Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1)

This includes designating target priorities, effects, and timing of fires, and

determining interdiction tasks within the maritime AO. The JFMCC’s

organizational construct and kill box duties may vary depending on the

military operation.

b. Establishing Commander. The JFMCC, designated by the JFC as the

maritime AO commander, is the establishing authority for kill boxes within the

maritime AO.

c. Control of Assets. The control of assets assigned to a kill box in a maritime

AO will align with maritime component commander (MCC) strike (or maritime

fires) CONOPS as outlined per the MCC OPORD, or the MCC portion of the JFC

OPORD. A maritime operations center may delegate authority to the composite

warfare commander (CWC) for control and deconfliction of fires and aviation

assets within kill boxes. During expeditionary strike group (ESG) operations

separate from the carrier strike group, subordinate echelons in conjunction with

the Navy tactical air control system, control and deconflict fires and aviation

assets within kill boxes. During some ESG operations the MACCS may also be

involved in the control of kill boxes in the maritime operational area.

Joint Force Air Component Commander

a. Duties. The joint air operations center (JAOC) is the JFACC’s primary

element for planning, coordinating, and employing kill boxes IAW the JFC’s

intent. Normally, the JFACC will be designated by the JFC as the area air

defense commander and the airspace control authority.

(1) The airspace control authority is responsible for coordinating with all kill

box establishing authorities on airspace planning.

(2) Normally the ASOC, as a direct subordinate element of the air operations

center (AOC), assigns theater air assets in kill boxes established in the

JFLCC’s AO.

b. Establishing Commander. When designated by the JFC, the JFACC is the

establishing authority for kill boxes in unassigned areas of the JOA.

c. Control of Assets. The JFACC, when designated as the airspace control

authority, uses the ACS to task and control theater air and space power within

the JOA. The senior element of the ACS is the JAOC. Within the JAOC, the

combat plans and combat operations divisions control kill box interdiction.

(1) Combat Plans. Target nominations requiring kill boxes for prosecution

are coordinated by combat plans during the ATO planning cycle. The master

air attack plan (MAAP) team will assign capabilities to meet required effects in

the kill boxes through coordination with Service liaison officers (LNOs) (i.e.,

BCD, MARLO, naval and amphibious liaison element (NALE), SOLE, and the

ASOC/TACP).

(2) Combat Operations. Kill boxes planned during ATO execution will be

planned by the offensive operations team through coordination with affected

components’ FCs or their LNOs and the ASOC/TACP.

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FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander

a. Duties. The joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC)

plans, coordinates, and employs kill boxes in a scheme of maneuver consistent

with JFC’s intent. A JFE embedded in the joint operations center (JOC) serves

as the focal point for all joint fires issues, including the coordination and

establishment of kill boxes within any joint special operations area (JSOA). The

JFSOCC can employ forces as one or more subordinate joint special operations

task forces (JSOTFs). When established, each JSOTF will form its own JFE.

These JSOTFs normally operate within a designated JSOA which may also be

located within another component’s AO.

b. Establishing Commander. The JFSOCC exercises establishment authority as

delegated by the JFC.

c. Control of Assets. The JFE coordinates the establishment of the kill box with

other component HQ. Embedded in the JSOTF JFE is a joint air coordination

element (JACE), which is the SOF equivalent of an ASOC or direct air support

center (DASC). The JACE functions as the focal point for air support requests

(ASRs) and advises the JFSOC/JSOTF on effective use of air power in support

of SOF. The JACE works directly with the SOLE at the JAOC to coordinate the

appropriate airspace required for all kill boxes established by the JSOTF(s).

(1) When a JSOA is located within another component’s operational area,

the JSOTF JFE may coordinate directly with that component’s FC for any fire

support assets allocated or apportioned specifically for operations within kill

boxes.

(2) When a JSOTF is in support of a component commander other than the

JFSOCC, the JSOTF JFE may coordinate directly with the supported

commander’s FC for FSCM requirements. Joint fires support and kill box

requirements for all SOF teams operating within another component’s AO and

outside of a JSOA are coordinated by the JSOTF’s special operations

command and control element (SOCCE) collocated with the other

component’s FC. SOCCEs may also be employed at each of the other

components’ HQ such as a corps or MAGTF. In such cases, kill box

establishment will follow the procedures established by that component

commander.

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

Chapter III

PLANNING

General

a. The JFC establishes detailed procedures and CONOPS for successful kill box

employment within the JOA by promulgating guidance and priorities.

Additionally, the JFC normally delegates authority to component commanders for

establishing and adjusting kill boxes in consultation with superior, subordinate,

supporting, and affected commanders. Component commanders may further

delegate that authority. The establishing commander is responsible for

coordinating and notifying all affected forces.

b. An area reference system facilitates the structural and procedural

requirements for using kill boxes, but the system is not a mandatory requirement.

c. Kill box procedures will not be ideal for every situation. Mission, enemy,

terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available/and civil

considerations and requirements for terminal attack control may determine that

other procedures would be more effective.

Kill Box Types

Blue Kill Box (BKB).

(1) Primary Purpose. The primary purpose of a BKB is to permit air

interdiction in the kill box without further coordination with the establishing

HQ. If the kill box is active, air-to-surface munitions (and their trajectories)

delivered by aircraft not assigned to the BKB must be coordinated. All aircraft

not assigned to an active BKB are restricted from entering unless coordinated

with the KBC or appropriate C2 nodes. The airspace included by a BKB

extends from the surface up to the limit established by the airspace control

authority. Surface-to-surface direct fires are not restricted by the

establishment of a BKB.

Note: Coordination is required with established HQ appropriate fire support

and airspace organization if ordnance is to be delivered from outside the

airspace defined by the kill box.

(2) Permits Rapid Engagement. A BKB minimizes the restrictions on air-to-

surface fires while also protecting aircraft. Effects and trajectories of

subsurface-to-surface indirect fires or surface-to-surface indirect fires are not

allowed to pass through the BKB. Land and maritime force commanders

must coordinate with appropriate fire support and airspace organizations to

deliver subsurface/surface-to-surface indirect fires into or through an

established BKB. The primary purpose of permissive FSCMs is to facilitate

the attack of targets. See figure 2.

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FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

Figure 2. Blue Kill Box

b. Purple Kill Box (PKB).

(1) Primary Purpose. The primary purpose of a PKB is to permit air

interdiction in the kill box without further coordination with the establishing HQ

while allowing land and maritime component commanders to employ surface-

to-surface indirect fires. The PKB allows joint fires in the kill box to create

synergistic effects with maximum potential for engaging targets. Surface-to-

surface direct fires are not restricted by the establishment of a PKB.

(2) Permits Integration of Fires. A PKB permits the integration of surface-to-

surface indirect fires with air-to-surface fires in the PKB without further

coordination. Air-to-surface and surface-to-surface indirect fires are

deconflicted by altitude separation. If other deconfliction techniques are

employed, the establishing HQ will coordinate with the air component to

define the appropriate deconfliction technique. All aircraft not assigned to an

active PKB are restricted from flying through the airspace unless coordinated.

Also, air-to-surface munitions (and their trajectories) delivered by aircraft not

assigned to the kill box will not penetrate the boundaries of a PKB unless

coordinated. See figure 3.

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

Figure 3. Purple Kill Box

Kill Box Terminology

a. Since a kill box is a FSCM, standard fire support terminology applies. Though

the following definitions are not listed in joint doctrine, each FSCM term is

commonly accepted in the fire support community:

(1) Established. A kill box is in effect. The kill box has been planned and

approved with an effective time. Information about the establishing time,

duration, and other attributes are published/disseminated using existing voice

or digital C2 systems.

(2) On-Order. A kill box is planned but does not have an effective time.

Additional information and coordination is required for the kill box to be

established. Typically, on-order measures are event triggered (e.g., target

time of appearance in the operational area is unknown during planning).

(3) Cancelled. The kill box is no longer established and if the commander

needs additional supporting fires then a new FSCM may need to be

requested.

b. A kill box status is either open or closed. Though the following definitions are

not listed in joint doctrine, the terms are described as they relate to kill boxes:

(1) Open. Term used to describe a kill box or a portion of a kill box that is

open to fires without further coordination or deconfliction. An established kill

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FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

box is inherently open, until closed or cancelled. Within an open kill box, the

airspace will be designated as either active or cold.

(a) Active. A kill box that has aircraft operating within the confines of the

kill box (to include unmanned aircraft systems [UASs]).

(b) Cold. A kill box that does not have aircraft operating within the

confines of the kill box (to include UASs).

(2) Closed. Term used to describe a kill box or portion(s) of a kill box where

fires or effects of fires are not allowed without further coordination. A closed

kill box does not restrict the airspace associated with the kill box, unless

specified by an air controlling agency.

Planning Considerations

a. Kill boxes can be used in conjunction with other existing FSCMs. Kill boxes

can be established anywhere in the JOA where expeditious target engagement is

required, to include rear areas. A kill box should also be considered in areas

where a traditional FSCM (e.g., the FSCL) is not defined or has not been

established.

b. Kill boxes are not required for all air interdiction missions. They are only used

to reduce coordination requirements between forces and facilitate the attack of

targets. Kill boxes are particularly useful in the following situations:

(1) Facilitating interdiction of mobile targets.

(2) Facilitating engagement of targets in areas where target locations are

imprecise or unknown.

(3) Focusing joint fires in areas not requiring detailed integration of fires and

maneuver, such as shaping fires.

(4) Facilitating engagement of targets in areas short of the FSCL, including

planned joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL) air interdiction targets.

(5) Facilitating engagement of planned interdiction targets when FSCL

moves (i.e., the FSCL move causes the targets to be short of the measure).

(6) Facilitating a battle hand-off from a ground commander to an air

commander. In this situation, the ground commander recognizes a threat or

threats in the AO that ground forces are unable to prosecute and hands the

targets to the air component for prosecution.

(7) Facilitating SCAR missions in identified target areas of interest (TAIs).

(8) Facilitating engagement of time sensitive targets.

(9) Facilitating execution for the suppression of enemy air defenses.

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

c. Establishing a kill box requires careful planning and coordination. Some of

the considerations for successful planning are:

(1) Determine the applicability of kill boxes in support of the CONOPS and

scheme of maneuver. Kill boxes are intended to facilitate engagement of

targets in conjunction with the commander’s concept of operations.

(2) Determine the establishing authority. This is normally a straightforward

task when the kill box falls within a single operational area. Establishing

authority is either designated by the JFC or delegated to the commander of

the operational area. For kill boxes that straddle boundaries, coordination

between affected commanders must establish who will take responsibility for

establishing the kill box. The kill box establishment does not geographically

alter any portion of either commander’s operational area, nor does it modify

either commander’s authority to alter/cancel the kill box. Cross-boundary

coordination simply identifies which owner will be designated the establishing

commander.

(3) Assign and disseminate the name of the kill box for integration into

OPORDs/SPINS/etc.

(4) Determine airspace requirements based on weapons flight paths,

maneuvering capability, delivery systems capabilities/limitations, terrain, and

the enemy. These considerations may be applied to any aircraft delivering

precision munitions from high altitude in a level delivery. Additional airspace

deconfliction, including ACMs, may be required. Special considerations may

be required for certain stand-off weapons, such as Tomahawk land attack

missiles or conventional air-launched cruise missiles with respect to flight

path deconfliction.

(5) Determine the effective time required for the kill box to accomplish the

commander’s objectives.

(6) Determine friendly locations and capabilities. This determination includes

SOF and other government agency personnel. This process can be difficult

and will require prior establishment of coordination procedures outside of

military only channels.

(7) Determine location of other FSCMs and ACMs.

(8) Ensure restrictive fire support coordination measures (e.g., restrictive fire

area, NFA, or a closed portion of the kill box) take precedence over kill boxes

to protect friendly forces on the ground.

(9) Consider the range and trajectory of surface-to-surface indirect fires and

their impact within the kill box.

(10) Develop a communications plan. Kill box frequencies must be

considered in the development of the communications plan, including

communication nets between C2 and fire assets. Ideally, each kill box will be

assigned a unique frequency.

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FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

(11) Adhere to theater ROE. Target engagement within an established kill

box must adhere to applicable elements of theater ROE (e.g., ROE for air

integration). Planners at the joint and component level should assess the

current ROE for appropriate or unduly restrictive target engagement criteria

within kill boxes and request appropriate ROE adjustments, as required.

