MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES (May 2010)

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1.3.5.3.

Blast Resistance of Structures at Exposed Sites

It may be possible for a structure at an ES to fail under blast loading so that its contents are

initiated practically instantaneously. This may be the result of major internal spalling from walls,

implosion of the door(s) or catastrophic failure of the entire structure. The quantity-distances in

Annex I-A, Table 1 presume that a structure at an ES is designed either to be strong enough to

withstand the blast or to be so light that secondary projections from the structure do not initiate the

contents taking account of their sensitiveness. An ES containing ammunition vulnerable to attack by

heavy spalling (e.g. missile warheads filled with relatively sensitive high explosives) requires special

consideration, see Part II, Chapter 5.

1.3.5.4.

Influence of Protective Construction upon Quantity-Distances

A building with marked asymmetry of construction, such as an igloo or another building

with protective roof and walls, but with one relatively weak wall, induces very directional

effects from the flames and the projection of burning packages containing ammunition

and explosives of Hazard Division 1.3. However, it is assumed for simplicity that the

effects from Hazard Division 1.3 are symmetrical about a PES, although it is known that

other structural characteristics and the wind can be significant.

Roofs may be designed to have special functions, such as:

Containment of fragments and prevention of lobbing of ammunition (the roof

on a PES).

Shielding against blast, projections and lobbed ammunition (the roof on an

ES).

The quantity-distances for buildings which contain fragments etc. depend upon

the particular design specifications. The reduced quantity-distances resulting

from shielding roofs are incorporated in the Tables in Annex I-A.

Walls may be designed to exclude firebrands, projections and lobbed ammunition. The

resultant reduced quantity-distances are incorporated in the Tables in Annex I-A.

However, a reduction often depends also on the provision of shielding roofs.

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1.3.5.5.

Construction to Contain Fragments and to Prevent Lobbing

The design of structures to contain projections or lobbed ammunition of Hazard Division

1.1 is an extremely complicated procedure and, unless warranted due to other special

circumstances, is prohibitive in cost.

In practice, it is generally only feasible to design a structure when the NEQ is small or

when the total content of the building is divided into smaller units by dividing walls

which prevent the mass explosion of the entire content of the building in the event of

explosion of one of the units. The design of a structure to contain projections and lobbed

ammunition represents a more stringent requirement than that for dividing walls to

prevent propagation.

1.3.5.6.

Structures to Protect from Flame Projections and Lobbed Ammunition

Protection from Effects of Ammunition of Hazard Division 1.1

Protection against High Velocity Projections from the Explosion of Stacks of

Ammunition

Ammunition stacks in the open or in buildings can produce high velocity

projections during an explosion. These projections may penetrate storage

buildings and retain sufficient energy to initiate the contents practically

instantaneously. Certain of the Q-Ds in Annex I-A (igloos) presume that the

roof, headwall and door(s) of igloos at the ES will arrest these high velocity

fragments. The presence of a barricade around the stack or building is always

preferred because of the increased protection given against attack by high

velocity projections.

Protection against the Explosion on Impact of Lobbed Ammunition

In the case of accident or fire, ammunition may be lobbed from any of the PES in

Table 1. Ammunition is least likely to be lobbed from the PES described in

columns a and b and more likely to be lobbed as the PES description changes

from c to f. These lobbed items may explode on impact (see subparagraph

1.2.1.2.b)). The fragments from these may penetrate stacks in the open or in a

storage building and retain sufficient energy to initiate the stacks practically

instantaneously. Certain of the quantity-distances in Annex I-A

(igloos)

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presume that the roof, headwall and door(s) at the ES will arrest these high

velocity fragments, but not necessarily lobbed items larger than 155 mm shell

(see subparagraph 1.2.1.2.b)). The presence of a barricade around a building is

always preferred and gives increased protection against the high velocity

projections, with the exception of those arising from items lobbed over the

barricade.

Protection from Effects of Ammunition of Hazard Division 1.2 or 1.3

Certain types of construction provide a reasonable degree of protection against

firebrands, comparatively low velocity projections, and lobbed ammunition (see Part II,

paragraph 2.3.2.3.). Examples are:

An earth-covered building with a headwall and door(s) of 15 cm reinforced

concrete or equivalent.

A heavy-walled building.

A barricaded explosives workshop with a protective roof.

In such cases the smaller Interior Quantity-Distances in Annex I-A, Table 2 or Table 3

are used. If the door or one weak wall etc. does not completely conform to the above

requirements, such smaller distances should only be authorized after a special assessment

of the relative orientation of the weak elements and the hazards involved.

