Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Intelligence Oversight

5 December 2006

FMI 2-22.9

B-5

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

B-19.

Army intelligence components will interpret nothing in AR 381-10 as authorizing the collection of

any information relating to a US person solely because of that person’s lawful advocacy of measures
opposed to government policy as embodied in the First Amendment to the US Constitution. The First
Amendment states:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances.

Retention of US Person Information

B-20.

Retention refers only to maintaining information about US persons that the Army intelligence

component can retrieve by the person’s name or other personal identifying data. AR 381-10, Procedure 3,
describes the kinds of US person information that Army intelligence component may knowingly retain
without the individual’s consent. AR 381-10 authorizes the retention of US person information under the
following criteria:

Information properly collected in accordance with AR 381-10, Procedure 2

Information acquired incidentally. Army intelligence components acquired the information
incidental to an otherwise authorized collection activity, and retained the information if it––

Could have been collected intentionally under the provisions of AR 381-10, Procedure 2.

Is necessary to understand or assess foreign intelligence or CI.

Is foreign intelligence or CI collected from authorized electronic surveillance. Electronic
surveillance means the acquisition of a nonpublic communication by electronic means
without the consent of a person who is a party to an electronic communication or, in the
case of a non-electronic communication, without the consent of a person who is visibly
present at the place of communication, but not including the use of radio direction-finding
equipment solely to determine the location of a transmitter.

Is incidental to authorized collection and may indicate involvement in activities that may
violate Federal, State, local, or foreign law.

Information relating to functions of other Army activities, DOD components, or non-DOD
agencies. The information pertains solely to the functions and responsibilities of other activities,
components or agencies, and is retained only as necessary to transmit the information to that
agency. The transmittal is filed and destroyed under general correspondence records
management. Army intelligence components will not retain the information in intelligence
databases or repositories.

Temporary retention. Army intelligence components may retain information up to 90 days,
solely to determine if the information is, in fact, retainable under this regulation. The 90-day
period starts upon receipt of the information.

Other information. Army intelligence components will only retain information not covered in
this section to report the collection for oversight purposes and for necessary subsequent
proceedings.

B-21.

Access to US person information retained in intelligence files, databases, and repositories is limited

to those with a need to know the information. US person information in intelligence files, databases, and
repositories is retained in accordance with disposition criteria in AR 25-400-2. Intelligence components
will review intelligence files and databases annually. Intelligence components will specifically review US
person information to ensure its retention is still necessary to an assigned function. This ensures US person
information is not held beyond established disposition criteria, is retained for an authorized function, and
was not retained in violation of this regulation. This does not apply to the Investigative Records Repository
or other authorized long-term records holding areas.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Appendix B

B-6

FMI 2-22.9

5 December 2006

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Dissemination of US Person Information

B-22.

In intelligence usage, dissemination is the delivery of intelligence to users in a suitable form with

subsequent application of the intelligence to appropriate missions, tasks, and functions. AR 381-10,
Procedure 4, governs the types of information regarding US persons that Army intelligence components
may disseminate, without the person’s consent, outside the component which collected and retained the
information. It does not apply to information collected solely for administrative purposes; disseminated
pursuant to law; or disseminated pursuant to a court order that imposes dissemination controls. An Army
intelligence component may disseminate non-SIGINT information about a US person without that person’s
consent under the following conditions:

The information was collected or retained under AR 381-10, Procedures 2 and 3.

The recipient is reasonably believed to have a need for the information to fulfill a lawful
assigned governmental function and is—

A DOD employee or a DOD contractor employee.

A Federal, State, or local law enforcement entity when the information is in the recipient’s
jurisdiction.

An agency of the US Intelligence Community so that it can determine if the information is
relevant to agency responsibilities.

A non-DOD or non-Intelligence Community Federal agency.

A foreign government, under the provisions of existing policy, agreements, and other
understandings with the US in accordance with AR 380-10.

Dissemination outside DOD of information about a US citizen or permanent resident alien from
a US Army system of records requires disclosure accounting under the provisions of AR 340–
21.

After consultation with the Department of Justice and DOD General Counsel, the legal office
responsible for advising the Army intelligence component concerned must approve any
dissemination that does not conform to the conditions listed in AR 381-10, Procedure 4.

The Adjutant General Counsel approves any other dissemination not conforming to Procedure 4
in coordination with the DOD General Counsel and the Department of Justice. These
dissemination requests are forwarded through command channels to the Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff, G2.

QUESTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY

B-23.

Questionable intelligence activity is conduct during or related to an intelligence activity that may

violate law, Executive Order or Presidential Directive, or applicable DOD or Army policy, including
regulations. Intelligence personnel will report questionable intelligence activity upon discovery.
Employees are encouraged to report questionable intelligence activity through command or inspector
general channels in accordance with AR 381-10. The following are commonly reported questionable
intelligence activities on improper collection, retention, or dissemination of US person information:

Gathering information about US domestic groups not connected with a foreign power or
international terrorism.

Producing and disseminating intelligence threat assessments containing US person information
without a clear explanation of the intelligence purpose for which the information was collected
(for example, listing area universities with foreign students or US companies with DOD
contracts in an assessment without showing a connection to a foreign power or international
terrorism). An exception to this would be an Army intelligence component providing direct CI
or technology protection support to a DOD contractor.

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Intelligence Oversight

5 December 2006

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Incorporating US person criminal information into an intelligence product without determining
if identifying the person is appropriate.

Collecting US person information for FP purposes without determining if the intelligence
function related to it is authorized (for example, collecting information on the domestic activities
of US persons).

Submitting a CI incident report under AR 381-12 that contains information on a US person
suspected of committing a crime not related to national security, as opposed to passing the
information directly to the responsible law enforcement or commander.

Storing operations and command traffic about US persons in intelligence files merely because
the information was transmitted on a classified system.

Collecting US person information from open sources without a logical connection to the unit’s
mission or correlation to a validated collection requirement (for example, a unit in one area
collecting information from the Web page of a militia group in another area, then reporting that
information as a CI incident report or disseminating it in unit intelligence products).

Disseminating command FP information on US person domestic activity as an intelligence
product (for example, including US person groups in an intelligence annex as enemy forces).

Becoming directly involved in criminal investigative activities (for example, direct participation
in a narcotics suspect interrogation) without prior Army General Counsel concurrence and
Secretary of Defense approval.

Identifying a US person by name in an Intelligence Information Report without a requirement to
do so.

Including the identity of a US person in a contact report when that person is not directly
involved with the operation.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5 December 2006

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Appendix C

Open Source Intelligence and Homeland Security

C-1.

Open sources are a readily accessible and rich source of publicly available information that CA, CI,

engineer, intelligence, law enforcement, logistics, medical, operations, PA, and other personnel can use to
enhance planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of Regular Army, Army National Guard, and
Army Reserve support to homeland defense and civil support missions. Publicly available information
includes published or broadcasted information on weather, terrain, and civil considerations needed to
support national, regional, state, and local civil support missions as well as information on foreign threats
to homeland defense. Retrieving and analyzing publicly available information as part of staff planning and
situational awareness ensures commanders and their subordinates receive timely, relevant, and accurate
information about the conditions and variables of the operational environment that affect homeland
security operations.

C-2.

Operating within the scope of their authorized functions and assigned missions, Army intelligence

organizations use open source research and intelligence production techniques to support homeland
security operations. Open source research and analysis of domestic operational environments may require
the collection, retention, and dissemination of US person information. When such activity is necessary,
Executive Order 12333, DOD Directive 5240.1-R, and AR 381-10 provide procedures that enable
organizations performing authorized intelligence functions to carry out those functions in a manner that
protects the constitutional rights of US persons. In addition, DOD Directive 5200.27 and AR 380-13
provide instructions on the acquisition, reporting, processing, and storage of CI investigative information
on persons or organizations not affiliated with DOD.

