Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 6)

The Operations Process

Table 6-5. The military decisionmaking process, step 5: COA comparison

Inputs

CEMA Element Actions

CEMA Element Outputs

• Updated CEMA running estimate

• In collaboration with the staff,

• For each course of action include

including assumptions.

conduct an analysis of advantages

final draft:

• Refined courses of action.

and disadvantages for each

- CEMA input to the concept of

course of action, emphasizing

operations with tasks.

• Evaluation criteria.

CEMA aspects.

• War-game results.

- CEMA-related information

• Provide input to the decision matrix

requirements.

tool as required.

- CEMA-related essential elements

• Recommend for the most

of friendly information.

supportable course of action from

- CEMA input to high-payoff target

a CEMA perspective.

list.

• Provide CEMA input and

- CEMA input to target information

participate in the course of action

folders.

decision briefing as required.

- CEMA input to target

synchronization matrix.

- Maps and overlays.

- Network infrastructure diagrams

and charts.

- Spectrum plan including the joint

restricted frequency list.

- Cyber effects request formats.

- Electronic attack request formats.

- Evaluation request messages.

CEMA - cyber electromagnetic activities

Course of Action Approval

6-11. The CEMA staff officer attends the COA decision briefing to help finalize the commander’s intent

based on the COA selected. The commander’s final guidance provides the CEMA element the

commander’s intent, any new critical information requirements, risk acceptance, and guidance on the

priorities for the elements of combat power, orders preparation, rehearsal, and preparation. The output from

the CEMA element is a finalized CEMA execution matrix (see table 6-6 on page 6-8).

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FM 3-38

6-7

Chapter 6

Table 6-6. The military decisionmaking process, step 6: COA approval

Inputs

CEMA Element Actions

CEMA Element Outputs

• Updated CEMA running estimate

• Receive and respond to final

• For the approved course of action

including assumptions.

planning guidance from the

include refined:

• Evaluated courses of action.

commander.

- CEMA input to the concept of

• Recommended course of action.

• Assess implications and take

operations.

actions to finalize CEMA element

- CEMA tasks.

outputs.

- CEMA-related information

• Provide CEMA input to the

requirements.

warning order.

- CEMA-related essential

elements of friendly information.

- CEMA input to high-payoff target

list.

- CEMA input to target information

folders.

- CEMA input to target

synchronization matrix.

- Maps and overlays.

- Network infrastructure diagrams

and charts.

- Spectrum plan including the joint

restricted frequency list.

- Cyber effects request formats.

- Electronic attack request

formats.

- Evaluation request messages.

CEMA - cyber electromagnetic activities

Orders Production, Dissemination, and Transition

6-12. The CEMA element provides the appropriate input for several sections of the operation order or plan

and associated annexes or appendixes as required. This may include input to other functional area annexes

such as intelligence, fire support, signal, and civil affairs operations as required (see table 6-7).

6-8

FM 3-38

12 February 2014

The Operations Process

Table 6-7. The military decisionmaking process, step 7: orders production, dissemination, and

transition

Inputs

CEMA Element Actions

CEMA Element Outputs

• Commander approved course of

• Conduct a more detailed war

• Final Appendix 12 (Cyber

action and any modifications.

game of the selected course of

Electromagnetic Activities) to

• Refined commander’s intent.

action as required.

Annex C (Operations).

• Refined commander’s critical

• Participate in the staff plans and

• Final CEMA input to Appendix 1

information requirements.

orders reconciliation as required.

(Defensive Cyberspace

• Participate in the staff plans and

Operations) to Annex H (Signal).

• Refined essential elements of

friendly information.

orders crosswalk as required.

• Final CEMA input to Appendix 2

• Finalize cyber effects request

(Information Network Operations)

• Updated CEMA running estimate

formats.

to Annex H (Signal).

including assumptions.

• Finalize electronic attack request

• Final Appendix 6 (Spectrum

• Refined draft Appendix 12 (Cyber

formats.

Management Operations) to Annex

Electromagnetic Activities) to

H (Signal).

Annex C (Operations).

• Finalize evaluation request

messages.

• Final CEMA input to Appendix 2

• Refined draft Appendix 6

(Military Deception) to Annex J

(Spectrum Management

• Finalize input to CEMA-related

(Inform and Influence Activities).

Operations) to Annex H (Signal).

operation order appendices and

tabs.

• Provide CEMA input and

participate in the operations order

brief.

• Provide CEMA input and

participate in confirmation briefings

as required.

CEMA - cyber electromagnetic activities

CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES IN PREPARATION

6-13. The CEMA element participates in the preparation phase of the operations process in order to create

conditions in cyberspace and the EMS that improve friendly forces’ opportunities for success throughout

all domains.

6-14. Many effects of CEMA require considerable legal and policy review. This often creates lengthy lead

times during the planning and preparation phases, even though the effects may occur nearly instantaneously

once executed. Initial preparations for many operations specific to cyberspace begin during peacetime,

although execution of operations occurs during a time of war. EW operations are generally conducted

under the authority of the tactical commander, subject to higher level rules of engagement and the laws of

armed conflict. Operations against targets in cyberspace are generally conducted under national or

combatant commander authority, subject to higher level rules of engagement and the laws of armed

conflict. Tactical level commanders may prepare for lethal actions against known enemy cyberspace assets

within an area of operations.

6-15. Preparation includes an assessment of a unit’s readiness to conduct CEMA. A unit’s readiness

includes its ability to operate in degraded conditions. Degradation to friendly networks can occur based on

many internal, external, intentional, and unintentional threats. Because most CEMA defensive measures are

executed continuously throughout all phases of the operation, during peacetime and war, preparation occurs

not only by the CEMA element and applicable staff entities, for example, the G-6 (S-6), but at the

individual level as well. Individual Soldiers not directly involved in CEMA contribute to the preparation

process by adhering to the basic tenets of information assurance and operations security.

6-16. During preparation the CEMA element conducts several actions. They include—

Revising and refining the CEMA estimate and tasks in support of the overall plan.

Rehearsing the synchronization of CEMA in support of the plan including integration into the

targeting process, procedures for requesting assets, procedures for deconfliction, and asset

determination and refinement.

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6-9

Chapter 6

Synchronizing the collection plan and intelligence synchronization matrix with the attack

guidance matrix and CEMA input to the operation plan or order annexes and appendices.

Assessing the planned task organization developed in support of CEMA, including liaison

officers and organic and nonorganic capabilities required by echelon.

Coordinating procedures with information collection operational elements.

Training the supporting staff of the CEMA working group during rehearsals.