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Section VI - Barricades: General Principles and

Influence on Quantity-Distances

1.3.6.1.

Functions of Barricades

An effective barricade arrests high velocity projections at low elevation from an

explosion which otherwise could cause direct propagation of the explosion.

A vertical faced barricade close to a PES also reduces the projection of burning packages,

ammunition and debris.

A barricade may also provide limited protection against blast and flame arising either

from an external or from an internal explosion when the quantity of explosives is

relatively small as it usually is in explosives workshops.

1.3.6.2.

Influence of Barricades upon Quantity-Distances for Hazard Division 1.1

Inter-Magazine Distances

An effective barricade avoids the use of very large Inter-Magazine Distances around a

site containing ammunition of Hazard Division 1.1. This is a significant factor in the cost

of a depot. The reduced quantity-distances are given in Annex I-A, Table 1.

Explosives Workshop Distances

An effective barricade avoids the use of large Explosives Workshop Distances from PES

containing ammunition of Hazard Division 1.1. A barricade or heavy wall around an

explosives workshop considered as an ES may provide some protection for personnel in

the lee of the barricade.

Exterior Quantity-Distances

Investigation of damage caused by blast and projections in recorded accidents and trials

shows that, in the case of Hazard Division 1.1, the difference between the Exterior

Quantity-Distances required for barricaded and unbarricaded buildings or stacks

respectively, is too small to be taken into account.

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1.3.6.3.

Influence of Barricades upon Quantity-Distances for Hazard Division 1.2

or 1.3

A barricade, other than a door barricade, does not itself generally provide sufficiently

effective protection against flame, radiant heat, projections and lobbed ammunition to justify a

reduction of the Inter-Magazine Distances around a PES containing Hazard Division 1.2 or 1.3.

However, to achieve flexibility in the use of sites, each one should be effectively barricaded.

1.3.6.4.

Influence of Door Barricade upon Quantity-Distances for Hazard Division 1.1

A door barricade is superfluous, as far as the use of Inter-Magazine Distances is concerned,

when igloos or other earth-covered buildings are sited side-to-side or rear-to-rear. When the front of

such a building at an ES faces the side or rear of an earth-covered building at a PES, a door barricade

may intercept concrete debris but the major consideration is the blast resistance of the headwall and

door(s) at the ES and this is not much affected by the barricade. When such buildings are sited front-

to-front, a door barricade may be ineffective. As regards personnel hazards, a door barricade of

reasonable height does not intercept debris which is lobbed or projected at a high elevation.

1.3.6.5.

Influence of Door Barricades upon Quantity-Distances for Hazard

Division 1.2

A fire in an earth-covered building containing ammunition of Hazard Division 1.2 produces

a serious hazard through the doorway from fragments and ejected ammunition. This hazard is

reduced by providing a separate barricade, with a vertical wall facing the door. Such a barricade at an

ES permits reduced distances shown in Annex I-A, Tables 2 A-F.

1.3.6.6.

Influence of Door Barricades upon Quantity-Distances for Hazard

Division 1.3

The deflagration of items and substances classified SsD 1.3.1 in an igloo or similar earth-

covered building produces marked directional effects in the hazardous sector, which is

taken to be the area bounded by lines drawn from the centre of the door and inclined 30°

on either side of a perpendicular to the door. This hazard is reduced by a door barricade,

at the PES, which has a vertical wall facing the door and is preferably backed with earth.

Such a barricade permits the use of the reduced quantity-distances in Annex I-A, Tables 3

A-C. This door barricade is not necessary when the door of the building at the PES faces

an earth-covered rear or sidewall of a building at an ES, or faces an explosives workshop,

which has both a barricade and a protective roof

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The burning of items classified SsD 1.3.2 in an igloo or similar earth-covered building

produces a hazard from fragments and projected items in the sector in front of the door.

This hazard is reduced by providing a separate barricade, with a vertical wall facing the

door. Such a barricade at both a PES and at an ES permits reduced distances shown in

Annex I-A, Tables 3 D-F.

1.3.6.7.

Quantity-distances between earth-covered buildings with common earth cover

In the case of a detonation, the type of earth cover between earth-covered buildings

affects the load on the acceptor igloo. The earth cover should be at least 0,6 m in depth. A

slope of two to one, meaning one unit of vertical rise for every two units of horizontal run

is recommended for the earth cover. The earth should comply with Part II, Para 2.3.3.3.