HOMELAND SECURITY

C-3.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security provides a framework for organizing the efforts of

federal, state, local, and private organizations whose primary functions are often unrelated to national
security. Military application of the National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preparation,
detection, deterrence, prevention, defending, and responding to threats and aggression aimed at the
homeland. DOD also provides military assistance to civil authorities, including consequence management
activities. The Armed Forces of the United States support the National Strategy for Homeland Security
through two distinct but interrelated mission areas: homeland defense operations and civil support
missions.

Homeland Defense Operations

C-4.

DOD is the lead, supported by other agencies, in defending against traditional external threats or

aggression. However, against internal asymmetric, nontraditional threats (for example, terrorism), DOD
may be in support of homeland security. When ordered to conduct homeland defense operations within US
territory, DOD will coordinate closely with other federal agencies or departments. Consistent with laws
and policy, the Services will provide capabilities to support COCOM requirements against a variety of air,
land, maritime, space, and cyber incursions that can threaten national security. These include invasion,
computer network attack, and air and missile attacks. The purpose of homeland defense is to protect
against and mitigate the impact of incursions or attacks on sovereign territory, the domestic population, and
defense critical infrastructure.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Appendix C

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5 December 2006

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Civil Support Missions

C-5.

Employment of military forces within the US, its territories, and possessions, under the auspices of

civil support, typically falls under the broad mission of military assistance to civil authorities. Military
assistance to civil authorities consists of three mission subsets:

Military Support to Civil Authorities.

Military support to civil authorities refers to support

provided by Federal military forces, DOD civilians, contractor personnel, and DOD agencies
and components in response to requests for assistance during domestic incidents to include
terrorist threats or attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. Military support to civil
authorities missions consist of DOD support to US domestic emergencies and for designated law
enforcement, civil disturbances, and other activities.

Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.

The use of the military in law

enforcement roles is a sensitive topic and restrictions apply to such use. Military forces
performing in this role support the lead Federal agency and other supporting agencies and may
be armed depending on the Secretary of Defense decision. Military support to civilian law
enforcement agencies may include, but is not limited to, national special security events, support
for combating terrorism, support to counterdrug operations, maritime security, ISR capabilities,
and general support.

Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances.

The President is authorized by the Constitution

and statutory laws to employ the Armed Forces of the United States to suppress insurrections,
rebellions, and riots, and provide federal supplemental assistance to the states to maintain law
and order. Responsibility for the management of federal response for civil disturbances rests
with the Attorney General.

Homeland Defense and Civil Support Command and Control

C-6.

Regardless of whether DOD is conducting homeland defense or civil support, military forces will

always remain under the control of the established Title 10, Title 32, or state active duty military chain of
command. In certain circumstances, military commanders or responsible officials in other DOD
components may face situations that will require them to provide immediate response to civil authorities.
Military commanders respond to requests from civil authorities prior to receiving authority from the
President or chain of command when immediate support is critical to save lives, prevent human suffering,
or to mitigate great property damage. Such requests are situation specific, time-sensitive, and may or may
not be associated with a declared disaster.

C-7.

The Army National Guard primarily operates under three different command relationships: federal

funding and federal control (Title 10 US Code); federal funding and state control (Title 32 US Code); and
state status (state funding and state control). Army National Guard adjutants general and commanders are
responsible for planning and training for federal and state missions. The Secretary of Defense may provide
funds to a governor to employ Army National Guard units or members to conduct homeland defense
activities that the Secretary of Defense determines to be necessary and appropriate for participation by the
Army National Guard units or members, as the case may be. The Army National Guard, when in state
status, responds under the governor’s control for civil support missions in accordance with state laws.
When Army National Guard personnel or units are federalized by order of the President under Title 10,
they respond under the same legal restrictions and structures (command and control) as Regular Army
military forces.

C-8.

For more information, Joint Publication 3-26 provides the joint doctrine to guide the Armed Forces

in the conduct of homeland security operations. It describes the homeland security framework, mission
areas, and missions and related supporting operations and enabling activities. It also discusses legal

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Open Source Intelligence and Homeland Security

5 December 2006

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C-3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

authorities; joint force, multinational, and interagency relationships; C2; planning and execution; and
training and resource considerations.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

C-9.

Intelligence operations have specific applications and legal implications when employed in a

homeland security operation. The US military has a limited role in collecting foreign intelligence in
domestic operations. Executive Orders and DOD Directives allow and require the collection of CI to
protect US Government property and human resources. The Services must turn over any information of
possible foreign intelligence value that they may have obtained in a CI or domestic operation to the FBI,
which has the primary responsibility for domestic intelligence collection within the United States. The
Patriot Act of 2001 eases some of the restrictions on foreign intelligence gathering within the United
States, and affords the US Intelligence Community greater access to information gathered during criminal
investigations.

C-10.

Under AR 381-10, Army intelligence activities may collect publicly available information on US

persons only when it is necessary to fulfill an assigned function. There must also be a link between the
collection of the US person information and the Army intelligence component’s assigned mission and
function. Army intelligence components must exhaust the least intrusive collection means before
requesting a more intrusive collection means. According to AR 381-10, the least intrusive means of
collection is from publicly available sources or with the US person’s consent. Within the US, Army
intelligence components may only collect foreign intelligence concerning US persons by overt means
except when all of the following conditions are present:

The foreign intelligence sought is significant and does not concern a US person’s domestic
activities.

The foreign intelligence cannot be reasonably obtained by overt means.

Collection has been coordinated with the FBI.

Other than overt means was approved in writing by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G2 or the
Commander, INSCOM.

C-11.

Under AR 380-13, the Army prohibits acquiring, reporting, processing or storing of investigative

information on persons or organizations not affiliated with DOD, except under those circumstances
authorized in AR 380-13, paragraphs 6 and 7, when such information is essential to accomplish DA
missions. Paragraph 6 addresses operations related to protection of army personnel, functions and
property. Paragraph 7 describes operations related to civil disturbances. All information-gathering
activities are subject to overall civilian control and general supervision by the Secretary or Under Secretary
of the Army.

C-12.

Investigative information includes all data developed as a result of CI investigative activities, such as

investigations, operations, and services, and through liaison with local, state, and federal agencies. It may
also come from unsolicited sources, and from public sources such as newspapers, magazines, books,
periodicals, handbills, and radio and television broadcasts. Where acquisition activities are authorized by
AR 380-13 to meet an essential requirement for information, maximum reliance is placed on liaison with
domestic civilian investigative agencies, federal, state, and local. AR 380-13 is not applicable to––

Pretrial investigations required by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

Activities involving cryptography.

Use by public information officers of relevant information from published sources solely for the
purpose of preparing responses to public inquiries.

Foreign intelligence information including the acquisition reporting, processing, and storing of
such information.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Appendix C

C-4

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5 December 2006

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Authorized criminal investigation and law enforcement information gathering activities (for
example, those activities not “CI related”) which are the responsibility of military police and the
US Army Criminal Investigation Command.

C-13.

Nothing in AR 380-13 prohibits the prompt reporting to LEAs, or keeping a record of such a report,

of any information indicating the existence of a threat to life or property, or violation of law. The
regulation does not prohibit the receipt of information from all agencies in the course of liaison authorized
by AR 380-13 provided organizations––

Promptly screen such information.

Immediately destroy information not authorized for the retention.

C-14.

AR 380-13 prohibits the assignment of Army personnel, military or civilian, to attend public or

private meetings, demonstrations, or other similar activities held off post to acquire investigative
information authorized by the regulation without specific approval by the Secretary or the Under Secretary
of the Army. This prohibition includes any attempt to encourage or request the unofficial attendance of
any persons at such events, whether or not such personnel have official CI or investigative responsibilities.
An exception to the policy is authorized when, in the judgment of the local commander, the threat is direct
and immediate and time precludes obtaining prior approval.

Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies

C-15.