(12) For surface-to-surface indirect fires, know the planned maximum

ordinate altitude. The fires element will normally plan at least a 1,000 foot

vertical buffer between the maximum ordinate within the kill box and the floor

of the purple kill box air space. During deliberate planning the maximum

ordinate altitude may not be known; however, this altitude will be planned

based on best available data and then adjusted prior to execution. Target

sets, weapon systems, and firing unit locations (range-to-target) must be

considered.

(13) Develop a contingency plan to minimize the impact of established kill

boxes on surface-to-surface indirect fires. The established kill box may

prevent attack of targets beyond the measure (due to trajectory restrictions)

unless it is closed or cancelled. Ground force planners should consider

planning for air support in those areas if fires are required. As an example, in

a linear operation, planning kill boxes (especially blue kill boxes) short of the

FSCL may limit surface-to-surface indirect fires between the kill box and the

FSCL.

(14) Determine the special considerations required by unique trajectory

munitions (e.g., the XM982 Excalibur and M31 Guided Missile Launch Rocket

System) due to their non-ballistic trajectories when utilized in close proximity

to kill boxes. Ballistic impact point (for XM982) calculations must be

determined and checked manually for kill box violations.

Kill Box Planning Process

Kill box planning falls under the purview of the joint targeting cycle. Planned kill

boxes are developed/established to support JFC or component commander

CONOPS, schemes of maneuver, and corresponding targeting efforts. Dynamic

targeting is the process during phase 5 of the joint targeting cycle which establishes

immediate kill boxes and validates planned kill boxes. Figure 4 correlates kill box

development with the joint targeting cycle, air tasking cycle, and the ATO

development timeline.

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

Figure 4. Kill Box Development Correlation

a. Planned Kill Boxes. The requesting commander begins development of kill

boxes to support operations following the joint targeting coordination board

approval of JIPTL targets. If a kill box is within the requesting commander’s AO,

then that commander is both the establishing commander and the supported

commander. If a commander requests a kill box that is in another commander’s

AO, the commander assigned the AO has the authority to approve or disapprove

the request. Cross-boundary establishment of kill boxes requires coordination

using similar procedures as for cross-boundary fires. Figure 5 illustrates the

detailed procedures for planned kill box development and establishment.

4 August 2009

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

Figure 5. Planned Kill Box Development

(1) Development. Once a determination is made that a kill box is required,

the initial FSCM attributes (priority, location, airspace, and time) will be

developed. These attributes must be coordinated with affected components

and airspace controlling agencies. Coordination includes determination of

target and effect priorities, ISR, intelligence preparation of the operational

environment (IPOE), availability of assets, assignment of tactical C2, and

integration into the airspace control authority’s airspace plan. The

establishing HQ names the kill box and coordinates establishment with all

appropriate commands and C2 agencies. Cross-component coordination and

deconfliction of nominated kill boxes should be accomplished using the JFC-

designated joint fires C2 system [e.g., theater battle management core

system (TBMCS), Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS),

and Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS)].

Procedures for each theater may vary. See figure 6 for the kill box request

format.

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

Kill Box Request

Target Set/ASR #/TGT #:

“_______________________________________________________”

Geographic Limits/Kill Box Location:

“_______________________________________________________”

Effective Times: “_________________________________________”

• Identify the date-time group (DTG) the kill box is established.

• Identify the DTG or the event that will cancel the kill box.

Kill Box Type: (and requested floor for purple kill box):

“_______________________________________________________”

(Identify whether it is blue or purple)

Establishing Commander:

“_______________________________________________________”

(Identify the establishing commander)

Establishing Commander’s Targeting Guidance:

“_______________________________________________________”

• Priorities:

(List the targets)

• Effects: (Identify the desired effects)

• Restrictions:

Remarks:

“_______________________________________________________”

(Give any additional information: e.g., NFA, no strike, etc.)

Figure 6. Kill Box Request Format

(a) JFACC. Kill box development begins when the approved JIPTL

arrives in the MAAP cell. Inside the cell, air planners/component liaisons

match JIPTL targets to available assets and required kill boxes become

geographically apparent. Kill box locations developed to support the

JIPTL prosecution are then passed to combat plans airspace planners to

determine conflicts. Any conflicts are worked out between the identified

organizations.

4 August 2009

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

(b) JFLCC/JFMCC/JFSOCC. Simultaneously, the component fires

support coordination agencies determine kill box requirements and

deconflict kill boxes with the scheme of maneuver, other FSCMs, and

friendly force locations. Airspace deconfliction analyzes potential impact

on friendly air operations, airspace requirements, surface-to-surface fires,

and air defense plans. The coordination/deconfliction results will be

merged to integrate kill boxes with the commander’s intent, scheme of

maneuver, and fire support plan.

(2) Approval, Distribution, and Establishment. Following coordination and

deconfliction, the establishing commander approves the kill box. To complete

the kill box planning process, the kill box attributes must be distributed to all

affected commands. The planned kill box attributes and information are

passed to all affected C2 agencies via the designated joint fires C2 systems.

The kill box is published in all applicable orders to include the ACO and

fragmentary orders.

(3) Validation. After promulgation, kill box attributes are updated as required,

driven by the target validation process. During this continuous process,

validation determines:

(a) If planned targets still contribute to objectives (including changes to

plans and objectives).

(b) If targets are accurately located.

analysis may result in changes to the kill box attributes (e.g., location,

size, target priorities, effective time, or cancellation).

Immediate Kill Boxes. As targets of opportunity are identified which require

air interdiction, air and fire support elements determine if kill boxes will facilitate

operations. An immediate kill box is one identified too late, or not requested in

time, to be included during deliberate targeting. Immediate kill boxes are

developed and established using dynamic targeting. Component current

operations C2 agencies conduct the required coordination and deconfliction as

detailed in the planned kill box development paragraph above. Also, when plans

change and planned kill boxes must be adjusted, dynamic targeting can manage

those changes (IAW the validation process shown above). See figure 7 for

information correlating immediate kill box development with the dynamic

targeting steps.

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

Chapter IV

EXECUTION

Execution of Operations Within Kill Boxes

a. The kill box is designed to rapidly facilitate planned and immediate air

interdiction. Operations typically associated with kill boxes include SCAR and

dynamic targeting. Electronic attack may also be employed within a kill box to

facilitate fires and provide synergy of prosecution for a given target.

b. Execution begins when a component commander establishes a kill box.

c. Planned kill boxes are indentified during component planning and targeting,

and after coordination/deconfliction with other affected components/agencies the

establishing commander will disseminate/publish the kill box in applicable orders

and the ACO per the JFC’s concept for fires and the ACP.

d. Immediate kill boxes are established by the current operations sections within

each command and are disseminated via appropriate means (voice and digital)

to ensure visibility across the joint force. If the establishing commander needs to

establish a kill box that cannot be promulgated through normal orders, a liaison

element such as a BCD or a C2 node such as the DASC/ASOC must inform the

JAOC that a kill box was established and its effective time. The JAOC will

promulgate the new FSCM to all C2 nodes.

Kill Box Entry/Exit

a. Entry into kill boxes in a JFLCC’s AO will normally be controlled by a C2 node

associated with the senior FC (e.g., DASC/ASOC); conversely, entry into a

JFACC established kill box will normally be controlled by the JAOC or

subordinate tactical air control system (TACS) element. A kill box status is either

open (active/cold) or closed.

b. Planned missions into a kill box should expect minimal C2 communications/

coordination assuming no ATO or targeting priority changes. As time and

conditions permit, amplifying information may be passed. Immediate tasking

may include some or all of the information in figure 8, C2 Agency Briefing. In

either case, at a minimum, C2 will pass kill box assignment, status, targeting

priorities, and working frequency.

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FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

Command and Control Agency Briefing

(Information Passed from C2 Agency to Aircraft)

Kill box name and status:

“___________________________________________________________”

Kill box floor (not required for blue kill box):

“___________________________________________________________”

Targets:

“___________________________________________________________”

(priorities, targets being worked, etc.)

Threats:

“___________________________________________________________”

Friendlies:

“___________________________________________________________”

(all applicable air and ground assets in vicinity of kill box)

Coordinator:

“___________________________________________________________”

(call sign and net)

Ordnance Restrictions or Requests:

“___________________________________________________________”

Remarks:

“___________________________________________________________”

(Restricted targets, other FSCMs/ACMs, hazards munitions, UAS

operations, etc.)

Example—Planned interdiction mission assigned to a cold kill box:

“Python 21, cleared to cold kill box 132LN, blue, working frequency TAD

15.”

(“Blue” denotes air is the only weapons platform being used for this

particular mission.)

Example—Immediate Interdiction mission into an active kill box:

[Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)] “Python 21, contact

Warhawk for retasking.”

[ASOC] “Python 21, proceed into active kill box 134LV, purple 120. Target

priorities are tanks, self-propelled, and towed artillery. Possible SA-8 in

quadrant 2. Contact kill box coordinator, Hoss 11 on Red 10.”

Note: “Purple 120” in this example denotes the kill box floor is 12,000 ft

mean sea level (MSL) due to surface-to-surface fires.

Figure 8. C2 Agency Briefing

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

Coordination Within an Active Kill Box

a. Aircraft operating within a kill box will be on an assigned kill box frequency or

have a previously coordinated deconfliction plan.

b. When multiple flights or formations are conducting operations within the same

kill box, deconfliction of attacks/airspace is required. Aircrew employing

weapons within a kill box should ensure that the entire trajectory of the munition

and its effects remain within the lateral/vertical limits of the kill box unless

previously coordinated.

c. C2 nodes must coordinate for additional airspace if required when weapons

employment occurs outside the assigned airspace (e.g., an aircraft delivering a

standoff munition outside the lateral/vertical limits of a kill box for impact within

the kill box). Aircraft on ATO assigned missions employing weapons into or

through an open kill box should coordinate with either the C2 agency or KBC (if

one is present). At a minimum, prior to weapons release the aircraft should

make an advisory call on the kill box frequency.

d. Normally, the C2 agency will assign KBC duties to the first manned flight to

enter a given kill box. Any combat aircrew can perform the basic duties of the

KBC. The primary responsibility of the KBC is to deconflict attacks/airspace

within the kill box. When possible, the KBC will provide the following:

(1) Expeditiously flow interdiction aircraft into and out of the target area.

(2) Prevent redundant strikes against previously destroyed targets.

(3) Provide targeting information/location.

(4) Provide target marks.

(5) Support laser-guided weapons.

(6) Confirming, locating, suppressing, and/or destroying surface-to-air

threats.

(7) Providing bomb hit assessment.

e. If a strike coordination and reconnaissance coordinator (SCARC) aircrew is

the first manned aircraft in a kill box, the SCARC will assume both KBC and

SCARC duties. SCARCs can also provide the following IAW FM 3-60.2; MCRP

3-23C; NTTP 3-03.4.3; and AFTTP 3-2.72 Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques,

and Procedures for Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance.

(1) Target prioritization and engagement.

(2) PID.

(3) CDE, including weapons/target pairing.

f. Forward air controller (airborne) (FAC[A])—USAF, US Navy, and USMC

FAC(A)s—are all capable of performing the SCARC mission.

4 August 2009

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

g. As the complexity of operations within a kill box increases, C2 nodes should

make every effort to assign SCARCs or FAC(A)s to the kill box. KBCs will

relinquish control to SCARCs/FAC(A)s checking into the kill box.

h. UAS kill box operations:

(1) UASs will not normally serve as KBCs or SCARCs. However, some units

are capable and specifically trained and equipped to perform these roles and

can perform the KBC or SCARC roles when assigned or required.

(2) UASs can pose significant challenges to kill box planning and

deconfliction due to their small size and limited ability to avoid other aircraft.

(3) UAS operations within a kill box also present coordination challenges.

(a) Many UASs do not have voice communications.

(b) UASs with voice communications may experience inherent delays

and the transmissions may be limited by line of sight restrictions.

the KBC to a C2 node and then to the UAS ground control station.

(4) UASs without radios should normally not operate within the airspace of a

blue kill box without prior coordination. Within a JFLCC AO, non-radio

equipped UAS operations within the lateral confines of a purple kill box should

operate at least 1,000 ft below the floor of the kill box.

i. Prior to entry into an active kill box, all flights will check in with the KBC using

figure 9, the kill box check-in briefing. This briefing may be abbreviated for

brevity or security (e.g., “as fragged” or “with exceptions”).