An earth-covered building often provides virtually complete protection to its contents

from the effects of an incident at a potential explosion site (PES) containing ammunition

and explosives of Hazard Division 1.2 or 1.3. When two or more buildings share a

common earth cover, the amount of ammunition and explosives permitted in them is less

than it would be if the buildings had separate earth cover. This is due to the earth couple

between the two PES´s, meaning the earth will transmit the explosive shock loading with

greater efficiency than air. In order to accommodate various types of earth, the following

Q-D is applied:

If the two earth covers intersect at a point 3/4 the height of the structures or

higher, Column D5 distances apply.

If the two earth covers intersect at a point between 3/4 and 1/2 the height of the

structures, Column D4 distances apply.

If the two earth covers intersect at, or below, a point 1/2 the height of the

structures, there is no Q-D reduction and Column D3 applies.

These distances refer to earth-covered buildings as specified in Annex II B. In the case of

unspecified earth-covered buildings in principle Column D6 distance applies.

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When earth-covered buildings, which meet the requirements of subparagraph 1.3.6.7.a)

and have an internal volume exceeding 500 m³, are considered as PES, then for NEQ of

Hazard Division 1.1 ammunition not exceeding 45 000 kg the following quantity-

distances should be applied to side- and rear-configurations only:

Inhabited Building Distances

D15-distances in Table 1 may be used from the sides of the earth-covered

building (PES) and D14-distances from the rear of the same building, but in no

case must the quantity-distance be less than

400 m. Definitions of

front/rear/side configurations are given in Annex I-A, Section I, Note A.1.5.1.

Public Traffic Route Distances

The Public Traffic Route Distances may be reduced to 2/3 of the Inhabited

Building Distances (D14- and D15-distances respectively) as calculated in

subparagraph 1), with a minimum of 270 m. These distances (D16- and D17-

distances) are shown in Annex I-A, Tables 1 A-C. However, the full Inhabited

Building Distances (D14- and D15-distances) with a minimum distance of 400

m should be used, when necessary, in accordance with subparagraph

1.3.1.15.b).

1.3.6.8.

Partly Barricaded Buildings or Stacks

Partly barricaded buildings or stacks are considered effectively barricaded only when both

ends of the barricade extend 1 m beyond the ends of the protected sides of the buildings or stacks.

1.3.6.9.

Natural Barricades

It is acceptable to take advantage of natural terrain where this provides protection equivalent

to that of artificial barricades. However, it is found that hills are usually insufficiently steep or close

to the ammunition or explosives and woods cannot usually be relied upon to provide the required

protection.

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Section VII -Injury and Damage to be Expected at Different

Levels of Protection for Hazard Division 1.1

and Grouping of Structures and Facilities

1.3.7.1.

Introduction

The purpose of applying Hazard Division 1.1 quantity-distances between PES and ES is

to ensure that the minimum risk is caused to personnel, structures and facilities. In

principle, those functions and facilities not directly related to operating requirements or to

the security of ammunition and explosives should be sited at or beyond the Inhabited

Building Distance.

In practice, it may not always be possible to provide this level of protection and some

activities and facilities will of necessity be sited at less than the Inhabited Building

Distance. In other cases, the nature of the facility or structure requires that greater

protection than that afforded by the Inhabited Building Distance, should be provided.

Damage to buildings and injury to personnel can result from either blast overpressure

effects or from projections (ammunition fragments and building debris from the PES).

The severity of the effects will be dependent on both the type of structure at the PES and

at the ES. The levels of damage considered in this section are when the PES is an:

Open or lightly confined stack of ammunition and explosives.

Earth-covered building containing ammunition and explosives.

The blast overpressure predictions in this section are relevant for quantities in excess of

4 500 kg. For smaller quantities the damage and injury levels may be pessimistic.

1.3.7.2.

Purpose of the Section

The aim of this section is to provide guidance on the kind of injuries and damage which can

be expected at different levels of protection and to propose typical personnel or facilities for which

these levels of protection might be considered acceptable. The standard base line for predicting blast

parameters is that outlined in Part II, Chapter 5, Section III, modified as appropriate for the charge

configuration, suppression by earth-cover or other technical considerations.

1.3.7.3.

Levels of Protection

The blast overpressure effects to be expected at a given scaled distance can be predicted

with a high degree of confidence. The technique is fairly well developed and the effects

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of blast may be treated deterministically, however, the techniques for determining the

hazards from projections are considerably less developed and the effects require a

probabilistic approach.

