Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2)

Planning for CCO

NAVAL BOARDING PARTIES

29.

Generally, naval boarding parties operate between two ships

supported by other naval forces. Specific organizations used for CCO

on this task will be in accordance with standard naval decision-making

processes. Existing naval procedures will apply and may be amplified

by the adoption of applicable CCO concepts and procedures.

AIRFIELD DEFENCE FORCES

30.

Generally, airfield defence forces operate from an area with a

secure or patrolled perimeter and controlled access. Specific

organizations used for CCO at these installations will be situation-

dependant and driven by forces available. Existing Air Force

procedures will apply and may be amplified by the adoption of

applicable CCO concepts and procedures.

SPECIAL TASKS

31.

Sniper Operations. Indiscriminate, random shooting during

a disturbance does not automatically mean sniper fire. While military

sniper operations emphasise deliberate and discriminate fire (often -

single-shots at long ranges), agitators, activists or others that may be

involved with crowds and disturbances may not act in the same way.

Their employment of gunmen could be for several reasons: disrupt the

security forces (military and police), inflame the crowd (kill several

participants and blame it on the security forces), or simple terror.

Hence, gunfire could involve multiple shots or automatic fire at targets

that are not easily understood. Special techniques may be required to

counter the activities of gunmen. A military force could be requested

to provide anti-sniper cover for CCO, even those conducted by police

forces. The policy for the provision of sniper support for CCO

requires careful consideration and consultation with the rules of

engagement and use of force guidelines. It would normally be

preferable to allow the police forces to use their own, or to employ

other forces that are specifically trained to work with police forces.

Battalion snipers could be employed after careful briefing and

rehearsals. ROE and direction will have to be clear as to whether the

military sniper is protecting our forces, police forces, emergency

forces or civilians. The operation will normally be conducted from

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outside the forces on the ground to cover the baseline of our own

forces. It is essential that well-trained military snipers are chosen and

that good communications be provided.

32.

Forces operating in built-up areas must form the habit of

looking for likely positions from which gunfire may be directed at

them or at civilians. On street patrols, both foot and mobile, the patrol

commander must assign areas of surveillance to members of his unit.

Some are detailed to look to the flanks, at windows, rooftops and trees

on each side of the street. Others are instructed to provide rear

security. Finally, during movement, the point keeps a close watch on

the likely fire positions to its front. The commander makes frequent

checks on his forces’ alertness and ensures that, where possible, they

avoid moving under streetlights or through other lighted areas. As in

all streets patrolling, he varies his route and speed of march. Forces

riding in vehicles follow substantially the same guidelines; they face

outboard and look out and up constantly. Areas that are known to

have come under previous gunfire or which represent good targets

such as intersections may be assigned static guards. These personnel

make use of available cover and concealment; in no case should they

be positioned on rooftops, unless local police and other forces are

shown their locations. Static guards are checked often and should not

remain at their posts for more than four hours. Should gunfire take

place while a disturbance, large fire, etc., is in progress, the actions of

anti-sniper teams must be coordinated with the actions of the main

force.

33.

Prior to an assault on a gunman, verbal persuasion should be

tried in order to convince him to surrender. Use of gas and smoke

from police resources may drive him into the open where he can be

apprehended, or gas and smoke may be used to disable the gunman

and cover the move of the anti-sniper teams. Covering and

suppressive fire may be used where circumstances allow.

34.

Military snipers are subject to the same restrictions on firing

as other military personnel. These restrictions must be clearly given in

the orders to the military snipers. Military snipers should not be used

where a marksman could do the job; otherwise unit snipers will soon

be exhausted. A further consideration is that the identity of unit

snipers, especially those who have been successful, must be protected.

Known military snipers may be the subjects of special manhunts

mounted by the criminal elements.

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35.

Clearance of Barricaded Buildings. The seizing and

occupation of a building is a fairly common crowd tactic during civil

protest events. This creates a significant hazard to forces operating in

the area, and it may be necessary to clear the building before order can

be restored. This type of CCO is high risk from the point of view of

safety of our own forces, negative publicity and the mission in theatre.

It should be avoided whenever possible unless it is essential to the

mission. While military forces have vehicles and equipment capable

of breaking into barricaded buildings, their use must be carefully

considered to avoid collateral damage or injury to personnel. It will

normally be better to isolate the barricaded building rather than trying

to enter it. Clearing barricaded buildings is similar to a cordon and

search operation—a cordon is deployed quickly and then the clearing

party is inserted. Rules of engagement and use of force must be

briefed and rehearsed before conducting building clearance operations.

If the military is involved in entering the building, it should be part of

a joint force (military and police) organized into three groups: a

cordon group, a clearing group and an escort group.

The cordon group is positioned outside the building

and prevents entry into the building, and detains

anyone leaving the building.

The clearing group is normally divided into:

(1)

Security Team(s). These teams secure

entrances. They may also secure rooms

and floors once they are cleared, if the

threat requires it.

(2)

Clearing Team(s). These personnel will

normally be police, particularly in domestic

operations. They physically move people,

make arrests, record property damage, and

collect evidence.

(3)

Chemical Irritant Team(s). If chemical

irritants are used, it will normally be used

by police forces, in support of the police

clearing teams.

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The escort group moves detained people away from

the AO, and hands them over to civilian law

enforcement authorities.

36.

Other Special Tasks. This may include bomb searches and

disposal, removal of barricades from roads/bridges, NBC response

team and other public facilities. Aide-mémoires for these special tasks

are provided at Annex B.

SECTION 6

TACTICAL FORMATIONS

37.

The task organization considered as the "minimum required"

to respond to a crowd confrontation situation is an infantry rifle

company, or like-sized unit of 120-200 soldiers, augmented with

reconnaissance, snipers, a CIMIC team, a PSYOPS team, and combat

service support (CSS) as applicable. One platoon is positioned to

either prevent collateral damage from occurring or to separate

opposing factions; one platoon assists with the linkup of the police

where applicable and one platoon postures to serve as a QRF. Tactical

formations within all planned or ad hoc formations are normally required

for a variety of situations. Some effective formations that require

specialized training could be, but are not limited to: cordon, box, line,

echelon, wedge, and stack formations.

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CHAPTER 5

CONDUCT OF CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

SECTION 1

GENERAL

CCO have been developed as a as a means of identifying

subsets of activities that may occur sequentially, concurrently, or in

isolation from each other. CCO cover the entire spectrum of crowd

interaction from observing a demonstration to manoeuvring a crowd

within the area of operations (AO). They encompass the entire

spectrum of conflict and cover the continuum of operations. The six

elements of CCO are further described in this chapter with emphasis

on additional procedures that may prove useful.

GENERAL RULES

General Rules. When dealing with a crowd, the following

general rules apply:

face the crowd;

use requests not orders;

use appropriate level of language;

ignore baiting tactics; and

identify potential leaders.

INITIATION OF AN OPERATION

CCO situations may be predicted, planned, or occur

spontaneously. The initiation of a military response to these

situations, including the task organization, specific equipment, and the

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ROE to be employed, is through the issue of standard operational

orders and instructions.

MILITARY RESPONSES FOR CROWD CONFRONTATION

OPERATIONS

The military response to operational direction to conduct

CCO may be a phased or emergency response.

Phased Response. A phased response could include

a graduated military response including approach,

force deployment, tactics, weapons, and physical

presence. Key concepts relating to the use of force

such as minimum force and self-defence are set out

in B-GG-005-004/AF-005 Use of Force in CF

Operations. The production of a graduated response

model to support the ROE could be considered at the

national level.

Emergency Response. An emergency response

implies an ability to anticipate, deploy or conduct a

CCO with minimum pre-planning. It could consist

of a quick reaction deployment or tactical decisions

made concurrently with the normal military combat

estimate. Effective use of drills and rehearsals can

facilitate such a response.

SECTION 2

CROWD INFLUENCING TECHNIQUES

Throughout CCO, crowd influencing techniques may prove

to be the most effective tools to be employed. Active and passive

measures to influence a crowd should be used to affect the outcome of

CCO situations. The value of warning and persuasion, without the use

of force, particularly when directed at community leaders is important,

and the use of minimum necessary force must always be borne in

mind. Tactics must include pre-emptive techniques for influencing

aggressive crowds before a disturbance can develop, force extraction

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skills, and the employment of non-lethal weapons (NLW) and

selective deadly force when and if necessary and reasonable in the

circumstances. The use of interpreters to make announcements where

necessary and a prior careful assessment of cultural aspects of the

local population are essential, particularly in assessing the most likely

effects of control measures and potential second and third order

effects.

A crowd nearly always includes innocent people, caught up

in it through circumstances or idle curiosity; it may also shelter

agitators, who seek to provoke the security forces into ill-considered,

hasty action. It reinforces the importance that no more than the

minimum necessary force is used to disperse a crowd and that the

methods employed are appropriate to its mood and the local situation.

The commander must consider which method of dealing with a crowd

is most appropriate for the situation. Effective measures include:

Contingency Planning. Anticipating crowds and

their goals, preparing demonstration sites,

information gathering, and information operations

are ways to help avoid CCO situations.

Deterrence. Disorderly conduct should be

consistently dissuaded, but planned for. The threat

or possibility of military response by itself is often

an effective crowd influencing technique.

Warning. If a crowd remains intransigent, all

adequate warning methods should be used, if

circumstances permit.

Persuasion. When deterrence and warning fail,

persuasion may be necessary. If possible, attempts

by the civil authorities should always be made to

persuade crowds to disperse peacefully. This is

normally the responsibility of the police. Military

forces should normally only be called in when the

situation has gone beyond this point. Nevertheless

some of the persuasion methods available are:

(1)

Voluntarily. The first step, which may

often be the most effective and the least

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provocative, is unobtrusive discussion with

the leaders. This may lead to the orderly

dispersal of a crowd. Moreover, this

dispersal then appears to be voluntary

rather than enforced by the security forces.

(2)

Verbal or Visual Persuasion. The crowd

may be addressed by loud hailer or by some

other form of amplified system. Someone

should always prepare announcements with

knowledge of local affairs and who can

advise on the most persuasive approach; an

announcer with a local accent may also be

effective and an interpreter may be needed.

If no expert is available then a commander

may have to extemporize; it is always most

profitable to address responsible members

of the crowd and rely on them to influence

the remainder. When adopting any of these

methods some pitfalls which should be

avoided are:

(a)

Pleas. Pleading from a position of

psychological or physical strength

may be a logical and productive

stage in the process of dispersal;

however it is more likely than not

that pleas from a position of

weakness will produce an adverse

effect.

(b)

Promises. While promises may

produce an immediate and positive

result, the longer term results of

rash promises made without due

authority are inevitably negative

and damaging to the security

forces.

(c)

Threats. Direct threats should be

avoided. The implied threat of

force, coupled with the credibility

of the force, must be relied upon.

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This does not preclude informing

the crowd that physical measures

will be taken.

(3)

Observation and Containment. There are

numerous occasions when to contain,

observe and threaten a crowd should be

enough. The lack of a suitable target,

which could be the security force, may

cause the crowd to disperse from fear or

boredom. The ringleaders may have

particular difficulty in inciting the crowd if

there is no suitable target for them to attack.

(4)

Show of Force. A display of force may be

very effective on those drawn into the

crowd more by curiosity than conviction.

However, a show of force may be seen as

provocative, causing the situation to get

rapidly worse. Less provocation can be

achieved by posting observation posts

(OPs), particularly on rooftops and high

buildings where they can be seen, so that

the crowd becomes aware of a military

presence, and individuals may begin to fear

being surrounded and decide to leave.

Their departure can be infectious and the

crowd should be allowed to melt away.

While an open show of force may require

that all forces available be seen, a more

unobtrusive approach should always be

backed up by a reserve. This may be

needed should an isolated detachment be

attacked or surrounded.

