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Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2) - page 42

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a relationship are expected to display a benevolent and

“Respecting officers

and

caring attitude (ai；爱) toward their subordinates; the

loving enlisted personnel is

subordinates, an attitude of respect and love (zun 尊)

the concrete embodiment of

toward their superiors. Not to act in this way is to shirk

the principle of unity between

one’s social responsibilities.

officers and men. Its basic

spirit is that officers should

These terms of “caring” and “respect” are still used by

cherish soldiers, and be

the PLA to describe the ideal relationship between

concerned

about

their

military commanders or leaders and their subordinates,

maturation and advancement

as will be discussed in Chapter 2.¹⁰

as well as their food and

clothing and daily life;

Second, the superior partner in a relationship relies on

soldiers

should

respect

the subordinate partner for support and advice. The

officers, obey their leadership,

wise advisor was viewed by Confucian thinkers as a

and support their work.”⁹

crucial figure in benevolent and effective rule. The

— How to Be a Good NCO

willingness to “readily listen to advice” (congjianruliu;

从谏如流) and to recognize and correct mistaken policies distinguished a successful

ruler from a merely well-intentioned one.¹¹ In today’s PLA, commanders are

encouraged to be similarly humble about their position, and to accept the advice and

suggestions of their troops to correct their mistakes.¹²

Leaders gain moral and political authority through benevolent rule. Confucius

believed that morality had an inherent

“You should be a kindred spirit

attractiveness that would impel others to follow.

with your soldiers, using the heart

At the top of the Confucian social hierarchy

of a parent and the feelings of an

stood the emperor, whose political legitimacy

eldest brother to surmount their

derived from his benevolent behavior. A good

difficulties and alleviate their

Confucian ruler acted as father to his people

suffering, making sure to transfer

and cared for their material and moral welfare.

warmth to the bottom of their

hearts.”¹³

In today’s PLA, military leaders have taken on

the role of the benevolent ruler. A military

— How to Be a Good NCO

leader is expected to act as a father (or, at the

⁹ Ou Guozheng, Liu Changjian, and Sha Gongping, eds., How to Be a Good NCO (zenyang dang

haoshibing; 怎样当好士官) (Beijing: Long March Press, 2000), p. 223.

¹⁰ See, e.g., Ou Guozheng, Liu Changjian, and Sha Gongping, How to Be a Good NCO, pp. 222-224.

¹¹ Zhang Shiping, Historic Strategies for Reference: Historical Reflections on Contemporary Chinese

Strategy (shijian dalüe - dangdai zhongguo zhanlüe de lishi kaolü; 史鉴大略 - 当代中国战略的历史思考)

(Beijing: Military Science Press 2005), p. 99.

¹² Chen Zhou, Theory and Practice of the PLA Democratic System (zhongguo jiefangjun minzhu zhidu de

lilun yu shijian; 中国解放军民主制度的理论与实践) (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1993), p. 12.

¹³ Ou Guozheng, Liu Changjian, and Sha Gongping, How to Be a Good NCO, p. 94.

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grassroots level, as an “elder brother”¹⁴) to his soldiers and to care for their well-

being, while exacting discipline, loyalty, and respect from them in exchange.

Moral behavior must be taught by example. Confucianism stresses the importance

of modeling moral behavior as an

example to others. Confucian rulers

SETTING A GOOD EXAMPLE

were expected to behave in an

After coming to power in

1949, the CCP

irreproachably moral fashion, in part

conducted numerous campaigns to present PLA

because doing so inspired their

personnel as models of moral and political

subjects to act with a similar degree

rectitude for Chinese society. The most

of benevolence and morality.

extensive of these was a 1964 CCP campaign

exhorting the Chinese people to “learn from the

A similar emphasis on modeling

PLA.”¹⁵ Today, even enlisted personnel who are

moral behavior exists in today’s PLA.

not Party members are seen as spokespeople for

Countless newspaper articles and

Party values, not just while they serve in the

political campaigns describe the

military but also when they leave the PLA for

selfless actions of

“model soldiers”

civilian life. A recent handbook for platoon

and exhort others to follow their

leaders notes that the PLA acts as a

“big

example. PLA publications also

smelting furnace” and “a big school” that brings

emphasize the need for grassroots

the Chinese people together and teaches them

leaders to serve as ethical role models

how to behave, not just as military personnel

for their troops, and stress the

but as citizens. ¹⁶

importance of moral behavior for

gaining civilian support.¹⁷

Martial classics

The same period that brought forth Confucius also produced a host of military writings

on which the PLA still draws. These texts were largely compendia of advice for the

leaders of small kingdoms. The PLA teaches its members that the lessons contained in

these “classics” (jing; 经) prove the superiority of the Chinese military tradition.

¹⁴ “Grassroots” (jiceng; 基层) refers to PLA units below the regiment level - i.e., battalions, companies,

and platoons.

¹⁵ William W. Whitson, The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71

(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 527; Ralph L. Powell, “Commissars in the Economy: ‘Learn

from the PLA’ Movement in China,” Asian Survey 5:3 (Mar 1965), pp. 125-138.

¹⁶ Liu Shihao, Techniques and Methods for Platoon Leaders Commanding Troops (paizhang daibing jifa;

排长带兵技法) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 2005), p. 242.

¹⁷ See, e.g., Huang Shaowen, Techniques for Squad Leaders Commanding Troops (Banzhang daibing

jiqiao; 班长带兵技巧), 2^nd Edition (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 2005), p. 29; Chen Anren, On the

Cultivation of Military Talent’s Moral Character (junshi rencai pinde peiyu lun; 军事人才品德培育论)

(Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2001), p. 275.

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Seven of these works were gathered together by later Chinese scholars as the “Seven

Military Classics” (wujingqishu; 武经七书). The most prominent among these is Sun-

tzu’s

(Sunzi’s) Art of War. Zhu De, the first Commander-in-Chief of the PLA’s

predecessor Red Army, famously held The Art of War in such esteem that he committed

the entire book to memory, and used it to guide strategic decisions and plan key battles.¹⁸

Mao Zedong frequently referred to Sun-tzu’s principles in his own copious writings on

warfare. PLA textbooks today call The Art of War “the most valuable and influential

ancient book among all books, ancient and modern, Chinese and foreign,” and in 2006 it

was made a required text for all PLA academies, where it is used for “improving the

strategy

and

command

CHINA’S “SEVEN MILITARY CLASSICS”

proficiency

of

military

officers.”¹⁹

Sun-tzu’s Art of War (Sunzi Bingfa; 孙子兵法)

4^th c BC

Wuzi (Wuzi; 武子)

4^th c BC

The PLA draws the following

lessons from Sun-tzu and

Sima Fa (Simafa; 司马法)

4^th c BC

other

Chinese

military

Wei Liaozi (Weiliaozi; 尉缭子)

4^th-3^rd c BC

classics:

Tai Gong’s Six Secret Teachings

4^th-3^rd c BC

Avoid or minimize war

(Tai Gong liutao; 太公六韬)

if

possible.

Sun-tzu

advocates

minimizing

Three Strategies of Huang Shigong

2^nd-1^st c BC

destruction and finding

(Huang Shigong sanlüe; 黄石公三略)

ways other than direct

Questions and Replies between

7^th c AD

military engagement to

Tang Taizong and Li Weigong (Tang Taizong

win, particularly if one’s

Li Weigong wendui; 唐太宗李卫公问对)

physical

strength

is

inferior to that of one’s

adversary. Tactics of

“winning without fighting” include diplomatic negotiation,

breaking down enemy morale, and luring away enemy troops. When war is

unavoidable, the military classics discourage total annihilation of the enemy,

preferring to cow him rather than wipe him out.

These concepts are still used in today’s PLA. In one recent article, for instance, two

PLA senior colonels define tactics such as restricting access to information, disabling

but not physically destroying equipment and communications platforms, and

deceiving and demoralizing enemy troops as forms of “winning without fighting.”²⁰

¹⁸ Li Xiaobing, A History of the Modern Chinese Army (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky,

2007), p. 48.

¹⁹ Xu Jianjun and He Shaohua, eds., College Military Course of Study（daxue junshi jiaocheng; 大学军事

教程) (Changsha: Zhongnan University Press, 2004), p. 30; “‘The Art of War by Sunzi’ Becomes Required

Course for Chinese Cadets,” Xinhua, 5 May 2006, OSC CPP20060505052010. See also Qian Ruyi,

Command Decision-Making and Strategem (Beijing: Kunlun Publishing House, 1999), OSC

CPP20030424000250: “The Art of War…is the most profound and influential book of all the Chinese books

on war, and a celebrated ‘bible of war’ throughout the world.”

²⁰ Wang Xingsheng and Wu Zhizhong, “Opinion Piece on Military Soft Power,” Jiefangjun Bao, 7 Jun

2007, p. 6, OSC CPP20070607710013.

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Victory depends on careful planning. Chinese martial tradition emphasizes the need

to plan a war well before it begins, studying the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses

and making an honest assessment of one’s own. This tradition stresses realism over

ideals and flexibility over absolute tactical principles. Mao Zedong similarly pointed

out that

“a careless military man bases his military plans on his own wishful

thinking.…He does not know or does not want to know that every military plan must

be based on the necessary reconnaissance and on careful consideration of the enemy’s

situation, his own situation, and their interrelations.”²¹

Stratagem and deception are key

elements of military strength. The

“Although you are

“Observe calmly;

Art of War is famous for its emphasis

capable, display

secure our position;

on “stratagem” - tricks or schemes to

incapability [to your

cope with affairs

outwit the enemy. Sun-tzu writes that

enemy]. When

calmly; hide our

wars are won largely on the enemy’s

committed to employing

capacities and bide

miscalculation of one’s capabilities

your forces, feign

our time; be good at

and plans, so exploiting elements of

inactivity. When your

maintaining a low

surprise and disinformation should be

objective is nearby,

profile; and never

a military priority.

make it appear as if

claim leadership.”

distant; when far away,

— Deng Xiaoping’s “24-

Deceiving the enemy about one’s

create the illusion of

Character Strategy”

intentions and capabilities remains

being nearby.”

central to the PLA approach to war, as

— Sun-tzu’s Art of War

reflected in Deng Xiaoping’s

“24-

character strategy” of the early 1990s,

which he proclaimed as the basic approach China should take toward its foreign and

security policy. U.S. Department of Defense officials today believe that “secrecy and

deception” remain a central component of Chinese military strategy.²²

An army cannot win unless its members possess a strong fighting spirit. Ancient

martial texts place a premium on the mental and spiritual state, or qi (气), of the army.