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

Kill Box Check-in Briefing

(Passed to Kill Box Coordinator Before Entering)

Mission Number: “_______________________________________________”

Number and Type of Aircraft: “_____________________________________”

Position and Altitude: “___________________________________________”

Ordnance: “_____________________________________________________”

(laser codes as applicable)

Playtime: “______________________________________________________”

Additional Aircraft/Aircrew Capabilities: “____________________________”

Remarks:

“_____________________________________________________”

(include assigned target from ATO or C2 if applicable, including target location

and time on target [TOT])

Example:

“Hoss 11(KBC), Python 21(flight)-mission # 2301, 4 F-16s entering 134LV from

the south, Angels 15, 4 X GBU 12 ea plus 20 mm, Laser code 1114 in sequence,

35 mins TOS, SADL/Litening Pod.”

Figure 9. Kill Box Check-in Briefing

Target Engagement

a. The KBC will relay specific kill box/target information to strike aircraft using

figure 10, the kill box attack briefing. The deconfliction portion of the attack brief,

including general attack flow from KBC to striker aircraft, is directive. Strike

aircraft must comply with deconfliction instructions or coordinate otherwise.

b. The targeting portion of the attack brief from the KBC to strike aircraft is not

directive. Under the ATO/SPINS/interdiction ROE, strikers are responsible for

meeting their own PID, CDE, and target engagement requirements. If a strike

aircraft enters a kill box with a previously assigned target, the KBC is only

responsible for providing airspace deconfliction.

4 August 2009

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

Kill Box Attack Briefing

(KBC to Striker Aircraft)

Deconfliction Instructions:

“____________________________________________________________________”

(Block altitude, keypads/quadrants, georef, flow, timing)

Target Description:

“____________________________________________________________________”

Target Location:

“____________________________________________________________________”

(Coordinates, geographic references, etc.)

Target Elevation:

“____________________________________________________________________”

Remarks:

“____________________________________________________________________”

(Buddy-laze plan, mark, time on target (TOT), threats, UAS, etc.)

Example:

“Python 21, Hoss 11, remain in Quadrant 4, Angels 15. Your target: column of 4 APCs

oriented north to south with dismounted infantry, location N3701.034 / W07601.089,

elevation 69 ft.”

Figure 10. Kill Box Attack Briefing

c. Strike aircraft may be assigned to a kill box with aircrew conducting SCAR.

Reference FM 3-60.2; MCRP 3-23C; NTTP 3-03.4.3; and AFTTP 3-2.72 Multi-

Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Strike Coordination and

Reconnaissance, for specific SCAR procedures.

d. When checking out of a kill box, departing KBCs/SCARCs will execute a

positive handoff to the appropriate flight, if applicable, and notify C2. If no flights

are available, the KBC/SCARC will execute a positive handoff with C2.

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

Appendix A

IMMEDIATE KILL BOX DECISION FLOW CHARTS

The four flow charts listed in this appendix are intended for use by staff agencies

to expedite the establishment of immediate kill boxes. Each diagram provides an

overview of the decisions and coordination required to establish immediate kill

boxes. Not shown, but understood, is that the steps in the charts occur within

dynamic targeting of the joint targeting process. The need for a kill box is based

on facilitating targeting decisions made during that process (e.g., what target,

what effects, when to strike, what strike asset, clearance and deconfliction

issues). Prior to use, the flow charts should be adjusted to reflect current theater

conditions.

4 August 2009 FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3.25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

(1) The combat operations airspace cell will build the kill box within the

airspace deconfliction tool to determine if conflicts exist.

(a) If there are no conflicts, the kill box is approved and established.

(b) If conflicts exist the airspace cell will work with the requesters for both

the kill box and the ACM that the kill box conflicts with to determine a

workaround.

c. Is the kill box within an unassigned area of the JOA? If No:

(1) The JAOC will begin coordination with the BCD, MARLO, NALE, SOLE or

establishing HQ directly on kill box establishment requirements.

(a) If the establishing HQ denies the request, the kill box is not

established.

d. If the establishing HQ approves the kill box request, the BCD, MARLO, NALE,

or SOLE will coordinate with the combat operations airspace cell to determine if

conflicts exist within the airspace deconfliction tool. Notably, some

FSCMs/ACMs are not recognized by C2 systems such as TBMCS and AFATDS.

For further information, consult FM 3-60.2; MCRP 3-23C; NTTP 3-03.4.3; and

AFTTP 3-2.72, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Strike

Coordination and Reconnaissance, appendix C, “ACM and Fires System

Coordination.”

• If there are no conflicts with the ATO/fires, the BCD, MARLO,

NALE, or SOLE will disseminate kill box establishment information

to the fires elements of subordinate and supporting forces along

with higher HQ (e.g., JFE). The combat operations division will

notify affected C2 nodes of the kill box information and

establishment.

• If conflicts exist, the airspace cell will work with the requesters for

both the kill box and the ACM to resolve conflicts to determine a

workaround. Once deconfliction has taken place the kill box is

established and information is disseminated.

4 August 2009 FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3.25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

(b) If no, the G-3/S-3/J-3 and the FSCOORD must make

recommendations for additional FSCMs to protect those troops.

(2) Notify the air defense artillery (ADA) LNO to establish a kill box.

Coordinate on the LNO’s risk assessment, if submitted.

(3) Can the ALO/TACP ensure that the kill box establishment will not

adversely affect air operations in support of the maneuver force or JFLCC

operations?

(a) If yes, the kill box recommendation goes forward.

(b) If no, the ALO LNO must provide a risk assessment to the

commander along with his/her recommendations.

(4) Weighing all the information and recommendations, the maneuver

commander makes his/her decision on establishing the kill box.

(a) If yes, the kill box is established.

(b) If no, the kill box is not established.

Is the kill box in the unit’s AO? If No:

(1) The FC coordinates with the commander of the AO where the kill box is to

be located and recommends that a kill box be established and provides all the

information concerning the establishment of the kill box.

(2) The staff of the affected commander performs steps in b(1), (2), and (3).

Does the affected component commander approve the establishment of a kill

box in the AO?

(1) If yes, the kill box information is established.

(2) If no, the kill box is not established.

e. Can the JFLCC clear the kill box for all friendly forces (e.g., SOF/other

government agencies)?

(1) If yes, the kill box information is disseminated to all component

commanders prior to establishment.

(2) If no, the JFLCC operational fires directorate (OFD)/FC must establish

additional FSCMs to protect those forces.

4 August 2009 FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3.25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

3. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Ground Combat Element Requesting

Immediate Kill Box

Figure 13. MAGTF Decision Flow Chart

a. Figure 13 outlines the coordination required for MAGTF subordinate elements

or the command element to request an immediate kill box.

(1) Is the kill box in the requesting unit’s AO? If Yes:

(a) Can S-3/G-3 confirm that there are no friendlies within the area of the

kill box?

• If yes, the kill box recommendation goes forward.

• If no, the S-3/G-3 and the fire support coordination center/FFCC

must make recommendations for additional FSCMs to protect those

troops.

(2) Can the AO ensure that the kill box establishment will not adversely affect

air operations in support of other MAGTF operations?

(a) If yes, the kill box recommendation goes forward.

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

(b) If no, the AO must provide a risk assessment to the commander

along with his/her recommendations.

(3) Weighing all the information and recommendations, the MAGTF

commander makes his/her decision on establishing the kill box.

(a) If yes, the kill box is established.

(b) If no, the kill box is not established.

b. Is the kill box in the MAGTF’s AO? If No:

(1) The FFCC coordinates with the commander of the AO where the kill box

is to be located and recommends that a kill box be established and provides

all the information concerning the establishment of the kill box.

(2) The staff of the affected commander performs steps in a(1), (2), and (3).

c. Does the affected commander approve the establishment of a kill box in the

AO?

(1) If yes, the kill box information is established. Kill box details are provided

to the JFACC by the MACCS to ensure appropriate cross component air

command and control coordination is conducted.

(2) If no, the kill box is not established.

4 August 2009 FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3.25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4. Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Requesting an Immediate Kill

Box

Figure 14. JFMCC Decision Flow Chart

a. Figure 14 outlines the coordination required for maritime forces to request an

immediate kill box.

b. Is the kill box in the JFMCC AO? If Yes:

(1) Does the JFMCC control the airspace defined by the kill box?

(a) If yes, the air defense commander (ADC) clears the airspace defined

by the kill box.

(b) If no, the ADC coordinates with the airspace control authority

(normally delegated to the chief of combat operations working for the

JFACC in the JAOC) to clear the airspace defined by the kill box.

c. Is the kill box in the JFMCC AO? If No:

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

Appendix B

KILL BOX COORDINATION VIGNETTES

The following vignettes demonstrate how the kill box process can be implemented

across components. The examples explore different possibilities and illustrate key

concepts in kill box coordination. However, they are not intended to be all-inclusive.

JFLCC Nominated Blue Kill Box Inside the JFLCC’s AO

a. During the military decision making process, a division FC subordinate to the

JFLCC has identified an enemy armored force well beyond the forward line of

own troops (FLOT) and beyond the expected movement of friendly forces for the

next 48 hours. In order to shape the operational environment, the division

FSCOORD and ALO identify a TAI, submit an ASR, and plan a blue kill box to

facilitate attack of this target. The northeast quadrant of the cell is not required

(based on terrain geography, friendly graphics, or other reasons). Establishment

of the blue kill box will allow air assets to attack this enemy formation without

further coordination. It is noted that a previously established NFA (over a

protected bridge) is located in the southeast (SE) quadrant of the kill box. The

kill box will not adversely affect ADA coverage for the land component. In

addition to the ASR, the FC will submit the following kill box request to the

JFLCC.

Kill Box Request.

Target Set/ASR #/TGT #: ____________________

Geographic Limits/Kill Box Location: Using the area

reference system, quadrants northwest (NW), SE, and southwest (SW)

of cell 124LK is identified as a kill box.

Effective Times:

Established at 240600ZAug04

Cancelled 260600ZAug04 or on-order

Kill Box Type: BLUE

Establishing Commander: JFLCC

Establishing Commander’s Targeting Guidance:

Priorities: Tanks, ADA, and armored vehicles.

Effects: Destroy/neutralize when found.

Restrictions: Do not destroy bridges or road networks. No

scatterable munitions near bridges, roads, or road intersections.

Remarks: No friendlies are within the proposed kill box. NFAs have

been established around restricted and no-strike targets.

The ARFOR FC conducts initial coordination with the BCD.

(1) For a planned kill box, the ARFOR sends a kill box FSCM to the BCD

Global Command and Control System-Army (GCCS-A) and AFATDS and an

ACM request to the BCD tactical airspace integration system (TAIS). The

FSCM is incorporated into the common operational picture (COP) via COP

4 August 2009 FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3.25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

synchronization. The BCD TAIS sends the ACM request to TBMCS/WebAD.

Combat plans airspace C2 section incorporates the kill box ACM request into

the air battle plan for the appropriate ACO period. BCD coordinates with the

MAAP team, to assign appropriate air resources and build missions to

accomplish the desired effects in the ARFOR kill box. The ATO is published

with missions directed to the kill box and the ACO contains the kill box as an

airspace measure.

(2) For an immediate kill box, the BCD informs the combat operations

airspace cell who will identify and resolve conflicts. The kill box is then built

into the ACO and ATO change once the kill box is approved by the JFLCC.

d. JFLCC approves the kill box.

(1) Planned kill boxes are requested and approved within the standard air

tasking cycle in boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups

(B2C2WGs).

(2) Immediate kill boxes are requested and approved in B2C2WGs.

e. A blue kill box is established by the JFLCC FC in AFATDS as an ACA for

quadrants NW, SE, and SW of cell 124LK, from surface to the standard kill box

height as identified in the SPINS (e.g., 25,000 ft mean sea level [MSL]). This

restricts surface-to-surface indirect fires from entering or passing through the kill

box without further coordination. The identified NFA (over the bridge) takes

precedence over the kill box.

(1) The JFLCC FC informs subordinate elements so that all field artillery, air

defense, and army aviation units know about the kill box.

(2) Air defense assets identify the kill box as a weapons hold area (weapons

control status “Hold”).

(3) The airspace command and control (AC2) cell identifies the kill box for

restricted operations that will prevent Army aviation assets from entering the

airspace.

f. Until kill boxes seamlessly appear in maneuver control systems, a best

practice is for the division/corps G-3 to create a phase line at some distance from

the kill box to alert of any unanticipated arrival of friendly troops, triggering the

cancellation of the kill box before the planned end time, if required.