Blast Effects - Open Stacks and Light Structures

It can be assumed that the blast overpressure from a light structure is the same as that to

be expected from a bare charge. This assumption is especially true as the scaled distance

increases. The following levels of protection (scaled distances) are considered:

Scaled Distance

Peak Incident (Side-on)

(Q in kg, distance in m)

Overpressure Expected

(bar)

55.5 Q^1/3

0.015

44.4 Q^1/3 to 33.3 Q^1/3

0.02 to 0.03

22.2 Q^1/3

0.05

14.8 Q^1/3

0.09

9.6 Q^1/3

0.16

8.0 Q^1/3

0.21

7.2 Q^1/3

0.24

3.6 Q^1/3

0.70

2.4 Q^1/3

1.80

Blast Effects - Earth-Covered Magazines

Earth-covered magazines will generally attenuate the blast overpressure, although in the

near field enhanced overpressure can be expected from the front of an earth-covered

magazine. The degree of reduction in blast overpressure from the sides and rear of the

magazine decreases as the scaled distance and/or as the NEQ increases. In general the

greatest reduction will be obtained from the rear of the earth-covered building. The

following levels of protection (scaled distance) are considered:

Direction

Scaled Distance

Peak Incident (Side-on)

(Q in kg)

Overpressure Expected

(distance in m)

(bar)

Side

18.0 Q^1/3

0.05

Rear

14.0 Q^1/3

0.05

Side

12.0 Q^1/3

0.09

Rear

9.3 Q^1/3

0.09

These overpressures do not apply when the NEQ is greater than 45 000 kg and when the

volume of the building is less than 500 m³.

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Projection Hazards - All Types of Potential Explosion Sites

The projection hazard from a PES cannot be related to the scaled distance. However, for

all practical purposes, there is likely to be a hazard from projections at all scaled distances

less than 14.8 Q^1/3, this hazard will be greater when the PES is not barricaded. Unless the

ES has been provided with protection against all projections, including high angle

missiles, then minimum distances at which the projection hazard is considered to be

acceptable for a particular situation, have been introduced as follows:

180 m

There is a significant hazard from projections at

180 m. This hazard is

tolerable for:

- Public traffic routes when the traffic is not dense and when the PES is an open stack

or a light structure.

- The protection of unbarricaded ammunition i.e., to prevent propagation from low

trajectory high velocity projections.

270 m

There is a significant hazard from projections at 270 m. The hazard is tolerable

for:

Main public traffic routes or when the traffic is dense and when the PES is an

open stack or light structure.

Public traffic routes when the traffic is not dense and when the PES is a heavy-

walled or earth-covered building.

Sparsely populated areas when the PES is an open stack or a light structure;

there would be a small expectation of damage or injury from projections.

400 m

There is a minor hazard from projections at 400 m. This hazard is tolerable for:

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- Main public traffic routes or when the traffic is dense and when the PES is a heavy-

walled or earth-covered building

Built-up areas when the PES is an open stack or a light structure.

All "Inhabited Buildings" when the PES is a heavy-walled or earth-covered

building.

1.3.7.4.

Reduction of the Hazard

Strengthening of buildings to prevent or reduce the hazard is feasible and may not be

prohibitively expensive. The hazard may be reduced by:

Suitably designed suppressive construction at the PES, this is only practicable when the

NEQ is relatively small for example reinforced concrete cubicles used in explosive

process building construction have a maximum practical limit of about

250 kg.

Standard NATO igloos can suppress about 100kg as a PES.

By designing the structures at the ES to withstand the overpressures and the debris and

fragment attack.

The use of light structures for ES which although they will be severely damaged by the

overpressure will not produce hazardous debris. In this case protection from high

velocity debris and fragments by receptor barricades is essential.

1.3.7.5.

Protection Level 55.5 Q^1/3 - Open Stacks and Light Structures

Expected Blast Effects

The overpressure expected at this distance ( 55.5 Q^1/3) will cause little or no

damage to unstrengthened structures.

Injuries and fatalities are very unlikely as a direct result of the blast effects.

There may be a minor hazard from broken glass or cladding falling from a

considerable height so as to strike people.

Personnel and Facilities Acceptable

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At this distance and beyond there is no restriction on personnel, activities or facilities.

1.3.7.6.

Protection Level 44.4 Q^1/3 to 33.3 Q^1/3 - Open Stacks and Light Structures

Expected Blast Effects

Unstrengthened structures are likely to suffer only superficial damage.

When large panes of glass are exposed so as to face the PES, 50 % or more

breakages may occur.

Injuries and fatalities are very unlikely as a direct result of the blast effects.

Injuries that do occur will be caused principally by flying glass.

Personnel and Facilities Acceptable

Because even superficial damage may in some instances be unacceptable, National

Authorities may require siting at these distances for facilities of especially vulnerable

construction or public importance. Examples are:

Large facilities of special construction of importance including:

- Large factories of vulnerable construction.

- Multi-storey office or apartment buildings of vulnerable construction.

- Public buildings and edifices of major value.