Military support to civilian LEAs includes support to civilian LEAs. This includes but is not limited

to combating terrorism, counterdrug operations, national security special events, and national critical
infrastructure and key asset protection. Joint Publication 3-26 describes National critical infrastructure
and key assets as the infrastructure and assets vital to a nation’s security, governance, public health and
safety, economy, and public confidence. They include telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas
and oil distribution and storage, water supply systems, banking and finance, transportation, emergency
services, industrial assets, information systems, and continuity of government operations.

C-16.

Under AR 380-13, information on persons and organizations not affiliated with the DOD may be

acquired, reported, processed, and stored only if there is a reasonable basis to believe that one or more of
the following situations exists:

Theft, destruction or sabotage of weapons, ammunition, equipment, facilities, or records
belonging to DOD units or installations.

Possible compromise of classified defense information by unauthorized disclosure or by
espionage.

Subversion of loyalty, discipline or morale of DA military or DAC personnel by actively
encouraging violation of laws, disobedience of lawful orders and regulations, or disruption of
military activities.

Demonstrations on Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve installations or
demonstrations immediately adjacent to them which are of such a size or character that they are
likely to interfere with the conduct of military activities.

Direct threats to DOD military or civilian personnel regarding their official duties or to other
persons authorized protection by DOD resources.

Activities or demonstrations endangering classified defense contract facilities or key defense
facilities.

C-17.

Effective liaison with local LEAs will occur regularly to determine if actual or potential situations

described above exist. Organizations will conduct CI surveys and inspections for the same purpose.

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Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances

C-18.

Military assistance for civil disturbances are missions of civil support involving DOD support,

normally based on the direction of the President, to suppress insurrections, rebellions, and domestic
violence, and provide federal supplemental assistance to the states to maintain law and order. In
accordance with AR 380-13, Army resources may only acquire, report, process or store civil disturbance
information concerning nonaffiliated persons and organizations upon receipt of specific prior authorization
from the Secretary or the Under Secretary of the Army. The Secretary or the Under Secretary of the Army
will only grant such authorization when there is a distinct threat of a civil disturbance exceeding the law
enforcement capability of state and local authorities. The authorization will set forth the procedures and
the limitations on the acquisition, reporting, processing and storing of civil disturbance information.

C-19.

As an exception to the above limitation, AR 380-13 authorizes overt acquisition and current

maintenance of the following information:

Listing of local, state, and Federal officials whose duties include direct responsibilities related to
the control of civil disturbances.

Data on vital public and commercial installations or facilities and private facilities believed to be
appropriate targets for individuals or organizations engaged in civil disorders.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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Appendix D

Copyright Basics

D-1.

AR 27-60 prescribes policy and procedures for the acquisition, protection, and transfer and use of

patents, copyrights, trademarks, and other intellectual property by DA. It is Army policy to recognize the
rights of copyright owners consistent with the Army’s unique mission and worldwide commitments. When
uncertain, intelligence personnel should contact their supporting Judge Advocate General office before
publishing information containing copyrighted or similarly protected intellectual property.

FAIR USE

D-2.

As a general rule, Army organizations will not reproduce or distribute copyrighted works without the

permission of the copyright owner unless such use is within an exception under US Copyright Law or
required to meet an immediate, mission-essential need for which noninfringing alternatives are either
unavailable or unsatisfactory. According to the US Copyright Office, “fair use” of a copyrighted work for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research is not an
infringement of copyright. The four factors in determining fair use are –

Purpose and character of the use.

In the context of fair use, intelligence operations are similar

in purpose and usage to non-profit news reporting and research organizations.

Nature of the copyrighted work.

Self-explanatory

Amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole.

There is no specific number of words, lines, or notes that may safely be taken without

permission. Usually, the amount or portion of copyrighted material is limited to quotations of
excerpts and short passages; and summary of a speech or article, with brief quotations.

Effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

The

effect on the market or value of copyrighted material relates to reproduction and dissemination
of products provided by the owner beyond that authorized the owner’s “Terms of Use” or
described in contracts and licenses with the US Government. Operators of fee-based data
services have an economic interest in the scope and dissemination of the data they offer.
Improper use or dissemination could be infringement on the copyright law protections of the
owner of the database.

D-3.

Implicit with fair use is the documentation and citation of the source of the copyrighted information.

Upon retrieval or collection, intelligence personnel must document the source’s identity and the
circumstances “who, what, where, when, and why” of retrieval or collection. When using copyrighted
material, intelligence personnel must include a citation or a reference that attributes the information to the
source. The format for citations may vary by organization or style manual (for example, Government Style
Manual, Modern Language Association, American Psychological Association) but the basic components
include the name of the authors, the title of the material; the date of publication, retrieval, or collection; the
identify of the source (for example, publisher, organization, website).

NATURE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS

D-4.

The following extracts from US Copyright Office Circular 1 provide basic information on the nature

of copyrighted works.

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Appendix D

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5 December 2006

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Description

D-5.

of “original works of authorship,” including literary, dramatic, musical, artistic, and certain other
intellectual works. This protection is available to both published and unpublished works. Section 106 of
the 1976 Copyright Act generally gives the owner of copyright the exclusive right to do and to authorize
others to do the following:

Reproduce the work in copies or phonorecords.

Prepare derivative works based upon the work.

Distribute copies or phonorecords of the work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.

Perform the work publicly, in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works.

Display the copyrighted work publicly, in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work.

In the case of sound recordings, perform the work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission.

D-6.

It is illegal for anyone to violate any of the rights provided by the copyright law to the owner of

copyright.  These rights, however, are not unlimited in scope. Sections 107 through 121 of the 1976
Copyright Act establish limitations on these rights. In some cases, these limitations are specified
exemptions from copyright liability.  One major limitation is the doctrine of "fair use," which is given a
statutory basis in section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act.  In other instances, the limitation takes the form
of a "compulsory license" under which certain limited uses of copyrighted works are permitted upon
payment of specified royalties and compliance with statutory conditions.

Protected Works

D-7.

The fixation need not be directly perceptible so long as it may be communicated with the aid of a machine
or device. Copyrightable works include the following categories:

Literary works.

Musical works, including any accompanying words.

Dramatic works, including any accompanying music.

Pantomimes and choreographic works.

Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.

Motion pictures and other audiovisual works.

Sound recordings.

Architectural works.

Data or information from fee-based websites.

Works Ineligible for Protection

D-8.

Several categories of material are generally not eligible for federal copyright protection. These

include among others:

Works that have not been fixed in a tangible form of expression (for example, choreographic
works that have not been notated or recorded, or improvisational speeches or performances that
have not been written or recorded).

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D-3

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Titles, names, short phrases, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; mere variations of
typographic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring; mere listings of ingredients or contents.

Ideas, procedures, methods, systems, processes, concepts, principles, discoveries, or devices, as
distinguished from a description, explanation, or illustration.

Works consisting entirely of information that is common property and containing no original
authorship (for example: standard calendars, height and weight charts, tape measures and rulers,
and lists or tables taken from public documents or other common sources).

International Copyright Protection

D-9.

There is no such thing as an "international copyright" that will automatically protect an author's

writings throughout the entire world. Protection against unauthorized use in a particular country depends,
basically, on the national laws of that country. Most countries, however, do offer protection to foreign
works under certain conditions, and these conditions have been greatly simplified by international
copyright treaties and conventions. For further information and a list of countries that maintain copyright
relations with the US is available in US Copyright Office Circular 38a, "International Copyright Relations
of the United States” on the US Copyright Office website at

http://www.copyright.gov

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Appendix E

Director of National Intelligence Open Source Center

E-1.

Open source as an intelligence discipline has been practiced to varying degrees throughout the

nation’s history. In addition over 200 years of military history of utilizing openly available sources, US
missions to foreign countries have traditionally dedicated personnel to reviewing local press and later
broadcast media to keep up with host nation current events and to understand local perspectives. The work
of those “Press Attaches” and their staffs has come to make a significant contribution to the effectiveness
of US Embassies abroad.

