Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 6)

90-8

7-10. Personnel and administration.

a. To remain an effective fighting force, the counterguerrilla unit

requires personnel and administrative support. Most, if not all, of

this support function occurs in the field trains at the brigade

support base.

b. The adjutant (S1) is at the battalion operational support base with

the supply officer (S4). The S1 is responsible for headquarters

management of the battalion base as well as S1 functions and

liaison with brigade. The headquarters commandant is with the

field trains of the battalion in the brigade base. This arrangement

keeps the battalion base as small as possible.

Personnel and administrative support for counterguerrilla

operations is essentially the same as in conventional operations.

Administrative operations remain relatively the same and

flexible to support the situation.

(For further information on personnel and administrative support

functions, see FM 7-20 and FM 71-2.)

7-6

FM 90-8

APPENDIX A

Subsurface Operations

Section

1. General

A-1. Type facilities.

a. This appendix explains how guerrillas may use natural caves or

construct underground facilities in the course of their operations.

These may be used for command and control centers, logistical

staging areas, hospitals, or even fortifications.

b. The larger underground facilities may be complex. Caves may

have many large chambers connected by passageways, while

tunnel systems may have many large rooms joined by intercon-

necting tunnels. Underground facilities may be wired for

electricity and communications and may even have pumping

stations for supplying air to lower levels.

A-2. Tunnel uses.

Tunnels may be dug with zigzags and sumps to lessen the effects of

small arms fire, explosives, and gas inside them. Some tunnels and

rooms, or passageways and chambers, may contain concealed exits to

allow guerrillas to hide or escape if the complex or cave is penetrated

while others may be booby-trapped to kill intruders. Tunnels and caves

are difficult to detect from the air or ground, and their construction may

make them impossible to destroy with conventional ammunition.

Tunnel entrances are normally covered by fire from another point in

the complex.

a. Guerrillas may use tunnels in penetration operations to gain

access to restricted areas. In built-up areas they may infiltrate

through sewers, or tunnel from the basement of a nearby building,

or subway tunnel, or sewer to their target. When they are below

the target, they may either construct an exit and penetrate the

target from below or fill the tunnel with explosives and blow up

the target.

b. Tunnels may also be dug in the basements of safehouses for use as

escape routes if a house is compromised.

Tunnels are used for approach and escape. They are used to obtain

access to caves and underground bunkers for use as firing

positions and protection against indirect fires. They are also used

as a common method of storing food and materials in underground

caches. Some tunnel complexes are large enough to house

underground hopitals and base camps.

A-1

FM 90-8

Section Il. Tunneling

A-3. Categories.

Tunnels vary from the simple to the complex. They are categorized as

hiding holes, access and escape routes, underground base areas,

fortified base camps, and bunkers.

Hiding holes. There are three basic types of holes used by

guerrillas. They are classified more by their location than by their

construction. Methods of construction and dimensions can be

expected to vary, depending on the area of operations.

(1)

Bamboo hole. This is easily and quickly camouflaged

(Figure A-1 ). The entrances to the holes differ as do the

techniques of camouflage. Most of the entrances are within

the edge of a bamboo clump or dense thicket or just outside

the edge. The hole cover, or trapdoor, contains camouflage

material. Some have pieces of cut bamboo or other vegetation

affixed to the top of the door. The edges of the door fit snugly

into the structure of the entrance. Other entrances may be

covered by spreading materials over them.

Figure A-1. Under bamboo hole.

A-2

FM 90-8

(2) Air hole.

Another characteristic common to small tunnels is the

(a)

air hole, which is normally made from a hollow piece of

bamboo or pipe 3 to 4 inches in diameter and inserted

into the tunnel and camouflaged on the surface.

(b) The air hole is the only telltale indicator in a beach hole

or tunnel. It differs from the bamboo hole in that it is

constructed in sand or dirt and constructed from cut

timbers (Figure A-2). It does not depend on roots to add

rigidity to the roof. The entrance is hard to locate as it is

often buried under afoot of loose sand or dirt; however,

it can be found by first finding the breathing tubes.

Some air holes are a continuation of the supports that

hold up local buildings. Other air holes may be exposed

by pulling up plants that grow nearby.

Figure A-2. Beach hole.

(3) Water entrance hole. This hole or tunnel (Figure A-3) is

located near a small stream or beside an old bomb crater

filled with water. These holes have no door and depend on

natural growth to hide the entrance. Sometimes the entrance

is completely submerged.

A-3

90-8

Base area. This may house a command post, ordnance shop, or

hospital. This type of tunnel system is not-as common as the ones

found in a fortified village or used as access or escape routes. It is

normally deep in guerrilla-controlled areas. This type of tunnel

complex may have several rooms, such as a 4- by 6-foot area or a

large 10-foot-square area with a 15-foot ceiling. They may also

include electric lighting or other comfort features (Figure A-5).

Figure A-5. Underground base area.

d.Base camps. These are usually fortified positions. They may

consist of a-central bunker, 18 inches above ground, and tunnels

100 to 150 meters long, connecting outer bunkers to the central

bunker. All bunkers have overhead cover and camouflaged firing

apertures. They are positioned to provide mutual support and

deny observation of the entire complex from any one location on

the ground (Figure A-6).

A-5

FM 90-8

Figure A-6. Fortified base camps.

Bunkers. Entrances are often in a house under a bed or table,

and have an outside exit. In many cases, bunkers are constructed

with walls up to 3 feet thick. The floor is below ground level. The

roof is normally constructed of logs covered with dirt, mud, or rock

from 3 to 6 feet thick. Sometimes, small logs (driven 3 to 6 feet into

the ground and extending upward to roof level) serve to reinforce

the walls. In some cases, the bunker maybe constructed entirely

of concrete. Most often, bunkers have one overt entrance and one

or more covert exits. The primary use of bunkers is to provide

cover and concealment. Firing apertures are just above ground

(Figure A-7).

A-6

FM 90-8

A-4. Construction methods.

One feature common to almost all tunnel complexes is the method

of excavation. The laborers are divided into a number of work

units and assigned tunnel sections. The units are placed

approximately 20 meters along the axis of the planned tunnel.

Each unit then digs a well or shaft to the desired depth where a

working area is enlarged. From this point, the units begin digging

toward each other. As the tunnel grows, the workers are formed in

a line to pass the soil out the excavation shaft. The soil is spead

evenly over the ground or a road, or under the forest canopy to

prevent detection. Once the main tunnel has been excavated, the

shaft is filled and camouflaged.

As the tunnel becomes more extensive, lower levels may be

constructed to provide additional room and better protection. The

degree of sophistication is dependent upon the purpose of the

tunnel and frequency of its use. Most of the tunnels constructed by

guerrilla forces are hiding places or escape routes; therefore, they

may be extensive in length, but not complex in design.

Whether their construction is complex or not, care is taken to

provide security throughout the tunnels. False corridors are

constructed, as are trapdoors and false walls. A U-shaped design

is often formed to give the impression that the corridor is a

deadend when actually a trapdoor leads to the way out.

Most tunnel systems require substantial planning before actual

construction. The systems are never haphazard. The tunnel is

reinforced by reveting or other means. One common method used

to reinforce tunnels is to coat walls with mud 3 to 6 inches thick

and build fires throughout the system to bake the mud, turning it

into a ceramic texture.

Tunnel systems are usually not constructed in a straight line.

They will follow a zigzag or serpentine course. This type of

construction is used to protect the occupants from small arms fire

in the event that tunnel systems are detected and breached.