Isolation. The isolation of ringleaders and

belligerent crowds may be necessary.

Containment. The crowd may wish to remain

mobile and may get destructive. The containment of

a crowd is key when dealing with a CCO.

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INFLUENCING AT SEA

Crowds afloat pose some problems before the boarding party

arrives. The use of all communication means and normal naval tactics

focussed at influencing the other ship should be considered in addition

to the force protection issues surrounding the boarding party. Once

aboard the other ship, the naval boarding party may use some of the

applicable techniques previously presented in this section.

SECTION 3

CONDUCT OF CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

FORCE EMPLOYMENT

General. The conduct of CCO cannot be templated, but

there are generally recognized steps and actions associated with most

CCO.

Force Employment. When required to employ a force on

CCO, the decision to employ a force rests with the operational

commander. If a decision is taken to be involved on CCO and

authority has been received from competent CF authority, then there

are a number of factors to be considered in dealing with crowds,

taking military action, deploying forces, and applying specific tactics

and techniques.

10.

Anticipation. Anticipation and the use of IPB as described

in chapter 4 can help avoid CCO situations. If surprised, pre-planned

techniques could help deal with the unanticipated. For example, if a

particular route is identified as a desirable approach route for busses

carrying a crowd, then a tactically useful technique might be to

temporarily block that road. Once the demonstrators dismounted from

their vehicles and closed on the military force, then the forces could

“leap-frog” one kilometre further down the road. This could be

repeated as often as necessary. Eventually, the crowd could get tired

and give up the idea of conducting a demonstration. If constantly

unloading from the busses did not dissuade the crowd from

demonstrating, at least time would be gained to muster a force big

enough to adequately prepare for CCO. However, to successfully

conduct this delaying tactic, a detailed IPB is required including an

analysis of key routes into potential demonstration sites.

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Conduct of CCO

11.

Preliminary Military Action. Before a disturbance occurs,

the military commander has to decide, in conjunction with the local

authorities, whether and where his forces should be concentrated,

where they should move to if disturbances occur, and whether or not

they should be seen to be available. It is often prudent to move close

to the scene of an anticipated disturbance, both to ensure that forces

are readily available and to enable commanders to keep in touch with

the situation. A commander must not, however, allow his forces to be

scattered, and should keep a reserve under his control. A joint

headquarters, where this is applicable, should be set up during this

preliminary stage and the military and civil authorities must either be

together in it or in close personal or radio contact.

12.

Information Required from the Civil Authorities. Civil

representatives should provide the following information:

Nominate a rendezvous, near to the scene of the

incident.

Indicate the best route to the rendezvous to ensure

arrival from the right direction without interference.

This route should be kept open by the civil

authorities, if possible.

An estimate of the size of the crowd, its intentions,

temper, weapons (if any) and capability.

Any relevant topographical details including lighting

problems at night.

The direction in which the crowd should be

dispersed (if applicable).

THE DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

13.

Prior to deployment of forces, certain preliminary planning

should have been completed and liaison with the civil authorities

established. Further planning will also be required to decide:

the route and direction by which forces should

arrive;

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whether the move should be overt and massive, with

a planned show of force, or unobtrusive;

the tactics and weapons needed on arrival;

a rendezvous where the military, local police and

local commanders can meet—it must be well clear

of the crowd but with a view of the scene of the

disturbances; and

preliminary orders for forces involved.

14.

Movement of Military Forces into the Area. The decision

whether to move forces openly or unobtrusively depends on the cause

and degree of the disturbance. When it is of a minor and local nature,

and particularly when violence has not yet occurred, the appearance of

forces may have a calming effect, but if the disturbance is more

serious and widespread, it may be wise to move in forces

unobtrusively. If the situation is serious and the local authorities are

rapidly losing or have lost control, forces must be moved in by the

most direct open route. The preliminary reconnaissance should have

identified all the likely routes, and civil action should be planned to

speed movement by such measures as manual overriding of automatic

traffic lights. It is essential that the move in be orderly, decisive and

deliberate because when tension is running high, this type of

movement has a steadying effect. Local guides and traffic escorts

should be provided if available. Forces must move in formed bodies;

neither personnel nor vehicles must be employed singly, and sentries

or lookouts should be posted in pairs.

15.

Arrival of Military Forces. Forces should be prepared to

intervene the moment they arrive at the scene of the disturbance so

that the situation does not deteriorate through unnecessary delay.

They must therefore have a well-rehearsed deployment drill. Forces

should never be brought to the scene of a disturbance until their

intervention is required. If they arrive too early and then have to stand

about waiting to be committed, the crowd may either find their

presence provocative, or it may get used to them and be encouraged to

think that no stronger measures will be used.

16.

Transport. The following points should be noted:

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Debussing Point. If the military force moves to the

scene of the disturbance in transport it should

normally debus away from the area, unless armoured

or special vehicles are in use and it is considered

advantageous to debus close to the crowd. Forces

must debus quickly to a practised drill with all their

equipment, and form up at once.

Soft Skinned Transport. Transport should be left

under guard well clear of the incident, except for one

vehicle which can be used to carry a small party

including a policeman, to deal quickly with any

specific diversions such as a splinter crowd setting

fire to property, looting or attacking an individual.

This vehicle can also carry wire or other barriers to

block off side streets, entrances to building, etc., and

is useful when dominating the area afterwards. It

should, if possible, be fitted with protection kits and

a fireproof canopy, and may carry a powerful public

address system and searchlights. If vehicles are

employed the commander may allot them tasks in

the forward areas dependent upon the local situation.

When vehicles are used well forward, a certain

amount of the equipment can be left in them until

required.

17.

Action on Arrival. There can be no master sequence of

events, and some of the actions listed below may have to be taken

during earlier stages of preparation and planning. Once forces arrive

at the scene of the disturbance, certain arrangements must either have

been made before arrival, or be put into effect at once. These are:

Information on the situation must be obtained from

all available sources.

If applicable an assessment must be made of the best

direction in which to disperse the crowd. Some

factors affecting this would be the mood of the

crowd and its intentions, the existence of attractive

targets and of other crowds, and alternative dispersal

routes.

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The method of handling the crowd must be decided.

It should not be bottled up but given time and room

in which to disperse.

The machinery for cooperation with the local

authorities must be established.

Deployment plans must ensure all round protection

to prevent rioters from encircling security forces. It

must be decided whether there is a deterrent value in

detaining agitators.

TERMINATION OF AN OPERATION

18.

Like any operation, the termination point of a crowd

confrontation situation is difficult to pinpoint. Once the crowd has

dispersed, the forces have disengaged, redeployed and reconstituted, a

CCO could be declared as completed.

19.

Subsequent Use of Civil Forces. If the military commander

assumes responsibility for the scene of disturbance, the local forces

under civil control should normally be withdrawn into reserve, but a

civil representative should remain with the military commander.

Possible tasks for these forces, where applicable, could be:

follow up quickly after the forces have used special

equipment, should the crowd show signs of

wavering, thus re-establishing police control;

cover the forces’ rear, by blocking side streets; and

make arrests and take into custody those detained by

the military forces.

DEALING WITH AGGRESSIVE CROWDS

20.

When an aggressive crowd gathers, crowd influencing

techniques should be employed and the following initiatives should be

considered where applicable and subject to the force organization

selected:

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Inner Ring Coordination. The establishment of an

inner ring and its coordination should take place at

the tactical level—at the scene of the disturbance.

Some key steps are:

(1)

establish contact with the appropriate

civilian law enforcement authorities;

(2)

establish contact with senior town officials;

(3)

keep civil police in front if a crowd gathers;

(4)

confiscate weapons from unauthorized

persons; and

(5)

using caution, get photos and video of

participants, particularly agitators.

Outer Ring Preparation. The establishment of an

outer ring and related measures should be effected

by higher headquarters. Examples of related

measures are:

(1)

be prepared to seal off any locations,

particularly weapons storage sites that

could exacerbate the situation;

(2)

be prepared to deny ingress into the

disturbance site; and

(3)

be prepared to counter a misinformation

campaign.

NAVAL BOARDING PARTIES

21.

Force employment of boarding parties will follow established

naval procedures aligned with the concepts presented in this chapter.

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AIRFIELD DEFENCE FORCES

22.

Force employment of airfield defence forces will follow

established Air Force procedures aligned with the concepts presented

in this chapter.

SECTION 4

CROWD MONITORING

23.

Crowd monitoring consists of activities to study, predict,

observe and report on potential and actual crowds. This is achieved

through passive and limited active means. Crowd monitoring may

include observing crowds as they gather or observing formed crowds

not interfering with operations or disturbing the peace. It involves the

collection of data on the size, location and mood of the crowd. One of

the most important aspects of Crowd monitoring is the prediction of

the goals of the gathering and the identification of the leaders or

agitators within the crowd. This is a normal activity conducted on all

operations to varying levels. The collection of intelligence or an over-

watch task are two examples of Crowd monitoring.

SECTION 5

CROWD AVOIDANCE

24.

Crowd avoidance consists of activities aimed to minimize or

avoid force-on-force contact with a crowd. There are two aspects of

crowd avoidance:

The use of crowd-influencing techniques without

becoming engaged with the crowd in order to

influence behaviour, by recommending dissolution

of the crowd, negotiating, dissuading future

activities, or negating the effectiveness of a crowd

without force-on-force contact. Given accurate

information from the monitoring of the crowd,

commanders can take measures to avoid interaction

with the crowd, while still completing their mission.

Crowd avoidance has the advantage of not exposing

the force to the dangers of crowd confrontation or

extraction and is enhanced through the use of

deception, camouflage, PSYOPS, intelligence,

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surveillance, reconnaissance and IO. Furthermore,

in cases where the crowd is being used to garner

public support for a certain cause, the military force

can maintain its impartial role. The intent is to

prevent the formation of a crowd and to de-escalate

its potential for violence.

The use of manoeuvre to avoid engagement with the

crowd. This is predicated on the military force’s

ability to manoeuvre. There is limited applicability

of this activity for a force tied to a geographical

mission. The intent is to provide tactical flexibility

to the commander by permitting him to choose the

time and place of intervention and to limit

provocation by the premature appearance of the

military force.

SECTION 6

CROWD DISENGAGEMENT

25.

Crowd disengagement consists of activities to separate a

military force from a crowd. This is mission driven and is commonly

conducted after the extraction of a specified person or persons from a

crowd. In some cases, friendly forces may support this

disengagement, which requires coordination and planning. In other

cases, commanders have to take advantage of an opportunity to

disengage as it arises. Crowd disengagement is a very complicated

and difficult endeavour requiring good leadership, training, planning

and coordination, if it is to succeed without unnecessary escalation of

force. Crowd disengagement may be conducted in a similar manner to

withdrawal tactics in ground combat operations. The extraction tasks

would be conducted either using normal task organizations or a

designated snatch squad.

SECTION 7

CROWD CONTROL

GENERAL

26.

Crowd control consists of activities to physically alter the

action and behaviour of a crowd. If a commander is unable to avoid a

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

confrontation with a crowd, due to the rapid development of the

situation, the requirements of the mission, or as an assigned task, then

the commander may need to take measures to prevent the crowd from

interfering with the accomplishment of the mission. This may involve

the direct interaction of military forces with the crowd. The

procedures and measures to be taken vary greatly by situation and

demand flexibility in execution. This activity may require physical

contact with the crowd, may be combined with legal actions such as

detention, and certainly will be the subject of close media scrutiny.

The most effective approach involves specialized training, full

spectrum of non-lethal capability set (NLCS) and detailed planning.

27.