E-2.

In February of 1941, the US Government took the first step in creating an open source mission-

specific organization by creating the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service, dedicated to “recording,
translating, transcribing, and analyzing certain radio broadcast programs” from foreign transmitters,
primarily Germany and Japan. Eventually residing in the CIA, that organization, which came be known as
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, developed into a service of common concern that for almost 65
years provided products derived from foreign open sources to consumers across the US military and
Government.

E-3.

In response to language in the Intelligence Reform and Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2004 and

recommendations in the Silberman-Robb Commission calling for more effective use of open sources to
support intelligence, the newly established DNI created the DNI OSC at CIA on 1 November 2005. The
DNI assigned the Director, CIA as Executive Agent for OSC. The DNI directed that the OSC to––

Build on the capabilities and expertise of the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

Report directly to the Director, CIA, in response to the Assistant Deputy, DNI, for Open
Source’s direction and guidance.

MISSION

E-4.

The DNI OSC supports the National Open Source Enterprise as directed by the Assistant Deputy

DNI for Open Source. The OSC is a center of excellence in the distributed Open Source Enterprise which
nurtures distributed expertise and capabilities that exist not only within the Intelligence Community but
also across the government and throughout the private sector and academia. The OSC works with
COCOMs and the entire DOD down to the small unit level to deconflict strategies and minimize
redundancy. As directed by the Assistant Deputy, DNI for Open Source, the OSC provides services of
common concern to the National Open Source Enterprise such as training and content procurement.

Open Source Requirements

E-5.

The OSC’s operations are driven by the standing open source requirements contained in the OSC’s

collection plans, which are reviewed and approved annually. OSC analysts are urged to familiarize
themselves with the collection plans and standing requirements related to their AOIs in order to gain
maximum benefit from their participation in the collection management process. The plans reside on
Intelink-Top Secret within the Open Source Requirements Management System site on the Intelink-SBU at

http://cres.cia.ic.gov/oshome.nsf/welcome

E-6.

Organizations wishing to submit ad hoc requirements to the OSC must contact their organization’s

designated point of contact for open source requirements. The points of contact are listed on the Open
Source Requirements Management System site. Contact the OSC Customer Service Center about a
specific requirement or the requirements process.

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Appendix E

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Operations

E-7.

The OSC maintains a worldwide network of multilingual regional experts. They respond to

intelligence requirements using open sources including radio, television, newspapers, news agencies,
databases, and the Internet. The OSC monitors open sources in more than 160 countries in over 80
languages and acquires open source data worldwide for organizations across the military and government,
down to local law enforcement.

E-8.

The OSC analyzes the content and behavior of the media and Internet websites of nations and other

international actors of significant policy interest to the US Government. These contextual and analytical
products, categorized as OSC Analysis and OSC Media Aids, are available on Opensource.gov and the
OSC websites hosted on government-sponsored communications systems, including SIPRNET and
JWICS.

E-9.

OSC products and services include––

Analysis.

OSC analyses range from short, time-sensitive products that explain the media

treatment of issues on the US Government policy agenda to longer analytic pieces that examine
issues or the content and behavior of a set of media over time to detect trends, patterns, and
changes related to US national security interests.

Media Aids – Media Guide.

Media guides offer a comprehensive characterization of the media

of a country or region and provide an overview or characterization of the larger media
environment, including what makes up the media of a country, how that media operate, who
uses the media and how they use it, and other factors, such as literacy rates, press laws,
economic status, and demographics that affect the media and their behavior or use.

Media Aids – Commentator Profile.

Commentator profiles provide detailed information on

one or more media personalities in a particular country, outlining their influence, background,
views, and biases on key topics. The focus is on personalities who speak or write about issues
of importance to the United States or who have influence with their government, businesses, or
large segments of the general population.

Open Source Center Reports.

Through its worldwide access to foreign media and other

publicly available material, the OSC provides translations and transcriptions of the latest
political, military, economic, and technical information gleaned from foreign open sources.
Reports gist from select sources, such as jihadist websites or daily editorials, on topics related to
the National Intelligence Priorities.

Video Services.

Video Services Division collects, analyzes, and disseminates more than 550

channels of foreign and domestic television and Internet video for 24 hours a day, 7 days a week
to military and Intelligence Community customers. Video Services Division can access, via
OSC’s international collection network, between 16,000 and 34,000 additional channels. Video
Services Division archives over 1.6 million hours of video per year and has a library containing
10,000 hours spanning 45 years. The Video Server System provides access to foreign video at
the desktop. The capabilities of the system include keyword searching, English closed-
captioning, speech-to-text transcripts, thumbnail program scanning, video on demand, unlimited
archive capability, still photographs from video, multiple customizable topic profiling, and on-
line ordering. The Video Server System hosts a nearly 2-year archive of web-accessible video.
Military customers can access the unclassified Video Server System hosted on the Open Source
Information Service network or request delivery via videotape, digital video device, or compact
disc.

Map Services.

OSC geographers are experts on foreign mapping, geographic information, and

geospatial technologies. The Maps Services Center provides maps, data, information, analytical
products, training and a host of related geographic services to those on the front lines of

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intelligence. Map Services Center maintains the community’s central repository of hundreds of
thousands of foreign maps and geographic data.

Open Source Tools

E-10.

The OSC array of tools facilitates the open source efforts of agencies and offices throughout the US

Government by enabling the creation, management, and dissemination of unclassified products, including
dissemination to classified networks and platforms. The tools’ effectiveness and high adaptability stem
from these characteristics:

Highly developed for open source exploitation and product creation through years of testing and
use in the OSC.

Designed to support a distributed workforce, and can accommodate staff or contractor resources.

Independent of location; most capabilities require only Internet access for full functionality.

Tailored for a non-technical workforce.

Consistent with Intelligence Community security, and technical and metadata standards.

E-11.

OSC tools include––

Analytic Tools and Methodology.

In the Analytic Development Lab, community analysts work

alongside open source specialists to discover new open sources and develop research and
analytic methods and tools. While working in the Lab, analysts have access to large-scale
Internet and data mining tools in addition to the linguistic and substantive resources of OSC.
Tours in the lab run from 6- to 12-month details, and there are limitations on the number of
spaces available.

Internet Exploitation Tools.

OSC’s Internet Exploitation Team provides training as well as

access to a large data repository; including an Internet cache and other purchased content, and a
suite of data mining tools to allow research of web-based and other open sources. As with tours
in the Lab, the training and system access are available to the community on a limited basis; use
of some services may also incur fees.

Video Collection and Product Creation.

The OSC’s video repository is an interactive, real-

time and archive database for viewing live and recorded television programming, Internet video
posts, and OSC video products at the desktop. The repository streams and records over 160
programs from 50 countries in 31 languages daily. Video processing tools, and more video
content, will be available mid-2006 through the OSC’s Digital Audio Video Enterprise (DAVE)
Program. The repository is directly accessible through the OSC’s website at

www.Opensource.gov

Product Creation Tools and Systems.

OSC product creation tools and systems enable the

creation of open source products via the Internet. For complex work processes, particularly
those involving a distributed workforce or a multi-step workflow, the OSC’s PRINCE system
provides the optimal solution, as its web interfaces enable product creation, editing, and
dissemination. Users can direct items for translation, editing, and dissemination from any point
in the globe, the only requirement being Internet access. PRINCE accommodates value-added
products, such as open source analysis, in addition to translations. The OSC’s website,
Opensource.gov, also has product creation capabilities that are simple to use and can be
accessed via the Internet. To ensure the broadest possible dissemination, open source products
created in PRINCE or Opensource.gov are distributed to classified networks, including JWICS
SIPRNET, as well as customer platforms.

Opensource.gov Content Management Services.