Completing precombat checks and inspections of CEMA assets.

Completing sustainment preparations for CEMA assets.

Coordinating with the assistant chief of staff, logistics (G-4 [S-4]) to develop CEMA equipment

report formats.

Completing backbriefs by subordinate CEMA working groups on planned operations.

Refining content and format for the CEMA element’s portion of the operation update assessment

and briefing.

CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES IN EXECUTION

6-17. Execution puts a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using

situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions. CEMA are

integrated and synchronized into the commander’s concept of operations. Fires provided by CO and EW

are employed in accordance with the targeting plan. These integrations are based on commander’s

guidance, desired effects, friendly capabilities, and likely enemy or adversary COA. During execution, the

CEMA element is responsible for monitoring the proper employment of these capabilities in accordance

with the commander’s guidance and ensuring the proper integration with other warfighting function

capabilities based on the concept of operations.

6-18. Each capability within CEMA has diverse operational functions and requirements. These

capabilities often require wide variances in times to achieve effects. The CEMA element accounts for these

time variances and ensures synchronization between the capabilities during execution. The effects from

each capability being utilized are then realized at the appropriate phase in the commander’s scheme of

maneuver.

6-19. During execution the CEMA element performs several actions. They are to—

Serve as CEMA experts for the commander.

Maintain a running estimate for CEMA.

Monitor CEMA in operations and recommend adjustments during execution.

Recommend adjustments to the commander’s critical information requirements based on the

situation.

Recommend adjustments to control measures and procedures related to CEMA.

Maintain direct liaison with the fires, signal, and intelligence cells to ensure integration and

deconfliction of CEMA.

Coordinate and manage CEMA taskings to subordinate units or assets.

Coordinate requests for nonorganic CEMA assets.

Continue to assist the targeting working group in target and access development and to

recommend targets to attack through CO or electronic attack.

Receive, process, and coordinate subordinate requests for CEMA assets during operations.

Provide input to the overall assessment regarding the effectiveness of CO and EW missions.

Maintain, update, and distribute the status of CEMA assets.

CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES IN ASSESSMENT

6-20. The CEMA element conducts an assessment of CEMA by following the same general procedures as

the assessment of all other operations. The CEMA assessment contributes to the overall assessment of the

operation.

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The Operations Process

6-21. Assessment requires direct feedback from those closest to observing the intended effects.

Assessment of CEMA relies heavily on sensors capable of monitoring networks, systems, and the EMS.

Visual systems can contribute to the assessment by detecting changes in the flights of enemy weapons and

trajectory profiles, or observing changes in adversary patterns of behavior.

6-22. During planning, assessment focuses on gathering information on cyberspace and its contribution to

the assigned area of operations to assist the commander and staff with understanding the current situation.

The CEMA element provides the commander with an understanding of the linkage between cyberspace and

the EMS to the supported mission or operation. During preparation and execution, assessment focuses on

monitoring the current situation and evaluating the operation’s progress.

6-23. During assessment, the CEMA element performs several actions. The CEMA element—

Continuously assesses the enemy’s reactions and vulnerabilities.

Continuously monitors the situation and progress of CEMA support of the operation towards the

commander’s desired end state.

Evaluates CEMA against measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.

THE INTEGRATING PROCESSES

6-24. The CEMA element ensures the integration of CEMA into the intelligence preparation of the

battlefield, targeting process, risk management, and continuing activities processes. These processes require

the involvement of the CEMA element throughout the operations process.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

6-25. The G-2 (S-2), as part of threat characteristics of intelligence preparation of the battlefield, evaluates

the threat’s ability to conduct cyberspace attack and electronic attack. This includes evaluating the threat

forces’ ability to protect their networks and command and control systems from attack. This can consist of

threat servers, websites, towers, satellites, and spectrum wavelengths. Because cyberspace is man-made,

new threat capabilities can be created in a relatively short period of time. The G-2 (S-2) determines

possible threat courses of action. The CEMA element assists the G-2 (S-2) in these efforts and their

integration into the concept of operations. An area of operations involves a portion of cyberspace as a part

of its whole. An area of influence may be a geographic area, a portion of cyberspace, or both. Due to the

global nature of cyberspace, it can be difficult to conceptualize cyberspace within the boundaries of an area

of operations and map out the physical elements of cyberspace geographically in the naturally occurring

domains. A geographic area is too limiting, and it is insufficient to contain cyberspace. Cyberspace may

expand the geographic area of local interest to a worldwide interest.

6-26. The CEMA element assists the G-2 (S-2) in describing how the variables of an operational

environment impact CEMA and vice versa. The element also assists with the assessment of enemy

cyberspace and EW capabilities, including an examination of doctrinal principles; tactics, techniques, and

procedures; and observed patterns of enemy operations in cyberspace and the EMS leading to a

determination of possible enemy courses of action. Enemy or adversary courses of action may involve

avenues of approach that reside solely within cyberspace or the EMS.

(For more information on

intelligence preparation of the battlefield see FM 2-01.3.)

TARGETING

6-27. Fires provided by CEMA are integrated and synchronized into the concept of operations during the

planning process and adjusted based on the targeting guidance. Both CO and EW, when authorized,

provide the commander with lethal and nonlethal actions in support of unified land operations. Targets and

problem sets may exist within or be accessible through all five domains.

6-28. The CEMA element participates in the targeting process to assist with the integration of fires

provided by both CO and EW. OCO provide a strike option in the form of cyberspace attack. EW provides

electronic attack. Targeting provides the process to match these capabilities (in addition to physical attack)

against targets. The commander’s intent plays a critical role and largely determines which form of fires or

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Chapter 6

combination of fires is necessary to produce the required effect—deny, degrade, disrupt, delay, deceive, or

destroy.

6-29. OCO, defensive cyberspace operations

(DCO)-response actions, and electronic attack provide

advantages and disadvantages with regards to their use. OCO can be more enduring. For instance, the

means by which these missions are executed involves the deployment of tailored computer code which can

reside on one or more enemy or adversary networks. DCO-response actions share similar characteristics.

The disadvantages of these CO missions are the additional time needed for careful policy and legal review

and strict adherence to rules of engagement and laws of armed conflict. Planners must also consider the

time intensive nature of target and capability development, as well as time needed for preparation and

execution. Electronic attack fires are likely to be more readily available to units at division echelons and

below. These fires are generally less enduring in nature. For instance, electronic attack against enemy

communications for denial purposes ends once the platform conducting the mission departs. Physical attack

(for example, a precision fires mission) may provide the best option for creating the intended effects on the

target. Physical attack may be combined with the OCO, DCO-response actions, and electronic attack

missions to create simultaneous and complementary effects.