General Procedures. One set of general techniques and

procedures of crowd control can be described using the acronym

IDAM: Isolate, Dominate, maintain common Situational Awareness,

and employ Multidimensional/Multi-echeloned actions described as

follows:

Isolate. Isolate, in time and space, the trouble spot

from outside influence or interaction to keep

demonstrations from spreading into bigger and

potentially more violent explosions of emotional

expression. The idea is to close access in and out of

the demonstration location. Once access is closed,

demonstrators tend to tire within hours, and the

demonstrations then die down, eventually resulting

in a peaceful conclusion. The use of foot patrols and

vehicular traffic control posts (TCPs), poised to

further isolate the demonstration, if control was lost,

might be positioned on a road network leading into

and out of the demonstration site. TCPs can also be

emplaced using engineer-type barrier material to

create an obstacle that is difficult to bypass.

Dominate. Dominate the situation through force

presence and control of information resources. In

the past, units demonstrated an overwhelming show

of force at the checkpoints, and conducted over

flights above demonstrations and disturbances.

Also, using all the air assets available gave ground

commanders a “bird's-eye view” of events on the

ground. Helicopter over flights provided real-time

situation reports ensuring units knew the “ground

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Conduct of CCO

truth” at all times. This knowledge gave

commanders a decisive advantage in both

negotiations with potentially aggressive elements

and tactical manoeuvres. Units can also dominate

using NLW.

Awareness. Common situational awareness is

maintained through timely, accurate and complete,

multi-source reporting. Reports can be received

from a broad spectrum of sources. Unit checkpoints,

air assets, close liaison, all contribute to an accurate

assessment of any situation.

Multidimensional, Multi-echeloned Actions.

CCO must be conducted with all available resources.

There may be physical confrontations by the tactical

elements, PSYOPS activity, CIMIC to influence

leaders and people, and commanders working with

civil leaders and national links. The CCO must be

coordinated at the appropriate headquarters.

CROWD CONTROL MEASURES

28.

Deployment. Deployment for crowd control varies by

situation. In addition to the general deployment considerations in the

previous section, additional considerations for crowd control measure

are highlighted in this section.

29.

Crowd Control Measures. Measures for crowd control can

be generally grouped into stopping or blocking a moving crowd,

containing a crowd and control of movement. Details on these tasks

are given in the following sub-sections.

STOPPING OR BLOCKING A MOVING CROWD

30.

It is usual to deploy forces to halt the progress of a crowd,

and such deployment focuses the attention of the crowd, thus

distracting attention from other moves by the security forces. It

establishes a base line from which:

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

Observation posts (OPs) are established and ground

reconnaissance carried out.

Every effort is made to identify individuals in the

crowd, especially agitators, using photography if

possible. At night, specialized lights are necessary.

CONTAINING CROWDS

31.

A stationary crowd may be preferable to a moving one and

thus, it could be contained in a controllable or desirable location. The

use of military and civil resources to accomplish this is a key step in

crowd control. Whatever methods are employed, the following points

should be considered:

the crowd must be provided with an avenue of

escape;

military forces must not become over-extended;

there is a danger of looting, arson, and other

property damage within the area;

no attempts to trick or deceive the crowd should be

made; and

strict discipline must be maintained within the

military force.

CONTROL OF MOVEMENT

32.

This involves the establishment of barriers, crowd control

formations, checkpoints or roadblocks and patrols in order to control

the movement of the crowd.

Purpose. The purpose of control of movement tasks

may have one or more of the following aims:

(1)

to dominate an area as a deterrent to

prevent the assembly of crowds;

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Conduct of CCO

(2)

to prevent crowds from being reinforced or

to channel their movement into desired

areas;

(3)

to deny contact between dissident groups;

(4)

to facilitate other operations by military

forces;

(5)

to record movement to detect patterns and

gain information; and

(6)

to demonstrate the dominance of the civil

authority and to increase public confidence.

Control measures must be applied fairly and firmly.

It must be made clear to the population that the

inconvenience and hardship is not being inflicted

with punitive intent, but in order to prevent or

control a disturbance. Whenever possible, actions

taken and explanations given must consciously

promote this truth.

Control of movement by military forces must not be

continued for longer than is absolutely necessary.

Control is dependent upon good communications.

All elements must have good communications with

their headquarters. Normally, this is by radio, but in

some cases it may be by line. The civil telephone

system could also be used.

Radio communication in urban areas may often be

difficult. It may be necessary to supplement military

radios with civilian pattern equipment (considering

security problems) or through the use of police

networks.

Types. The types of tasks for controlling movement

are roadblocks, checkpoints, OPs, patrols and

domination from rooftops. Specific details on these

types of tasks are:

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(1)

Roadblocks. It is also important to realize

that just as military forces could block the

roads leading into a demonstration or

potential disturbance location, various

factions that wanted to conduct

demonstrations could also block roads,

preventing relief forces from assisting with

disturbance control. An aide-mémoire on

roadblocks and a suggested list of

equipment is at Annex B, Appendix 2.

Roadblocks are established to achieve one

or more of the following:

(a)

to maintain a continuous check on

road movement;

(b)

to separate known agitators;

(c)

to enforce government regulations;

and

(d)

to limit access to a specified area.

(2)

Checkpoints. There are occasions when it

is desirable to impose a system of control

of movement, without bringing all

pedestrian and vehicular traffic to a halt. A

checkpoint is more selective than a

roadblock in that it does not attempt to stop

all traffic. A checkpoint should be able to

be expanded into a roadblock. The

purposes of checkpoints are:

(a)

to assist traffic flow past or around

a given area or point;

(b)

to maintain observation;

(c)

to assist in area domination; and

(d)

to act as a deterrent to unlawful

activity.

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Conduct of CCO

(3)

Observation Posts. Military OPs are as

useful for CCO as they are for any

operation.

(4)

Patrols. Patrolling is covered in detail in

other manuals. For CCO, the purposes of

patrols are to dominate an area by their

presence, to gather information, to maintain

contact with the crowd, and to provide

escort.

(5)

Domination from Roof Tops. The

purpose of dominating from rooftops is to

dominate an area prior to commencing a

local task. Specific planning details are:

(a)

Joint reconnaissance must be

conducted with civilian law

enforcement authorities. The

highest rooftops affording the best

observation should be used

whenever possible. Any building

that is selected must be secure.

The danger of position being

isolated and burned out must be

considered and contingency plans

prepared. The roof top positions

must be sited with interlocking

arcs of visibility and be mutually

supporting. Communications

should be provided and when

possible, a police officer should be

included to provide local expertise

and, perhaps alternate

communications.

(b)

Roof top personnel spend the bulk

of their time observing, reporting

and relaying information to

ground forces. They might

become involved in crowd control

by being in a position to use

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persuasion. They may have to act

as marksmen.

SECTION 8

CROWD DISPERSAL

GENERAL

33.

Crowd dispersal consists of activities to break up a crowd. It

is achieved through some active and some passive means when a

military force assists in the dispersal of the crowd or suppression of a

disturbance. It is usually necessary to first control the crowd and then

attempt to disperse it. Crowd control measures employed here, are the

same as described earlier under crowd control. Crowd dispersal may

involve activities aimed solely at dispersing a crowd or may be

conducted to also suppress a crowd. Dispersal will likely but not

necessarily involve physical contact or resistance from the crowd. To

disperse a crowd, it may be necessary to suppress it first. Suppression

of a crowd is by its nature physical and likely violent.

34.

General Procedures. If all other steps including persuasion

fail, Crowd dispersal may be necessary. The most effective means to

disperse a crowd is to remove or isolate the leaders and agitators

within its midst. The use of area dispersal systems may be the

preferred method to increase effectiveness. Generally, the most

effective approach involves specialized training, full spectrum of

NLCS and detailed planning. Some techniques of crowd dispersal are

described in the following paragraphs.

DEPLOYMENT

35.

The deployment of a military force is, in itself, a step in

escalation and demonstrates the resolve of the civil authority to

disperse or suppress a crowd. Deployment could be divided into two

stages—the approach march, and the show-of force deployment:

The Approach March. The approach march is

made to a secure area out of view of the crowd. The

formation to be adopted for an approach march

either mounted in vehicles or on foot, is the column

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Conduct of CCO

formation. This means that the force (company size

for the purposes of this example) moves one platoon

behind the other on a single axis of advance, with

company headquarters immediately behind the

leading platoon.

Use of helicopters for crowd and route surveillance

could assist the commander in adjusting to changing

situations and to anticipate threats to the security of

his column. Unless it is apparent that life is

threatened, commanders should not be diverted by

other incidents en route to their assigned AO.

If the approach march is in transport, debussing is

done clear of the disturbance, unless armoured or

special vehicles are in use and it is considered

advantageous to debus close to the crowd. Forces

must debus quickly by a practised drill with all their

equipment, and form up at once.

Transport is left under guard well clear of the

incident, except for one vehicle which can be used to

carry a small party including a policeman, to deal

quickly with any specific diversions such as a

splinter crowd setting fire to property, looting or

attacking an individual. This vehicle can also carry

wire or other barriers to block off side streets,

entrances to building, etc., and is useful when

dominating the area afterwards. It should, if

possible, be fitted with a protection kit and a

fireproof canopy, and may carry a public address

system and searchlights. When armoured personnel

carriers are used well forward, a certain amount of

the forces' kit can be left in them until required.

It is unlikely that the original information the

company commander received will allow him to

plan the detailed deployment of his forces prior to

his actual arrival on the scene. Initial exaggeration

and subsequent crowd activity could necessitate a

quick reconnaissance by the commander on arrival.

Information may be obtained from Civilian law

enforcement authorities, rooftop standing patrols,

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

helicopters, etc. He should be prepared to react

quickly from the moment he arrives at the scene of

the disturbance so that the situation does not

deteriorate through unnecessary delay;this requires

well-rehearsed deployment drills. It does not mean

that forces must always be used at once since a

premature appearance could detract from the shock

effect of their sudden intervention later.

The Show of Force Deployment. Forces should

not appear on the scene of the disturbance until their

intervention is required. If they arrive too early and

then have to stand about waiting to be committed,

the crowd may either find their presence

provocative, or it may get used to them and be

encouraged to think that no stronger measures will

be used. Second stage deployment should take place

in full view of the crowd, but beyond the range of

hand-thrown missiles (50 to 60 metres,

approximately), and to the rear of any deployed

police forces. If the show of force deployment has

no visible intimidation effect on the crowd, more

positive action must be taken. During the

deployment, the commander must consider the

following additional factors in developing the next

stage of his plan:

(1)

location of business areas vulnerable to

damage;

(2)

location of any public utilities that might be

damaged by a dispersing crowd;

(3)

direction of the wind, in the event civilian

law enforcement authorities have used or

intend to use chemical irritants;

(4)

location and number of innocent

bystanders;

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Conduct of CCO

(5)

the location of any physical features that

will help to break up the crowd into small

groups; and

(6)

the direction in which he intends to disperse

the crowd, considering clear and obvious

routes to facilitate dispersal.

The military commander must keep a barrier

between his forces and the crowd. It may be the

same barrier earlier deployed behind civilian law

enforcement authorities, but with gaps now closed or

with natural or artificial obstacles already in position

that can be advantageously employed. The military

force must not become directly involved with the

crowd; it is not equipped to do so.

DISPERSAL MEASURES

36.

A crowd nearly always includes innocent people caught up in

it through circumstances or idle curiosity; it may also shelter agitators,

who seek to provoke the security forces into ill-considered, hasty

action. It is therefore important that no more than the minimum

necessary force is used to disperse a crowd and that the methods

employed are appropriate to its mood and the local situation. The

commander must consider which method of crowd dispersal best fits

the situation. The following are possible dispersal measures:

Warning. All reasonable efforts are made to warn

the crowd to disperse.

Show of Force. The deployment of the forces in a

controlled and deliberate manner.