To maximize access to open source

products, Opensource.gov content management capabilities are available to the community.
These capabilities include highlighting individual open source products on the site or even
highlighting the open source efforts of other government agencies through the creation of entire
“communities,” or pages, on the site. These content management capabilities can be granted to

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government employees or contractors, and require minimal training. The OSC also offers a
fee-for-service capability for managing the content of other government agencies. For more
information, contact OSC’s Directorate for Information Access at 703-613-5844 or the Open
Source Center Help Desk at 1-800-205-8615.

Open Source Center Website

E-12.

Opensource.gov, formerly known as fbis.gov, is the OSC’s Internet-accessible website. The site is

available to the Uniformed Services, any US Government employee, and US Government contractors.
Accounts can be set up easily and quickly over the Internet. The site provides ready access to the top
OSINT on key issues of the day. OSC has over 200 content managers working around the globe to
actively manage the 2,400 to 2,500 reports––translations and analysis––OSC issues each day. Customers
can find OSINT on major issues on the Opensource.gov home page, browse the over 100 pages on the site
devoted to regional or topical reporting, or search the entire repository if they wish to delve deeper. A
single search on Opensource.gov can retrieve reporting and analysis from today or dating back to the mid-
1990s.

E-13.

The OSC works with other US Government components to host their open source products on

Opensource.gov. Many of the National Intelligence Council’s unclassified products are now available, and
the National Intelligence Council has its own page on the site. In addition, an increasing number of DOS
reports are on Opensource.gov, as are selected reports from the US Army’s FMSO and other DOD
components. By placing their open source products on the website, organizations across the government
dramatically increase the availability of the products. On the commercial side, OSC has thus far (as of
January 2006) focused its efforts on acquiring analysis of the foreign media. As a result, a number of
studies by InterMedia and Media Tenor are available on the site. OSC anticipates branching out to other
open source resources in the future.

E-14.

One of the drivers behind the development of a “state of the art” website for the OSC was the goal of

increasing the amount of multimedia available to customers. This goal includes multimedia content in
textual products, usually in the form of attachments or links; multimedia in its “raw” form, such as
streaming video or recorded television programs; and video analysis products. OSC’s collection units
currently monitor and analyze hundreds of thousands of hours of television and radio broadcasts each year.
The yield of this enormous collection effort includes live video streams from high-profile channels, such as
Al-Jazirah, and thousands of hours of archived video from thousands of television stations around the
world. While some of that content is currently available on Opensource.gov via the Video Server link on
the home page, the OSC’s multiyear, multimillion dollar DAVE project will dramatically increase this
amount in the coming years. DAVE deployments begin in early Calendar Year 2006 and will continue
through 2008. In addition, DAVE will provide customers outside OSC ready access to tools for
manipulating and searching video.

E-15.

OSC also combines various media formats to create sophisticated web products that enhance

usability of and access to open source material. For example, the “Repository of Kim Jong Il’s Public
Appearances” catalogs all major appearances by the North Korean leader with pertinent video, images, and
media reporting, while the “China Open Source Community” highlights key open source resources on
China.

E-16.

Opensource.gov serves double-duty in that it operates as both a pull and push technology. On the

“push” side, customers have the option of subscribing to the content in the repository via email or file
transfer protocol (ftp), depending on their needs. Opensource.gov also provides a system-to-system push
and is, for example, used to transfer OSC reporting to classified as well as unclassified networks and
systems. Opensource.gov’s product delivery options are easily accessed through the “Browse and Search”
community on the site.

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E-17.

Opensource.gov promises the capability for OSC to create a “community of interest” with its

customers through greatly increased interaction. The first significant step in this direction came in the form
of web logs, or “blogs,” which the OSC initiated in October 2005. OSC blogs are run by OSC, academic,
and private sector experts on top intelligence issues, and the OSC’s initial efforts have been on China,
Central Asia, library and geospatial intelligence, and, interestingly, foreign blogs (in the aptly named “Blog
on Blogs”). Most recently, new blogs have been launched on terrorist use of the Internet and Kazakhstan.
In addition to blogs, Opensource.gov customers can interact with the OSC by providing feedback on the
products in Opensource.gov.

E-18.

To ensure that customers can access the OSC’s products no matter where they are, Opensource.gov

is accessible via the Internet at www.opensource.gov. System protection is provided by Secure Sockets
Layer, the same system commonly used to protect banking and financial data on the web. Secure Sockets
Layer not only provides security from system intrusion but also ensures that customer movement within the
site is not subject to hostile tracking.

E-19.

To gain access to the OSC’s site, a simple account registration process is available on

Opensource.gov, and account approval occurs within one business day for government employees using
.gov or .mil email accounts in their application. Applications with commercial email addresses are
generally validated telephonically, which can take longer. Government contractors can also get accounts,
but their contract status must be validated by their government contracting officer.

Customer Center

E-20.

The OSC’s Customer Center has experts ready to assist in helping customers. The Customer Center

is open Monday through Friday from 0800 – 1630 (Eastern Standard Time). The Customer Center can be
reached via telephone, facsimile, or email at as follows:

Toll Free Voice: 1-800-205-8615.

Commercial Voice: 203-338-6735.

Commercial Fax: 703-613-5735.

Defense Switched Network: 695-8761.

Secure Voice: 65670 or 9365670.

NIPRNET: oscinfo@rccb.intelink.gov.

SIPRNET: assist@jdiss.cia.sgov.gov.

JWICS: assist@jdiss.cia.ic.gov.

Open Source Academy

E-21.

OSC’s Open Source Academy has been a leading provider of open source tradecraft training since

2003. As intelligence consumers place a greater value on OSINT, open source specialists throughout the
Federal Government, including the armed services, are turning to Open Source Academy courses to build
their open source skills and keep abreast of evolving technologies. Open Source Academy is building
relationships with community leaders and training focal points across the community to develop a
comprehensive approach to instilling open source tradecraft skills. The Academy hosts participants from
the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy, DOD’s CI Field Activity, Defense Human Intelligence Service,
DIA, Department of Treasury, DOS, FBI, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, National
Reconnaissance Office, and National Security Agency and welcomes personnel with OSINT duties from
US Government organizations not yet listed.

E-22.

The Open Source Academy's core curriculum includes instructor-led courses on an expanding range

of topics, from analysis to Internet exploitation to reviewing finished intelligence products. The following
Open Source Academy courses are open to military and government employees:

Assessing Media Environments.

Bright Planet – Deep Query Manager.

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Appendix E

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Creating Multimedia Products.

George Mason University Seminars on Understanding and Analyzing.

Global Media (by invitation).

Hidden Universes of Information on the Internet.

Introductory Analytic Tradecraft.

Media Analysis.

Orientation to the OSC.

OSINT and the Other Intelligence Disciplines.

Overview of the OSC Collection Requirements Process.

Reviewing Analytic Products.

Security and Privacy Issues for Internet Users.

E-23.

Open Source Academy courses focus on real-work issues and provide open source tradecraft

knowledge and tools that enhance intelligence collection and analysis practices. There is ample
opportunity for shared learning and networking as participants exchange insights, experience, and solutions
with colleagues from organizations across the community. Participants also receive valuable reference
materials that they can use to reinforce and apply the course content at their regular duty stations.

E-24.

The Open Source Academy Course Catalog describes each of the courses and indicates when they

are offered. Course objectives are also available upon request. To obtain a copy of the Catalog, register,
or request information on Open Source Academy’s other services, contact the Open Source Academy
Registrar at 703-613-5090.

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Appendix F

INTELINK-SBU System

F-1.

The Intelink-SBU is a US Government, Joint-use, remotely accessed, and operationally implemented

information service that is used to access and process unclassified, publicly accessible information only. It
provides a protected environment to exchange authorized unclassified, unclassified for official use only,
and sensitive but unclassified information among personnel of the Defense, the Diplomatic, the Homeland
Security, the Intelligence, and the Law Enforcement communities. The Intelink-SBU firewalls protect
users and allow customers to access the public Internet; thus giving Intelink-SBU users a single point of
access to an unprecedented amount of unclassified open source information.