Decide

6-30. The characteristics of cyberspace and the EMS provide threats and adversaries with considerable

measures of anonymity. Individuals, politically motivated groups, and criminals can have a larger cyber

persona or role than some nation states. Intelligence collection is a critical step for identifying potential

threats or adversaries in cyberspace. Designating targets that reside within cyberspace and the EMS

depends heavily on the intelligence collection effort. Each designated target and its required effect is

assigned to OCO, electronic attack fires, traditional physical fires, or a combination of each in accordance

with their capabilities.

6-31. An important part of this step in the targeting process is identifying potential fratricide situations and

providing electronic protection and DCO to mitigate them. This requires intense coordination and

synchronization on the part of the CEMA element. Any action in cyberspace and the EMS, either offensive

or defensive, must be coordinated and balanced with potential degradation inflicted on friendly systems.

The spectrum management operations (SMO) component of CEMA is leveraged to ensure that electronic

attack does not cause unwanted interference on friendly systems or degrade friendly networks. The nature

of OCO, by design and implementation, mitigates friendly network fratricide.

Detect

6-32. The capabilities that provide situational understanding of cyberspace provide situational data in the

form of network topology (terrain), configuration, operating system, and enemy and adversary actions and

intentions. Capabilities that provide situational understanding of the EMS provide situational data in the

form of geospatial location, signal strength, system type, and frequency of target to focus OCO, electronic

attack, or physical attack on the intended target.

Deliver

6-33. The CEMA element ensures the full coordination, integration, deconfliction, and employment of

CO, EW, and physical fires in accordance with the commander’s time-phased scheme of maneuver. Close

coordination between collecting assets (sensor) and those assets delivering the fires (shooter) is critical

during the engagement to avoid unintended effects.

Assess

6-34. Execution of CEMA is often dependent on intelligence. Effects produced by CEMA are not always

readily visible. The intelligence community operates many airborne and ground-based sensors. These

sensors provide the raw data. This data is converted into intelligence that then supports the conduct of

CEMA. In some cases this intelligence can be immediately used by tactical forces. Intelligence is the

primary contributor to the assessment of effects produced by CEMA on enemies and adversaries and their

6-12

FM 3-38

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The Operations Process

reactions to counter these effects. Intelligence allows for the adjustment of the targeting process. (For more

information on intelligence see ADP 2-0, ADRP 2-0, FM 2-0, and FM 2-01.3.)

6-35. Close coordination between sensor and shooter regarding the success or failure of the intended

effects often provides instant feedback. This coordination can also facilitate necessary, rapid adjustments.

(For more information on targeting see FM 3-60.)

RISK MANAGEMENT

6-36. Throughout the operations process, the CEMA element uses risk management to mitigate risks

associated with cyberspace and the EMS that have the potential to impact mission effectiveness. The

CEMA element begins the risk management process during planning and applies the process to CEMA

continuously through preparation and execution. (For more information on risk management, see FM 5-19.)

CONTINUING ACTIVITIES

6-37. While executing tasks throughout the operations process, commanders and staffs plan for and

coordinate continuing activities. The CEMA element coordinates with the staff to participate in these

continuing activities as necessary, and it ensures that CEMA are fully synchronized and integrated within

these processes. As needed, each continuing activity addresses tasks specific to each capability within

CEMA. The continuing activities are liaison, information collection, security operations, protection, terrain

management, and airspace control. (See ADRP 5-0 for more information on continuing activities.)

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6-13

Chapter 7

Integration with Unified Action Partners

Army forces conduct operations as part of a joint, interdependent force. In addition,

they routinely work with multinational forces and interagency, intergovernmental,

and nongovernmental partners as part of unified action. As such, Army commanders

must work with unified action partners throughout the operations process. This

chapter discusses how commanders and staffs integrate cyber electromagnetic

activities (CEMA) with unified action partners.

JOINT OPERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS

7-1. Army operations that involve the use of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) can

have joint implications. Each service component has cyberspace operations (CO), EMS requirements, and

electronic warfare (EW) capabilities that contribute to an integrated whole, synchronized by a joint force

headquarters.

7-2. The CEMA element ensures that the conduct of CEMA aligns with joint information operations,

CO, EW, spectrum management operations (SMO), and doctrine. The Army supports joint force objectives

by integrating its CO, EW functions, and SMO requirements through the conduct of CEMA.

7-3. Army units may work as subordinate elements of a joint task force or form the core headquarters of a

joint task force. The Army uses its CEMA element staff to integrate the capabilities within CEMA into the

joint operations planning process. The integration of these capabilities into operations occurs at the

information operations working group, at the joint spectrum management element in the communications

directorate of a joint staff for SMO, and for EW that may occur at the joint electronic warfare cell in the

joint force headquarters. When transitioning to become a part of a joint task force, an Army unit has the

option of maintaining the CEMA element separately from the joint electronic warfare cell, integrating the

element into the higher CEMA element, or converting to a joint organizational model.

7-4. The theater campaign plan guides the planning of CEMA. The Army contributes an integrated

CEMA plan to support joint operations. (For more information on joint information operations, see JP 3-13.

For more information on joint SMO, see JP 6-01.)

HOMELAND DEFENSE AND DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL

AUTHORITIES CONSIDERATIONS

7-5. Commanders and staffs understand the unique legal and political parameters, and the roles, missions,

and capabilities of other United States (U.S.) government agencies when conducting CEMA in support of

homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities. During homeland defense and defense support

of civil authorities, the supported military command is U.S. Northern Command or U.S. Pacific Command.

7-6. Army commanders may be required to assist with homeland defense and defense support of civil

authorities by providing CO, EW, and SMO. This support is provided within the appropriate legal

framework that ensures compliance with federal laws. Unless approved by appropriate authorities, Army

assets cannot be used to perform attack or exploit operations on U.S. entities. In the event of a homeland

defense operation, the Department of Defense (DOD) may be the lead federal agency in formulating

CEMA responses, or it may provide support to another federal agency such as the Department of Justice.

The U.S. service components criminal investigative and counterintelligence organizations may be able to

bring Title 18 or Title 50 authorities to bear in situations involving U.S. and foreign entities actions in

cyberspace and the EMS. A state’s National Guard forces may play a role in responding to a CEMA related

event whether under the command of the governor (either in State Active Duty or Title 32 status), or in

12 February 2014

FM 3-38

7-1

Chapter 7

Title 10 status under the command of the President. Army Reserve forces may also be brought onto active

duty in Title 10 status to respond to CEMA related events.