We might think of qi as something like “morale,” which impels one to fight even

when one’s physical resources are exhausted. Commanders can nourish their troops’

qi by keeping them materially well-supplied, treating them benevolently, and

providing rewards and punishments that make their will to fight stronger than their

fear of death.²³

²¹ Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War” (1936),

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_12.htm.

²² Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of

Defense, 2008), Chapter 3.

²³ See “The Methods of the Ssu-ma,” translated by Ralph D. Sawyer, in Ralph D. Sawyer, ed., The Seven

Military Classics of Ancient China (New York: Basic Books, 1993), p. 121.

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Today’s PLA also views “fighting spirit” as the

“Experience shows that, given

key to martial success. Some PLA writers

equality of weaponry and

ascribe near-mystical qualities to this spirit,

armaments,

fighting

spirit

terming it a

“magic weapon for defeating

decides the result of wars; given

enemies.”²⁵ Mao Zedong stressed the importance

inferiority in weapons and

of “fighting spirit” when discussing the PLA’s

armaments, a strong fighting

successes in the Korean war, explaining that the

spirit may make up for the

difference between the more-advanced U.S.

inferiority in armaments.…”²⁴

military and the PLA was that the United States

— PLA Daily

had “more steel [weaponry] than qi” while China

had “more qi than steel.”²⁶

Warfare will be successful only if it is just and has the support of the people.

China’s ancient strategists believed that only just wars could be successful. Both

ancient Chinese texts and modern PLA writings define a just war as one fought on

behalf of all the people; they suggest that a war entered into for the personal gain of a

ruler or commander (or, PLA texts argue, for the gain of the bourgeois class) is

doomed to failure.

“Only by a just war…will the

This principle links the justness of an army’s

military be able to maintain the

cause with its ability to inspire the

“fighting

morale to achieve victory for a

spirit” necessary to win wars. It also notes that,

long period of time, pressing

in times of war, national unity rests on the

forward with indomitable will,

support not just of military personnel but of

and crushing all opposition.”²⁷

society as a whole.²⁸

— “Discussion on Military Soft Power

Building,” 2006

²⁴ “Vigorously Fostering Combat Spirit - Fourth Commentary on Education Activities on the Chinese

Military’s Loyal Fulfillment of the Historic Missions for the New Stage and the New Century,” Jiefangjun

Bao, 3 Apr 2006, p. 1, OSC CPP20060404515009.

²⁵ “Fostering Combat Spirit with the Focus on Fulfillment of New Missions,” Jiefangjun Bao, 20 Apr 2005,

p. 1, OSC CPP20050420000118.

²⁶ “Fostering Combat Spirit with the Focus on Fulfillment of New Missions.”

²⁷ Wang Xingsheng and Wu Zhizhong, “Discussion on Military Soft Power Building,” Zhongguo Junshi

Kexue, 2007-1, pp. 92-98.

²⁸ Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, p. 154.

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DICTA OF SUN-TZU REFERENCED BY TODAY’S PLA

“The general who makes calculations before battle will win.”

(weizhan er miaosuan sheng; 未战而庙算胜)

“If you know yourself and you know your enemy, in a hundred battles you will

not lose one.” (zhiji zhibi, baizhan budai; 知己知彼，百战不殆)

“All warfare is based on deception.” (bingzhe guidao ye; 兵者诡道也)

“Subdue the enemy army without fighting.”

(buzhan er qu renzhibing; 不战而屈人之兵)

“The best thing is to attack the enemy’s plans, next best to attack his diplomatic

relations, next to attack his army, and only last to attack his cities.”

(gu shangbing famou, qici fajiao, qici fabing, qixia gongcheng;故上兵伐謀，其

次伐交，其次伐兵，其下攻城)

Literary classics

Members of the PLA also draw lessons from the heroic warriors and clever strategists

whose exploits are celebrated in Chinese literature. Many of these semi-legendary tales

draw on events from China’s wars of antiquity. They remain wildly popular in Chinese

society today, where they have been adapted into video games, television series, comic

books, and other popular culture products (see Figure 1-1).

Two 14^th-century novels in particular - the Romance of the Three Kingdoms and Water

Margin (sometimes known as The Outlaws of the Marsh) - remain important touchstones

for the PLA. The heroes of these novels are depicted as the human embodiments of both

Sun-tzu’s martial principles and Confucius’ social and political mores. In Romance of the

Three Kingdoms, the main characters are powerful military and political leaders, while in

Water Margin they are outlaws and bandits. Their different social positions

notwithstanding, all fight cleverly, courageously, and in the name of righteous

government and fair treatment of the common people. ²⁹

Present-day PLA publications frequently reference these novels, often as object lessons in

the efficacy of specific military tactics. Mao Zedong cited both works in his own writings,

and was known to be particularly fond of Water Margin.³⁰ Most of the tactics and

strategies depicted in these novels mirror those described in Sun-tzu.

²⁹ Lo Kuan-chung, Three Kingdoms: China’s Epic Drama, translated and edited by Moss Roberts (New

York: Pantheon Books, 1976), p. 9.

³⁰ See, e.g., Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War.”

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Figure 1-1: A personality quiz based on characters from Romance of the Three Kingdoms

Both novels also highlight essential human qualities that the PLA considers important for

its own personnel. (PLA views on these qualities are discussed in greater detail in

Chapter 2.) These include:

Loyalty. In both novels, the heroes’ primary virtue is loyalty - to one another and to

principles of righteous imperial rule. Similar demands are made on PLA personnel,

who forswear their personal interests to fulfill their “Four Loyalties” to the Party, the

Motherland, the Chinese people, and the military profession.

Modesty. Both novels disdain characters driven by ambition for personal power. The

PLA also professes to eschew individual glory in favor of collective accomplishment.

Adherence to bonds of obligation. The heroes of both novels place a premium on

fulfilling their obligations to others, even at the cost of their own lives. Though not

often explicitly discussed in PLA writings, obligations based on a variety of personal

ties play an important role in the PLA.

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Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought

“Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought” (makese liening zhuyi mao zedong sixiang;

马克思列宁主义毛泽东思想) permeates PLA doctrines and organizational structures.

Chapter 2 of this report outlines some of the values that derive from this ideology;

Chapter 3 discusses its most important organizational legacies for the PLA.

Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought is inextricably linked to the historical

development of the CCP. The Party and its ideology developed in China throughout the

early part of the

20^th century. This development can be broken into three phases,

discussed below.

Phase One: Soviet indoctrination and the First United Front (1921-1927)

In its early years, the CCP

forged close ties with the

THE FIRST UNITED FRONT

Kuomintang

(KMT, also

Although the CCP and the KMT were political rivals, both

called

the

“Nationalist

considered themselves revolutionary parties, fighting to

Party,” or guomindang; 国

strengthen China against the forces of “imperialism” and

民党) and the Soviet Union.

“warlordism.” Both sought financial support and

The CCP was founded in

organizational guidance from the Soviet Union. Russian

July 1921, without a military

advisors from the Communist International

(Comintern)

arm. In its first few years,

persuaded the two parties to set aside their ideological

the CCP had a minimal

differences and cooperate to overthrow the regional warlords

presence on China’s political

who then controlled much of China. Thus, the KMT and

scene, numbering only a few

CCP joined forces under the “First United Front” (~1923-

hundred members and led by

1927).

largely unknown figures.³¹

The KMT was much larger -

The combined KMT-CCP forces took part in the “Northern

it had

50,000 members by

Expedition” (1925-26), a military campaign that succeeded

1923, and was led by the

in breaking the power of many warlords and reuniting much

revered politician Sun Yat-

of China. Nonetheless, the First United Front was an uneasy

sen and the powerful general

alliance that ended in bloodshed in early 1927, when KMT

Chiang Kai-shek.

leader Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Communists purged

from the alliance.

These two parties joined

forces for several years in the “First United Front” (described in the shaded box above).

In 1924, under the guidance of the Comintern, they jointly established an institution that

would give shape to both parties’ ideologies and institutions for decades to come: the

Whampoa Military Academy (huangpu junxiao; 黄 埔 军 校 ). Modeled after Soviet

military academies, Whampoa was intended to provide professional military training, as

well as ideological guidance, to China’s revolutionary parties.

³¹ Figures suggest that the CCP had about 300 members in 1923, two years after its founding, and perhaps

1,500 by 1925. John King Fairbank, China: A New History (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1992), p. 282;

Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1990), p. 336.

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contingent” to lead the people into revolutionary self-awareness.³⁵ In this sense, the

Party was an organization of “professional revolutionaries.”³⁶

“The revolutionary army

Lenin further believed that revolution could take place

and the revolutionary

only through military conflict, writing that

“the

government are two sides

revolutionary army is needed because great historical

of the same medal.”³⁷

issues can be resolved only by force.”³⁸ His view is echoed

by Mao’s famous statement that “all power comes from

— Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

the barrel of a gun.”³⁹ The revolutionary army must be

completely controlled by and subordinate to the Party - in fact, in Lenin and Mao’s

view, the army has no missions apart from those of the Party. Thus the PLA is a

“Party-Army.” The “absolute leadership” of the CCP over the PLA was confirmed in

resolutions adopted at one of the CCP’s early policy plenums, the 1929 “Gutian

Conference.”⁴⁰

The mass mobilization principle. Lenin - and Mao after him - wrote that the

military must mobilize the entire population

“Let the people of the whole country

to participate in revolutionary war. The

mobilize, take up arms and join the

tasks of mobilization include setting up

War of Resistance. Let those with

mass organizations among the people to

strength contribute strength, those with

educate them on revolutionary theory;

money contribute money, those with

mobilizing ordinary citizens to join military

guns contribute guns, and those with

units, militias, and labor uprisings; and

knowledge contribute knowledge.”⁴¹

seeking material support from the people

for PLA tasks. In this view, there is no clear

— Mao Zedong, “Mobilize All the Nation’s

delineation between Party, people, and

Forces For Victory in the War of Resistance”

army: all are mobilized simultaneously

through a network of Party-managed, interwoven organizations.