Tools for digging are simple. A bucket and pick or shovel are the

main tools. Common methods of illumination include carbide

lamps, flashlights, candles, and in larger complexes, small,

fuel-driven generators for electric lighting.

Secrecy of location is considered of utmost importance. All means

are taken to camouflage and conceal tunnel entrances. Often,

tunnels are hidden in tombs, walls, floors, or under water.

Extensive use of booby traps and mines should be expected in and

around tunnel complexes. Some common booby traps are mortar

and artillery duds rigged for command detonation. These may be

buried or suspended in trees in the immediate vicinity. Hand

A-8

FM 90-8

grenades and homemade bombs are used to booby-trapdoors and

hatches. Poisonous snakes may be placed in tunnels to inflict

casualties.

A-5. Detection of tunnels.

The first step in detecting or locating tunnels is to reduce a large

geographical area of interest to a smaller area of probable

locations. This can be accomplished by studying general

indications of probable tunnel locations.

Some indicators that tunnels are being employed by guerrilla

forces are:

(1) Movement of guerrillas in a specific direction after being

spotted by aircraft.

(2) Sniper fire occurring from areas where there are no obvious

avenues of withdrawal.

(3) Vegetable gardens far from places of habitation.

(4) Operations where guerrillas inflict casualties at relatively

long range and disappear without making close contact or

being detected by friendly forces.

(5) The smell of burning wood or food cooking in an area lacking

habitation.

Conventional air photography produces results if the appearance

of the surface and vegetation are changed from normal. This

requires skilled personnel to interpret photos. In a jungle

environment, air photography may be prohibited because dense

vegetation, such as double or triple canopy jungle, obscures the

ground.

Once determined that a specific area may contain a tunnel

system, there are several indicators that are helpful in detecting

tunnels. Visual inspections often disclose the general area of a

tunnel, but not its precise location. The key to finding a tunnel

system is the application of common sense to the situation. A

platoon or company should be assigned a small search area, never

larger than a 1000-meter grid square for a company. These small

areas are picked based on intelligence reports or past actions of

the guerrilla force. The unit searches every square meter of the

area. Some visual indicators usually found are:

(1) Worn places on trees that the guerrilla uses as handholds.

(2) A small trail, much like a game trail, through the brush into a

clump of small trees.

(3) Cut trees, although not a sure sign.

A-9

160-739

- 94 - 5

FM 90-8

(4) Limbs tied near tree top to conceal the use of a tunnel from

aircraft.

(5) Slight depression in or around a group of small trees.

(6) Air holes, a sure indicator.

(7) A lone individual, especially a female, in the area.

(8) Fresh cooked food with no one attending the site.

(9) Fresh human feces in an area.

All these indicators are good. However, in different areas they

may vary. The places to look for indicators are in the corners of

hedgerows, in the corners of village huts, and in the secluded

corners of trails and streams. The enemy often hides in these

places so he can see while not being seen. Additionally, hiding in

these places allows those who put the finishing touches on the

camouflage to escape undetected. The guerrilla is aware of the

danger of establishing a pattern. However, he must have a

location that provides him with observation as well as concealment.

So look for observation posts that allow him to move into or out of

an area undetected.

Occasionally, the specific location of a tunnel can be obtained by

interrogating the local populace, or prisoners of war (PW) who

may have occupied, or helped in digging, the system. Because of

the method of constructing a tunnel system, that of using an

excavation shaft to reach the level of the tunnel and then closing

this shaft once the tunnel is completed, the individual may not be

able to locate an entrance or exit unless he has seen or used the

completed tunnel.

A-6. Tunnel search operations.

Entering an area where a tunnel complex is located requires a

methodical approach. Security to the flanks and rear is imper-

ative.

The size of the objective area of operations determines the

strength of the unit assigned the search mission. Basically, the

unit, company, or platoon is task-organized for tunnel operations.

A company is divided into three elements: security, search, and

reserve. (The headquarters element remains with the security

element.)

(1) Security — one platoon plus headquarters element to cordon

search area.

(2) Search — one platoon to search immediate area for tunnels.

The search element is subdivided into search and security

teams.

A-10

FM 90-8

(3) Reserve

- one platoon to assist in cordon and reinforce as

necessary.

A platoon is divided into three elements:

(1) Security - one squad plus headquarters element to cordon

area.

(2) Search - one squad to search area for tunnels. The search

element is subdivided into search and security teams.

(3) Reserve - one squad to assist in cordon and reinforce as

necessary.

The techniques of deliberate search are centered around the rifle

squad. Each squad is divided into a security and a search team.

A slow, methodical search is conducted in the area of operations.

Once assigned a search area, the squad systematically searches

every square meter. The security element move toward the limits

of the search area. Once a hole (tunnel) is discovered, the security

element surrounds the area while the search team prepares to

destroy or neutralize the hole (tunnel).

A-7. Special equipment.

The unit may require the following special items to perform tunnel

operations:

Mine detector — used to detect ammunition and weapon caches.

Grenades - fragmentary, chemical (CS) gas, chemical (HC)

smoke, while phosphorus (WP), and concussion types. Grenades

should not be used after friendly forces have entered a tunnel.

Demolitions — used to destroy tunnel system. Because of the

complexity of charges needed to destroy some tunnel complexes,

an engineer team should support the search unit. Also, the large

amount of demolitions required for some operations may present

unique logistical problems, especially in a jungle environment.

Air generator — used to force smoke into tunnel complex.

Flashlights — to search tunnels.

Weapons — caliber .45 pistol should be used inside tunnels. The

pistol has good stopping power and is effective at close range.

Loudspeaker — used to call enemy from tunnels.

A-11

90-8

Section Ill. Destroying Underground Facilities

A-8. Four-step process.

The destruction of a tunnel is a four-step process, beginning (1)

with a soldier firing one or two magazines from a rifle into the

tunnel entrance. This has a tendency to discourage the enemy

from staying close to the entrance.

After gaining the attention of the guerrillas, they are told to

vacate the hole or tunnel or be killed. They may give up without a

fight, saving not only the efforts of killing, but of excavating the

hole or tunnel for weapons and documents.

If this fails, breaching operations are used(2). A grenade is placed

on the entrance cover to gain access. The entrance cover is

removed in this manner to minimize the effects of any attached booby

traps.

Once the entrance cover is destroyed, the following measures are

used (depending on the mission):

(1) Insert grenades (3), fragmentary or concussion, to kill the

guerrillas. Ensure that the grenades are cooked-off prior to

throwing them in the hole or tunnel.

(2) Insert a combination of HC smoke and CS chemical

grenades. This serves two purposes: HC smoke may reveal

the locations of other entrances or exits, and CS may force

the guerrillas to evacuate the hole or tunnel. Captured

guerrillas become a source of intelligence in finding other

holes or tunnels.

The last step (4) is the entry of soldiers to ensure that all weapons

and documents are recovered and all enemy dead, wounded, and

living are removed. The hole or tunnel is thoroughly searched for

small compartments built to hide weapons and ammunition. If a

tunnel complex proves to be extensive with bunkers and large

rooms, it is cleared systematically. Bunkers are destroyed or

occupied to prevent the enemy from reoccupying them through

another tunnel. Do not clear more bunkers than friendly

forces can hold.

Deliberate search techniques emphasize where to look for the

enemy (locations that provide him with observation, cover,

concealment, and an escape route). When the soldier learns what

to look for (a game trail, worn and cut trees, an air hole, human

feces, a depression, fresh food, a lone individual), any of these

indicators is likely to trigger a mental alert that the enemy is not

far away. After the tunnel is searched, it is destroyed with

explosives.