Warning of Escalation. Warning that the use of

chemical irritants and non-lethal impact weapons is

imminent.

Escalation of Force. Use of chemical irritants and

non-lethal impact weapons.

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Physical Engagement (Batons and Shields). The

physical movement of formation to disperse crowd.

Greater Force. The use of water cannons. The use

of firearms is only considered if there is a threat to

life.

Dispersal in Open Spaces. Dispersing a crowd in a

large open space may be more difficult because:

(1)

Larger crowds can assemble.

(2)

Their direction of movement is less easy to

anticipate and, subsequently, to channel.

The security forces can therefore be more

easily enveloped or outflanked.

(3)

It may be difficult to establish a baseline.

(4)

It will be more difficult to establish a

clear-cut division between the crowd and

the controlling forces.

(5)

Some NLW are less effective because their

results can more easily be avoided.

(6)

Variations. Some adjustments have to be

made to the techniques already described,

and in general terms these are:

(a)

Decide where the crowd can be

allowed to go and deploy

accordingly.

(b)

Employ an adequate number of

forces. In a large area this should

seldom be less than a battalion.

(c)

Consider the use of armoured

vehicles and NLW.

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Conduct of CCO

(d)

Maintain an adequate mobile

reserve.

(e)

Maintain continual observation on

the crowd to detect any change in

its mood or objective.

Handling of a Dispersing Crowd. Once a crowd

has started to disperse, the commander should

de-escalate the use of force. However, it may

occasionally be necessary for forces to advance to

keep the crowd on the move in the right direction.

Forces advancing and driving a crowd before them

should remember that the pace is that of those

furthest away. A crowd on the move in the right

direction should not be hurried. Those able to see

the forces are no doubt going as fast as they can and

not nearly so fast as they would wish. On no

account should the crowd be encircled so that it is

unable to disperse.

Whenever the crowd begins to disperse, the military

force follows up the initial success. They maintain a

steady pressure on the crowd to maintain the

momentum to disperse. It must be remembered that

the movement of individuals in contact with the

forces and police is likely to be slowed by those

further back, so quick movement of a crowd is

impossible. If the crowd splits, as at a street

intersection, controlling forces must follow up and

maintain a pressure on all its parts. When the scene

has been cleared, patrols may be deployed to

maintain surveillance and deter the crowd from

reforming. Helicopters are particularly useful for

follow-up surveillance and early warning of crowd

regrouping or acts of violence.

The fundamental consideration in the advance is to

bring to bear in a coordinated effort as much force as

is necessary to break the resistance of the crowd and

to disperse it. The combination of police and

military should have sufficient strength to dominate

the area, but the force actually applied should be the

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

minimum necessary. The aim is to establish

stability as quickly as possible, so that normal

activity can be resumed.

Possible methods of following up a crowd are an

in-line formation or a flanking movement. The

in-line formation is used when a company is

sweeping a large area. A flanking movement is

delivered from the front and from one flank and

tends to drive the crowd towards the open flank.

By approaching from more than one direction

simultaneously, each section of the crowd is made to

feel for its own safety. Thus, the common purpose

linking the crowd is broken and the task of

dispersing them made easier. Care must be taken to

ensure that elements of the crowd do not get behind

the advancing force.

CONFIRMATION OF DISPERSAL

37.

An operation does not end with the dispersal of a crowd. The

crowd must not be given the opportunity to reassemble. A joint plan

must be made by military and police for patrolling the area after the

dispersal of a crowd, and for removing any barricades erected by it. If

possible local residents should be persuaded to remove the barricades

themselves or at least assist in doing so. Only when the military and

police commanders are both satisfied that the crowd is not

reassembling, or that Civilian law enforcement authorities can handle

the situation alone, should the military forces be withdrawn.

SECTION 9

CROWD MANOEUVRING

38.

Crowd manoeuvring consists of activities to manage the

movement of a crowd. It may encompass some or all of the other

CCO activities. By these activities, a military force denies an area or

causes a crowd to vacate an area to assist the scheme of manoeuvre.

This may be accomplished through passive and active means, either in

or out of contact with a crowd. The military force will avoid placing a

crowd in harms way, deliberately, particularly when the successful

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Conduct of CCO

completion of a mission depends upon clearing, containing or denying

an area to civilians to facilitate accomplishing the mission. The

development of this concept is partially linked to the future Urban

Battlespace concept, but contemporary examples also exist.

Manoeuvring civilians away from a particular bridge to permit the use

of the bridge by friendly forces is one example. Another example of

this approach is encouraging a crowd to vacate the immediate area

around a target prior to its engagement. Crowd manoeuvring may be

very resource intensive and normally encompasses all of the other

CCO activities. Given the scale of this task it is likely to be a brigade

or higher-level initiative.

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CHAPTER 6

SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT FOR CROWD

CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

A force armed only with traditional military

weapons normally has only two options for

enforcing compliance: threats of deadly force and

application of deadly force. This limitation creates a

critical vulnerability, which belligerents may quickly

discern, and use to their advantage. Non-lethal

capabilities provide a wider range of options, which

augment traditional means of deadly force, but do

not replace them.

—US Army Field Manual 90-40, Multiservice

Procedures for the Tactical Employment of

Non-Lethal Weapons

SECTION 1

GENERAL

TYPES OF EQUIPMENT

The primary building block for all CF operations is multi-

purpose combat capability. CCO requires an increased range of

capabilities, which can be obtained through the use of non-lethal

weapons (NLW) and equipment. CCO equipment may include

personal protective equipment (e.g. face shields and protective body

shields), non-lethal impact weapons (e.g. batons, baton round and

water cannon), non-lethal short-range weapons (e.g. pepper spray and

chemical irritants), and ancillary equipment (e.g. barricades).

USE OF EQUIPMENT

NLW provide for more flexibility in the conduct of CCO, but

any use of force requires commanders to make difficult trade-off

decisions between mission accomplishment, force protection, and the

obligation to use minimum force. The concept of minimum force is

related to both non-deadly and deadly force and is the minimum

degree of authorized force, which is necessary and reasonable in the

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circumstances. Depending on the circumstances, minimum force may

include deadly force.

SECTION 2

LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL WEAPONS

LETHAL WEAPONS

Lethal Weapons. Lethal weapon is defined as any weapon

which can be used to cause death or serious bodily injury and includes

firearms, rocks, knives, clubs, gasoline bombs and explosive devices.

The potential use of such weapons against CF personnel must be

considered in every commander’s OPP. The use or threat of the use of

lethal weapons may constitute a hostile act or hostile intent for the

purposes of CF ROE.

NON-LETHAL WEAPONS

Non-Lethal Weapons. NLW are defined in

B-GL-300-007/FP-001 Firepower as those weapons, munitions and

devices that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to

incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities,

permanent injury to personnel and undesired damage to property and

the environment. This definition does not include information

operations (e.g. jamming, psychological operations, etc.) or any other

military capability not designed specifically for the purpose of

minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired

damage to the environment, even though these capabilities may have

non-lethal effects (e.g. smoke and illumination). The aim is for NLW

to assist in mission accomplishment, to enhance force protection, and

to assist in the preservation of human life by reducing the need to

resort to deadly force.

Use of Non-Lethal Weapons. NLW expand the number of

options available to commanders confronting situations where the use

of deadly force poses problems. They provide flexibility by allowing

forces to apply measured military force with a reduced risk of serious

non-combatant casualties, but in a manner that provides force

protection and effects compliance with the intended operational

objectives. Since NLW can be employed at a lower threshold of

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Specialized Equipment for CCO

danger (subject to ROE), commanders can respond to an evolving

threat situation more rapidly, thereby retaining the initiative and

reducing the vulnerability of the force. It must be stated that NLW are

always to be backed up by lethal weapons and the authority to use

them and that even when NLW are used, casualties, including

fatalities, could ensue. Extreme care must be taken when visibly

displaying and particularly firing NLW projectiles from weapons that

also have a lethal capability as a crowd may assume that lethal force

has been used and respond with lethal force in self-defence

accordingly.

NLW reinforce deterrence and expand the range of options

available to force commanders. NLW achieve this by enhancing

military capabilities to accomplish six objectives:

discourage, delay or prevent violent actions;

limit escalation of the situation;

take military action in situations where use of deadly

force is not an option;

better protect CF forces;

temporarily disable personnel; and

reduce collateral civilian damage.

The availability of NLW shall not limit a commander’s

options for self-defence. If deadly force is appropriate, having regard

to all of the circumstances at the time, it may be applied immediately,

without having first to apply non-deadly force

CATEGORIES OF NON-LETHAL WEAPON

Although there may be a number of different NLW categories

and weapons available to a force, only the employment of those with a

specific CCO application will be considered in this manual. The

collective NLW suite available for CF operations is known as the non-

lethal capability set (NLCS) and is further described in paragraph 9

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below. Categories of NLW and equipment that may be used for CCO

are:

Personal Protective Equipment. This includes all

items that provide individual protection. It may

include body shields, helmets—with or without face

shields, gloves, groin protectors, body armour, nape

protectors and shin guards.

Non-lethal Impact Weapons. This includes all

weapons where impact with a target individual is

used to tailor behaviour. It includes the traditional

baton as well as NL impact rounds, such as the

40 mm sponge grenade and the 12 Gauge bean bag

or sock round (a fabric pad or “sock” containing

40 g of lead shot). These rounds may be accurate up

to 50 m, depending upon type and model and their

use is governed by the ROE. Effective and

dangerous ranges must be fully understood for each

projectile before use and point of aim is usually the

lower body and not the chest or head area.

Typically, it will often take more than one such

round to deter an individual and this needs to be

considered when using single-shot weapons

(e.g. M203). Electronic shock dart pistols (such as

the Taser 21) also fall within this category.

Water Under Pressure. Water under pressure can

be projected from water cannons or fire hoses.

Water cannons should operate in pairs so that one

can be away filling up. They are large vehicles that

may be difficult to manoeuvre in narrow streets, and

must be escorted to and from the area and protected

while in operation. Fire engines and fire hoses

become targets for violence once they have been

used to quell disturbances, and this and the possible

urgent need for them in their conventional role

should be taken into account before sanctioning their

use. The ways in which water can be used are:

(1)

As a Dousing. This method may be the

most humane way of dispersing a crowd,

especially in cold weather.

100

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(2)

As a Jet. The jet can temporarily

neutralize a person and even knock him

over. At ranges of less than five metres, the

jet must be aimed at the feet, not at the

body and never at the head. CS in solution

in the jet enhances the effect.

Non-lethal Short-range Weapons. These are

chemical irritants that generally cause irritation of

the eyes, choking and coughing as well as pain to

the skin and mucous membranes. These irritants

include: OC (pepper spray), CN, Parva and CS gas.

Also commonly referred to as riot control agents

(RCA), they may be delivered by riot gun, canister,

grenade or spray, depending upon type and desired

effect. CS canisters require much careful planning

and consideration before their use as they can have

as much effect on own forces as on the crowd,

particularly where activists are equipped with gas

masks and welders gloves enabling them to throw

back the canisters. The unpredictable nature of wind

movement in urban areas also makes the CS clouds

as likely to affect our own forces as the crowd and,

as some 10% of the population are unaffected by

CS, the overall effects will be variable and difficult

to predict. Some considerations for the use of CS

are:

(1)

CS gas causes watering and irritation of the

eyes, choking and coughing. The effects

usually disperse in five to ten minutes, but

it takes a determined person to remain in a

CS gas concentration. CS gas can be

delivered by riot gun, pistol or by grenade.

(2)

A commander must take the following into

account before using CS gas:

(a)

The size, temper and composition

of the crowd. CS gas may induce

panic in a tightly packed crowd.

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Crowd Confrontation Operation

(b)

Whether wind conditions allow

the speedy build-up of an effective

concentration.