7-7. Conducting CEMA in the homeland presents a challenge to the Army commander due to the

possibility that the malicious activity originates from within the U.S. The policy and legal restrictions that

govern the DOD’s domestic activities extend to the Army’s operations in cyberspace. The Army works

closely with the Department of Justice and Homeland Security, and each State’s National Guard works

closely with State and local governments, to defeat threats to U.S. cyberspace. Commanders must ensure

that the legal, constitutional, and privacy rights of U.S. citizens are protected throughout the planning and

execution of CEMA.

7-8. During disaster relief operations Army units may be expected to provide assistance in reconstituting

or restoring access to cyberspace which may include SMO or, in unique circumstances, providing EW

support to allow military and U.S. government organizations to communicate or be connected for

situational awareness. The supported federal agency may be the Department of Homeland Security or the

Department of Justice. Army installations currently interface with both government and civilian emergency

responders via land mobile radio networks. Army units must be prepared to join those networks during

defense support of civil authorities operations.

INTERAGENCY AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

7-9. Army commanders must consider the unique capabilities, structures, and priorities of interagency and

intergovernmental partners in the planning and execution of CEMA. Successful execution of missions with

partners requires a shared understanding and common objective for the operation.

7-10. Interagency and intergovernmental partners often have command relationships, lines of authority,

and planning processes that can vary greatly from the Army. This will generally require liaison elements to

be in place prior to operations, as it will likely be too late and ineffective to establish these elements

after-the-fact. Partners often manage tasks through committees, steering groups, and interagency working

groups organized along functional lines. The commander is responsible for developing interagency and

intergovernmental coordination requirements and will likely require a robust liaison element similar to that

required for multinational operations.

7-11. Interagency and intergovernmental partners sometimes have policies that differ or are more

restrictive than the Army’s policies. These differences manifest in legal authorities, roles, responsibilities,

procedures, and decisionmaking processes. The commander must ensure that the interagency and

intergovernmental planners clearly understand military capabilities, requirements, operational limitations,

liaisons, and legal considerations. Staffs integrating these partners into operations must understand the

nature of these relationships and types of support that partners can provide. Commanders will likely need to

achieve consensus in the absence of a formal command structure to accomplish mission objectives with

these organizations.

MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

7-12. Army units conducting CEMA within multinational operations require a robust liaison effort.

Effective liaison mitigates complications caused by differences in policy and facilitates system integration

and information sharing.

7-13. Differences in national standards and laws pertaining to sovereignty in cyberspace and the EMS may

affect the willingness or the legality of a country’s participation in CEMA. Some partners may refuse to

participate, while others will enable or undertake their own operations separate from the Army

commander’s mission.

7-14. Connectivity is essential when multi-national forces function in mutual support during combat

operations. Connectivity issues may be compounded by interoperability issues. Hardware and software

incompatibilities and disparities in standards, information security, and information assurance policy may

cause gaps in security or capability that require additional effort to fix. This will likely slow down the

collection, dissemination, and sharing of information among partners. Commanders and staffs should

anticipate connectivity incompatibilities and disparities before entering a multinational operation.

7-2

FM 3-38

12 February 2014

Integration with Unified Action Partners

7-15. Intelligence and information sharing with allies and multinational partners is important during

multinational operations. When conducting CEMA with multinational partners, Army units must ensure

adherence to information assurance and computer network defense procedures. Security restrictions may

prevent full disclosure of some cyberspace and electromagnetic capabilities or planning, which may

severely limit synchronization efforts. Effective synchronization requires access to systems and information

at the lowest appropriate security classification level. Commanders are responsible for establishing

procedures for foreign disclosure of intelligence information. (See AR 380-10 for more information on

foreign disclosure.)

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS CONSIDERATIONS

7-16. Commanders ensure adherence to information assurance and computer network defense procedures

when conducting CEMA with nongovernmental organizations. Planning with nongovernmental

organizations may be necessary for foreign humanitarian assistance, peace operations, and civil military

operations. Incorporation of these organizations into an operation requires the commander to balance the

need of the nongovernmental organization for information with operation security. Many nongovernmental

organizations may be hesitant to become associated with the military to prevent compromising their status

as independent entities. Many seek to maintain this status to prevent losing their freedom of movement or

to keep their members from being at risk in hostile environments. Strategic level planning for inclusion of

nongovernmental organizations into civil affairs operations will likely be required to coordinate CEMA.

HOST-NATION CONSIDERATIONS

7-17. Each nation has sovereignty over its EMS and cyberspace components within its geographic area.

The use of a nation’s cyberspace and the EMS require coordination and negotiation through formal

approvals and certifications. Host-nation coordination with regard to the use of the EMS is a function of

SMO. Coordinating spectrum use is based largely on the potential for electromagnetic interference with

local receivers. This coordination ensures initial spectrum availability and supportability for operations and

establishes cyberspace availability, such as bandwidth allocation. Additionally, coordination seeks to

develop an interoperable cyberspace defense capability. Host-nation coordination will not be extended to

enemy nations or their military. Considerations for coordination must be given to adjacent countries,

particularly if forces stage, train, or operate within these countries. Likewise, compatibility of protective

measures, such as countermeasures systems, is essential to avoid system fratricide that degrades protection

for all.

INSTALLATION CONSIDERATIONS

7-18. Tactical cyber electromagnetic systems are complex and constantly evolving. Warfighter readiness

and the ability to fight upon arrival are crucial for a fully capable, ready force. Commanders and system

operators must be proficient at using the tools, systems, and processes necessary to execute CEMA.

7-19. Executing CEMA in a garrison environment presents unique challenges for several reasons. First,

staffs may not be co-located physically, and this requires them to use telephonic or virtual collaboration and

coordination. Second, the limitations on CO, EW, and electromagnetic spectrum operations will be

constrained due to laws, policies, and regulations. Third, unique mission sets for different installations

(testing, training, and maintenance) may require special considerations. Lastly, operational relationships

with garrison organizations such as the Network Enterprise Center need to be firmly established.

7-20. The installation as a docking station system allows units to train and exercise the same information

technology capabilities they use on the battlefield at home station. This “train as you fight” strategy allows

commanders and system operators to maintain skills and ensure equipment readiness. Both EW and SMO

capabilities must be integrated with this system in order for CEMA to provide the force multiplication

necessary in today’s net-centric environment and support the warfighting functions.