³⁵ See Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “What is To Be Done? - Burning Questions of Our Revolutionary

Movement,” in Henry M. Christman, ed., The Essential Works of Lenin (New York: Bantam Books, 1966).

³⁶ Benjamin I. Schwartz, “Themes in Intellectual History: May Fourth and After,” in John K. Fairbank and

Denis Twitchett, eds., The Cambridge History of China, Volume 12: Republican China 1912-1949 (Part I)

(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 431.

³⁷ Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “The Revolutionary Army and the Revolutionary Government” (1905), in

Bernard Isaacs and Isador Lasker, eds., Lenin Collected Works, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing

House, 1962), pp. 560-68, http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1905/jul/10.htm.

³⁸ Lenin, “The Revolutionary Army and the Revolutionary Government.” Emphasis in original.

³⁹ Mao Zedong, “Problems of War and Strategy” (1938),

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_12.htm.

⁴⁰ Liu Yuan, “The Historic Position of the Gutian Meeting in Our Army Building,” Qiushi No. 16, 16 Aug

2007, OSC CPP20070821710010.

⁴¹ Mao Zedong, “For the Mobilization of All the Nation’s Forces for Victory in the War of Resistance”

(1937), http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_02.htm.

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To accomplish these tasks, the Red Army integrated itself into the daily life of rural

communities, holding Marxist study sessions and recruiting peasants to the

revolutionary cause.⁴²

Phase Two: Breaking with the KMT and forming the Red Army (1927-1930s)

The First United Front broke down in April

CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMIES

1927, after KMT forces, on Chiang Kai-shek’s

orders, killed thousands of CCP members and

The Red Army (originally known as

wiped out nearly all of the CCP’s urban bases.

the “Chinese Workers and Peasants

This purge forced the remaining CCP into the

Red Army”) was formed by the CCP

countryside. On August 1, 1927 - a date that

after the disintegration of the First

the PLA considers its founding moment

-

United Front in 1927.⁴³

20,000 Communist troops, led by Marshal

During the “Anti-Japanese War” (i.e.,

Zhu De, attacked a KMT arsenal at Nanchang,

World War II), when the CCP and the

Jiangxi Province. Thus began the Chinese

KMT suspended their civil war to

civil war. With Mao at its helm, the CCP

jointly resist Japanese invasion, the

would fight against the KMT on and off for

main body of Red Army was absorbed

the next two decades.

into the joint forces and re-designated

the Eighth Route Army. A New

The Communist army, which came to be

Fourth Army was also formed around

known as the “Red Army” (hongjun; 红军)

a core of fighters who had served as the

was made up largely of poor, underequipped

rear guard during the Long March.⁴⁴

peasants. It was faced with materially superior

In 1948, after the civil war against the

enemies: the KMT and, later on, the Japanese

KMT had resumed, these two forces

military.

were integrated into the People’s

Liberation Army.⁴⁵

Phase Three: Modifying Marxist-Leninist

principles to fit Chinese circumstances

(1938 onward)

In October 1938 Mao called for the “Sinification of Marxism.”⁴⁶ Having determined that

Lenin’s urban, industrial revolution was inappropriate for China’s largely rural

population, he modified Marxist-Leninist principles to better fit China’s circumstances.

⁴² Harlan W. Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945-

1981 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), p. 3.

⁴³ William Wei, “‘Political Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gun’: Mao and the Red Army,” in David A.

Graff and Robin Higham, A Military History of China (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), p. 233.

⁴⁴ Wei, “Political Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gun,’” pp. 243-244.

⁴⁵ Li Xiaobing, A History of the Modern Chinese Army, p. 46.

⁴⁶ Mao Zedong, The Collected Works of Mao Zedong (Mao Zedong ji; 毛泽东集) (Tokyo: Hokubosha,

1970), 6.260-1; see also Stuart Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York: Praeger

Publishers, 1969), pp. 172-73.

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The many essays Mao produced on this topic are an essential part of what the CCP now

calls “Mao Zedong Thought” (mao zedong sixiang;毛泽东思想).

One of the most influential elements of Mao Zedong Thought was Mao’s belief that the

CCP’s best chance of winning was to adopt guerrilla tactics, a strategy that he later

developed into the concept of “People’s War.”⁴⁷

PEOPLE’S WAR

“People’s War” combines Sun-tzu’s principles of deception and calculation with the

mobile, flexible tactics of guerrilla warfare. Mao articulated this concept most clearly in

his 1938 essay “On Protracted War.” Mao believed that the poorly equipped CCP army

could succeed against technologically superior enemies by arming and training large

numbers of peasants.⁴⁸ Some of these soldiers were to be incorporated into the Red

Army’s regular forces, while others would form local militias and guerrilla units that

could be called upon in times of emergency.

As originally conceived, the components of “People’s War” included:

•

“Luring the enemy deep” into one’s territory, then attacking them

• Wearing down the enemy in a protracted war of attrition

• Focusing on the enemy’s weakest points

• Mobilizing the entire population to resist the enemy

• Using speed, surprise, deception, and stratagem

• Using guerrilla tactics when one’s forces are too weak for conventional warfare.

This concept seems far removed from the “local, high-tech wars” the PLA expects to fight

today. In 1979 Deng Xiaoping modified the doctrine of “People’s War” to “People’s War

Under Modern Conditions,” giving more credence to the use of high-tech weaponry while

maintaining an emphasis on striking the enemy’s weak points. Subsequent doctrinal shifts

have moved the PLA even further from the original principles of People’s War, but it

remains a revered concept and is frequently redefined to fit current operational doctrine.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ See, e.g., Mao Zedong, “On Guerilla Warfare” (1937),

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/index.htm.

⁴⁸ William W. Whitson, The Chinese High Command, p. 18.

⁴⁹ See Paul H. B. Godwin, “Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine, 1949-1999,” in Mark A.

Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, eds., Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience

Since 1949 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 39-40; Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, The Science

of Military Strategy, pp. 110-111; Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China’s Use of Force:

Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), p. 26.

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In addition to “People’s War,” today’s CCP and PLA leaders consider several other

Maoist principles to be relevant for the modern Chinese military, including the following:

Ordinary people should participate in decision-making, but only in a limited and

controlled fashion. Lenin’s concept of democratic centralism (minzhu jizhong; 民主

集中) continues to guide the CCP’s attitude toward participatory decision-making in

Party institutions. Defined as “freedom of discussion, unity of action,” democratic

centralism emphasizes the importance of controlled discussion and debate in Party

decision-making procedures.⁵⁰ The Party allows all of its members to take part in

wide-ranging discussions on matters of policy

(the

“democratic” aspect), but

mandates that once a policy direction has been decided all discussion will end and all

members will uphold that decision (the “centralist” aspect).

Mao adapted democratic centralism

WHAT IS THE MASS LINE?

to more fully incorporate the

The mass line means “taking the ideas of

opinions of ordinary people into

the masses (the scattered and unsystematic

Party decisions. The uniquely

ideas) and concentrating them

(through

Maoist concept of the mass line

study, changing them into concentrated,

(qunzhong luxian; 群 众 路 线 )

systematic ideas), then going into the

posits that the Party needs to

masses to publicize explanations…

understand the masses’ ideas and

causing the masses to persist in them and

opinions in order to make informed

translate them into action, and through

decisions and design effective

mass action test these ideas to see if they

policies. However, it holds, the

are correct.…In this kind of unlimited

people themselves may not

cycle, every time around will be clearer,

comprehend how best to turn their

livelier, and richer.”⁵¹

scattered ideas into coherent policy.

— Mao Zedong, “Some Questions

Thus, the responsibility for actual

Concerning Methods of Leadership”

policy-making and implementation

continues to rest with the Party, which

“centralizes” the people’s wisdom and

“returns” well-crafted policies back to the citizenry. Succinctly expressed in the

slogan “from the masses, to the masses” (cong qunzhong zhong lai, dao qunzhong

zhong qu; 从群众中来, 到群众中去), the mass line principle remains central to the

participatory, “democratic” mechanisms built into the PLA. (For more on this topic,

see Chapter 4.)

Human willpower can overcome great material disadvantage. A distinctive

aspect of Mao’s thought was his focus on voluntarism - the notion that human will is

the determining factor of the success or failure of all endeavors. Mao believed that a

sufficiently strong will could overcome not only personal shortcomings, but even

⁵⁰ Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “Report of the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.: A Letter to the St. Petersburg

Workers” (1906), http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1906/rucong/viii.htm.

⁵¹ Mao Zedong, “Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership” (1 Jun 1943),

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-3/mswv3_13.htm.

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To give more texture to this narrative, PLA textbooks and official histories divide post-

1840 history into three major periods. Below, we summarize these periods, and the

lessons the PLA draws from them.

It is important to understand that the PLA’s version of China’s history is not presented

objectively. Historical events that do not resonate with this CCP-approved narrative are

barely discussed.

1839-1921: Foreign intrusion and internal disorder

This period of painful national loss is bounded on one end by the Opium War, which the

CCP considers the dawn of foreign aggression against China, and on the other by the

CCP’s own founding. During this period, China was under siege both externally and

internally. In addition to its struggles with foreign powers, it was plagued by internal

political division and a number of large-scale rebellions.

Figure 1-2 depicts the large territorial losses China suffered during this period.

KEY EVENTS, 1839-1921

1840-1842: The United Kingdom, determined to keep Chinese markets open to the

opium trade, launches the First Opium War (some accounts mark its beginning in

1839) against China’s Qing Dynasty. China loses, and is forced to open its seaports to

Western countries and Japan. The result is a semi-colonial system of extraterritorial

treaty ports, effectively depriving the Chinese imperial government of control over

significant parts of its own territory.