Figure F-1. Intelligence Community Enterprise architecture

Overview

F-2.

Intelink-SBU is a private electronic network that provides the information technology infrastructure

enabling protected intranet research for the sharing of sensitive and unclassified information within the

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Appendix F

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Intelligence Community components, its customers, and affiliates. It was developed at Director of Central
Intelligence direction under authority contained within the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended) and
Executive Order 12333 to support the National Intelligence effort through full and free exchange of
information across all agencies and departments of the Federal Government.

F-3.

Additionally, Intelink-SBU provides protected and monitored access to the public Internet in order to

provide Intelink-SBU users a single point of access to unclassified intelligence information. It provides a
central point of access for Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard units around the
World to share common mission tools and practices. Intelink-SBU provides the one venue that the Army
contributes resources to support. Intelink-SBU provides unique OPSEC tools and techniques that, if not
available on one network, would cost the DOD and the Army millions of dollars to replicate.

F-4.

This Intelink-SBU system is not directly connected to the public Internet. Access to Intelink-SBU

services is implemented through multiple virtual private networks. Users gain access to the public Internet
through Intelink-SBU provided proxy-based firewalls. The Intelink-SBU boundary devices include
firewalls and the virtual private network tunnel boxes, including the desktop-tunnel endpoint devices.

F-5.

Intelink-SBU users can view current and historical open source content, shared by Intelink-SBU

participants or purchased by a participant from a commercial vendor. This is more of a rear-only view into
Intelink-SBU. Participants appear as an Intelink-SBU network (intelink.gov) on the Internet, instead of
using their organization’s network name, such as a “.mil” site. Participation in the Intelink-SBU network is
via a standalone (dedicated) host or network connected host.

Standalone (Dedicated) Host. The use of a standalone, dedicated laptop or desktop platform is
the preferred option to support the Intelink-SBU environment within an Army organization with
the least amount of residual operational risk to the supporting network. The installation firewall
will deny all traffic to the Intelink-SBU client and permit by exception only the destination
Intelink-SBU IP address inbound or outbound to the Intelink-SBU client. The system will only
be used for the Intelink-SBU virtual private network connection. Use of the open Internet for
web-surfing, connection to local or web email, or other unapproved applications will not be
installed or authorized.

Network Connected Host. Users are required to access the local host through existing
authentication methods, traditionally through input of a user name and password, before they
can access the local system; and then shall use a separate user name and password to access the
Intelink-SBU account. The local host identified for Intelink-SBU connectivity will have a
statically assigned IP address for the desktops to attribute security auditing and reviews. User
activity on the Intelink-SBU server is seen as an intranet user on the Intelink-SBU network, and
all user activity is logged and accountable to that user. When using desktop virtual private
network software, all existing local network devices (for example, printers, network file servers,
local email services) become unavailable.

General Requirements

F-6.

Intelink-SBU is responsible for providing virtual private network desktop client configuration

management, application support, and product updates. This system displays the DOD Warning Banner as
a part of the logon process. Access to the Intelink-SBU virtual private network from any system will be
restricted to authorized users. No temporary, seasonal, or liaison personnel shall be authorized to use an
Intelink-SBU virtual private network client installed on an Army information system. Personnel using a
NIPRNET LAN connected and supported Intelink-SBU systems will possess access credentials equivalent
to their position and authorizations for use of those NIPRNET systems. This requirement is waiverable
only when access to Intelink-SBU is from a standalone (dedicated) system used for Intelink-SBU
connectivity only, and the individual is authorized an Intelink-SBU account. Many Intelink-SBU users
who do not possess or hold an appropriate clearance are often assigned open source tasks on the Intelink-

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SBU network as the best operational use of these personnel and as a training vehicle available to those
personnel pending their clearance approvals.

F-7.

All users accessing the Intelink-SBU system will receive training on the importance and risks of

establishing a virtual private network from internal systems and the procedures for any data transfers that
may be conducted as part of their acceptable use of such systems. Users will have unique personal
identifiers unless mission requirements dictate the use of pseudonym identifiers (aliases). Internal
procedures will record and track these aliases identifiers with actual users in the event Intelink-SBU
requires incident attribution.

F-8.

Password management for the Intelink-SBU service is centrally managed by the Intelink

Management Office through a dedicated Service point of contact trusted agent. Each MACOM should
establish a centrally managed Intelink-SBU accounting mechanism for control and approvals of accounts.
Normally this would reside in the organization’s intelligence directorate, but is customizable in accordance
with local directives. If the MACOM establishes centralized control of the Intelink-SBU approval,
notification of such a designation shall be made to the Army Intelink-SBU (for example, INSCOM) point
of contact. If a MACOM point of contact is not established, the Army Intelink-SBU point of contact can
service and manage Intelink-SBU Access Requests at the Army level.

F-9.

DOIM network and information assurance security teams (or designated personnel) will have

administrator rights to all Intelink-SBU computers and network components that connect to the garrison
NIPRNET, or are supported by the DOIM. The System Administrator or other information assurance
person will review audit logs weekly and maintain these logs for at least one year. Intelink-SBU
information systems are configured with local security policy to audit, at a minimum, the success and
failure of––

Audit Account Logon Events.

Audit Account Management.

Audit Logon Events.

Audit Policy Change.

Audit System Events.

F-10.

Intelink-SBU account users are not allowed to give out or share user, system, or network information

using email, interactive websites, or telephone of any Intelink-SBU accounts or network accesses. They
will use these accounts within their official capacity for the authorizations granted to them. No personal
use or violations of ethical or professional conduct will be tolerated. Intelink-SBU will monitor acceptable
usage of all user accounts and activities.

F-11.

DOIM personnel may access and physically inspect this system, conduct scans, or collect

information as a part of their role in protecting networks and systems or investigating incidents. The
DOIM may monitor and record this system’s activity to ensure system and data availability, confidentiality,
and integrity. DOIMs will use automated tools to periodically detect system vulnerabilities and review
system security settings. DOIM and the Installation Security Office have the right to disconnect service if
the system configuration is not maintained or a breach in security is detected.

F-12.

All Intelink-SBU identified workstations will be registered in the Army Asset and Vulnerability

Tracking Repository database when approved for installation. The Repository is accessible at

https://newia.us.army.mil

F-13.

To request Intelink-SBU access, personnel must contact their organizational Intelink-SBU account

manager or send an email to

accounts@intelink.gov

F-14.

The Army G6 Information Assurance Office approved the Information Assurance Better Business

Practice for connecting the NIPRNET to the Intelink-SBU on 30 November 2005. The Intelink-SBU
Better Business Practice is available online from the Army's Information Assurance Office at

https://informationassurance.us.army.mil/bbp/

https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/4938453

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Appendix H

Open Source Resources

(The following information is reprinted in whole or part from articles published in the Military Intelligence
Professional Bulletin, Volume 31, Issue 2, October-December 2005.)

OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE ON SIPRNET

H-1.

Once a decision is made on requirements and means of dissemination, it is time to begin searching

for relevant information. Surprisingly, the first place to begin the search for publicly available information
is not on the Internet or the DNI’s Intelink-SBU, but on the classified networks. The SIPRNET and, to a
lesser extent, JWICS, contains numerous links to open source resources.

H-2.

The Army open source Portal could be the best place to start your search on the SIPRNET. It has an

open source Products section and an Army open source Sites section. These sections will lead you to
numerous finished products, and to sites where individual units host their own products. Ideally, one of the
command’s sites will match your open source requirements, and this will save a lot of time and effort by
not having to duplicate the work that others have already done. Also, by reviewing the other units’ sites,
you can see how other organizations approach open source and gain insight on what may work best for
your organization.

H-3.