A-12

FM 90-8

A-9. Neutralization-demolition procedures.

Tunnels. Since each tunnel system differs in size and construction,

a different quantity and placement of explosives is needed for

each type.

(1) The use of block explosives to destroy a tunnel system has a

disadvantage: all the explosive power is concentrated at one

point. Thus, the destruction is localized, and often portions of

the tunnel are unaffected. However, a large (10-to 12-pound)

block of explosive tamped against the ceiling may cause an

entire tunnel to collapse.

(2) Advantages of block-type explosives are the ease of em-

placement, ease of procurement, and feasibility of aerial

resupply. Also, block or satchel charges are effective in the

destruction of bunkers, sunken living quarters, and under-

ground rooms. Cratering charges are also effective for

underground rooms. Short tunnels can be destroyed effectively

by block explosives.

(3) The shaped charge in tunnel destruction is successful when

used in specific circumstances. A shaped charge placed

underground in the middle of a tunnel complex, and aimed

downward, destroys an area of the tunnel complex around

and above the charge. Also, a shaped charge placed in a deep

complex and aimed upward results in extensive destruction.

(4) Another effective method of tunnel destruction utilizes

bangalore torpedos placed throughout the tunnel length

(regardless of depth). The constant length of explosives

throughout the tunnel ensures complete destruction. The

bangalore (5 feet long) is adaptable to the twists and turns in

tunnels. Each tunnel where it can be pushed through). A

disadvantage of bangalore torpedoes is the logistical

problem arising from their size and weight. There may be a

problem with resupply if large quantities are used to

completely destroy a tunnel system.

Bunkers. Underground living quarters, bunkers, and underground

hideaways can be destroyed by block or satchel charges placed

strategically inside the room. The following are examples of

structures and the size and placement of charges.

(1) Bunkers dug into the ground and covered by dense brush

(average size 4 by 8 by 4 feet) can be destroyed with 3 pounds

of explosives placed next to a wall.

(2) This bunker (8 by 5 by 4 feet) can be destroyed by placing a

5-pound charge against the roof toward the side of the

strongest beam (Figure A-8).

A-13

FM 90-8

(3) This 4-inch-thick concrete wall bunker (6 by 6 by 5 feet) can

be destroyed by placing 8 to 9 pounds of explosives at the

point where the tunnel enters the bunker, and will also

destroy a portion of the tunnel (Figure A-9).

Figure A-9. Reinforced underground bunker.

(4) This bunker depicts an underground hospital capable of

holding 10 to 12 persons. It is about 10 feet below the surface.

Usually 15 feet long by 8 feet wide by 6 feet high, it is

constructed of cement and steel I-beams. The room is

completely destroyed by interlacing three bangalore

torpedoes in the I-beam rafters (Figure A-10).

Figure A-10. Underground hospital.

A-14

FM 90-8

APPENDIX B

The Urban Guerrilla

Section I. General

B-1. Effects of the urban environment.

Cities and towns are vulnerable to urban guerrilla violence

because they are the focus of economic and political power. In

many cases, public utilities and services can be disrupted. Thus,

the government may appear to have lost control of the situation.

The concentration of a large number of people in a relatively small

area provides cover for the guerrilla. However, the insurgent may

find support only in certain areas of a town or city. In any event,

the urban guerrilla lives in a community that is friendly to him or,

as a minimum, is too frightened to withhold its support or inform

on him. He has a close relationship with leaders and other

guerrillas, and may have a communication system using women

and children who also provide cover for other activities.

The urban guerrilla can operate more boldly than his rural

counterpart as reflected by his tactics: the sniper complements the

more conventional ambush and often replaces it; explosive

devices may be used either as instruments against the community

or more selectively against individuals or groups.

The availability of large numbers of people ensures that crowds

can be assembled and demonstrations manipulated with

comparative ease. The presence of women and children restricts

counterguerrilla force reactions, and a clumsy reaction may

ensure a major incident that provides the guerrilla with

propaganda. Publicity is easily achieved in an urban area

because no major incident can be concealed from the local

population even if it is not widely reported by the news media.

Terrorist successes may be exploited to discredit the ability of the

police, counterguerrilla force, and civil government to provide

protection and control the guerrillas.

The urban guerrilla cannot, like his rural counterpart, establish

bases and recruit large military units. He is an individual, a

member of a relatively small group, relying on the cover afforded

by the people of the city and on terror to avoid betrayal.

Individuals and small groups are effective in an urban environment

because it is easier for them to avoid capture; if captured, however,

the terrorist may be able to expose only two or three persons to

government or counterguerrilla forces.

B-1

FM 90-8

B-2. Guerrilla tactics.

a. The urban guerrilla works alone or in small cells, and his tactics

are different from those of his rural counterpart.

b. They include:

(1)

Disrupting industry and public services by strikes and

sabotage.

(2)

Generating widespread disturbances designed to stretch the

resources of the counterguerrilla force.

(3)

Creating incidents or massing crowds in order to lure the

counterguerrilla force into a trap.

(4)

Provoking the counterguerrilla force in the hope that it may

overreact and provide hostile propaganda.

(5)

Fomenting interfactional strife.

(6)

Sniping at roadblocks, outposts, and sentries.

(7)

Attacking vehicles and buildings with rockets and mortars.

(8)

Planting explosive devices, either against specific targets or

indiscriminately, to cause confusion and destruction, and to

lower public morale.

(9)

Ambushing patrols and firing on helicopters.

Section Il. Techniques to Counter the Urban Guerrilla

B-3. Urban counterguerrilla operations.

Operations against urban guerrillas may vary from a passive

policy designed to curtail terrorist activities so that community

life can continue (under certain constraints), to an active policy

which involves the counterguerrilla force seeking out and

capturing or killing the enemy. The level of intensity at which

operations are conducted will be determined by the civil govern-

ment.

Fighting the urban guerrilla is generally a police mission.

However, the military counterguerrilla force commander maybe

required to assist the police in this mission or even take it over.

The techniques used are similar to the ones used in rural areas.

Before operations are conducted, information must be obtained

about the enemy, his environment, and operations (Appendix H).

The techniques include:

(1) Installation of base defense (Appendix E).

(2) Roadblocks and checkpoints (Chapter 3).

B-2

90-8

(3) Crowd dispersal (FM 19-15).

(4) Cordon-and-search operations (Chapter 3).

(5) Patrols (Chapter 3 and Appendix D).

B-4. Minimum force.

The principles remain the same, but in an urban environment the

principle of minimum force becomes more important and is directly

related to the rules of engagement. There is greater danger of injuring

or killing innocent civilians in heavily populated centem. Since there

are seldom large groups of guerrillas in cities, there are no base camps,

only safe houses. Opportunities for deliberate attacks rarely occur. Just

as fighting guerrillas in a rural environment, killing or capturing the

urban guerrilla is not a mission that is quickly accomplished.

B-3

FM 90-8

APPENDIX C

Ambush Patrols

Section

1. General

C-1. Purpose of ambushes.

The ambush patrols discussed in this appendix are combat patrols

with missions to establish and execute ambushes to harass or destroy

targets and/or capture personnel and equipment. Ambushes generally

are executed to reduce the guerrilla’s overall combat effectiveness.