1850-1864: China is embroiled in the immense Taiping Rebellion, which results in

the deaths of millions of Chinese and is put down only with military assistance from

foreign powers resident in China.

1899-1900: The Boxer Uprising starts as a popular anti-foreign movement but quickly

turns against the Qing imperial court for not doing enough to stave off foreign

influences. Eventually the Qing court declares war on eight resident foreign powers; it

loses, and is plunged into debt by the massive indemnities it is forced to pay.

1894-1895: China loses the Sino-Japanese War and is forced to cede Taiwan and

other territories to Japan.

1911: The Qing Dynasty collapses and the last emperor of China formally abdicates.

China is declared a republic, under the leadership of the Nationalist Party, or

Kuomintang (KMT). Much of the country becomes a fractured collection of fiefdoms

controlled by regional “warlords” (junfa; 军阀).

1921: The Chinese Communist Party is founded in Shanghai.

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Figure 1-2: Chinese territory lost and regained since 1840

1840

Greatest extent of imperial

China’s effective control

1920

Smallest extent of the

Republic of China’s effective

control

Present day

Effective territorial control of

the People’s Republic of China

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1921-1949: The rise of the CCP and the Red Army

In Chinese history texts, this period of struggle is bounded on one end by the founding of

the CCP and on the other by its triumph over the KMT. This was a period of nearly

perpetual warfare in China. While the KMT and CCP came together twice to fight a

common enemy, their ideological and personal antagonisms persisted throughout.

For much of this period, the Red Army was essentially on the run, its ranks filled with

poor peasants who were hungry, poorly clothed, and poorly trained. When the Chinese

civil war re-ignited after the close of World War II, the Red Army slowly evolved toward

more mass-oriented battlefield tactics and eventually consolidated its diverse forces into a

single

“People’s Liberation Army.” However, it continued to think of itself as an

overmatched, essentially guerrilla army. ⁵⁵

KEY EVENTS, 1921-1949

1921: The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is founded in Shanghai.

1923-1927: The CCP and KMT join forces in the First United Front.

1926: United Front forces conduct the Northern Expedition, defeating regional

warlords and reuniting large portions of China.

April

1927: The KMT purges Communists from the United Front, massacring

thousands of CCP members, in the “White Terror.”

August 1, 1927: Communist forces under Zhu De attack KMT outposts in the

Nanchang Rebellion, which the PLA considers its founding moment. The Chinese

civil war begins.

1931-1932: Japan annexes Chinese Manchuria.

1934-1935: Communist forces endure the Long March (changzheng; 长征). After

breaking out of KMT encirclement in Jiangxi Province, Mao’s forces march more than

8,000 miles in 10 months, engaging in more than 500 battles and losing nearly 90

percent of their original 85,000 troops.

1937-1945: Japan declares war on China, and sacks and loots Chinese cities, most

notably in the 1937 Rape of Nanking. The KMT and CCP suspend their civil war to

form a Second United Front against the Japanese, whose occupation of large parts of

Chinese territory lasts until the end of the Anti-Japanese War (i.e., World War II).

1948: The Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army are integrated to form the

People’s Liberation Army.

1946-1949: The Chinese civil war resumes, culminating in the founding of the

People’s Republic of China in 1949 and the retreat of KMT forces to Taiwan.

⁵⁵ Larry M. Wortzel, “The Beiping-Tianjin Campaign of 1948-49: The Strategic and Operational Thinking

of the People’s Liberation Army,” in Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, Chinese Warfighting, p. 60.

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We end our discussion of Chinese history with the beginning of the reform period, since

PLA writers consider the decades since then to be part of the current era; much that has

happened in that era is covered in other chapters.

KEY EVENTS, 1949 -1979

1949: The People’s Republic of China is founded.

1950-1953: The Chinese military engages American forces in the Korean War, which

is referred to in China as the “Aid Korea, Resist America War.”

1954-1958: The PLA conducts a number of operations against KMT forces on

Taiwan, but does not invade.

1962: China conducts a brief border war with India.

1966-1976: The “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” profoundly disrupts the

PLA’s development.

1969: The PLA is involved in a number of skirmishes with Soviet forces along its

northern border.

1976-1978: After the death of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping gradually amasses

power, eventually becoming China’s paramount leader and introducing a broad set of

reforms aimed at modernizing China’s economy, government, and military. The period

since 1978 has become known as China’s “reform and opening up” (gaige kaifang;

改革开放) period.

1979: China goes to war with Vietnam to “teach it a lesson” for invading Cambodia;

border skirmishes continue through the early 1980s.

Lessons the PLA takes from its history

The PLA promotes the following beliefs with regard to China’s post-1840 history.

The “Century of Humiliation” shows that Western nations are by nature

aggressive, forcing China to wage defensive wars.

The PLA takes the events of the 19^th and early 20^th centuries as evidence that Western

powers are fundamentally rapacious, greedy, and aggressive. Some PLA academics today

assert that this is a longstanding orientation, writing that Western nations were

historically

“slave states

[that] frequently launched wars of conquest and pillage to

expand their territories, plunder wealth, and extend their sphere of influence.”⁵⁷

By contrast, PLA authors assert, China’s strategic tradition is distinguished by its

constant pursuit of peace.⁵⁸ The PLA depicts China, both historically and in the current

era, as a

“peace-craving and peace-loving” nation, emphasizing that

“peace claims

⁵⁷ Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, The Science of Military Strategy, p. 93.

⁵⁸ See, e.g., Gong Yuzhen, Analysis of China’s Strategic Culture (zhongguo zhanlüe wenhua jiesi; 中国战

略文化界斯) (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2002), Chapter 1.

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precedence” (he wei gui; 和为贵) over war in the Chinese worldview.⁵⁹ China wages war

only when all other means of securing peace have failed. PLA texts further declare that

China has never harbored territorial ambitions against other nations.⁶⁰ Accordingly, the

PLA characterizes all Chinese wars as defensive actions against invaders.⁶¹ Any

confrontation between China’s military and that of another nation is depicted as the result

of the other nation’s aggressive actions, or “hegemony.”

The Maoist military principle of

REINTERPRETING “ACTIVE DEFENSE”

“active defense” (jiji fangyu; 积

The PLA justifies military actions against other

极防御) draws on the PLA’s

nations by distinguishing in its writings between

depiction of its mission as purely

“strategic attack” and

“tactical attack.” PLA

defensive, asserting that China

strategists claim that the principle of

“active

will strike only after the enemy

defense” allows for China to make the first tactical

has struck. This is a curious

strike when threatened

“strategically.”

“Strategic

assertion, given that the PRC has

attacks” are defined as those not only on the Chinese

launched first strikes in a number

military but also on China’s sovereignty, the Chinese

of military actions outside its

people, or the CCP’s political control - including the

borders. Nevertheless,

PLA

use of “hostile forces such as religious extremists,

publications consistently interpret

national separatists, and international terrorists.”⁶² In

China’s military actions as being

this way either military attacks on the PRC’s

driven by an overt threat to

territory or political attacks on the CCP may justify a

China’s national security.

counter-attack by the PLA.

The PLA justifies its current

defense modernization in part by recalling China’s legacy of victimization by the West

and Japan. It claims that it seeks merely to prevent future invasion, not to expand China’s

military footprint.⁶³

⁵⁹ Lin Chengdong and Chen Zhengdong, “The Importance of National Defense Construction and Army

Building in the Overall Layout for Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” Jiefangjun Bao, 6 Oct 2007, p.

6, OSC CPP20071206710007; David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and

Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 21.

⁶⁰ Wu Pin, “Military Scholar on Tactics Views Defense Issues” (interview with Maj. Gen. Cai Yuqiu), Ta

Kung Pao, 1 Aug 2007, OSC CPP20070806710004.

⁶¹ For example, two PLA scholars at the Academy of Military Science write that “China’s tradition of a

unified domain … [meant that the military] paid more attention to domestic order rather than expansion”

starting with the 2^nd century BC. See Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, The Science of Military Strategy, p.

72.

⁶² Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, The Science of Military Strategy, p. 426; see also Wu Pin, “Military

Scholar on Tactics Views Defense Issues.”

⁶³ David M. Finkelstein and John Unangst, Engaging DoD: Chinese Perspectives on Military Relations

with the United States, CNA Research Memorandum 99-0046.90 (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation,

1999), p. 2.

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DISTRUST OF FOREIGN INTENTIONS: A LEGACY OF THE PAST

As discussed above, the Chinese today view the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries as a

dark period in their history. The year 1840 is considered the dividing line between

China’s proud imperial past and her subsequent subjugation to foreign whims.

The impact of the “Century of Humiliation” on China’s self-image and national

aspirations cannot be overemphasized. Chinese citizens still display a deep sense of

wounded pride over this period. Due in large part to bitter memories of the sovereignty,

power, and human lives that China lost, feelings against foreign interference still run

very strong. For instance, one media commentator hailed the 2008 Beijing Olympics as

a chance to “dispel the lingering bitterness from the humiliating defeats China suffered

at the hands of imperialist aggressors in the past century.”⁶⁴

The CCP at times actively encourages PLA members to distrust foreign intentions. For

instance, President Hu Jintao, in a 2004 speech on the PLA’s main tasks, warned that

“Western hostile forces have not given up the wild ambition of trying to subjugate us,

intensifying the political strategy of Westernizing and dividing up China.”⁶⁵

China’s external sovereignty and domestic stability are closely linked; the PLA

must strive to protect both.

The Chinese have long believed that

“internal strife and external calamities”

(neiluanwaihuan; 内乱外患) are fundamentally linked.⁶⁶ The PLA points to the unrest

and rebellions that characterized pre-1949 China as evidence that for the Chinese nation

to survive, it must respond effectively to both external pressures and internal forces of

disorder (such as ethnic separatism, local unrest, crime, and corruption). Even after the

PRC was founded, the PLA teaches, the security of the new nation was still shaky for

many years. PLA leaders proclaim that the PLA played a central role in guaranteeing the

PRC’s hard-won sovereignty and promoting its subsequent economic development.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Hong Liang, “Time to Drop the Baggage of History,” China Daily, 2 Sept 2008, OSC

CPP20080902968010.