The DA Intelligence Information System (IIS) is another site on the SIPRNET that should be looked

at. This site also provides links to numerous open source products and units hosting open source pages.
Additionally, DA IIS also has a companion page with links to hundreds of indexed websites available
through Intelink-SBU.

A RUNNING START ON THE WORLD WIDE WEB

H-4.

Once the search of the Internet finally begins, a common mistake is to think that fee-for-service sites

are required, but in the majority of circumstances this is not the case. It will quickly become apparent there
are more than enough free or already-paid-for sites available, and the purchase of information by individual
units is not required. Of course, there are exceptions for access to unique services or databases, and it is up
to the individual unit to determine if they want to spend resources on these services.

H-5.

A good first site at which to begin your search for open source content is the Intelink-SBU

homepage. Intelink-SBU is a virtual private network managed by the Intelink Management Office which
provides authorized users access to unclassified and for official use only information from both the US
Government and commercial sources. If your unit does not already have access to the Intelink-SBU
network, contact them at

info@center.intelink.gov

, and they can assist you in gaining access. For OPSEC

reasons, the site is not accessible directly from the Internet and requires password authentication for access.

H-6.

The Intelink-SBU homepage provides links to unique government sites that are accessible only

through the Intelink-SBU network, such as WBIL, which contains basic and background information on
140 countries, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, and the NASIC. The US Intelligence Community
also provides authorized users free access through Intelink-SBU to premium content providers such as
Jane’s Electronic Library, Oxford Analytica, Elton B. Stephens Company (EBSCO) Host, Economist
Intelligence Unit, and other services that would be cost prohibitive for organizations if they had to pay for
the content individually. The site also allows you to customize live feeds from numerous worldwide news
services directly to your desktop and, in addition to the links, contains handbooks and reference materials
on how to best exploit open source material. Furthermore, in an effort to enhance the user’s OPSEC

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Appendix H

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posture, Intelink-SBU also provides “protected access” to the public Internet to allow open source research
without divulging personal or organizational identities.

H-7.

The AKO Library Program site provides users another Internet tool with a wealth of information.

By now, all Army soldiers are aware of AKO, but the fact that the library site exists, and what it contains,
is not commonly known. Unlike Intelink-SBU, this site acts more as a gateway to informational type
services that one would normally associate with that of a library, and is accessible directly from the
Internet. AKO is not limited only to soldiers; non-Army government users and government contractors can
also gain access to the site when sponsored by an Army user.

H-8.

A separate article would be required to describe all of the products available at this site, but

representative examples are Country Watch, which provides up-to-date political, economic, cultural,
business and environmental information on 192 countries; and the Student Resource Center link, which
provides access to the Worldmark Encyclopedias (worldwide coverage of geographic and cultural issues.)
EBSCO Host is available on the AKO site, as well as on Intelink-SBU, providing access to thousands of
journals which could contribute to more long-term intelligence issues.

H-9.

One unique feature of the AKO library site is the “Ask a Librarian” link. If you experience difficulty

trying to find a source or a specific piece of information, you can call on a professional research librarian
for help. Simply type in your question, and you will normally receive a response within 48 hours.
Regardless of where you are in the world at that moment, you will be able to receive assistance on
whatever you are researching.

H-10.

Other government library services are available beyond the AKO site. National agency libraries (for

example, Library of Congress, National Library of Medicine) and the libraries of military colleges and
universities (Combined Arms Research Library, Naval War College) provide searchable sites and content.
If the product you require is not available via the Web, many of them will loan the document directly to
your command library.

H-11.

Neither AKO nor Intelink-SBU are all-encompassing sites that will satisfy all requirements, but

these sites need to be fully researched and exploited before any consideration is made to purchase content.
While many premium content providers produce original content, the majority repackage much of the
information that is already available from these two sites.

H-12.

Beyond Intelink-SBU and AKO, the Internet provides a seemingly limitless amount of information

that can support your mission. Once the search of the remainder of the Web begins, it is important to
ensure that only quality sites are used. Reading Untangling the Web, available on the Intelink-SBU
homepage, is recommended prior to searching in order to learn the best techniques to utilize the Web and
to understand the potential pitfalls as well. There are numerous sites that look and feel like authoritative
websites, but are factually incorrect or biased towards a certain viewpoint that an unsuspecting analyst may
not realize.

BEYOND THE WORLD WIDE WEB

H-13.

It could be a mistake to overlook the traditional brick-and-mortar library as an source for publicly

available information. The quality and quantity of material will vary from location to location, but most
libraries have access to inter-library loan programs, providing access to more resources than are available
at your local branch as mentioned earlier.

H-14.

Depending on your location and budget, private organizations and universities can provide another

source for information, and these institutions are also rich in subject matter experts in their respective
fields. The Joint Analysis Center (JAC) has unique access to some world-renowned organizations, such as
the Chatham House and the Royal United Services Institute, which frequently conduct seminars on topics
of direct interest to US European Command (USEUCOM). Our analysts have the opportunity to attend

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these lectures and hear directly from world leaders and experts. Membership to these types of
organizations is relatively expensive; our participation in these seminars is facilitated by our geographical
proximity to London. If budget constraints or distance do not allow direct participation, many of these
organizations provide e-memberships, at a much-reduced cost compared to full memberships, which may
meet your needs.

TAILORED OPEN SOURCES

H-15.

Table H-1 contains some of the open source resources specifically tailored for MI research. For

more information, visit the MI Library homepage at

http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/mi_library/ default.asp

Table H-1. Open source research resources

Information Need

Information Source

Location

Regional Information

Department of Army
Intelligence Information
System (DA IIS)

AKO Password needed:

https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/132281

https://akocomm.us.army.mil/dadpm

Terrorism and

Insurgency

TRADOC Deputy Chief of
Staff for Intelligence
(DCSINT) Contemporary
Operational Environment
and Threat Integration
Directorate (CTID)

Jane’s World Insurgency
and Terrorism

Periscope: Terrorism
Database

AKO Password needed:

https://dcsint-

threats.leavenworth.army.mil/Terrorism/default.aspx

Hard and soft copy. Purchase from Jane’s or other
book vendor. For the online version, access it via
Intelink-SBU for free at

http://www.intelink.gov//Reference/janes/

Access via AKO Library Reference Center.

Cultural Awareness

Arab Cultural Awareness
Handbook

, TRADOC

DCSINT CTID

UMI Culture, Foreign
Language Integration
Center

AKO Password needed:

https://dcsint-

threats.leavenworth.army.mil/Handbooks/default.aspx

Public Internet at:

http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/main.asp

Operational

Environment

Assessments, Country

Studies, Regional

Security, and Defense

Information

TRADOC DCSINT CTID

Marine Corps Intelligence
Activity

TRADOC DCSINT FMSO

Jane’s Sentinel Security
Assessment

Access via AKO at:

https://dcsint-

threats.leavenworth.army.mil/default.aspx

Access via Intelink-SBU at:

http://www.mcia.intelink.gov/

Public version available at

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/index.htm

Access FOUO site via Intelink-SBU:

http://www.fmso.intelink.gov/

Hard and soft copy. Purchase from Jane’s or other
book vendor. For the online version, access Jane’s
Online via Intelink-SBU for free at

http://www.intelink.gov//Reference/janes/

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Appendix H

H-4

FMI 2-22.9

5 December 2006

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Table H-1. Open source research resources (continued)

Jane’s World Armies

Library of Congress Country
Studies

Library of Congress Portals to
the World

Library of Congress
USSR/Eastern Europe
Foreign Press Survey

National Ground Intelligence
Center

DA-IIS

Military Policy Awareness
Links in the Military Education
Research Library Network of
the National Defense
University

For hard copies, contact INSCOM. For online access
via Intelink-SBU

http://www.mcia.intelink.gov

Public Internet:

http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html

Public Internet:

http://www.loc.gov/rr/international/portals.html

Access via Intelink-SBU:

http://www.intelink.gov/loc/eedbrief

Access via Intelink-SBU:

http://dadpm.inscom.intelink.gov/ngic/list.htm

AKO Password needed:

https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/132281

https://akocomm.us.army.mil/dadpm

Public Internet:

http://merln.ndu.edu/index.cfm?type=page&pageID=3

Daily Intelligence Briefs

and Reports

Terrorism Literature Report

Terrorism OSINT Report

Swedish Morgen Report

Warning Intelligence on the
Internet Review

Oxford Analytica

Jane’s Terrorism and
Research Center

Access via Intelink-SBU:

http://www.intelink.gov

Access via Intelink-SBU:

http://www.intelink.gov/cgi-
bin/rd?http://www.oxan.com/oxweb/

Access Jane’s Online via Intelink-SBU:

http://www.intelink.gov//Reference/janes/

Medical Intelligence

Armed Forces Medical
Intelligence Center

Access via Intelink-SBU:
http://www.afmic.intelink.gov/

Military Equipment

Worldwide Equipment Guide

TRADOC DCSINT CTID

AKO Password needed:

https://dcsint-

threats.leavenworth.army.mil/COE/default.aspx

and

click on Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG).