Destruction is the primary purpose of an ambush since guerrillas killed

and/or captured, and equipment and/or supplies destroyed or

captured, critically affect the guerrilla force. Harassment, the

secondary purpose, diverts guerrillas from other missions. A series of

successful ambushes causes the guerrilla force to be less aggressive

and more defensive; to be apprehensive and overly cautious; and to be

reluctant to go on patrols and move in convoys or in small groups.

C-2. Types of ambushes.

There are two types of ambushes. A point ambush involves patrol

elements deployed to support the attack of a single killing zone.

An area ambush involves patrol elements deployed as multiple,

related, point ambushes.

b. An ambush is categorized as either hasty or deliberate. A hasty

ambush is an immediate action drill, an action of a combat patrol

wilth little or no information. When information does not permit

detailed planning required for a deliberate ambush, a hasty

ambush is planned. In this case, the ambush patrol plans and

prepares to attack the first suitable guerrilla force. A deliberate

ambush is planned as a specific action against a specific target.

Detailed information of the guerrilla force is required: size, nature,

organization, armament, equipment, route and direction of

movement, and times the force will reach or pass certain points on

its route. Deliberate ambushes are planned when:

(1) Reliable information is received on the intended movement

of a specific force.

(2) Patrols, convoys, carrying parties, or similar forces establish

patterns of size, time, and movement sufficient to permit

detailed planning for the ambush.

A unit conducting a combat patrol, before departing, plans and

rehearses the ambush of the type of guerrilla force it may

C-1

90-8

encounter. It establishes and executes ambushes as opportunities

arise.

Section Il. Attack Fundamentals

C-3. Three elements.

Surprise, coordinated fires, and control are basic to a successful

ambush.

C-4. Surprise.

Surprise must be achieved or else the attack is not an ambush. Surprise,

which distinguishes an ambush from other forms of attack, allows the

ambush force to seize and retain control of the situation. Surprise is

achieved by careful planning, preparation, and execution. Guerrillas

are attacked in a manner they least expect.

C-5. Coordinated fires.

All weapons, including mines and demolitions, are positioned, and all

direct and indirect fires are coordinated to achieve:

Isolation of the kill zone to prevent escape or reinforcement.

Surprise delivery of a large volume of concentrated fires into the

kill zone to inflict maximum damage so the target can be

assaulted and destroyed.

C-6. Control.

Close control is maintained during movement to, occupation of,

and withdrawal from the ambush site.

b. The ambush commander’s control of all elements is critical at the

time of target approach. Control measures provide for

(1) Early warning of target approach.

(2) Withholding fire until the target moves into the kill zone.

(3) Opening fire at the proper time.

(4) Initiating appropriate actions if the ambush is prematurely

detected.

(5) Lifting or shifting supporting fires when the ambush

includes assault of the target.

(6) Timely and orderly withdrawal to an easily recognized

rallying point.

C-2

FM 90-8

Personnel conducting the ambush remain still and quiet while

waiting for the target to appear. They may have to forgo smoking;

endure insect bites and thirst in silence; and resist sleeping,

easing cramped muscles, and performing normal body functions.

(Ambushes should have a rest plan and a mess plan.) When the

target approaches, they do not open fire before the signal is given.

Section Ill. Planning

C-7. Flexibility.

An ambush is planned and prepared using troop leading

procedures. Planning considerations include whether the ambush

is to be a deliberate ambush or a hasty ambush. In a deliberate

ambush, more target intelligence is available to permit planning

for every course of action at the target. Planning for a hasty

ambush includes tentative plans both for the types of targets that

may be ambushed and for varying situations. Both plans are

flexible enough to allow modifying, as appropriate, at the ambush

site. All plans are rehearsed in detail.

b. Planning provides for the following:

(1) Simplicity. Every soldier must thoroughly understand

what he is to do at every stage of the operation. In an

ambush, more so than in other operations, the failure of even

one soldier to perform exactly as planned can cause failure.

(2) Type of ambush. The type of ambush affects the organiza-

tion, number of men, and amount of equipment and

communications required.

(3) Deployment. Each possible formation is considered for its

advantages and disadvantages.

C-8. Manner of attack.

The attack may be by fire only (harassing ambush) or may include

assault of the target (destruction ambush).

C-9. Size of ambush force.

The force is tailored for its mission. Two men may be adequate for a

harassing ambush. A destruction ambush may require the entire unit

(squad, platoon, company).

Organization. An ambush patrol is organized in the same

manner as other combat patrols to include a headquarters, an

assault element, a support element, and a security element. The

assault and support elements are the attack force; the security

C-3

90-8

element is the security force. When appropriate, the attack force is

further organized to provide a reserve force. When an ambush site

is to be occupied for an extended period, double ambush forces

may be organized. One ambush force occupies the site while the

other rests, eats, and tends to personal needs at the objective

rail ying point or other concealed location. They alternate after a

given time, which is usually 8 hours. If the waiting period is over

24 hours, three ambush forces maybe organized.

Equipment. The selection of equipment and supplies is based on

the:

(1) Mission.

(2) Size of the guerrilla force.

(3) Means of transportation.

(4) Distance and terrain.

(5) Weight and bulk of equipment.

Routes. A primary route is planned which allows the unit to

enter the ambush site from the rear. The kill zone is not entered if

entry can be avoided. If the kill zone must be entered to place

mines or explosives, care is taken to remove any tracks or signs

that might alert the guerrillas and compromise the ambush. If

mines, mantraps, or explosives are to be placed on the far side, or

if the appearance of the site might cause the guerrillas to check it,

then a wide detour around the kill zone is made. Here, too, care is

taken to remove any traces which might reveal the ambush. Also,

an alternate route from the ambush site is planned.

Site. Maps and aerial photographs are used to analyze the

terrain. When possible, anon-the-ground reconnaissance is made.

As far as possible, so-called “ideal” ambush sites are avoided.

Alert guerrillas are suspicious of these areas, avoid them if

possible, and increase vigilance and security when they must be

entered; surprise is even more difficult to achieve in these areas.

Instead, apparently unlikely sites are chosen, when possible.

Considering this, an ambush site must provide:

(1) Fields of fire.

(2) Concealed positions.

(3) Canalization of the guerrillas into the killing zone.

(4) Covered routes of withdrawal (to enable the ambush force to

break contact and avoid pursuit).

(5) No exit route for the guerrilla force.

Occupation of the site. As a rule, the ambush force occupies the

ambush site at the latest possible time permitted by the tactical

C-4

FM 90-8

situation and the amount of site preparation required. This not

only reduces the risk of discovery but also reduces the time that

soldiers must remain still and quiet in position.

Positions. The unit moves into the ambush site from the rear.

Security elements are positioned first to prevent surprise while the

ambush is being established. Automatic weapons are then

positioned so that each can fire along the entire killing zone. If

this is not possible, they are given overlapping sectors of fire so

that the entire killing zone is covered. The unit leader then selects

his position, located where he can see when to initiate the ambush.

Claymore mines, explosives, and M203 grenade launchers maybe

used to cover any dead space left by the automatic weapons. All

weapons are assigned sectors of fire to provide mutual support.

The unit leader sets a time by which positions are to be prepared.

The degree of preparation depends on the time allowed. All men

work at top speed during the allotted time.

Camouflage. Camouflage is important. Each soldier must be

hidden from the target. During preparation for the patrol, each

soldier camouflages himself and his equipment and secures his

equipment to prevent noise. At the ambush site, positions are

prepared with minimal change in the natural appearance of the

site. All debris resulting from preparation of positions is con-

cealed.

Movement, noise, and light discipline. Movement is kept to a

minimum and the number of men moving at a time is closely

controlled. Every man is as quiet as possible, especially at night.