⁶⁵ Hu Jintao, “Understand the New Historic Missions of our Military in the New Period of the New

Century” (renqing xinshiji xinjieduan wojun lishi shiming; 认清新世纪新阶段我军历史使命),

http://gfjy.jiangxi.gov.cn/yil.asp?idid=11349.htm.

⁶⁶ See, e.g., Christopher P. Twomey, “Chinese Strategic Cultures: Survey and Critique,” paper prepared for

Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Comparative Strategic

Cultures Curriculum (Washington, DC: SAIC, 2006). Twomey argues that a concern with domestic

stability is “in no way … unique to China,” though China does “justif[y] these preferences through its own

history” (p. 8).

⁶⁷ History Research Institute of the Academy of Military Science, Eighty Years of the People’s Liberation

Army (zhongguo renmin jiefangjun de bashinian; 中国人民解放军的八十年) (Beijing: Military Science

Press, 2007), pp. 265-274.

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China’s wariness of external interference leads it to adopt what seems, from the outside,

to be a rather paranoid attitude toward other nations’ intentions. Many Chinese leaders

believe that “hegemonic” nations, such as the United States, are bent on undermining

weaker countries from within. In the PLA’s view, many of the world’s domestic

disturbances and regional hostilities may be traced to such interference. One influential

PLA text asserts, for instance, that “the hot issues in Southern Asia, Central Asia,

Northeastern Asia, and Southeastern Asia are all related to the meddling of the dominant

countries.”⁶⁸

To toughen the nation’s defenses against external threats, the PLA believes that it must

also maintain domestic stability. This lesson was reinforced during the period of Western

intrusion, when the weak ability of the imperial army to resist foreign invaders was

further hampered by internal rebellions. As a result, the PLA is tasked with maintaining

domestic order not just for the sake of Party survival but also for the sake of national

survival.

The CCP and the Red Army “saved” China, providing the leadership and political

awareness necessary to liberate the country and to resist foreign aggressors and

domestic tyrants.

The PLA teaches that the Chinese people chafed under the “humiliations” brought about

by foreign imperialists and feudal warlords, but that their attempts to overthrow these

oppressors lacked any “firm core leadership”

and were doomed to failure.⁷⁰

“An important reason why the

undertakings of the Party and the

PLA texts stress that the PRC would never have

people could constantly advance from

been founded, or China “liberated,” without the

victory to victory and socialist China

victories of the Red Army. They teach that the

has been able to gain a firm foothold

PLA’s victories over the Japanese invaders and

in the midst of international

the Nationalist Army “saved” China from its

turbulence…is that we have the PLA:

downward spiral, marking the beginning of

the heroic army that remains loyal to

China’s

“standing up” after a long era of

the Party, to socialism, to the

powerlessness,

division,

and

foreign

Motherland, and to the people.”⁶⁹

exploitation.⁷¹

— PRC President Hu Jintao

⁶⁸ Zheng Shenxia (PLAAF General, director of Academy of Military Science), “Thoroughly Study and

Implement the Party’s New Achievements in Military Guidance Theory,” Junshi Kexue 2007-4. Full-text

DoD translation at OSC CPP20080223563001.

⁶⁹ Hu Jintao, speech delivered at rally marking the 80^th founding anniversary of the PLA at the Great Hall

of the People in Beijing, 1 Aug 2007, OSC CPP20070801050015.

⁷⁰ History Research Institute of the Academy of Military Science, Eighty Years of the People’s Liberation

Army, pp. 1, 5.

⁷¹ See, e.g., Zou Zhicheng, ed., College Military Instruction Course of Study (daxue junshike jiaocheng; 大

学军事科教成) (Changsha: Hunan University Press, 2004), pp. 9-11; Xu Jianjun and He Shaohua, College

Military Course of Study, pp. 7-11. The remaking of the Chinese military is depicted as central to halting a

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Soldiers’ poor traditional image

To gain the people’s trust, the Red Army needed to overcome the unfavorable public

image with which Chinese soldiers had been saddled for many generations. Imperial

China displayed an ambivalent attitude toward soldiers: the martial and literary classics

discussed earlier revered military

prowess, but the Confucian scholar-

“GOOD MEN DON’T BECOME SOLDIERS”

official elite viewed martial activities

The image of military personnel in imperial

with disdain. They saw the use of

China was captured in the popular saying that

violence as a

“failure of statecraft”

“just as good iron isn’t used for nails, good men

and its practitioners as lacking in

don’t become soldiers”

(haotie bu da ding

moral virtue.⁸⁷ Military officer status

haonan bu dangbing; 好铁不打钉, 好男不当

was conferred not upon the highly

educated and capable but rather upon

兵).⁸⁶

low-level government officials whose

work garnered little respect.⁸⁸

This image was exacerbated by the behavior of the warlord armies during the early

decades of the 20^th century. The warlords - regional power-holders who controlled

mercenary armies - had little interest in the people’s welfare. They levied high taxes and

siphoned revenues away from education and social services in order to feed and arm the

armies that sustained their power. People who lived in contested territories were

subjected to the “requisitions and abuses of passing armies” and often saw their homes

destroyed and livelihoods ruined by internecine warfare.⁸⁹ Moral strictures on soldiers’

behavior toward ordinary people were weak or nonexistent, so the military was viewed

by the public as a “huge preparatory school for banditry” and soldiers gained a reputation

for corruption and lawlessness.⁹⁰ Soldiers in these armies scarcely received better

treatment than the civilians they abused: commanders were known for inflicting extreme

brutality upon their subordinates.⁹¹

⁸⁶ Edward L. Dreyer, “Continuity and Change,” in David A. Graff and Robin Higham, eds., A Military

History of China (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2002), pp. 25-26.

⁸⁷ Robin Higham and David A. Graff, “Introduction,” in Graff and Higham, A Military History of China, p.

16.

⁸⁸ Dreyer, “Continuity and Change,” p. 26.

⁸⁹ Edward A. McCord, “Warlordism in Early Republican China,” in Graff and Higham, A Military History

of China, p. 189.

⁹⁰ Robert Slate, “Chinese Role Models and Classical Military Philosophy in Dealing with Soldier

Corruption and Moral Degeneration,” Journal of Third World Studies, Spring 2003,

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3821/is_200304/ai_n9173399/print.

⁹¹ Chen Zhou, Theory and Practice of the PLA Democratic System (zhongguo renmin jiefang jun minzhu

zhidu de lilun yu shijian; 中国人民解放军民主制度的理论与实践) (Beijing: Military Science Press,

1993), p. 3.

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The KMT was portrayed by the CCP as similarly oppressive. Mao’s writings from the

1930s and 1940s are filled with vituperation against the KMT army, portraying its leaders

as exhibiting atrocious behavior toward the local populace and their own enlisted

personnel alike. The KMT government was widely seen as corrupt and unable to handle

social and economic problems.⁹³

A new kind of Chinese army

Many of the bedrock values of today’s PLA were formulated to emphasize the distinction

between the Red Army and the warlord and KMT armies. To win the hearts and minds of

the peasant population, the Red Army sought to define itself as a new type of military,

and to present an alternative vision of civil-military interaction and internal command

relationships.

MAO’S PORTRAYAL OF THE KMT ARMY

Today’s PLA teaches that the Red Army

won popular support by exhibiting three key

In 1944, Mao wrote of a KMT general:

characteristics:

“Tang Enbo is fundamentally opposed to

the people of Henan

[Province], who

First, PLA texts assert, rather than being

say … ‘Henan has four disasters: flood,

mercenaries concerned only with

drought, locusts, and Tang.…Inside Tang

personal gain, Red Army personnel

Enbo’s units, officers and enlisted

possessed a selfless spirit of devotion to

personnel are isolated from each other.

the cause of ending the oppressive

The troops consist of people rounded up

“feudalist” system, and a willingness to

by force. On ordinary days they are

sacrifice material comfort and even their

berated and beaten, exhausted by hunger

lives to achieve this goal.

and fatigue.… In the face of battle they

Second, the Red Army was made up of

just desert and run, having no will to

soldiers who were the

“sons of the

fight.”⁹²

people” (renmin de zidi bing; 人民的子

弟兵). Red Army soldiers were taught to see themselves as “fish” and the people as

the

“water” that nourished and sustained them.⁹⁴ It was devoted to serving the

people’s interests, in contrast to previous armies that served the interests of a ruling

⁹² Mao Zedong, “Crisis Arising from the Fall of Changsha” (24 Jun 1944),

http://www.marxists.org/reference/arhive/mao/works/collected-works-pdf/volume9-part1.pdf.

⁹³ Li Xiaobing, A History of the Modern Chinese Army (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky,

2007), pp. 73-74.

⁹⁴ Mao Zedong, “On Guerrilla Warfare” (1937),

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/ch06.htm; William Wei,

“‘Political Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gun’: Mao and the Red Army,” in Graff and Higham, A

Military History of China, p. 236.

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class.⁹⁵ This concept of

“the

THE PLA VIEWS LENIENT TREATMENT OF

people’s interests above all” is

POWS AS AN EXAMPLE OF ITS HUMANENESS

captured in the name “People’s

Liberation Army.”⁹⁶

The PLA considers humane treatment of prisoners

of war (kuandai fulu; 款待俘虏) to be an indicator

Third, the Red Army prided

of its unique focus on morality.⁹⁷ When the PLA

itself on its humane and fair

discusses its own history it cites the

treatment of its personnel. As

compassionate treatment it has given to prisoners

Mao wrote in 1936, “We do not

of war in past conflicts as an example of its moral

permit any of our Red Army

superiority.

commanders to become a

blundering hothead.”⁹⁹ The Red

For example, when allegations of prisoner abuse

Army aspired to produce

by U.S. forces at Abu Ghraib surfaced in the

commanders who viewed

international media in

2004, PLA and official

enlisted personnel as equal in

PRC media directly contrasted this abuse with the

human dignity to themselves.