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FM 3-38

7-3

Chapter 7

PRIVATE INDUSTRY CONSIDERATIONS

7-21. Private industry plays a significant role in the conduct of CEMA. The Army relies on its connectivity

with its defense industrial base partners and the private industry for many of its non-warfighting day-to-day

functions for support and sustainment. Examples include electronic databases and interfaces for medical

services, accounting and finance services, personnel records, equipment maintenance, and logistics

functions. Global transport and logistics require data exchange between military and private networks. The

Army relies on shipping companies, transportation grid providers, and suppliers as a part of the global

transportation system.

7-22. The security and reliability of private industry networks directly affects DOD operations. These

networks are not administered by DOD personnel, but they are essential to effective Army operations.

Responsibility for these networks falls on the network owners.

7-23. Private industry has proven to be the primary catalyst for advancements in information technology.

This has resulted in the DOD becoming increasingly reliant on commercial off-the-shelf technology. Many

of these products are developed by, manufactured by, or have components produced by foreign countries.

These manufacturers, vendors, service providers, and developers can be influenced by adversaries or

unwittingly used by them to provide counterfeit products or products that have built-in vulnerabilities. The

DD Form 1494 (Application for Equipment Frequency Allocation) process determines compatibility and

interoperability of commercial off-the-shelf systems that use the EMS in support of national needs.

7-24. The Department of Defense information networks (DODIN) reside on commercial networks that

reside in the four traditional domains in the form of undersea cables, fiber optic networks,

telecommunication services, satellite and microwave antennas from local telephone companies, and leased

channels from satellites. Many of these commercial networks are under foreign ownership, control, and

influence. This makes the conduct of CEMA vulnerable to access denial, service interruption,

communications intercept and monitoring, infiltration, and data compromise. Army commanders pursue

risk mitigation through adherence to operations security, information assurance, inspection of vendor

supplied equipment, encryption, and promotion of user and commander education.

7-4

FM 3-38

12 February 2014

Appendix A

CEMA Input to Operation Plans and Orders

This appendix provides fundamental considerations, formats and instructions for

developing cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA) input to Army plans and orders.

This appendix provides the format for Appendix

(Cyber Electromagnetic

Activities) to Annex C (Operations).

APPENDIX 12 (CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES) TO

ANNEX C (OPERATIONS) TO OPERATIONS PLANS/ORDERS

A-1. Commanders and staffs use Appendix

(Cyber Electromagnetic Activities) to Annex C

(Operations) to operations plans and orders to describe how CEMA) support operations described in a base

plan or order. The electronic warfare officer (EWO) is the staff officer responsible for this appendix. This

Appendix 12 is a guide, and it should not limit the information contained in an actual Appendix 12 based

on this recommended context. Appendix 12 should be specific to the operations plans and orders being

conducted, and the content of actual Appendix 12s will vary greatly.

A-2. This appendix describes CEMA support and objectives. Complex CEMA support may require a

schematic to show CEMA integration and synchronization requirements and task relationships. This

includes a discussion of the overall CEMA concept of operations, required support, and specific details in

element subparagraphs and attachments. This appendix contains the information needed to synchronize

timing relationships of each of the elements related to CEMA. This appendix also includes CEMA related

constraints, if appropriate.

[CLASSIFICATION]

Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the OPLAN or OPORD. Place the

classification marking at the front of each paragraph and subparagraph in parentheses. See AR 380-5

for classification and release marking instructions.

Copy ## of ## copies

Issuing headquarters

Place of issue

Date-time group of signature

Message reference number

Include the full heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level

attachment.

APPENDIX 12 (CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

TO OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarter] [(classification

of title)]

(U) References: Add any specific references to cyber electromagnetic activities, if needed.

(U) Situation. Include information affecting cyber electromagnetic activities

(CEMA) that

paragraph 1 of Annex C (Operations) does not cover or that needs expansion.

(U) Area of Interest. Include information affecting CEMA; cyberspace may expand the area of

local interest to a worldwide interest.

[page number]

[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure A-1. Appendix 12 (CEMA) to Annex C (Operations)

12 February 2014

FM 3-38

A-1

Appendix A

[CLASSIFICATION]

APPENDIX 12 (CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

TO OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarter] [(classification

of title)]

(U) Area of Operations. Include information affecting CEMA; cyberspace may expand the area

of operations outside the physical maneuver space.

(U) Enemy Forces. List known and templated locations and CEMA unit activities for one

echelon above and two echelons below the order. Identify the vulnerabilities of enemy information

systems and CEMA systems. List enemy CEMA operations that will impact friendly operations. State

probable enemy courses of action and employment of enemy CEMA assets. See Annex B (Intelligence) as

required.

(U) Friendly Forces. Outline the higher headquarters’ CEMA plan. List plan designation,

location and outline of higher, adjacent, and other CEMA assets that support or impact the issuing

headquarters or require coordination and additional support. Identify friendly CEMA assets and

resources that affect subordinate commander CEMA planning. Identify friendly forces CEMA

vulnerabilities. Identify friendly foreign forces with which subordinate commanders may operate.

Identify potential conflicts within the electromagnetic spectrum, especially if conducting joint or

multinational operations. Identify and deconflict methods and priority of spectrum distribution.

(U) Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and describe

other organizations in the area of operations that may impact CEMA or implementation of CEMA

specific equipment and tactics. See Annex V (Interagency) as required.

(U) Third Party. Identify and describe other organizations, both local and external to the area

of operations that have the ability to influence CEMA or the implementation of CEMA specific

equipment and tactics. This category includes criminal and non-state sponsored rogue elements.

(U) Civil Considerations. Describe the aspects of the civil situation that impact CEMA. See Tab

C (Civil Considerations) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) and Annex K

(Civil Affairs Operations) as required.

(U) Attachments and Detachments. List units attached or detached only as necessary to clarify

task organization. List any CEMA assets that are attached or detached, and resources available from

higher headquarters. See Annex A (Task Organization) as required.

(U) Assumptions. List any CEMA specific assumptions.

(U) Mission. State the commander’s mission and describe CEMA in support of the base plan or

order.

(U) Execution.

a. Scheme of Cyber Electromagnetic Activities. Describe how CEMA support the commander’s

intent and concept of operations. Establish the priorities of support to units for each phase of the

operation. State how CEMA tasks will degrade, disrupt, deny, and deceive the enemy. State the defensive

and offensive CEMA measures. Identify target sets and effects, by priority. Describe the general concept

for the integration of CEMA. List the staff sections, elements, and working groups responsible for

aspects of CEMA. Include the CEMA collection methods for information developed in staff section,

elements, and working groups outside the CEMA element and working group. Ensure subordinate units

and higher headquarters receive the CEMA integration plan. Describe the plan for the integration of

unified action and nongovernmental partners and organizations. See Annex C (Operations) as required.