- Large educational facilities of vulnerable construction.

- Large hospitals.

- Major traffic terminals (e.g. large railway stations, airports etc.)

- Major public utilities (e.g. gas, water, electricity works).

Facilities of vulnerable construction used for mass meetings:

- Assembly halls and fairs.

- Exhibition areas.

- Sports stadiums.

Built-up areas which are both large and densely developed.

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1.3.7.7.

Protection Level 22.2 Q^1/3 - Open Stacks and Light Structures

The equivalent protection levels in respect of earth-covered buildings greater in volume than

500 m³

and when containing a NEQ of Hazard Division 1.1 less than 45 000 kg are:

- From the side:

18.0 Q^1/3

- From the rear:

14.0 Q^1/3

Expected Blast Effects

Unstrengthened buildings will suffer minor damage, particularly to parts such

as windows, door frames and chimneys. In general, damage is unlikely to

exceed approximately 5 % of the replacement cost but some buildings may

suffer serious damage.

Injuries and fatalities are very unlikely as a direct result of the blast effects.

Injuries that do occur will be caused principally by glass breakage and

flying/falling debris.

Personnel and Facilities Acceptable

This distance is termed "Inhabited Building Distance" and is the minimum distance, in

conjunction with the overriding minimum distances given in paragraph 1.3.7.3., at which

inhabited buildings not directly connected with the functions of the Explosives Area

should be sited. This level of protection is proposed as acceptable for the following kinds

of facility:

Unbarricaded stacks of ammunition and explosives.

Structures and facilities in the administration area of a depot or factory with a

considerable number of occupants (more than 20), examples are:

- Main office buildings.

- Non-explosives workshops.

- Mess halls and kitchens.

- Main canteens.

- Main shower and changing facilities.

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Structures and facilities in the administrative area of a depot or a factory which

are important for the functioning of the installation, examples are:

- Manned fire stations.

- Central heating plants.

- Main vehicle pools.

- Gasoline storage and dispensing facilities.

- Unprotected water supply and power installations.

Inhabited buildings (as defined by the National Authority), whether single

buildings, communities or areas of scattered habitations.

Structures and facilities in which people assemble, except as indicated in

subparagraph 1.3.7.6.b) above.

Facilities serving the safety and needs of the general public, examples are:

- Gas, water and electricity supply installations.

- Radar and communications stations.

Important lines of transport, examples are:

- Main railway lines.

- Motorways and major roads.

- Major navigable waterways.

1.3.7.8.

Protection Level 14.8 Q^1/3 - Open Stacks and Light Structures

The equivalent protection levels in respect of earth-covered buildings greater in volume than

500 m³ and when containing a NEQ of Hazard Division 1.1 less than 45 000 kg are:

- From the side:

12.0 Q^1/3

- From the rear:

9.3 Q^1/3

Expected Blast Effects

Unstrengthened buildings will suffer average damage costing in the range of 10 % of the

total replacement costs to repair.

Personnel in the open are not likely to be seriously injured by blast.

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There is a fairly high probability that injuries will be caused by glass breakage and

flying/falling debris.

Personnel and Facilities Acceptable

This distance is termed the "Public Traffic Route Distance" and is the minimum distance,

in conjunction with the overriding minimum distances given in paragraph 1.3.7.3., at

which routes used by the general public, for purposes unconnected with the explosives

facility, should be sited (except when the PES is a heavy-walled building and when the

route is a main route or when the traffic is dense). This level of protection is proposed as

acceptable for the following kinds of facility:

Structures and facilities within an administration area connected with the

explosives installation with a limited number of occupants (less than 20).

Facilities in which people assemble only temporarily and which can be quickly

cleared. Examples are:

- Public paths.

- Recreational areas where no structures are involved.

- Parking places.

- Small arms ranges.

Railways, public roads and navigable waterways of minor to medium

importance. (For public roads the risk of secondary injury can be reduced by

ensuring that the road sides are free from obstacles which are likely to result in

injuries to the occupants of vehicles leaving the road as a result of the driver's

reaction to the explosion).

1.3.7.9.

Protection Level 9.6 Q^1/3 - Open Stacks and Light Structures

Expected Blast Effects

Buildings which are unstrengthened can be expected to suffer damage to main

structural members. Repairs may cost more than 20 % of the replacement cost

of the building. Strengthening of buildings to prevent damage and secondary

hazards is feasible and not prohibitively expensive.

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Cars may suffer some damage to metal portions of the body and roof by blast.

Windows facing the blast may be broken, however, the glass should not cause

serious injuries to the occupants.