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

JFACC Nominated Blue Kill Box Outside the JFLCC’s AO

a. During IPOE, the JFLCC identifies a mobile free rocket over ground (FROG)-7

battery operating within the littoral region of the JFMCC AO, able to influence

future maneuver operations, and nominates it for inclusion to the JIPTL. The

JFC validates the JIPTL and during the MAAP cycle air component aircraft are

assigned the responsibility for its destruction. The target is identified as mobile

and, without a desired point of impact, the target can best be serviced through kill

box interdiction. Therefore, a kill box request is submitted.

b. Kill Box Request.

Target Set/ASR #/TGT #: ____________________

Geographic Limits/Kill Box Location: Using the area reference

system, the entire cell 132AW is identified as a kill box.

Effective Times:

Established at 240600ZAug04

Cancelled 26060 0ZAug04 or on-order

Kill Box Type: BLUE

Establishing Commander: JFMCC

Establishing Commander’s Targeting Guidance:

Priorities: FROG-7, tanks, ADA, and armored vehicles.

Effects: Destroy/neutralize when found.

Restrictions: Do not destroy bridges or road networks.

No scatterable munitions near bridges, roads, or road

intersections.

Remarks: No friendlies are within the proposed kill box. NFAs have

been established around restricted and no-strike targets.

c. Because the target area is partially within the JFMCC AO and partially within

the JFC’s unassigned AO (for which the JFACC is responsible), the JFACC must

coordinate with the JFMCC and receive approval for creation of the blue kill box.

The NALE rep in the MAAP cell is tasked to gain JFMCC approval for this kill

box.

d. In this scenario, the JFMCC does not have operations that would be

adversely impacted by the JFACC requested blue kill box and approves its

creation. Since the JFMCC boundary splits the kill box, the coordination for kill

box establishment also determines the establishing authority. In this case, the

decision is made that the JFMCC will be the establishing authority. Because of

bandwidth limitations while afloat, the JFMCC AFATDS is unable to promulgate,

therefore the JFMCC requests the BCD input the kill box into AFATDS. A

JFMCC blue kill box is entered by the BCD in AFATDS as an ACA for cell

132AW, from surface to the standard kill box height as identified in the SPINS

(e.g., 25,000 ft MSL). The MAAP team produces an ACM request to the Combat

Plans airspace cell to determine potential conflicts. Conflicts are identified and

resolved, and the kill box is built into the ACO and the ATO is published.

4 August 2009 FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3.25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

JFMCC Nominated Purple Kill Box Inside the JFLCC’s AO

a. A Marine expeditionary brigade level amphibious assault is scheduled to take

place in 5 days within an amphibious objective area designated by the JFC. The

intelligence section of the command element briefs the ground combat element

commander (regimental combat team [RCT] commanding officer [CO]) on an

enemy high speed armor avenue of approach that transits from the JFLCC AO.

The RCT CO determines the need to shape the amphibious landing area in

preparation for the amphibious assault. This will allow air assets and naval

surface fire support (NSFS) to engage targets in the area without further

coordination. The JFMCC anticipates their surface-to-surface trajectories in the

purple kill box to be no higher than 6,500 ft MSL and using UAS in the kill box for

target location and tracking, operating between 7,000 ft and 9,000 ft MSL. The

JFMCC FSCOORD and air officer recommend establishing a purple kill box

within the JFLCC AO, along the enemy avenue of approach. The location of the

kill box is well forward of the JFLCC’s FLOT, but short of the FSCL and the

airspace is controlled by the ASOC within the JFLCC.

b. Kill Box Request.

Target Set/ASR #/TGT #: ____________________

Geographic Limits/Kill Box Location: Using the area reference

system, the entire cell 129AW is identified as a kill box.

Effective Times:

Established 240600ZAug04

Cancelled 26060 0ZAug04 or on-order

Kill Box Type: PURPLE

Recommended floor is 10,000 ft MSL.

Establishing Commander: JFLCC

Establishing Commander’s Targeting Guidance:

Priorities: Tanks, armored vehicles, artillery.

Effects: Destroy.

Restrictions: Do not destroy bridges or road networks. No

scatterable munitions near bridges, roads, or road intersections.

Remarks: No friendlies are within the proposed kill box. NFAs have

been established around restricted and no-strike targets. Cross-

boundary fires (specifically including surface-to-surface) from the

JFMCC into the approved purple kill box are authorized, providing that

weapon trajectories and weapon effects are confined with the purple

kill box and require no further coordination.

c. Upon receiving the JFMCC request, JFLCC confirms requested purple kill box

does not affect his scheme of maneuver.

d. JFLCC approves and establishes the purple kill box.

e. A purple kill box is established by the JFLCC FC in AFATDS as an ACA for

cell 129AW, from 10,000 ft MSL with a standard kill box height as identified in the

SPINS (e.g., 25,000 ft MSL). This restricts surface-to-surface indirect fires from

4 August 2009 FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3.25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

entering or passing through the airspace portion of the purple kill box without

further coordination. Cross-boundary surface-to-surface fires from the JFMCC

into the purple kill box are also authorized.

(The creation of the kill box does not

automatically remove the restrictions of the boundary—in this case; the restrictive

boundary within the kill box has been specifically coordinated.)

f. The BCD informs the MAAP team, who processes an ACM request to the

combat plans airspace cell to determine potential conflicts. Once conflicts are

resolved, the kill box is built into the ACO and the ATO is published.

g. The JFLCC FC informs subordinate elements so that all field artillery, air

defense, and army aviation units are aware of the kill box.

h. Air defense assets identify the kill box as a weapons hold area (weapons

control status “Hold”).

i. The AC2 cell and TACS identifies the kill box for restricted operations that will

prevent aviation assets from entering the airspace.

j. A best practice is for the division/corps G-3 to create a phase line at some

distance from the kill box to alert the fires cell/G3 of any unanticipated arrival of

friendly troops, triggering the cancellation of the kill box before the planned end

time, if required.

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

JFLCC Nominated Purple Kill Box Inside the JFLCC’s AO

a. Anticipating an upcoming planned movement of the FSCL, the Corps G-2 and

FC have identified an area where suspected enemy forces will continue to

operate short of the FSCL and beyond the expected movement of friendly forces

for the next 24 hours. The Corps commander’s guidance to the fires brigade

commander is to continue to attack these enemy forces with airpower and with

long range artillery fires. The Corps FSCOORD, fires brigade commander and

ALO/ASOC recommend the establishment of a purple kill box over the identified

area after determining the lateral limits of the kill box and identify an altitude floor

which will permit maximum use of artillery fires with fixed wing assets. The

altitude floor will also allow for most effective employment of Corps UAS

operating below the floor. Establishment of the purple kill box will allow air

assets to attack enemy formations throughout the area without further

coordination; allow Corps UAS to continue to monitor the area; and allow artillery

to engage detected high payoff targets. There are established NFAs around

numerous restricted and no-strike targets (religious and cultural sites) located

within the confines of the requested kill box. SOF and long range surveillance

unit teams in the area require several more NFAs be established. The FC

submits the kill box request to the JFLCC FC.

b. Kill Box Request.

Target Set/ASR #/TGT #: ____________________

Geographic Limits/Kill Box Location: Using GARS, the entire cell

134LV is identified as a kill box.

Effective Times:

Established at 180600ZAug08

Cancelled 190600ZAug08 or on-order

Kill Box Type: PURPLE

Recommended floor is 12,000 ft MSL.

Establishing Commander: JFLCC

Establishing Commander’s Targeting Guidance:

Priorities: Tanks, armored vehicles, and C2 nodes.

Effects: Destroy/neutralize when found.

Restrictions: Do not destroy bridges or road networks. No

scatterable munitions near population centers, bridges, roads,

or road intersections.

Remarks: Friendly forces are within the proposed kill box. NFAs have

been established around these forces along with numerous restricted

and no-strike targets.

c. The ARFOR FC conducts initial coordination with the BCD. The ARFOR

sends a kill box FSCM to the BCD GCCS-A and AFATDS and an ACM request

to the BCD TAIS. The FSCM is incorporated into the COP via COP

synchronization. The BCD TAIS sends the ACM request to TBMCS/WebAD.

Combat plans airspace C2 section incorporates the kill box ACM request into the

ABP for the appropriate ACO period. BCD coordinates with the MAAP team, to

assign appropriate air resources and build missions to accomplish the desired

4 August 2009 FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3.25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

effects in the ARFOR kill box. The ATO is published with missions directed to

the kill box and the ACO contains the kill box as an airspace measure.

d. JFLCC establishes the kill box. Planned kill boxes are requested and

approved within the standard air tasking cycle in B2C2WGs.

e. A purple blue kill box is established by the JFLCC FC in AFATDS for cell

134LV, with a floor of 12,000 ft MSL to the standard kill box height as identified in

the SPINS (e.g., 25,000 ft MSL). This restricts surface-to-surface indirect fires

from entering or passing through the upper portion (12,000 - 25,000 ft) of the kill

box. The established NFAs have priority over the kill box.

f. The JFLCC FC informs subordinate elements so that all field artillery, air

defense, and army aviation units are aware of the kill box.

g. Air defense assets identify the kill box as a weapons “Hold” area.

h. The AC2 cell identifies the kill box as a ROA that will prevent Army aviation

assets from entering the airspace.

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

JFSOCC Nominated Purple Kill Box Outside the JFLCC’s AO

a. At the beginning of major operations and campaigns, JFSOCC is assigned

the mission of securing and protecting gas and oil platforms (GOPLATs) off the

coast inside the JFMCC’s AO. There are hostile forces on the GOPLATs as well

as fast and shore attack craft known to be in the vicinity. To accomplish both of

these missions, the JFSOCC requests and receives JFC approval for a JSOA

surrounding these platforms. The mission analysis shows that securing the

GOPLATs can be accomplished within the JSOA with JFSOCC assets, but

additional resources are required to protect the platforms from attack craft

outside the JSOA. The JFE embedded in the JFSOCC JOC sends the following

kill box request to the JFMCC FFCC for a purple kill box between the shore and

the JSOA to facilitate NSFS and air support against approaching fast attack craft.

Anticipated max ordinate for available 5 inch NSFS is 1,500 ft MSL, so the

recommended floor for the purple kill box is 3,000 ft MSL.

b. Kill Box Request

Target Set/ASR #/TGT #: Enemy fast attack craft between the JSOA

and the shore.

Geographic Limits/Kill Box Location: Using the area reference

system, the entire cell 31K and quadrants NW and SW of 31L is

identified as a kill box.

Effective Times:

Established at 210600ZAug04

Cancelled 230600ZAug04 or on-order

Kill Box Type: PURPLE

Recommended floor 3,000 ft MSL.

Establishing Commander: JFSOCC

Establishing Commander’s Targeting Guidance:

Priorities: Fast attack boats, other hostile vessels.

Effects: Destroy/neutralize when found.

Restrictions: Per the JFMCC restriction, no mine laying

operations inside the kill box.

Remarks: Notify JACE if engagements of targets reach kill box

keypads closest to JSOA, and advise of any leakers.

c. The JSOCC JFE conducts coordination with the JFMCC JFE. For a planned

kill box, the NALE and SOLE plans element informs the MAAP team in the AOC.

The AOC then processes an ACM request to the combat plans airspace cell to

determine potential conflicts. Conflicts are identified and resolved, and the kill

box is built into the ACO and the ATO is published if the JFMCC approves the kill

box. For an immediate kill box, the NALE and SOLE operations element informs

the combat operations airspace cell who will identify and resolve conflicts. The

kill box is then built into the ACO and ATO change once the JFMCC approves

the kill box.

4 August 2009 FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3.25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

d. JFMCC approves the kill box:

(1) Planned kill boxes are requested and approved within the standard air

tasking cycle.

(2) Immediate kill boxes are requested and approved (best case) in the

tactical flag command center or (worst case) by the current operations watch.

e. A purple kill box is established by the JFMCC FFCC. The decision is relayed

to the NALE and input into TBMCS by the AOC airspace cell using Web AD.

f. The JFMCC propagates the kill box information using the CWC system to the

ADC, sea combat commander, strike warfare commander, and information

operations warfare commander. The information is further propagated using real

time voice communications (immediate) or through daily intentions messages

(planned).

g. JFMCC command and control assets (airborne, surface) are identified for the

kill box and are subordinate to the ADC.

h. The CWC identifies the kill box for restricted operations and requires all air

interdiction assets to check in with ADC via Red Crown, or in an amphibious

operation Green Crown, prior to entering the AO.

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

REFERENCES

Joint Publications

JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 02 May 2007.

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,

12 April 2001.

JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, 22 March 2007.

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 Sept 2006.

JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations, 10 August 2009.

JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, 13 November 2006.

JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, 08 July 2009.

JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 13 April 2007.

JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 26 Dec 2006.

Multi-Service

FM 3-60.1, MCRP 3-16D, NTTP 3-60.1, AFTTP3-2.3, Multi-Service Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Targeting Time-Sensitive Targets, 20 Apr 2004.

FM 1-02.1 (FM 3-54.10), MCRP 3-25B, NTTP 6-02.1, AFTTP3-2.5, Multi-Service

Brevity Codes, 30 Oct 2007.

FM 3-60.2, MCRP 3-23C, NTTP 3-03.4.3, AFTTP3-2.72, Multi-Service Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance,

26 Nov 2008.

Army

FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, 21 September 2004.

FM 3-0, Operations, 27 February 2008.

FM 3-90, Tactics, 4 July 2001.

Marine Corps

MCWP 3-16, Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Element

28 November 2001

MAWTS-1, Forward Air Controller (Airborne) [FAC(A)] Handbook, 1 January 2004

Navy

NWP 3-56 (Rev A), Composite Warfare Commander’s Manual, August 2001

Air Force

AFOTTP 2-3.2, Air and Space Operations Center, 13 December 2004

Other

USCENTCOM - USCENTAF, Kill Box Interdiction/Close Air Support CONOPS

(KI/CAS CONOPS), SECRET Rel GBR and AUS

USPACOM - ROK - US Combined Forces Command Publication 3-1,

Joint Fires - Korea

4 August 2009 FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3.25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

GLOSSARY

PART I - ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AC2

airspace command and control

ACA

airspace coordination area

ACS

airspace control system

ACM

airspace coordinating measure

ACO

airspace control order

ACP

airspace control plan

ADA

air defense artillery

ADC

air defense commander

AFATDS

Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System

AFI

Air Force instruction

AFTTP

Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures

ALO

air liaison officer

ALSA

Air Land Sea Application Center

ANGLICO

air and naval gunfire liaison company

area of operations

approx.

approximately

ARFOR

Army forces

ASOC

air support operations center

ASR

air support request

ATO

air tasking order

AWACS

Airborne Warning and Control System

B2C2WG

boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups

BCD

battlefield coordination detachment

BCL

battlefield coordination line

BKB

blue kill box

command and control

CAS

close air support

CDE

collateral damage estimate

commanding officer

CONOPS

concept of operations

COP

common operational picture

CWC

composite warfare commander

4 August 2009

FM 3-09.34, MCRP 3.25H, NTTP 3-09.2.1, AFTTP 3-2.59

D-F

DASC

direct air support center

DTG

date-time group

ESG

expeditionary strike group

FAC(A)

forward air controller (airborne)

fires cell

FFCC

force fires coordination center

FLOT

forward line of own troops

field manual

FROG

free rocket over ground

FSCL

fire support coordination line

FSCM

fire support coordination measure

FSCOORD

fire support coordinator

foot

G-3

Army or Marine Corps component operations staff officer (Army

division or higher staff, Marine Corps brigade or higher staff)

GARS

Global Area Reference System

GCCS-A

Global Command and Control System-Army

GOPLAT

gas and oil platform

H-I

headquarters

IAW

in accordance with

IDN

initial distribution number

IPOE

intelligence preparation of the operational environment

ISR

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JACE

joint air coordination element

JADOCS

Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System

JFACC

joint force air component commander

JAOC

joint air operations center

JFC

joint force commander

JFE

joint fires element

JFLCC

joint force land component commander

JFMCC

joint force maritime component commander

JFSOCC

joint force special operations component commander

JIPTL

joint integrated prioritized target list

JOA

joint operations area

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

JOC

joint operations center

joint publication

JSOA

joint special operations area

JSOTF

joint special operations task force

K-L

kill box

KBC

kill box coordinator

kilometer

LeMay Center

Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and

Education

LNO

liaison officer

MAAP

master air attack plan

MACCS

Marine air command and control system

MAGTF

Marine air-ground task force

MARFOR

Marine Corps forces

MARLO

Marine liaison officer

MCC

maritime component commander

MCCDC

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

MCRP

Marine Corps reference publication

MILSTRIP

military standard requisitioning and issue procedure

min

minute

MSL

mean sea level

MTTP

multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures

NALE

naval and amphibious liaison element

NASUP

Navy Supplement Publication

NFA

no-fire area

NSFS

naval surface fire support

NTTP

Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures

northwest

NWDC

Navy Warfare Development Command

NWP

Navy warfare publication

OFD

operational fires directorate

OPORD

operation order

4 August 2009 FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3.25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

PID

positive identification

PKB

purple kill box

RCT

regimental combat team

ROA

restricted operations area

ROE

rules of engagement

S-3

battalion or brigade operations staff officer (Army; Marine Corps

battalion or regiment)

SADL

situation awareness data link

SCAR

strike coordination and reconnaissance

SCARC

strike coordination and reconnaissance coordinator

southeast

SOCCE

special operations command and control element

SOF

special operations forces

SOLE

special operations liaison element

SPINS

special instructions

southwest

TACP

tactical air control party

TACS

tactical air control system

TAI

target area of interest

TAIS

tactical airspace integration system

TBMCS

theater battle management core system

TGT

target

TOS

time on station

TOT

time on target

TRADOC

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command

U-Z

UAS

unmanned aircraft system

United States

USAF

United States Air Force

USMC

United States Marine Corps

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

PART II - TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

air defense artillery - Weapons and equipment for actively combating air targets

from the ground. Also called ADA. (JP 1-02)

air liaison officer - The senior tactical air control party member attached to a

ground unit who functions as the primary advisor to the ground

commander on air power. An air liaison officer is usually an

aeronautically rated officer. Also called ALO. (JP 1-02)

airspace coordinating measures - Measures employed to facilitate the efficient

use of airspace to accomplish missions and simultaneously provide

safeguards for friendly forces. Also called ACMs. (JP 3-52)

airspace control order - An order implementing the airspace control plan that

provides the details of the approved requests for airspace coordinating

measures. It is published either as part of the air tasking order or as a

separate document. Also called ACO. (JP 1-02)

airspace coordination area - A three-dimensional block of airspace in a target

area, established by the appropriate ground commander, in which

friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from friendly surface fires. The

airspace coordination area may be formal or informal. Also called

ACA. (JP 1-02)

air support operations center - The principal air control agency of the theater air

control system responsible for the direction and control of air

operations directly supporting the ground combat element. It

processes and coordinates requests for immediate air support and

coordinates air missions requiring integration with other supporting

arms and ground forces. It normally collocates with the Army tactical

headquarters senior fire support coordination center within the ground

combat element. Also called ASOC. (JP 1-02)

air tasking order - A method used to task and disseminate to components,

subordinate units, and command and control agencies projected

sorties, capabilities and/or forces to targets and specific missions.

Normally provides specific instructions to include call signs, targets,

controlling agencies, etc., as well as general instructions. Also called

ATO. (JP 1-02)

amphibious objective area - A geographical area (delineated for command and

control purposes in the order initiating the amphibious operation) within

which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious

force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment

of the amphibious force's mission and must provide sufficient area for

conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations. Also called AOA.

(JP 1-02)

area air defense commander - Within a unified command, subordinate unified

command, or joint task force, the commander will assign overall

responsibility for air defense to a single commander. Normally, this will

be the component commander with the preponderance of air defense

capability and the command, control, and communications capability to

4 August 2009 FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3.25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

plan and execute integrated air defense operations. Representation

from the other components involved will be provided, as appropriate, to

the area air defense commander's headquarters. Also called AADC.

(JP 1-02)

area of operations - An operational area defined by the joint force commander for

land and maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically

encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander,

but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish

their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (JP 3-0)

battle damage assessment - The estimate of damage resulting from the

application of lethal or nonlethal military force. Battle damage

assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional

damage assessment, and target system assessment. Also called

BDA. (JP 3-0)

battlefield coordination detachment - An Army liaison that provides selected

operational functions between the Army forces and the air component

commander. Battlefield coordination detachment located in the air

operations center interface includes exchanging current intelligence

and operational data, support requirements, coordinating the

integration of Army forces requirements for airspace coordinating

measures, fire support coordination measures, and theater airlift. Also

called BCD. (JP 3-03)

battlefield coordination line - A fire support coordinating measure similar to a fire

support coordination line (FSCL), which facilitates the expeditious

attack of targets with surface indirect fires and aviation fires between

this measure and the FSCL. To facilitate air delivered fires and

deconflict air and surface fires, an airspace coordination area will

always overlie the area between the battlefield coordination line (BCL)

and the FSCL. BCL location is graphically portrayed on fire support

maps, charts, and overlays by a solid black line with the letters “BCL”

followed by the establishing headquarters in parentheses above the

line and effective date-time group below the line. Also called BCL.

(MCRP 5-12C)

boundary - A line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating

coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units,

formations, or areas. (JP 1-02)

close air support - Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile

targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require

detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of

those forces. Also called CAS. (JP 1-02)

command and control - The exercise of authority and direction by a properly

designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the

accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are

performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,

communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander

in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP

1-02)

coordinated fire line - A line beyond which conventional and indirect surface fire

support means may fire at any time within the boundaries of the

establishing headquarters without additional coordination. The

purpose of the coordinated fire line is to expedite the surface-to-

surface attack of targets beyond the coordinated fire line without

coordination with the ground commander in whose area the targets are

located. Also called CFL. (JP 3-09)

data - Representation of facts, concepts, or instructions in a formalized manner

suitable for communication, interpretation, or processing by humans or

by automatic means. Any representations, such as characters or

analog quantities to which meaning is or might be assigned. (JP 1-02)

date-time group - The date and time, expressed in digits and time zone suffix, at

which the message was prepared for transmission. (Expressed as six

digits followed by the time zone suffix; first pair of digits denotes the

date, second pair the hours, third pair the minutes, followed by a three-

letter month abbreviation and two-digit year abbreviation.) Also called

DTG. (JP 1-02)

direct air support center - The principal air control agency of the US Marine air

command and control system responsible for the direction and control

of air operations directly supporting the ground combat element. It

processes and coordinates requests for immediate air support and

coordinates air missions requiring integration with ground forces and

other supporting arms. It normally collocates with the senior fire

support coordination center within the ground combat element and is

subordinate to the tactical air command center. Also called DASC. (JP

1-02)

direct fire - (DOD) Gunfire delivered on a target, using the target itself as a point of

aim for either the gun or the director. (Note: the Army definition

includes missile and rocket fire.) See FM 3-20.21 (FM 7-20)

fire support coordination line - A fire support coordination measure that is

established and adjusted by appropriate land or amphibious force

commanders within their boundaries in consultation with superior,

subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. Fire support

coordination lines facilitate the expeditious attack of surface targets of

opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. A fire support

coordination line does not divide an area of operations by defining a

boundary between close and deep operations or a zone for close air

support. The fire support coordination line applies to all fires of air,

land, and sea-based weapon systems using any type of ammunition.

Forces attacking targets beyond a fire support coordination line must

inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary

reaction to avoid fratricide. Supporting elements attacking targets

beyond the fire support coordination line must ensure that the attack

will not produce adverse effects on, or to the rear of, the line. Short of

4 August 2009 FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3.25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

a fire support coordination line, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface

attack operations are controlled by the appropriate land or amphibious

force commander. The fire support coordination line should follow

well-defined terrain features. Coordination of attacks beyond the fire

support coordination line is especially critical to commanders of air,

land, and special operations forces. In exceptional circumstances, the

inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack of

targets beyond the fire support coordination line. However, failure to

do so may increase the risk of fratricide and could waste limited

resources. Also called FSCL. (JP 3-09)

fire support coordination measure - A measure employed by land or amphibious

commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and

simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. Also called

FSCM. (JP 3-0)

forward air controller (airborne) - A specifically trained and qualified aviation

officer who exercises control from the air of aircraft engaged in close

air support of ground troops. The forward air controller (airborne) is

normally an airborne extension of the tactical air control party. Also

called FAC(A). (JP 1-02)

forward line of own troops - A line that indicates the most forward positions of

friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time. The

forward line of own troops normally identifies the forward location of

covering and screening forces. The forward line of own troops may be

at, beyond, or short of the forward edge of the battle area. An enemy

forward line of own troops indicates the forward-most position of hostile

forces. Also called FLOT. (JP 1-02)

fragmentary order - An abbreviated form of an operation order issued as needed

after an operation order to change or modify that order or to execute a

branch or sequel to that order. Also called FRAGORD. (JP 5-0)

ground combat element - The core element of a Marine air-ground task force

(MAGTF) that is task-organized to conduct ground operations. It is

usually constructed around an infantry organization but can vary in size

from a small ground unit of any type, to one or more Marine divisions

that can be independently maneuvered under the direction of the

MAGTF commander. The ground combat element itself is not a formal

command. Also called GCE. (JP 1-02)

indirect fire - Fire delivered on a target that is not itself used as a point of aim for

the weapons or the director. (JP 1-02)

joint air operations center - A jointly staffed facility established for planning,

directing, and executing joint air operations in support of the joint force

commander's operation or campaign objectives. Also called JAOC.