(c)

The downwind hazard to

uninvolved persons or traffic.

(d)

The need to avoid CS gas

cartridges entering confined

spaces such as the interior of

buildings, as the gas can be

dangerous in a confined space.

(e)

Whether the reduction in visibility

caused by the use of CS gas

hampers the detention of

ringleaders.

(f)

The most appropriate means of

delivery taking account of these

factors, safety and the

achievement of the aim.

(g)

The risk of discharging canisters

being thrown back at own forces.

(h)

The degree of protection of

security forces.

Ancillary Equipment. These are items not covered

by the categories above and include barricades that

may be used to channel a crowd in a particular way

or to deny access to certain areas or facilities.

Barricades may become in themselves a focus for

the crowd where they are seen as objects of control

and the intent may be to break through as a sign of

defiance. Caltrops may be used to prevent vehicular

access along routes although their use either has to

be a surprise or, if they are visibly emplaced, they

must be carefully guarded. High power spotlights

enable ringleaders to be identified and targeted

during low light conditions as well as other general

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uses. Fire extinguishers are also ancillary

equipment. Although the CF does not have war

dogs, they may also be considered to be an ancillary

NLW, where canine units are available.

NON-LETHAL CAPABILITY SET

In the near future, when a unit is notified to deploy on a

mission that will likely involve CCO in some capacity, it may draw

and use a NLCS to enhance its force protection and to reduce non-

combatant casualties. An NLCS could contain the weapon systems,

munitions, and equipment required to satisfy most operational

requirements for an enhanced capability to apply non-lethal force. It

could be employed in a manner that will incapacitate personnel or

material, while minimizing fatalities or permanent injury or damage to

property and the environment. A CF conceptual NLCS may be

designed to support a 200-person unit, reinforced with support

personnel, as a basis for employment of the components. The set

contents can be divided into four categories of equipment:

Individual Protective Equipment. These items

could include helmets, face and body shields

(ballistic and riot control types), shin and knee

guards, groin protection, gloves, and other protective

garments as they become available.

Weapons. These items could include a shotgun, riot

batons, individual Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) [Pepper

Spray] or M36 CR dispensers, riot control agent

dispersers, restraining devices, and a variety of non-

lethal munitions.

Ancillary Equipment. These could include devices

such as bullhorns and voice-amplifying devices (for

protective masks), or tools to increase command and

control capabilities. They also include high-

intensity searchlights and devices that can be used at

local checkpoints for area denial, flex cuffs, and fire

extinguishers.

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Training Devices/Allocations. Each capability set

could include training devices and training

ammunition. Training ammunition is the minimum

necessary to conduct live-fire qualification or

familiarisation for each ammunition type. Since

many of the operations that require non-lethal

capabilities continue for extended periods, these sets

could provide training ammunition for three separate

unit rotations before training stocks require

replenishment or munitions stocks need to be

rotated.

EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR NON-LETHAL

WEAPONS

10.

Employment Principles. The following employment

principles are intended to ensure common direction, focused effort and

efficient use of NLW:

Authorization. Commanders will seek CDS

authorization to deploy with and employ specific

NLW through the rules of engagement (ROE)

process as detailed in B-GG-005-004/AF-005, Use

of Force in CF Operations.

Complement to Deadly Force. A force armed with

only traditional military weapons has few options

for effecting compliance—maintaining a presence,

the threat of force, including firing warning shots, or

actually employing deadly force. NLW provide

commanders with a more extensive array of options

providing the means for flexible and selective

engagement. The wider range of options provided

by non-lethal capabilities augments deadly force but

do not replace it. NATO policy on NLW states that

the resort to deadly force must always remain

available to a commander when the situation

demands it and NLW should never jeopardize the

right of soldiers to defend themselves with such

deadly force. ROE must be clearly articulated and

understood to establish the role of NLW as an

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additional means of employing force, for the specific

purpose of limiting death or serious injury. The

ROE continuum must not necessitate the use of

NLW as a precursor to deadly force.

Legality. The employment of NLW shall be

consistent with the following:

(1)

international law;

(2)

domestic Canadian law, and

(3)

host nation law (where applicable).

Variable Response Capability. In order to realize

their fullest potential NLW must be capable of

delivering varying levels of effects and be integrated

with lethal weapons. This characteristic is

sometimes referred to as a “rheostatic” or “tuneable”

capability. The objective is to enable commanders

to increase or decrease the degree of non-lethal

effects applied in order to ensure compliance. The

rheostatic capability provides a range of effects

necessary to achieve a continuum of force scale. It

is not necessary for a single system to have this

characteristic, but rather, that the family of NLW

employed by the force possesses this capability.

Notwithstanding the above, our forces should never

be limited to carrying only NLW. Each soldier must

have recourse to conventional deadly force

whenever necessary.

11.

Planning Considerations. Planning for the use of NLW

should always consider the following:

The operational response to possible reactions by the

target should, if practical, be fully rehearsed.

Planning must also consider the potential counter-

measures that a target group might employ to negate

the effects of NLW.

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Preparations should include a plan to deal with and

seek the support of the media. Personnel

participating in interviews or briefings must be

prepared to address the role of NLW so as to provide

a clear understanding of the role of these weapons.

Medical, legal, civil and public affairs plans should

be integrated into the overall plan for the use of

NLW.

12.

Training and Organization. NLW should enhance the

commander’s ability to accomplish assigned missions. As much as

possible, NLW should be compatible, complementary and easily

integrated with current and planned conventional weapons. They

should be designed for simplicity of operation and maintenance. As

much as possible, non-lethal effects should be delivered by existing

launchers and weapon systems. NLW training must be readily

integrated into other individual and unit training activities. NLW and

tactics should be designed for ease of use after brief periods of

individual and collective training. This training should not detract

from the unit’s other operational training tasks. The use and

maintenance of these systems should not require commanders to make

major alterations to the organization of their units or dedicate a

significant percentage of the unit’s assets to these purposes.

SECTION 3

MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT

13.

Use of Dogs. Although the CF does not possess canine units,

they are an invaluable asset in assertive dispersal techniques used by

civilian law enforcement authorities and other military allies. They

may therefore be available to a Canadian commander and some

understanding of their utility is provided below. It is of paramount

importance that the dogs and handlers be well trained and disciplined.

The mere presence of the dogs as a show of force may act as a

deterrent to crowd action against members of the crowd management

teams. This is due to the strong psychological effect that the fear of

the dog being utilized may have on people in the crowd. Military

working dog (MWD) teams can also be employed in conjunction with

CCO formations as a method of increasing the crowd's apprehension

about approaching or engaging the formation. The MWD teams

should be placed behind the formation, in plain sight of the crowd, but

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in front of the command element. The MWD teams work back and

forth behind the formation as an intimidation measure. The presence

of MWD teams, coupled with the presence of soldiers prepared to

conduct CCO, produce a profound psychological effect on the crowd.

MWD teams must depart the area prior to the use of riot control

agents. MWD teams must move a safe distance from the crowd to

ensure the safety of the canines. Canine units may be used for:

static guard positions;

access denial at streets, buildings, vehicle assembly

points, police barricades, and checkpoints;

foot patrol of specific areas; and

they may also replace team members from any of

these positions or add strength to a team facing

numerical superiority from a crowd.

14.

Canine units are used in cordon formation to reduce the risk

of flanking manoeuvres or to assist with officer rescue operations.

The decision to activate the canine units in aggressive crowd dispersal

techniques must be the decision of the on-site commander. This action

must be utilized only as a measure of last resort when lesser force options

have been exhausted, ineffective or are inappropriate to the actions of the

crowd. The use of canine units will require specific ROE.

15.

The handler must keep dogs on lead. Escape routes must be

available for the crowd when the canine units are deployed.

16.

Photography. Agitators and the general public realize that

photographs implicating them in violence may hasten their arrest and

conviction. Overt photography may therefore help to disperse a

crowd. It can, however, have an apposite effect either because the

ringleaders have kept in the backg2round, or because those who believe

they have been photographed set out to smash the cameras and destroy

the evidence. Photography must therefore be used circumspectly and

cameramen must be protected.

17.

Cameras. The camera can help to identify leaders, weapons

being employed and record tactics being used. Events must be

documented to hold personnel, factions, and gangs or groups

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accountable. To ensure that the right message is being presented, the

information environment must be controlled through the synchronized

efforts of the public affairs, legal, PSYOPS, and CIMIC cells.

Photographs form a valuable record of events, but a hand held video

recorder provides a more effective and immediate record of events

with dates and times superimposed. A prudent commander ensures

that both cameras and video recorders are available to cover any event

where trouble is anticipated. Helicopters can easily be employed to

record events, by camera or video, for the commander on the ground.

The use of the media to obtain suitable photographs, video film shots

and other associated evidence should also be considered. It may be

appropriate for the superior HQ to monitor and record the international

TV and media outlets if the incident has attracted such attention.

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ANNEX A

GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

The purpose of this annex is to provide a glossary of terms

and abbreviations relating to CCO.

Terms and Definitions. The following terms and definitions

are used throughout this document:

Booby-Trap. A device designed, constructed or

adapted to kill or injure, which functions when a

person disturbs or approaches an apparently

harmless object or performs an apparently safe act.

Civil Disobedience. For the purposes of CCO, this

term is included in the term crowd, but it can further

be defined as a non-violent defiance of civil

authority or challenge to public policy, law or action

that protestors believe runs counter to constitutional

principle or to some basic right of conscience,

dignity or welfare.

Civil Disturbance. For the purposes of CCO, this

term is included in the term crowd, but it can further

be defined as group acts of violence and disorder

prejudicial to public law and order.

Controlling Forces. This collective term is used to

describe the police, military and civil agencies used

by a government to maintain or restore law and

order.

Crowd. A crowd is defined as a concentration of

people gathered together whose presence or

anticipated behaviour is such that it requires action

for the maintenance of order. This definition of a

crowd is primarily focused at a civilian body. Since

it may include militia, non-uniformed combatants,

asymmetric elements, or terrorists, these elements

are normally considered as combatants. The use of

the term “crowd” encompasses a plethora of other

non-doctrinal terms as disturbances, gatherings or

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mobs. For the purposes of doctrinal clarity, these

may be considered as related and interchangeable

terms, but crowd will be considered as the

overarching term to include them all.

Orderly Crowd. Orderly crowds are generally self

controlled, operate on reason, willing to keep peace

and hesitate to take group action, but lack trained

organization and effective leadership..

Disorderly Crowd. Disorderly crowds have an

active nucleus, draw spectators, and are

unpredictable. Disorderly crowds are very

emotional, usually progress to some form of

aggressive action, are bordering on violence, could

quickly lose control and develop into a riot, have

identifiable militant members taking leadership and

individuals circulating through the crowd

encouraging others.

Crowd Confrontation Operations. Crowd

confrontation operations is defined as military

operations conducted by a military force to manage

a crowd whose formation, presence or anticipated

behaviour is such that action is required.

CCO Hierarchy. A COO hierarchy has been

developed in order to identify subsets of activities

that may occur sequentially, concurrently, or in

isolation from each other. CCO cover the entire

spectrum of crowd interaction from observing a

demonstration to manoeuvring a crowd within the

area of operations (AO). They encompasse the

entire spectrum of conflict and cover the continuum

of operations. There are six elements to the CCO

hierarchy: crowd monitoring, crowd avoidance,

crowd disengagement, crowd control, crowd

dispersal and crowd manoeuvring.

Crowd Monitoring. Crowd monitoring consists of

activities to study, predict, observe and report on

potential and actual crowds.

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Glossary and Abbreviations

Crowd Avoidance. Crowd avoidance consists of

activities to minimize or avoid contact with a crowd.