Aircraft will suffer some damage to appendages and sheet metal skin. They

should be operational with only minor repair (see also Part IV, Chapter 5).

Cargo type ships will suffer minor damage from blast to deck houses and

exposed electronic gear (see also Part IV, Chapter 6).

Personnel may suffer temporary loss of hearing, permanent ear damage is not

to be expected. Other injuries from the direct effects of blast overpressure are

unlikely, although there are likely to be injuries from secondary effects, i.e.

translation of objects.

Personnel and Facilities Acceptable

This should normally be the minimum distance at which unprotected duty personnel

(troops, military and civilian maintenance and security personnel and crews of ships)

should be permitted when their duties are not closely and specifically related to the PES.

Examples are:

Open air recreation facilities used only by military personnel and where

dependants and the general public are not involved.

Training areas for unprotected military personnel.

All military aircraft when the PES is not for the immediate service of the

aircraft.

1.3.7.10.

Protection Level 8.0 Q^1/3 - Open stacks and Light Structures

Expected Blast Effects

Buildings which are unstrengthened can be expected to suffer serious damage

which is likely to cost above 30 % of the total replacement cost to repair.

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Serious injuries to personnel, which may result in death, are likely to occur due

to building collapse or loose translated objects.

There is some possibility of delayed communication of the explosion as a

result of fires or equipment failure at the ES, direct propagation of the

explosion is not likely.

Cargo ships would suffer damage to decks and superstructure. In particular

doors and bulkheads on the weather-deck are likely to be buckled.

Aircraft are expected to sustain considerable structural damage.

Personnel and Facilities Acceptable

This distance is termed "Explosives Workshop Distance", the level of protection is

proposed as acceptable for the following kinds of facility:

Explosives workshops in which the personnel present are kept to the minimum

essential for the task.

Packing and shipping (transit) buildings in the Explosives Area.

Minor transmission and communication lines.

1.3.7.11.

Protection Level 7.2 Q^1/3

This distance is used by US Authorities to define explosives workshop separation in the US

and is comparable to Protection Level 8.0 Q^1/3. However, a great deal of information is available in

the US for Protection Level 7.2 Q^1/3 and is included in this section for completeness.

Expected Blast Effects

Damage to unstrengthened buildings will be of a serious nature. Repair is

likely to cost 50 % or more of the total replacement cost.

Personnel injuries of a serious nature or possible death are likely from debris

of the building at the ES and from translation of loose objects.

There is a 1 % chance of eardrum damage to personnel.

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Some possibility of delayed communication of explosion as a result of fires or

equipment failure at the ES. There is a high degree of protection against direct

propagation of an explosion.

Cargo ships would suffer some damage to decks and superstructure by having

doors and bulkheads buckled by overpressure.

Aircraft can be expected to suffer considerable structural damage from blast

overpressure.

Personnel and Facilities Acceptable

Workers engaged in major construction in the vicinity of ammunition

production areas, waterfront areas where ammunition is being handled or areas

used for the loading of aircraft with explosives.

Labour intensive operations closely related to the PES, including inert supply

functions serving two or more identical or similar PES.

Rest and buildings for light refreshment for use of workers in the immediate

vicinity. Such facilities will normally only be used when work is stopped in the

nearby explosives buildings and should be limited to a maximum of 6 persons.

Area offices with a permanent occupancy of a small number of person, directly

supporting the work of the Explosives Area or process buildings.

Guard buildings in which those security personnel directly responsible for the

security of the Explosives Area are housed when not on patrol.

Unmanned buildings containing immediate reaction fire-fighting appliances.

Operations and training functions that are exclusively manned or attended by

personnel of the unit operating the PES. This includes day rooms, squadron

operations offices and similar functions for units such as individual missile

firing batteries, aircraft squadrons, or ammunition supply companies.

Manoeuvre area, proving grounds tracks and similar facilities for armoured

vehicles together with the armoured vehicles themselves may provide adequate

protection to the crew from fragment and debris.

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Areas used for the maintenance of military vehicles and equipment (trucks,

tanks) when the PES is basic load or ready storage limited to 4 000 kg or less

at each end when the maintenance work is performed exclusively by and for

military personnel of the unit for which the basic load of ammunition is stored.

Auxiliary power and utilities functions, inert storage and issue sites and

mechanical support at naval dock areas when not continuously manned, when

serving only the waterfront area, and when the PES is a ship or an ammunition

handling location at the waterfront. When loss of the facility would cause an

immediate loss of a vital function, Inhabited Building Distance must be used.