(JP 1-02)

joint fires - Fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more

components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support

of a common objective. (JP 3-0)

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

joint force air component commander - The commander within a unified

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force

responsible to the establishing commander for making

recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached,

and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating

air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be

assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the

authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the

establishing commander. Also called JFACC. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander - A general term applied to a combatant commander,

subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to

exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational

control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

joint force land component commander - The commander within a unified

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force

responsible to the establishing commander for making

recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached,

and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and

coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational

missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component

commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions

and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called

JFLCC. (JP 1-02)

joint force maritime component commander - The commander within a unified

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force

responsible to the establishing commander for making

recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached,

and/or made available for tasking maritime forces and assets; planning

and coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such

operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime

component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish

missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also

called JFMCC. (JP 1-02)

joint force special operations component commander - The commander within

a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force

responsible to the establishing commander for making

recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached,

and/or made available for tasking special operations forces and assets;

planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such

operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special

operations component commander is given the authority necessary to

accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing

commander. Also called JFSOCC. (JP 1-02)

4 August 2009 FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3.25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

joint operations area - An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic

combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a

joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander)

conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Also

called JOA. (JP 3-0)

joint special operations area - An area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a

joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations

force to conduct special operations activities. It may be limited in size

to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive

enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare

operations. Also called JSOA. (JP 3-0)

joint special operations task force - A joint task force composed of special

operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a

specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of

a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations

task force may have conventional non-special operations units

assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also

called JSOTF. (JP 1-02)

kill box - A three-dimensional area used to facilitate the integration of joint fires.

(JP 3-09)

littoral - The littoral comprises two segments of battlespace: 1. Seaward: the area

from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support

operations ashore. 2. Landward: the area inland from the shore that

can be supported and defended directly from the sea. (JP 3-32)

Marine expeditionary brigade - A Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) that is

constructed around a reinforced infantry regiment, a composite Marine

aircraft group, and a combat logistic regiment. The Marine

expeditionary brigade (MEB), commanded by a general officer, is task-

organized to meet the requirements of a specific situation. It can

function as part of a joint task force, as the lead echelon of the Marine

expeditionary force (MEF), or alone. It varies in size and composition

and is larger than a Marine expeditionary unit but smaller than a MEF.

The MEB is capable of conducting missions across the full range of

military operations. In a joint or multinational environment, it may also

contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or attached to

the MAGTF. Also called MEB. (MCRP 5-12C)

Marine expeditionary force - The largest Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF)

and the Marine Corps principal warfighting organization, particularly for

larger crises or contingencies. It is task-organized around a

permanent command element and normally contains one or more

Marine divisions, Marine aircraft wings, and Marine logistic groups.

The Marine expeditionary force is capable of missions across the

range of military operations, including amphibious assault and

sustained operations ashore in any environment. It can operate from a

sea base, a land base, or both. In a joint or multinational environment,

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

it may also contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or

attached to the MAGTF. Also called MEF. (MCRP 5-12C)

master air attack plan - A plan that contains key information that forms the

foundation of the joint air tasking order. Sometimes referred to as the

air employment plan or joint air tasking order shell. Information that

may be found in the plan includes joint force commander guidance,

joint force air component commander guidance, support plans,

component requests, target update requests, availability of capabilities

and forces, target information from target lists, aircraft allocation, etc.

Also called MAAP. (JP 1-02)

mean sea level - The average height of the surface of the sea for all stages of the

tide; used as a reference for elevations. Also called MSL (JP 1-02)

naval surface fire support - Fire provided by Navy surface gun and missile

systems in support of a unit or units. Also called NSFS. (JP 1-02)

no-fire area - An area designated by the appropriate commander into which fires or

their effects are prohibited. Also called NFA. (JP 1-02)

operational area - An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for

geographic areas in which military operations are conducted.

Operational areas include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as

area of responsibility, theater of war, theater of operations, joint

operations area, amphibious objective area, joint special operations

area, and area of operations. (JP 1-02)

positive identification - Identification criteria established in the rules of

engagement that requires a potential target to be identified as a valid

target prior to engagement. Positive identification criteria may vary

from operation to operation because the joint force commander and

subordinate commanders will establish requirements for positive

identification prior to combat operations, in order to achieve the

required confidence of target identification for engagement. Also

called PID.

restricted operations area - Airspace of defined dimensions, designated by the

airspace control authority, in response to specific operational

situations/requirements within which the operation of one or more

airspace users is restricted. Also called ROA. (JP 3-52)

rules of engagement - Directives issued by competent military authority that

delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States

forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other

forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02)

special operations command and control element - A special operations

element that is the focal point for the synchronization of special

operations forces activities with conventional forces activities. It

performs command and control functions according to mission

requirements. It normally collocates with the command post of the

supported force. It can also receive special operations forces

operational, intelligence, and target acquisition reports directly from

deployed special operations elements and provide them to the

4 August 2009 FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3.25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

supported component headquarters. It remains under the operational

control of the joint force special operations component commander or

commander, joint special operations task force. Also called SOCCE.

(JP 3-05.1)

special operations forces - Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the

Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and

specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support

special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02)

special operations liaison element - A special operations liaison team provided by

the joint force special operations component commander to the joint

force air component commander (if designated), or appropriate Service

component air command and control organization, to coordinate,

deconflict, and integrate special operations air, surface, and

subsurface operations with conventional air operations. Also called

SOLE. (JP 1-02)

strike coordination and reconnaissance - A mission flown for the purpose of

detecting targets and coordinating or performing attack or

reconnaissance on those targets. Strike coordination and

reconnaissance missions are flown in a specific geographic area and

are an element of the command and control interface to coordinate

multiple flights, detect and attack targets, neutralize enemy air

defenses and provide battle damage assessment. Also called SCAR.

(JP 3-0)

supported commander - 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all

aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or

other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint

operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares

operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a support

command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from

another commander's force or capabilities, and who is responsible for

ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance

required.

(JP 1-02)

supporting commander - 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or

other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting

plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense

agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command

relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or

sustains another commander's force, and who is responsible for

providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (JP 1-

02)

synchronization - 1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and

purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive

place and time. 2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence

sources and methods in concert with the operation plan to ensure

FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3-25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

intelligence requirements are answered in time to influence the

decisions they support. (JP 2-0)

tactical air control party - A subordinate operational component of a tactical air

control system designed to provide air liaison to land forces and for the

control of aircraft. Also called TACP.

(JP 1-02)

target area of interest - The geographical area where high-value targets can be

acquired and engaged by friendly forces. Not all target areas of

interest will form part of the friendly course of action; only target areas

of interest associated with high priority targets are of interest to the

staff. These are identified during staff planning and wargaming.

Target areas of interest differ from engagement areas in degree.

Engagement areas plan for the use of all available weapons; target

areas of interest might be engaged by a single weapon. Also called

TAI. (JP 1-02)

terminal attack control - The authority to control the maneuver of and grant

weapons release clearance to attacking aircraft. (JP 1-02)

time on target - 1. Time at which aircraft are scheduled to attack/photograph the

target.

2. The actual time at which aircraft attack/photograph the

target.

3. The time at which a nuclear detonation as planned at a

specified desired ground zero. Also called TOT. (JP 1-02)

4 August 2009 FM 3-09.34 / MCRP 3.25H / NTTP 3-09.2.1 / AFTTP 3-2.59

FM 3-09.34

MCRP 3-25H

NTTP 3-09.2.1

AFTTP 3-2.59

4 August 2009

By Order of the Secretary of the Army

GEORGE W. CASEY JR.

Official:

General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

JOYCE E. MORROW

Administrative Assistant to

the Secretary of the Army

0922501

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Not to be

distributed; electronic media only.

By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force

STEPHEN J. MILLER

Major General, USAF

Commander

Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education

ACCESSIBILITY:

Publications and forms are available on the e-Publishing

website at www.e-publishing.af.mil for downloading or

ordering.

RELEASABILITY:

Distribution authorized to DOD and DOD contractors only to

protect technical or operational information from automatic

dissemination under the International Exchange Program or

by other means. This protection applies to publications

required solely for official use and to those containing

valuable technical or operational information. This

determination was made on 11 Jul 2008.

Supersedes AFTTP(I) 3-2.59, 13 June 2005.

AOMSW

MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS,

TECHNIQUES, AND

PROCEDURES FOR

AIR OPERATIONS IN MARITIME

SURFACE WARFARE

NTTP 3-20.8

AFTTP(I) 3-2.74

November 2008

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to DOD and

DOD contractors only to protect technical or operational information

from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange

Program or by other means. This protection applies to publications

required solely for official use and to those containing valuable

technical or operational information. This determination was made on

22 Feb 2008. Other requests will be referred to:

NWDC, ATTN: N5, Newport, RI 02841-1207;

and LeMay Center, ATTN: DDJ, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6112.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that must prevent

disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

PREFACE

1. Purpose

This multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publication

consolidates the Services’ best tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for

missions involving air assets conducting maritime surface warfare (SUW). The

objective is to enable seamless integration of air assets in the conduct of maritime

SUW. This MTTP publication lays the foundation for integrating forces in either

preplanned or dynamic scenarios and strives to simplify ―plug and play‖

interoperability.

2. Scope

The overarching objective of this publication is to describe TTP that facilitate the

integration of joint forces supporting current operation plans (OPLANs) and concept

plans (CONPLANs). Emphasis is placed on checklists, check-in formats, aircraft

capabilities, and weaponeering guidance to engage maritime surface vessels. When

applied, the MTTP in this publication will improve the joint force maritime component

commander’s (JFMCC’s) ability to rapidly establish superiority within the maritime

operational environment. This publication also addresses smaller scale operations

including protecting surface vessels in transit or conducting operations.

3. Applicability

This mission specific publication is applicable to United States Navy (USN) and

United States Air Force (USAF) assets. Even though the target users are theater air

maritime planners and squadron level aircrew, the manual applies to personnel at all

echelons. Planners should use the MTTP publication to support comprehensive

CONOPS development and crisis-action plans; support the development of small and

large-scale exercises; and serve as a quick reference guide to assist decision making

in time-sensitive scenarios. Shipboard watchstanders and tactical aircrews will find

this MTTP publication to be a straight forward guide to training and execution.

4. Implementation Plan

Participating Service command offices of primary responsibility will review this

publication, validate the information, and, where appropriate, reference and

incorporate it in Service manuals, regulations, and curricula as follows:

Navy. The Navy will incorporate these procedures in US Navy training and

doctrine publications as directed by the Commander, Navy Warfare Development

Command (NWDC)[N5]. Distribution is in accordance with Military Standard

Requisition and Issue Procedure Desk Guide (MILSTRIP Desk Guide) Navy

Supplement Publication-409 (NAVSUP P-409).

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Air Force. The Air Force will incorporate the procedures in this publication in

accordance with applicable governing directives. Distribution is in accordance with

Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-360.