PLA’s historical record. In an interview with a

Hence, food was distributed

former PLA officer who had been involved in the

equally among all Red Army

administration of POW camps during the Korean

members, commander and

War, the People’s Daily reported that “in sharp

subordinate alike, and officers

contrast to the atrocious behavior of U.S. troops,

were forbidden to

“beat and

the Chinese military treated U.S. prisoners of war

insult their soldiers” as officers

most humanely.” The former officer observed that

in the warlord armies had

“The Chinese troops practiced

‘revolutionary

done.¹⁰⁰

humanitarianism’

toward

the

POWs

throughout.”⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Air Force Enlisted Forces Handbook Editorial Committee, PLA Air Force Enlisted Forces Handbook

(zhongguo renmin jiefang jun kongjun shibing shouce; 中国人民解放军空军士兵手册) (Beijing: Blue

Sky Publishing House, 2006), p. 159.

⁹⁶ Wang Jingchao and Fang Ning, The Science of Military Management (jundui guanli xue; 军队管理学)

(Beijing: Military Science Press, 2001), p. 110; Chen Runsun, “Loving the Military and Making Combat

Preparations,” Jiefangjun Bao,16 Jan 2002.

⁹⁷ Lian, “Giving Lenient Treatment to POWs,” in Song Shilun and Xiaoke, eds., The Chinese Military

Encyclopedia (zhongguo junshi baike quanshu; 中国军事百科全书), Vol. 4, Political Work and Military

Logistics in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1997), p. 229.

⁹⁸ Xie Rongbin, “Former POW Camp Administrator Recalls that China Practiced 'Revolutionary

Humanitarianism' Toward American POW's in the Korean War, in Sharp Contrast to U.S. Treatment of

Chinese POW's Then and Iraqi Prisoners Now,” Renmin Ribao, 25 May 2004.

⁹⁹ Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War” (1936),

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_12.htm.

¹⁰⁰ Chen Zhou, Theory and Practice of the PLA Democratic System, pp. 5, 11.

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Moral and disciplinary codes

The CCP’s desire to closely tie the military to the common people was the impetus for

the Red Army’s first code of moral conduct. Devised by Mao Zedong and Red Army

Commander-in-Chief Zhu De shortly after the Red Army’s founding, this code was

known as the “Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points of Attention” (san da jilü

baxiang zhuyi; 三大纪律八项注意).¹⁰²

The “Three Rules and Eight Points” acted primarily as a guide for Red Army soldiers in

their interactions with civilians. It required them to project the image of a benevolent

force genuinely concerned with minimizing the adverse impacts of military activity on

civilian life.

THREE MAIN RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND EIGHT POINTS OF ATTENTION

Three Main Rules of Discipline (san da jilü; 三大纪律):

1. Obey orders.

2. Take not even a needle or thread from the people.

3. Turn in all confiscated goods.

Eight Points of Attention (baxiang zhuyi; 八项注意):

1. Replace all doors and return the straw on which you slept before leaving a

house.

2. Speak courteously to the people and help them whenever possible.

3. Return all borrowed articles.

4. Pay for everything damaged.

5. Be honest in business transactions.

6. Be sanitary: dig latrines a safe distance from homes and fill them up with

earth before leaving.

7. Never molest women.

8. Do not mistreat prisoners.¹⁰¹

Although some of these rules now seem outdated when taken literally, the PLA still

considers them its “basic laws of discipline and social order, and the foundation for all

¹⁰¹ Wei, “Political Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gun,’” p. 235.

¹⁰² The “Three Rules and Eight Points” underwent a few incarnations. Chen Zhou, for instance, provides a

list of eight “Points of Attention” that are in a slightly different order and, for points 1 and 6, he substitutes

“Do not beat or curse at people” and “Do not damage crops.” There are other variations as well. It appears

that the final content of the “Three Rules and Eight Points” was not finalized until 1947. See PLA General

Headquarters, “Instruction on the Re-Issue of the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for

Attention,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 4:155-56.

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military discipline.”¹⁰³ The PLA also expects its personnel to treat the “Three Rules and

Eight Points” as fundamental guidelines for military-civilian relations. Soldiers

participating in the rescue and relief efforts following the Sichuan earthquake in May

2008, for instance, were praised in the PLA Daily for “strictly obeying the ‘Three Rules

of Discipline and Eight Points of Attention,’ and … [being] highly-disciplined troops.”¹⁰⁴

Moral standards for today’s PLA

The PLA’s significant reforms since the 1990s have been accompanied by new attempts

to emphasize the importance of its core values. In October 2001, the General Political

Department (GPD) of the PLA, on the orders of then-Chairman of the CCP Central

Military Commission Jiang Zemin, issued eight “Servicemen’s Moral Standards” (junren

daode guifan; 军人道德规范).

Unlike the “Three Main Rules and Eight Points,” which were primarily concerned with

servicemen’s behavior toward civilians, the “Moral Standards” focus on ethical conduct

within the military. In an interview with a reporter from the PLA Daily shortly after the

new standards were issued, the GPD’s propaganda chief implied that these new standards

were formulated in reaction to the corrosive pressures of China’s rapid economic growth

and social change on PLA values.¹⁰⁶ These pressures, and the negative impact that the

PLA leadership fears they are having on PLA mores, are discussed in Chapter 5.

SERVICEMEN’S MORAL STANDARDS, 2001 (JUNREN DAODE GUIFAN; 军人道德规范)

1.

Obey the Party’s Command (ting dang zhihui; 听党指挥).

2.

Be patriotic and devoted (aiguo fengxian; 爱国奉献).

3.

Love the military and practice for war (aijun xiwu; 爱军习武).

4.

Respect officers and take care of soldiers (zungan aibing; 尊干爱兵).

5.

Closely observe discipline (yanshou jilü; 严守纪律).

6.

Hold fast to integrity (jianshou qijie; 坚守气节).

7.

Work diligently in spite of difficulties (jianku fendou; 艰苦奋斗).

8.

Be civilized and courteous (wenming limao; 文明礼貌).¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Chen Zhou, Theory and Practice of the PLA’s Democratic System, p. 179.

¹⁰⁴ Jie Zhengxuan, “Engrave Loyalty to the Mission on the Earthquake-Fighting and Disaster Relief

Battlefield,” Jiefangjun Bao, 3 Jul 2008, p. 6, OSC CPP20080703710001.

¹⁰⁵ “Full Text of the ‘Soldiers’ Moral Standards,’” Xinhua, 26 Oct 2001.

¹⁰⁶ Sai Zhongbao, interview with leader of the PLA General Political Department’s Propaganda Department,

Jiefangjun Bao, 2 Nov 2001, p. 3.

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TWO TASKS FACING TODAY’S PLA

In the late

1990s, President Jiang Zemin announced two “historical tasks” facing the

modernizing PLA:

•

“Winning wars,” or remaining competitive in modern warfare; and

•

“Not degenerating,” or remaining true to PLA values and traditions.¹⁰⁷

This pronouncement makes clear what the end goals are toward which PLA values are

oriented. It also highlights one of the most difficult challenges that the PLA now faces:

upgrading its professional capabilities while retaining the traditional values upon which it

bases its identity and self-image.

Old and new moral codes, along with a range of PLA publications, underscore the PLA’s

belief that certain values are crucial to maintaining the superior

“human factor” of

Chinese military personnel. The following section presents the most important of these

values and explains what they signify in the PLA context.

The PLA’s core values

Loyalty

THE “FOUR LOYALTIES” OF THE PLA

The PLA’s vision of loyalty links together Party,

• Loyalty to the Party

country, people, and military. One PLA publication

lists these as the PLA’s “Four Loyalties,” and Hu

• Loyalty to the Motherland

Jintao promoted them as “core military values” in

• Loyalty to the people

2008.¹⁰⁹

• Loyalty to the military profession.¹⁰⁸

To the Party

The PLA considers absolute, unwavering loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

and its missions to be its highest value and most important obligation. Accordingly, the

first of the 2001 Moral Standards calls upon personnel to “uphold the principle of the

Party’s absolute leadership of the military, preserve the power of the Party Central

Committee and Central Military Commission, and protect the status of Party

organizations at all levels as the core leaders of the unit.”¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ See e.g. Jun Li, “New Development in the Party’s Military Guidance Theory - A Study of Jiang

Zemin’s National Defense and Army Building Theory,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 2003-1, pp. 42-50; OSC

CPP20080815436001; Sai Zhongbao, interview with leader of the PLA General Political Department’s

Propaganda Department, p. 3.

¹⁰⁸ PLA Air Force Enlisted Forces Handbook, p. 160.

¹⁰⁹ PLA Air Force Enlisted Forces Handbook, p. 160; “Chinese President Promotes Military Values,”

Xinhua, 30 Dec 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-12/30/content_105.

¹¹⁰ “Full Text of the ‘Servicemen’s Moral Standards.’”

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From its inception, the basic purpose of the PLA has been to assist the CCP in obtaining

and maintaining political power. Mao and all subsequent

Party control of the

Party leaders have taken it as an article of faith that firm

military is as fundamental

control over the PLA is indispensible to the CCP’s

a principle to the PLA as

monopoly on power. This firm control requires PLA

civilian control is to the

members to exhibit a strong sense of personal loyalty to

U.S. military.

the Party, achieved through continuous indoctrination on

why obedience to the Party is morally correct. PLA

personnel are urged to view the Party’s leadership as the ultimate guarantor that “the

nature, purpose, and inherent qualities of the people’s military will not change, the

excellent traditions and work styles of the people’s military will not be lost, and military

construction will be in the correct direction.”¹¹¹

Unlike many other militaries, in which personnel are expected to separate themselves

from politics, the CCP considers heightening servicemen’s “political consciousness”

indispensible in ensuring their loyalty to the Party and enabling them to “dedicate their

lives to the struggle for the grand objectives of communism.”¹¹² This “consciousness” is

deemed particularly important for mid- and senior-level officers.¹¹³

To the Motherland

Chinese President Hu Jintao has defined “serving the country” as “closely linking an

individual’s future and destiny with the country’s future and destiny.” For the PLA, this

means “resolutely defending the country’s sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity,”

upholding Party rule within the nation, and “building a prosperous, strong, democratic,

civilized, and harmonious modern socialist country.”¹¹⁴ These goals re-emphasize the

PLA’s dual mission, to both ensure national security and safeguard domestic stability and

development.