Light discipline is rigidly enforced at night. Smoking is forbidden

at night and is closely controlled in the day.

C-10. Execution.

a. Three signals, often four, are needed to execute the ambush.

Audible and visual signals, such as whistles and pyrotechnics,

must be changed often to avoid establishing patterns. Too

frequently, use of the same signals may result in their becoming

known to the enemy. A guerrilla might recognize a signal and be

able to react in time to avoid the full effects of an ambush. For

example, if white star cluster is habitually used to signal

withdrawal in a night ambush, an alert guerrilla might fire one

and cause premature withdrawal.

A signal by the security force to alert the patrol leader to the

guerrilla’s approach may be given by:

(1) Arm-and-hand signals.

(2) Radio, as a quiet voice message, by transmitting a prearranged

number of taps, or by signaling with the push-to-talk switch.

C-5

FM 90-8

(3) Field telephone, when there is no danger that wire between

positions will compromise the ambush.

A signal to initiate the ambush, given by the patrol leader or a

designated individual, may be a shot or the detonation of mines or

explosives. The ambush should be initiated with a mass casualty

producing weapon

(Claymore antipersonnel mine or M60

machine gun).

A signal for lifting or shifting fires, if the guerrilla force is to be

assaulted, may be given by voice command, whistles, or

pyrotechnics. All fire stops immediately so that the assault can be

made before the guerrilla can react.

A signal for withdrawal may also be by voice command, whistles,

or pyrotechnics.

C-11. Fire discipline.

This is a key part of the ambush. Fire is withheld until the signal is

given, then immediately delivered with the heaviest, most accurate

volume possible. Properly timed and delivered fires contribute to the

achievement of surprise as well as to destruction of the guerrilla force.

When the guerrillas are to be assaulted, the lifting or shifting of fires is

equally precise. Otherwise, the assault is delayed, and the guerrillas

have an opportunity to recover and react.

C-12. Withdrawal to the objective rallying point.

a. The objective rallying point is far enough from the ambush site so

that it will not be overrun if the guerrilla force attacks the

ambush. Routes of withdrawal to the objective rallying point are

reconnoitered. If possible, each person walks the route he is to use

and picks out checkpoints. When the ambush is to be executed at

night, each person must be able to follow his route in the dark.

b. On signal, the unit quickly but quietly withdraws to the objective

rallying point, reorganizes, and begins its return march.

If the ambush was not successful and the unit is pursued,

withdrawal may be by bounds. The last group may arm mines,

previously placed along the withdrawal route, to further delay

pursuit.

C-13. Four ambush techniques.

A near ambush is a point ambush with the assault element within

reasonable assaulting distance of the kill zone (less than 50

meters). Close terrain, such as jungle and heavy woods, may

C-6

FM 90-8

require this positioning. It may also be appropriate in open terrain

in a “rise from the ground” ambush.

A far ambush is a point ambush with the assault element beyond

reasonable assaulting distance of the kill zone (beyond 50 meters).

This location may be appropriate in open terrain offering good

fields of fire or when attack is by fire for a harassing ambush.

A harassing ambush is an ambush in which attack is by fire

only.

d. A destruction ambush is an ambush which includes assault to

close with and decisively engage the guerrilla force.

Section IV. Point Ambush Formations

C-14. Positions.

A point ambush, whether independent or part of an area ambush,

is positioned along the expected route of approach of the guerrilla

force. Formation is important because, to a great extent, it

determines whether a point ambush can deliver the heavy volume

of highly concentrated fire necessary to isolate, trap, and destroy

the guerrillas.

The formation to be used is determined by carefully considering

possible formations and the advantages and disadvantages of

each in relation to terrain; conditions of visibility, forces,

weapons, and equipment ease or difficulty of control; force to be

attacked; and overall combat situation.

This section discusses formations developed for the deployment of

point ambushes. The formations are identified with names that

correspond to the general pattern formed on the ground by

deployment of the attack element. They include:

(1) Line formation (two techniques, Paragraph C-15).

(2) L-formation (two techniques with variations, Paragraph

C-16).

(3) Z-formation (Paragraph C-17).

(4) T-formation (two techniques, Paragraph C-18).

(5) V-formation (two techniques, Paragraph C-19).

(6) Triangle formation (closed; open with variations, Paragraph

C-20).

(7) Box formation (two techniques, Paragraph C-21).

C-15. Line formation.

a. The attack element is deployed generally parallel to the guerrilla

force’s route of movement (road, trail, stream). This positions the

C-7

90-8

attack element parallel to the long axis of the kill zone and

subjects the guerrilla force to heavy flanking fire. The size of the

force that can be trapped in the kill zone is limited by the area

which the attack element can effectively cover with highly

concentrated fire. The force is trapped in the kill zone by natural

obstacles. mines

(Claymore, antivehicular, antipersonnel),

demolition’s, and direct and indirect fires (Figure C-1).

Figure C-1. Line formation: harassing or destruction ambush.

b. A disadvantage of the line formation is the chance that lateral

dispersion of the force maybe too great for effective coverage. The

line formation is appropriate in close terrain that restricts

guerrilla maneuver and in open terrain where one flank is

restricted by mines, demolitions, or mantraps. Similar obstacles

can be placed between the attack element and the kill zone to

provide protection from guerrilla counterambush measures.

When a destruction ambush is deployed in this manner, access

lanes are left so that the force in the killing zone can be assaulted.

The line formation can be effectively used by a “rise from the

ground” ambush in terrain seemingly unsuitable for ambush

(Figure C-2).

C-8

90-8

Figure C-2. Line formation: destruction ambush with access lanes for assault of target.

An advantage of the line formation is its relative ease of control

under all conditions of visibility.

C-16. L-formation.

The L-shaped formation is a variation of the line formation. The

long side of the attack element is parallel to the kill zone and

delivers flanking fire. The short side of the attack element is at the

end of, and at right angles to, the kill zone and delivers enfilading

fire that interlocks with fire from the other leg (Figure C-3).

Figure C-3. L-formation: destruction ambush.

C-9

FM 90-8

This formation is flexible. It can be established on a straight

stretch of a trail or stream or at a sharp bend in a trail or stream

(Figure C-4).

Figure C-4. L-formation: destruction ambush at bend of trail or stream.

When appropriate, fire from the short leg can be shifted to parallel

the long leg if the guerrilla force attempts to assault or escape in

the opposite direction. In addition, the short leg prevents escape

in that direction or reinforcement from that direction (Figure C-5).

Figure C-5, L-formation: short leg prevents escape or reinforcement.

C-17. Z-formation.

The Z-shaped formation is another variation of the L-formation. The

attack force is deployed as in the L-formation but with an additional

side so that the formation resembles the letter Z. The additional side

may serve to (Figure C-6):

• Engage a force attempting to relieve or reinforce the guerrillas.

• Restrict a flank.

• Prevent envelopment (of the ambush force).

• Seal the end of the kill zone.

C-10

90-8

Figure C-6. Z-formation: destruction ambush.

C-18. T-formation.

In the T-shaped formation, the attack element is deployed across,

and at right angles to, the route of movement of the hostile force so

that the attack element and the target form the letter T. This

formation can be used day or night to establish a purely harassing

ambush, and at night to establish an ambush to interdict

movement through open, hard-to-seal areas (such as rice paddies).