This section is designed to provide insight and understanding of the components of CEMA and how these

activities are integrated across the operational plan. It is recommended that this appendix include an

understanding of technical requirements.

[page number]

[CLASSIFICATION]

A-2

FM 3-38

12 February 2014

CEMA Input to Operation Plans and Orders

Figure A-1. Appendix 12 (CEMA) to Annex C (Operations) (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]

APPENDIX 12 (CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

TO OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarter] [(classification

of title)]

This appendix concentrates on the integration requirements for CEMA and references appropriate

annexes and appendices as needed to reduce duplication.

(1) (U) Organization for Combat. Provide direction for the proper organization for combat,

including the unit designation, nomenclature, and tactical task.

(2)

(U) Miscellaneous. Provide any other information necessary for planning not already

mentioned.

(U) Scheme of Cyberspace Operations. Describe how cyberspace operations support the

commander’s intent and concept of operations. Describe the general concept for the implementation of

planned cyberspace operations measures. Describe the process to integrate unified action partners and

nongovernmental organizations into operations, including cyberspace requirements, constraints, and

restraints. Identify risks associated with cyberspace operations. Include collateral damage, discovery,

attribution, fratricide (to U.S. or allied or coalition networks or information), and possible conflicts.

Describe actions that will prevent adversary action(s) to critically degrade the unified command’s

ability to effectively conduct military operations in its area of operations. Identify countermeasures and

the responsible agency. List the indications and warnings, and how they will be monitored. State how the

cyberspace operations tasks will destroy, degrade, disrupt, and deny enemy computer networks. Identify

and prioritize target sets and effect(s) in cyberspace. If appropriate, state how cyberspace operations

support the accomplishment of the operation. Identify plans to detect or assign attribution of adversary

actions in the physical domains and cyberspace. Ensure subordinate units are conducting defensive

cyberspace operations. Synchronize the CEMA element with the IIA section. Pass requests for offensive

cyberspace operations to higher headquarters for approval and implementation. Describe how DOD

information network operations support the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Synchronize

DOD information network operations with elements reconcilable for friendly network operations (G-6

[S-6]). Prioritize the allocation of applications utilizing cyberspace. Ensure the employment of cyber

capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace.

Considerations should be made for degraded network operations. (Reference appropriate annexes and

appendices as needed to reduce duplication).

(1) (U) Defensive Cyberspace Operations. Describe how defensive cyberspace operations are

conducted, coordinated, integrated, synchronized, and support operations to defend DOD or other

friendly cyberspace and preserve the ability to utilize friendly cyberspace capabilities.

(2) (U) Offensive Cyberspace Operations. Describe how offensive cyberspace operations are

coordinated, integrated, synchronized, and support operations to achieve real time awareness and direct

dynamic actions and response actions. Include target identification and operational pattern information,

exploit and attack functions, and maintain intelligence information. Describe the authorities required to

conduct offensive cyberspace operations.

(3)

(U) DOD Information Network Operations. Describe how information operations are

coordinated, synchronized, and support operations integrated with the G-6 (S-6) to design, build,

configure, secure, operate, maintain, and sustain networks. See Annex H (Signal) as required.

(U) Scheme of Electronic Warfare. Describe how electronic warfare supports the

commander’s intent and concept of operations. Establish the priorities of support to units for each phase

of the operation. State how the electronic warfare tasks will degrade, disrupt, deny, and deceive the

enemy. Describe the process to integrate and coordinate unified action partner EW capabilities which

support the commander’s intent and concept of operations. State the electronic attack, electronic

protection, and electronic warfare support measures and plan for integration. Identify target sets and

effects, by priority, for electronic warfare operations.

[page number]

[CLASSIFICATION]

12 February 2014

FM 3-38

A-3

Appendix A

Figure A-1. Appendix 12 (CEMA) to Annex C (Operations) (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]

APPENDIX 12 (CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

TO OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarter] [(classification

of title)]

Synchronize with G-7 (S-7) and the inform and influence activities (IIA) staff. See the following

attachments as required: Tab C,D,E (Electronic Warfare) to Appendix 12 (Cyber Electromagnetic

Activities); Annex J (Inform and Influence Activities); and Annex C (Operations).

(1) (U) Electronic Attack. Describe how offensive EW activities are coordinated, integrated,

synchronized, and support operations. See Tab C

(Electronic Attack) to Appendix

(Cyber

Electromagnetic Activities).

(2)

(U) Electronic Protection. Describe how defensive EW activities are coordinated,

synchronized, and support operations. See Tab D (Electronic Protection) to Appendix 12 (Cyber

Electromagnetic Activities).

(3) (U) Electronic Warfare Support. Describe how EW support activities are coordinated,

synchronized, and support operations. See Tab E (Electronic Warfare Support) to Appendix 12 (Cyber

Electromagnetic Activities).

(U) Scheme of Spectrum Management Operations. Describe how spectrum management

operations support the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Outline the effects the

commander wants to achieve while prioritizing spectrum management operations tasks. List the

objectives and primary tasks to achieve those objectives. State the spectrum management, frequency

assignment, host-nation coordination, and policy implementation plan. Describe the plan for the

integration of unified action partners’ spectrum management operations (SMO) capabilities. See Annex

H (Signal) as required.

(U) Tasks to Subordinate Units. List CEMA tasks assigned to each subordinate unit not

contained in the base order.

(U) Coordinating Instructions. List CEMA instructions applicable to two or more subordinate

units not covered in the base order. Identify and highlight any CEMA specific rules of engagement, risk

reduction control measures, environmental considerations, coordination requirements between units,

and commander’s critical information requirements and essential elements of friendly information that

pertain to CEMA.

(U) Sustainment. Identify priorities of sustainment for CEMA key tasks and specify additional

instructions as required. See Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

(U) Logistics. Use subparagraphs to identify priorities and specific instruction for logistics

pertaining to CEMA. See Appendix 1 (Logistics) to Annex F (Sustainment) and Annex P (Host-Nation

Support) as required.

(U) Personnel. Use subparagraphs to identify priorities and specific instruction for human

resources support pertaining to CEMA. See Appendix 2 (Personnel Services Support) to Annex F

(Sustainment) as required.

(U) Health System Support. See Appendix 3 (Army Health System Support) to Annex F

(Sustainment) as required.

(U) Command and Signal.

(U) Command.