To the people

PLA servicemen are urged to enthusiastically “serve the people” (wei renmin fuwu: 为人

民服务). As a “people’s army,” the PLA is supposed to “share the same destiny and be of

¹¹¹ Qiu Nengyang, “Strengthening ‘Five Types of Consciousness’ to Ensure the Party’s Absolute

Leadership of the Military” in Cai Dongchen, ed., Generals Discuss the Military (jiangjun lun bing; 将军

论兵) (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2006), p. 543.

¹¹² Zhang Shusen and Cao Xueyi, eds., Guidebook to Military Life (junlü shenghuo zhinan; 军旅生活指南),

2^nd Edition (Beijing: People’s Armed Police Publishing House, 2007), pp. 2-3.

¹¹³ Chen Anran, On the Cultivation of Military Talent’s Moral Character (junshi rencai pinde peiyu lun; 军

事人才品德培育论) (Beijing: National Defense University Publishing House, 2001), pp. 273, 279.

¹¹⁴ Xu Zhuangzhi and Cao Ruilin, “Hu Jintao Calls for Vigorously Cultivating the Core Values of ‘Being

Loyal to the Party, Deeply Cherishing the People, Serving the Country, Showing Devotion to Missions, and

Upholding Honor’ for Contemporary Revolutionary Soldiers,” Xinhua, 30 Dec 2008, OSC

CPP20081230172001.

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one heart with the people, and place the interests of the people above everything.”¹¹⁵ PLA

writings state that the Chinese military’s strong connection with the common people was

crucial to its past victories. ¹¹⁶

Personnel are taught that when their own personal interests conflict with the people’s

interests, the people’s interests (as determined by the Party) must always come first.¹¹⁷

To the military profession

PLA personnel are also expected to exhibit an “ardent love” for the Chinese military.

They are taught to view the PLA as “a firm pillar of the people’s democratic dictatorship,

a steel wall defending the socialist Motherland, and an important force in the construction

of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Studying the PLA’s “glorious history,” as

discussed in Chapter 1, is intended to inspire officers and enlisted men to carry forward

the “good traditions of our Party and military.”¹¹⁸

Honor and heroism

“Honor” for the PLA means having a spirit of extreme devotion to one’s tasks. This spirit

is believed to manifest itself in feats of heroism, as well as in everyday service to one’s

fellow citizens.¹¹⁹ It also means not doing anything to harm the public image of the

Chinese military or the Chinese nation.¹²⁰

¹¹⁵ Wang Jingchao and Fang Ning, The Science of Military Management, p. 110.

¹¹⁶ See Wang Jingchao and Fang Ning, The Science of Military Management, p. 110

¹¹⁷ PLA Air Force Enlisted Forces Handbook, p. 159.

¹¹⁸ Ou Guozheng, Liu Changjian, and Sha Gongping, eds., How To Be a Good NCO (zenyang dang hao

shiguan; 怎样当好士官) (Beijing: Long March Press, 2000), p. 221.

¹¹⁹ “Worshiping Honor - Sixth Commentary on Vigorously Fostering Core Values of Contemporary

Revolutionary Servicemen,” Jiefangjun Bao, 10 Jan 2009, p.1, OSC CPP CPP20090112702008.

¹²⁰ In a commentary on the 2008-09 promotion of “military core values,” a Jiefangjun Bao editor defined

“honor” as follows: “To uphold honor is to consciously cherish and defend the honor of the country, the

military, and military members; put honor ahead of one’s life; consciously practice the concept of socialist

honor and disgrace; promote the spirit of revolutionary heroism and collectivism; improve quality and

develop in an all-around way; strive for first-rate results and render meritorious service; uphold the

integrity of the revolution; and strictly observe military discipline.” See Xu Zhuangzhi and Cao Ruilin, “Hu

Jintao Calls for Vigorously Cultivating the Core Values of ‘Being Loyal to the Party, Deeply Cherishing

the People, Serving the Country, Showing Devotion to Missions, and Upholding Honor’ for Contemporary

Revolutionary Soldiers,” Xinhua, 30 Dec 2008, OSC CPP20081230172001.

The PLA’s current definition of “honor” incorporates the larger concept of “socialist honor and

disgrace,” a campaign initiated by Hu Jintao in April 2006. Hu Jintao promoted “8 honors and 8 disgraces”

(barong bachi; 八荣八耻) for the Chinese population; these focused on devotion to nation and to one’s

fellow citizens, and to being disciplined, honest, and hard-working. For more on the “8 honors and 8

disgraces,” see “New Moral Yardstick: 8 Honors, 8 Disgraces,” PRC Government’s Official Website, 5

Apr 2006, http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-04/05/content_245361.htm.

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The PLA’s concept of honor and heroism has three essential elements:

Honor and heroism manifest themselves in self-sacrifice. PLA members must be

willing to sacrifice their “individual interests, self-respect, or even life” in the service

of the Four Loyalties.¹²¹ This includes placing a lower priority on familial

responsibilities, something that conflicts with traditional Confucian obligations and

which “normal people would not be able to handle.” For instance, “when their parents

fall ill, soldiers may not be able to do their filial duty; on New Year’s Day or other

festivals, soldiers may not be together with their families.”¹²² PLA personnel are

taught that even though dedicating oneself to military service above other obligations

can lead to personal ruin, this should be viewed as “success in spite of failure” (shi de

qisuo; 失得其所). ¹²³

Honor and heroism are collective, not individual. The PLA consistently

discourages personnel from engaging in “individual heroism” and showing off, and

encourages them to refuse personal honors

when the other members of their unit have also

“The value of honor is not in the

earned praise.¹²⁴ The PLA has singled out a

direct benefits it can provide to

number of specific

“heroic figures” and

those who earn it, but rather in the

“honored models,” whose actions it promotes

recognition by organizations and

through propaganda activities (a few of these

society of the contributions made

heroes are profiled in Appendix

2). In most

by a person or a group.” ¹²⁵

cases, though, these individuals are honored

— PLA Air Force Enlisted Forces

after perishing in the line of duty, and thus do

Handbook

not personally benefit from this lionization.

Heroism is manifested not just through extraordinary feats but also through

doing one’s ordinary work extraordinarily well. Most of the servicemen whom

the PLA propagandizes as heroes are not supermen with extraordinary capabilities

who achieve great feats of bravery on the battlefield (an increasingly rare distinction,

given that PLA personnel have not been on a battlefield in decades). Rather, PLA

heroes tend to be ordinary soldiers who earn praise by “completing their work and

carrying out their duties in an excellent fashion.” ¹²⁶ The famous model soldier Lei

¹²¹ Zhou Xiaoxian and Tian Wenming, Guidebook for Unit Construction under High-Tech Conditions, p.

760.

¹²² Zhang Shusen and Cao Xueyi, Guidebook to Military Life, pp. 31-32.

¹²³ Zhang Shusen and Cao Xueyi, Guidebook to Military Life, p. 24.

¹²⁴ PLA Air Force Enlisted Forces Handbook, p. 160.

¹²⁵ PLA Air Force Enlisted Forces Handbook, p. 160.

¹²⁶ PLA Air Force Enlisted Forces Handbook, p. 160.

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Self-control

PLA personnel are urged to act

WHAT IS “SELF-CONTROL?”

moderately

and soberly

in

all

circumstances. The PLA teaches that a

A recent PLA publication defines

“self-

lack of “self-discipline”

(zilü; 自 律 ) or

control” as

“being good at restraining

yourself, and controlling your emotions; not

“self-control” (ziwo kongzhi; 自我控制)

becoming inflamed, not grumbling, not

can lead to disobedience, an unwillingness

talking irresponsibly, and not eating or

to participate in daily military tasks, and

drinking excessively; and, consciously

disharmony among the ranks.

observing discipline and various systems of

regulation.” ¹²⁹

Obedience to Party regulations

“Party discipline” (dangji; 党纪) refers to

One element of “self-control” about which

the standards of behavior or rules of

the PLA seems to be increasingly

conduct that all Chinese Communist Party

concerned, is frugality. Personnel are

(CCP) members must adhere to.131 It is

instructed to use their pay wisely, to deposit

limited to Party members in the military,

much of their wages every month, to avoid

who are subject to punishment by a

debt, and in general to repay their debts to

hierarchy of Party organizations if they

their family and to society.¹³⁰

are found in violation of Party discipline.

The types of conduct which constitute a violation of Party discipline are many and varied,

essentially including anything that violates either Party or State law, or “endangers the

interest of the Party, the State, or the people.” ¹³² Examples include corruption, abuse of

power, dereliction of duty, and immoral behavior, such as rampant alcoholism and sexual

promiscuity. ¹³³

¹²⁹ Zhou Xiaoxian and Tian Wenming, Guidebook for Unit Construction under High-Tech Conditions, p.

759.

¹³⁰ Ou Guozheng, Liu Changjian, and Sha Gongping, How to Be a Good NCO, p. 88.

¹³¹ “Regulations of Chinese Communist Party on Disciplinary Punishments,” Renmin Ribao, 18 Feb 2004,

http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1026/2346251.html.

132

“Regulations of Chinese Communist Party on Disciplinary Punishments.”

133

Cheng Baoshan, ed., The Fundamental Laws and Regulations of Military Political Work in the New

Century and New Era—Studying the Newly Revised and Promulgated “Regulations of the Chinese

People’s Liberation Army on Political Work” (xin shiji xin jieduan jundui zhengzhi gongzuo de genben

fagui—xuexi xin xiuding banbu de “zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhengzhi gongzuo tiaoli”; 新世纪新阶段

军队政治工作的根本法规—学习新修订颁布的《中国人民解放军政治工作条例》) (Beijing: Military

Science Publishing House, 2004), p. 215.