5. User Information

a. NWDC, the Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education

(LeMay Center), and the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center developed this

publication with the joint participation of the approving Service commands. ALSA will

review and update this publication as necessary.

b. This publication reflects current joint and Service doctrine, command and control

(C2) organizations, facilities, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures. Changes in

Service protocol, appropriately reflected in joint and Service publications, will likewise

be incorporated in revisions to this document.

c. We encourage recommended changes for improving this publication. Key your

comments to the specific page and paragraph and provide a rationale for each

recommendation. Send comments and recommendations directly to—

Navy

Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command

ATTN: N5

686 Cushing Road

Newport RI 02841-1207

DSN 948-1070/4201 COMM (401) 841-1070/4201

E-mail: alsapubs@nwdc.navy.mil

Air Force

Commander, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education

ATTN: DDJ

155 North Twining Street

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6112

DSN 493-2640/2256 COMM (334) 953-2640/2256

E-mail: lemayctr.ddj.workflow@maxwell.af.mil

ALSA

Director, ALSA Center

114 Andrews Street

Langley AFB VA 23665-2785

DSN 575-0902 COMM (757) 225-0902

E-mail: alsa.director@langley.af.mil

NTTP 3-20.8 / AFTTP(I) 3-2.74

17 November 2008

NTTP 3-20.8

AFTTP(I) 3-2.74

NTTP 3-20.8

Navy Warfare Development Command

Newport, Rhode Island

AFTTP(I) 3-2.74

Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine

Development and Education

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

17 November 2008

AOMSW

MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR

AIR OPERATIONS IN MARITIME SURFACE WARFARE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY……………………………………………………………………...vii

Chapter I OVERVIEW

1. Introduction

2. Missions

3. Surface Warfare Considerations

Chapter II MARITIME CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Overview

2. Tactical Airspace Control

3. Composite Warfare Commander

Chapter III PLANNING

1. Overview

2. Planning Resources

3. Mission Planning Considerations

4. Maritime Weaponeering Considerations

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to DOD and DOD contractors only to protect technical or operational

information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This protection

applies to publications required solely for official use and to those containing valuable technical or operational information. This

determination was made on 22 Feb 2008. Other requests will be referred to:

NWDC, ATTN: N5, Newport, RI 02841-1207;

and LeMay Center, ATTN: DDJ, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6112.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

17 November 2008

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iii

Chapter IV EXECUTION

1. Overview

2. Surface Surveillance Coordination

3. Maritime Air Support

4. Air Interdiction of Maritime Targets

Appendix A: BRIEFING FORMATS

1. Check-in Brief

2. Surface Contact Report

3. MAS 9-Line

4. Checkout Briefing Format

5. Surface Picture Report

Appendix B: US SURFACE VESSEL IDENTIFICATION

1. US Surface Vessel Identification

2. Aircraft Carriers

3. Cruisers

4. Destroyers

5. Frigates

6. Amphibious Assault Ships

7. Amphibious Transport Docks

8. Dock Landing Ship

9. Coastal Patrol Ships

10. Mine Countermeasures Ships

11. Auxiliary Ships

Appendix C: MERCHANT SURFACE VESSEL CLASSIFICATION GUIDE

REFERENCES

GLOSSARY

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. CSG Airspace

Figure 2. ESG Airspace

Figure 3. Composite Warfare Commander Call Signs

Figure 4. CSG/ESG Operational Area

Figure 5. 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

Figure 6. US Naval Surface Combatant Defensive Zones

Figure 7. Bar Scan Search Technique

Figure 8. Expanding Square Search Technique

Figure 9. Sector Search Technique

Figure 10. Full Rig Technique

Figure 11. Quick Rig Technique

Figure 12. Keyhole Technique

Figure 13. Lane Structure Example

Figure 14. GARS Enabled Kill Box

Figure 15. Surface Picture Report (front side)

Figure 16. Surface Picture Report (back side)

Figure 17. Merchant Vessel Groups

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Mission Descriptions

Table 2. Weather Planning Rules of Thumb

Table 3. SLEDGEHAMMER Threat Intentions

Table 4. Escalation of Force

Table 5. MAS Asset Check-in Example

Table 6. Abbreviated MAS 9-Line

Table 7. Mission Report Example

Table 8. Check-in Brief (aircraft transmits to controller)

Table 9. Surface Contact Report

Table 10. MAS Briefing Form (9 Line)

Table 11. Checkout Briefing (INFLTREP)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

AOMSW

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air

Operations in Maritime Surface Warfare

This publication consolidates the Services’ best TTP in air operations against

maritime targets into a single MTTP publication. The manual is written under the

assumption that the joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) is the

supported commander providing the majority of AOMSW mission support. The

objective is to describe effective response options specific to the maritime domain

with the appropriate aircraft and sensors/weapons available. These TTP are the

foundation for integrating forces in either preplanned or dynamic scenarios with an

emphasis on multi-Service interoperability. The mission specific TTP in this

publication are applicable to United States Navy (USN) and United States Air Force

(USAF) assets. The target users for this document are theater air maritime planners

and tactical level aircrew. Planners should use the MTTP publication to support

comprehensive CONOPS development/crisis-action plans; support the development

of small and large-scale exercises; and serve as a quick reference guide to assist

decision makers in time-sensitive scenarios. Tactical aircrews will find this MTTP

publication to be a straight forward guide for training and execution.

Chapter I Overview

Chapter I describes basic maritime C2 and provides an overview of AOMSW

missions to include surface warfare considerations.

Chapter II Maritime Control Responsibilities

Chapter II discusses strategic and operational C2 in a maritime environment.

Consideration is given to differences between air and sea C2 responsibilities/

capabilities.

Chapter III Planning

Chapter III outlines mission planning and weaponeering considerations for both

planners and aircrew in the maritime environment.

Chapter IV Execution

Chapter IV defines SSC, MAS, and AIMT missions in support of AOMSW. The

chapter also describes TTP for tactical execution of AOMSW missions.

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vii

PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS

The following commands and agencies participated in the revision of this publication:

Joint

US Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA

US Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, HI

US Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, FL

Joint Command and Control Net-Enabled Weapons, JC2NEW, Eglin AFB, FL

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Integrated Contingency Model JT&E,

NS Norfolk, VA

Joint Center of Excellence Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Creech AFB, NV

North American Aerospace Defense Command, Peterson, AFB, CO

Army

US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Army Capabilities Integration Center,

Fort Monroe, VA

Navy

Navy Warfare Development Command, Norfolk, VA

Helicopter Maritime Strike Wing Pacific, San Diego, CA

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, West Bethesda, Maryland

Naval Strike Air Warfare Center, Naval Air Station Fallon, NV

Tactical Training Group Atlantic, Fleet Combat Training Center, Dam Neck, VA

Tactical Air Control Group 1, San Diego, CA

Tactical Air Control Squadron 21, NAB Little Creek, Norfolk, VA

Surface Warfare Development Group, NAB Little Creek, Norfolk, VA

Air Force

Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, Maxwell Air Force

Base, AL

Air Combat Command/A-3, Langley AFB, VA

Air Combat Command/A8CA, Langley Air Force Base, VA

Air Combat Command/A3TW, Langley Air Force Base, VA

961st Airborne Air Control Squadron, Kadena AFB, Japan

19th Special Operations Squadron, Hurlburt Field, FL

USAF/A5XK, Checkmate, Pentagon, Washington, DC

77th Weapons Squadron, USAF Weapons School, Dyess AFB, TX

340th Weapons Squadron, USAF Weapons School, Barksdale AFB, LA

1st Operation Support Squadron, Langley AFB, VA

Coast Guard

Coast Guard CG-37RCA, Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, DC

viii

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Chapter I

OVERVIEW

1. Introduction

This publication provides multi-Service TTP for the seamless integration of air assets

during the conduct of maritime surface warfare. The maritime domain is defined as

the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above

these, including the littorals. AOMSW is intended to support the joint force

commander’s (JFC’s) objectives by providing capabilities/forces in support of joint

maritime operations. The end state of this publication is a streamlined support

process for maritime surface warfare within the joint force maritime component

commander’s (JFMCC’s) area of operations (AO).

2. Missions

The JFC normally designates a JFMCC to command and control joint maritime

operations. As a functional component commander, the JFMCC has authority over

assigned and attached forces as well as forces/assets made available for tasking to

perform operational missions. When the JFC designates a JFMCC AO, the JFMCC

is the supported commander within the AO. As the supported commander, the

JFMCC has the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing of fires

within his AO. This MTTP publication provides a foundation to enable effective joint

and coalition air participation in planning and executing three specific missions:

surface surveillance coordination (SSC), air interdiction of maritime targets (AIMT),

and maritime air support (MAS). See table 1. MAS operations, unlike close air

support (CAS), may cover large areas of open water. As the JFC’s maritime

warfighter, the JFMCC integrates coalition and Service assets into these missions.

Table 1. Mission Descriptions

SSC in maritime SUW provides reconnaissance and surveillance

Surface

in support of the maritime commander’s objectives. The SSC

Surveillance

mission plays a critical role in establishing/maintaining the

Coordination

common operational picture (COP).

MAS is air action against hostile surface targets at sea that

Maritime Air

require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and

Support

movement of maritime forces.

AIMT in maritime SUW differs from MAS in that detailed tactical

Air Interdiction of

integration with surface forces is not required. This mission

Maritime Targets

shares many common similarities with traditional air interdiction

and strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR) missions.

3. Surface Warfare Considerations

a. When the find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA) steps of the joint

targeting process are applied to the maritime domain operations are complicated by

factors such as adverse weather; mobility; threats; intelligence, surveillance, and

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reconnaissance (ISR) capability; and weapons’ capability. To overcome limitations

involved in completing the targeting process on maritime surface targets, this MTTP

publication identifies tactical C2 factors, planning considerations, and execution

processes in order to augment traditional naval roles such as:

(1) Protecting sea lines of communication

(2) Denying the enemy commercial and military use of the seas

(3) Establishing maritime power projection

(4) Protecting naval logistic support to forward deployed battle forces

b. While there are many similarities between air operations over land and sea,

important differences exist:

(1) Lack of visual/terrain references at sea. The lack of visual references

adversely affects not only the ability to navigate but also the ability to quickly orient

an aircrew to the tactical picture for safety and targeting. The lack of terrain

eliminates the capability of low altitude aviation assets to employ terrain masking for

threat avoidance. Therefore, these assets will often be within range of a surface

ship’s weapon systems when attack criteria are achieved.

(2) Target identification (ID). Similarities in ship design, appearance, and

density of surface traffic require aircrew threat training tailored to the maritime

environment.

(3) Naval vessel mobility. Surface vessel mobility negates the effectiveness of

coordinate seeking weapons. A vessel’s mobility coupled with poor weather

conditions can increase difficulties in performing visual identification and complicate

targeting.

(4) Friendlies/Neutrals/Noncombatants. The vast majority of maritime vessels

are commercial shipping representing every major nation in the world. Their

presence in the midst of an emerging tactical picture has fratricide and collateral

damage implications.

(5) Maritime rules of engagement (ROE). The maritime environment

encompasses historical laws of the sea which impact ROE (e.g., territorial waters

versus high seas).

(6) Maritime airspace control. Nearly every combatant has a powerful radar

sensor/weapons system; as a result, maritime airspace control tends to be more

positive vice procedural. This emphasis on positive control involves more controlling

agencies within the maritime domain. (e.g., REDCROWN [RC], GREENCROWN

[GC], STRIKE control)

(7) Tactical C2. While the maritime environment contains common tactical C2

such as a forward air controller (airborne) (FAC[A]) and a strike coordination and

reconnaissance coordinator (SCARC), it also employs tactical C2 unique to the

maritime environment such as a maritime air controller (MAC) and an aircraft control

unit (ACU).

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(8) Composite warfare commander (CWC) nomenclature. Maritime forces are

scalable in size and capabilities; therefore, a unique naming convention has evolved

to accommodate this scalability within the CWC command structure. See chapter II

for additional details.

(9) Naval flight operations. The very nature of naval flight operations is that they

are mobile; the large deck aircraft carriers and smaller combatant vessels possess

aviation detachments. The location of high-density flight operations is ever

changing, requiring constant coordination for safe deconfliction.

(10) Sub-surface operations. Deconfliction of surface warfare and subsurface

operations will be coordinated at the CWC level. Aircrew should immediately report

the location of all submarines, when spotted, to the CWC.

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Chapter II

MARITIME CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Overview

This chapter discusses the tactical C2 structure and airspace deconfliction

considerations for naval surface forces. The information is useful to guide joint air

assets conducting SUW because control responsibilities differ from SSC and MAS.

In addition, AIMT operations are not executed in close tactical coordination with

naval surface forces.

2. Tactical Airspace Control

a. Command and Control. Maritime tactical air C2 is normally conducted by air and

surface units under the broad category of aircraft control units (ACUs). ACUs must

efficiently utilize assets to maximize search volume and maintain deconfliction for

controlled assets. In most cases, SSC assets will be controlled by a designated

ACU. Typical ACUs include airborne platforms and surface vessels.

b. REDCROWN/GREENCROWN

(1) Air assets approaching carrier strike groups (CSGs) or expeditionary strike

groups (ESG) must establish contact with the initial controlling agency responsible

for detection and identification as soon as they are within radio range. REDCROWN

(RC) supports the maritime air defense commander (ADC) and is responsible for

detection and identification of aircraft approaching a CSG’s airspace and delousing

friendly aircraft from enemy aircraft. GREENCROWN (GC) is responsible for

detection and identification for ESGs. Contact with RC/GC must be established as

soon as practicable and in accordance with the applicable theater operating

procedures.