(1)

(U) Location of Commander. State the location of key CEMA leaders.

[page number]

[CLASSIFICATION]

A-4

FM 3-38

12 February 2014

CEMA Input to Operation Plans and Orders

Figure A-1. Appendix 12 (CEMA) to Annex C (Operations) (continued)

[CLASSIFICATION]

APPENDIX 12 (CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

TO OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarter] [(classification

of title)]

(2) (U) Liaison Requirements. State the CEMA liaison requirements not covered in the unit's

SOPs.

(U) Control.

(1) (U) Command Posts. Describe the employment of CEMA specific command posts (CPs),

including the location of each CP and its time of opening and closing.

(2) (U) Reports. List CEMA specific reports not covered in SOPs. See Annex R (Reports) as

required.

(U) Signal. Address any CEMA specific communications requirements. See Annex H (Signal)

as required.

ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order.

[Commander's last name]

[Commander's rank]

The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy of the attachment. If the

representative signs the original, add the phrase "For the Commander." The signed copy is the

historical copy and remains in the headquarters' files.

OFFICIAL:

[Authenticator's name]

[Authenticator's position]

Use only if the commander does not sign the original attachment. If the commander signs the original,

no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing

staff officer requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the

signature block.

ATTACHMENTS: List lower level attachment (tabs and exhibits). If a particular attachment is not

used, place "not used" beside the attachment number. Unit standard operating procedures will dictate

attachment development and format. Common attachments include the following:

APPENDIX 12 (CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

TO OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)]-[issuing headquarter] [(classification of

title)]

ATTACHMENT : List lower-level attachment (tabs and exhibits)

Tab A - Offensive Cyberspace Operations

Tab B - Defensive Cyberspace Operations - Response Actions

Tab C - Electronic Attack

Tab D - Electronic Protection

Tab E - Electronic Warfare Support

DISTRIBUTION: Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments.

[page number]

[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure A-1. Appendix 12 (CEMA) to Annex C (Operations) (continued)

12 February 2014

FM 3-38

A-5

Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army, multi-Service, or joint definitions,

and other selected terms. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army)

follows the term. The proponent publication for a term is listed in parentheses after

the definition.

SECTION I - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADP

Army doctrine publication

ADRP

Army doctrine reference publication

Army regulation

ATTP

Army tactics, techniques, and procedures

CEMA

cyber electromagnetic activities

CJCSI

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

CJCSM

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual

cyberspace operations

COA

course of action

Department of the Army

DCO

defensive cyberspace operations

Department of Defense (for forms)

DOD

Department of Defense

DODI

Department of Defense instruction

DODIN

Department of Defense information networks

electronic attack

EHF

extremely high frequency

EMS

electromagnetic spectrum

EMSO

electromagnetic spectrum operations

electronic protection

electronic warfare support

electronic warfare

EWO

electronic warfare officer

field manual

G-2

assistant chief of staff, intelligence

G-3

assistant chief of staff, operations

G-6

assistant chief of staff, signal

G-7

assistant chief of staff, inform and influence activities

G-9

assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations

IIA

inform and influence activities

joint publication

OCO

offensive cyberspace operations

S-2

intelligence staff officer

S-3

operations staff officer

S-6

signal staff officer

S-7

inform and influence activities staff officer

S-9

civil affairs operations staff officer

SHF

super high frequency

SIPRNET

SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network

12 February 2014

FM 3-38

Glossary-1

Glossary

SMO

spectrum management operations

UHF

ultra high frequency

U.S.

United States

USC

United States Code

VHF

very high frequency

SECTION II - TERMS

countermeasures

That form of military science that, by the employment of devices and/or techniques, has as its objective

the impairment of the operational effectiveness of enemy activity. (JP 3-13.1)

cyber electromagnetic activities

Activities leveraged to seize, retain, and exploit an advantage over adversaries and enemies in both

cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, while simultaneously denying and degrading adversary

and enemy use of the same and protecting the mission command system. (ADRP 3-0)

cyberspace

A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of

information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications

networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. (JP 1-02)

cyberspace operations

The employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or

through cyberspace. (JP 3-0)

cyberspace superiority

The degree of dominance in cyberspace by one force that permits the secure, reliable conduct of

operations by that force, and its related land, air, maritime, and space forces at a given time and place

without prohibitive interference by an adversary. (JP 1-02)

defensive cyberspace operation response action

Deliberate, authorized defensive measures or activities taken outside of the defended network to

protect and defend Department of Defense cyberspace capabilities or other designated systems.

(JP 1-02)

defensive cyberspace operations

Passive and active cyberspace operations intended to preserve the ability to utilize friendly cyberspace

capabilities and protect data, networks, net-centric capabilities, and other designated systems. (JP 1-02)

Department of Defense information network operations

Operations to design, build, configure, secure, operate, maintain, and sustain Department of Defense

networks to create and preserve information assurance on the Department of Defense information

networks. (JP 1-02)

Department of Defense information networks

The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, and associated processes for

collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on-demand to warfighters,

policy makers, and support personnel, including owned and leased communications and computing

systems and services, software (including applications), data, and security. (JP 1-02)

directed energy

An umbrella term covering technologies that relate to the production of a beam of concentrated

electromagnetic energy or atomic or subatomic particles. (JP 3-13.1)

electromagnetic compatibility

The ability of systems, equipment, and devices that use the electromagnetic spectrum to operate in

their intended environments without causing or suffering unacceptable or unintentional degradation

because of electromagnetic radiation or response. (JP 3-13.1)

Glossary-2

FM 3-38

12 February 2014

Glossary

electromagnetic hardening

Action taken to protect personnel, facilities, and/or equipment by blanking, filtering, attenuating,

grounding, bonding, and/or shielding against undesirable effects of electromagnetic energy. (JP 3-13.1)

electromagnetic interference

Any electromagnetic disturbance, induced intentionally or unintentionally, that interrupts, obstructs, or

otherwise degrades or limits the effective performance of electronics and electrical equipment.