Research Studies:

Military, Defense

Focus, and Student

Papers

Air University Research Web

Public Internet:

https://research.maxwell.af.mil/index.aspx

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Open Source Resources

5 December 2006

FMI 2-22.9

H-5

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Table H-1. Open source research resources (continued)

Intelligence: Studies,

Research, and

Journal Articles

Central Intelligence Agency:
Studies in Intelligence

MIPB

Public Internet:

http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies.html

Public Internet:

http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/mipb/default.
asp

Imagery and Maps

Google Earth: World
imagery and other
geographic information

National Geospatial
Intelligence Agency

CIA Map Library

The Perry-Castañeda
Library Map Collection

Download free software from

http://earth.google.com/

Access via Intelink-SBU:

http://intelink.nga.mil

Access via Intelink-SBU:

http://www-maps.intelink.gov/

Public Internet:

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/Map_
collection.html

Scientific and

Technical Sources

and Research from

Foreign Countries

Spires High-Energy Physics
Database Indexes over
500,000 articles, papers,
preprints, and technical
reports

H-Print Network
Search for foreign research
in energy, science, and
technology

Public Internet:

http://www.slac.stanford.edu/spires/hep/

Public Internet:

http://www.osti.gov/eprints/

Strategy, Foreign

Policy, and Defense

Strategic Studies Institute

Oxford Analytica

Combat Studies Institute

US Air Force
Counterproliferation Center

Digital National Security
Archive; Searchable
database with access to
once classified documents
regarding US Foreign Policy.

Public Internet:

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil

Access via Intelink-SBU:

http://www.intelink.gov/cgi-bin/rd?http://www.
oxan.com/oxweb/

Public Internet:

http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/csi
.asp

Public Internet:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm

Public Internet access at:

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Appendix H

H-6

FMI 2-22.9

5 December 2006

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Table H-1. Open source research resources (continued)

Intelligence:

Warfighter Systems,

Electronic Warfare, and

unmanned aerial vehicles

Jane’s C4
Jane’s Radar & Electronic
Warfare
Jane’s Electronic Mission
Aircraft
Jane’s Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles

Periscope

Global Security

Purchase from Jane’s. For the online version, access it
via Intelink-SBU for free at

http://www.intelink.gov//Reference/janes/

Access via AKO.
Reference

Army Libraries

Library Reference Center

Public Internet:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/

Foreign Language:

Foreign Media,

Translation Tools, and

Language Training

Open Source Center

Cultural, Foreign
Language Integration
Center

Language Survival Kits,
Defense Language
Institute-Foreign
Language Center

Google Translation

Foreign Language
Resource Center

Access via Intelink-SBU:

http://www.intelink.gov/cgi-in/rd?https://www.fbis.gov/

Public Internet:

http://www.Opensource.gov

Public Internet:

http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us

Public Internet:

http://oef.monterey.army.mil/downloadlsk.html

Public Internet:

http://www.google.com/language_tools

Access via Intelink-SBU:

http://www.intelink.gov/about/machine_translation.htlm

Access via Intelink-SBU:

http://flrc.interlink.gov/

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5 December 2006

FMI 2-22.9

I-1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Appendix I

Basic Internet Search Techniques

I-1.

The ability to search the Internet is an essential skill for open source research and collection personnel.

The Internet provides access to webpages and databases that hold a wide range of information on current,
planned, and potential operational environments.

Untangling The Web

An Introduction to Internet

Research

, a DOD product, provides detailed information on the Internet and Internet search techniques.

Untangling The Web

and similar works are available on the Intelink-SBU homepage at

http://www.intelink.gov

. In addition, all search engines, commercial databases, and most other Internet

resources provide Help pages, overview pages, tours, or tip sheets on how to search the Internet or a
specific site. This appendix and the summary in Table I-1 provide basic techniques and procedures for
searching the Internet.

CYBER SECURITY

I-2.

The Internet is not a benign environment. There are operations and computer security risks to

searching the Internet and interacting with Internet sites. Searching the Internet can compromise OPSEC
by leaving “footprints” on visited sites. Visiting Internet sites can compromise computer security by
exposing vulnerability or providing information that exposing the computer and the network to malicious
software or unauthorized access. Users must be vigilant to potential threats; use only authorized hardware
and software; and comply with OPSEC measures.

I-3.

Awareness of what information the user's computer provides to each server and site on the Internet is

the beginning of effective cyber security. Just by visiting a site, the computer transmits machine
specifications such as operating system and type and version of each enabled software program, security
levels, a history of sites visited during that session, cookie information, user preferences, communication
protocol information such as an IP address (for the user and hosting or proxy server), enabled languages,
and other computer profile information such as date and time (and time zone), referring URLs (the
previous site visited), and more. Available on unprotected computers could be the email address of the
user, login information, their certifications. In addition to computer vulnerabilities, just knowing where
the research comes from may affect the page accessed. Sites frequently redirect visitors to alternate web
pages (or totally block access) based on what user is searching for, where the user is located, what
language the user is searching in, and what time of day the user accessed the site.

I-4.

Uniform resource locator information from the previous sited visited (referring URL) is frequently an

OPSEC issue. It identifies some characteristics and interests of the user to the visited site, server, and
country. While necessary for an effective search, the use of specific, focused, search terms such as
locations, names, and equipment have obvious OPSEC implications.

Example:

If the user enters the search terms [bradley us army], the referring URL from the

Google hit list would be: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=bradley+us+army. This tells
the visited site that the user is searching in English (hl=en) for information on US Army General
of the Army Omar N. Bradley or the US Army’s Bradley infantry fighting vehicle (IFV).

I-5.

All actions taken on a website are logged and saved by the site (and linked to the user with cookie

data). User actions include not merely words typed in the search field but also choices in drop-down
menus, check boxes, and movement patterns. On many sites, information that the user provides or fills in
becomes part of the site and searchable, such as in sites for groups, mailing list archives, forums, weblogs,
and wikis. Some of the key information to avoid sharing is not only specific intelligence or research

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Appendix I

I-2

FMI 2-22.9

5 December 2006

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

interests and gaps but also military plans, operations, and exercises; maps, charts, locations, and schedules;
equipment, operational, and personal vulnerabilities, capabilities, and shortfalls; and lists of names and
related numbers such as telephone numbers, birth dates, and identification numbers.

I-6.

Information about current threats and tips on cyber security are available online from the US

Computer Security Readiness Team at

http://www.us-cert.gov

Table I-1. Internet search techniques and procedures

PLAN SEARCH

I-7.

Intelligence personnel use their understanding of the supported unit’s mission, the SIRs, indicators,

and the Internet to plan, prepare, and execute their search. The SIR helps to determine what information to
search for and where to look. The SIR provides the focus and initial keywords that intelligence personnel

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2) - page 23