A small unit can use the T-formation to harass, slow, and

disorganize a larger force. When the lead guerrilla elements are

engaged, they will normally attempt to maneuver right or left to

close with the ambush force. Mines, mantraps, and other

obstacles placed to the flanks of the kill zone slow the guerrilla’s

movement and permit the unit to deliver heavy fire and then

withdraw without becoming decisively engaged. (Figure C-7).

The T-formation can be used to interdict small groups attempting

night movement across open areas. For example, the attack

element may be deployed along a rice paddy dike with every

second member facing in the opposite direction. The attack of a

force approaching from either direction requires only that every

second member shift to the opposite side of the dike. Each member

fires only to his front and only when the target is at close range.

Attack is by fire only, and each member keeps the guerrilla force

under fire as long as it remains to his front. If the force attempts to

escape in either direction along the dike, each member takes it

under fire as it comes into his vicinity. The T-formation is effective

at halting infiltration. (Figure C-8).

C-11

FM 90-8

C-19. V-formation.

The V-shaped attack element is deployed along both sides of the

guerrilla route of movement so that it forms a V. Care is taken to

ensure that neither group (or leg) fires into the other. This

formation subjects the guerrilla to both enfiladin

interlocking fire (Figure C-9).

Figure C-9. V-formation.

The V-formation is suited for fairly open terrain but can also be

used in the jungle. When established in the jungle, the legs of the

V close in as the lead elements of the guerrilla force approach the

apex of the V; elements then open fire from close range. Here, even

more than in open terrain, all movement and fire is carefully

coordinated and controlled to ensure that the fire of one leg does

not endanger the other. Wider separation of the elements makes

this formation difficult to control, and there are fewer sites that

favor its use. Its main advantage is that it is difficult for the

guerrilla to detect the ambush until well into the kill zone (Figure

C-10).

Figure C-10. V-formation

(close range).

C-13

FM 90-8

C-20. Triangle formation.

This is a variation of the V-formation and can be employed in three

ways:

Closed triangle. The attack element is deployed in three

groups, positioned so that they form a triangle (or closed V). An

automatic weapon is placed at each point of the triangle and

positioned so that it can be shifted quickly to interlock with either

of the others. Elements are positioned so that their fields of fire

overlap. Mortars may be positioned inside the triangle. When

deployed in this manner, the triangle ambush becomes a small

unit strongpoint which is used to interdict night movement

through open areas, when guerrilla approach is likely to be from

any direction. The formation provides all-round security, and

security elements are deployed only when they can be positioned

so that, if detected by an approaching target, they will not

compromise the ambush. Attack is by fire only, and the target is

allowed to approach within close range before the ambush force

opens fire (Figure C-11).

Figure C-11. Closed triangle.

(1)

Advantages include ease of control, all-round security, and

guerrillas approaching from any direction can be fired on by

at least two automatic weapons.

(2)

Disadvantages include the requirement for an ambush force

of platoon size or larger to reduce the danger of being overrun

by a large guerrilla force; one or more legs of the triangle may

come under guerrilla enfilade fire; and lack of dispersion,

particularly at the points, increases danger from guerrilla

mortar fire.

C-14

FM 90-8

b. Open triangle (harassing ambush). This variation of the

triangle ambush is designed to enable a small unit to harass, slow,

and inflict heavy casualties upon a larger force without being

decisively engaged. The attack group is deployed in three

elements, positioned so that each element becomes a corner of a

triangle containing the kill zone. When the guerrillas enter the kill

zone, the element to the guerrillas’ front opens fire on the lead

guerrillas. When the guerrillas counterattack, the element

withdraws and an assault element to the flank opens fire. When

this group is attacked, the element to the opposite flank opens fire.

This process is repeated until the guerrillas are pulled apart. Each

element reoccupies its position, if possible, and continues to

inflict maximum damage without becoming decisively engaged

(Figure C-12).

Figure C-12. Open triangle formation: harassing ambush.

C-15

FM 90-8

Open triangle (destruction ambush). The attack group is

again deployed in three elements, positioned so that each element

is a point of the triangle, 200 to 300 meters apart. The kill zone is

the area within the triangle. The guerrillas are allowed to enter

the killing zone; the nearest element attacks by fire. As the

guerrillas attempt to maneuver or withdraw, the other elements

open fire. One or more assault elements, as directed, assault or

maneuver to envelop or destroy the guerrillas (Figure C-13).

Figure C-13. Open triangle formation: destruction ambush.

(1) As a destruction ambush, this formation is suitable for

platoon-size or larger units; a unit smaller than a platoon

would be in danger of being overrun.

C-16

FM 90-8

(2)

Also, control, in assaulting or maneuvering, is difficult.

Close coordination and control are necessary to ensure that

assaulting or maneuvering assault elements are not fired on

by another party; and the ambush site must be a fairly level,

open area that provides (around its border) concealment for

the ambush elements (unless it is a “rise from the ground”

ambush).

C-21. Box formation.

This formation is similar in purpose to the open triangle ambush.

The unit is deployed in four elements positioned so that each

element becomes a corner of a square or rectangle containing the

kill zone (Figure C-14).

Figure C-14. Box formation: harassing ambush.

It can be used as a harassing ambush or a destruction ambush in

the same manner as the two variations of the open triangle

ambush (Figure C-15).

C-17

90-8

Figure C-16. Area

(multiple point) ambush.

b. The guerrilla force, whether a single group or several parties

approaching from different directions, is permitted to move to the

central kill zone. Outlying ambushes do not attack (unless dis-

covered).

The ambush is initiated when the guerrillas move into the central

kill zone.

d. When the guerrillas break contact and attempt to disperse,

escaping portions are intercepted and destroyed by the outlying

ambushes.

e. The multiple point ambush increases casualties and harassment

and produces confusion.

This version of the area ambush is best suited in terrain where

movement is largely restricted to trails. It provides best results

when established as a deliberate ambush. When there is not

sufficient intelligence for a deliberate ambush, an area ambush of

opportunity (hasty ambush) may be established. The outlying

ambushes are permitted to attack guerrillas approaching the

central kill zone, if the guerrilla force is small. If it is too large for

the particular outlying ambush, the guerrillas are allowed to

continue and they are attacked in the central kill zone.

C-19

90-8

C-24. Area ambush: baited trap

a. A variation of the area ambush is the “baited trap” ambush.

b. A central kill zone is established along the guerrilla’s route of

approach.

c. Point ambushes are established along the routes over which units

relieving or reinforcing the guerrilla will have to approach.

The guerrilla force in the central kill zone serves as “bait” to lure

relieving or reinforcing guerrilla units into the kill zones of the

outlying ambushes. A friendly force can also be used as the “bait.”

e. The outlying point ambushes need not be strong enough to

destroy their targets. They may be small harassing ambushes

that delay, disorganize, and cause casualties by successive

contacts.

This version can be varied by using a fixed installation as “bait”

to lure relieving or reinforcing guerrilla units into the kill zone of

one or more of the outlying ambushes. The installation replaces

the central kill zone and is attacked. The attack may intend to

overcome the installation or may use it as a ruse.

g. These variations are best suited for situations where routes of

approach for relieving or reinforcing guerrilla units are limited to

those favorable for ambush (Figure C-17).

Figure C-17. Area

(baited trap) ambush

C-20

90-8

Section VI. Unusual Ambush Techniques

C-25. Spider hole ambush.

a. This point ambush is designed for open areas that lack the cover

and concealment and other features normally desirable in a

“good” ambush site. The attack element is deployed in the

formation best suited to the overall situation (Figure C-18).

Figure C-18. Spider hole ambush.