10)

Minimum distance between separate groups of explosives loaded combat-

configured aircraft or between aircraft and a PES such as a preload site which

serves to arm the aircraft. The use of intervening barricades is required to

further reduce communication and fragment damage and eliminate the

necessity for totalling the NEQ. The loading of ammunition and explosives

aboard aircraft can be accomplished within each group of aircraft without

additional protection.

11)

Parking lots for privately owned automobiles belonging to the personnel

employed or stationed at the PES.

12)

Separation of naval vessels from PES consisting of other naval vessels to

which quantity-distance standards apply. When the PES is an ammunition ship

or an ammunition activity, the separation will be determined by reference to

special regulations established for piers and wharves of ammunition

shiploading activities.

13)

Container "stuffing" and "unstuffing" operations which are routine support of

the PES. When the PES is a magazine in a storage area, containerizing

operations may be considered as part of the magazine and separate quantity-

distance rules will not be applied.

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1.3.7.12.

Protection Level 3.6 Q^1/3 - Open Stacks and Light Structures

Expected Blast Effects

Unstrengthened buildings will suffer severe structural damage approaching

total demolition.

Severe injuries or death to occupants of the ES are to be expected from direct

blast effects, building collapse or translation.

Aircraft will be damaged by blast to the extent that they will be beyond

economical repair. If aircraft are loaded with explosives, delayed explosions

are likely to result from subsequent fires.

Explosions may occur in ES containing ammunition as a result of fire spread

by lobbed debris or blast damage. A high degree of protection against direct

propagation of an explosion is to be expected providing direct attack by high

velocity fragments is prevented.

Personnel and Facilities Acceptable

Buildings housing successive steps of a single process in an explosives factory.

Separation of buildings for security guards from explosives locations, provided

the risk of the personnel becoming militarily ineffective in the event of an

explosive accident can be accepted.

Separations among buildings and facilities of a tactical missile site where

greater distances cannot be provided due to technical reasons.

Temporary holding areas for trucks or railcars containing explosives to service

production or maintenance facilities provided barricades are interposed

between the explosives locations.

Unmanned auxiliary power facilities, transformer stations, water treatment and

pollution abatement facilities and other utility installations which serve the

PES, and loss of which will not create an immediate secondary hazard or

prejudice vital operations.

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1.3.7.13.

Protection Level 2.4 Q^1/3 - Open Stacks and Light Structures

Expected Blast Effects

Unstrengthened buildings will almost certainly suffer complete demolition.

Personnel and Facilities Acceptable

Personnel stationed in magazine areas for one or two men.

Crews performing storage and shipping functions in the magazines may

operate for short periods of time at adjacent magazines. In large magazine

areas controls should be exercised by management to reduce the length of time

that unrelated operations are exposed to one another at distances less than 9.6

Q^1/3.

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Section VIII - Q-D Rules in the Particular case of Aboveground Storage

of Ammunition Classified 1.6N

1.3.8.1.

Preliminary remark

This section of the Manual is reserved for ammunition classified 1.6N It was written at a

time when very few statistical data were known on the behaviour of these articles in transport and in

storage. Therefore it was difficult to derive from experience what should be the behaviour of a set of

1.6N ammunition of the same family in case of an accidental stimulus. Among several options, the

AC/258 Group took the decision to choose a middle way solution which leads to the

recommendations listed below. In the future when the behaviour in storage of 1.6N ammunition will

be better known it may be necessary to revise this decision.

1.3.8.2.

Most credible accidental event

During storage of 1.6N ammunition belonging to the same family the most credible

accidental event resulting from an accidental stimulus is the detonation of a single munition without

instant transmission of the detonation to other munitions of the same family and/or moderate

combustion of the whole quantities of ammunition.

1.3.8.3.

Q-D rules

The Q-D distances between an ES and a PES which are given by the Q-D rules, are derived

from the above-mentioned "most credible accidental event". The assessment of the hazard generated

by the detonation of a single munition takes into account only the blast effect and neglects the

projection effect of a single munition. The Q-D distances are obtained by taking, for a given

configuration "ES, PES" the largest distance determined by applying

the Annex I-A, Tables 1 A-C (1.1 Q-D rules) to a single munition

the Annex I-A, Tables

3 D-F (SsD 1.3.2 Q-D rules) to the whole quantities of

ammunition with aggregation of the NEQ.

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CHAPTER 5 - SEPARATION OF POL-FACILITIES WITHIN MILITARY

INSTALLATIONS

1.5.0.1.

Separation of Small Quantities of POL

Small quantities (not exceeding 100 litres) of petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) held as

immediate reserves for operational purposes within a military installation require no specific quantity-

distances from buildings or stacks containing ammunition or explosives.

1.5.0.2.