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SOURCES AND REQUIREMENTS OF DISCIPLINE IN THE PLA

A recent PLA handbook lists the sources and content of PLA discipline as follows:

The five primary sources of PLA discipline (in order of importance):

1. The line, guiding principles, and policies of the Chinese Communist Party

2. The national Constitution, laws, and regulations

3. The military’s systems of tiaoling, tiaoli, and guizhang [“regulations”]

4. Superiors’ orders and instructions

5. The “Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points of Attention”

The ten basic requirements of PLA discipline:

1. Submit to leadership, and strictly enforce orders and prohibitions.

2. Guard posts closely, and carry out duties.

3. Respect officers and take care of soldiers, and uphold solidarity and friendship.

4. Keep soldiers’ discipline in neat formation, and have an upright bearing.

5. Raise the level of vigilance, and guard secrets.

6. Cherish weapons, equipment, and public property.

7. Be honest in your duties, and do not seek personal gain.

8. Support the government and cherish the people, and protect mass interests.

9. Abide by social morals, and pay attention to decorum.

10. Hand confiscated goods over to the public, and do not abuse prisoners.¹³⁴

Strength of will

The PLA expects its personnel to exhibit exemplary toughness and steadfastness of

character. This encompasses such qualities as fighting spirit, endurance in the face of

hardship, and psychological resilience.

The “fighting spirit” so treasured in ancient martial classics remains an important PLA

value today. PLA personnel are expected to be “brave and fearless when faced with the

enemy,” have strong morale, and be willing to

“press ahead and face death

unflinchingly.”¹³⁵

¹³⁴ PLA Air Force Enlisted Forces Handbook, pp. 105-107.

¹³⁵ Li Qiang, Cao Chuanbiao, and Wu Aili, "Fostering Combat Spirit Through Military Training,” Kongjun

Bao, 20 Mar 2007, p. 1, OSC CPP20070516436004; “Vigorously Fostering Combat Spirit - Fourth

Commentary on Education Activities on Chinese Military's Loyal Fulfillment of Historic Missions in New

Century and New Stage,” Jiefangjun Bao, 3 Apr 2006, p. 1,OSC CPP20060404515009.

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The PLA also expects its personnel to be capable

“Soldiers’

[need to] endure

of bearing extreme hardship without complaint,

hardship is embodied by their

since many will have to live in unpleasant and

arduous surroundings. Very few

difficult environments. PLA personnel are taught

PLA units are garrisoned in well-

about the enormous difficulties their Red Army

to-do, bustling areas; in fact, most

forefathers overcame, reminding them that the

units are stationed in inland

hardships they face are mild by comparison.

villages with relatively backward

economic conditions, remote,

In addition to physical endurance, enlisted

bleak, and desolate border or

personnel are also expected to be thick-skinned in

coastal

defense

areas,

vast

receiving criticism from superiors. One PLA

expanses of frozen snowfields,

manual states,

“Soldiers must hear and absorb

faraway island outposts, the

unpleasant words. Doing so is very beneficial in

uninhabited

Gobi, windswept

guiding our work and study. As the ancients said,

deserts,

or

oxygen-deprived

‘good medicine tastes bitter but is beneficial for

plateaus with little water.” ¹³⁶

illness; the truth often grates on the ear but is

— Guidebook to Military Life

beneficial for behavior.’”¹³⁷

Unity of purpose

The PLA vision of unit cohesion is based on an idealized relationship between officers

and enlisted personnel. PLA leaders consider

“unity between officers and enlisted

personnel” (guanbing yizhi; 官 兵 一 致 ) to be the keystone of cohesion. When the

interests of officers and enlisted personnel diverge, as PLA texts claim they did in the

warlord and Nationalist armies, cohesion suffers, making it impossible to “realize internal

and external harmony and form a strong unit.”¹³⁸ This causes dysfunction in peacetime

and impairs combat strength in wartime. In its views on unit cohesion, the PLA differs

from the U.S. military, which emphasizes strong, combat-forged bonds between

personnel at the same level, or “buddies.”

The PLA teaches that unity between officers and enlisted personnel rests on a close

relationship of mutual obligation, built in peacetime. Harmony and cohesion within a unit

suffers only when officers and enlisted personnel fail to carry out these obligations.

This relationship mirrors the Confucian bond between parents and children, referenced in

Chapter 1. The PLA urges each member of a unit to think of that unit as a caring

extended family. ¹³⁹ The PLA instructs that - as in a family - officers and enlisted

personnel both have clear duties to perform:

¹³⁶ Zhang Shusen and Cao Xueyi, Guidebook to Military Life, p. 31.

¹³⁷ Zhang Shusen and Cao Xueyi, Guidebook to Military Life, p. 27.

¹³⁸ Chen Zhou, Theory and Practice of the PLA’s Democratic System, p. 8; Chen Anren, On the Cultivation

of Military Talent’s Moral Character, p. 27.

¹³⁹ Liu Shihao, Techniques and Methods for Platoon Leaders Commanding Troops (paizhang daibing jifa;

排长带兵技法) (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 2005), p. 206.

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Officers

(and, in some

texts, NCOs) must cherish

AMERICAN VS. CHINESE VIEWS OF UNIT COHESION

their

subordinates and

place these subordinates’

U.S. Army

PLA

welfare above their own, in

“The objective measure of

“If officers can take

order to “protect common

cohesion is whether a

care

of

[enlisted

soldiers’ human dignity…

soldier will choose to stay

personnel] just like

dispel worries, and over-

with his buddies and face

their

parents

did,

come difficulties.”¹⁴² This

discomfort and danger when

considerately helping

is deemed especially im-

given the opportunity or

them to solve various

portant

for

younger

temptation

to

choose

difficulties,

soldiers

personnel, whose

“indivi-

comfort and safety. The

will

be able

to

dual moral and psych-

extreme

measure

of

experience the warmth

ological characters are all

cohesion is willingness to

of the big family of the

still in a stage of forming

die with fellow soldiers

unit … and the unit will

and developing, and are not

rather than leave them to die

be able to form very

yet

very mature or

alone.”¹⁴⁰

strong cohesion.”¹⁴¹

stable.”¹⁴³

In return, enlisted personnel are expected to unconditionally obey orders, give

leaders the respect they deserve, and “actively assist officers in doing their work.”¹⁴⁴

This includes accepting their assignments without question and respecting officers’

personal dignity.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁰Field Manual 22-51: Leader’s Manual for Combat Stress Control (Washington, DC: Headquarters,

Department of the Army, 2001), Section 3-10 (“Unit Cohesion”),

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/22-51/22-51_c.htm#3-10.

¹⁴¹ Li Xuezhi, Xia Xinxin, and Huang Yongjun, eds., Skills for Political Instructors Leading Troops

(zhidaoyuan daibing jiyi; 指导员带兵记忆) (Beijing: PLA Press, 2005), p. 57.

¹⁴² “Full Text of the ‘Soldiers’ Moral Standards.’”

¹⁴³ Sai Zhongbao, interview with GPD Propaganda Department leader, p. 3.

¹⁴⁴ “Full Text of the ‘Soldiers’ Moral Standards.’”

¹⁴⁵ Ou Guozheng, Liu Changjian, and Sha Gongping, How to Be a Good NCO, p. 222.

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Though the PLA’s views on cohesion are clearly

ABOLISHING RANKS

influenced by the Confucian emphasis on

harmony between superiors and subordinates,

One reflection of the PLA’s concern

relationships among personnel must also be

with equality is its ambivalence about

squared with the PLA’s Maoist principles.

ranks, which military leaders at

These principles, developed during the Red

certain points in PLA history have

Army period, emphasize “political equality” and

seen as creating class divisions in the

the avoidance of class divisions within

PLA.

“revolutionary” institutions like the PLA. ¹⁴⁸

The Red Army identified its members

only by their job title, and the PLA

PLA leadership manuals emphasize that officers

did not introduce ranks until

1955,

and enlisted personnel are equal in human

when it sought to follow the Soviet

dignity (renge; 人格), and set apart only by their

rank system.¹⁴⁶ This system lasted

different duties and divisions of labor (zhiwu,

just ten years before it was abolished

fengong; 职务，分工).¹⁴⁹ Accordingly, officers

in

1965, in a period when foreign

are instructed that they are not inherently

influences were considered counter-

superior to enlisted personnel, and that they hold

revolutionary and military ranks were

leadership positions only because they are well-

considered bourgeois.¹⁴⁷ The PLA

suited to carry out these particular tasks.

divided its forces only into “cadre”

Officers are expected to be good at managing

(officers) and

“fighters”

(enlisted

and commanding troops, just as enlisted soldiers

personnel). Military ranks were not

are expected to be adept at the physical and

re-established until 1988.

mental skills necessary for success on the

battlefield. PLA texts emphasize that both skill sets are equally important.¹⁵⁰

In accordance with this principle, officers are instructed to avoid the following:

¹⁴⁶ China’s People’s Liberation Army: An Introductory Course of Instruction (Alexandria, VA: The CNA

Corporation, 2004), 316.

¹⁴⁷ Handbook of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, DDB-2680-32-84 (Washington, DC: Defense

Intelligence Agency, 1984), p. 14, http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Foia/PLA_handbook.pdf.

¹⁴⁸ This principle is touted in contemporary media as well as older texts. For a recent statement on PLA

“equality,” see e.g. Ling Huanxin, "Democracy-Building in the Military Viewed From the Regulations of

the Servicemen Committee, "Jiefangjun Bao, 12 Jun 2008, p. 6, OSC CPP20080612710007. The origins of

the concept are discussed in Lai Zhuanzhu, The Gutian Conference from Beginning to End (gutian huiyi

qianhou; 古田会议前后), cited in Chen Zhou, Theory and Practice of the PLA Democratic System, p. 19.

¹⁴⁹ Ou Guozheng, Liu Changjian, and Sha Gongping, How To Be a Good NCO, p. 222.

¹⁵⁰ Liu Shihao, Techniques and Methods for Platoon Leaders Commanding Troops, p. 202.

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