The attack element is concealed in the “spider hole” type of

covered foxhole. Soil is carefully removed and positions expertly

camouflaged.

When the ambush is initiated, the attack element members throw

back the covers and literally “rise from the ground” to attack.

This ambush takes advantage of the tendency of patrols, and

other units, to relax in areas that do not appear to favor ambush.

The chief disadvantage is that the ambush element is vulnerable

if detected prematurely.

C-21

160-739 O - 94 -

FM 90-8

C-26. Demolition ambush.

Dual primed, electrically detonated mines or demolition charges

are planted in an area over which a guerrilla force is expected to

pass. This may be a portion of a road or trail, an open field, or any

area that can be observed from a distance. Activating wires are

run to a concealed observation point sufficiently distant to ensure

safety of the ambush element.

b. As large a force as desired or necessary can be used to mine the

area. The ambush element remains to fire the charges; other

personnel return to the unit.

When a guerrilla force enters the mined area (kill zone), the

element on site detonates the explosives and withdraws immediately

to avoid detection and pursuit (Figure C-19).

Figure C-19. Demolition ambush.

C-27. Special ambush situation.

Attacks against columns protected by armored vehicles depend on the

type and location of armored vehicles in a column, and the weapons of

the ambush force. If possible, armored vehicles are destroyed or

disabled by fire of antitank weapons, landmines, and Molotov

cocktails, or by throwing hand grenades into open hatches. An effort is

made to immobilize armored vehicles at a point where they are unable

to give protection to the rest of the convoy and where they will block the

route of other supporting vehicles.

C-22

FM 90-8

APPENDIX D

Patrolling

Section I. General

D-1. Patrols.

a. This appendix provides guidance on patrolling. It describes

various types of patrols and patrolling techniques.

A patrol is a mission. The unit that has the mission organizes for

the conduct of the patrol. When organizing for the patrol, unit

integrity is maintained as much as possible.

The requirements of the mission determine the size, organization,

and equipment of a patrol. Some missions may require only two or

three men, lightly armed with no special equipment; some

missions may require a squad or platoon, specially armed and

equipped. A unit is always tailored for the mission it is to execute.

The effectiveness of a patrol is limited only by the ingenuity of the

planner and the skill and aggressiveness of the unit leader. For

this reason, they are one of the commander’s most valued tools.

Patrols are especially valuable in counterguerrilla operations.

Aggressive patrolling in an area greatly reduces the guerrillas’

freedom of movement, hampers their operations, and weakens

their influence on the local population.

Patrols are classified according to the nature of the mission

assigned.

D-2. Reconnaissance patrols.

They collect information and confirm or disprove the accuracy of

information previously received. Reconnaissance patrols are further

classified as:

• Zone reconnaissance patrols.

• Area reconnaissance patrols.

D-3. Combat patrols.

They provide security and harass, destroy, or capture enemy

personnel, equipment, and installations. Combat patrols also collect

and report information whether it is related to the assigned mission or

not.

D-1

FM 90-8

Section Il. Planning

D-4. Five phases.

There are five phases involved in mission planning: patrol steps,

reverse planning sequence, the warning order, the time schedule, and

the operation order. The patrol leader uses patrol steps (derived from

troop leading procedures as discussed in FM 7-10) in planning the

mission. The leader considers all steps but executes only those required

by the mission. The steps may occur in various sequences, and some are

considered and accomplished simultaneously.

D-5. Patrol steps.

(Consider all steps; accomplish those necessary; sequence may vary.)

•

Study the mission.

•

Plan use of time.

•

Study terrain and situation.

•

Organize the patrol.

•

Select men, weapons, equipment.

•

Issue warning order.

•

Coordinate (continuous throughout).

•

Make reconnaissance.

•

Complete detailed plans.

•

Issue operation order.

•

Supervise (at all times), inspect, rehearse.

• Execute the mission.

D-6. Reverse planning

The unit leader uses reverse planning sequence to allot time for each

action of the patrol. He plans this schedule around any critical times

specified in his order.

D-2

FM 90-8

Section Ill. Reconnaissance Patrols

D-10. Information requirements.

a. Reconnaissance patrols provide the commander with timely,

accurate information of guerrillas and the terrain they control.

This information is vital in making tactical decisions.

The commander may require information of a specific location or

small specific area, usually a known or suspected position or

activity. An area reconnaissance patrol secures this information

by reconnoitering the location or by maintaining surveillance

over the location.

c. The commander may require information of an extended area, or

may desire information of several locations within an area. A

zone reconnaissance patrol secures this information by recon-

noitering the area, by maintaining surveillance over the area, or

D-7

FM 90-8

by making the coordinated area reconnaissance of designated

locations within the area.

D-11. Security.

In addition to reaching the objective without discovery, if

possible, a reconnaissance patrol also tries to conduct its

reconnaissance or surveillance without being discovered. Stealth,

patience, and maximum use of concealment are mandatory.

b. A reconnaissance patrol fights only to protect itself or, when

authorized, to accomplish its mission. The commander dispatching

the patrol is responsible for informing tha patrol whether it is to

fight, if necessary, to accomplish the mission.

Day and night reconnaissance patrols use essentially the same

techniques. The principal differences are:

(1) Day reconnaissance requires greater use of concealment.

The patrol is more likely to be seen than at night and usually

will not be able to move as close to the objective.

(2) Night reconnaissance requires stealth. Sounds carry farther

at night, and reduced visibility usually requires a closer

approach to the objective.

d. When two or more teams of a patrol are to assembly at a linkup

point, one team is designated to secure the linkup point for the

arrival of other teams. The route and tasks of this team are

arranged so that it can reach the linkup point first and

accomplish these tasks.

Section IV. Combat Patrols

D-12. Seek and attack.

a. A combat patrol has the general mission of seeking out and

attacking targets of opportunity. An ambush is a combat patrol

(Appendix C).

b. In conventional operations, the enemy’s general location is

usually defined. Specific targets for patrols are not difficult to

locate and designate. Missions for patrols can be, and usually are,

specific and limited.

This situation seldom exists in counterguerrilla operations,

however. Specific targets for raids and for other forms of attack

are much more limited, because of the characteristics of

guerrillas. They are elusive and highly mobile; they avoid decisive

engagement; they avoid prepared positions and establish

relatively few fixed installations.

D-8

90-8

A combat patrol searches for and, within its capability, engages

targets when and where found. Engagement is by raid, ambush,

or any form of attack suitable to the situation.

D-13. Flexibility.

a. The combat patrol is one of the commander’s most flexible

weapons. Uses vary from a two-man patrol executing a harassing

ambush of opportunity to a reinforced platoon conducting raids,

ambushes, and target-of-opportunity operations. In some

instances, a patrol encountering a superior force may maintain

contact with the force until reinforcements permit decisive

engagement. Effectiveness of the patrol depends, not on size, but

on the suitability to a given situation.

The use of combat patrols forces guerrillas to engage in decisive

combat at unfavorable times and places. They can be used to

locate and destroy enemy camps, elements, and supply points.

Saturation of an area with patrols forces the guerrillas to either

curtail operations or consolidate in larger groups, which are

favorable targets for air, artillery, and large-scale attack.

Patrols may be inserted by parachute, helicopter, surface or

subsurface watercraft, or ground methods. The conduct of the

patrol itself remains unchanged, even though the method of

insertion changes.

Section V. Motorized Patrols

D-14. Missions, organization.

Patrols may be motorized (usually as an economy-of-force

measure) to allow them to:

(1) Cover greater distances in less time than dismounted patrols.