Separation of Unprotected Aboveground POL Tanks and Drums

If required, unprotected aboveground POL steel tanks and drums are separated from buildings

or stacks containing ammunition or explosives by the Inhabited Building Distance

(Annex I-A,

Section II). Where the POL-facilities are vital they should be sited at IBD and a minimum distance of

400 m must be observed from buildings or stacks containing ammunition or explosives of Hazard

Divisions 1.1.

1.5.0.3.

Separation of Protected Aboveground POL Tanks and Drums

If required, quantity-distances less than those for unprotected tanks and drums

(see

paragraph 1.5.0.2.) may be used where a surface storage tank or a drum storage area is

provided with structural protection against blast and fragment hazards. For purposes of

applying this paragraph, "protected" will be considered to mean that the POL storage tank or

drum as an ES is provided with structural protection sufficient to ensure that the POL storage

tank or drum and contents will experience no more damage than if sited at inhabited building

distance.

The criteria specified for the separation of POL from explosives areas are intended primarily

for use in determining separations at large permanent ammunition depots. It may be desirable

to weigh the cost of distance/protective construction against strategic value of the POL

supplies and the ease of replacement in the event of an incident. Reduced distances may be

approved if the POL loss can be accepted, and if the POL-facilities are sited and provided

spill containment so as not to endanger the explosives. Such reduced distances must be

acceptable to both host and user nations.

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CHAPTER 6 - HAZARD FROM ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION TO

AMMUNITION CONTAINING ELECTRO-EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

1.6.0.1.

Introduction

Over recent years there has been a significant increase in the use of communications

equipment throughout the military and civil environment including all forms of

transportation in support of management functions, control of resources and area security.

These equipments produce electro-magnetic radiation of varying intensity according to

their output and antenna gain and are potentially hazardous when used in close proximity

to explosive devices which have an installed electrical means of initiation known as

electro-explosive devices (EED).

The advice contained in this chapter represents the minimum precautions to be observed

in order to prevent hazard to EED resulting from exposure to the radio frequency (RF)

environment at frequencies up to 40 GHz. It is intended that this chapter should provide

guidance of officials concerned with the storage, movement and processing of EED or

stores containing EED and the control of RF equipment which may be used within, or

enter, those establishments/vehicles used for these purposes.

Consideration is not given to the precautions to be taken with regard to lightning and

electrostatic discharge. These areas are also considered by AC/327 Working-Group 6 and

published in associated STANAGs.

More detailed Information regarding NATO’s electromagnetic radiation management and

environment assessment programs can be found in Allied Environmental Conditions

Publications (AECP)-2 and AECP-250.

1.6.0.2.

General

Any firing circuit associated with an EED, or other electrical conductors such as wires,

tools and fingers in contact with the EED, when placed in a RF field will act as an

antenna with the inherent capability of picking up some electrical energy from the field.

When the leading wires of an EED are separated they could form a dipole antenna and

provide an optimum match between the dipole and the EED leading to maximum transfer

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of power to the EED from the radiated source. Unseparated (short circuited) leading

wires could form circular antennae which may also constitute good receiving systems.

Unless appropriate precautions are taken, the power/energy levels induced into the firing

circuits from the standing RF fields may be sufficient to inadvertently initiate the EED.

Design criteria for the modern EED when installed in weapon systems require

electromagnetic (EM) screening and specified orientation of firing leads to reduce the

RADHAZ. For this reason, EED separated from their parent system are regarded as less

safe than when installed into the system with all leads connected as intended by the

designer.

The attachment of external cables and test sets to systems containing EED will usually

increase their susceptibility to EM energy pick-up.

The protective switch in a circuit which prevents the initiation of an EED by direct

current until the desired time is not an effective barrier to electromagnetic (EM) energy.

1.6.0.3.

a) An EED is a one shot explosive or pyrotechnic devie used as the initiating element ina an

explosive or mechanical train and which is designe to ctivate by application of electrical energy.

In present use foru techniques of electrical intiation are employed:

Bridge-wire (BW) and Film bridge (FB) EED.

Conducting Composition (CC) EED.

Exploding Bridge-wrie (EBW) EED.

Slapper Detonator.

1.6.0.4.

Storage and Transport

EED are encountered in a variety of configurations between their manufacturing stage

and their ultimate disposal. These configurations range from trade packaging in bulk,

military packaging and sub-packages, and installed in munitions, to various stages of

separate and exposed states which occur in processing and training.

It is important for users to understand how these configurations can influence the basic

precautions to be adopted in storage and transportation. Precautions in transport should

include measures to be covered in emergencies from straightforward vehicle breakdown

to accidents involving fire and/or casualty evacuation.

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