(JP 3-13.1)

electromagnetic intrusion

The intentional insertion of electromagnetic energy into transmission paths in any manner, with the

objective of deceiving operators or of causing confusion. (JP 3-13.1)

electromagnetic jamming

The deliberate radiation, re-radiation, or reflection of electromagnetic energy for the purpose of

preventing or reducing an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and with the intent

of degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s combat capability. (JP 3-13.1)

electromagnetic pulse

The electromagnetic radiation from a strong electronic pulse, most commonly caused by a nuclear

explosion that may couple with electrical or electronic systems to produce damaging current and

voltage surges. (JP 3-13.1)

electromagnetic spectrum

The range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity. It is divided into 26

alphabetically designated bands. (JP 3-13.1)

electromagnetic spectrum management

Planning, coordinating, and managing use of the electromagnetic spectrum through operational,

engineering, and administrative procedures. (JP 6-01)

electronic attack

Division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or

antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading,

neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires. (JP 3-13.1)

electronic intelligence

Technical and geolocation intelligence derived from foreign noncommunications electromagnetic

radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources. (JP 3-13.1)

electronic masking

The controlled radiation of electromagnetic energy on friendly frequencies in a manner to protect the

emissions of friendly communications and electronic systems against enemy electronic warfare support

measures/signals intelligence without significantly degrading the operation of friendly systems.

(JP 3-13.1)

electronic probing

Intentional radiation designed to be introduced into the devices or systems of potential enemies for the

purpose of learning the functions and operational capabilities of the devices or systems. (JP 3-13.1)

electronic protection

Division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment

from any effects of friendly or enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum that degrade, neutralize, or

destroy friendly combat capability. (JP 3-13.1)

electronic reconnaissance

The detection, location, identification, and evaluation of foreign electromagnetic radiations. (JP 3-13.1)

12 February 2014

FM 3-38

Glossary-3

Glossary

electronics security

The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value

that might be derived from their interception and study of non-communications electromagnetic

radiations, e.g., radar. (JP 3-13.1)

electronic warfare

Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic

spectrum or to attack the enemy. (JP 3-13.1)

electronic warfare reprogramming

The deliberate alteration or modification of electronic warfare or target sensing systems, or the tactics

and procedures that employ them, in response to validated changes in equipment, tactics, or the

electromagnetic environment. (JP 3-13.1)

electronic warfare support

Division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational

commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and

unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition,

targeting, planning, and conduct of future operations. (JP 3-13.1)

electro-optical-infrared countermeasures

A device or technique employing electro-optical-infrared materials or technology that is intended to

impair the effectiveness of enemy activity, particularly with respect to precision guided weapons and

sensor systems. (JP 3-13.1)

emission control

The selective and controlled use of electromagnetic, acoustic, or other emitters to optimize command

and control capabilities while minimizing, for operations security: a. detection by enemy sensors; b.

mutual interference among friendly systems; and/or c. enemy interference with the ability to execute a

military deception plan. (JP 3-13.1)

frenquency deconfliction

A systematic management procedure to coordinate the use of the electromagnetic spectrum for

operations, communications, and intelligence functions. Frequency deconfliction is one element of

electromagnetic spectrum management. (JP 3-13.1)

host nation

A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be

located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP 3-57)

inform and influence activities

The integration of designated information-related capabilities in order to synchronize themes,

messages, and actions with operations to inform United States and global audiences, influence foreign

audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decisionmaking. (ADRP 3-0)

information environment

The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on

information. (JP 3-13)

information-related capabilities

Capabilities, techniques, or activities employing information to effect any of the three dimensions

within the information environment to generate an end(s). (FM 3-13)

integration

2. The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a

whole. (JP 1)

offensive cyberspace operations

Cyberspace operations intended to project power by the application of force in or through cyberspace.

(JP 1-02)

Glossary-4

FM 3-38

12 February 2014

Glossary

operational environment

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of

capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

radio frequency countermeasures

Any device or technique employing radio frequency materials or technology that is intended to impair

the effectiveness of enemy activity, particularly with respect to precision guided weapons and sensor

systems. (JP 3-13.1)

red team

An organizational element comprised of trained and educated members that provide an independent

capability to fully explore alternatives in plans and operations in the context of the operational

environment and from the perspective of adversaries and others. (JP 2-0)

synchronization

The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat

power at a decisive place and time. (JP 1-02)

wartime reserve modes

Characteristics and operating procedures of sensors, communications, navigation aids, threat

recognition, weapons, and countermeasures systems that will contribute to military effectiveness if

unknown to or misunderstood by opposing commanders before they are used, but could be exploited or

neutralized if known in advance. (JP 3-13.1)

12 February 2014

FM 3-38

Glossary-5

References

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.

ADRP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 24 September 2013.

JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 8 November 2010, as

amended through 15 September 2013.

REQUIRED FORMS

These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.

DA Form 2028. Army Electronic Publications and Forms. February 1974.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS

Most joint publications are available online: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm >.

CJCSI 5810.01D. Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program. 30 April 2010.

CJCSM 3320.02D. Joint Spectrum Interference Resoultion (JSIR) Procedures. 3 June 2013.

DODI 4650.01. Policy and Procedures for Management and Use of the Electromagnetic Spectrum.

9 January 2009.

JP 1-04. Legal Support to Military Operations. 17 August 2011.

JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 22 October 2013.

JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 11August 2011.

JP 3-13. Information Operations. 27 November 2012

JP 3-13.1. Electronic Warfare. 08 February 2012.

JP 3-57. Civil-Military Operations. 11 September 2013.

JP 3-60. Joint Targeting. 31 January 2013.

JP 6-01. Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations. 20 March 2012

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: <http://www.apd.army.mil/ >. Army regulations

are produced only in electronic media and available at the same link.

ADP 2-0. Intelligence. 31 August 2012.

ADP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 10 October 2011.

ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.

ADP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.

ADRP 2-0. Intelligence. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012.

ADRP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.

ATTP 3-13.10. EW Reprogramming:Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the

Reprogramming Electronic Warfare (EW) Systems. 1 February 2011.

ATTP 5-0.1. Commander and Staff Officer Guide. 14 September 2011.

FM 2-0. Intelligence. 23 March 2010.

FM 2-01.3. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace. 15 October 2009.

12 February 2014

FM 3-38

References-1

References

FM 3-13. Inform and Influence Activities. 25 January 2013.

FM 3-36. Electronic Warfare. 9 November 2012.

FM 3-60. The Targeting Process. 26 November 2010.

FM 5-19. Composite Risk Management. 21 August 2006.

FM 6-02.70. Army Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations. 20 May 2010.

FM 6-02.71. Network Operations. 14 July 2009.

FM 6-99. U.S. Army Report and Message Formats. 19 August 2013.

FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces.

Title 18, United States Code. Crimes and Criminal Procedures.

Title 32, United States Code. National Guard.

Title 40, United States Code. Public Buildings, Property, and Works.

Title 44, United States Code. Public Printing and Documents.

Title 50, United States Code. War and National Defense.

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 6) - page 26