(2) When checking in with RC/GC, the following information is required at a

minimum if not already coordinated by C2 aircraft for individual fighter/bomber

flights:

(a) Aircraft call sign (number and type of aircraft).

(b) Mission number.

established geographic references (GEOREFs), or latitude/longitude in accordance

with special instructions (SPINS).

(3) RC/GC will verify SUW aircraft for operable identification, friend or foe (IFF)

Mode 2/4. Assuming IFF Mode 2/4 is valid, SUW aircraft should expect to receive

―SWEET SWEET‖ from RC/GC which allows them to proceed on their missions. If

Mode 2/4 is not coming up as valid with RC/GC they will report ―SOUR‖ for either

Mode 2, 4, or both. Unless specifically addressed in the SPINS, SUW aircraft

without valid IFF Mode 2/4 will not normally be allowed to continue the mission.

c. Airborne Command and Control (E-2, E-3, P-3C littoral surveillance radar system

[LSRS]).

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(1) Whenever possible, C2 aircraft (E-2, E-3, or in some cases E-8) should be

used to streamline communication for aircraft joining and exiting the area.

(2) Airborne C2 can be designated as the regional ADC or sector air defense

commander and may fulfill the roles of RC/GC.

d. Airspace Deconfliction

(1) Surface Action Group (SAG). A SAG can consist of one or more naval

surface vessels with rotary wing aircraft or unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) that

usually operate at low altitude. Airspace control and deconfliction will occur using

the ship’s call sign on a prebriefed frequency. In the absence of a prebriefed

frequency, the ship should expect to be queried on the international emergency

frequency (Guard). Aircraft should maintain a 5 nautical mile (nm) standoff from

Navy SAGs unless cleared otherwise.

(2) Carrier Strike Group

(a) A CSG consists of one aircraft carrier (CVN) supported by other naval

surface vessels with significant fixed wing and limited rotary wing aircraft. Because

of the large volume of traffic within close proximity to the CVN, caution must be

exercised when approaching CSG airspace. CSG airspace control is provided by

strike control, marshal control, and tower control which extends out to 50 nm. See

figure 1.

Figure 1. CSG Airspace

(b) Strike Control. "STRIKE" controls aircraft within 50 nm of a CSG or

ESG. If transiting within 50 nm of a CSG or ESG, aircraft will check in with STRIKE

using the same format as with REDCROWN. The STRIKE controller has the ability

to provide radar control but primary duties are for administrative accounting and IFF

verification of aircraft in CSG or ESG airspace.

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17 November 2008

an approach control. MARSHAL establishes holding and airspace deconfliction

during recovery at night and in poor weather conditions. AOMSW aircraft may have

to contact MARSHAL control for deconfliction within an approach area.

(d) Tower Control. "TOWER" controls airspace within a 10 nm radius of the

CVN from the surface to unlimited. TOWER can be contacted on the land/launch

frequency. No aircraft should approach closer than 10 nm without positive control

from TOWER.

(3) Expeditionary Strike Group

(a) An ESG consists of air-capable amphibious ships supported by other

naval surface combatants. Like a CSG, an ESG conducts both rotary wing and fixed

wing aircraft operations. ESG airspace control extends out to 50 nm and is provided

by the tactical air command center (TACC), amphibious air traffic control center, and

tower control. See figure 2.

Figure 2. ESG Airspace

(b) TACC. ―ICEPACK‖ controls aircraft within 50 nm of the amphibious

assault ships (LHD/LHA). If transiting less than 50 nm from the ESG, aircraft check

in with ICEPACK using the same format as GREENCROWN.

within 10 nm from the LHD/LHA and is responsible for providing instrument

meteorological conditions (IMC) approach and departure services. No aircraft

should approach closer than 10 nm without positive control from CENTER while the

LHD/LHA is conducting flight operations.

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(d) Tower Control. ―TOWER‖ controls airspace within 5 nm of the

LHD/LHA. TOWER can be contacted on the land/launch frequency. No aircraft

should approach closer than 5 nm without positive control from TOWER.

3. Composite Warfare Commander

a. The CSG and ESG utilize the composite warfare commander (CWC) construct.

The officer in tactical command (OTC) is normally the CWC. However, the CWC

construct allows an OTC to delegate tactical command to the CWC. The CWC

wages combat operations to counter threats to the force and to maintain tactical sea

control with assets assigned, while the OTC retains close control of power projection

and strategic sea control operations. Subordinate to the OTC and CWC are

principal warfare commanders responsible for specific warfare areas as depicted in

figure 3. These warfare commanders are responsible for collecting and

disseminating information and, in certain situations, are delegated authority to

respond to threats with assigned assets.

b. Six principal warfare commanders (PWCs), subordinate to the CWC, are

designated by their warfare area. Aircraft may be assigned to more than one PWC

based on priorities. Delineation of PWC supported/supporting relationships and

assignment of responsibilities will be outlined by operation task (OPTASK) message.

c. The CWC and the PWCs are assigned an individual two letter callsign. The first

letter of the callsign identifies the particular strike group while the second letter

identifies the corresponding mission area. For example, the callsign of the Air

Defense Commander (ADC) for the Enterprise strike group could be EW (Echo

Whiskey). Figure 3 lists the various PWCs. Depending on the situation, one PWC

can serve as both the Sea Combat Commander (SCC) and the Surface Warfare

Commander (SUWC). NWP 3-56, Composite Warfare Commander’s Manual,

provides further information concerning the CWC concept.

Figure 3. Composite Warfare Commander Call Signs

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Chapter III

PLANNING

1. Overview

This chapter provides resources for mission planning and maritime weaponeering.

The general planning and employment considerations previously developed for air-

to-ground missions serve as the baseline for maritime mission planning. NWP 3-20

series (Surface Warfare), NTTP 3-03.4, Naval Strike and Air Warfare, and AFTTP 3-

1.1, General Planning and Employment Considerations, also provide checklists for

mission planning.

2. Planning Resources

a. Air Tasking Order (ATO)

b. Airspace Control Order (ACO)

c. Special Instructions (SPINS)

d. Collaboration-at-Sea website. The majority of resources needed to operate with

Naval assets can be found on the collaboration-at-sea website. If tasked to contact

a Navy asset (e.g., CSG, ESG, SAG), access the general collaboration-at-sea portal

on SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet): http://205.0.132.75/ The

following information is displayed on the unit specific collaboration-at-sea website:

(1) Operational Tasking Messages.

(a) Operation Task (OPTASK) Communications. This document defines

the satellite communications channels and radio (secure and clear) frequencies the

CSG utilizes.

(b) OPTASK Link. This document provides all the parameters for link

utilization including net assignments, track limitations, and crypto.

symbology for track assignments.

(d) OPTASK Air Defense and/or ADC Daily Intentions Message (DIM). This

message outlines naval vessels designated as firing units, ACUs, and additional

fleet air defense responsibilities.

(e) OPTASK SUW/Sea Combat Commander (SCC) and/or the SCC DIM.

This message will contain the priority contact set:

Contacts of Interest (COI). COI have tactical significance but may

not be a threat to the force. As an example, a COI may be defined

as a naval combatant operating in a particular area or it may be an

unknown surface contact operating in a designated area. Their

presence has no real impact on mission completion.

Critical Contacts of Interest (CCOI). CCOI present a threat to the

force and their locations must be identified for successful completion

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of the mission. A CCOI could be a potential adversary suspected of

either terrorist or smuggling activity.

Vessel of Interest (VOI). The term VOI is usually assigned to

specific vessels whose interest is derived from intelligence sources.

(f)

Area of operations with defined vital areas and criteria needed for

classification and identification.

Vital Area (VA). VA is defined by the expected weapons release

range of the threat and is centered on the high value unit. It is

possible to have more than one VA.

Classification, Identification, and Engagement Area (CIEA). CIEA is

the area outside the VA but inside the surveillance area (SA) in

which all contacts detected must be classified, identified, and

monitored. The ability to escort, cover, or engage must be

maintained. Any potential threat must be monitored prior to entering

the VA.

Surveillance Area. The area determined by the CSG commander

where organic and inorganic sensors keep track of activity to prevent

surprise contacts from entering the CIEA.

(g) Commander’s guidance and intentions for prosecuting contacts (e.g.,

engagement authority, positive identification [PID] requirements). See figure 4 for a

typical CSG/ESG operational area.

Figure 4. CSG/ESG Operational Area

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17 November 2008

(h) Pre-Planned Response (PPR) documents. PPRs are the guiding

documents for strike groups to follow for response to a myriad of situations. Often

the PPR will drive the DIMs and it can provide guidance for assets working with

strike groups.

(2) Carrier Air Wing (CVW) Air Plan/Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) Air Plan.

An air plan is a graphical representation of flight operations which lists call signs,

tactical frequencies, launch/recovery times, flight composition, and fuel/ordnance

loads. Air Plans contain Navy direct support sorties which are not normally listed on

the ATO as well as ATO-derived common use sorties.

(3) Card of the Day (frequency/call signs). The card of the day or the card of the

week will have SPINS and maritime-specific daily code words, base numbers, as

well as the call signs and TACAN channels of friendly Navy units.

(4) Point of Contact (POC) Email and Phone Numbers.

(5) Carrier Intelligence Center. This is the intelligence hub of the CSG. Points

of contact can be found on the specific ships’ collaboration-at-sea site.

3. Mission Planning Considerations

a. National Airspace and Maritime Domain

(1) National Airspace. National airspace extends to 12 nm off the coast of the

respective country, including any island or group of islands. Consent to fly into

national airspace requires a diplomatic clearance. Diplomatic clearances can

require full disclosure of aircraft contents and the purpose of the proposed overflight.

While ships enjoy rights of innocent passage, there are no automatic rights of entry

for aircraft.

(2) International Airspace. Aircraft normally have freedom to conduct all types of

military operations subject to the requirements of ―due regard‖ as defined by

Department of Defense Instruction 4540.01. There are no legal requirements for a

nation’s airspace controlling agency to provide safety of flight. The US does not

recognize a specific altitude at which airspace ends and outer space begins. Every

country has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory

and their domestic laws apply to activities in its territorial airspace. Any activities

conducted in the airspace of another country require the approval of that country.

For example, conducting ISR in the national airspace above another country without

permission would likely be viewed as an infringement on that country’s sovereign

rights and a violation of its territorial integrity. Although several coastal nations have

asserted claims intended to prohibit warships and military aircraft from operating in

security zones extending beyond their territorial sea (12 nm from their coast), these

claims have no basis in international law and are not recognized by the United

States. International law does not recognize the right of any nation to restrict the

navigation of foreign warships or flight of military aircraft beyond its territorial sea.

(3) International Straits. Military aircraft are afforded the right of transit passage

through international straits. While in the strait exercising this right, aircraft must

proceed without delay and refrain from any threat or use of force against nations

bordering the strait. Military aircraft will operate with ―due regard‖ for safety of

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NTTP 3-20.8 / AFTTP(I) 3-2.74

navigation and will monitor the appropriate international distress radio frequency

(i.e., Guard). Consult NWP 1-14M, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of

Naval Operations, July 2007, for further information.

(4) Law of the Sea Convention. Figure 5 depicts the divisions of the oceans and

airspace per the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Figure 5. 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

(5) NWP 1-14M, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,

July 2007. This publication sets out those fundamental principles of international

and domestic law that govern US naval operations at sea. This includes the leg

divisions of oceans and airspace (national and international waters, straits, etc.),

navigation and national over flight of military aircraft, the general Law of Armed

Conflict, and Principles of Lawful Targeting (to include lawful and unlawful

combatants). A copy of this publication can be found on the NWDC Doctrine

Discussion Group website at:

https://dom.nwdc.navy.mil/DDG/DDG.nsf?OpenDatabase

(6) Maritime Claims Reference Manual. This manual contains a framework for

understanding international/territorial claims as well as US recognized limits of

sovereignty. A copy of the Maritime Claims Reference Manual is posted at:

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/20051m.htm

b. Maritime Airspace and Procedures. When operating in the maritime

environment, it is important to understand the different types of airspace control

measures and procedures.

c. Timely and Accurate Intelligence.

NTTP 3-20.8 / AFTTP(I) 3-2.74

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Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1) - page 17