The intent is to persuade the crowd toward

acceptable behaviour, recommend dissolution of the

crowd, negotiate, dissuade future activities, or

negate the effectiveness of the crowd, without force-

on-force contact.

Crowd Disengagement. Crowd disengagement

consists of activities to separate a military force

from a crowd, or to extract a specified person or

persons from a crowd.

Crowd Control. Crowd control consists of

activities to physically alter the action and behaviour

of a crowd.

Crowd Dispersal. Crowd dispersal consists of

activities to break-up a crowd.

Crowd Manoeuvring. Crowd manoeuvring

consists of activities to manage the movement of a

crowd. It may be very resource intensive and

normally encompasses all of the other CCO

activities.

Defence Establishment. Any area or structure,

such as bases, camps and buildings as well as

vessels, vehicles and aircrafts (including training

aircrafts provided by civilian contractors), under CF

control, as well as the materiel and other things

situated in or on such area or structure.

Demonstration. A demonstration is a public

meeting or march expressing protest or other

opinion on an issue. For the purposes of CCO, this

term is included in the term crowd, but it can further

be defined as a crowd that is exhibiting sympathy

for or against the authority, or some political,

economical, or social condition. Generally, it is a

non-violent civil protest by a public gathering to

show dissent, disapproval or remonstrance against

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an official policy. They may be legally sanctioned

or illegal, but the process of expression has statutory

and constitutional protection.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal. The detection,

identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe,

recovery and final disposal of unexploded explosive

ordnance (UXO). It may also include an explosive

ordnance that has become hazardous by damage or

deterioration.

Gathering. For the purposes of CCO, this term is

included in the term crowd but it can further be

defined as a group of people in a recognized area.

Gatherings can be either legal or illegal and may be

orderly or disorderly. Any gathering can begin

orderly and become disorderly. Disorderly

gatherings are those that exhibit increased violence

and illegality. Militarily speaking, gatherings with

potential to impact on operations are termed crowds.

Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). Those

devices placed or fabricated in an improvised

manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious,

pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals, designed to

destroy, disfigure, distract or harass. IED may

incorporate military stores, but are normally devised

from non-military components.

Non-lethal Weapons. NLW are those weapons,

munitions and devices that are explicitly designed

and primarily employed for non-lethal effects on

personnel with a low probability of permanent injury

and non-lethal effects on equipment with a

minimum of undesired damage while respecting the

environment. This definition does not include

information operations (e.g. jamming, psychological

operations, etc.) or any other military capability not

designed specifically for the purpose of minimizing

fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and

undesired damage to the environment, even though

these capabilities may have non-lethal effects (e.g.

smoke and illumination).

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Glossary and Abbreviations

Panic. For the purposes of CCO, this term is

included in the term crowd but it can further be

defined as a panicked crowd that lacks organization,

purpose or control, and involves frenzied personnel

exhibiting uncharacteristically uncontrolled and

violent behaviour, e.g. an out of control mob. Panic

is extreme fear that inspires unreasoned and frantic

efforts to reach safety or to achieve security. It is

highly contagious and can cause people to become

so irrational that their actions endanger themselves

and others.

Riot Control. For the purposes of CCO, this term is

included in the term crowd control.

Unlawful Assembly. For the purposes of CCO, this

term is included in the term crowd, but it is defined

in the Criminal Code of Canada as an assembly of

three or more persons who, with intent to carry out

any common purpose, assemble in such a manner or

so conduct themselves when they are assembled as

to cause persons in the neighbourhood of the

assembly to fear, on reasonable grounds, that they:

(1)

will disturb the peace tumultuously; or

(2)

will by that assembly, needlessly and

without reasonable cause, provoke other

persons to disturb the peace tumultuously.

Abbreviations. The following abbreviations are used in this

publication:

1 CAD

1 Canadian Air Division

ABCA

United-States (America), Britain, Canada,

Australia

ACP

Aid of the Civil Power

ALEA

Assistance to law enforcement authorities

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Area of operations

AOR

Area of responsibility

ASF

Auxiliary security force

Command and control

C2W

Command and control warfare

CAS

Chief of Air Staff

Capability component

CCC

Criminal Code of Canada

CCO

Crowd confrontation operation(s)

CFNA

Canadian Forces Northern Area

CIMIC

Civil-military cooperation

CIS

Communications and information systems

CLS

Chief of Land Staff

CMS

Chief of Maritime Staff

CSS

Combat Service Support

CWC

Chemical Weapons Convention

EOD

Explosive ordnance disposal

Electronic warfare

GST

Geomatics support team

HNS

Host nation support

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Glossary and Abbreviations

ICBRD

Improvised chemical, biological and

radiological device

IDAM

Isolate, Dominate, maintain common situational

Awareness, and employ

Multidimensional/Multi-echeloned actions

IED

Improvised explosive device

Information operations

IPB

Intelligence preparation of the battlespace

IPTF

International Police Task Force

ISR

Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

ISTAR

Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and

reconnaissance

IRU

Immediate reaction unit

JHQ

Joint Headquarters

LAV

Light armoured vehicle

LEA

Law enforcement agency

LFAA

Land Force Atlantic Area

LFCA

Land Force Central Area

LFQA

Land Force Quebec Area

LFWA

Land Force Western Area Source

LOAC

The Law of Armed Conflict

MARLANT

Maritime Forces Atlantic Source

MARPAC

Maritime Forces Pacific Source

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Military Police

MSU

Military Specialized Unit

MWD

Military working dog

NBC

Nuclear, biological and chemical

NBCD

Nuclear, biological and chemical defence

NDCC

National Defence Command Centre

NLCS

Non-lethal capability set

NDA

The National Defence Act

NEO

Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations

NGO

Non-Governmental Organization

Non-lethal

NLW

Non-lethal weapons

Observation post

Op O

Operation order

OPP

Operational planning process

PAff

Public affairs

PSO

Peace support operations

PSYOPS

Phychological operations

QRF

Quick reaction force

SAR

Search and rescue

RCA

Riot control agents

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Glossary and Abbreviations

ROE

Rules of engagement

ROEAUTH

Rules of engagement authorization

ROEREQ

Rules of engagement request

Rendezvous

SOFA

Status of Forces Agreement

SOP

Standing operating procedure

TAOR

Tactical area of operational responsibility

TCP

Traffic control post

Task force

TFC

Task force commander

TIM

Toxic industrial material

TFBH

Task Force Bosnia Herzegovina

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees

UXO

Unexploded explosive ordnance

VCP

Vehicle checkpoint

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ANNEX B

AIDE-MÉMOIRES FOR SPECIAL TASKS RELATED TO

CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

This annex contains the following aide-mémoires:

Appendix 1—Aide-Mémoire on Defensive Counter-

Measures in Crowd Confrontation Operations.

Appendix 2—Aide-Mémoire on Field Defences and

Obstacles in an Urban Crowd Confrontation

Situation.

Appendix 3—Aide-Mémoire on Cordon and Search

Operations.

Appendix 4—Aide-Mémoire for Searching

Personnel and Checking Documents.

Appendix 5—Aide-Mémoire for Searching

Vehicles.

Appendix 6—Aide-Mémoire for Searching

Buildings.

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APPENDIX 1

AIDE-MÉMOIRE ON DEFENSIVE COUNTER-MEASURES

IN CROWD CONFRONTATION OPERATIONS

Ensure that whatever action/counter-measure you use is

within your rules of engagement (ROE) and Use of Force Summary

Card. Some suggestions for counter-measures are:

ACTION

COUNTER-MEASURES

Verbal Abuse.

Ignore verbal abuse.

Obscene remarks,

torments, jeers, and

accusations.

Ridicule. Slogans

Provocation is not justification for retaliation.

on vehicles and

Restraint must be exercised until the offender

installations, flowers

touches the service person, at which time, non-

placed in service

deadly force may be applied, as authorized by

rifle muzzles.

ROE and Use of Force Summary Card.

Attacks. Gangs

Orders for posts or patrols should detail

threatening,

immediate action for defence of detachments (e.g.

intimidating, or

remain in, or move to defensive area, call for

attacking

assistance, apply the minimum force for defence,

detachments.

and identify leader for arrest and evidence

purposes when help arrives, as authorized by

ROE and Use of Force Summary Card).

Throwing Objects.

Remove or prevent access to source, if

Rocks, sticks,

possible. Do not throw materials back at

bottles, etc.

rioters and persons disturbing the peace.

Possible actions include: withdrawal to better

ground, absorb barrage while waiting for

rioters and persons disturbing the peace to tire,

intimidate by use of cameras, separate activists

from spectators, arrest leaders, as authorized

by ROE and Use of Force Summary Card.

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ACTION

COUNTER-MEASURES

Throwing

Step aside to avoid. Show restraint if not

Chemicals. Molotov

directly endangering troops or general public.

cocktails, acid, etc. at

Apply the minimum force necessary to prevent

personnel.

further attacks, detain as authorized by ROE

and Use of Force Summary Card.

Molotov Cocktails.

Move out of range or provide close protection.

Against vehicle

Call for assistance. Locate, isolate, and apply

patrols.

the minimum force necessary to capture, or if

action continues, apply force to prevent, as

authorized by ROE and Use of Force Summary

Card.

Molotov Cocktails

Ensure outer perimeter is beyond throwing

and Grenades.

range, if possible. Detain or prevent by

Against vital points.

applying the minimum force necessary, as

authorized by ROE and Use of Force Summary

Card.

Sniper Fire.

Call for assistance. Locate, isolate, and

evacuate bystanders from area, neutralize the

sniper using the minimum force necessary, as

authorized by ROE and Use of Force Summary

Card.

Random Weapon

Call for assistance, and beware of panic from

Fire. From within

within group or mob. Identify, detain as

groups or mobs.

authorized by ROE and Use of Force Summary

Card.

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APPENDIX 2

AIDE-MÉMOIRE ON FIELD DEFENCES AND OBSTACLES

IN AN URBAN CROWD CONFRONTATION SITUATION

INTRODUCTION

The aim of these notes is to outline how field defences and

obstacles can be used in crowd confrontation operations.

OBSTACLES

Obstacles are used to control pedestrians or vehicles.

Additional information pertaining to obstacles can be found in

B-GL-332-001/FP-001 Unit Standing Operating Procedures and

Tactical Aide-Mémoire and, once published, B-GL-361-005/FP-001

Obstacles.

Obstacles may be erected either temporarily or as a

permanent part of the protection around Defence establishments, or

designated areas. The traditional obstacles of barbed wire and

kniferests are used in these situations, but a new factor, particularly in

regard to temporary obstacles, is the difficulty of driving pickets into

hard surfaces and so anchoring them firmly to the ground. In these

circumstances, heavy weights in the form of concrete obstacles such as

concrete cylinders, concrete tetrahedrons and dragon's teeth may be

used. Oil drum obstacles and steel tetrahedrons may also be used.

In order to assist in the control of traffic, road bumps may be

used. These are bumps 12 to 15 centimetres in height, and about 60

centimetres wide, constructed across the roadway. They are usually

made of asphalt keyed into the road surface. Wide sidewalks may

have to be similarly treated. On occasions, temporary bumps may be

required; they can be constructed of timber.

FIELD DEFENCES

Field defences are used to protect personnel, weapons and

supplies from hostile elements and may be constructed where there is

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time. Reference should also be made to B-GL-361-006/FP-001

Engineer Field Manual Field Fortifications

Sangars. The digging of field defences is seldom possible;

breastworks or sangars are almost always required. They could be

used for both fire positions and observation posts. Detailed design and

construction will depend on local circumstances; the information given

in these notes should be taken for general guidance only.

