the general instructions of the SC.

0215

Maritime Component Commander

Maritime operations include any actions performed by forces on, under or over the sea to gain

or exploit command of the sea, control of the sea or sea denial, and to project power from the sea. The

MCC is responsible for the maritime aspects of the JFC’s mission.⁷ The MCC coordinates operations

with other component commanders, ensures unity of effort, and establishes liaison accordingly. If not

the joint force air component commander (JFACC), the MCC ensures that land and sea-based

maritime air assets, above what is needed to fulfill the maritime mission, are made available to the

JFACC, and are integrated into JFACC operations. The MCC should establish a maritime liaison

element within the joint air operations centre (AOC), if appropriate. Retained maritime air assets also

need to be coordinated with the JFACC for inclusion into the air operations directive.

The MCC:

a. Plans and executes maritime operations and employs designated maritime forces in

support of the JFC’s concept of operations.

b. Exercises OPCON and/or TACOM/TACON over forces assigned to him.

c. Advises the JFC on the proper employment of all forces under MCC control.

⁷ AJP-01 uses the term joint force maritime component commander to refer to the C2 of maritime forces by the maritime

component commander.

2-5

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

d. Selects units for assignment to subordinate TF/TGs according to capabilities, JFC´s

intention, and required missions.

e. Acts as a supporting commander within the designated maritime area of operations unless

otherwise directed by the JFC. Synchronises and integrates movement and manoeuvre,

firepower, and interdiction within the designated area of operations. Provides support to

other component commanders.

f. Provides to the JFC a recommendation on target priorities within the targeting cycle.

Serves as a member of the JTCB, if established, and designates the target priorities, required

effects, and timing within the maritime area of operations.

g. Requests required logistic support from the JFC.

h. Provides the CIS services that are required for the C2 of subordinate formations.

i. Supports JFC INFO OPS by developing INFO OPS requirements that support maritime

operations and synchronising the maritime force assets when directed.

j. Establishes combat identification standing operating procedures and other directives based

on JFC guidance.

k. Coordinates air maritime coordination (AMC) procedures with the JFACC.

l. Coordinates targeting and combat assessment with the JFC and other component

commanders.

m. Conducts liaison with the ACA for air space control and the ADC for air defence matters,

particularly for the naval TG air defence area of interest. (Refer to AJPs 3.3, 3.3.5 and 3.3.7

for further discussion of the roles of the JFACC/ACA/ADC.)

n. Ensures that cross-component support is provided as directed by the JFC and agreed by

the respective national contingent commander.

o. Provides liaison support to the JFC staff.

p. Evaluates the results of maritime operations to include the effectiveness of interdiction

operations and forwards these results to the JFC to support the overall combat assessment

effort.

q. Keeps the JFC and other component commanders informed of the situation, with

emphasis on developments that may require changes in the concept of operations or the need

for additional resources.

r. Conducts PI activities as directed by the JFC.

s. Maintains liaison with the submarine operating authority (SUBOPAUTH).

Figure 2-1 illustrates MCC relationships to JFC and other components. TACOM/TACON of all

or part of these forces can be delegated to an OTC for each selected task force, group, or unit. The OTC

2-6

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

may retain TACOM/TACON authority or may delegate certain functions to subordinate commanders.

The OTC is always responsible for accomplishing the mission of the force. Section VI, Articles 0250

thru 0255, provides a description of C2 amphibious operations. Figure 2-2 provides an example of MCC

relationships. The authority and delegated functions for the execution of the OTC’s policy can be

delegated to a composite warfare commander (CWC).

Joint Force

Commander

Joint Force Special

Joint Force Land

Joint Force Air

Joint Force Maritime

Ops Component

Component

Forces/Capability

made available

Operational Control

Command Relationships determined by JFC

Note: Other components may exist as determined by the JFC.

Figure 2-1. Maritime Component Command Relationships to JFC and Other Components

2-7

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

AJP 3.1

TF 333

MARITIME COMPONENT OF ALLIED/JOINT FORCE

TG 333.1

TG 333.2

TG 333.3

TG 333.4

AMPHIBIOUS

ADVANCE

CARRIER

SUBMARINES

GROUP

TU 333.1.1

TU 333.1.2

TU 333.3.1

TG 333.3.2

TU 333.3.3

AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING

CARRIERS

SCREENING

LOGISTIC

SHIPS

FORCE

UNITS

SHIPPING

TE 333.1.1.1

TE 333.1.1.2

TE 333.3.2.1

TE 333.1.1.3

TE 333.3.2.2

DETACHED

ELEMENTS

Figure 2-2. Maritime Component Command Relationships

Note. This diagram is only an example (e.g., submarines may not come under the OPCON of

the maritime component command).

0216 Tactical Command

TACOM is the authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces for the accomplishment of

the mission assigned by higher authority. It involves responsibility for the conduct of the tasks

pertaining to the mission, that is issuing detailed orders and ensuring their correct execution. It also

involves responsibility for the general safety of assigned units, although ultimate responsibility

remains with the commanding officers. TACOM of units temporarily attached does not include

authority to give them tasks inconsistent with the mission previously allocated to them. TACOM of

forces also includes retention or assignment of TACON.

0217 Officer in Tactical Command

The OTC is the senior officer present who is eligible to assume command, or the officer to whom

TACOM is delegated. (See AAP-6.) When a task organization is established, the OTC shall be named

in the order creating it. If the OTC is unable to exercise command, the next senior officer present in

the task organization will assume and retain command unless otherwise ordered. When a task

organization has not been established and the higher authority has not selected the OTC, the senior

2-8

CHANGE 1

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED

NATO ANTI–PIRACY MULTINATIONAL DOCTRINE (2008) - page 6