(2) Operate in contaminated areas too dangerous for dismounted

patrols.

(3) Carry more or heavier equipment, weapons, and ammuni-

tion.

b. A motorized patrol is organized into elements and teams in the

same manner as a dismounted patrol. Substitution of tracked

carriers for wheeled vehicles provides an increased potential for

battlefield mobility (Figure D-1).

When soldiers are assigned to vehicles, squad or fire team

integrity is maintained as far as possible. One soldier is

designated commander of each vehicle.

D-9

90-8

Figure

D-1. Organization of a motorized reconnaissance patrol.

d. A motorized patrol is prepared in the same general manner as a

dismounted patrol. In addition, however, vehicles must be

checked to ensure that they are in good mechanical condition and

properly supplied with fuel, oil, and water. Drivers and other

personnel are as thoroughly prepared for the mission as regular

patrol members.

e. Motorizing enables a patrol to carry heavy and bulky equipment

such as:

(1) Antitank weapons and ammunition are placed near the front

and rear of the patrol. Personnel are designated to man and

support these weapons when they are employed.

(2) Surveillance equipment.

(3) Additional automatic weapons and ammunition.

Communication between vehicles and between the patrol and

higher headquarters is essential. Within the patrol, radios, voice

commands, and visual signals may be used. Vehicular-mounted

radios are usually the best means for communication with higher

headquarters. Light aircraft may be used to drop messages and to

relay radio messages.

D-15. Movement.

A motorized patrol moves by one of three methods: continuous

movement, successive bounds, and alternate bounds:

D-10

90-8

In continuous movement, all vehicles travel at a moderate rate of

speed, with all personnel alert. The lead vehicles stops to

investigate only those areas that appear dangerous. This is the

fastest, but least secure, method of movement.

b. In successive bounds, vehicles keep their relative positions in the

column. The first and second vehicles operate as a team in moving

from one observation point to another. The second vehicle is

placed in a concealed position, occupants dismounting if

necessary, to cover movement of the first vehicle to an observation

point. On reaching this point, occupants of the first vehicle

observe and reconnoiter, dismounting if necessary. When the area

is determined to be clear, the second vehicle is signaled forward to

join the first vehicle. The commander of the first vehicle carefully

observes the terrain to the front for signs of guerrillas and selects

the next stopping point. The first vehicle then moves out and the

process is repeated. Movement distance of the lead vehicle does

not exceed the limit of observation or the range of effective fire

support from the second vehicle. The lead vehicle and personnel

are replaced frequently to ensure constant alertness. The other

vehicles in the column move by bounds from one concealed

position to the next. Each vehicle maintains visual contact with

the vehicle ahead but avoids closing up (Figure D-2).

Figure D-2. Lead vehicle moves by bounds.

D-11

90-8

In alternate bounds, all except the first two vehicles keep their

relative places in the column. The first two vehicles alternate as

lead vehicles on each bound. Each covers the bound of the other.

This method provides more rapid advance than movement by

successive bounds but is less secure; it does not allow soldiers in

the second vehicle enough time to thoroughly observe the terrain

to the front before passing the first vehicle. Security is obtained by

the vehicle commander who assigns each soldier a direction of

observation: to the front, flank(s), or rear. This provides each

vehicle with some security against surprise fire from every

direction and provides visual contact with vehicles to the front

and rear. For maximum observation, all canvas is removed from

the vehicles.

D-16. Actions at danger areas.

The commander of the leading vehicle immediately notifies the

unit leader when he encounters an obstacle or other danger area.

Designated soldiers reconnoiter these places under cover of the

weapons in the vehicle. Obstacles are bypassed, if possible. When

they cannot be bypassed, they are cautiously removed.

Side roads intersecting the route of advance are investigated.

Soldiers from one vehicle secure the road junction; one or two

vehicles investigate the side road. The amount of reconnaissance

of side roads is determined by the patrol leader’s knowledge of the

situation. Men investigating side roads do not, however, move

past supporting distance of the main body of the patrol.

Bridges, road junctions, defiles, and curves (that deny observation

beyond the turn) are danger areas. Soldiers dismount and take

advantage of available cover and concealment to investigate

these areas. The vehicle is moved off the road into a covered or

concealed position; weapons from the vehicle cover the advance of

the investigating personnel (Figure D-3).

When approaching a village, two or three soldiers may go forward

on foot to reconnoiter. Other soldiers cover their movement from

covered or concealed positions.

Actions on contacting guerrillas depend on whether the mission

permits or prohibits engaging in combat. For example, if the

mission permits or requires the exploitation of opportunities for

combat and the lead vehicle detects, or is attacked by, an ambush,

then soldiers in the lead vehicle move to positions from which the

guerrillas can be brought under fire. The soldiers dismount and

maneuver to destroy the ambush. Higher headquarters is notified

of the situation.

D-12

FM 90-8

Section VI. Dismounted Movement

D-17. Techniques.

There are many movement techniques that can be utilized. This section

describes basic and linear movements, and combat, zone, and area

reconnaissance.

D-18. Basic movements.

In all cases, the unit moves from a start point (SP) to an objective

rally point (ORP) and then on to its objective (OBJ) area (Figure

D-4).

Figure D-4. Basic movement sequence.

The unit may then return to the ORP upon mission accomplishment,

or it may proceed through the objective area and onto a linkup

point (LUP) (Figure D-5). From there the unit continues with a

follow-on mission, or returns to base.

Figure D-5. Other basic techniques.

D-14

FM 90-8

D-19. Linear movement.

Stream and trail. This technique of movement calls for the unit

to use a trail or stream as a navigation guide. The unit may not be

traveling on the trail or stream, but only in the vicinity of it for

security (1).

b. Contour. The unit selects a contour interval and follows that

elevation (2).

Cross-compartment. The unit travels in a generally straight

path regardless of terrain features (3). Reference Figure D-6.

Figure D-6. Stream and trail

(1), contour

(2), and cross-compartment

(3).

D-20. Combat and zone reconnaissance patrols.

These techniques are general and illustrate how units operate on

sections of terrain in guerrilla territory (Figures D-7).

D-15

FM 90-8

APPENDIX E

Bases

Section I. General

E-1. Three types.

This appendix explains the three types of bases generally used in a

counterinsurgency: patrol bases, operational support bases, and

support bases.

E-2. Tactical uses.

Patrol bases are used by a company or smaller units. Operational

support bases are used by battalions, and support bases are used by

brigades and larger units.

Section Il. Patrol Bases

E-3. Planning.

a. When a unit halts for an extended period, it takes active and

passive measures to provide maximum security. The leader

selects, occupies, and organizes an area so located that it provides

passive security from enemy detection. This is a patrol base.

Planning a patrol base is usually a part of the patrol’s operation;

or it may be an on-the-spot decision. The length of time a patrol

base is occupied depends on the need for secrecy. In most

situations, occupation should not exceed 24 hours except in an

emergency. A patrol base is occupied the minimum time

necessary to accomplish the mission. The same base is not

(usually) used again.

In counterguerrilla operations, patrol base secrecy is required;

and evacuation (if discovered) depends on the degree of control the

guerrilla force has in the base area, their ability to react to the

discovery of a base, and their ability to affect the unit’s mission.

When a guerrilla force is relatively small and weak, patrol base

secrecy may not bean overriding consideration; and if the base is

discovered, evacuation may not be required. In an area controlled

by a large guerrilla force with a high degree of combat capability,

patrol base secrecy is mandatory; and if discovered, evacuation is

required.

E-1

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 6) - page 41