Materials. A number of different materials have been tested

against various types of small-arms fire, but in the majority of cases,

sandbags filled with compacted sand or earth have been found to be

the most satisfactory. Where elevated positions are required, the

weight of the necessary sandbags may be too great for the structure of

the building. In these circumstances, mild steel, armoured plate, or

brickwork may be used. Engineer advice must be sought for

construction of this kind. Purposely acquired bulletproof material,

such as fibreglass or kevlar shields could also be used but due to

unpredictable bulletproofing properties any attempts to use other

materials must be avoided unless they have been tested by the

Engineers.

Design Principles. When designing or siting positions, the

factors below should be borne in mind:

Use of Weapons. Fire positions must allow the

effective use of weapons.

Protection. The positions must be strong enough to

withstand attacks from the heaviest known weapon

that is likely to be used.

Speed. The urgency and expected duration of the

protective works will dictate the type of materials to

be used and the design. Rapid construction will rely

on sandbags and similar material, while low urgency

or long duration will allow the use of other materials

such as concrete.

Simplicity. Designs should be simple and strong.

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Appendix 2 to Annex B

Development. The positions should allow for

progressive improvement.

Strength. The constructed position must be strong

enough and properly designed to be stable and not

liable to collapsing under its own weight. This

applies to all sandbag construction

Control and Communications. The control and

communications requirements of the users of the

protective position must be considered. This

includes the ability to reinforce or resupply.

Concealment. The occupants of a defensive

position in an urban disturbance situation should,

whenever possible, be screened from outside view.

SIGHT SCREENS

Sniping into controlling forces, bases and at troops engaged

on static tasks in the open (e.g. EOD teams) may be minimized by

erecting sightscreens to prevent observation. These are normally of

corrugated iron erected on scaffolding or timber frames.

CONCLUSION

10.

To be effective in urban conditions, obstacles must be firmly

held down. If pickets cannot do this, heavy weights are required.

11.

Where time allows, well-sited and constructed sangars allow

controlling forces to dominate urban areas by observation and fire.

12.

There is no wholly satisfactory substitute for sandbags for

rapid emplacement of protective works, although they are labour and

maintenance intensive. More durable works constructed out of

concrete or large earth filled containers (such as the Hesco-Bastion)

should be used when feasible. Protective works should have a roof

and interior revetments. Due to their unpredictable peformance

unconventional materials such as plastics should only be used where

construction from other materials is impracticable.

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APPENDIX 3

AIDE-MÉMOIRE ON CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS

The purpose of a cordon and search operation is to isolate a

chosen area by cordoning if off, and then systematically searching it.

It is normally a joint military and police task that has the aim of the

capturing wanted persons, arms, ammunition, explosives, documents,

supplies, etc.

Legal Considerations. There are significant legal issues

relating to cordon and search operations, particularly searches and the

interception and disruption of communications. The following

procedure shall only be conducted when lawful authority has been

established for the cordon and search operation.

Fundamentals. The fundamentals of cordon and search

operations are:

Intelligence. Cordoning an area, thus restricting the

populace's movement and then searching their

homes, is bound to irritate the innocent and may,

particularly if the inconvenience is unduly

prolonged, cause the loss of their support.

Haphazard searching is seldom effective and it

absorbs very large numbers of personnel and

resources. It is therefore critical that there should be

good intelligence, indicating that a search will be

productive.

Surprise. The operation must be conducted with

complete security and mounted in a speedy and

effective manner to surprise the wanted persons and

therefore achieve the desired results.

Effectiveness. Sufficient resources must be

available to conduct a tight cordon and effective

search. Insufficient resources leave gaps, which can

be used to escape, thus negating any advantage of

the operation, losing the confidence of the civil

population and wasting time and resources.

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Organization. Rapid deployment is necessary and vehicles

and/or helicopters are used whenever possible. If troops move on foot,

the likelihood of warning being passed into the target area is greatly

increased. An operation is conducted by parties, tailored to the

number of available personnel and is organized as follows:

Joint Headquarters. A single headquarters

containing command elements of all forces

involved, e.g. military, police, and intelligence, and

the necessary communications to exercise control.

Inner Cordon. This is the military force that

contains the area to prevent outward movement.

Outer Cordon. This is the military force that

isolates the area to prevent inward movement;

Search Parties. These are the police parties,

possibly with military protection, which search

buildings and their occupants.

Holding Parties. These are the military parties that

establish and guard temporary holding centres.

Screening Teams. These are the police intelligence

teams that conduct interrogation and identify

suspects.

Escorts. These are soldiers who escort suspects to

permanent civil facilities after interrogation.

Reserves. These are military and civilian law

enforcement personnel designated for tasks such as:

(1)

dealing with disturbances within the

cordon;

(2)

reinforcing the cordon;

(3)

pursuit of persons breaking out from the

cordon;

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(4)

maintaining standing patrols on roofs or

high ground;

(5)

enforcing a curfew;

(6)

operating and protecting public address

equipment; and

(7)

providing relief.

Stages. There are two stages to a cordon and search

operation. They are:

the cordon stage; and

the search stage.

Cordon Stage. The purpose of a cordon is to isolate and

seal-off a designated area to prevent entry or exit, prior to a search

operation. Cordons can be either urban or rural. A cordon must be

able to:

observe inwards at ground level;

observe outwards, in urban surroundings this must

include roof-tops, upper story windows, etc.;

observe inwards above ground level where there are

buildings close by;

cover all roads leading into the area;

provide mutual support within itself;

physically prevent a breakout; and

block underground access/egress routes.

A cordon established in darkness must be unbroken, with

every man in sight of the next. In daylight, a cordon can sometimes be

thinned out and maintained by a chain of observation posts of one or

two personnel, with gaps covered by patrols. Normally, it is

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impossible to maintain a continuous cordon for any length of time,

owing to the large number of personnel required. A cordon of 100

metres in a built-up area requires nearly 30 personnel. The following

may be used as a guide:

cordon facing inwards—15 personnel per

100 metres;

facing outwards and watching opposite roof-tops

and windows—an additional five personnel per

100 metres;

facing inwards and watching roof-tops and windows

above the cordon—an additional five personnel per

100 metres;

to cover any side roads or alleys leading into the

area—an additional one or two personnel per

100 metres; and

numbers may be reduced in an area with large

modern buildings.

The aim of a cordon is to surround an area before the

inhabitants realize what is happening. It is sometimes best to move

directly into position by helicopters or vehicles, while on other

occasions it may be advisable to deplane or debus some distance away.

The decision depends on the available approaches and exits, and on

the local situation. Normally, the quickest way is the best, the

approach being by one route whenever possible, in order to simplify

control.

Exact timing is the most important factor affecting the

success of a cordon, and the most difficult to achieve. As far as

possible, the area must be surrounded simultaneously; if some troops

are late, an alert suspect is given an open exit through which he can

escape. Equally, surprise will be lost if anyone connected with the

operation arrives in the target area before the cordon is in position.

Detectives and police searchers should move at the rear of the military

convoy.

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10.

A route is easier to negotiate if movement takes place when

there is very little civilian traffic on the roads; this may be just before

dawn, or possibly in the middle of the day. The following points

should be considered:

Forward Rendezvous. When the approach is made

in vehicles, there should, if possible, be a forward

rendezvous (RV), so that the commander can regain

absolute control prior to the move into the cordon

area. It should be close to, but out of sight and

sound of, the target area. Vehicles should not

remain in the forward RV for more than two or three

minutes because of the possible loss of surprise.

Routes. It is normally best to move to the forward

RV by one route, as this is the simplest way in

which to coordinate the simultaneous arrival of the

whole convoy. From the forward RV to the

objective, enough routes should be used to ensure

that the cordon is established simultaneously. The

sub-unit with the furthest distance to travel should

move first; subsequent departures from the forward

RV can be on a timed basis.

Traffic Control. It is seldom feasible to deploy

traffic police in advance without prejudicing

security. A police vehicle, preferably accompanied

by police motorcyclists, should travel immediately

behind the column leader and drop off policemen for

point duty as the column progresses; these personnel

rejoin the rear of the column, being picked up by

another police vehicle. The system of traffic control

should be activated just before the convoy is due to

move from the forward RV; traffic must be held up

at the rear by traffic policemen from the police

vehicle in the rear. If a number of side roads lead

into the route selected between the forward RV and

the target area, they must be sealed off to prevent

civilian vehicles from infiltrating into the convoy.

The police does this from the police vehicle

travelling behind the column leader's vehicle.

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11.

When a large area is to be searched it may be desirable to

temporarily disable the commercial telephone system and employ

jamming as required. The following action may have to be taken with

the concurrence of the local civil authority:

Telephone Exchanges. Automatic exchanges have

to be dealt with by communications technicians

isolating the circuits at the exchange or at a

distribution point. This requires that a

communications officer be brought into the planning

at an early stage. Local telephone technicians may

be required to carry out the actual physical

disconnection. In order to preserve security, they

should not be told of the task until the last minute

and once they have been told, a military lineman

should escort them at all times until the task is

completed. Any manually operated exchanges in the

area concerned should be occupied by troops and

include a bilingual capability. Operators should be

instructed to inform subscribers who attempt to

make the calls that the service has been discontinued

temporarily.

Coordination. The time factor is important and the

disconnection of lines should be synchronized with

the occupation of exchanges. Security prohibits any

prior warning being given to civilian subscribers.

Mobile Phone Networks and Civilian Radios.

The proliferation of mobile phones and civilian

radios may require that their supporting networks or

signals may need to be monitored or jammed in

concert with the IO plan.

12.

Debussing/Deplaning and Deployment. As soon as troops

leave the forward RV, surprise is lost. Speed in identifying the target

area and in deployment is therefore essential. To achieve this rapid

deployment, the following sequence of action could take place:

In a vehicle approach, each company commander

travels about 30 metres in front of his column with a

guide, if one is available. The company commander

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then has time to confirm the correct spot for all to

debus, or from which to direct his platoons to their

debussing points in their sectors of the cordon. In

the case of a helicopter approach, the company

commander travels in the first helicopter.

Platoon commanders quickly indicate section

positions, as speed is essential. Section

commanders, without a pause, lead their sections

and double to the areas allotted. The cordon should

not be on the close side of the road, but as far back a

possible to gain a field of view. If strengths permit,

two-man patrols move behind the cordon in each

sector to act as pursuit parties should anyone break

through.

On arrival at section areas, troops adopt the “on

guard” position (less bayonets), facing their

individual areas of responsibility. The platoon

commander quickly confirms that the troops are

deployed, and he or the platoon second in command

coordinate areas of observation.

13.

Action after Deployment. The following suggested

sequence of events may have to be varied for particular tasks

according to the circumstances:

Checking the Cordon. The cordon commander

makes an immediate check of the area and

personally ensures that the overall cordon is

complete. Roads or alleys and open spaces that are

likely escape routes are sealed off with wire,

barricades, etc., but remain under observation by

sentries. When the troops have been in the “on

guard” position for a few minutes, the cordon

commander may feel that the full psychological

effect has been achieved, and a more relaxed, but

still alert, position may be adopted.

Instructions to the Public. Once the cordon is in

position, the police warn inhabitants that a curfew is

in force, and tell them what to do if they wish to

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enter or leave the area. This is a police matter, but

the military commander tells the police where he

wishes the cordon entry and exit point to be sited.

Challenging. If anyone in the cordon sees a suspect

approaching, he shouts “on guard”, all those in his

sector shall adopt the “on guard” position and pass

on the warning order verbally.

Thinning the Cordon. The cordon may have to

remain in position for long periods, the length of

time depending on the number of buildings, size of

the area, the strength of the police available for

searching, and the density of the community. To

thin out the cordon, the following action should be

taken:

(1)

position wire obstacles, barricades, etc., to

cut off escape routes, or replace the cordon

line by pairs of sentries sited tactically and

in depth;

(2)

sentries require good all-round observation

and communications to give warning of any

attempt to break out; roof-top OPs can

assist; and

(3)

when thinning out the cordon, entire

sections should be removed; they can then

be rested close at hand and form a tactical

reserve.

14.

Search Stage. The purpose of the search stage is to conduct

a search to discover and detain persons and/or confiscate other

contraband items. There are two types of searches. They are:

Detailed. A systematic, itemized search of a

designated area (all persons, homes and vehicles,

etc.).

Tertiary. A spot search of a designated area.

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15.

Search Techniques. Searches are one of the opportunities

on which the security forces have the initiative and can decide when,

where and how to act. Therefore, they play an important part in

operations. Constant harassment of hostile persons by searching

forces them to move arms, ammunition, explosives and other devices

so that they are placed at greater risk of discovery. The concept

behind search operations has developed quite extensively over the

years to take account of the clear evidence that:

hostile groups have become more sophisticated in

their ability to hide and conceal weapons and

equipment and this requires a more complicated

search response; and

the effectiveness of search operations has risen

markedly and can play a significant role in the

capture of hostile weapons and equipment belonging

to hostile groups.

16.

The aim of search operations is to:

protect persons and property that may be potentially

at risk;

gain intelligence and information;

deprive hostile groups of their resources; and

gain evidence to assist subsequent prosecution.

17.

Objectives. Such operations are usually carried out jointly

by military and civilian law enforcement authorities with a view to:

the capture of wanted persons, arms, radio

equipment, supplies, explosives or documents;

the disruption of hostile activities such as bomb

making or weapon manufacture; and

the elimination of the influence of hostile groups in

a specific locality, particularly with regard to

expanding a controlled area.

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18.

A search usually involves looking for:

persons;

hostages held in captivity;

threats to the security forces during the search (this

includes mines, booby-traps and improvised

devices);

arms of all kinds (these arms may have been

stripped down and the parts hidden in different

places);

ammunition;

bulk explosives;

demolition accessories, detonators, detonating cord

and fuses;

radios, relays and micro-switches;

NBC warfare agents and materials for creating

improvised chemical, biological and radiological

devices (ICBRD);

NBCD equipment such as respirators, and auto

injectors; and

anything which is out of place; e.g. unusual

quantities of batteries, wire, nails, sugar, petrol, or

chemicals and fertilizers which can be used to make

home-made explosives.

19.

The police normally carry out a search and give all the

necessary orders to the civilians involved. Each search party should

consist of at least one policeman and a protective military escort;

ideally, all search personnel will be civil police. The escort's task is to

guard the police searchers and to prevent anyone from escaping.

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20.

If a military search team is established it must be carefully

chosen and properly trained. Unqualified personnel should never do

searching, except in an emergency. Team members should have some

knowledge of building and vehicle construction and will normally be

based on the engineers, who are trained in booby traps, and explosives.

A search team should be established and trained together before

employment on a task; they should not be an ad hoc grouping formed

on the spot. The search team should include police (civil or MP) to

ensure the collection of evidence if that is required. In a purely

military operation with the aim of removing the threat and gathering

intelligence, such forensic gathering is not essential.

21.

Planning Search Operations. Searches require a great deal

of preliminary discussion and liaison with other units, and the success

of most searches is dependent upon meticulous planning. This is to

ensure that:

there is legal authority to conduct the search;

the operation is based on good intelligence;

adequate numbers of search teams and equipment

are deployed;

EOD teams must be alerted if it is believed that the

target is booby-trapped or if explosives may be

found;

the search is sprung on the target at the most

opportune moment; and

adequate cordon or protection troops are available to

prevent the escape of insurgents and to protect the

searchers from attack or distraction.

22.

Avoiding Rigid Procedures. It should be assumed that

hostile eyes observe every search made, and the techniques and

procedures used are noted. If searches are conducted according to a

rigid pattern, traps are likely to be set to catch those who use that

pattern. It is therefore most important that every action, from

establishing a cordon to the arrival of the search teams and their

method of searching in the target area be considered from this point of

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view. Varying procedures and drills is useful but some procedures

cannot and should not be varied to ensure consistency and avoid

possible safety error.

23.

Planning Factors. The main planning factors to cover when

search operations are considered are:

Tasking. Clear direction covering the operational,

legal and political considerations of any search

operation have to be established before any

searching commences.

The Objective of the Operation. Once this

objective has been decided upon, it needs to be set in

context with other military operations planned in the

same time frame. This factor usually provides the

sort of time/duration of operation that can be

allowed for the search operation.

The ‘Need to Know’ Caveat. This caveat is

probably the key to any successful search operation.

Commanders and their staffs should be introduced to

the plan according to a carefully calculated planning

sequence.

A Deception Plan. There will be a need for a

deception plan to protect sources or to achieve

operational surprise. It may well be necessary to

conceal the true nature of any search operation or its

timing from some of those taking part as part of the

‘need to know’ caveat.

Training. The area of operations (AO) probably

dictates the requirements for training and of the type

of specialists needed for particular tasks. If the task

is beyond unit resources then engineer advice and

support should be obtained.

Systematic Work Pattern. This applies both to the

planning of search operations as well as to the actual

conduct of the search. The approach to any search

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operation has to be careful, detailed and completely

systematic to avoid error or oversight.

Thoroughness of Work. As the title implies search

operations require a high level of thoroughness

before, during and on completion of any task.

24.

The Sequence of Planning a Search. Having covered the

main factors that affect the overall planning of a search operation, it is

necessary to consider in logical sequence, the more detailed planning

necessary to ensure that all points are covered. These are:

Anticipation of Hostile Action. Every searcher

needs to know the methods of disguising and hiding

objects by hostile groups in order to anticipate their

actions and methods. He needs to assess constantly

the adversary’s aim in order to pre-empt his actions.

In addition, a commander should also determine the

threat faced by the soldiers carrying out the

operation and whether, by his action, they have

become the targets. This should also include

consideration of the effect of the operation on the

local population and whether any action may

antagonize them unnecessarily.

Isolation of the Target Area. Here the use of a

cordon or other form of protection party has to be

decided. On no account should any person be

allowed in or out of a search area once the operation

has started.

Coordination of Action. All actions must be

coordinated to ensure a systematic and integrated

search operation. This should include the following:

(1)

the inter-action of members within a search

team and between different teams; and

(2)

the coordination between search teams and

other troops, the EOD disposal operator and

the local authorities.

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Minimizing Risks. Normally the most dangerous

moment of a search is on or soon after arrival in the

area. If activists are surprised or disturbed,

precipitate and violent action may ensue. Similarly

if civilians are involved there may be some attempt

to distract or delay the start of search operations.

Once military control of the target area has been

established then risks occur if searches move out of

sequence or if a sudden “find” leads to loss or

neglect of drills and procedures. “Finds” may

sometimes be decoys or ‘sacrifices’, in order to

distract attention from more valuable targets.

Maintenance of Records. These are invaluable in

the case of finds and the provision of evidence in

subsequent prosecutions—and more importantly in

providing the intelligence staff with more

information about the area and the way any hostile

groups operate, which can be recorded and used in

future operations.

25.

Detailed search techniques for persons, vehicles and

buildings are outlined in appendices 4 to 6 respectively. Some general

points to be noted are:

Searching Personnel. Some considerations are:

(1)

Occupants of a vehicle should be asked to

stand facing it with their hands resting on

the roof or side. The search should include

the armpits, the stomach, inside thighs and

the crotch. Clothing should not be patted,

as this might result in small flat objects

being missed, but should be rolled between

the fingers. Hats and hair must also be

checked.

(2)

Persons should be searched by searchers of

the same gender as those persons being

searched.

Searching Vehicles. Some considerations are:

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(1)

Vehicles. Each vehicle must be dealt with

separately. The selection of vehicles for

searching may be governed by instructions,

possibly based on intelligence, or it may be

left to the random choice of the roadblock

commander. It is seldom possible to

examine a vehicle completely at a

roadblock, particularly mechanical

stripping, and it may be necessary to escort

vehicles, for which such an examination is

contemplated, to a selected workshop.

(2)

Searchers. At least two searchers are

required for a minivan; larger vehicles need

more searchers and possibly special

equipment. There must also be an armed

sentry, who must not get involved in

searching; his task is to protect the

searchers and watch the occupants of the

vehicle being searched.

(3)

Conduct of Search. All vehicle occupants

must be searched and then made to stand

clear of their vehicle but close enough to be

involved should the vehicle be rigged with

explosives. The driver should then be

made to open all doors, the hood and trunk

in case of car bombs. This action shows

whether the driver is familiar with the car

and that he has not stolen it. The owner or

the driver of the vehicle must watch the

whole search.

(4)

Completion of Search. To refute

subsequent accusations of theft, on

completion of the search it may be

appropriate to get the vehicle’s owner to

sign voluntarily an indemnity certificate

stating that he has suffered no damage or

loss during the search. In case the owner

refuses to sign it, the searchers will make

sure to take adequate notes and photos in

order to help refute subsequent accusations.

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When this is completed, the vehicle is

allowed to proceed unless there is a reason

for detaining the vehicle or its occupant

longer.

(5)

Evidence. If a search uncovers anything

the evidence must be recorded.

Searching Buildings. Some considerations are:

(1)

Search parties must be courteous but firm.

Persons who are obstructive must be

warned that their conduct is an offence,

which may justify that they be detained to

allow the operation to proceed.

(2)

The search must be thorough and

systematic. Incriminating articles will not

be found easily. At the same time,

minimum damage should be caused to

property.

(3)

Yards and outbuildings such as garden

sheds and garages must be searched as

thoroughly as the main building.

(4)

The movement of persons whose premises

are being searched must be carefully

controlled.

(5)

Precautions must be taken against

subsequent allegations of theft or damage.

Teams should work in pairs.

(6)

Evidence of finds must be carefully

assembled, notes made as soon as possible

to include photographs if possible.

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APPENDIX 4

AIDE-MÉMOIRE FOR SEARCHING PERSONNEL AND

CHECKING DOCUMENTS

INTRODUCTION

Legal Considerations. There are significant legal issues

relating to search operations, particularly searches of persons. The

following procedures shall only be conducted when lawful authority

has been established to search personnel. Searches must only be

conducted in accordance with the appropriate orders and applicable

law. In certain circumstances persons can be searched as follows:

as a condition of entry;

at a security or post incident checkpoint;

when a person is detained;

to search any detained person for weapons or for any

other means that could pose a threat to the safety of

any person.

Great care must be taken when carrying out body searches.

The military forces must search in a manner that demonstrates their

professionalism and courtesy. These factors make it imperative that

searches of people are only conducted in circumstances that are

lawful.

SEARCHES

Types of Searches. There are two types of searches for

persons. These are:

quick body search (in the public eye);

detailed body search (out of the public eye).

Quick Body Search. The quick body search is normally

carried out:

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When dealing with a large number of people and a

detailed body search is not warranted.

As a preliminary to a detailed body search, when the

immediate requirement is to detect anything which

could be used to harm the searcher, the person being

searched or anyone else.

As a preliminary to a detailed body search when the

immediate requirement is to secure any evidential

material which could be jettisoned or destroyed

before the detailed search.

Procedure. The search should be conducted as

follows:

(1)

If possible searchers should work in pairs,

with one person doing the physical

searching and the other observing both the

searcher and the subject. The second

person may act as a cover for the first.

(2)

The searcher may place one foot between

the person’s feet and the wall. This will

enable him to kick the person’s feet out

from under him if he moves to escape or to

attack the searcher.

(3)

The searcher should not stand directly in

front or behind the subject so as to avoid

being kicked, kneed or butted with the

head.

(4)

The searcher should not be distracted or

intimidated and should avoid eye contact

with the subject.

(5)

The observer should watch for non-verbal

communications, e.g. increased

nervousness or tension or silent gestures to

others.

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